Bunreacht na hEireann (Dréacht)—Coiste (Ath-thógaint).
Contributions 131–270 of 270. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I understand that amendment No. 100 is bound up with it, but I am not sure. However, I will accept your ruling on it, Sir. I move amendments Nos. 34, 35, 36 and 37:—
34. In Section 2, sub-section 1º, to delete the word "Taoiseach" line 2 and substitute the word "Government".
35. In Section 2, sub-section 2º, to delete the words "may, in his absolute discretion, refuse to" line 1 and substitute therefor the words "shall not".
36. In Section 2, sub-section 2º, to delete the words "Taoiseach who" line 2 and substitute therefor the words "Government which".
37. In Section 2 to delete sub-section 3º.
Section 2 of Article 13 deals with the very important matter of the dissolution of the Dáil. It also deals with the summoning of the Dáil, not so important a matter, but still of importance, and particularly so when joined with this very important matter of dissolution. As Section 2 stands, the President shall dissolve and summon Dáil Eireann on the advice of the Taoiseach. Secondly, the question of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dáil Eireann, and has power to get a dissolution, emerges. The phrase in Article 2 is so cast as definitely to convey the meaning that, ordinarily, a Taoiseach who has failed to command the support of a majority in Dáil Eireann ought to get a dissolution if he demands it, because the phrase has suffered the peculiar twist that the President may refuse to grant a dissolution to such a Taoiseach, that is, a Taoiseach who has lost the support of the majority in Dáil Eireann. Then, finally, we have the smaller matter that the President may—and I am reading that as "at his own discretion"— convene a meeting of either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, because the phrase has it that he may do it "after consultation with the Council of State."
That position is to be contrasted with the present position which, I think, is the democratic one. The ordinary position is that the dissolution of a representative House is under its own control. The summoning follows almost as a matter of course. It is a smaller matter but it is generally under the control of that representative House also. It has been a constitutional provision in this State since the beginning that the head of an Executive Council who had lost the support of the majority of the House could not demand a dissolution. In contrast to that, we have sub-section (2) of Section 2 of Article 13 which, from the way the sentence is thrown, conveys the implication that even a Taoiseach having lost the support of the majority of Dáil Eireann should be able to get a dissolution. I think that is wrong. I think the present position, in which there is an absolute prohibition against the head of an Executive Council who has lost the support of the majority in Dáil Eireann getting a dissolution, is the correct position.
As far as the first paragraph is concerned, I have got considerable enlightenment from the last argument, because I gather that the President's view of phraseology in this Constitution is that where the phrase "on the advice of the Government" occurs, there is implied virtual unanimity of the Government, but where the phrase "on the advice of the Taoiseach" occurs, so far from there being any implication of a unanimous, or virtually unanimous, view of the Government, the phrase is used where the Taoiseach is acting more or less off his own. Certainly, there is no context of unanimous support, or virtually unanimous support, for the Government, so that the new situation proposed in the Constitution is that a dissolution of the Dáil could be demanded by a Taoiseach, even though he had lost the support of the majority of his colleagues, and, secondly, a dissolution of the Dáil may be demanded, and the implication of the framework of the sentence is, "and should be granted," to a Taoiseach, head of an Executive Council, who has ceased to command a majority in Dáil Eireann. That is completely against the ordinary constitutional provisions as known in the Constitution; it is against the practice; and I wait to hear the argument to be put forward for the change proposed.
The last point is why should the President at any time be given power —after meeting this body, the Council of State, his own bodyguard of yes-men whom he simply must call together, hear the views of the members and then can completely disregard their views—to convene a meeting of either or both Houses of the Oireachtas? This Parliament has been enabled, through its Standing Orders, to secure a speedy summoning of the Dáil to meet an emergency situation. We can carry on with that. I do not see any reason for the intervention of this outside person.
Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted, and 20 Deputies being present,
Comment on this
I have been asked to explain why the existing system is to be changed. My answer to that is that the existing system is, in my opinion, a bad one. Let us take this question, in the first place, about advice by the Taoiseach alone. I hold that it is very much better practice that, in this matter, the responsibility for giving advice should be placed on one pair of shoulders—the shoulders of the Taoiseach. He may find a division in the Executive Council. If he were to consult the Dáil he would be bound to find a division of opinion and possibly if a vote were taken in the Dáil at any particular time, there would be no dissolution at all. There may be big questions on which it is advisable, in the opinion of the person who has the chief responsibility placed upon him, that the opinion of the country should be got. Again, we have to take the actual situation. He is, in all probability, the leader of the dominant political Party. There is no use in pretending that, in this case, he is taking arbitrary action, because, if there is going to be an election, the whole position with regard to his Party is going to be settled by the vote taken at that election. Considering the situation as a whole, he may come to a decision which would be supported by, let us say, parts of the organisation which might not necessarily correspond with the division the Government of the day. Ordinarily, as in the other case, be would not face such a situation without getting substantial unanimity. But it may not be possible to do that. There may be a question in which the Cabinet itself is divided. From his view of the difficulties of the question that is to be settled, he may come to the conclusion that his proper duty is to let the people decide. Therefore, I think that, in this case also, it is advisable that the dissolution should take place, or be given on the advice of the Taoiseach.
