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Dáil

Vote on Account, 1941-42 (Resumed).

Contributions 1–124 of 260. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Last night, I said that, during the course of the debate, suggestions had been made that there had been no foresight and no planning. The facts will, I think, prove that those suggestions are as unjustifiable as some of the remarks made with regard to special articles such as petrol, wheat and potatoes. There has been planning. A year before the war broke out—in September, 1938—we were so alive to the need for planning, lest there should be a war, that we began to plan then. Everybody knows that, in a situation like this—the situation which we looked upon then as possible—the fundamental question for us was one of supplies. All planning was based on that—all planning must be based on that—the question of supplies for the various industries which fulfill our needs, the various industries, occupation in which enables those citizens so engaged to exchange their services and the goods they produce for the services which are rendered by other members of the community to them in return.

Realising that everything depended upon supplies and that, when a crisis should arise, that would be our principal care, we saw that it would ultimately become the most important Department of the State on the economic side. We saw that the conduct of that Department would require initiative and energy, and, perhaps, a greater staff than many of the other Departments. The first thing was to decide on the person to be chosen to take charge of that most important Department. Obviously, the person who was to take that part was the man who had been associated with the building up of our industries, the man to whom it is due more than to any other one man that we were in the relatively happy position that we have been able to maintain up to the present, the man who was charged with the policy on which we were elected as a Government first.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce, as he was then, knew the industries, he had experience of them, he had been working for a number of years endeavouring to implement the policy of trying to make this country as self-sufficient as possible, and as independent of outside sources of supply as possible. His knowledge and his energy obviously fitted him for that position. But that was a year before the war. We fully realised that, when the war came, it would become a Department of State all to itself, of necessity requiring the full time of a member of the Government, but, as it was a year before the war, we considered that the Minister could prepare by making a special section of his Department do the planning ahead. Then, if the crisis should come upon us, if war should break out, he would be able quickly to take over the specialised staff and constitute a special Department of State. He put the ablest men he had—and they are amongst the ablest officers in the State—on that work, and the planning was begun a year before the war.

The moment that section of the Department was set up—that is, long before the war—there was made an exhaustive survey of our needs. The question of foodstuffs—food for human beings and for animals—was surveyed; and the supplies of raw materials which we could produce and of raw materials we had of necessity to bring from outside were examined. Importers, manufacturers and traders were interviewed and they were urged to accumulate reserve stocks as quickly as they could. People talk about collecting reserve stocks as if that were a trifle, as if it were very easy to collect vast stores and keep them in advance, possibly to meet a war of two, three, four or five years' duration. That, of course, is a complete mistake. The storage accommodation that is available generally is only for a much shorter period than that. Not only is it necessary to have accommodation for these reserve stocks, but there is also the financial side of the transaction to be considered. Our traders and our merchants carry on, expecting to turn over in a much shorter time than that which you have to plan for if you want resources and reserves with which to face a war.

Financial arrangements had to be made to enable them to purchase and hold those reserve stocks. Through the Minister and his Department—or the section of his Department that I am speaking of—arrangements were made with the banks by which credits were given, and substantial reserves were, in fact, brought in. Difficulties of storing were partially solved by urging traders to send down along the line as quickly as possible the goods that came in. The wholesalers were to get their stores at once from the importers and send them down to the retailers, and we tried to help the retailers by asking the private citizen who could do it to take in reserve stores.

At this point, I think I might make an observation. I heard a Deputy here complaining that some people had stores of goods and others had not, and that they were casting jealous eyes on those who had. I want Deputies to look at that for a moment in this connection. Those who bought those stocks at that time did so on the call of the Minister who was responsible for trying to see that we had the largest stocks possible. They obeyed this call and did it without subtracting from any other person's heap. They did not increase their own pile by taking it away from others, and I am perfectly certain that, if some of them were called upon to do so, and there was absolute need for it, they would be willing to make some of those stocks available for general use. It is most unfair, however, to suggest that those who did, at that time, obey the orders or the call which was given were not acting in a public-spirited way. They were, and it is very much better that these stores should now be in the country somewhere than that they should not have been in the country at all, because, as quickly as they went down along the line, they were replaced at the top. There is only one thing that is important in that complaint about people having stores. It is said, and said truly, that many a poor person would have liked to do the same, but could not do it—could not afford it, had not the money. That is true, and as far as the State, as a whole, was able, the State tried to meet that particular case.

