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Dáil

Bunreacht na hEireann (Dréacht)—Coiste (d'ath-thógaint).

Contributions 166–335 of 335. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

What will happen if the President says "I remit that punishment completely" and the other authority says "I reduce it by half"? What happens in such a case?

Comment on this

The position will not arise.

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How is it to be prevented?

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Because you will never be stupid enough to have it arise. The President will exercise it clearly on behalf of the Government.

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But in cases where the Government had decided to hand over the mitigation of the punishment to some other authority. Suppose they hand that over to somebody else?

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If the Legislature is stupid enough to do that they will have to settle it between them. The Legislature would not, be stupid enough to leave it in that way.

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It is not the Legislature but the Constitution that is leaving it in that way. The way to change it is to put in the words "that the President's view shall over-ride." I suggest you put in something like that.

Comment on this

There is no need of it.

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I move amendment No. 43:—

To delete Section 7 of Article 13. I think it would be entirely useless that the President should be given power to communicate with the Houses of the Oireachtas by messages. The matter is certainly not of such importance that it should be put in here. What is the necessity of giving, in any Constitution, such a right as that given to the President? What is the idea of the President issuing national addresses or sending messages to the Oireachtas? What is its purpose?

Comment on this

The purpose is that the President occupies a non-Party position. He is supposed to act in a non-Party way. The occasion may arise in which the Government of the day might think it advisable to have a message to the people from the President on some matter and when such an occasion would arise it would be clear that the President concurred. If the Government wants to issue a message to the people on any particular matter they could do so without the President. But if there happened to be an occasion in which, for instance, it was thought desirable to get all Parties to co-operate and the President was willing to address this message, then it could come as from a non-Party source. But the President is expressly forbidden from giving any message to which the Government would object. The value of this is that it enables a non-Party address, which would appear to come from the President as not belonging to any particular Party, to be sent to the people.

Comment on this

That phrase of the President's:

"a non-Party address which would appear to come from the President",

is interesting. That is what the President said. It is not being done in connection with any Party, we are told. But the Government is a Party organisation. The Government will be regarded as a Party and this section in Article 13 will enable the Government to get its Party mind expressed through a non-Party President.

Comment on this

No, it is quite clear that could not happen there.

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What is quite clear is that the President can be forbidden to speak except he speaks in accordance with the Government's views.

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He cannot be compelled to speak if he himself does not think it is right.

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If he lends himself for the purpose he may issue an address which can be made to appear to come from a non-Party source.

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That is not an accurate statement.

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It is not my phrase; it was yours.

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It may not be the Deputy's phrase, but the fact is that it is clearly set out in the Constitution that the President may, with the concurrence of the Government—it would be unwise to permit such a thing to occur without the concurrence of the Government; it would be unwise to leave it open and make such a thing possible—on an occasion in which he and the Government would think it wise so to do, address a message which, because it came from the President, would be listened to by the people, who might not listen to the Government of the day. For instance, if there was an appeal for co-operation between Parties, it would come very much better from the President, and it would come more easily, than it would come from, say, the head of the Government or the head of the Party. Consequently, there is an advantage in making it possible for the President to issue such an address. The danger would come in if the President were allowed to issue an address which would be contrary to Government policy. In order that such an address could be made you will have to get the concurrence of the Government and the President, and the President would not concur except the situation was such that it was evident it was a matter in which all Parties ought to co-operate.

Comment on this

With regard to Section 7 (3), it appears to me at first sight to have certain dangers attaching to it. Will it not prohibit the President from giving a statement of his reasons to Parliament in the event of a refusal of a dissolution to a Taoiseach?

Comment on this

Oh, yes. I think it would be highly undesirable to leave it open to a President to address either Parliament or the nation in that sense contrary to the views of the Government of the day.

Comment on this

The case where he might refuse a dissolution is a case where a Taoiseach has been defeated in this House?

Comment on this

Yes.

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Is it seriously intended, if that defeated Taoiseach applies for a dissolution and the President refuses, that the President shall not be allowed to make a statement as to why he refuses?

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Whatever Government is in power, it should concur. I do not think it right that the President should be allowed to make any statement or give any address which would be contrary to the policy or the views of the Government of the day.

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Take the case that the President decides either to allow or reject an appeal for a referendum. Is it desired that he should not be able to make a statement of the reasons that guided him in allowing or rejecting? I must say I was struck with some surprise that in actions of that sort he should be debarred from making a brief matter-of-fact statement of his reasons for doing it. I suggest that, if the President has not already thought about the subject, he should give it a little attention between this and the Report Stage and consider whether any special provision should be put in to enable a statement to be made on such occasions as that.

Comment on this

I think it would be extremely dangerous. We have heard a great deal about clashes. There is no opportunity here for a clash in the ordinary sense, bringing matters before the people. The danger would lie if the President, over the head of the Government, was to make some appeal to the nation on some matter or address a message to the nation. You would immediately have two authorities, and you cannot have that. On the whole, the best course would be to make it possible for the President, in a case where he concurred and where the Government also wished it done, to issue an address. But I do not think the President ought to be permitted to enter into what might give rise to a public controversy with the Government.