The first point of difference is that, whereas a dissolution would be given on the advice of the Government, according to the amendment, it is, according to the Draft Constitution, to be on the advice of the head of the Government. The next point of difference is: In this Constitution, a Government that has failed to have a majority can ask for a dissolution. I hold that that is right because, if we are going to accept the principle that the people are ultimately to judge, there can be no objection to the people being asked to decide. Therefore the power given here is simply the power of saying that a situation has arisen in which the people themselves ought to decide and not merely the majority in the Parliament. You interpose the will of the President, and the President has no discredion if the Taoiseach and the Government of which he is the leader have the majority. The President cannot intervene in these circumstances; he has to give the dissolution. But if the Government should happen to be defeated on a particular question and they felt that that was a question in which their view, although they were a minority, would be held by the people as a whole, I think it is right that a dissolution should be possible.
We have to take the circumstances in which it would be reasonable that a dissolution should be given and the circumstances in which it would not be reasonable that a dissolution should be given. I grant you that there are certain circumstances in which the leader of a Government, or a Government, should not be given a dissolution but there are circumstances in which they should. In order to try to distinguish between these two cases, we bring in a third person, so to speak, as arbiter. He will give his decision and grant a dissolution, or refuse it, at his own discretion, having heard the views expressed on the matter by the Council of State. Again, I lay stress on the fact that the function of the Council of State is simply to make the President aware of the possible consequences of his action and of the matters which he should bear in mind before he arrives at his decision. There is no use in putting that aside with a wave of the hand as if it were of no consequence. Let us assume that the President is a just man who wants to act fairly and wisely. He will, undoubtedly, give great weight to the views expressed by the Council of State. He has to give his decision having heard those views. That does not preclude the possibility, having heard these views, of his giving a dissolution where other people might say a dissolution should not be given. In this case, I have just been reminded that the President acts without the Council of State. The question is whether the Council of State should come in in this case or not.
Comment on this
It does matter very much. We must assume that the people elected to office are not all the time trying to do wrong things, but that they are properly carrying out their duties and acting with justice. But a man may be very just and fair, and yet may not be able if he were alone to make up his mind: to see all aspects of the particular question or the possible consequences of a particular line of action proposed. That is the value of the Council of State. The reason why the Council of State is not put in here is this, that when the Taoiseach who is defeated goes to the President, if he is told straight off "I cannot give you a dissolution; the circumstances under which you have been defeated are such that I do not think there is any question which should be put to the people," he may be prepared straight away to say: "Very well, we need go no farther with it." But, ordinarily in the Council of State, you will have members of the Opposition. Consequently, if he asks for a dissolution, the fact that he is looking for it, and has been refused, will become known, and there would be greater confidence between them if he goes and says to the President:"I think the circumstances are such in which I should have a dissolution." The President would probably not give him an answer then but would consult some members of the Council of State, the members of the judiciary perhaps, as to whether in these circumstances it would be wise to give a dissolution or not. If there is any question of putting in the Council of State there, I have no objection to that.
Comment on this
After consultation with the Council of State: where a Government that has been defeated does not command a majority and the Taoiseach asks for a dissolution from the President.
Comment on this
The question does not arise then. The President, although he is not obliged in this case to consult the members of the Council of State, would, in fact, consult, say, the members of the judiciary, so that he might see all the pros and cons with regard to the decision that he was asked to make. Consequently, I think this is a better practice because there can hardly be a doubt that a situation will arise, or may well arise, in which a Government may be very narrowly defeated and in which the view taken by the minority would be that taken by the country as a whole. You are here then enabling the possibility of an appeal being made to Cæsar, namely, the people.
