Policy of Executive Council.—Motion of Censure.
Contributions 71–171 of 171. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
Not an incorrect statement, but a misleading statement —to the effect that there were no agreements which fettered your Government in regard to the Land Annuities—the Land Act of 1923 and the Land Bond Act of 1925.
Comment on this
I do not know as to that, but I do know that when it was being alleged that the 1923 Agreement was not a secret one, the Deputy, who was then Minister, knew that in regard to the Land Bond Act of 1925, he wanted to publish that agreement in full to the Dáil, and he wrote to his colleague, Deputy Blythe, who was then Minister for Finance, asking that permission should be sought from the British Government to allow them to publish that agreement.
Comment on this
The Deputy said three. The first record of that agreement that can be found in the files is a letter from the Secretary of the Executive Council circulating copies of the agreement to all members of the Executive Council, and that letter is marked "secret."
Comment on this
In view of the fact that the President said that he strongly deprecated the practice of the Minister and others quoting from official files, I should like to know does the Minister subscribe to that?
Comment on this
Would the Minister, instead of quoting from the files which were secret, quote from the public records which are not secret? He will find what the President—Deputy Cosgrave—said in Volume 3, Column 2498, Dáil Debates, 26th June, 1923. Will the Minister quote from the Dáil debates which were not secret, which are public, and which it is quite legitimate to quote from?
Comment on this
I have not got the debates at hand, but I gather that Deputy Hogan has the necessary quotations. Will the Deputy quote Deputy Cosgrave's statement?
Comment on this
Here is what Deputy Cosgrave, the then President, said:—
The law provides that these annuities are to be collected hence-forth by the Government of Saorstát Eireann——
that is of the Dáil
—and that the proper amounts should in due course be paid into either of the funds out of which dividends and sinking fund payments in connection with the various land stocks are paid. These stocks will continue to be managed by the British Government, but it is part of the present arrangement for the adjustment of past land purchase transactions that we should pay over the annuities and leave it to the British Government to pay the interest to the stock-holders.
Is that correct?
Comment on this
I am accepting the Deputy's word for it that it is correct. But mark the statement: "The law provides that these annuities were to be paid over." What law? What law provided that these annuities were to be paid over? It certainly was not the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. And it certainly was not the Treaty that provided that these annuities should be paid over. In fact, that statement was as false and as misleading as the statement which Deputy Cosgrave made when he returned from London in 1925 and said that he had settled all our financial obligations with Great Britain for a great big nought. It was just as false and misleading, because the law provided not that they should be paid over, but that they should be retained here for the use and benefit of the Irish people.
Comment on this
The President, in order to make it perfectly clear that not only were these moneys paid in accordance with the law but also in accordance with the agreement with the British, also made this statement:
The actual sum due to pay the annuities is much greater than the sum which comes in. At the recent negotiations which took place in England we came to a provisional arrangement which binds us, or in which we accepted liability for the payment of a certain sum pending a settlement regarding the major question. That sum in all amounts to about £160,000 over and above the amount we will get in annuities.
That statement was made to the Dáil in 1923. The Dáil was told, therefore, that the annuities were to be paid over to the British for the stock-holders, and that that was the result of an agreement made with the British recently.
Comment on this
I do not know where Deputy Hogan keeps his barrel of red herrings. He is trying to get me away from the question whether these agreements were secret or not. There was a provisional agreement, the terms of which were not disclosed beyond this fact: that under this agreement you contracted to pay three million and odd pounds to the British.
Comment on this
Will the Minister allow me to ask one more question?
Comment on this
Oh, now, fair play! I have only one or two questions more. Would the Minister agree that this provisional agreement was not secret in face of that publication?
Comment on this
No, I would not. Every word and every line of it was secret, and the manner in which it was referred to by Deputy Cosgrave was also deliberately misleading—just as if it were a mere sort of book-keeping arrangement—a mere matter of accounts—subject to adjustment at the ultimate financial settlement. But the text of the agreement was kept secret and nobody knows better than the Deputy how secret it was kept.
I said I would give the Deputy credit. Even the devil must have his due some time and Deputy Hogan is not as black as he is painted sometimes.
Comment on this
When you want to keep a thing secret in future put it in the Dáil debates.
Comment on this
But you take jolly good care of the particular circumstances—a civil war just ended, a completely unrepresentative Dáil, more than half the representatives denied——
Comment on this
And you take good care that so far as the Irish people are concerned, you will see that the newspapers tuck away any reference to the matter in an obscure corner and in fact that you will supply the newspapers with a carefully worded statement——
Comment on this
——which makes it appear that it is a provisional agreement that had no real effect and that it was a mere book-keeping transaction.
Comment on this
It was put only in an obscure corner of the papers?
Comment on this
Up to now there have been no interruptions of speakers. The debate might continue on these lines.
Comment on this
The Deputy is correct up to this point and it is vital to the whole matter under discussion. I gather that Deputy Hogan, Deputy Fitzgerald and other members of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party hold this agreement was not secret. Is that the point Deputy Hogan was trying to make?
Comment on this
We have been trying to make it clear for the last ten or fifteen minutes that it is a dead secret to everybody.
Comment on this
You are doing your best all right but you have not white-washed the blackness yet. This agreement, we are told, was not secret. Who, outside the eight members of the Executive Council on this side and the members of the British Cabinet on the other side, ever saw the agreement until the text of it was published this year, if it were not secret? If it were not secret why did Deputy Blythe, when he was Minister for Finance, permit a letter to be written to the British Treasury stating that it would be "politically inadvisable" to publish this agreement?
Comment on this
I cannot understand Deputy Dillon's attitude in the matter. He has a name that is honoured in Irish history. I believe he is a good Nationalist, but is not one of the matters, which are vital to this quarrel, the question whether the Irish people and the Irish Legislature ever had the opportunity to ratify this agreement or not? Would not our case be so much weaker if this agreement were in fact a published agreement and if the text of it were known to every man and woman in the country? Have not the members of the Opposition who were responsible for that agreement and, again I say, are responsible for the present economic dispute because of that agreement, endeavoured to weaken the morale of our people and to sap their courage by saying it was not secret, that it was known to them, and that we are bound in honour, in justice and in equity by that agreement? Is that not the whole point?
I am endeavouring to show that, as far as we were concerned, and as far as the Irish people, were concerned, the agreement was withheld from them. They were denied all knowledge of it. They were denied it not merely by the action of our own Executive Council, but with the acquiescence and consent of the British Government, who were the other parties to it. That is why I have endeavoured to show that the agreement was deliberately kept secret, and it was kept secret because in the words of the then Minister for Finance it was politically inadvisable to publish it. Why was it politically inadvisable to publish it? Because if it had been published the Government that had entered into it would not have held their place for one six months. The moment that the implications of the agreement became clear to the Irish people, the moment they realised that it was imposing on them a burden that would cripple this country economically for generations, they would have turned and would have rended those who were responsible for it. Whatever else may arise out of this quarrel, whatever may be the issue of the dispute, there is one thing the people on the other side of the water may make up their minds about. That is, that the intelligence and the commonsense of the Irish people will never allow them again to trust their destinies to a group of politicians who could defraud them as they did defraud them who signed that 1923 Agreement.
It is not merely we who are complaining of the secrecy of it. I would remind the House that members of the British Parliament complained of the secrecy also, that Lord Danesfort in 1926 referred to these agreements, and that he was denied all knowledge of the 1923 Agreement because the Executive Council of the Irish Free State would not permit the 1923 Agreement to be published. If it was not secret, and if the last Government communicated it to this Dáil, why did they not permit its publication in 1926? Why, when Deputy Hogan as Minister for Agriculture wanted that agreement published—I will give the date, on the 6th January, 1925—when he asked the Minister for Finance to secure the consent of the British Government to the publication of that agreement, why did Deputy Blythe on 7th February, 1925, reply to Deputy Hogan, then Minister for Agriculture, and say that he considered it undesirable to publish the agreement, if this agreement were not a secret one?
Comment on this
If this agreement were not secret, why was it considered undesirable to publish it? Why did Deputy Hogan suggest that the consent of the British to its publication should be secured at all, if the Dáil had full knowledge of it? That is the dilemma that Deputy Hogan is in.
Why was this motion brought forward at all? I gathered from Deputy MacEoin that it was because the Opposition are anxious to get peace. He spoke in military parables to the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and he asked us did we take the usual military precautions. Just examine this matter again in military terms. Suppose this were not an economic war, but that we were engaged in physical warfare, with all the accoutrements of war, and there were two armies facing each other, and one company or two companies or one battalion or one regiment of one of the armies began to shout out, "Oh, the commander is not taking steps to satisfactorily adjust our differences with the enemy. We censure him because he has failed to satisfactorily adjust our differences with the enemy, and we must have peace. We must have peace." What sort of overtures do you think the enemy would make, and what frame of mind would he be in for receiving overtures from a commander who had such a disloyal and a mutinous section of the army behind him?
What is the purpose of this Resolution? To make peace according to Deputy MacEoin—to make peace impossible, on the plain interpretation of it, and to encourage Britain to stand out in the hope that their allies in this country will unseat the present Government. What sort of peace are the Opposition looking for? You have not stated that. Deputy Hayes, in a very astute speech, said that if we "made clear a political position..." What is the implication in that? How much further does Deputy Hayes want the Government to go in clarifying its political position? There is a strange unity of expression between Deputy Hayes and members of the British Cabinet. They are all telling us that if we will loyally accept the British Commonwealth then money is no object.