Comment on this

I think this section of the Article is a highly objectionable one. The President this morning, on another section, said that the President referred to in the Constitution is supposed to be non-Party; he is supposed to represent the community as a whole. Here you have a situation in which some question of national or public importance may become a matter of bitter controversy and there may be difference of opinion between the Government and the Opposition. The Government in the circumstances can go to the President and ask him to issue a statement on that matter supporting their point of view. That would be turning the President into a politician at once, if he is not one already. It is perfectly idle for us to hope, at our present stage of political evolution, that we will be able to find for the office of President some person who is not always a politician. Fifty or 60 years ago a lighthearted librettist wrote that every child born to the world was born a little Liberal or a little Conservative, and that was at a time when the whole of Europe was either Liberal of Conservative. Since that time a great many isms other than Liberalism or Conservatism have been developed in Europe and I suggest that no child can be born nowadays without being infected from the date of its birth with some political ism. Therefore, I do not contemplate a position here in the future in which we will have a President who is not a supporter, or Presidents who are not supporters, of one Party or another. The President may endeavour to be non-political, but he will never be able completely to detach his mind from his earlier political affiliations. The President said it would be highly objectionable to have a statement issued by the President not approved by the Government. I quite agree, but I think it is more objectionable still for a statement to be issued by the President which has the support of the Government, because, on a matter of national or public importance that is in controversy between the Government and the Opposition, he will inevitably turn himself in the eyes of the people into a partisan. That is objectionable, and I submit that he ought to reconsider that aspect.

Comment on this

With regard to Deputy MacDermot's point, might I ask is there anything to prevent a President addressing a message to the Gaelic League or the Dublin Chamber of Commerce against the wishes of the Government?

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I am not going to answer the Deputy.

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Is that facilitating the House?

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I have been facilitating the House on all sorts of nonsensical points.

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Is there a constitutional prohibition against that?

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Anything the President does he will do it in concurrence with the Government.

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That is not here.

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It is there.

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There is no such prohibition. Again, if the President addresses a message and finds he does not correctly address himself, will he be allowed to address an amendment to the address without the approval of the Government?

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 44:—

To delete Section 8, and substitute a new section as follows:—

No act of the President in exercise of the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution shall be valid or capable of enforcement unless countersigned by the Taoiseach either alone or with the competent Minister or Ministers each of whom thereby accepts responsibility for such act of the President.

This is the amendment to which Deputy MacDermot referred a few moments ago as the one in which, if I had views about a particular matter, I should have set them down. I ask the Dáil to delete Section 8 in the Draft Constitution in its entirety and substitute my amendment for it. The wording of the amendment is the best I could do in order to boil down into one phrase the phrases that I extracted for myself from 17 Constitutions. It is noteworthy that that phrase does run through the majority of the Constitutions. I simply took two books that came to my hand; I did not pick or choose. I have Constitutions that range from 1875, in the case of France, up to as late as 1925, and I find that as a common element in regard to all these, and as an element, peculiarly enough, in modern Europe, where there is a kingdom or sort of republican form of government, where the head of the State is a President or a King, you get mainly that acts of the President must bear the counter-signature of the Minister, and you get also, in the great majority of cases, the phrase I have added which imputes responsibility to the Minister who signs for everything for which he does so sign.,

I suggest that it is a wise principle. We have got to this point in democratic institutions right through the world, except where dictatorships have supervened, that you have a democratic House and in it you have members of Government and these members of Government bear responsibility individually for acts of their Departments, and where you have Cabinet Government, the group as a whole bears responsibility for the several acts of the Ministers who compose it. In that way, you get tied up all responsibility in the Executive or Cabinet of the day, and it is a very wise provision. It has two effects. First of all, it puts a check on the King or the President and, in the second place, it puts a further check upon the Government and upon the individual Ministers in that they assume political responsibility for anything done in their name.

The Yugo-Slavian Constitution contains the provision:

"No act in exercise of the royal power shall be valid or capable of enforcement unless countersigned by the competent Minister."

Comment on this

How much of a protection was it in Yugo-Slavia?

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It is not a compiete protection.

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They got a dictatorship there.

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You have to go to the other point of getting some way of enforcing something presented to the King. You must look at this thing in two ways. You want to get somebody to bear responsibility by countersigning, and you want, where the Government wants to do something and the President tries to refuse, to get a way of enforcing the Government's point of view through against the President. I have tried to deal with both of these. I must do it in two sections because of the rules of order and of the way the Constitution is drafted. This is only the first part. The Yugo-Slavian Constitution further says:

"The competent Minister shall be responsible for all acts of the King, oral or written, whether countersigned or not and for all his actions which are of a political character."

Incidentally, it was not by reason of that Constitution, or any weakness in it, that the Yugo-Slavian situation took on another complexion. In Poland, you have an Article which opens with the signing of laws. It is a longish Article, but towards the end you have the phrase:

"To be valid, every governmental act of the President of the Republic must be signed by the President of the Council and by the Minister within whose Department the matter lies who thereby takes responsibility."

You have clauses similar to that in the Constitutions of Austria, Esthonia, Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark and even Mexico. In the case of France, it is very simply stated in a single sentence:

"Every act of the Government must be signed by the responsible Minister."

With regard to Belgium, it is very difficult to find a way through the particular clauses of the Constitution there, but I find in one clause something which at any rate does impose somewhat the same restriction. I do not say that it is as complete as the others and I do not put it forward as one of my examples. The other examples are Norway and Sweden which are kingdoms, Finland, Greece, one Constitution of Roumania, Turkey, Latvia and Lithuania. That is the only survey I was able to make, and those are the Constitutions contained in the two books open to me, one giving Constitutions some of which are out-of-date and the other certain amendments of them.