I might, at this point, perhaps, also talk of the general policy that we have been adopting, not merely in this crisis but all the time. If any Deputy takes the Constitution and reads Articles 43 and 45 in that Constitution he will see, set out very clearly, the general principles which have inspired Government action from the time that we took office. Deputy McGilligan complained that we have not completely socialised services here as they have done in Britain at the present time. We may have to do it if this crisis continues and if circumstances get so bad that steps like that are needed, but that is not the normal line upon which we have been trying to approach our social problems. We know perfectly well that the present social system has in it grave evils, and we have tried to remedy these evils by acting on certain principles well-accepted by our people. In the Constitution we have acknowledged the right of private property, but we have also pointed out the right of the State, for the common good, to de-limit the exercise and the use of private property, to make sure that it would subserve not merely the individual but also the common good, the good of the community as a whole. We have also laid stress on private initiative and private enterprise. We believe that private initiative and private enterprise will produce a better state of living for our people as a whole than any other method, but, again, the right of the State to direct, and the duty of the State to supplement and to encourage, has been recognised.

When this crisis began, our aim, naturally, was to try to work along these lines, to do everything that the State was bound to do for the common good, without departing from these fundamental principles. It may be, as I have said, that before this crisis is over the State may have to exercise its right to de-limit the use and to direct the use of private property, and to direct private initiative and private enterprise, so as to make them subserve the common good in the present crisis. It may have to interfere considerably, but we regard interference, unless it can be proved to be absolutely necessary, as unwise, because we believe that it creates greater problems than the problem it seeks to solve. Human life, modern human life, is extremely complex. No man, and no group of men, can completely see all that complexity. If you try to do it, you try to do it in the same sort of way, and you make the same mistakes, as those people who take up statistics and try, through some general figures such as average figures, to get from them conclusions about particular cases. It is the particular case—the individual—that matters in the life of the community finally, and if the State takes on more than it can properly accomplish, you are bound to have disaster.

My belief is that this community will be safer, safer ordinarily and safer in a crisis, if, instead of trying to centralise everything, it tries to decentralise to the utmost possible extent. We believe that that is true. We believe that it is the right method of approach, and it has been on that line of approach that the planning which was done by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, in the section of his Department before he became Minister for Supplies, was carried out. Deputy McGilligan asked, was anybody warned or was anybody consulted. That warning and that consultation took place from the beginning. It took place, as I have said, before the war, in trying to get private enterprise to take time by the forelock and look ahead, and it was repeated at various times since the war began. As proof of that, I shall read for you a circular which was sent from the Dublin Chamber of Commerce and the Associated Chambers to all their members. I am going to read this circular in full, if I may, because there are a number of lessons to be drawn from it.

Comment on this

What is the date?

Comment on this

The 1st July, last year.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

1940?

Comment on this

Yes, last year. I said that before the war a section of the Department was set up and that from that time there was constant warning and constant communication with the private enterprises that carry on our commercial life here in this country. The circular is as follows:—

"At a conference held on Monday the 1st July, in the Department of Supplies, at which the honorary officers of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and the honorary officers of the Dublin Chamber were present, the Secretary to the Department referred to the recent broadcast by the Minister for Supplies and stated that the uncertainty of the future has made it imperative that this country should increase its stocks of essential commodities. Storage capacity can be provided by distributing stocks downwards, eventually making use of the storage capacity of the actual consumers.

"The honorary officers expressed their entire agreement with this policy, and, with the approval of the Secretary to the Department of Supplies, are circulating this memo to all members of the Chambers of Commerce. All traders, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers should, in their own interests as well as the interests of the country, increase their stocks to their utmost capacity and should impress upon their customers the advisability of doing the same. The consequent dispersal of stocks will release storage capacity in the usual centres and will also ensure that stocks of all commodities will be well distributed. This may prove a great benefit should circumstances arise which might dislocate distribution from the usual supply centres."

