Constitution (Removal of Oath) Bill, 1932 (From the Seanad).
Contributions 107–228 of 228. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 2 of 1932 ›
If they do not enter into it, then where are we at all? I thought we had obligations—that Britain had rights through an international document which we proposed to break?
Comment on this
The first day I spoke here I said that I was opposed to it because I thought and believed it was the betrayal by an Irish leader of his pledge given to the Irish people.
Comment on this
I wish that Deputy Dillon would have shown wherein it is a breach of the Treaty, because the only place wherein, even if I were breaking the Treaty by the removal of the Oath—and Deputy Dillon apparently is prepared to do away with the Oath whether or not it is a breaking of the Treaty—
Comment on this
I doubt very much, if Deputy Dillon read over his previous statements, if he does not come to the conclusion that as regards the Oath, whether it was a breach or not, he would agree to it.
Comment on this
No, Sir. I said that I accepted the view that it was not a breach. But if it were a breach of the Treaty then you must tear up the Treaty and set up a Republic.
Comment on this
Deputy Dillon is prepared to take our views with regard to the Oath and not with regard to Section 2?
Comment on this
I would have been better pleased with Deputy Dillon's speeches if I could have seen more consistency and if he had shown us wherein Section 2 could possibly be a breach of the Treaty. His argument was not that of Deputy Fitzgerald. I cannot see how Deputy Dillon can argue for one moment that Section 2 is a breach of the Treaty. The section, as far as we are concerned, I repeat once more, is brought in for the simple reason that we did not want to have this question brought up to be decided in a domestic Court. Consequently, if there was a doubt—and there was a possibility of that happening—we are anxious as far as we can to prevent that possibility. We are doing it frankly, and we think we have a right to do it, in the interests of our people. The second purpose for which it is introduced is to put the Treaty in the place that treaties between nations usually occupy. I admit that that might be a matter for another Act. I agree that it might mean that, but when it is going to serve the other purpose, which is germane and necessary from our point of view for complete safety, then I think it is justifiable that, instead of having two Acts, it should be incorporated in one Act. That is why it is here. If there was no question of the possibility of our domestic Courts being asked to try this matter—and I have already shown that I do not think it is a proper way —then, I agree that this could have been put more appropriately, from Deputy Dillon's point of view, in another Act.
Comment on this
Because I do not believe in half doing things. Do it right when you are about it at all. And we are doing it right. I do not propose to speak any more in this debate. I have said, on the general heads, what I want to say. I had hoped that this would have passed without these Second Reading speeches, because I do not think they are going to lead anywhere. It was necessary, however, to state once more where we stood.
Comment on this
I want to ask two questions. First, if the President has taken the opinion of the Attorney-General or any other lawyers that a domestic decision in our favour —that is, in our Courts—would have no international validity. Is he aware that international law is founded upon the decisions of Courts and that, for instance, Lord Stowel's decision in favour of the British Government is cited as an example?
Comment on this
I can answer that by saying that I did not think it necessary to ask anybody because it so much stands to common sense that a domestic court, which would be held to be a biassed court if it gave a judgment in our favour, would be regarded as prejudiced by the opposite party.
Comment on this
Will the President say if the Free State Treaty is a binding document in this State and what document gives it validity?
Comment on this
It is binding because the Treaty was accepted—accepted as being ratified anyhow—by those who set up the State.
Comment on this
My own view is that the ratification of the Treaty, in so far as it was ratified at all, from any Irish point of view, is open to question— that there might be a very big question involved in that if we take it as coming from Dáil Eireann, the Parliament of the Republic. As a matter of fact, with my own hand I stroked out the motion "That Dáil Eireann hereby ratifies." It was going to be proposed by Arthur Griffith. With my own hand I struck out the word "ratifies," which he had put down, and put the word "approves," and he accepted that. The reason he agreed was that it would not have been competent for a Parliament that regarded itself as sovereign and independent to ratify any such instrument. So, as far as ratification is concerned, looking from a purely sovereign point of view at the sovereignty of the old Dáil as the Parliament of the Republic, ratification can very well be questioned. From the Free State point of view it was held by the recent Executive Council that ratification was provided in the instrument itself. It was indicated quite clearly in the instrument, and when legislation was mentioned in it, it was deliberately ambiguous, because the British did not want to admit that we had here a sovereign Parliament that was capable of a sovereign act, such as the ratification of an international instrument, and, because they wanted to maintain their position, they put in the word "legislation" by which they could claim their own Act of Parliament. But it provided for a form of ratification in its own terms and it was that Act fulfilled the conditions which were mentioned in the instrument itself. That was the ratification. If you want to go back, and to go behind the foundation of the State, the Judges in my opinion do not have to go behind the foundation of the State. As far as they were concerned a certain thing was begotten in a certain way. A certain stage was reached. There was the foundation then of a new State, and naturally the Judges in any court dealing with law would trace the origin of the creation of the new State. I do not see anything wonderfully complex in this decision at all. They simply did not go beyond the creation of the State, and regarded themselves as Judges functioning on legislation which dated back its origin to a certain date. Of course, to those who did not want to go back, who are ashamed to go back, there is no question involved; none whatever. It is quite plain, simple sailing. It is not so simple to people who keep all the facts in mind from the very beginning. All our difficulties in Ireland to-day are begotten from that fact that there were from the very beginning, ambiguities of one kind or another deliberately created. Unfortunately, we are not at the end of them yet. I sincerely wish we were. We are trying, as far as we can, and as quickly as we can, to get out into the position in which we will really have a solid foundation for our position. To the legal question, therefore, as to where it gets its authority—the Irish view—which I take it is Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's position, my answer would be that the Treaty was ratified, and that there is no suggestion of undoing the ratification. The ratification provided for in the Act was effective. It stands. Whatever power was given by that ratification still stands. We are not denouncing the Treaty. We are dealing with the domestic application of certain parts of the Treaty which by development have become obsolete. That is the position. If you go from the other angle that the British might have pursued, then the arguments of the Attorney-General are there.
Comment on this
I asked the President a question which he could have answered in one sentence, yes or no. He is after speaking for twenty minutes and has left me where I was. I asked him if the Treaty has the force of law in this country, if he would name the instrument which gives it the force of law.
Comment on this
It is a very old dodge to be asked to answer a question by yes or no. The answer has to be given in a detailed presentation of all the circumstances.
Comment on this
If the President wants to go on for another twenty minutes I do not want to interfere.
Comment on this
The Treaty has the force of law as an international instrument because it was ratified.
Comment on this
The Act provided in the instrument which says that it must be presented for ratification—I think ratification is the word used—to the Members of Parliament elected to sit in Southern Ireland.