We can forsake the age-long aspirations of the people, we can break the pledges which were given to the electors, we can betray the dead, we can turn our backs on the whole course of Irish history, we can forsake the goal towards which the Irish people have been marching, and when we do that, money is no object. We can get the same price for betraying the aspirations of the Irish people in 1932 as members of the Irish Parliament got for carrying the Union in 1800. Of course money is no object when British politicians want to achieve their end. I am not blaming the English politicians because they offer the bribe, but I am blaming Irishmen, who claim to represent Irish constituencies and to speak for the Irish people, for trying to coerce or to coax or cajole the Irish people into accepting that bribe. "What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul," and what would it profit the Irish people or the Irish nation if they were to accept Deputy Hayes' advice, if they were to accept a shameful peace, a shameful but only temporary peace, that would bring to us neither prosperity nor happiness, and would send this generation in shame down the paths of the ages as a generation which betrayed, when it might have realised, Irish aspirations.
Comment on this
A Chinn Comhairle, I have listened with close attention to the Minister for Finance, a responsible Minister of this Government, and he ended his peroration by suggesting that a compromise in the economic dispute between this country and Great Britain is to be likened to the sale of this country by the corrupt members of a group in the Irish House of Commons at the beginning of the 19th century. That is an aspect of the present situation which is new to me.
Now, sir, when this country and Great Britain first became involved in a difference as to the liability of this country for the land annuities, President de Valera made a very special appeal that, in so far as possible, those who could not see eye to eye with him should refrain from putting forward in public a view calculated to weaken his position. I am aware that certain honourable public men felt that to accede to that request was not consistent with their duty. I had a different view. I felt that as Fianna Fáil was in office it was entitled to have its chance. I felt that in offering to submit its case to arbitration the Fianna Fáil Government had adopted a course which was strictly in accordance with honour and prudence, and I felt that while that offer was made I should say nothing in public, even though I differ from President de Valera, calculated to make his position more difficult, or to make the possibility of friendly settlement more remote.
I do not disguise the fact—and I wish the President were here that I might say it in his presence—that I went to him on more than one occasion, and spoke to him in private of the developments that I thought were taking place in the country, and of the course that events were taking, as far as I could see. I do feel that the President's request was entitled to respect up to a point, but I think there comes a time when it is the duty of anybody who professes to represent a constituency or a section of the Irish people, to say frankly in public what he believes, if he believes that there is great danger ahead. Now, I have listened to members of the Fianna Fáil Party speaking of the prospects, throughout this trouble. I remember hearing the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance pour scorn on anybody who suggested that these problems were grave. I remember the Minister for Defence solemnly getting up and saying that, using his best judgment, the only result he foresaw from this economic struggle was that the Irish people would grow so fat that we would have to put new doors in Irish houses in order to let them pass in and out. I must say I felt that that did not represent the true sense of responsibility of other members of the Cabinet. I want to say now that we have reached a stage in this economic struggle when thought on the lines of Deputy Hayes' speech is better and more profitable than thought on the lines of the speech of the Minister for Finance.
The Minister for Finance could not understand my point of view when I reminded him that President de Valera had publicly decried the reading of confidential files. My point of view on it is this, that, if the Minister for Finance thinks the Irish people should be placed in possession of information which is contained in Government files, he should go to the Executive Council and ask the Executive Council to recommend to this Dáil that those papers should be published in toto, because the quotation of short paragraphs from long documents inevitably results in a certain measure of misrepresentation, and at least it leaves the feeling behind it that only part of the truth has been told. If any reference has to be made to a document of that character, and the truth has to be laid before the people—and that should be done if the Executive Council thinks it is necessary for the true presentation of the Irish case—the document should be published in full. Unless they think that necessary, I suggest that the Minister for Finance would be better advised to fall in with the President's view, and eschew absolutely the practice of quoting from any document which the Executive Council is not prepared to publish.
Comment on this
Might I just point out to Deputy Dillon that a large number of those documents will be available to the Dáil if the Opposition asks for them.
Comment on this
I do not propose to pursue that matter further. If it be deemed prudent that these papers should be published the responsibility is with the President of the Executive to lay them before the Irish people. If he believes it is not in the public interest or that these documents contain certain confidential things, which no responsible Government should publish, be they Fianna Fáil or Cumann na nGaedheal, it would be much better if the President's advice on this matter were followed. However, that is a minor matter. As I said the lines upon which we were going seems to be unprofitable, because as I said at a very much earlier stage, last June, it appears clear to every reasonably minded man that there is no real victory in any fight that is fought to a finish. It does not in the least matter now which side wins this fight. If it is a question of winning or losing and if England smashes President de Valera, then England and Ireland have lost this fight just as much as if President de Valera smashes England. If England smashes President de Valera and wipes out his policy by economic pressure and bringing hardship to bear on the Irish people, no matter whether the people of this country thinks President de Valera was well advised or not, the people of this country will resent the fact that the British Government, by economic pressure, has smashed a man who is in the position of Irish leader. There is no use turning away from these facts. This is a deep rooted instinct in the Irish people. On the other hand, if President de Valera presses this thing through, and successfully gains his point by refusing to yield an inch and by being absolutely implacable and uncompromising, the net result of it will be that he will create in England and amongst the people of the country whom the Minister for Finance described as the "sister island" a bitterness and resentment and general feeling of dissatisfaction, which will injure us far more in the long run than the annuities could ever compensate us for.
I want to ask the House to throw their minds back to 1917, right in the middle of the Great War when things were desperately bitter, and feeling in England was at boiling point and the great thing was to capture Berlin and hang the Kaiser. The Marquis of Lansdowne rose at that juncture and said: "Look here, I believe this fight has assumed such proportions that if you capture Berlin, Vienna, Sofia and Constantinople, the price you will have paid for that capture will unfortunately be more than all that victory would be worth. You may win the war but so surely as you win it you lose the peace." The Marquis of Lansdowne was spat upon. A word that is all too familiar in this House was hurled at him. He was described as a traitor, a man who was letting down the boys in the trenches, a man who had not the spirit of the bulldog breed. How many men and women in England to-day regret not having taken the advice of the Marquis of Lansdowne in 1917 instead of beating Germany and Austria down into the dirt, and beating them down with the self same language as is being used here now. I can well remember how we were told that they were swaggering bullies and that the instinct of the German people was not to yield an inch. Now, I submit, the very self same thing is being done here. We are told that we are face to face with swaggering bullies who want to trample us down and we have either to face them now or else lie down before them. Surely that kind of thing is calculated to do nothing but harm to them and to us. I am not concerned with what happened in the past, and what on earth does it matter. What is the use of going into whether this was a secret agreement with England or not? The Minister for Finance knows, and there is not a single man sitting on those benches who does not know, that the Cumann na nGaedheal Government never treacherously sold this country.
I have been opposed to them all my life, and I have been opposed to the President and his Party when they were joined in Sinn Fein, but I know just as well as that Party knows that a leader on either side was never intentionally a traitor to his own country. You may take the view that these agreements were imprudent agreements and instead of being damn good bargains, they were damn bad bargains. That is a matter of opinion. It is a perfectly legitimate view to take, and we will never quarrel violently about that. But take the allegations and the suggestions that they were corrupt and fraudulent, and that there was a conspiracy with the British Government to defraud the Irish people; now the men who made those statements know quite well they are untrue, and I submit that the President of the Executive Council knows they are not true. He may take the view, as I say, that they were bad or imprudent, but he knows that there was no fraud and no treachery whatever. We have the Irish Government and the British Government face to face. Both sides are adamant on the question of the constitution of the tribunal. The Irish Government say they will not accept the principle that there must be an Imperial Court. I want to remind this House that it is not the Fianna Fáil Party that advanced that theory. That theory has been advanced and endorsed by the entire Oireachtas of this State when it was brought before it by Deputy McGilligan when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he most expressly said that "in many disputes I would welcome a Commonwealth tribunal, but we will never accept the principle that it is the right of any other member of the Commonwealth of Nations to insist on submitting every dispute to which we are a party to a Commonwealth court. On the contrary, we reserve the right to refer any dispute in which we are involved to an international court, if and when, we deem it desirable." That principle was endorsed by the whole Oireachtas, so that there is no question of this being some skeleton which the Fianna Fáil Party dug up. It is the avowed policy of the State. Now, we are face to face with that very thing. We have one principle and Great Britain has another in respect to that matter. The Fianna Fáil Government maintains that these agreements are technically invalid in the legal sense, quite apart from their equity altogether, and Great Britain maintains they are valid.