The third matter is the meeting of the two Houses, the right to cause the Houses to be assembled. Now, circumstances may well arise, at least so. we were told very often in recent months by members on the opposite benches where a Government may try to do things and not summon the Dáil. Deputy McGilligan now tells us that we have the Standing Orders and that they are adequate. That is a curious reversal of attitude because laws were not good enough before. Now, we have Standing Orders, and we are told they will be good enough to meet the situation. This is a situation which, in my opinion, ought to be met by the Constitution and the Executive, no matter what may be said from the opposite benches, is being given tremendous powers in this Constitution. If an Executive was doing something which it was felt they could not do if they were faced with Parliament, I think again that you are not giving extraordinary powers to the President if you give him the right to cause Parliament to assemble. He only brings the supreme legislative body into session. Surely there can be no objection to that. He is not likely to cause Parliament to meet and face the humiliation of being told by Parliament that his calling of it together was unnecessary and not proper. You are providing the safeguard that the Executive, which is responsible to Parliament, will have to face their masters under any circumstances in which the President thinks it is right that it should be done. These are the three points that were raised, and these are the explanations that I have for the text as it stands.
Comment on this
There is one point that I would like the President to deal with. In sub-section (2) of Section 2, Article 13, it is provided:
"the President may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dáil Eireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dáil Eireann."
Are we to visualise that as meaning the Taoiseach personally, or is that to be taken as embracing the whole Executive Council?
Comment on this
If that is so, I think that provision would need to be amplified. Suppose the Taoiseach had ceased to retain the support of a majority of Dáil Eireann in his personal capacity, should there not be a further provision, when you give the President an absolute discretion to refuse a dissolution, to enable him to get Dáil Eireann to appoint a new Taoiseach.
Comment on this
I take it that, if the Government has failed to secure support and faces the Dáil again, a new Government would be elected. For instance, if there was a measure which was regarded by the Government as one of primary importance, one which they felt it was essential they should get if they were to continue in office, there might be the question of getting a vote of confidence. If they felt that in those circumstances they could not, in fact, get a vote of confidence in the Dáil, then the Prime Minister would go to the President and say: "Our Government has been defeated on a measure of primary importance, and if I go for a vote of confidence on this question I do not think that I can get it, but the matter on which I have been defeated is of such a character that I am satisfied that if the people, the ultimate court for deciding these matters, got the opportunity they would decide in my favour." Under these circumstances the President has the right to say to him: "Well, you were defeated, and I am not going to give you dissolution." What, then, would be the position of the Taoiseach? He would go back to the Dáil and resign because obviously he could not carry on if he has to face a Dáil in which he is in a minority. It is stated here definitely that he has to resign if he fails to command support in Dáil Eireann. Therefore, the position for him was that he had to resign. Dáil Eireann would proceed to elect another Taoiseach and there would be a new Government formed. That is the position on that hypothesis.
On the other hand, if he goes to the President, and the President agrees with him that the situation is one in which the people ought to be given an opportunity to decide the question, he can say: "Very well, you prepare the proclamation and I will sign it, and we will dissolve Parliament. Then there is an election on that issue, and the electors will settle whether the Taoiseach, when he comes back, has a majority to carry on, or whether he is in a minority. What that simply means is that we are making provision in the Constitution for the possibility of referring a question of primary importance, on which the Government has been defeated, to the people for a decision.
Comment on this
And others will hold the contrary view, and say that such a power should not be given, but I hope I have made it clear what will happen if a dissolution is refused.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 38:—
In section 3, sub-section 1º, to delete all words after the word "shall" line 2 to the end of the sub-section and substitute therefore the words "be signed by the President".
This is only preparatory to an amendment which occurs later on. The sub-section says:—
"Every Bill passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas shall require the signature of the President for its enactment into law."
Then, a later clause says:—
"The President shall promulgate every law made by the Oireachtas." Instead of the words "shall require the signature of the President", I want to substitute the words "shall be signed by the President". Later on, there is an amendment to the effect that if the President fails or neglects to sign a Bill when the Constitution says that he should sign it, then, within a certain period, the Chairman of Dáil Eireann shall sign, and the Bill becomes law.
Comment on this
I see no reason at all for agreeing to that amendment. The promulgation of law ought to be a definite act by the President as the final or last part, so to speak, of the legislature, and I see no reason why that should be deleted.
Comment on this
I was speaking about sub-section (1) of Section 3, which says that every Bill passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas shall require the signature of the President for its enactment into law.
Comment on this
That is necessary. If the President is really to be at all effectively a part in the whole scheme, his signature is necessary.
Comment on this
That word "effectively" just marks the point I want to make. My view is that once the legislation passes, the signature ought to be compulsory.
Comment on this
Well, the power of doing certain other things, which he has, depends on the fact that he has to append his signature, which, under the circumstances here, can be withheld under certain other things—for instance, the Supreme Court, and so on, which is essential to the whole scheme.
Comment on this
That means that the President, by refusing his signature, can prevent a law passing.