Comment on this

And in several of those countries there have been dictatorships since.

Comment on this

I want to bring it to a particular point in regard to some of these countries. Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania are notable examples. Changes were made in the Constitutions and the changes were marked out in the book I quoted here the other evening as being notable for one thing—an attempt to limit the authority of the Executive. How that limitation was done varied. Sometimes it was by giving a President certain powers and sometimes by giving a Parliament extra powers. In the main, however, it was by giving a President extra powers. The eight Constitutions that were referred to as being marked by that particular feature of a weakening of the power of the Executive, the taking away of power from the Executive, on very much the same lines as has been suggested here, are Germany, CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Finland, Yugo-Slavia and the three Baltic States. The three Baltic States have since suppressed Parliamentary institutions off and on. It has not been continuous and I think that last year all three made an attempt to reinstate Parliamentary government. Germany, of course, we know about. I do not think anybody would regard Poland as other than a totalitarian State at the moment and I do not know that Yugo-Slavia can be regarded as having Parliamentary government of a free and unforced type. That leaves CzechoSlovakia and Finland alone. I threw in Yugo-Slavia the other night because the situation there was somewhat mixed. There is somewhat in and out situation there, too, but of those eight countries in whose Constitutions an attempt was made to limit the authority of the Executive, six have walked out on the path of suppression of democratic institutions.

With that warning from recent history ahead of us, why should we weaken the power of the Executive? Why should we avoid, even although they may not have been capable themselves of stopping a particular rush towards dictatorship, the clauses which the Constitutions in the world generally contain, and can contain, I suggest, for no other reason than to bring home responsibility into the democratic House of the Parliament for anything the Government or the President does? Let us have these safeguards whatever value they are. Why should we break down one barrier, which may be capable of being overthrown, but which does seem to be some sort of barrier? It brings the President down in every act he does, and it brings down the Government in every act for which they have to advise the President, to the facing of the reality of their political situation, and they have to answer in whatever is the democratic House of the Parliament. I suggest it is a valuable clause to have in the Constitution. It is one sanctified by use in a great many countries and one the abandonment of the use of which has led, or has helped to lead, to very disastrous results. I suggest it for consideration.

Comment on this

There is no evidence that I can see in what Deputy McGilligan has said that this clause has proved of value anywhere. What is clear is that it has proved of no value in some places. Deputy McGilligan says that, where a dictatorship has been set up, a clause of this kind has had to go. Of course, it had to go, and a great many other clauses had to go. When a dictatorship is introduced, obviously everything inconsistent with that dictatorship has to go first. That is a truism. It proves nothing as to the efficacy of any particular clause in preventing a dictatorship. The amendment proposed is, in any case, too wide because it applies to all the powers and functions of the President, including those which it is intended he should exercise at his personal discretion— namely, the power to refuse a dissolution to a defeated Taoiseach and the power to exercise a certain discretion with regard to a referendum. Obviously, there would be no sense in requiring his exercise of these powers to be countersigned by the Taoiseach, either alone or with another Minister. As regards the actions of the President which are dependent upon Government advice and approval, I, personally, see no objection to a proviso of the kind suggested here but, equally, I see no advantage in it. I have listened with an open mind to what Deputy McGilligan said and I cannot see that he has offered a fragment of evidence that such a proviso has proved of any value elsewhere. When people are making new Constitutions, they are vey apt to turn to precedents and, if a clause of this kind happens to be embodied in one Constitution, it is very likely to be embodied in a dozen others. That does not prove that it is something which experience has found to be of substantial value.

I suggest that the fundamentals of Parliamentary government are sufficiently settled and sufficiently understood in this country, and that they have a sufficiently long history and experience here and in the British Empire for it to be needless to put in a clause of this kind. The advice of the Government is all-powerful in the exercise of functions by the President except in a very limited range of matters where he is given a personal discretion and the putting in of a clause of this kind seems to me to add nothing to the security of the situation, though it might be put in without harm, so far as I can see.

Comment on this

I have already indicated my views on the matter, and I do not propose to speak again.

Notice taken that 20 members were not present. House counted and 20 members being present,

Comment on this

On a point of order, may I ask why the first declaration of the Chair was not put into effect?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The Chair was of opinion that the question was not understood by the House.

Comment on this

As a point of order, I submit that the Chair declared the motion lost. Having made that declaration, has the Chair the right, of its own initiative, to reconsider that declaration?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The Chair has a discretion in matters of this kind. In the circumstances existing, when the question was about to be put, the Chair was of the opinion that the question was not understood by the House, and that these circumstances warranted reconsideration of the declaration.

Comment on this

Did you not make the question beautifully clear?

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May I again submit that the Chair put the motion quite clearly on the first occasion, and gave the House adequate time to mark its approval or disapproval? The Chair, having waited, declared the motion lost. May I respectfully submit that that was the decision of the House?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The circumstances of the situation, in the opinion of the Chair, warranted the putting of the question a second time. There was not a House present. Then, additional Deputies came in. They had not full knowledge of what had taken place previously. The question put was not in the form of the amendment as it appears on the paper. In the question, as put, an attempt was made under the rules of order, to save a subsequent amendment, so that it might be considered by the House. In these circumstances, the Chair was of opinion that the House had not a proper opportunity of understanding the question, as originally put.