Comment on this
The President stated that members of the Opposition were ashamed to go back. We are not ashamed to go back. We will go back to the time when we accepted the invitation of Mr. Lloyd George to see where Ireland would fit in in the Commonwealth. All our troubles started from the acceptance of that invitation. We are not ashamed to go back.
Comment on this
Will the President, who has been most courteous in agreeing to answer questions, allow me to ask one more? Leaving the Treaty out of the question altogether, as I have consistently done, and assuming for argument's sake that we are not breaking the Treaty in removing the Oath, I want to ask this question: Now that it has been made absolutely apparent as everyone would have expected that the British regard the removal of the Oath as a hostile act; and that, moreover, it has become apparent that the Commonwealth as a whole regards it as something inconsistent with the obligations of partnership——
Comment on this
I will leave out anything disputable. Let me put it this way: Now that it is apparent that the British regard the removal of the Oath as a hostile act and that we have done something inconsistent with the fundamental principle of consulting our partners about a matter relating to the basis of the Commonwealth as a whole, why not as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb? Why not let us get finished with this question? The only reason the President gave was that he has no mandate. For heaven's sake, let us consult the people and get the matter cleared up.
Comment on this
Question put: That amendment No. 2 be not agreed to.
Do you agree with this result?
I move: That the Dáil disagree with the Seanad in the following amendment:—
This Act shall not come into force until an agreement has been entered into between the Government of the Irish Free State and the British Government providing that Article 4 of the Treaty of 1921 shall cease to have effect and such agreement has been ratified and approved by Resolution of Dáil Eireann.
Comment on this
We find ourselves again in the peculiar position that on an amendment, which comes from the Seanad, providing that this Act shall not come into force until an agreement has been entered into between our Government and the British Government that Article 4 of the Treaty shall cease to have effect and such agreement has been ratified and approved by Resolution of Dáil Eireann, we are simply told by the President that he does not propose to accept it. No statement is made as to the reasons. I return again to the legal position in which we find ourselves. The Seanad has proposed to delay the coming into operation of this particular measure until there is agreement that Article 4 will cease to have effect. The President says he will not accept that and he said that, in the circumstances which he has recently described. He has been challenged by a variety of people as to why it is necessary to remove the Treaty from the Constitution of this country. The only answer I could extract from the storm of words in which the President indulged was that he was taking no chance. There was apparently some residuum of doubt in his mind about leaving the Treaty in the Constitution. He had doubt in those circumstances as to whether the obligation imposed to take the Oath was removed, and he was not taking any chances. That is to say, if the Treaty must be put in jeopardy to ensure that the Oath is to go, then, in that conflict, the thing that is to go by the board is the Treaty. That is the gist of the last argument. He will take no chance. He said, later on, that it was to remove any possibility of doubt. He admitted it would be much better done in a second Act. His sole justification is to remove the possibility of doubt.
Again I say that statement does imply, on the positive side, that there is a doubt in the President's mind as to whether or not the removal of Article 17 from the Constitution would have any effect if the Treaty is still left in existence, and is still left as approved in the Constitution given to this country. Never in the course of his long harangue did he come to the other point. What about the Act upon which the Attorney-General relies as being law in this country? The Act passed by the British Parliament in March, 1922, is, according to his legal adviser, gripped by Article 73 of our Constitution and is law. And if it is law and if there is no doubt about the Oath being imposed by the Treaty then there is doubt about the removal of the Oath as long as that Act, gripped by Article 73 and in force in this State, is not repealed.
The Seanad amendment asks that there should be delay until there is agreement that Article 4 is of no effect, but the President says "No" to the Seanad's appeal. The Attorney-General believes there is not a lawyer on the British side who holds that the removal of the Oath is either illegal or inconsistent with our present status, and that no British lawyer will argue it is anti-Treaty. In these circumstances the President will not accept the Seanad's proposal and wait until there is agreement with Britain that Article 4 of the Treaty has ceased to have effect. The President has told us in regard to the whole issue there is a fundamental difference of opinion between the people of this country and the British as to what the Articles of Agreement amount to. There is no doubt upon one point. The present Opposition has never wavered in their view, that there was a Treaty in 1921, that it was implemented later, and that there is a Treaty still in force between the two countries, and whatever quibble the President may indulge in, for purposes of argument, and whatever twists and turns he takes between the points of his argument, there never was any such distinction made here. It was always accepted and argued by us that it was a Treaty, and on every occasion on which that point was ever raised or could be raised here, or in London, or in Geneva, there was never any failure to raise the issue. In many cases we had it established that it was a Treaty. We got it agreed by professors of law and jurists writing in journals upon law that it was a Treaty, and we finally got British statesmen in their turn to say that, whatever doubts there may have been upon it at one time, there is no doubt about it now, and all these statements were made prior to the emergence of the present squabble. I stress that lest the President might argue that the contention had lately been changed to bring new strength to the British in the present squabble.
The President, in all this matter about the Treaty, says that he pursued both lines of argument, though the Attorney-General only pursued one. The Attorney-General pursued only one although he shouted aloud that no reputable lawyer would be so silly as to say that there were not two views. By implication, therefore, he says there is another line of thought, that people can argue another view, and by implication comes round to the President's point that there are two views. While saying there are two views, and that there can be arguments on both sides, why does the President propose to take that irrevocable step which is founded upon only one point of view?
The Seanad asks that there should be agreement. The President believes with the Attorney-General that no British lawyer would controvert our possession of sufficient power to enable us to get rid of the Oath. He believes that there is an argument of substance, an overwhelming argument based on the analogy he makes with Canada. The Seanad asks that there should be pause until there is agreement on the Treaty issue and until the coercive power to this argument based on the Canadian analogy is shown to be as good as the President thinks it is, and until we see if the Canadian analogy satisfies the people who, his Attorney-General says, have no legal arguments to put up against this country in what it is doing in this measure. Let the President test out, after pausing on this, with the British Government, or with the Canadian Government, or with any of the other Governments of the Commonwealth, whether or not they regard this country as being in every detail in the same position as Canada. I would not hold that we are. I doubt if there is anybody who will hold that there is absolute similarity as between any of the members of the Commonwealth. Two of the States of the Commonwealth stand out in a peculiar position by themselves, ourselves and South Africa, with Treaty obligations. The rest have not Treaty obligations, but they have imposed obligations, obligations not accepted in the way ours were, but obligations imposed by constituent Acts of the British Parliament. The President makes play with the phrase, which he always tears from its context "The States of the Commonwealth are in no way subordinate, one to another, in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs," and he stops short there, although there is only a comma in the declaration, which continues "though united by common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Why does the President always stop there at the comma? Has the President ever quoted that phrase "though united by common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations" in any of the speeches he has made on this?