Comment on this
Pardon me. If you look at Section 5, Article 14, page 24, you will find that there is a commission. The Article says:
"The Council of State may make such provision as to them may seem meet for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution in any contingency in which the President or a commission appointed under this Article fails or is unable to exercise and perform the said powers and functions or any of them and which is not provided for by the foregoing provisions of this Article."
Now, the foregoing provisions of the Article make certain provisions, and in any case, while these do not cover every contingency, there is the reserve power here and, under these circumstances, the Council of State would have placed upon it the duty of making the necessary arrangements. Accordingly, if the President were to refuse to sign a Bill, under conditions in which he was not at liberty to refuse according to the Constitution, the work would be done for him.
Comment on this
The Deputy means the paragraph starting off with: "In the event of the absence of the President", and so on?
Comment on this
Yes. My point is that Article 14 deals with the appointment of a commission in certain eventualities, such as the absence of the President, his temporary or permanent incapacity, his death, his resignation, his removal from office, and so on. Does paragraph 5 enlarge that?
Comment on this
I should say, yes— that there is a residuary power given there to deal with anything that might not have been dealt with at all.
Comment on this
The idea of the new Article 14 and the purpose of writing it at that length was that I was not pleased with the form in which these three or four Articles were placed. They were long Articles, and the desire was to cut them up, in accordance with the general scheme, by having short sentences and short paragraph as far as possible. As well as that, there is the change that you have the provision that the commission shall consist of the following persons, namely, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the Dáil, and the Chairman of Seanad Eireann, and so on. That is a matter of form, as well as these ones about the Deputy Chairman of Dáil Eireann or the Deputy Chairman of Seanad Eireann. Then you have a provision which says that, in any contingency which is not provided for by the foregoing provisions of the Article, the Council of State may, by a majority of its members, make provision for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President under the Constitution. Is that what the Deputy suggests is new?
Comment on this
Section 1 of the new Article 14 contains the phrase: "failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office," which is only reached in Section 5 of the former Article.
Comment on this
Yes. Section 1 of the proposed new Article says that in the event of his absence, and so on, or his failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office, the powers and functions shall be exercised and performed by the commission.
Comment on this
They can sign a Bill, for instance, in a case where the President refuses to sign it.
Comment on this
The one point that I wish to make is that it does not seem to me that there is any duty imposed upon him to sign a Bill. The clause says that for a Bill to become law, his signature shall be attached to the Bill, but it does not appear to enforce it on him as a duty to sign the Bill.
Comment on this
It says that he shall exercise and perform the functions conferred on him by this Constitution.
Comment on this
When a Bill has passed both Houses of the Oireachtas it still requires his signature before it becomes law, and, as far as I can see, nobody in the Constitution is to put a duty on him to affix his signature. It appears to be left within his own discretion.
Comment on this
The first section of Article 12 says:
"There shall be a President, hereinafter called the President, who shall take precedence over all other persons in the State and who shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law."
The word "shall" there, I take it, is mandatory.
Comment on this
Is that what the President is relying on as putting coercion on him to sign laws? Is that the clause?
Comment on this
What I am suggesting to the President is that Article 12 (1) does not include the signing of laws, and nowhere else in the Constitution is it said that it is his duty to sign a law, unless he thinks fit to do so.
Comment on this
We shall see. First of all, I would be inclined to say that "shall" there is mandatory. Then in Article 25 (2), on page 50, we have the following:—
"Save as otherwise provided by this Constitution, every Bill so presented to the President for his signature and for promulgation by him as a law shall be signed by the President not earlier than five and not later than seven days after the date on which the Bill shall have been presented to him."
Comment on this
That might cover the point, but would it not be clearer if he adopted the amendment suggested by Deputy McGilligan in this clause and inserted the words "shall be signed by the President," instead of "shall require his signature"?
Comment on this
Yes—"shall be signed by the President not earlier than five and not later than seven days after the date on which the Bill shall have been presented to him."
Comment on this
It says that it shall be signed within two limits of time. Surely that is mandatory?
Comment on this
Then we may take it from the President that there are two Articles which are meant to coerce him. One is the general clause in Article 12 and the other is Article 25, page 50. That is the foundation of whatever there is in the Constitution in the way of coercing the President into doing his duty in regard to legislation?
Comment on this
Then under amendment No. 54, which has been introduced, if the President fails to do this, which is his duty, I understood him to say that there will be a reference to the Council of State to find out whether he had failed. Is that so?