Comment on this

May I submit, again, with all possible respect, that there is absolutely no precedent for this proceeding.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Precedents must be created.

Comment on this

The motion was not put in any unusual form. The form in which you put the motion was the ordinary form in which such a motion is put to the House. There was no particular strain on the intelligence of Deputies who wished to vote in favour of it. Having put the question, and have declared the motion lost, I submit that your ruling stands.

Comment on this

The Deputies were only in process of coming in.

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They were in the House before the question was put.

Comment on this

With regard to amendments Nos. 45 and 46, which refer to the question of impeachment, that matter is being reconsidered for Report Stage, and I do not propose to move the amendments.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 47:

In Section 8, to delete sub-section 3º.

There seems to be agreement on this matter. The whole matter will be covered by the impeachment provision.

Comment on this

I am prepared to accept this amendment.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

If the amendment has not been moved it cannot be discussed.

Comment on this

I move it myself.

Comment on this

Has the President the consent of Deputy Norton to move the amendment?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

If the President has not the authority of Deputy Norton to move the amendment, he cannot do so.

Comment on this

We had better leave it over then for the next stage.

Comment on this

On behalf of Deputy O'Neill, I move amendment No. 50:—

In Section 9, line 4, to delete the words "in his absolute discretion or" and to delete all the words after the words "Council of State" to the end of the section.

Would the President explain to me what is meant by the words "on the advice or nomination of, or on receipt of any other communication from, any other person or body."

Comment on this

In the Constitution it is provided, in a number of places where the President will act either on his own discretion as, for instance, in the case of granting a dissolution to a Government that failed to retain the support of a majority, or on the advice of the Taoiseach in the case, say, of a nomination by him or, on a nomination by the Dáil. The President would be acting on the advice of a person when he accepted the nomination by the Taoiseach of members of the Government. There will be nomination by a body when he acts on a nomination by the Dáil.

Comment on this

That is not a power or function conferred on the President.

Comment on this

No, but it says, "save where it is provided that he shall act in his absolute discretion or after consultation" with, say, the Council of State, or where he acts on the nomination of some other body.

Comment on this

What are the other bodies?

Comment on this

I have mentioned them if the Deputy would listen. In the case of a person, on the nomination of the Taoiseach, and of a body where the Dáil makes a nomination. The President appoints the Taoiseach on the nomination of the Dáil, or he may act on the receipt of a communication, say, of a petition from the Seanad. The Deputy will find that in one place or another in the Constitution the use of every one of these words is justified.

Comment on this

On behalf of Deputy Costello, I move amendment No. 51:—

To delete Section 10.

I do not propose to take up the time of the House on this amendment. Most of the ground has already been travelled over. Personally, I dislike this Article very much. I do not see why this Constitution cannot in itself contain the powers which the President shall have and shall exercise, or why this vague and indefinite general power should be vested in the Government. It is a perfectly invalid argument to say that this is meant only to deal with small matters. What we mean does not matter one button. What we mean here is of no importance. The important thing is, what we say. It is not what is hidden in the recesses of our minds, but what is expressed in the words we use that matters, because that is what the world at large sees, and that is what is handed down by us to succeeding Dáils and Seanads. Here we are laying it down in this Constitution that any power and any function of any sort or description can be conferred upon the President by law. I submit to the House that a clause of that nature should not be in the Constitution.

Comment on this

I still object—

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

I do not want to interrupt, but I think a decision was taken to the effect that amendment No. 12 would govern this.

Comment on this

I do not think so. Is the Leas-Cheann Comhairle referring to the question of the Army?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

No. I am referring to the powers conferred on the President by law. Deputy McGilligan did say that there was a connection between the two amendments. I am referring to amendment No. 12.

Comment on this

The two amendments are closely connected.

Comment on this

I do not think so.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Well, Deputy McGilligan held that there was a connection between the two.

Comment on this

Well, apart from that, I presume that I can speak on the section itself?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Yes.

Comment on this

I also object to the section itself. I object to it for the reason that I think the President could not justify his position in this matter. I regard this country, at the present moment, as being suspended between membership and non-membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The object of the section, so far as I can gather it from what the President said in the House, is to secure that, if Parliament so wishes, it, at any moment, can go out of the Commonwealth without consulting the people. If that is the case, I hold that Parliament ought to be equally entitled to go into the Commonwealth without consulting the people. If Parliament is to be debarred from doing the one thing, it ought to be debarred from doing the other; and if it is to be free to do one thing, it ought to be equally free to do the other.

Comment on this

I think that I have argued the matter with regard to the advisability of giving powers by law sufficiently, Sir, and I do not think there is any further use in going into that matter.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Is amendment No. 51 withdrawn?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

I will put the amendment, if the Deputy desires.

Comment on this

It is certainly not withdrawn.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 52:—

In Section 10, sub-section 1º, after the word "law" line 2 to add the words "No additional powers or functions may be conferred on the President unless the legislation purporting to confer such powers or functions is approved (a) by not less than two-thirds of the members of Dáil Eireann or (b) by a referendum."