Comment on this
There was always the stop. I often sat here with this document in my hands, and the President has not, to my knowledge, gone beyond that point "in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs."
Comment on this
"Although united by common allegiance to the Crown." That is the phrase that must be brought, as a matter of fact, into the context of this argument, and another item must also be brought into the context, that we have a Treaty. If there is a status Article in the Treaty and if there are other Articles which do not depend on status, it is going to require considerable argument to prove that a status Article can so enlarge as to get rid of a specific limitation, signed to and agreed upon, and that particular thing will not be got over by merely throwing in the phrase "in no way subordinate, one to another, in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." Anyway, if that argument has weight, that because there is a statement that members of the Commonwealth are "in no way subordinate, one to another, in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs," let us have that argument made and let us see if that argument is going to win through as easily as the President and his optimistic Attorney-General think, and let us have the pause the Seanad requires to see if this matter can be settled by agreement. Because the agreement ought to be easy if what the Attorney-General says is true, that there is no British lawyer who will contest the validity of what is being done here, and if what the President says is true, that words quoted from the 1926 Conference are an unequivocal expression of opinion that any such thing as an Oath, in the circumstances of this State, is an anomaly. If all these things are so easy, let us get the coercive power of these great arguments brought to bear on the other parties to the agreement. Let us have them paraded before the other partners in the Commonwealth, and let us have some report back as to whether or not they agree with the easy optimism of the President and the Attorney-General, who have no doubt about the answer to these things.
The President, in the end of his harangue, said that he is acting on the conviction that we can do what is being attempted in this Bill. What is that?—that we can remove the Oath. The President is "acting on the conviction." Has his Attorney-General that same conviction? This is what he said, previously: "On the question as to whether the Oath is obligatory, I admit there are two views." Now, that was in answer to his own preamble that I wanted him to say whether, "I believe the Oath obligatory or not." That is the quotation, and the Attorney-General's answer to the question: Did he believe the Oath was obligatory or not, was "I admit there are two views. Any lawyer would be silly on a difficult question, which has been discussed over several years, to lay down positively that his own interpretation of certain things is absolutely the correct one." Has the Attorney-General the conviction which the President says he has, that he can do this? Where is the conviction? Which one of the two views does he adopt? Was he the legal adviser on whose legal advice the President has assumed conviction that what he is doing is correct? Is it the Attorney-General, upon whom the President leans for his assurance in this matter, or is it the Attorney-General who advised that, when the removal of the obligation imposed by law was being attempted, for that purpose an amendment of the Constituent Act was necessary, and was necessary in this particular, that you had to take out the Treaty from the Constitution? We have never yet got the answer to the point: Why are these two things being brought together? Why are they being joined by the phrase "for that purpose," excepting the argument, which the President has lately used, that he is putting the second part in because he is taking no chances with this?
I want to relate that again to the simple item of this whole Bill—we want to remove the obligation imposed by law. There is a Treaty there. It may be—some people have doubts—that the Treaty does impose an obligation to take an Oath, but, in order that we will take no chances, we are going to wipe out the Treaty, and we are going to do that and say that we are not breaking the Treaty; and while we are doing that, we say that no British lawyer has been found to say that we are breaking the Treaty, and, while we are doing that, the Attorney-General of this State, who, presumably, was called in to advise on this matter, says that there are two opinions about whether the Oath is obligatory or not. But the President is taking no chances. He is taking no chance with the removal of the Oath. He is taking every chance with a breach of the Treaty, and when the two things have to be put in contrast, he is going to have the Oath removed, and it is a matter of indifference to him whether the Treaty is broken or not. He is going to argue, while the Oath is being removed, that it is not a breach of the Treaty. His Attorney-General has only one point of view on this matter, while he can pursue two lines of argument, but the Attorney-General, to whom he points, has pursued two lines of argument and he shouts loudly that there are two points of view about this, as there are upon any matter almost. If that does not mean a recognition of the other point of view, and if it does not imply some doubt as to whether the other point of view is right or not, I do not know what words mean. The whole argument is summed up in the President's statement, which I have quoted three times, that he is taking no chances in this matter. As I said, he is taking no chances with the one item but the Treaty can be let go.
The last comment the President made on all this was that this is a simple operation of trying if the door is open. He said that we have been told that we have, in the Treaty, an open door to freedom, and he proposes to try it whether the door is open. The method he proposes for trying whether the door is open is the old-fashioned one of slamming his head up against it, and he does that, although, if I may relate the phrase again to the metaphor he used, the Attorney-General has warned him that there are two views about whether the door is open or not in this particular matter. The President is not going to accept the Seanad's suggestion that there should be a pause, and that we should wait and, keeping the Attorney-General in the background, try somebody who has one view on the matter and see whether that person can get the force of argument brought to bear on the other parties to the agreement, and get it agreed that Article 4 of the Treaty has ceased to have effect. In these circumstances we could have what the President says he wants and have the Treaty honourably kept. Even at this late stage, even when the Bill has been put through this House and the Seanad with this amendment, the President refuses to accept the suggestion that there should be some delay now and that some pleasant approach should be made to see if agreement can be secured in the matter. The matter is decided for him. He is taking no chances. Another Deputy has said in this House already to-day that he may come to realise quite soon that his action has been unfortunate, that his attitude has been provocative, and, worst of all, it has been shown by the speeches in this House that, while this unfortunate action and this provocative attitude have been taken up, he has not a solid opinion behind him that what he is doing is right legally. Having gone a certain distance in a hurry and mistakenly, it is a matter of prestige now about drawing back, even although it is not drawing back to any point other than saying, "Let us see what will happen to the negotiations." That is what the Seanad has asked and what, even at this late point, we think the Dáil should accept, it having been revealed how weak, how unreliable, how vacillating in all points, is the opinion behind the President upon which he is acting in this thorough-going fashion.
Comment on this
Before the debate ends I should like to ask one question which seems to be of practical importance, and that is: whether the President has now any reason for believing that the passage of this Bill will do anything to promote decent order in this country and to consolidate the foundations of the State? In other words, is there any reason for thinking that any section of the community will become reconciled to our present Constitution, will present themselves, perhaps, for election to the Oireachtas as a consequence of the removal of the Oath, or is there an objection, a more fundamental one, an objection to our being in the Commonwealth at all?