Comment on this
It is not a contingency that is envisaged in amendment No. 54. Amendment No.54 introduces a new Article 14, and says that "in the event of ... failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office or any of them", then the commission is to carry out the duty. Do I gather from the President that the intention is to get the nature of the failure established to the satisfaction of the Council of State and that the commission shall then perform his duties? Is that right?
Comment on this
We have it stated in the amendment that "in the event of the absence of the President. . . . or failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office, or any of them, or at any time at which the office of President may be vacant, the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution shall be exercised and performed by a commission constituted as provided in Section 2 of this Article." There is a commission to be constituted in a certain way.
Comment on this
I am only on the single point. In the first line of amendment No. 54 there is a question of the temporary or permanent incapacity of the President. That has to be established to the satisfaction of a majority of the members of the Council of State. We then go on—"failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office". Then the commission comes into play. Failure to exercise the powers established to whose satisfaction?
Comment on this
The Council of State is not mentioned here. The form originally was, as well as I remember, that there were residuary powers left to the Council of State as a whole, to deal with any situation which was not covered by any explicit provision made in the Constitution. That was an omnibus power. They were given power to deal with any situation. One of these was to deal with the case where the President failed to carry out his functions.
Comment on this
It would be proceeded with in this way. The Government would complain that the President had not performed his functions or at least would have to appeal to the body which was to act in the contingency. The body to act in this general contingency would be the Council of State. They would clearly, if they had to act, have to be satisfied that there was failure, just as we had it to-night on another matter that a certain court will have to decide whether it had jurisdiction. Here the Council of State would have to be satisfied that the President had failed to perform his functions and then the commission, according to this, would act.
Comment on this
There have been some changes made at certain points. The original position has been changed somewhat. Formerly, in the original draft, there was a position where the Council of State was to appoint the commission. We have gradually arrived at the position now when it is considered better to have a permanent commission. The commission comes in there in the first instance and it would be their duty to act. In case they did not, the Council of State came in as a final reserve to deal with the situation.
Comment on this
I cannot see in the old Article 14 where there was to be any commission appointed by the Council of State.
Comment on this
In the document before us there was no provision for a commission being appointed by the Council of State.
Comment on this
Pretty nearly, I think. I move these two amendments:—
40. To delete Section 4.
41. To delete Section 5.
These two amendments explain themselves. This Constitution wants to vest in the President supreme command of the Defence Forces. If that merely meant that the President became, as kings do elsewhere, an honorary colonel of various regiments and that we should allow him to spend part of his salary in providing himself with various uniforms or decorating himself in any way that might tickle his vanity, provided there was no extra emolument given to recoup him for the extravagance which he had indulged in in that way, it would do no harm, but when we come to the next section, which states that the exercise of the supreme command shall be regulated by law and that all commissioned officers of the Defence Forces shall hold their commissions from the President, then we are definitely getting into dangerous ground. I see no reason whatever for having the officers hold their commissions from the President. I know that there are Constitutions which have a phrase in them corresponding to this paragraph 4. I know that in the majority of Constitutions where that phrase occurs the supreme command is vested in the President, but it may not be exercised by him in time of war, or any approach to war. It is quite clearly indicated that it is only a ceremonial business. I suggest that it is exceptional in Constitutions to have a clause corresponding to 5 (2), that all the commissioned officers of the Defence Forces are to hold their commissions from the President. If we had some prohibition in this that nobody who had ever been, say, a member of the Executive Council, nobody who had ever been head of the Executive Council, if we had even the prohibition that people who held certain officers were not eligible for and could not be elected to the Presidency of the country, there might be something to be said for this. But in that condition in which we must contemplate that the President, hereafter, is going to be somebody who was closely connected with a political party, and certainly will have been a member of the Executive Council, possibly will have been head of the Executive Council, and where politics are all around the President, and particularly in the new condition where he can present himself for election at least once more, and will, therefore, have the temptation to play politics during his first term of office, I see no reason whatever for giving such a man—who will be a politician, getting into power through the persuasion of a political party— complete control of the Forces, when he will not be subject to the immediate authority or the close impact of the Dáil upon him. I see no reason for giving that man this right that all the commissioned officers of the Forces should hold their commissions from him.
Comment on this
In regard to the position here that the supreme command of the Defence Forces should be vested in the President, it is quite clear that that is only nominal. It could only be nominal. Any powers that he might exercise there will have to be exercised under the Constitution, and, therefore, any powers that he might exercise in virtue of that vesting will have to be exercised on the direct advice of the Government. Is not that so? Any power given to the President can only be exercised on the advice of the Government, which is responsible to the Parliament. Next, there is the question that the exercise of the command should be regulated by law. This envisages a situation in which the Army in this country, as in every other democratic country, would be immediately controlled or under the ultimate effective control of Parliament. The Government is responsible to Parliament and Parliament makes the law. Is it not obvious that Parliament would regulate the command of that so as to make it effectively under the control of the Executive Council? Therefore, you cannot imagine that a law would be passed by Parliament which would give the ultimate control of the Forces out of its own power and hand it over to the President. In fact, they could not do it under this.