Now, I should like you to note the date.

Comment on this
A Deputy

1940.

Comment on this

Yes, last year. Everybody knows that the war entered on a new phase last summer. Everybody knows that our difficulties in getting supplies were greatly increased by that change. Everybody knows that the danger to this country from every direction increased at that date. Before that time the Minister had been doing everything possible to get just these things done. That was not the first time he spoke in that sense either to chambers of commerce, to traders, or to manufacturers. He had been doing it all the time. But because of this new danger, this new phase, and this new crisis, he took an opportunity of speaking over the radio, and also took an opportunity of bringing representatives to meet the officers of his Department.

As I have said, we started to plan a year before the war—that planning, necessarily, being centred about the question of supplies. That planning went on till the war broke out. When the war broke out we changed the section of the Department into an independent Ministry and the Minister took over those officers who had experience already of the problems, who had made the surveys already, who knew the difficulties and knew what was to be done, and added to them—sometimes to the discontent of other Departments—other officers of ability who would be able to take on the increased burden which came upon them the moment the war broke out.

But the moment the war broke out, you had a new set of circumstances altogether. Before the war, no matter how much you asked people to take heed, or warned them there was a danger of war, they said, "Oh, that is a chance." Many people said—just as we had Deputies here yesterday saying—that this was all panic-mongering, that it was going to mean loss to the country, that there was no danger. Human beings are by nature only too ready to take the easy course and to say, "God is good for tomorrow," and they did not want the incitement of other people to make them do that. It was hard to stir them up but, when war broke, those who had not taken advantage of the warnings found that they were in difficulties. The nation as a whole was in difficulties.

We are a creditor nation. We have a large sum of sterling assets. They belong to members of our community, but in time of strain, like all private property, they could be availed of to the interest of the community as a whole. They could, if they were liquid, if they could be moved; but the moment war broke out every country, the belligerent countries, and even the neutral countries, began to put all sorts of restrictions in the way so that the claims that outside people had upon them, represented by their money in the particular country, were repudiated. For that is what it meant —a repudiation of the claims. Money is not much good or claims are not much good to you if you are not able to make them effective by getting things that you want. An American millionaire in New York may be able to get all sorts of things for himself, but take that millionaire and put him on an uninhabited island and I think, if he were faced immediately with need for food and so on, his attitude there towards his money would be very much that of the cock in the fable: the grain of wheat would be much more important to him than the precious stones.

We were a creditor country. We had large sums of money invested abroad, representing, as I said, claims abroad. They could not be realised at once. Even in normal times very heavy realisation would mean very heavy loss. The selling out of these and buying goods in return and getting them in large amounts would mean loss. But in this case, you could not do it unless you had the agreement of the countries in which your money was invested. As I have said, all these countries at the beginning of war put restrictions on the sale and realisation of sterling, particularly in foreign exchange. They put on restrictions, not merely in getting foreign exchange for their currency, but they put on restrictions in giving their own actual goods. You had both. What were we to do? Normally, we get from our investments abroad a certain interest or income which we can translate from year to year into goods and which over a long period we normally do, but we could get neither interest nor capital the moment the war broke out, unless by agreement.

We were in the same position with regard to our shipping. We have no mercantile marine of our own. I told you some of the difficulties we would have had if we had a mercantile marine. Our goods were translated here formerly in the main in British ships, but the moment war broke out the British Government had need for all its ships and the use of these ships was regulated by their interest in winning the war. The first thing for us to do, therefore, was to make agreements in regard to some of these matters. Agreements and arrangements were made which were of use to both sides, of mutual benefit, and it was by reason of these agreements that we got most of the things which we got from the time the war broke out—not all, but a good deal.

But again, there are people who talk about war without apparently realising what war means. Our dangers would be much better appreciated by the people if they realised that one half the world is fighting against the other half, that it is a question of life or death for the nations involved, and that because it is so, they will put aside every other consideration except the consideration of trying to bring victory to their own side. Every other consideration goes overboard, and arrangements which were made, and which were satisfactory for a time, no longer obtain. We have a position that was explained time after time, a position in which our dependence must be upon ourselves.