Are we going to sit opposite one another for ever, with this blank assertion or can we see no hope of our respective positions being reconciled? I see none. But I see a way out. If you cannot reconcile the preliminaries it is a very good thing, sometimes, to put the cart before the horse. If you cannot settle the preliminary points, why not get down to the real and concrete issue, and that is as to the moneys that Britain alleges are due to her from this country? Let us shelve the question of principle. Let us not ask England to waive her principle nor we to waive ours, but let us ask ourselves this question: There are the land annuities and other sums—payments amounting to something like £5,000,000—cannot the question be approached in this way? Let us forget for the moment the particular designations of this sum, and, let us say, there is a financial amount of about £5,000,000 that England thinks is due to her from the Free State. Without going into the nature of these sums, may we not look at them after all as a money price, or part of a money price that was paid for the rectification of past injustice and something to smooth over the difficulties that lay in the way in 1921? There are pensions and annuities which flow from a long system of injustice in the past. There we have £5,000,000. I ask the President of the Executive Council now, and by his answer I will be deeply and profoundly affected: "Is the path open to settlement along the lines of saying that this money is due from one country to another; that it is money claimed by one country from another, that it is part of a general equitable settlement? If an equitable proposal is made whereby we both undertake to assume a share of the burden which formed part of the settlement of seven centuries of strife, then probably we will listen with the intention of considering that proposal in an equitable and generous spirit." If England says she will bear one proportion if we bear the other; if she says "we will bear three-fifths if you will bear two-fifths" or some proposal of that kind, I think the President ought to be in a position to say that we are prepared to leave the abstract question of principle aside, and rather than perpetuate an acrimonious war, we would be glad to leave aside this academic question of either an international or a national court. By leaving these things on one side, to mellow for a little time, in due course it might be not impossible to discover that the principle we are contending for, and which Deputy McGilligan advocated at the Imperial Conference, and afterwards at Geneva, might be accepted by the entire Commonwealth. There is one way it never will be accepted, and that is if there is an attempt made by any one member of the Commonwealth to ram it down the throat of the other members of the Commonwealth. If President de Valera thinks he can compel England to admit something by forcing it down her throat and down the throats of other members of the Commonwealth, then he is a much more foolish man than I took him to be.
I think we have reached the stage at which we can ask the President another question. I have always taken the view that Fianna Fáil was entitled to have its chance. I am glad it has had its chance, and I think it is to the good of the country that it has had its chance. I ask the President, now, if the time is not ripe to inform this country whether there is any prospect of a conclusive and final settlement of the relations between Great Britain and Ireland within the Commonwealth of Nations as we know it. I think that until we know that fact there can be no real progress in this country. While I am quite clear that it is a good thing to give Fianna Fáil a chance to prove its policy before the country, I am not prepared to support the continuance of a policy which has, as its final aim, the removal of this country from the Commonwealth of Nations, whereof at present we are a free and independent member. I do not think it is fair, or just, to the people in the name of prosecuting an economic war to defend a particular principle, deliberately to create a situation which, if continued, would make membership of the Commonwealth of Nations impossible. I aim at political freedom. I think every man and woman in this House wants political freedom and would not be content without political freedom. There are some of us who believe that the securest political freedom this country can have, and the securest economic freedom are to be found within the Commonwealth of Nations, co-equal members with every other nation in the Commonwealth as independent and sovereign States.
If I were to believe that the policy which President de Valera is prosecuting at the present moment is one with a deliberate intention of leading our people into a position where they would be forced to repudiate membership of the Commonwealth, then I would no longer be able to support President de Valera's policy or to suggest to the people that they should support it. I am led to make that statement, because when a Minister of the Executive Council speaks in a debate of this character I am bound to assume he weighs his words, and that what he states he states with the most deliberate intention. The Minister for Finance said here to-day— he was referring to Deputy Hayes's speech—when the suggestion was made that this should be settled by compromise—I do not profess to quote his exact words, but he said: "We could get the price they got. We could get the price that the corrupt members of the Union Parliament of 1800 got when they sold their country, by turning our backs upon the dead." Am I to understand from that that the policy of Fianna Fáil is that there should be no accommodation with the Commonwealth of Nations except on a basis of separation? Am I to understand from that that there can be no compromise, no settlement by amicable agreement of this economic dispute, unless there be political considerations of status involved in this agreement? Am I to understand that, contrary to what President de Valera said, this dispute has ceased to be an economic dispute and that other considerations have arisen, or am I to understand that President de Valera is prepared to-morrow, if an equitable proposal that would make for the settlement of this economic difference is put up, to accept this proposal, to end this economic war, and to turn his face to the future for this country as a sovereign and independent State in the Commonwealth of Nations?
Comment on this
Nobody asks, and nobody could ask, the President to set a limit to the march of this nation. Nobody could ask the President to pledge the action of the Irish people. It is neither in his power nor in the power of any other man to do that. What I am entitled to ask is, whither is he leading the Irish people? Until he is in a position to state whither he is leading them, how can any man tell the people whether they are wise to follow or not? How can any people know whether to follow or not if they do not know where they are being led? What I am asking the President is: Is a settlement of this difference possible on a purely financial and fiduciary basis; or is it true that this difference is being made the excuse for leading the Irish people whither they never authorised him to lead them? If that be true, then I think the terms of this motion are justified. But if it be true that the President is prepared to make a just and equitable settlement of this difference that exists with England on the lines I suggested to him, or any other lines that will commend themselves to this House, then I think he is entitled to his chance to make that settlement. I think that anything we can do to help him to make that settlement should be done. It is for him to answer, it is for him to make it clear. But I think the time has come now when the obligation rests upon the President to make it clear, and clear in an unequivocal way. I want to know, and there are thousands of people who voted for Fianna Fáil who want to know, whither the President is leading them. When he answers that question, then we will know whether to advise the people to follow, or whether to advise the people to call him to account and to pass a new judgement on what is a new policy, and a policy that he never put to the people before.
Comment on this
The Minister for Finance in the course of his speech and in his peroration would lead one to believe that this struggle with the British is one for the vindication of some treasured idea, or one for the pursuit of some old vendetta. I understood that it was really a difference about money; that it was really a demand to end certain payments that have heretofore been made to the British; and to end these payments, not for the mere sake of grabbing the money, but for the sake of improving the economic state of the country. If it is a business dispute, then I hold it ought to be looked upon in that way; that we ought not to have these attempts that are being made to stir up public anger and enthusiasm; that we need not have all these accusations of treachery thrown at everybody who criticises or opposes the Government; that, in fact, we need not have got to this particular pass.
Now that the thing is on, I think there is nothing to be gained by any misrepresentation or by trying to raise the temperature of public opinion. There is no use in pretending that we are standing out against some sort of British aggression. There is no use in the President doing what he did the other day at the Ard-Fheis, pretending that the British have seized upon an opportunity to fasten a quarrel upon us, or suggesting that possibly that is what happened, and that if we do not resist to the bitter end now we will be subjected to all sorts of unjustified demands to which we should have to yield. It would be better to have it admitted that there has been no British aggression in this matter; that, whether we were right or wrong, the aggression came from our side; that we were the attackers in the matter; that we were the people who opened the quarrel.
There were agreements made in regard to these particular payments. I will not follow the Minister for Finance into his discussion on what is in the Departmental files. He has all the Departmental files and can make any use he thinks wise to make of them. He can keep them secret, or he can publish them, or he can publish selections. He has only just to consider, and I hope he is doing it, what is the best for the country. The agreement about the land annuities was made and the substance of the agreement was disclosed very early after it was made. The fact that it had been agreed that we should pay the land annuities was made known to the Dáil, and was known to the people; and the only reason there was not a great deal of discussion about it at the time was that everybody took it as a matter of course. At that time the propaganda which we have experienced lately had not begun and the newspapers did not regard it as anything very new or sensational that an agreement had been made that the land annuities would be paid over to the appropriate fund. These agreements were made and they were acted upon. For instance, the money for the R.I.C. pensions was voted year after year in the Dáil and continued to be voted after the propaganda had started. Not only were the agreements made known to the Dáil and acted upon, but other agreements were based on these. The agreement of December, 1925, whereby our liability for portion of the British national debt was wiped out, as was stated by Deputy Cosgrave in the Dáil, was based on the previous agreements that the land annuities should be paid over and that the R.I.C. pensions should be paid. He pointed out in his speech, I think on the Second Reading of the Bill confirming that agreement, that the plea he made to the British for the cancellation of their claim for National Debt was that we were already paying in land annuities, R.I.C. pensions, and other payments as much as we could afford, and the agreement amending the Treaty was based on the fact that these agreements were in existence and were being acted upon.
It would have been quite legitimate for this country to ask for a review of these agreements or any of them. It would have been quite legitimate for the present or any Government to say that, in the circumstances that have now arisen, these agreements are too onerous; that the burdens they impose are greater than we can afford; and to ask that the whole matter be reopened. The Government, however, did not do that. They did what was equivalent to repudiating the agreements. I think that, in the circumstances, it would not have been unreasonable for the British Government to have said: "If you are going to repudiate the agreements already entered into and acted upon, then we are going to have no discussion; we will take our own measures." If the British took up that attitude I think it would not have been stringent or drastic or unreasonable, but instead of doing so they said: "We will arbitrate." That is a proof that there has been no British aggression at any stage in this matter. It is a proof, if proof were needed, that there is a spirit of accommodation on the other side, and that if there were any serious attempt to reach an agreement, an agreement could be reached.
We, on this side of the House, have always stood for having an international tribunal, but I would not ask for an international tribunal in this matter, because I believe that whatever legal case there is, and I think it is slender, we would be more likely to succeed in it before a Commonwealth tribunal than before an international court. I am unable to understand, if the President wants any settlement, why he did not make an attempt to reach an agreement on the personnel of the court. There is surely no national principle that precludes us from having the matter arbitrated by a Commonwealth tribunal, even although we are not prepared to agree that all disputes must be settled by a Commonwealth tribunal. There is no reason why, in a particular instance, or in particular instances, if it suits us, or if it is the only way out, we should not try to have a Commonwealth tribunal. There is no reason at all why the President should not have, on the offer that was made by Mr. Thomas, proposed that he should nominate his own representatives and that they and the British representatives should meet and make an attempt to get a chairman who would be agreeable to both. That could have been done, because the British expressly announced that they were not standing on the Imperial Conference proposal.