A good deal of attention has been directed already to the proposal contained in this Constitution to confer additional powers on the President by law, and practically all Parties in the House, with the exception of the Government Party, have directed particular attention to the danger that the President may be endowed by a Government with powers of a kind which, in the opinion of the people of the country or in the opinion of a substantial minority in the Dáil, it is not desirable to confer upon the President. It may be urged by the Government, as a reason for retaining this particular Article, that such powers or functions as the President may be possessed of, or may be given by law, are exercisable or performable by him only on the advice of the Government; but that does not get over the very real danger that the Executive Council might give powers to a President which would seriously invade the right of Parliament to exercise jurisdiction or to exercise its powers in the particular matters dealt with. The President may tell us, of course, in the course of this discussion, that no such powers or functions, conferred on the President by law, shall be exercisable or performable by the new President save on the advice of the Government; but it has been pointed out already, in a discussion on an earlier section of this Article, that there is always a grave danger that a Government, weak or subservient, or anxious to run a conspiracy with the President, may hand over to him all kinds of powers which, although they may be exercisable or performable only on the advice of the Government, nevertheless may constitute a serious infringement on the rights of Parliament.

If we were able, at this stage, to know what powers it was proposed to confer on the President by law, it might not be necessary to put down an amendment of this kind; but since we do not know what powers are proposed to be conferred upon him, I think it is necessary that the Legislature should make sure that whatever powers the new President is to get by law are of a kind that, in the first place, an overwhelming majority of the Legislature may agree should be given to him, or that, in the absence of that overwhelming majority, the Government of the day should go to the country and submit the matter to a referendum of the people and get the people's authority to give the President these additional powers. It has been submitted already that a Government which was losing caste with the people, knowing that it was going to walk the plank at a forthcoming election, might desire to give powers to the President which would be an invasion of the Parliamentary rights of the people and of the rights of the Legislature. This amendment is designed to ensure that the President cannot get such additional powers unless, in the first place, there is an agreement by an overwhelming majority of Parliament to give him such powers or, failing that, that the matter should be submitted to a referendum of the people.

Nobody desires to withhold from the new President certain formal or ceremonial functions which it might be desirable, from certain standpoints, to confer upon him; but what the House must guard against is the giving of wide powers to him without the agreement of a majority of the people to have these powers conferred on him. It may be, of course, that we will be told in the course of this debate that such powers as are given to the new President will be exercisable only on the advice of the Government; but it might be the desire of a majority of the people in the country, as it might be the desire of a very substantial minority in the Dáil, that no such powers should be given to the President, even though he exercises them only on the advice of the Government. I want, therefore, to ensure that the President will not get these additional powers or functions unless the legislation purporting to confer these powers is approved by not less than two-thirds of the members of Dáil Eireann —which would ensure that an overwhelming majority of Dáil Eireann would have to agree that these powers should be given—or that, if the Government of the day were not able to get its legislation passed by that majority, then they had the alternative of going to the people on a referendum and asking the people to agree to give these additional powers. If the Government are willing to be bound by the first restriction here, it means that we can ensure that no Government, with a majority of one in the House, can give away powers which properly belong to Parliament; and if they accept the second restriction, then, at least, we can be assured that those who are not in favour of giving away such powers can carry on a campaign in the country urging the people in favour of voting whether or not to give these additional powers.

If there is any question of giving certain additional powers to the new President, it is necessary for the Legislature to be careful that the powers and functions to be conferred on the new President are not an invasion of the rights of Parliament. If we knew what these additional functions were, we might not regard the matter in so serious a light but under this Constitution as it stands, it is possible for the Government of the day acting through an automatic majority in this House, to confer upon the President powers which, in the opinion of the people of the country, expressed through a majority vote, the President should not be given. I want therefore to ensure that the Government of the day cannot confer any new powers on the President to be exercisable by him, no matter on whose advice, unless the Act conferring such powers is approved by at least two-thirds of the members of the Dáil or unless authority is obtained from the people for doing so by means of a referendum.

Comment on this

Would the Deputy indicate to the House why a Government should hand over to somebody else powers which they could exercise themselves?

Comment on this

We saw what happened in Germany.

Comment on this

Why a Government should hand over powers which they can exercise themselves to anybody I do not see. Presumably, they can exercise these powers as members of the Executive. They could advise the President as to the exercise of these powers, or presumably they could exercise them themselves. There must be some authority for doing it. I have argued this several times over, and I do not wish to detain the House any further on it. I see no reason for the amendment. Amendment No.53 closes any gap there might be.

Comment on this

I should like to raise a point cognate to that raised by Deputy Norton on his amendment. Perhaps the President would give the House his views on it. I suggest that, whether Deputy Norton's amendment is carried or not, it would be wise to have a provision in this Constitution that the legislation purporting to confer such powers on the President should not be legislation enacted under Article 24 of the Draft Constitution, that is, emergency legislation. I hope the President will indicate his view on that point. A good deal of anxiety as to the possible extent of these powers would be relieved if it were recognised that such legislation would be put through the Oireachtas by the ordinary procedure, and not be put through as emergency legislation.

Comment on this

We can deal with that matter when it comes to the question of emergency legislation.

Comment on this

I merely wish to indicate that our Party will support Deputy Norton's amendment.

Comment on this
Division

Amendment put.

Tá 26
·
Níl 33
Result Lost The question put was not agreed to.

Do you agree with this result?

I move amendment No. 53:—

In Section 10 to delete sub-section 2º and to insert a new section as follows:—

11. No power or function conferred on the President by law shall be exercisable or performable by him save only on the advice of the Government.