There has been planning. I think the Minister for Supplies was unfair to himself when he said that adequate steps were not taken. I know the sense in which he meant that. He meant to say that the steps which were taken did not, in the event, save us from those things from which we wanted, and were planning, to save the country. I say that nothing that by ordinary human foresight could have been provided for was neglected, and those who take and use a phrase that the Minister used, to try to suggest, as has been done, that there was neglect on the part of the Government or any of the Departments, are acting as unfairly and just as unwisely in the national interest, as the people who took up the phrase of the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures and used it to our detriment in Britain and America. The full meaning was distorted. Surely we have enough difficulties to meet at the present time without having to meet misrepresentation of that sort. I say there has been planning. Everything that was humanly possible in our circumstances, to make provision in advance, was done and the reserve stocks that had been accumulated were of such value that, when the shock and dislocation of the war came, it was hardly felt here. Life was almost as if no such position had been created. It went on smoothly, so smoothly that the danger was that people might not realise that it could not go on like that for ever.

We had to warn the people from the start that during the war it could not be "business as usual." If they did pass over that crisis, which caused dislocation, shock, inconvenience and loss in practically every country, if they passed over it quietly here, it was because of the planning done in the section of the Department of Supplies, which was created a year before the war began. If we have been able to pass for one and a half years through a war of this magnitude, and if we only began to feel it last September, or at the beginning of this year, that has been due to the fact that everything that foresight could do to plan ahead and to make arrangements had been done.

In regard to special commodities which are of particular importance, special arrangements had to be made. Special companies were set up to see that we got our supply of grain, fuel, animal feeding-stuffs and timber. These are fundamental commodities, of such importance that the Minister departed from the general lines we have gone on, of inspiring existing importers and traders to do their work. Special companies were set up, closely associated with the Departments, in order to give whatever influence and direction the State could give, by getting together people who had special experience, knowledge and ability, to try to add to and to supplement what was ordinarily done by private companies. As the Minister for Finance points out these were nonprofit making companies.

I say that there has been care exercised from the very start. It has been suggested that we could have done better before, and that we could do better now than has been done by the Departments in present circumstances, if we set up something like an economic council. You could with a different form of State organisation and a different type of Constitution have such a body. There is no doubt that one could frame a form of government in which you could have an economic council doing the work that it has been suggested it should do, but it does not fit in with our system. In fact, with our system it would be needless duplication. I have many times realised the fact that Ministers' time was taken up, to no small extent, with day to day administrative problems, Parliamentary work and so on. I have thought that it would be a useful thing if, in addition, you could have something like an economic headquarters staff. It was pointed out here by Deputy Norton that I had, actually when I was in opposition, recommended that for that very reason. When we came into office we had a certain programme which we wanted to develop and to carry through, and naturally the same thought occurred to me again, why not have such? I tried to plan it to see how it would work, and how it would fit in with the machinery that already existed, and I found it would not work. I found that there would be duplication.

The main reason why it would not work is that there are Departments which are doing that work, and if you set up any group, such as an economic council of the type indicated by Deputy Norton, you would have the difficulty that, when planning it should plan upon some given policy, and very soon the planning becomes a question of politics, a political problem. They are not in a position to solve these problems. They may make recommendations which the Government sees are out of line with the general policy which it regards as best for the country as a whole and their plans are turned down. Even though they were accepted, there is the question of the execution of such plans. People who plan ought, as far as possible, be given the execution of the plan. If you had a group of that particular kind divorced from the Departments, they would have to depend ultimately on the Departments to carry out the plans, and if the Departments believed that some of these particular plans were not really workable, they would immediately object to them, and leave you in the position that nothing was done. So the first thing one has to bear in mind, in talking about an economic headquarters staff or anything of that kind, is that you must make it possible for those who make plans to operate their own plans.

It is interesting to note that efforts were made in Britain to do the very same thing because, fundamentally, the method of government in Britain, as far as administration is concerned, is roughly the same as our own. There is Ministerial responsibility; there are Departments with Ministers at their heads and having staffs who carry out the policy of the Government as operated by the Minister. The idea of an economic headquarters staff has been tried in Britain over a number of years. Mr. Stanley Baldwin, I think it was in 1925——

Comment on this

Has not this question of an economic council been decided by the House recently?