Comment on this
I propose to vote for the amendment. Perhaps I should say this: The President has been unable to take my point, which I have raised on more than one occasion during the debates on this Bill. However, I remain convinced, and I have always felt, that so long as there was an agreed tribunal between the two parties to this agreement upon which this State is founded, if we were satisfied that something we proposed to do by way of legislation was not a breach of the Treaty, we were entitled to proceed and the onus probandi that it was a breach of the Treaty lay upon the other party. If we had agreed upon a tribunal, one with the other, to which the other party would go, and if they could satisfy that tribunal that what we had done, or purported to do, was a breach of the Treaty, then by virtue of our agreement our proceeding was null and void and had not been done at all. Therefore, it would be immediately incumbent on the President to go back to the country and say, “I did all I could do with the authority you placed at my disposal to carry your will into effect. It has been decided in the light of the agreement that exists that it was physically impossible for me to do what you wanted me to do. If you still want this to be done, then you must give me wider powers to go further than I asked leave to go in the first instance.” The procedure of the President in insisting on Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill has done away with that position and, to my mind, created a position in which the President says, “If within the Treaty we can remove the Oath we shall do it on our mandate, but if it involves breaking the Treaty, then we will suffer no risk of that being declared at the agreed court and outside our mandate. We will abolish the Oath; we will abolish it, in any case.”
The President has advanced the case that were we to get a decision in our own courts, the other party would say, "That court is prejudiced in your favour." Were it to be against us, then our case was greatly jeopardised. I do not care what the other party says. The other party are as much bound by obligation as we are bound and they have agreed to a court to which this matter should be referred. The President has repeatedly stated that the Constitution was drawn in agreement with Great Britain and that Great Britain consented to all its implications. It has been laid down again and again that if there was a difference the way to invalidate a piece of legislation which was alleged to be a breach of the Treaty was to cite it as such before our Supreme Court, and if, on their declaration, it was a breach of the Treaty, that piece of legislation was null and void. If the other party did not choose to accept that, then it was for them to prove their justification in not accepting it, and I think they would have a difficult task. Therefore, I am convinced that had the President taken the course that I had hoped he would take, we were in an invulnerable position and, honestly believing that this was not a breach of the Treaty, we would pass the legislation. If, on reference to the appropriate tribunal, it was proved to be such a breach, then the legislation was as if it were never passed and it was open to the President to go back to the country. He has destroyed that position, if this Bill passes into law in its present form. Therefore, I say that if it be the President's intention to withdraw that safeguard to the existing position, then, unless we are prepared to destroy the entire Treaty position and to revert to the status quo ante of 1921, I see no remedy at our disposal but to meet the other party, discuss the proposal and on their assenting to it proceed upon it. Had the President left the existing safeguards, I do not believe such a course was necessary at all, and I believe the ordinary process of legislation was adequate and honourable. With Sections 2 and 3 attached, I cannot see the President's point of view. I fully appreciate that he believes he is acting according to the highest standards of national honour. I must only ask him to believe that I am acting on the same dictates. Influenced as I am by these considerations, I am not prepared to vote for the Bill with Sections 2 and 3 in it. Now that these sections have been carried by the Dáil, I feel bound to vote for the amendment in order that, even as the Bill at present stands, it will not come into operation without the consent of the other party to the Treaty, or the complete repudiation of the Treaty and reversion by this country to the status quo ante of 1921.
Comment on this
I cannot think that the Deputies who have spoken are so very innocent as they pretend to be. What is in this but an invitation not to agree? Is it not quite clear if the British do not want this all they have to do is to refuse to agree? Then there would be an end to this matter. I wonder what Deputy McGilligan and those with him would have said if a proposal of that sort were put up about the Privy Council or about their interpretation of the Treaty? How did they claim they got their interpretation of the Treaty accepted? They believed they were right; they maintained their position, even though that position was assailed by those who did not want them to take it up. They held to their position.
Comment on this
There were places other than the Conference where they took up that position; they took up that position in Geneva and elsewhere. They got whatever acceptance of their position they have got by maintaining, asserting and believing that they were right. Our position is the same. We believe we are right in this. We know that this amendment is a wrecking amendment, introduced simply to postpone the thing for ever — until Tibb's Eve. Agreement, when one of the parties knows that all it has to do is to refuse to agree and then it will have it as it wants it! Deputy McGilligan and others appear to be very innocent when sitting on the Opposition Benches.
Comment on this
Perhaps the President will answer the question I put as to whether the passage of this Bill was expected to bring any other section into the Oireachtas?
Comment on this
I can give no guarantee on that of any kind. All I can say is that once there is no obligation on any citizen to forswear any principles he has about the rights of this country or the form of Government he wants in this country, once he can come in and all that is asked of him is to come into an Assembly of other representatives of the people without any further commitment except to obey majority rule, then I think the cause for opposition so completely disappears that I cannot understand reasonable people not taking the course. I know there is a section of the community opposed to this. I am opposed to it myself. I came in here: I submitted to whatever had to be done and I did that simply because there was no other road, no other course, by which I could do what I considered to be my duty. It was a humiliating course in the last analysis. The only alternative was force. I did not want to use force, neither do the men who are outside and who are not accepting this. They do not want to use force. What is necessary is to indicate to them that there is a plain, open road by which their aspirations can be achieved and that there is nothing which would appear to close that road, such as the making of provisions which are inconsistent with their views.
I am opening the road and removing the barriers. I believe when the road is opened it will be travelled along. I believe that when you have that peaceful road open towards the attainment of those people's ultimate aspirations, it will be taken. There may be a few who will refuse to take it, but any solid reason for doing so would disappear. I believe that by the opening of that road we will have made an advance towards peace and constructive effort here that will not be achieved by any other method. You are presented with the opportunity of getting unified direction for the nation here or, at least, for this part of the country, by removing this, which is a barrier to certain people. Those people refuse to accept what we were forced to accept as the lesser of two evils, as they then appeared to us and as they still appear to me.
I regarded it at that time, and I have not ceased to regard it, as the lesser of two evils, the other evil being that, being outlawed, we would naturally resort to the outlaw's methods. Once there is no idea of outlawry, once every citizen is free to hold what ever opinions he likes, once this becomes openly a democratic Assembly in the full sense, representative in the widest sense, I believe common sense suggests that the difficulties we have at the present time will disappear. I am, I agree, banking on that common sense. I have no assurance. I am not looking for any assurance, but I think the opening of that road promises such advantages to the nation that it is worth our while to clear away the barrier.
Comment on this
Am I wrong in thinking that there were a great many speeches to the contrary made by leaders of a certain section of the people?
Comment on this
That may be. So far as I am concerned, I am convinced that this is a wise course to take. It is only when I am proved wrong that I will admit that this is not the proper course to take. I think it is the course that national dignity demands and that anyone working for national peace should take. With regard to Deputy McGilligan's point, he said that I omitted words relating to being united by a common allegiance to the Crown. I said it was untrue that I omitted them. The question of allegiance is not involved here. The allegiance of the State to the Crown is not involved here, good, bad or indifferent. What is involved is whether there shall be an obligation imposed on members to take the Oath. The removal of that obligation does not end the allegiance at all. It does not end the question of King George being King here in so far as he is made King by the Treaty. What is being removed here is simply this test which has all the objections to it which tests of every kind have. The attempt at confusion by suggesting that this is ending allegiance and that this is cutting ourselves away from the Commonwealth is all beside the point. A day may come when it may be necessary to consider other matters.