It is not necessary to argue it, I have spoken on this subject so often.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 54:—

To delete the Article and insert in lieu thereof the following new Article:—

ARTICLE 14.

1.—In the event of the absence of the President, or his temporary or permanent incapacity established to the satisfaction of a majority of the members of the Council of State, or in the event of his death, resignation, removal from office, or failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office or any of them, or at any time at which the office of President may be vacant, the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution shall be exercised and performed by a Commission constituted as provided in Section 2 of this Article.

2.—1º. The Commission shall consist of the following persons, namely, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of Dáil Eireann (An Ceann Comhairle), and the Chairman of Seanad Eireann.

2º. The President of the High Court shall act as a member of the Commission in the place of the Chief Justice on any occasion on which the office of Chief Justice is vacant or on which the Chief Justice is unable to act.

3º. The Deputy Chairman of Dáil Eireann shall act as a member of the Commission in the place of the Chairman of Dáil Eireann on any occasion on which the office of Chairman of Dáil Eireann is vacant or on which the said Chairman is unable to act.

4º. The Deputy Chairman of Seanad Eireann shall act as a member of the Commission in the place of the Chairman of Seanad Eireann on any occasion on which the office of Chairman of Seanad Eireann is vacant or on which the said Chairman is unable to act.

3.—The Commission may act by any two of their number.

4.—The Council of State may by a majority of its members make such provision as to them may seem meet for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution in any contingency which is not provided for by the foregoing provisions of this Article.

5.—The provisions of this Constitution which relate to the exercise and performance by the President of the powers and functions conferred on him by this Constitution shall apply to the exercise and performance of the said powers and functions under this Article.

There are two purposes served by the change. One is——

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

If the President will allow me to intervene, it would be better first to delete the Article so as to meet amendments Nos. 55 and 56. We will take that as agreed?

Comment on this

The point of the amendment is, first of all, that those short sentences run more generally on the lines of the Constitution. The intention is to provide for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President in nearly any contingency; to provide for the exercise and performance of his powers and functions by means of a Commission, the Commission, as the House will see, to consist in the first instance of the Chief Justice, the Chairman of Dáil Eireann (An Ceann Comhairle) and the Chairman of Seanad Eireann. The President of the High Court shall act as a member of the Commission in case the Chief Justice is not able to act. The Leas-Cheann Comhairle shall act as a member of the Commission in the place of the Ceann Comhairle in case the latter is not able to act, and the Deputy Chairman of the Seanad shall act for the Chairman of the Seanad in case the Chairman is not able to act. Then, in case there is any contingency not covered by the preceding provisions, the Council of State can, by a majority of its members, make provision to perform the functions in such a way as seems meet. Then there is the final provision that the provisions of the Constitution relating to the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President shall apply in the case of the Commission as well—whatever Commission is acting.

Comment on this

The President has not dealt with one point in regard to failure to exercise and perform powers and functions. The President indicated that that was to be enacted in this form: "established to the satisfaction of the Council of State." Is that so? The President did say that the other night. I pointed out that the Council of State has authority to stop there at the incapacity point. I understood the President to say he was going to make it that failure to perform duties was also to be regulated by failure established to the satisfaction of the Council of State.

Comment on this

There is, first of all, the Commission that comes in——

Comment on this

The Commission does not come in until after the failure.

Comment on this

The Commission has to act in case a failure is reported by anybody. If, for instance, there was a failure, and the Government were to report that failure, it is obvious that the Commission would have to perform the functions. It would be its duty to do it in case a failure of the President was reported. That would be a matter of fact, which would have to be determined by the people who would be called upon to perform the functions. I would say that if the Commission could be brought into existence, that is unless you had certain circumstances in which those three persons were not available, you would have the Council of State as a reserve body, which would itself again have to determine whether there was a failure, and I take it that the complainant, so to speak, in the case would be the Government. The Government would complain that a certain Bill had not been signed, or that some other act which should have been done on advice was not being done, and it would establish it to the satisfaction of the Commission in the first instance.

Comment on this

The President did not say that the other night. However, we will discuss that on the other stage.

Comment on this

If that Commission did not act, the question of the Council of State would come up, and the Council of State would be bound by this Constitution to make such provision as seemed meet for the carrying out of the functions which were neglected or were not performed by the President.

Comment on this

I understood Deputy McGilligan's point to be this: Is there any need to provide special machinery by which it can be told whether or not there has been failure to exercise these functions?

Comment on this

Is not that a question of fact?

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this

Who is to determine that?

Comment on this

Supposing the whole Constitution was working, I take it that the Government would immediately go to the Chief Justice and inform him, as a member of the Commission, that a certain Bill had been sent to the President, that he had not signed it, and that, therefore, there was failure on his part. I take it that that would only happen where the President said he would not do so. Then the matter would be brought to the attention of the Commission, whose duty it would be to perform these functions on the President's behalf, or perform these functions whether he was willing or not.

Comment on this

I take it that there would have to be agreement between the Government and the Commission that there had been failure to exercise these functions.

Comment on this

That is not in the Article, but we will discuss it on the Report Stage.

Comment on this

Is there power on the part of the Commission to decide whether the President is doing his job or not? Can the Commission act by bringing that to the notice of the Government and set up an inquiry to see if the President is performing his job satisfactorily?