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It was referred to in the course of this debate by at least three Deputies in relation to planning supply.

Comment on this

I am dealing with these.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

A motion on supplies was recently decided. Deputies, however, are not precluded from raising it on the Vote on Account in connection with procuring supplies. A motion may not be repeated until after a lapse of six months. Were all reference to such matters ruled out in relation to taxation or expenditure, Deputies might be hampered in dealing with many important aspects of financial policy.

Comment on this
Hugh Victor Flinn Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance (Mr. Flinn) Fianna Fáil

I understand that it has been intimated that it was desirable that on this Vote Ministers should deal with the question of supplies.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Quite so.

Comment on this

Mr. Baldwin when he was Prime Minister set up a Committee of Civil Research in 1925, and the idea was that it was to work on similar lines to those of the Imperial General Staff. The idea was that what could be done in the case of planning ahead for the Army, should be also possible in the case of the civil Departments. That was a failure. Mr. MacDonald set up an Economic Advisory Council when he was Prime Minister, about 1929, and that was a failure. There was an Economic Survey Staff set up some time ago of which Sir Josiah Stamp, Professor Clay and others were members and that also has disappeared. I suggest that bodies interested—and I believe the Labour Party are interested—in this whole question, seeing how impossible it is to make this idea fit in with the working of Departments as we have them here, should read a book by Laski. Deputy Norton said he is a Communist. I do not mind what he is; he is a professor of political science in the University of London and these are studies of the working of these institutions. Deputies need not accept anything he says if they think it is Communistic. All I am asking is that they should simply read that work as an interesting analysis which shows up, no matter what may be said of the idea by itself or in connection with a different form of government, how impossible it is with our form of government to get such a plan to work.

There is always going on under our system of government just that planning which Deputy Norton wants to have adopted. I have told you how planning for supplies was being done by the Department of Supplies. A section of the Department of Industry and Commerce, when it was doing that work, had constant touch with the people in the particular businesses concerned—people who know their own business as experts know it. There is constant consultation by the various Departments with the interests concerned. There is constant planning going on. The Minister for Industry and Commerce and his staff are constantly in touch with industry and with commerce. The Minister for Agriculture is constantly in touch with the agricultural industry and planning is done there. Sometimes it is necessary to get a special group of Ministers to meet as a sub-committee of the Government to deal with certain problems. These sub-committees meet and they discuss problems which are common to them. For instance, the duties of the Minister for Supplies, when he took over that office, clearly could be divided into two categories—getting goods from outside, and getting goods produced here. The question of getting goods from outside, the commerce side of it, touched on the work of the Department of Industry and Commerce, and the Minister for Supplies was naturally in touch with the Minister for Industry and Commerce in regard to certain of the matters connected with supplies. In regard to getting goods produced here, he was also in touch with the Minister for Industry and Commerce. The Minister for Industry and Commerce was the active agent in trying to establish substitute industries or in arranging for a changed production by our industries to meet the needs of the new situation.

In connection with the question of food, the Minister for Supplies had to go to the Minister for Agriculture. These three Ministers are naturally closely related in this whole question of supplies. Recently the Minister has with him a sub-committee of the Cabinet, an economic sub-committee, with Ministers such as the Minister for Industry and Commerce and the Minister for Agriculture, in order that problems of general interest would be discussed and dealt with. So that you have planning going on in the separate Departments, and then you have planning by means of sub-committees of the Government and by the Government as a whole. If you try to introduce any other planning group, except those which in a particular way are related to each other, you will have not merely a fifth wheel on the coach, but you will have something worse. It would be worse than useless.

I have been asked, looking ahead, what are we doing. The most important thing we have to fear in looking ahead is, that we shall not have food enough. That would be the greatest of all our calamities. People died from starvation in this country before. Perhaps it should be said that the war would have to last a very long time indeed before our people would starve. If they were neglected, they might. If we take care now and be timely about it, they will not. I do not want to go back again to the question of bread which I dealt with rather fully last night. But, I would again urge every Deputy, when he gets back to the country at the week-end and, indeed, until the sowing season is over, to urge the farmers to increase their tillage and particularly to sow those crops which are needed for human food.