The Minister for Finance did not take those steps because, as I believe, he did not want arbitration, and I think there were good reasons for not wanting arbitration, because, even with the most favourable tribunal, it could only, I think, have ended in the one way. He could not expect, in all the circumstances of the origin of this dispute, that the British would take his point of view that, because there was not formal Parliamentary ratification of these agreements, they should be treated as mere scraps of paper. There was a very obvious reason why they could not take his point of view because, if one Government can repudiate the agreements of its predecessor, there is no reason why the Government that might succeed it, could not repudiate its agreements. There is no greater sanctity attaching to an agreement because it has formal Parliamentary ratification than because it has the signature of a Minister who has the confidence of the House and continues to retain the confidence of the House for years after the agreement is entered into.
The British could see perfectly well that if they consented to the complete repudiation of this agreement which had been entered into by the then Government, and if a new agreement was made and ratified by the unanimous vote of this House, it would be quite possible for a party to arise in a year or two and say that no agreement which is not submitted to a referendum of the people is binding on the people, and, if you had an agreement ratified by a referendum of the people, it would be possible, in five or ten years, for a party to arise and say: "There are so many voters on the register now who had nothing to say in the referendum, and they cannot be bound by something which they did not share in deciding." It should be perfectly obvious to the President that he was doing his best to make it impossible for the British to reach any agreement when, instead of reopening agreements entered into, and acted upon, he simply brushed them aside as something which, because he came in representing another Party, he refused to recognise.
I think, as I have said, that the determination of the President not to be trapped into any sort of arbitration is obvious because there were things in his speeches which made it perfectly clear that, even if the British had agreed to an international tribunal, we would not have got very far towards arbitration, and that he had prepared his line of retreat and would have broken on the terms of reference. I think he was wise in all that, but it would be a good thing to get rid of the pretence, because I think that the one satisfactory method and the one safe method of settling the matter was by direct negotiation. I am not going to answer the question of the Minister for Finance as to what we would regard as a satisfactory settlement. That would depend on many things, but settlement by negotiation involves a compromise. The Government cannot go into negotiations demanding, not merely all they have ever asked before, but something in addition, and hope to have a successful issue.
The Government cannot hope by negotiations to get the full £5,000,000 and to go out of the Commonwealth with the blessing of the British Government and have the British Government employ their troops to coerce the Six Counties to join the Free State. He must expect something less than his full demand. I do not know whether those would be his full demands —perhaps he would demand a large payment in respect of over-taxation in addition. If this is to be settled by negotiation, there must be compromise. There must be some splitting of the difference and I think that, in order that there may be a satisfactory settlement, there must be a settlement of all the matters outstanding, not merely the financial matters but the constitutional matters that are outstanding, and that a good bargain cannot be made on one issue alone. This is a question, as I have said, of money, or it was supposed to have begun as a question of money, and the Government should recognise that it would be quite possible to keep the whole £5,000,000 and leave the country much worse off than it was when the £5,000,000 were being paid or much worse off than it would be if the £5,000,000 continued to be paid.
No settlement of the financial issues, no settlement of this question of the £5,000,000, will be satisfactory unless it is a settlement that is satisfactory to both sides. The Minister for Finance asked was the settlement to be satisfactory to us or was it to be satisfactory to Great Britain. It must be satisfactory to both sides, because if it was one that pleased us and caused grave displeasure on the other side, then, there is no doubt that, in our trade relations with Great Britain, we would suffer disadvantages that would more than outweigh anything we might gain by pressing our fight too far, if we were able to press it too far, and there is no indication that, by continuing so long, we are going to be able to force the British people to a settlement. There is no indication whatever that they are feeling this, or that they are facing starvation; no indication that they feel themselves shaken by the measures that we have taken here.
On the other hand, if one may judge from the Press, although feeling is hardening in Great Britain I have no doubt that if the Government were anxious now to make a settlement they could make a satisfactory settlement, because it is to the interests of the British people that there should be amity and goodwill between the Free State and Great Britain, that there should be normal trade relations, that the difficulties and the possibilities of difficulties that have been confronting them in regard to their relations with this State should disappear. I have no doubt that whatever hate may have arisen on the other side would be overcome, and that the solid interests of Great Britain would cause the British people to be prepared to negotiate a reasonable and satisfactory compromise. What is wanted on this side is a disposition to make the best of the position, a disposition to realise that the full demands, the full claims that have been put forward, cannot be obtained, and that our representatives must sit down with the representatives of the British Government in a reasonable spirit, something very different from what was displayed during the last conversations in Great Britain, and arrive at a compromise.
As some Deputies have already stated, the Ministers on the other side must have the courage to compromise, must have the courage to do whatever they think is best for the country in the circumstances, and they must not out of false pride continue a struggle which is bankrupting and impoverishing the people here. They must not be afraid that somebody may come after them and do some mean trick of reading all their private documents and thereby try to villify and misrepresent them. They should have the courage to do the things Governments have to do. They should not regard themselves as leaders of some sort of forlorn hope, and they should have regard for the sufferings of the people. The Government have economic as well as other functions. They should do the duty of a Government. They should make the best settlement that can be made, and they should have the courage to stand over it and to face any of the jibes that, undoubtedly, idiots of various sorts will hurl at them simply because of the settlement they have made.
Comment on this
Deputy Cosgrave's speech to-day had a certain purpose in it. It was, of course, to paint a contrast between the state of this country when he was sitting on these benches and the state of the country to-day, when other people occupy them. In one part of his speech he told us what a prosperous country we had; we were the envy of other peoples. To-day, alas, within a period of six months—and it is very strange that it should have happened within a period of six months—we are in danger. I think I could not do better than to quote the Deputy's words. I have not got any official report yet, but this newspaper report is, I think, sufficiently accurate—a copy of the Deputy's speech was obviously given to the Press. He said:
As the result of the Government's policy stark poverty and acute distress would now seem to be the only prospect for the people and for their children, and perhaps for their children's children, unless immediate and effective steps are taken to avert threatened calamity and disaster.
He goes on to say:
Great as are the material losses, the spiritual losses are far more terrible. In conditions as they now exist discontent and unrest have developed with alarming rapidity; political passions have been aroused to a degree hitherto unknown even in this country; implacable hatreds between fellow-countrymen are a commonplace; the vices of avarice, greed and envy are widespread; the loosening of morals which invariably accompanies all periods of strife is apparent; class hatred is being stirred up; the very fundamental principles of Christian charity are in danger of being forgotten; and religion itself is being menaced by the stealthy but steady progress of the forces of social and moral disintegration.
Comment on this
That is the picture that the Deputy paints, after a period of six months, of a country that was supposed to be the envy of other countries. And all that can happen in six months.
Comment on this
The mover of this motion has been capable of blowing hot and cold on these matters whenever it suited his purpose. At one time he wanted the people of this country and the people of the world to believe that we had a regular paradise here and, when it suited his purpose, when, for example, he was bringing in the Public Safety Bill, he could tell us quite another tale. This is something of the picture of this paradise when the Deputy wanted to bring in a Public Safety Bill that we have been able to get along with——
Comment on this
——without for the last six months. This is what the Deputy said:
Murder has become one of the normal and expected elements of the present situation....
That, in this paradise which we were supposed to have when the gentlemen opposite occupied these benches!
And the new teachings of Communism which are accepted to a greater or lesser extent by these organisations have greatly increased the danger of the permanent perversion of the youth of the country.
And that Communism, which we were told was so rife that it was necessary to take powers which no civilised Government that calls itself democratic had ever taken before, was able to put up only one candidate in the election and that candidate got a couple of hundred votes in the biggest industrial centre in the country.
Murder, conspiracy and intimidation are being used against the people.
That, in this paradise of law and order which we had when the gentlemen opposite were in power!
The Church and the State are the only bulwarks against chaos. The present movements aim at the destruction of both....
It is very like something that the Deputy said to-day, but it is not to-day that that thing has happened. The Deputy cannot have it both ways as he had in the past. That speech is a two-faced speech and in the same way the Deputy was acting in a two-faced manner in the past. At one time, when he wanted to tell of the prosperity this country had under his régime, it was a wonderful country, the envy of all other countries; but when he wanted to bring in the Public Safety Bill to deprive people of normal liberty, it was simply a country where murder was rife and where Communism was threatening to undermine the very foundations of society.
Comment on this
Is the President aware that since that statement was made a Socialist College has been established in Eccles Street, Dublin?
Comment on this
The powers that we as a Government asked for were sought because we were convinced that without them it would be impossible for this Government or any Government to carry on in circumstances such as now prevail.
But the test of the capacity of the people to maintain a stable State existence lies in its determination to defeat these evils.
What were they? These evils, in this land that was the envy of all other countries during his régime, were, intimidation, violence, Communism and kindred activities."
We are now being put to that test and on our firm action here and now depends the whole life of our State as well as our good name before the other civilised peoples of the world.