Comment on this

I take it that it is mandatory. The amendment includes these words "the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution shall be exercised and performed by a Commission constituted as provided in Section 2 of this Article." Therefore, I take it that the Commission, if it is brought to its notice in any way whatever that the President has failed to exercise functions which should be performed by him would take it to be their duty to take cognisance of that. Ordinarily I take it that the initiative would be taken by the Government of the day.

Comment on this

Is it the President's view now that there is any mandatory obligation on the Commission to concern itself as to how the President performs his duty from time to time, so that it might exercise, in the event of negligence by the President, the functions which are set out in this Article for the Commission to discharge? Is it possible for the Government, by collusion, to slur over the omission or failure of the President to perform his functions, or is it possible for the Commission to say that they thought he was not doing his duty?

Comment on this

It is not expressly set out, but I cannot see how the question of the Government being in collusion with the President, or whatever is in the Deputy's mind in that regard, could arise. It is laid down that the Commission has a duty to perform if the President does not perform his functions. These functions are mainly performed on the advice of the Government. I take it, it would be failure to do something which the Government had a right to advise the President to do. If you had such a case, I take it that the Government would go to the Commission and ask them to perform the necessary functions.

Comment on this

My point is that there should be some machinery inserted by which the Commission would function. The President says that in the event of it happening something could be done. Why not put in a definite provision?

Comment on this

The Government must take action.

Comment on this

We ought to have some way of starting.

Comment on this

It is self-starting.

Comment on this

I suggest to Deputy Norton that if he reads the Article he will find there is nothing to start.

Comment on this

I want to ascertain from the President whether it is possible for him to say to the Commission, on behalf of 49 per cent. of the members of this House and of the Second Chamber, "the President is not doing this job in a satisfactory manner and is not carrying out his duties."

Comment on this

This Article has nothing to do with the manner but only with non-performance.

Comment on this

Supposing there is a certain obligation on the President to do certain things under the Constitution and that he declines and that the Government of the day thinks he is doing them, when quite a considerable volume in the country take the view that he is not, is it possible for the Commission to hold a watching brief for the people to ensure that the President exercises his functions, or is it necessary, in the first instance, that a complaint should be made by the Government of the day to the Commission? Is it possible for 49 per cent. of the members of this House and of the Second Chamber to say to the Commission: "We think you ought to see about this matter because, in our opinion, the President is not carrying out his duties?" Who is to start the inquiry?

Comment on this

The functions of the President are definitely set out. We all know what they are. We can take it that a Bill has to be signed within a certain time and that certain things have to be done in reference to it. If the President fails to do any of these things, then those responsible for putting the Bill through Parliament, or the Government, will immediately say that they want the Bill signed. The Constitution says that certain things can be done. Take a case where the two Houses agree, and that everything is all right, the Bill is sent to the President for signature, which is necessary for it to become law. After four days or within whatever time they expected it, the Government of the day would naturally come along and say they wanted the Bill with the President's signature to it. If the President refused to sign it, and if the time was up, then the Government would immediately inform the Commission that the President had failed in his functions, that he had a Bill which he had not signed, and that it was the duty of the Commission by the Constitution to perform his functions in that case. Unless we are going to take it that this body will not carry out its constitutional functions the Bill will be signed. Going a further step, suppose they fail, then you have the further reserve in the Council of State, which can make any provision that seems to be necessary. They will be appealed to in the same way. The duties will be carried on for him by proxy.

Comment on this

Can anyone complain to the members of the Commission that the President is not exercising his functions?

Comment on this

They can complain and get no result.

Comment on this

That is nonsense.

Comment on this

Can they complain?

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this

Why not put a provision into the Article?

Comment on this

It is not necessary. The Government need never meet. Why do we not make provision that the Executive Council is to meet? We have to allow a certain amount of common sense. A Government is there to meet and to perform its work. This Commission is to meet, and if a complaint is made to it, it has to be made by those who are going to be affected by the failure of the President to perform his duties. If you take any particular function that the President has to perform and you ask us what is going to happen in that case, the ordinary routine will be pointed out. If you say that the Commission will not meet and nobody can complain to them and that the Council of State will not meet, you will get nowhere. Suppose Parliament does not meet when the President summons it, what is going to happen?

Comment on this

Is it not necessary to put in some provision in this Article which would provide that, on receiving a complaint from a category of persons entitled to make complaints, the Commission shall exercise its functions?

Comment on this

It is not necessary. That is narrowing it. If a case comes under the notice of the Commission the Commission itself can say: "Here is a thing which the President has not done; it is our constitutional duty to do it."

Comment on this

It is not clear to me from this that the Commission will operate in that way.

Comment on this

The word "shall" in practice, I will almost say in every instance through this Constitution, is of a mandatory character. The President shall perform the powers and functions imposed by this Constitution and the Commission shall similarly do these things.

Comment on this

That involves an inquiry by the Commission. Is it empowered to make that inquiry?

Comment on this

It is, if it wants it. Is it not the commonsense thing that these functions are necessary to let the machinery of State work? There will be a stoppage somewhere, and people affected by that stoppage will bring the complaint that the President failed to perform his duty. It is clear that the operating body will be the Government.

Comment on this

It will be all right in the Irish text.

Comment on this

Amendments Nos. 55 and 56 were put down merely to carry through the idea that we have been advocating throughout for the paramount power of the Government under this Constitution. That matter has been already discussed, and I do not think any useful purpose would be served by further discussion. Therefore, I do not propose to move the amendments.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Amendment No. 57 is governed by amendment No.1.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 58:

"In Section 1, sub-section 1º, after the word "citizen" to insert the words, "without distinction of sex."