In answer to Deputy MacDermot, I may say that I am prepared to take the challenge. Let the British on their side take the challenge and we can have it out. Let the British declare unequivocally that they will not regard a decision by the Irish people to go outside the Empire as an act of hostility and will not follow a decision of that sort up by a hostile action against the Irish people. I am prepared to take the challenge. If they do not make that unequivocal statement I am not going to ask the Irish people to decide in the other form in which they may have to decide. Notwithstanding the threats, notwithstanding the action they may decide, but the decision then will be taken under quite different circumstances from the decision which it is pretended we are now in a position to take.
The moment the ambiguity of that matter is cleared up, I for one would be only too happy to have the matter decided once for all in order to know where we stand.
Comment on this
May I ask this question? The President is invariably kind and courteous. I want to ask him whether he would regard as hostile action the mere withdrawal of trade privileges that go with membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations?
Comment on this
No, I would not. I have never pretended that I wanted to have it both ways as they say. Not for one moment. As far as we are concerned if our people decide to become an independent Republic, then they are not entitled to any privileges that might go with association in the British Commonwealth of Nations. They are entitled simply to what they can get by mutual trade advantages, and if you ask me they are not getting any more at the moment.
Comment on this
I think the President is entirely wrong in describing this amendment as a wrecking amendment. It is true that there have been some differences of opinion between the Government and the British Government in regard to the interpretation of the Treaty and that we have held to our position, that we have made progress and that we have succeeded in almost every case in having our view accepted. We held to our position in Conference and we made progress by negotiations and conferences and we got our views accepted in that way. There is no reason at all for thinking that the position is changed now. In fact I think that the President himself must believe, if he will think over it for a minute that, just as in the past, it will be possible now to get agreements made with the British by negotiations, to get new views accepted, to get a Treaty in certain respects if necessary re-interpreted so as to bring the two countries to common accord. If the President accepted this amendment and if he acted on it and if he did what he ought to do where there is a question of difference of agreement about the Treaty, make the attempt to get into accord with the other Party, then I believe that the object he has in view would be much better served than by the course he is taking. It would be much better served not merely in a political or constitutional sense but it would happen that no damage of any sort would be suffered by the people of this country. To accept the amendment would not necessarily mean that it would be postponed to Tibb's Eve and it would not happen as experience shows that the other people would not listen to reason.
We can testify to this that ever since the Treaty the British have been eminently willing to listen to reason; that sometimes progress has been slow, but there has been no such thing as being up against a stone wall. The Government that was in power did not proceed by legislation when there was no agreement. The President mentioned the Privy Council question. We had two views about the Privy Council question, but we delayed until there would be complete agreement, and we were, I believe, on the point of getting complete agreement. Meantime we took certain interim steps that saved the situation for the time being.
With regard to the other matter with which the President dealt, I do not believe that in the matter of dealing about the Oath and the provoking of an unnecessary quarrel with the British and allowing things to go on interrupted outside, he is taking the line that is going to give any prospects of peace in the country. He has admitted himself that the most prominent leaders, or the people whom we judge to be the most prominent leaders, those whom he is trying to conciliate, have on many occasions, and from their organ in the press, indicated that they attach no importance to the Oath and I think that if the President hopes for big results from the line he is taking he is away back before 1917. A new propaganda and a new doctrine have grown up in all the world since 1917 and the people who are attached to that doctrine and who are engaged in that propaganda do not pay any attention to the minor old-fashioned things that the President is so much concerned with. I will be greatly surprised and very happily surprised if it turns out that the line the President is taking has any conciliatory effect in certain quarters here. I am too much afraid that what it will do will be to encourage them and I believe it will bring the country difficulties. It will bring greater difficulties rather than diminish difficulties.
The President talks about the British making a declaration outside. The President talks about settling things once and for all. Nothing of a political or constitutional character can be settled once and for all. There is always the fact that new generations will grow up, circumstances will change and any decision that may be taken by one generation may be reversed by the next. It is true that the fruits of the decision cannot be got rid of; that many of the fruits will remain, but the question cannot be closed and settled for all time. It is liable to be opened up again. The thing for the people to do is to make their decisions for the time being and from time to time in the varying circumstances of the time. It is a childish thing to say that we will decide an issue for all time, for circumstances are always changing. It is for us to decide things as best we can and to make the decision in the best way we can.
Every individual is coerced in every decision he has to make. He is coerced by the want of means of getting a living and by every factor that impinges upon him. No condition exists in which a decision can be made in vacuo. It is idle to expect otherwise. If the Deputy would be willing in some circumstances to say that he would stand for remaining in the British Commonwealth of Nations then he ought to say it, subject to conditions, and he ought not to take up the equivocal line he is taking up. He should aim to do one thing. The Deputy's policy has been in the past to divide our people where they might have easily been united; his policy has been to make one side decide for one thing and another side for another line of action. I think the Deputy has done much harm by that line of action in the past and he is continuing to do it.
Comment on this
Deputy McGilligan has again trotted out his usual arguments. I do not know whether he really appreciates the meaning of what he said. My words were directed to the interpretation of the Treaty. Taking the Treaty document as it was in 1921 there was a doubt about taking the words, the literal words in the agreement itself whether they were or were not obligatory. But now things have so changed that we can remove this Oath. That is a matter on which I have no doubt whatever. I think if the Deputy likes to study the despatches he would see our position is absolutely clear. In paragraph 5 of the despatches the position is set out:
The Government of the Irish Free State must maintain that this is a matter of purely domestic concern. The elimination of the Oath, and the removal of the Articles of the Constitution necessary for that purpose, is a measure required for the peace, order and good government of the State. The competence of the legislature of the Irish Free State to pass such a measure is not open to question and has been expressly recognised by the British legislature itself. It is the intention of my Government, therefore, to introduce immediately on the re-assembly of Parliament a Bill for the removal of Article 17 of the Constitution, and for such consequential changes as may be required to make the removal effective.