Comment on this
Suppose they do; we are assuming that we are going to have such an extraordinary situation that Parliament, which is so jealous of its powers, is going simply to hand them away, but in any case the handing of them away would not be constitutional, because we have a law that any powers or functions given to him by law will be exercised on the advice of the Government. If the Parliament is going to give away its powers, then the Government can give away its powers, and the Government does not mean anything. There you have the position that the people have nothing to depend upon. If you envisage such a situation, then of course Parliamentary and representative institutions are a mere farce. To get any dangerous position, such as would seem to be indicated by the speeches from the opposite side, you would have to get this state of affairs: that Parliament was going completely to hand over its powers, and that the Government was going to be such—although it would have to be nominally giving advice—that it would be just the advice that the President wanted. As I say, if you are going to envisage that state of affairs there is no use in writing any Constitution. We are assuming here that the representatives of the people will continue to be as jealous of their ultimate control of the Army as representative institutions have generally shown themselves to be. I say that if you assume anything else, then you will get a situation in which the President, whether he has active control or not, is able to dominate the situation to such an extent that his will becomes law. If that situation is envisaged, one cannot frame a Constitution to meet it.
Comment on this
There is one point which I want to make, and that is that the President does not seem to recognise the difference between the Constitution and ordinary law. The Constitution is precisely meant to guard against dangerous cases. If the President would allow me to finish a sentence and would attend to the ordinary rules of debate—I think I am quoting him fairly accurately—we might get on. The Constitution is precisely meant to guard against dangers. Every Constitution does envisage a case where there would be an attempt to interfere with the people's liberties. That is the reason why you have certain guards against Parliament, and also against people in the position of President. Therefore, that argument does not hold. I can well envisage a case in which a discredited Party as a Government might use its power to make the command exercised by the President a real command, and not merely a nominal command.
If, as I think ought to be the case, the President were merely a functionary, merely a nominal person at the head of the State, or for most purposes at the head of the State—not strictly head of the State, I admit—if he were merely a ceremonial representative of the State, I could understand the line taken up by the President, but our contention all along has been that he is something very different. The possibility is there under this Article. You will notice it is put in under the powers to be conferred on the President. It is there put in dealing with the powers of the President. I think that is dangerous. The President is living in the 20th century—I often wonder if he does live in the 20th century—and he calmly tells us that the representatives of the people will never give control of the Army to the President. Does he know that such a place as Europe exists? Will the President get it into his head that there are places other than Great Britain in the world? He finds it difficult to do that. There are places on the Continent in which the representatives of the people have given that power over to the President. He tells us calmly that generally the representatives of the people have shown themselves to be particularly jealous to preserve their rights in this respect, when they have done exactly the opposite.
Comment on this
I do not pretend to know conditions in Europe as the Deputy knows them. The little I do know seems to suggest that where that has happened the people have consented to do it.
Comment on this
It could not have happened if the people did not consent. It certainly happened in one case. In the first instance the people will have to elect their representatives, and they will have to choose people who will safeguard their interests. If the people are prepared to change the form of government and to allow another system to be set up, then I say they cannot be protected. If Parliament is going to do these things, and if it can be done without the will of the people, the Constitution is not going to bring them very far. The supreme control of the Army has to be vested somewhere. It is vested in the Executive Council at the moment. Under this Constitution, while the vesting will be in the President, as a non-political personage, the actual point is this, that the President in his office is supposed to act not as a Party person. We have for a number of years a Ceann Comhairle selected from one particular Party.
Comment on this
Certainly I do not want to get the Deputy on to anything of that sort. I think it would be better for the dignity of the House that it should not be done.
Comment on this
With regard to this matter, I say that you cannot get a person absolutely and completely without political views. When I say political views, I mean views on government and the conduct of affairs. If he is worthy at all he must have opinions from day to day. They may not be the opinions held by a Party, but he will have views. He enters office and takes an oath to carry out his functions in a certain way, but as far as it is humanly possible to remove him, he is removed from Party politics. The question is: Should he have supreme control, or should it be vested in the Executive Council? I say this is better, as it indicates the continuity of the State. It is better that it should be vested in him as being less political than the Executive Council of the day. But control is, in fact, in the Executive Council or Government of the day. It is their advice has to be taken in regard to the exercise of these functions because it is solely a Government Constitution and as far as the Constitution can make it right there it is. If the law is passed it will be passed by Parliament. Supposing the law regulates that it is to be done in a particular way, and that he cannot be given the power of acting except on the advice of the Government——
Comment on this
Effective control of the Army remains with Parliament and the immediate control remains with the Government responsible.