As I indicated on the Second Reading, my own feeling is that this is unnecessary, but as there seems to be the view that people will be happier if they have it, I am proposing to insert it.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 59:

In Section 1, sub-section 1º. line 1, after the word "citizen" to insert the words "without distinction of sex," and at the end of the sub-section to add the words, "No citizen shall be placed by law under any such disability or incapacity by reason of sex, class or religion."

The principle of my amendment has been met by the President's amendment to insert "without distinction of sex." I am anxious that the other part should also be accepted—"No citizen shall be placed by law under any such disability or incapacity by reason of sex, class or religion"—so that there would not be any discrimination by reason of class or religion. As I say, the principle of my amendment has been met by the President and I appreciate it. I thought it well to put down the amendment because certain fears were aroused amongst women's associations and amongst women generally throughout the country. Certainly, if nothing was meant by leaving it out, there is no reason why it should not be put in. I am glad the President has seen his way to accept it.

Comment on this

I am not satisfied that the mere insertion of the words, "without distinction of sex," covers the point. "Every citizen, without distinction of sex, who has reached the age of 21 years, shall be eligible for membership of Dáil Eireann"— that would be perfect. But I think the part that is interpolated in the Article, "who is not placed under disability or incapacity by this Constitution or by law," still leaves it open to the passage of a law creating disability. I think the real object of Deputy Mrs. Redmond's amendment is that, while the insertion of the words, "without distinction of sex," puts each sex on an equality, equally both sexes should be placed on an equality as regards the imposition of disability by a law made with that object. The disabilities by law must be made under the electoral law, and should be equally applicable to both classes, and there should not be any discrimination of class or religion. Perhaps the President will examine the matter.

Comment on this

There is possibly a point there, but I am not quite satisfied that it is exactly as the Deputy has indicated. If you take it that every citizen, without distinction of sex, is entitled to a vote, I do not think you can suggest that you would have a law then disqualifying women as women.

Comment on this

Surely as long as the Constitution contains what amounts to a proviso that the law may make a change, there is this difficulty.

Comment on this

The law may make a change under general rules. If the first part indicates that they are qualified without distinction of sex, I think it would hardly be held to be in accordance with that.

Comment on this

The first test under sub-section (2) will be "every citizen without distinction of sex," so that the two sexes jump that hurdle together. Then you come to the next one, "who complies with the provisions of the law." Under that constitutional clause the law could make a distinction founded upon sex.

Comment on this

There is a certain difficulty, namely, that in making disqualifications such as those suggested to be inserted in the Constitution, when you open the door to make it possible to disqualify bankrupts, and so on, in the opening you have the possibility of doing very much more than that. That is a difficulty undoubtedly. It is the difficulty I referred to previously when I said— to put it the opposite way—that in order to keep out a draught you are sometimes tempted to nail down the windows. But if you do you will also be prevented from opening them to let in fresh air. If you leave them open for one purpose, the danger is that they may be used for another. It is difficult to manage that situation without a long and unsightly list, such as was suggested by the Deputy in an amendment to the Constitution elsewhere which we dealt with the other day. I will have this examined, as Deputy Costello suggested, to see whether we can make certain that in any disqualifications, if such are made by law, there will be no question of women being discriminated against in comparison with others.

Comment on this

One has to make provision for disability by law taking away from the privilege here given. But it is not an easy thing to say that any disqualifying law shall not be based upon sex—to make no distinction according to sex?

Comment on this

It is a question of how to do it.

Comment on this

I do not see why nailing down windows or any metaphors like that come in. You will simply say that, if there is going to be any disqualification about bankrupts, imbeciles, etc., it will be male and female imbeciles and bankrupts equally.

Comment on this

That is so. There is no difference of opinion so far as what should be put in is concerned. I promise to go into it and see what would be the best form of words to cover any possibility. The old Constitution had the same difficulty—the same thing was open under it—but that does not matter.

Comment on this

Is the President keeping the other points mentioned in Deputy Mrs. Redmond's amendment in mind?

Comment on this

I think we disposed of that. Religion is covered elsewhere.

Comment on this

No.

Comment on this

I think so.

Comment on this

There are certain doubts about that.

Comment on this

Article 44, Section 2, sub-section (2) states:

The State guarantees not to endow any religion, and shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status.

Comment on this

Is that in respect of the practice of religion?

Comment on this

Is it not in respect of the endowment of religion?

Comment on this

I would not say that.

Comment on this

There is a fear that the specific words which open the paragraph may run right through.

Comment on this

I will have that looked into. The intention is clear that there will be no disability on the ground of religion. I will have the matter examined, if Deputies wish, to see whether that, in fact, can be possible by restriction.

Comment on this

Surely if it were broken up and the first phrase was about endowing and the second was that no disability should be imposed, the thing would be free.

Comment on this

I have no doubt of the President's intention, but I want to guard against future dangers.

Comment on this

I shall look into that, although I do not think there is any danger.

Comment on this

Of the three points in the amendment, sex is covered, religion lies over to a later clause, and class cannot be defined.

Comment on this

That is the trouble with class.

Comment on this

I move to report progress.

The Dáil adjourned at 2 p.m. until Tuesday, June 1st.

Comment on this