The only point I want to make about the matter is this, that we were either prosperous in his time, and a model of law and order or we were not. We were either in the distressful condition that everyone outside believed, as he would like to have us believe in the last paragraph, or we were not. What made us the envy of the world as regards prosperity in his time? What was the prosperity they had in his time for over ten years, which they boasted was the longest time that any other Government had for carrying out its policy? We had 250,000 of the flower of our people running away from this prosperity into the darkness of these uncivilised or depressed countries that he said envied us. Where was the other evidence of prosperity? Was it the 250,000 head of cattle fewer than we had at the beginning, or the 250,000 fewer acres of land in cultivation? Where was the evidence of that prosperity? Not merely was there not prosperity, but the Government at that time had not the foresight, which they accuse us of not having, to see that a period of depression was coming upon this country which it was wise to take measures in advance to meet. The prosperity was simply the prosperity of the propagandists. It had no real existence, and the people themselves judged of that when they made up their minds that they were not going to have a continuation of that Government.
We are told that we blundered into this controversy with Britain; that we outraged all codes of international good manners in our conduct with Britain; that, at the moment of our political exaltation, we rushed out and told the world of our differences with Britain, and that we indulged in the pastime which Irishmen are always represented as being engaged in by those who dislike the Irish people— and who have always tried in the past to misrepresent the Irish people—of twisting the lion's tail. What was it that was said at this supposed moment of exaltation? The mover of this motion could not move it without meanly trying to suggest that the broadcasts which I gave were at the expense of the Irish people. These broadcasts were arranged by the Columbia Broadcasting Station of America and did not cost the Irish people one farthing. (Hear, hear.)
Comment on this
The mover of the motion hopes that we have all short memories. Let us go through this broadcast and see where it offends against good taste, and where there is a twisting of the lion's tail. I have it here, and I can go through it paragraph by paragraph, and I defy any member of the House to show where there was anything that any country could take objection to. It was given when we were not in office. It was given on 4th March and was a repetition of the pledges and the policy we put before the Irish people and nothing more. It opens with a greeting to friends in America whose aid had been of such assistance in the National struggle in the past, and who had been directly of assistance in the National struggle to put into office a Government that had for its purpose the working out of the National destiny in accordance with National traditions. After the introductory greeting I said:
Every friend of Ireland is, I am sure, overjoyed, as I am, at the thought of the re-union of the national forces here—particularly in this year of St. Patrick's Centenary, and of the Eucharistic Congress—the re-union of those forces so disastrously divided by the Treaty of 1921. For ten years our nation has been struggling in agony in an attempt to free itself from the dilemma in which it was then placed with an oath of allegiance, hateful to all who prized independence, standing in the way of acceptance of the one rule of government by which discipline and ordered progress could be secured.
Is that an objectionable passage? Is it or is it not a fact that that Oath of Allegiance did stand in the way of national unity, and in the way of ordered conditions here and made it necessary for the previous Government —instead of getting goodwill and cooperation—to bring in the Public Safety Act to which I have just referred? The next paragraph says:
This oath will now be removed and every section of our people will at last, without coercion of conscience, or sacrifice of principle, be able to send their representatives to the people's assembly where national policy and the direction of the national advance can then be authoritatively determined by majority vote.
Is that the offending paragraph? Where is the outrage to international good manners in that paragraph or of diplomatic usage? I said that the Oath would be removed and, speaking before action for the removal of the Oath, I said that in our opinion, according to the best advice we had got, it could be done and was within our competence and was not a violation of the Treaty. I continued:
Thus we shall have internal peace without coercive legislation, and with that peace the conditions which will make it possible to devote the energies of our people to the task of economic re-organisation and reconstruction, so that the resources of our country and the labour of our people may be rationally utilised to provide a decent standard of comfort for all our citizens, and our young manhood and womanhood be given the opportunity, heretofore denied to many of them, of earning a living in their own land.
What is wrong with that? Why should a statement of that kind be regarded as opening a quarrel with any country? It had reference to our own internal conditions and the policy which our Government, when it took office, would put before it.
Parents in this country must no longer be doomed to rear their children for export. To provide opportunities for work for our unemployed must then be our first task. Such opportunities can be created if we give to our own people the work which we are at present giving to strangers. The goods that we unnecessarily import would give employment to more hands than we have at present unemployed.
I do not see anything there that would offend any foreign country.
The extent of our dependence upon foreign produce and manufactures will be appreciated when I point out that the three millions of us here in the Free State—in twenty-six of the thirty-two counties of our island— purchase more goods from Great Britain than any other country in the world.
Is that the offending paragraph?
It is hard to make people realise that to-day we, the people of the Free State, are Britain's best customers and that we buy from her more than the 300,000,000 of Indians. We buy from her £10 worth of goods for every £9 worth she buys from us.
Why should the English or anybody else take offence at that? It is a statement of fact.
Within the last ten years we bought from foreign countries £120,000,000 worth of goods more than we sold. This drain of our wealth is impoverishing us and we must stop it. The drain of the millions of pounds which Mr. Cosgrave's Government has been sending to England yearly without justification must also stop.
I think that possibly that is the offending paragraph.
How many realise that the burden of our annual payments to Britain is relatively heavier on us than the burden of the War Reparation payments on Germany? For every £100 the Germans raise for Governmental expenses, they have to find £20 for Reparation payments. We have to find £24 for our payments to England. Some time ago, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, when British Prime Minister, admitted that no other country exported so much of its revenues as ours did and stated that Britain's capacity to bear financial burdens was 66 times as great as that of the Free State. On that basis, our annual payments to England are heavier on us than a payment of £330,000,000 annually would be on Britain, and that is a sum ten times as great as Britain's annual debt payments to the United States.
Perhaps that was the offending paragraph.
I repeat—the burden of our annual payments to Britain is ten times that of the burden of Britain's annual debt payments to the United States. It is clear that we could not continue to bear such a burden and prosper. Our determination to keep here the land annuities at present being handed over to England is referred to, by those who wish to misrepresent the position, as "repudiation." It is nothing of the kind.
I may say that I used these words deliberately, because when I had been in the United States previously there was a campaign to misrepresent our attitude.
These moneys are not legally due to England. As a measure of justice, these moneys were given to Ireland by the British Parliament on the dissolution of the Union partnership. On that dissolution, Britain retained for herself and the other peoples of the partnership everything that had been procured with moneys from the common purse into which Ireland was made to pay more than her just share. Commissions of Inquiry set up by the British Parliament admitted this and estimates made by British officials of Ireland's over-payments amounted to three times the total amount of the advances for land purchase in Ireland.
This is longer than I thought, but it is worth reading to show what this offending statement was that I broadcast—so offensive to Britain that it precluded any chance of reasonable negotiations and precluded any possibility of settlement.
As a measure of justice, then, I say the annuities were given to the two Irish State Treasuries, North and South. Those collected by the Northern Treasury are retained there. Those collected by the Free State have been wilfully handed over to Britain. Mischief-makers wish to represent our efforts to secure fair play for the people of Ireland as a policy of antagonism to England.
We have had remarks of a similar kind to-day. We are to have a similar resolution to try to broadcast that same misrepresentation to-morrow.
That is as false as the other misrepresentations I have referred to. My desire has always been to bring about the friendliest relations between Great Britain and Ireland, but I know that the only sure foundation for such relations and for a lasting peace is justice and the recognition of the right of our people to be free. That is what I strove for from 1919 to 1921, when President of the Republic, and that is what I now intend to strive for. I have no dislike of the English people. I want to see the people of Ireland and the people of Britain as next door neighbours, living beside each other in peace and harmony, freely co-operating in matters of agreed common concern. Both peoples will benefit. Mutual understanding and the readiness to be fair, each to the other, is all that is required. The political wrong that stands out from all others is the partition of our country. It was enacted despite the protests of the overwhelming majority of our people. The area cut off was not determined on any principle of right or justice. It was gerrymandering pure and simple. The Unionists were given the largest area they had sufficient majority to hold. Even Ulster itself was partitioned for that purpose. Partition was not intended to solve the problem of minorities, for the Nationalist minority in the area cut off is relatively greater than the Unionist minority in the island as a whole. If the relations between Ireland and Great Britain are to be placed on a foundation of really lasting peace, this wrong must be righted. To the people of our race who are listening to me, I appeal to use their influence so that Ireland, this ancient land of their fathers, the land of Patrick, of Columbcille and Brigid, this land of Tone, and of Emmet—whose anniversary this is—may have her unity restored to her.
That is the offending document. I have read every particle of it. I ask any Deputy who is prepared to judge fairly to say whether that document is any justification for the pretence that, by some blundering attitude of ours, we made negotiations and normal relations with the Government of Great Britain impossible. I read the document out as a whole, both for the purpose I have indicated and to show that there is no change in our attitude now from our attitude when we came into office or the attitude we adopted in the General Election. We went before the people. We have not led the people astray. We said to the people: "We are going to remove the Oath if you put us into power." We told them that we were going to remove the Oath for the reasons I gave in that broadcast speech—because it was necessary to remove it if we were going to have internal peace and to be rid of coercive measures and the misrepresentations of our country to which those who have to bring in coercive measures have to descend. I told them that we were going to keep the Land Annuities, that they would not be paid to Britain until Britain made good her case to get them. We were charged with calling this an "economic war." In the very speech in which the mover of the Resolution says we called it an "economic war," he himself, right through, calls it an economic war. Yet, that is the term that we are supposed to have coined to magnify the present situation. It is said that if we were going into war we should have chosen our time. Our time was determined by the time the former Government chose to go to the country. They chose to go to the country at a certain time for their own purposes. They went to the country and the country rejected them. We promised that we would not hand these moneys over. When the first payment came along, we made good our pledge to the people by keeping it, and not handing the moneys over in June. If the Deputy had so much foresight, he should have been able to foresee his own defeat. If he were interested in the future of this country, he should have chosen to go at a time when we would not have our cattle—when our cattle would be sold. Apparently, he had not that foresight. We, however, had given our pledge to the people and we acted in accordance with our pledge. We refused to pay over that money, believing that Britain was not entitled to it until she had made good her case to get it.