Comment on this
I should like commissioned officers of the Defence Forces to hold their commissions from the King, but failing that, it seems to me to be far better and more appropriate that they should hold them from the head of the State than from a member of the Government of the day. If we are going to object to an arrangement of an exceptional character, I feel inclined to ask in how many countries is it the custom for commissioned officers to hold commissions from the Government of the day, or from one of the Ministers composing the Government of the day.
Comment on this
That is what I am talking about. I suggest that in every kingdom they are held from the King.
Comment on this
There are kings in the Scandinavian countries, in Belgium and in Great Britain. Further, I know that in certain republics they are held from the President. I think that is the case in France. It is certainly the case in Finland.
Comment on this
About the President of Finland. The Act of 1934 says that all Government Acts must be signed by the President. That is the section dealing with Government Acts.
Comment on this
I make this statement that the President of Finland has personal discretion in any act he has to perform in connection with the Army, without any counter signature by the Government or any member of the Government.
Comment on this
I make the statement with confidence that the President of Finland acts in connection with the Army on his own discretion. Furthermore, although it does not bear on the question of the Army, the President of Finland has a veto on legislation and can prevent a law from being put into force until the people have been consulted on it.
Comment on this
On a point of order, are we discussing the amendment before the House now or one that was before it last night?
Comment on this
The Deputy introduced the subject. To return to the Army, it seems more appropriate that the President should hold supreme command and that commissioned officers should hold commissions from the President than that authority should be in the Minister for Defence or the Executive Council as a whole. I do not understand the object of Section 5 (1) which says: "The exercise of the supreme command of the Defence Forces shall be regulated by law." What is the point in that? Is it meant to indicate that some supplementary legislation has to be passed in connection with it?
Comment on this
In that case the suggestion I was going to make, as regards substitution for this, is as to whether it would not be as well to get in somewhere the notion that the exercise of the supreme command of the Defence Forces by the President should be subject to the control of the Oireachtas. I know that that is what is intended.
Comment on this
Would it not be as well to state it definitely in connection with the Defence Forces?
Comment on this
The only point is that if you put it in, or if you leave it out, a point will be made about it. I am afraid it has enabled a great deal of propaganda to be made that would not be possible at all if we had put into every section "on the advice of the Government". We have put it into one section on page 20. I am afraid I will have to see that this is brought prominently before the attention of the public so that the propaganda going on will not be made effective.
On page 20, Article 13, Section 9 says: "The powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution shall be exercisable and performable by him only on the advice of the Government, save where it is provided...." So that in any other place where you see the President does anything and you have no other provision after it, or no other qualification, such as, "at his own discretion," or "after consultation with the Council of State" or "on the nomination of the Dáil," or something of that sort, but simply that the President does this or that, then you add to it "on the advice of the Government." It was simply to save a certain amount of verbiage. The basis for a great deal of the pretence that has been possible here, that the President will be a dictator, is because we saved verbiage and put in one clause, instead of 40 or 50 times in the course of the Constitution, that the President shall do it on the advice of the Government. It is clearly on the advice of the Government that he will exercise any functions in this Constitution. To remove all possibility of doubt, we have put down an amendment making it quite clear that, if he is given any functions by law, those functions, no matter of what character they are, even though they are of a character that, if they were in this Constitution, he could do them of his own discretion or after consultation with the Council of State, shall be exercised only on the advice of the Government. It is provided that if he gets any power whatever by law he shall exercise that power only on the advice of the Government.
Comment on this
That is an interesting afterthought, but it is an afterthought. The situation in the Constitution, as presented to us was that, in all matters generally arising under the Constitution and given to the President, he had to act on the advice of the Government. We will see afterwards what that means. But there was an omission, whether deliberate or not, that matters given to him by law were not caught by that phrase. Now, as an afterthought, by amendment, it is suggested to us that this is going to be amended. What does that mean? The President is going to act on the advice of the Government—sometimes on the advice of a member of the Government, the Taoiseach, sometimes on the advice of the Government.