Quite clearly the statement is put there that the right to do so was recognised by the British legislature. And it is very pertinent to observe that neither in the succeeding despatches nor in the succeeding statements made by the British Government also has that statement been controverted. But Mr. Thomas has gone back and adopted the arguments presented to the British by the gentlemen on the opposite side waving the Treaty in our faces. I challenged Deputy McGilligan in the last discussion here and I challenged Deputy Fitzgerald that when they went to the Imperial Conference and asked first at one and again at a later Conference to get agreement, that it was competent for the legislature here to deal with the removal of the Privy Council — I challenged them that they were told at that time that they could not do it because they would be breaking the Treaty. I challenge them that they were told at that time that they could not do it because that would be a breach of the Treaty and I challenge them if the attitude they took up was not the same attitude we are taking up now, that whatever the position was in 1921, things had so changed that their right to do so was unquestioned at that date. I further challenge them that Deputy Blythe has stated, and it has been implicit in what Deputy Dillon has said, that this question of conference agreement has been something that has been thrown overboard. I fail to understand why they have the hardihood to state, if the 1930 Conference Report emerged from the Conference without any agreement on this question of the Privy Council or the right to remove it, notwithstanding that it was expressly stated here, that they proposed to remove the appeal to the Privy Council. Now they suggest that they were not going to do it in the bold way that we propose to do it. Am I not correct in stating that notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Thomas, the same Mr. Thomas with whom we are dealing, took up the attitude that that is a breach of the Treaty, Deputy Fitzgerald, Deputy McGilligan and the Government proposed to get on with the proposal to remove the appeal to the Privy Council? I also want to know how Deputy McGilligan stands for the method which he says was the ordinary backdoor method, of taking away the appeal to the Privy Council? I challenge him again if that is so and I challenge him if the British representative at the Imperial Conference ever gave assent to that method of removing the appeal.
Comment on this
I challenge Deputy McGilligan whether the representatives of the British Government ever gave sanction to that method or any method of removing the appeal.
Comment on this
I would be quite content if the Deputy could give us the passage. When we see where it is contained we will be satisfied.
Comment on this
That the British have three times assented to the removal of the appeal to the Privy Council.
Comment on this
The British have three times declared that a certain method of dealing with the Privy Council was constitutional.
Comment on this
Am I right in stating that Mr. Thomas said that the removal of the appeal to the Privy Council was unconstitutional?
Comment on this
That one method of doing it was, but another was not. I would like the Attorney-General to think over it for a little while to get out of the difficulty, because I like challenges.
Comment on this
When I make the challenge implicit in my challenge, is the assertion that Mr. Thomas declined to accept your view and Deputy Fitzgerald's view as to whether the Privy Council was implicit in Article 2 or not?
Comment on this
Imperial Conferences, like ordinary meetings, are articulate through their minutes.
Comment on this
The Attorney-General talks about the back-door methods which we had of removing the Privy Council. I took him to mean certain actions that we took in regard to particular judgments and decisions of the Privy Council. I understood he was referring to our action in the Lynham versus Butler case and the other case. When he asked us if the British Government approved of that, if he means by approved that they liked what we did, certainly they did not, but they admitted that we were perfectly right constitutionally and our action was not challenged by them.
Comment on this
Suppose we bring in a Bill for the removal of appeal to the Privy Council are we going to get the support of the Opposition?
Comment on this
If you bring in one of my Bills certainly, but not if you bring in the other, because we rejected that as being a breach of the Treaty.
Comment on this
There is no doubt that agreement had been reached with the British Government about the Privy Council as to the method of dealing with the Privy Council?
Comment on this
Certainly as regards one Bill. I have already answered the President that we will give him our support in that Bill.
Comment on this
The President asked whether there was agreement with the British Government as to the form of Bill to be introduced. If there was no agreement on the form of Bill, why did the Deputy state that he was going to introduce a Bill to remove it?
Comment on this
Because we knew one of them was unconstitutional. I did not say I had two opinions on the matter.
Comment on this
I referred to the matter of whether there is now any legal or constitutional obstacle to our removing the Oath. On that I have no doubt whatever.
Comment on this
As far as I remember I challenged the Attorney-General to state if it was his opinion or whether any large body of legal opinion could be got to assert, if there was ever a probability of this question going before an impartial tribunal, that the court would go into the matter on the lines proposed by the President. The Attorney-General said in reply to me, in reply to that legal question, that there were two legal opinions involved and that anybody who said otherwise would be a fool. The challenge I put on the point we are discussing in this Bill, was, would he give a legal opinion to assure the President that if when they went before an impartial international tribunal ever a probability that that court would give a decision in his favour and it was in reply to that that the Attorney General said that there were necessarily two opinions and that he would be foolish to advise that there would be only one opinion. That had no reference back to 1921. That was a statement in the surrounding circumstances of to-day. I think the Attorney-General if he will cast his mind back will see immediately that he has misread on that point.
Comment on this
I said three times dealing with the matter that I have heard that you cannot read—
Comment on this
I think that supports my view that the Attorney-General has to quote a thing half a dozen times before it penetrates to his inner consciousness. He is the type of man whom certain people would describe as having esprit d'escalier— the type of man who, having said something, has to think out afterwards what he should have said. He is now trying to explain away the flaw in his own arguments. He is now trying to explain his own blunders but this is going to remain against the Attorney-General as long as he remains in law. I will read it to him again.
Comment on this
Of course it is right —right from my angle but not right from the angle on which he says we are going to take an irrevocable step founded on one of these opinions of which he says there are two. It is quite an obvious point. If I say there are two opinions on anything I am not going to advise immediately banging one's head against a door in order to prove that one of them is right. If I say that two things are possible with regard to a particular situation I am not going to ask the country to become embroiled with a friendly nation to prove one of them. That is what he did.
Comment on this
Let us hear what he said on the 29th April. There was only one point of view then to be considered — was it legal to take away the Oath? On the 29th April, this was his own statement: "He wanted me to say whether I believe the Oath obligatory or not... First on the question as to whether the Oath is obligatory or not, I admit that there are two views. Any lawyer would be silly on a difficult question which has been discussed over several years to lay down positively that his own interpretation of certain things is absolutely the correct one." The President is going under the assumption that it is the correct one. He is banging his head against a door.
Comment on this
I am going to read it all. I want to get back to this door argument. It reminds me of a story of two niggers discussing the sale of a mule. One of them — the one to whom the mule had been sold — complained afterwards that, to use an Americanism, he had been "sold a pup," because it was a blind mule. The other said "it was not blind at all and I told you it was not blind.""Then why," said the other "did he run up against a tree?" The other nigger replied "he is not blind, but he just don't give a damn."