The question of arbitration again of course has come up. One does not want to be a political genius to know that in a matter of that kind if there is to be a settlement, it has to be got either by submitting the case to a third party to be decided by arbitration, or else it has to be decided by negotiations. It was quite clear that these two courses were open and they were the two courses along which, if the money was not to be paid, and if we were not to continue the policy of our predecessors, a settlement would have to be reached. The British Government put up a proposal of arbitration and we accepted it. They put up a proposal of arbitration with a condition. They said it was a matter of principle with them that the tribunal should be a British Commonwealth tribunal of the character outlined in the Imperial Conference Report of 1930.
I want to make it clear to Deputies in the House what were the agreements that were arrived at in that Report. One would imagine from the accusations and charges brought against us that there had been an agreement that whenever a dispute arose between two members of the British Commonwealth they would submit it to the arbitration of a court of the character outlined there. Nothing of the sort did happen. No such agreement was made. They were particularly careful to avoid any such agreement being arrived at. The agreement in so far as it was an agreement was this: that if the two parties did agree, then that an ad hoc tribunal would be set up of a certain character. But it was to be a voluntary submission on both sides. Neither party had a right to cite the other before the tribunal. That was the idea.
We did not violate any agreement come to by refusing to have our case submitted to such a tribunal. If the British made it a matter of principle we might ask ourselves why? What right had they to make it a matter of principle? It had not been accepted as a matter of principle at the Imperial Conference. Then what right had the British Government to make it a matter of principle—a something that would be binding on themselves? They had not any right. Then as they made it a matter of principle we could not accept it because it would be taken as a precedent, whenever in the future there would be a dispute, that such a dispute would have to be settled by such a tribunal. Our predecessors objected to and refused in certain cases to accept such a tribunal. But now the things that they rejected we must take, and if we do not take the things they rejected then we are acting unpatriotically as if the same methods that operated in their case did not operate in ours and with greater force.
The road to arbitration, therefore, was definitely closed, but not by us. We said: "We are prepared to have this case tried before an international tribunal. So long as there is no restriction whatsoever on the personnel, we are prepared to have it tried, but if you make it a matter of principle to restrict the personnel to citizens of the States of the British Empire, then we do not accept that principle and you are closing the door on the road to arbitration." They have not receded a bit from that. They have modified the agreement come to at the Imperial Conference. It is they, if anybody, who are acting contrary to the spirit of the 1930 Conference. There it was enacted that a case could be brought before the tribunal, whether that case was justiciable or not. They were prepared to waive that, but they were not prepared to waive a departure from the position they took up that it was a matter of principle that disputes between two members of the British Commonwealth should be tried before a Commonwealth tribunal. That is the position with regard to arbitration. It is known to the House. All that we claim is that it was not we banged and closed the door. It was the British Government, and they did that at the earliest possible stage.
We are accused that we did not at the very beginning send a nice polite Note to the British and say: "We do not agree with you in this particular matter of the oath. We are having the oath removed. Will you allow us to do so?" Our position was that the removal of the oath did not run across the Treaty; that it was a domestic matter, and that it was within our competence to remove that oath; that it did not run across the Treaty in any way whatever, and we proceeded accordingly.
With regard to the land annuities our position was not new. The British knew perfectly well, for we informed them in advance, that we would not pay these annuities when the payments were due. There were negotiations, the result of which I have just told you as regards arbitration. The other road was by arbitration and negotiation.
What has the present Government done to make negotiations impossible? We take, I admit, a different view of our position from those on the opposite benches. They have only one justification for their payment of these moneys for the past ten years and that was that they were legally due. They stand by what they call a binding agreement and what the British call a binding agreement. We do not agree they are binding agreements at all. We hold that that agreement of 1923, apart altogether from its provisional character, was not put before this House and did not receive the sanction of this House.
With regard to the extent to which agreements between Executives are binding on a country, what is the usual practice? There was a practice in Britain, as far as I understand, up to 1914. It was a practice, in the case of Britain, that all such agreements as involved a charge on the public purse should be brought before the House of Commons, before the representatives of the British people, and ratified and sanctioned. Since the War, the practice has been universally that treaties of an international character of any magnitude, not merely treaties involving payments of money but all treaties of magnitude, are brought forward for ratification. We know that in other countries it is a part of the Constitution that such agreements should be formally ratified. But, of course, the members of the opposite benches say: "Oh, well, what is the difference? If agreements made by the Executives are not binding, then agreements made by the Parliaments will not be binding, and these agreements not being binding, agreements made by a referendum will not be binding and agreements made by a generation will not be binding because the next generation might repudiate them." Surely, nobody is so foolish as to be impressed by anything of that sort. The Executive, in matters of that sort, are merely the negotiating instruments of the Parliament. The Parliament does represent the country and a continuity, and there is all the difference in the world between a purely Executive agreement and an agreement sanctioned by Parliament. This particular agreement was not disclosed as an agreement to the Dáil at that time. It was kept in the files and not disclosed to the Irish people for a period of nine years after-it was signed. Are we unfair in saying that the Executive on the opposite benches were not frank? I put it no further than that. Is it unjust or unfair to say that they were not frank with the people or with the representatives of the people? Why was it kept secret? Why were its terms not divulged? If there was nothing to hide, why was it not brought into the light of day? I accuse them certainly of not being frank. They probably had good motives for not revealing it as a whole and for not bringing it forward to be ratified as other agreements were ratified. It was not ratified in this Parliament, nor was it ratified by the Parliament of Great Britain where also, as a whole, it was never brought forward or ratified until we learned from the dispatch of Mr. Thomas that it was going to be made the foundation of the British claim.
I should like to point out to you—I have pointed it out before—that the case that was made by the lawyers representing the former administration was based on a different principle altogether. It was the principle that these land annuities were not a public debt, but were in the nature of a private debt—a position which no lawyer would attempt to defend before any court. But that was not the position taken up by the British Government. They did not say: "These are only debts due from the citizens of your country to the stockholders, whether citizens of your country or elsewhere." They knew they could not stand upon that. They said: "Here is an agreement binding in honour and in law on your State—this agreement of 1923—and we claim that we get these annuities in accordance with that agreement." We claim here that our people cannot be bound by such an arrangement come to between the Executives. We claim that in accordance with the practice of the British Parliament itself, in accordance with the general practice of States, and in accordance with the resolution which was passed here in the Dáil itself, such arrangements cannot bind the people unless they are submitted to and ratified by the representatives of the people. That resolution was passed, I would remind the Dáil, before the later agreement of 1926, which was called the Ultimate Financial Settlement, was signed. This agreement also, I would point out, was kept from the Irish people without being revealed as a whole, although it was supposed to be the Ultimate Financial Settlement to which all people who had been reading about it and taking an interest in it were looking forward. The 1923 agreement was kept secret for nine years and the 1926 agreement was kept secret for eight or nine months. Here is the resolution which was passed by Dáil Eireann on February 26, 1926, in an amended form as proposed by Deputy Cosgrave, the then President:
That the Dáil, recognising that Saorstát Eireann cannot be committed to or bound by any agreement with an external Government without the prior sanction and consent of the Dáil, has no desire to limit the Executive Council in the exercise of its functions or in the discharge of its duty to defend and promote the interests of the State and its people.
What does that mean? Its meaning is obvious. It means that the Executive of the day are empowered to negotiate agreements, but that the country cannot be committed to or bound by any agreement with an external Government without the prior sanction and consent of the Dáil. That is the principle which we are standing by. It was recognised by the Dáil in 1926 on the motion of Deputy Cosgrave himself. We stand by that principle. We think it is a right principle, and that the Dáil were right in standing by that principle. It is the only right principle, and I put this supposition to members of the House—suppose, just for a moment, that the thing was the other way about. Suppose there had been a British Government that at that time, for one reason or another of its own, agreed that as a financial settlement they would pay £5,000,000, or sixty-six times five if it was to be proportionate, that is £330,000,000— suppose a sum of that magnitude was agreed to by the British Government of 1926, and that that Government agreed to a financial settlement by which Britain was to pay that sum to this country, and that that was entered into and was not ratified by the Parliament—not accepted, in other words, by the representatives of the British people. And suppose that it had continued doing that for eight or ten years, and that somebody like Mr. Snowden or Mr. Thomas came along and said: "We do not know of any such agreement; the Executive of the day, if they entered into such an agreement, had no power to bind our people to it; the fact that it has been made for a number of years, whether through misunderstanding or otherwise, does not deprive us of the right to discontinue the payments, and until our Parliament authorises us to pay them we will cease to pay them." Suppose that that happened. Do you think that we would have any power to enforce any legal claim which we might think we had in these circumstances when they could point out to us what their practice was, and what the commonsense of the situation was— that it is only by the body of representatives of the people and not by the Executive in secret that the nation could be bound? Is it not quite obvious to everybody that we would fail and that we would be in a hopeless position? And I say that the British are in a hopeless position to-day. They have no right legally, and what are they doing? We are told that these measures which they are taking are not intended to be reprisals, and are not intended to be coercive—that it is an attempt simply to get these moneys back.