But supposing he does not act on the advice of the Government, what happens? There is again an amendment brought in to meet a situation that was debated on the Second Reading, that there was no way of coercing the President to act as the Government intended him to act or wished him to act, where the Constitution intended that the Government should have power. Now, we get this Article 14 re-written and introduced in amendment No. 54. We were told this evening, when the President was asked to analyse that, that he did not know to whose satisfaction failure to exercise his powers had to be established. In the end he throws out that it is to be established to the satisfaction of the Council of State; and the Council of State is a body of people who can be appointed or dismissed by the President until he gets a group who will agree with his viewpoint. That what the advice of the Government comes to when analysed down through all the circuits in this Constitution. The President is bound to act on the advice of the Government and, in the end, a decision as to whether he comported himself in accordance with the Constitution, according to the President's statement, is to be determined by the Council of State. That is no constitutional safeguard for anybody.
On the special matter of the exercise of the supreme command of the Army, Deputy MacDermot referred me to France. The French Constitution says that the President shall have a variety of powers, one being: "He shall dispose of the armed forces"; and the last paragraph of the Article is: "Every act of the President of the Republic must be countersigned by a Minister."
Comment on this
By an amendment which I have put down I am trying to put in the countersignature of a Minister. Will it be accepted?
Comment on this
I am trying to write into it what I find in the vast majority of the Constitutions in the world.
Comment on this
Deputy MacDermot also referred me to Norway and Sweden. In Sweden, first of all, there is an Article which states that the King shall be the commander-in-chief. Then there is an Article which states:
"Matters of military command, that is to say, decisions in which the King personally acts in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces, shall be decided by the King, when he is personally exercising the executive power, in the presence of the head of the military Department within whose province the matter falls. The head of that Department is bound, under his responsibility, to express his opinion upon the measures adopted by the King, at the time when such measures are under consideration; should he disapprove of the decision of the King he shall enter his objections and advice upon a minute which the King shall authenticate by his Royal signature."
Later it says:
"The matters of government which are to be considered matters of military command shall be determined by law enacted by the King and the Riksdag jointly."
Comment on this
The Deputy's argument was that commissions were held from the King in Norway and Sweden and from the President in France. I do not care whether they are held from the King or President as long as they are completely and entirely under the control of a Minister, as long as there is somebody here who is responsible to Dáil Eireann.
Comment on this
I maintain he is not. He is only under the control of the Council of State, a body of "yes-men," a group of his own. Consider putting up as a constitutional safeguard a body which is to be appointed in this way. There are certain people ex officio members, and then, “such other persons, if any, as may be appointed by the President under this Article to be members of the Council of State.” The Article then goes on: “The President may at any time and from time to time by warrant under his hand and seal appoint such other persons as in his absolute discretion he may think fit to be members of the Council of State, but not more than seven persons so appointed shall be members of the Council of State at the same time.” He can get that body shifting around from hour to hour. It is a rubbishy safeguard, if that is the body which is to determine whether the President is acting on the advice of the Government or not. If we are going to have something embodied in the Constitution, it ought to be a little bit more respectable than a group that can be changed at any moment that the President dislikes them. The alternative offered is this. This seeks to put in, as an Article of the Constitution requiring a Constitution Amendment Act, that all officers shall hold their commissions from the President. Why should it be so? Why should not the Dáil dispose of the armed forces of the community? Why should not the Minister for Defence, subject to Parliamentary question from day to day——
Comment on this
What is subject to advice—the control that the President has? I will deal later with that argument. It is made a constitutional provision, unchangeable except in a very rigid way, that all the commissions must be held from the President. It is a bad, dangerous, insecure position in which to have the President and the Army without a single link. If there is nothing else in it, I object to that. Let us look at the rest of it. The supreme command of the forces is to be vested in the President. The President says that there is a great safeguard, that it is to be regulated by law, and gives us his usual tirade, "Do we think that any representative Government or Parliament is going to surrender its authority?" I do not think that Parliament will surrender its authority.
What I think of is this: a Government on the eve of going out of office, knowing it is going to be beaten, with a President elected a year before, in for six years, and that Government, by a majority in a dying Parliament, decides that it will pass a law which will hand over certain powers with regard to the military command to the President. What happens afterwards? The President is to take the advice of the new Government. But it is the Council of State which will decide whether he is acting on the advice of the Government or not. That is no safeguard. The new Government can challenge the new law. Can the President determine whether it is a constitutional amendment? He can. Then, it goes off to the people and there is delay.
The President is not so blind to what is happening in Europe. He told Deputy O'Sullivan that on the Continent he did not know of any place where democracy had been trampled upon, and where representative institutions had been trampled upon, through any such abuse as we raised here. Surely the whole trouble on the Continent, in any country where democratic institutions have been trampled upon, is that people had to pretend that they got the power from the Constitution; but they did it by coercing the people at voting time.