That is just the position of the Government. It is not exactly blind. It is not even a one-eyed man that is leading them: it is, if I might say so, a three-eyed man; and it just does not give a damn. What does the Attorney-General mean when he says that "any lawyer would be silly to lay down positively that his own interpretation of certain things is obviously the correct one. I admit there are two views. I say there are eminent men—even eminent lawyers— whose eminence would be admitted, who had held that the Oath is not obligatory." Who had held it, he says. They held it because, interpreting the statement which was given to us at the time and examining the position in Canada they will not quite say "the Oath is not obligatory." The President could not get a more ambiguous statement than that, with all his experience in ambiguity. What does the Attorney-General think about the Oath on the 29th April? This is the outstanding blur upon the Attorney-General. He discussed it with various people and lawyers and he had their opinions and his own opinion — his two views — and any man would be silly not to say that there are two views. The dispatch does not say there are two views. It says: "there is only one view, and that is ours." We are told that we are a dishonourable Opposition because we are holding that there is another view. Is the Attorney-General a dishonourable man because he said there were two views? If not, why are we dishonourable, because we preach the same argument? That is the Attorney-General's mistake. The trouble about it is that, if a man is capable of making that mistake, if he is to be relied upon in these matters, it is important to know that he was not brought into the conference. We had the great temple of silence introduced to the British legal Minister who came across. If he is capable of making a mistake on fundamental issues, what reliance can be given to him on the smaller points? On that, the Government is so assured, that they will not have any agreement, any thought of the conference which, the President admitted, brought the Treaty to such a point — although for that he deserves no thanks, because it was brought in the face of his opposition and in the face of the maligning of everything that was done.
The Attorney-General's only recourse when this is brought up against him is to get to the Privy Council, and we have this performance about challenging to this, that, and the other thing. I can speak with some authority about these Imperial Conferences. I was at one in 1923. I was at one in 1926 and again in 1929, and I was at the last one in 1930. Had I the documents in my hands, I believe I could point to the very pages where certain things were said — where Lord Cave said: "You do not need anything further, because you have discovered a most ingenious way of preventing the appeals." I go further. We discussed this question slightly in 1929. We discussed it heatedly on many occasions in 1930, and the point at issue then was not that the Bill should stereo-type the position which we have achieved — which is that no appeal can in fact be taken to the Privy Council— but the downright removal of the Privy Council from the Constitution. That was what was under discussion. As far as the first thing was concerned, there was pretty nearly unanimity. We were within our Constitutional rights. I explained it myself. I had my words queried and finally accepted, and what we had done by way of post factum legislation on individual cases was constitutionally correct. That is a thing I say without any fear of challenge. A Bill to establish that position—to do it by one piece of legislation instead of by several — is the same. There were objections to any further action with regard to the Privy Council. There was definite objection, but again the conference method was tried.
I have said — and I cannot speak openly — what I have done in a sort of a hint. Let the President advance his Oath question to the same point as we advanced the radical taking away of the Privy Council, and he will be able to go to the people and say that not merely to a section of the community on his side, and he will have the whole community, and further, will have South Africa, Australia and Canada on his side. That is the Privy Council situation. There were two ways of dealing with it. One, agreed, constitutional. Apart from the Privy Council document altogether, a remark was passed twice, I think, in the House of Lords. There was the other radical way of dealing with it, which was not agreed to, and we did not proceed with the legislation. If the President brings in the first Bill I am speaking of, I do not think he will find much difficulty about it here or elsewhere. He will if he brings in the second Bill because we will say now, being in Opposition, what operated in our minds when we were the Government and what prevented us from taking certain action. Why should we not say it again when people are going to take action which we thought it unsound for us to take? The first Bill is a different thing and, on that, I think the President will find that there will be no difficulty here or on the other side, except the difficulty that will be raised, as it might be, by his approach to such a problem, but not by the actual way of dealing with it in the end. At any rate there is the Attorney-General to go back to always. His two opinions mean that there were at one time two opinions, and how is he clear in his mind that the other thing is an analogy of the Privy Council? He had previously misquoted what happened with regard to the Privy Council, and if he has not read into the document what he has said, he has not read the document properly, and has not got any information from the Constitutional law sense, but that might be the result of a defect in his reading. In the face of the Seanad amendment, asking for some pause in the hope that there may be agreement, to which the President says: "No, we will go ahead," it looks badly for the false analogy of what we had done. What we did all the time was to study advance by methods of conference and conciliation, and we got to the point that the President had to admit that he found in the Treaty virtues and points he never suspected. They were brought out by the method that the Seanad in the amendment asks to have adopted. The President will not have that, but relies upon the two-minded Attorney who is advising him on the special matter whether the Oath is obligatory or not.
Comment on this
This debate reminds me of a spiritualistic seance. At least the Opposition are calling up the dead, and invoking once again the spirit of British ascendancy in this country which has entered into their souls and has become a part of themselves. We are told by Deputy Blythe that we should make an attempt to get the Treaty differently interpreted. Listening to them one would think that the Treaty was the birth certificate of the Irish nation; that it was necessary to legitimise the race and give it what it claims as a birthright. We are to make an attempt to get the Treaty differently interpreted, as if Irish history began with the Treaty. They have been making the attempt to get it differently interpreted. We heard Deputy McGilligan talk about the fictitious victories of 1923, 1926, 1929 and 1931. They removed the appeal to the Privy Council in "the most effective and ingenious way." They have been negotiating about it for over ten years but the appeal to the Privy Council is still in the Constitution but the Oath is gone.
Comment on this
It is gone, and is as dead as Queen Anne. The whole proceeding on the part of the Opposition is as malodorous as the attempt to resurrect that dead and almost forgotten lady. It is as malodorous and as futile, because the Oath will never again be alive as an issue in Irish politics. We disposed of it for ever and the next Dáil that meets in this House will be a free Dáil, not oath-bound, and not concerned in any way with a Sovereign outside this country. If there is one thing that convinces that the method which the Government has pursued in this matter is the correct one, it is the speech to which we have just listened from Deputy McGilligan. It was not merely the correct method but the only honourable method. He has boasted here, and has repeated as a brag what was said to him by Lord Cave: "You do not have to remove the appeal to the Privy Council, because you have discovered an ingenious and effective way of removing it." I do not know whether his way was effective or not, but I suggest that there must have been some doubt at any rate. Otherwise why so much cogitation? Why was so much time spent on a Bill preparing to remove the appeal to the Privy Council, an appeal which, even after four victories, General McGilligan — Talleyrand McGilligan — at the Imperial Conference was still afraid, and was still unable to bring to this House, or unable to convince the Government, of which he was a member, that it was wise to bring into the House? Which is the more honourable way of dealing with the Constitutional problem? The ingenious and effective way of Deputy McGilligan or the honourable or straightforward way of the present Government? If we were constitutionally entitled to remove the appeal to the Privy Council, which was implicit in Article 2 of the Treaty, are we not constitutionally entitled to remove the Oath also? The Deputies cannot have it both ways. If we can dispose of the appeal to the Privy Council we can dispose of the Oath. I suggest that when a constitutional issue arises there is no necessity — and it would be neither honourable nor courageous — to ask permission of any outside power to deal with that issue, that if we asked any power external to these shores to deal with that issue would be acknowledging overlordship from that power. It used to be the claim of those who sit on the Opposition Benches that we are co-equal with Great Britain, that there was no longer any suggestion of British domination here. Why are we to restore the suggestion of British domination here by asking permission to determine for ourselves what is a purely domestic issue? The one thing that seems clear from the debate, particularly from the speech that was made by Deputy McGilligan, is that opposition to the course which we are taking is merely vexatious opposition, that they have constituted themselves the British Light Brigade in the House, that they are skirmishing for England, and that they are manufacturing arguments which the English themselves never dreamt of. If there were any other proof than Deputy McGilligan's speech needed to show that the Opposition is vexatious, that it is not based upon any concern for this nation's honour or for this people's welfare, it would be the statement made by Deputy Blythe that the President has created differences, had caused trouble throughout the country and that he had divided the people. Nobody knows better than Deputy Blythe how hard the President strove to avoid those differences. Nobody knows better than Deputy Blythe that this very question of the Oath, which divided the people ten years ago, has remained a living issue in Irish politics, that it is upon that issue this Party was returned to power — to remove that Oath — and, by removing it, we hope for ever to remove the cause of dissension amongst Irishmen.