Now, it is extraordinary, with all this goodwill which they say they have for us, that they should be treating us in a very different fashion to the way they are treating Russia. Russia did not pay her debts to the British and repudiated the debts. We deny that we have a debt. Yet the British Government, which has placed a virtual embargo on our exports, has taken no similar action against Russia. Not merely that but they are seeking trade with Russia. They are even giving Russia millions by way of credit to keep up that trade and yet their trade with this country was much greater than the trade with Russia. Have we not reason to think that there is something peculiar in the situation when we find that we are treated in this fashion and that another country is treated in quite a different fashion although even from the British point of view the offences would be in the same category? We deny they are in the same category, but let us even take the British position. What is the reason? Obviously, the reason is that they think that they can squeeze us. I see no other. They think that by squeezing us they would be able to get the Irish people to cease supporting the Government they have chosen and to put in a Government that would be more suitable to them—perhaps I might use the word "acceptable" as the word "suitable" might be misunderstood—a Government more acceptable to them. I say deliberately as far as I can see that the whole aim of British policy in this matter has been to try to apply pressure to drive the Irish people from behind the Government they deliberately chose and try to get restored here the Government that was working in such amity with England in the past. I have no doubt whatever that if we were to continue making these payments we might also be able to purchase British goodwill. We cannot continue making these payments and we shall not continue to make these payments, believing as we do that they are not due from us.
We heard of the hardship that has been imposed by the British tariffs, but we heard very little of the hardship that was imposed in the past by these payments. Let us see what they amounted to in relation to our agricultural trade with Great Britain. Take our butter. We got for our butter in Great Britain in 1931 just over £2,000,000. The annuities alone amount to 143 per cent.—144 per cent. really— of that figure. In other words, we were not merely giving them all our butter for nothing but if we increased the amount of butter sent to them by 44 per cent. we would be making a present of the whole amount to them— producing it and handing it over to Britain. That would merely equal the present of £3,000,000 we were paying in land annuities alone. If we were to count our payments at £5,000,000, as they were, then 239 per cent.—in fact, 240 per cent. is the nearer figure —of our butter would be sold before it would equal that payment of £5,000,000. In other words nearly 2½ times—2 4-10 times—the amount of the butter we exported would be presented to them.
The amount we were paying to Britain was the same as if we had made Britain a present of practically two and a half times the butter we were selling to them. We did not hear Deputies on the opposite benches then telling us that the farmers were slaving, toiling and producing this butter and that we would have to sell two and a half times the amount we were exporting before it would equal the money we were giving over to Britain.
We heard also about eggs. Our exports of eggs were worth roughly last year £2,227,000. We would have to sell 134.7 per cent. of that figure—that is we would have to sell 34 per cent. more—before it would equal the payment of £3,000,000. If we take the figure as £5,000,000, we would have to produce and sell two and a quarter times the whole of the eggs we had, to equal that figure. Then we come to the question of cattle. We can take the tariff on cattle at present. I remember Deputy O'Sullivan speaking in Kildare and saying that there might be a tariff of £1 a head, £2 or £3 per head. I pointed out at that time that £3 per head would not equal the amount that Britain was getting quietly by means of the land annuities. The amount we paid in land annuities represented 23.7 per cent. of our total trade in cattle. Our total payments of £5,000,000 would represent just the present tariff of 40 per cent. on cattle. We were paying actually the equivalent of a tariff of 40 per cent. Let them get every penny of that 40 per cent. tariff on our cattle and they will not be getting any more than we were paying them then. We were giving them 40 per cent. of the total that we got from our cattle trade by these payments. In the case of live pigs our payments of £5,000,000 would mean that we would not merely give them the number of pigs we were sending, but that we would have to increase that number by two and a quarter times and make them a present of the whole lot before it would equal the amount of the payments we were making them. In the case of sheep, the payments would equal about four and a quarter times the value of our sheep trade.
Why did Deputies on the opposite benches not come to the relief of the farmers then—these makers of great bargains, these people who want you to imagine that all you have got to do is to go to the British Government and say: "We are being badly treated, will you not be good to us?" and that there and then you will get a grand bargain? Why did not these people, who know so much about making good bargains, go to the British Government if bargains were so easily made? Why did they not go to the British Government and say to them: "We cannot continue to give you four and a half times as much as all our sheep exports are worth and hope to prosper; we cannot give you two and a quarter times all our exports of pigs are worth, make you a present of it every year, and hope to prosper"? Under present conditions, with depressed prices, when every Government is asking to be relieved of inter-Governmental payments, which are admittedly the cause of depressed conditions, why did not these makers of good bargains—these wise statesmen who are looking into the future but who cannot see their own defeat though it is staring them in the face—why did they not go at that time and say to the British Government: "This is unfair to our Government; we admit we made a bargain; we do not say we are not bound by it, but we ask you to relieve our people of what is an impossible burden for them to bear"? Now they think they can do it, and why? Why do they think they could do it now when they could not do it then? Something must have happened in the meantime. I suggest it is the change of Government. I suggest that the only thing that has happened is that there has been a change of Government, that the Irish people have shown that they did not want the other Government, that was doing these things, to continue in office. It is because of that fact that there is a new situation.
What is our policy? On every single occasion on which there was a suggestion of negotiation we have responded and said we were willing. Deputy Dillon put a question to me. When we get the British Government putting these questions, I shall answer them. When some representative of the British Government makes a statement such as Deputy Dillon makes now, I am prepared to give an answer but I am not going to give an answer to some member of the House, who is going to put a question of that sort that is purely hypothetical and cannot influence the real situation one bit. It is for the British Government, if they want it, to put these questions. They know perfectly well from our attitude, from the beginning, that we wanted to have friendly relations between the two peoples, that the last thing we wanted was to stir up old hatreds. We do not want to do that.
We are quite as prepared to meet and discuss the case as we were in the past, but if there is to be a discussion of any value it must not be the type of discussion in which two parties settle down simply to argue their case. It is quite clear that if both sides are going to argue the merits of their case you must have some third party to decide. That is quite the sort of thing you could do if you were going to have a third party, some tribunal, to give a decision, but that is not negotiation as I understand it. We have not widened this question beyond the financial side of it. I do not know what Deputy Blythe wants. In the first part of his speech he seemed to state that we were somehow widening it out to circles beyond that of the financial relations between the countries, and at the end of his speech he said that we would have to widen it out. Now which is it to be?
As far as we are concerned our attitude has been made quite clear. We are not deceiving the Irish people. We took office under a certain understanding, and we have been true and will be true to that understanding until we go before the Irish people again. When we go before the Irish people we will put forward the policy we think is best, at that particular time, for the country. Until the Irish people are consulted, we have definite obligations and definite pledges to them, and we mean to be faithful to those pledges in so far as they are limiting us in any direction. Where we have imposed limitations on ourselves we are going to be as faithful to those limitations as we were to the promises we made that we were going to advance in certain directions. That is the only answer I can give to any Deputy who questions me on our present attitude— the only answer I am justified in giving, and the only answer that he is justified in asking. Therefore, I say to Deputy Dillon two things. With regard to the question he put me, I say that that is a question for some representative of the British Government to put, and if it is so put I will give the answer. I see no purpose in answering it here and I have indicated why.
As regards Deputy Blythe and "where we are going," I have said definitely that where we gave pledges to our people we regard these as sacred promises; we mean to keep them both in the direction in which they limit us and in the direction in which we have pledged ourselves to advance. I therefore say that this vote of censure which has been moved is unjustified.
Comment on this
Is the President concluding? The usual practice is to give the mover of the motion half an hour.
Comment on this
I have often not got that myself, but it does not matter, I will give it. The position then is this, that we regard this vote of censure as altogether unjustified. The speech of the mover depicts a condition which is not the real condition, both in the picture he gave of the condition of the country before and its condition now. There is no way in which we can bring about negotiations; there is no way in which the present situation can be remedied except by recognition of the fact that if we want to maintain our right to these annuities we must proceed exactly as we have proceeded. It is for us here to take note of what our internal resources are, and to get every element in the country, in so far as we can, determined that they will lose no opportunity of trying to recorder their economic life so as to meet the situation that would, in any case, have had to be faced. It is quite obvious that that situation was there, and I therefore ask, with confidence, the members of the House to turn down this motion.
Comment on this
I seldom start off a speech with the applause of the Opposition, or rather of the Government. However, I take it as a compliment. We have been treated to a very long speech on the part of the President— one hour and five minutes.