Comment on this
The Attorney-General has the habit, when he gets up, of referring to the question of the Privy Council. I am rather glad he did because it was a point which I tried to put twice before and no answer was made to me. The argument by analogy with the Privy Council is just an attempt to misrepresent the whole situation. The Privy Council position was that, by Article 2 of the Treaty, there was an analogy with Canada and as Canada had an appeal to the Privy Council an appeal to the Privy Council would flow from that Article to this country. The President argued that, in so far as the Oath may have been mandatory in the Treaty, it flowed only from Article 2 in the same way as the Privy Council did. So far as my memory goes, our argument in 1930 about the Privy Council was based largely on whether we should take action prior to the passing of the Statute of Westminster or not. So far as I remember — I am only speaking from memory — the indications were that there would not be the same opposition to our action with regard to the Privy Council after the passing of the Statute of Westminster as there was prior to the passing of that Statute, because there is no mention of the Privy Council in the Treaty. It can only be brought into the Treaty as flowing from our comparison with Canada in Article 2. The Oath is specifically set out in Article 4 of the Treaty. The President on, I think, the Committee Stage of this Bill, said that Article 4 was only in the Treaty because it was necessary to provide for a variation in the form of Oath in our case as compared with the Canadian case. At the moment, I thought he had possibly forgotten the circumstances of 1921. Then I remembered that in his concluding speech on the Second Reading on the previous Friday, he had himself referred to the fact that the final draft of the Treaty, as it stood on the Friday prior to the 6th December, was brought back containing Article 4 not as it is now but as he himself said, with a direct Oath in it, as in Canada. The whole argument about the Treaty had centred round that Article providing for an Oath. When that Article provided for the identical Oath there is in Canada, the suggestion or attempted argument, which nobody can pretend to think a very honest argument, that that Article was only brought in to provide for a different form of Oath from Canada cannot hold water. From 11th October until 6th December, the central argument regarding the Treaty was as to the Oath clause. The Oath clause provided in no way for any variation of the Oath as taken in Canada but for the identical Oath as taken in Canada. On the other side an attempt is made to mislead the people by drawing a bogus analogy with the Privy Council and it is argued that the Oath flowed from the same Article. Then there would be no need to bring in a specific clause. The President said that Article 4 was only brought in — he knows it is not so — to provide for a different form of Oath from Canada. Yet, he stated on Committee Stage that when the document was brought back on Friday morning or Saturday he looked down a few clauses and fixed upon the Oath clause. He said that that crystallised the whole position, and that that was exactly the same Oath as was taken in Canada. Now, he turns round and says that Article 4 was only brought in to provide for a variation of the form of Oath and that the Oath so far as it was mandatory was only mandatory by Article 2. The whole history of the situation contradicts that. The fact that the Oath is set out specifically, that it has one Article to itself, the Article on which the whole Treaty debate turned between us and the English, indicates quite clearly that that was a vital thing. The Privy Council was not even referred to. We proposed taking action with regard to the Privy Council because the Privy Council appeal only flowed from Article 2 of the status Article and because our status had changed since 1921. But the specific details in the Treaty have not changed since 1921 and can only be changed by agreement between the two parties.
Comment on this
I am reminded by the Parliamentary Secretary that agreement was come to as to the time in which a certain programme would be got through. Looking at the clock, I am afraid that we may not be able to fulfil that programme. As regards the Deputy's argument, I myself made a mistake about the document. The Deputy prides himself on his memory but we were both wrong. I looked up the document since and the modified form of Oath is in it, so that the argument about Canada does not apply.
Comment on this
The form as it appeared was not the Oath taken in Canada at all. What made me look it up again was that the modified form I was supposed to have suggested could only have come from the Canadian Oath if it was the one there. It was based upon something existing in a document before me. When I looked it up. I found I had made a mistake. The Deputy prides himself on his wonderful memory but all his argument is based on wrong premises.
Comment on this
I cannot accept the President's statement. The President says that the form of Oath he proposed was based on the Oath in a document before him.
Comment on this
The Deputy will agree with me in a moment. I interrupted now because it would be only a waste of time making an argument based upon a fallacious foundation.
Comment on this
No. I had seen a document a few days before and I saw just a short form they have in Canada. Afterwards, I said: "How can I have made any such suggestion of that sort based on such a foundation?" I found, as a matter of fact, that it was not the form in Canada that appeared in the document that came over on that Friday or Saturday.
Comment on this
It was the direct form of Oath. The whole discussion during the period prior to that had been not as to whether our analogy with Canada was implied in the Oath but turned entirely upon the insertion in the Treaty over and above Article 2 of the stipulation as to the Oath. I think the President will remember that when Arthur Griffith came back for a week-end he said, "You will get no agreement without the Oath." I do not want to misrepresent the President but I think he replied, "Yes, an oath but not that oath."
Comment on this
I make no mistake when I say that the central point of argumentation between 11th October and 6th December, was the specific clause to be inserted in the Treaty setting out the form of Oath to be taken here. That was the whole point. A vote was taken on that again and again; it was postponed. But that was the point on which, really, the Vote on the Treaty was taken, not on Article 2, or anything flowing from that. Nothing of the sort. It was not Article 2 that divided us. We were prepared to accept that without any trouble. The whole trouble that brought about the crisis was not Article 2, but Article 4, which set out the form of the Oath which was to be taken. That is the truth.
Comment on this
I do not want to go into that argument; it would take too long, and it would really not be to the point.
Comment on this
Question—"That the Dáil disagree with the Seanad in amendment 4"— put.
Do you agree with this result?