Comment on this
He has travelled over the whole ground. Some of it had been already covered by Deputy Norton. We were asked what the condition of affairs here was some twelve or thirteen months ago—what it was that led us to say that there was prosperity here in this country. Perhaps the best description I can give in that direction is from a bulletin of the Swiss Bank Corporation on the world economic crisis. This article calculates that twenty million workers are now suffering from enforced unemployment, whilst two or three years ago unemployment was practically unknown outside Great Britain. Diagrams show that in the middle of 1930 only three countries could be regarded as prosperous, compared with ten countries a year earlier and twenty-seven countries ten years before. The three countries classed as prosperous are Denmark, Ireland and Norway, with France in an intermediate condition below them, but in advance of the depressed countries.
Other information is also available from the League of Nations in connection with that, but if Deputies or the President want to see exact particulars regarding the condition of affairs here during the last ten years he will find them in the statistical abstracts published here last year and the year before, showing 240,000 persons in insurable occupation ten years ago and last year 294,000 persons; showing also a marked reduction in the amount of unemployment insurance paid in the first three years, 1922 to 1925, in the following three years, and in the succeeding three years from that time; showing it is not by any means a simple extension of the number of persons in insurable occupations, or rather occupations in which they were insured and which they were enjoying up to that time, but that we actually made solvent the Unemployment Fund that was insolvent a few years ago. There are 50,000 persons more in employment in the short space of nine years. No other country in the whole world can show such a remarkable advance in that connection, and Deputy Norton was speaking with his tongue in his cheek this afternoon when he was criticising the industrial activity of the Government in the last ten years.
Comment on this
I have read the home assistance figure and I find there are 12,000 persons more in receipt of home assistance than there were at the time I was in the far benches and responsible for the Government of this country.
Comment on this
I did not interrupt the little Vice-President. The figure was 94,000, and it is now 12,000 in excess of that figure. I did not interrupt the President but the moment you get in a point with those people you have interruptions. The Vice-President should behave himself. We are told now that this agreement signed in 1923 was not sanctioned by this House. In the Appropriation Act of 1923 and in each subsequent Act and three times this year there is down in our statutory enactments that these sums are to be paid to Great Britain.
When an agreement is made with another country either here or in Great Britain, and I believe the practice is the same in practically all the Dominions, no agreement is worth the paper it is written on respecting money unless the money is voted by Parliament, and it is well known by the Front Benches, and Deputy Davin knows it, that these moneys were brought up here and voted in this House. It cannot be denied. I have the Appropriation Act here. I can show it and read out the figures, and read out to whom the money is to be paid. It is to the British Government.
Comment on this
My Government did more for this country than your Government could do if you were in office for one hundred years. What was one of the promises Fianna Fáil made when looking for votes? "Fianna Fáil stands for peace." What does peace mean? Are the farmers in this country at the present moment in peace? We heard a few moments ago some of the mathematical rubbish which has resulted in putting those gentlemen over there on the front benches. We have heard it would cost twice and a half the cost of butter to pay the land annuities and other payments to Great Britain; twice and a half the cost of the export of eggs to pay them, and it would cost forty per cent. on the cattle exports to pay them. Does it not follow that the sum total of these has to be added in order to produce the money? No, that is not told to the people; that is reserved. People have an idea, from statements made here, that we have got to give butter for nothing, eggs for nothing and forty per cent. on our cattle for nothing. The fact of the matter is that the people now are taxed forty per cent. on their cattle, and they are taxed also in respect of other items, and the President who is a child, I am sure, about finance, whatever he may know about mathematics, knows full well that last year or the year before or any previous year (I think I am hitting my blows home) was not the time to go to the British Government to ask for a reconsideration of these payments. What is the history during the last eighteen months of Great Britain? Anybody who has studied the situation there, who has even read the newspapers, realises that some thirteen or fourteen months ago a serious financial and economic crisis faced the British people. It meant a change of Government. Along with a change of Government it meant a Supplementary Budget. It meant furthermore that they went off the gold standard, and I am sure by this time the Minister for Finance realises the significance of that departure. That is the period we were invited to go over to negotiate on these matters. We were in a far stronger financial position than Great Britain at that time, and nobody knows it better, however much they may deny it, than the three Ministers sitting on the far side.
The position now is quite different. Cattle prices, sheep prices, pig prices, practically all the agricultural prices, have fallen and there is now an opportunity in view of all the circumstances of the case and from the different approaches made by the various Governments, not alone here but all over the world, in respect of debts and so on, to point out that the position here is such that agriculture, our main industry, is no longer equal to the burden of meeting those particular demands and to ask, as the British are now asking the Americans, as the French are putting it to the Americans, and as the Germans are supporting both of them to consider these matters on an international basis. And further, there is no reason in the world, and there is every good reason, why we should not get from the British Government and the British Parliament those preferences and those advantages which have been given to other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations whose business, whose trade, and whose usefulness in respect of economics is by no means of the same standard as our own. At this moment, they are considering in respect of lamb and mutton an economy on that particular product of agricultural produce, and they are prepared to go further even than preference to ensure that there will be a supply of mutton and lamb in future for the British market. Why could we not get these advantages and these privileges in respect of our main product—cattle?
Comment on this
There is no use in making senseless interruptions like that, because we have it on the authority, even of the British Ministers, that if the approach is made on the basis of our incapacity to meet that particular burden, they are prepared to consider it. Why not try them? After all, what is going to be the future of Governments between countries if we do not adhere to, and accept agreements that have been made? If they at any time had shown, in connection with these negotiations, a disposition not to listen to us, other than the international formula which I adverted to a while ago, that is, inability to pay, if they said whether you can pay or not we are going to tax you for that, then there would probably be some basis for the President's very senseless interruption.
It so happened here this evening that we were spoken to at some length by the Minister for Education. Looking over the debates which took place on the Treaty I find he was one of the very few persons in the Dáil at that time, and they are not many on that side now who were in Parliament at that time, who pointed out that what economies we could effect, in respect of the new administration, would be practically swamped by the interest and the Sinking Fund on the National Debt. And further, here is the publication by the Party to which the Deputy beyond belongs and the Ministers belonged some ten years ago, clause by clause, Document No. 2. What is the sum and substance of it? The financial clause reads "that Ireland shall assume liability for such share of the present debt of Great Britain and Ireland," and so on.
Comment on this
I will read it all if you like: "that Ireland shall assume liability for such share of the present debt of Great Britain and Ireland and of the payment of war pensions as existing at this date as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of set-off or counter-claim, the amount of such sums being determined, in default of agreement, by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of Ireland or of a British Commonwealth." And this note comes underneath. "Similar to the Treaty clause, with the important difference that Ireland (line 1) accepts liability for a capital sum, not an annual payment, like a tribute." Then it goes on to say that the arbitrator might be an Irish or a British citizen. What was the other statement of the President? During the period we were negotiating in respect of Article 5 he announced, if my recollection is correct, that we were to be liable for a sum of nineteen million pounds according to the accounts that had been submitted by the British Government before he left office.
Comment on this
That misrepresentation has been repeated thousands of times, and each time I got an opportunity I have corrected it. What I said was that—speaking from recollection of papers which I saw during the negotiations, the British were claiming on the 1920 basis eighteen or nineteen million pounds, and that is a fact.
Comment on this
The fact of the matter is, it was brought to the public notice that a big bill had come in. What was the inference to be drawn from that? Was it that it was sent over for support, that we were to meet it, or repudiate it?
Comment on this
Here is the statement from the President:
If there are any people left who believe in the Treaty policy ... they will be finally disillusioned when that other Commission provided for in the Treaty—the Financial Commission—is set up and comes to deliver its award. As a warning in advance I inform all these that the demand of the British at the time of the negotiations was for a yearly sum of over £19,000,000
What about the first part?
Comment on this
If Deputies want to get these things off I will send them to them. Again the President says:
Even the man with a stake in the country would not like the Treaty when they saw the amount of the national debt they would be saddled with.
It was in relation to this, and in connection with all this, that we were negotiating, and got off, in 1925, with complete immunity from the national debt and were put into a position that no other country in Europe or America was in. We were free as no other country was, without a penny piece of debt. We have been advising the Government what to do for the last three months. We have been advising, and even supporting them, and the President, notwithstanding the pronouncement of his own press, made the admission when crossing over to the Conference in London that the speech I made a day or two previously was a helpful speech.
Just one or two other matters before I conclude. On the 29th September, it was announced in the sporting pages of the Irish Times—I am sure Ministers opposite never read the sporting pages of the papers, they would do better if they did—that Mr. Leader sent eight yearlings to Newmarket in England to be sold. He bought them at the Dublin Horse Show for 400 guineas, that is practically £50 a piece. He received, as well as I remember, over 400 guineas for one and got £1,680 guineas for the other seven. That is to say he would have got 2,200 guineas for the eight. There is a striking lesson. They were tainted goods here. The unpopularity of this conflict had prevented British buyers from coming here, but an Englishman bought them; they lost their taint, and that Englishman made a profit in selling them in Newmarket of the difference between 400 guineas and 2,200 guineas.
Comment on this
I never made a wild speech at that time, or any other time and I never missed a train and gave it as an excuse, nor am I late of the South Irish Horse either.
Comment on this
No, sir, and I shall tell the Minister more. I was well bred and well reared, and I have been taught to behave myself in public and in private and I hope this country will always have in its Ministry people who will show the rearing they got in this country.
Comment on this
May I ask the President a question arising out of a statement made by the Minister for Finance?
Comment on this
Are you, a Chinn Comhairle, going to allow another speech at this stage of the debate?
Comment on this
Question put.
Do you agree with this result?