Comment on this

Will the Taoiseach guarantee that there will be sufficient seed?

Comment on this

The Deputy was answered before about seed by the Minister for Agriculture and told that there was sufficient seed. There can be economy in the use of seed as in other things.

Comment on this

I accept the Taoiseach's assurance on that.

Comment on this

I am telling the Deputy what the Minister for Agriculture told him on a previous occasion.

Comment on this

I heard differently since, but I accept the Taoiseach's assurance.

Comment on this

I cannot myself go round and find out every store in which there is seed, but I am telling the Deputy what the Minister for Agriculture said on former occasions when this question of seed came up. There may be some difficulty, I believe, about an adequate supply of Spring wheat— I am not sure of that—but that was the only thing in regard to the vital matters of food that I have heard any question about. But there can be economy in the use of seed. I remember listening to one of the Ministers, I think it was the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures, pointing out that beet seed is usually sown in a long line and then thinned out, and that if you are short of seed you can make it go much further if you put two or three grains here and two or three grains there. In that way you will not be wasting the seed. I know that at one time the usual method of sowing wheat was to carry it in a sheet and fling it around in every direction. I do not think that is practised to the same extent now and in that way there is an economy in the use of seed. Economy in the use of seed and indeed in the use of all materials is most important at present. That applies to very many things. We have been quite wasteful in our methods because we had not to be economical. Now we have to be economical and every man who makes one seed do the work of two, if you can imagine that, is a creator and a saviour at the present time.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

On the question of seeds, is the Taoiseach aware how absolutely essential it is that provision should be made immediately by farmers for the production of seeds for root crops for next year, and will he ask the Department of Agriculture to take steps in that matter? I am informed by county agricultural instructors and others who know all about this business that it is essential, if root crops are to be provided next year, that steps should be taken during this month at the latest.

Comment on this

One of the troubles we have is that when Ministers speak in the House all the Deputies are not present, and Deputies do not always read the Official Reports, so that things which are dealt with by Ministers are not known about or are forgotten about. I was not in the House myself, and I am not sure if he did, but I am told that the Minister for Agriculture dealt with that question in detail. I know from looking at the reports and getting an idea of the work being done by the Department of Agriculture that the Department have had this whole question of seed supplies very carefully under consideration and I have no doubt that any steps necessary to warn farmers about what they are to do will be taken.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

I was in the House on that occasion and I heard the Minister's statement on that matter, but the fact is that whatever the plans of the Minister or the Department may be, they are not being carried out in the country, and when this month is over it will be too late to do it.

Comment on this

I know that there is a very big difference between warning people and getting people to accept the warning; telling people what they are to do and getting them to do it. But I do not know of any steps which the Minister can take that he has not taken in that way. He is probably urging the county committees of agriculture and the agricultural instructors to get this done. What can we do if ultimately people will not do it, except we set up a special State section and try ourselves to provide the seed? I do not know what would be the magnitude of that.

Comment on this
Mr. Morrissey

That would be the ideal solution.

Comment on this

I do not know. It may be a big task. In this country we are getting more and more into the position of depending on the Government and the State as a fairy godmother. If we cannot get people to do these things for themselves, the only way to save them from themselves may be to try to adopt some method such as I have indicated. But, do not let us have the people all the time in leading strings, taking them by the hand and helping them along. We must get them to stand on their own feet, and that is the best way in the present situation.

Comment on this

Might I inform the Taoiseach that seed merchants are prepared to propagate seed? Already plots of mangels and turnips have been prepared and others are being made under guarantees given to the farmers by the seed merchants. It would be possible for the Government to help in that matter. I thoroughly agree with the Taoiseach that it is not fair to ask the Government to do things we should do ourselves, but if we are doing them ourselves, I hope we shall get the co-operation of the Department.

Comment on this

Yes. The Deputy has indicated the line the Government usually follows. The method suggested by Deputy Morrissey as being the ideal one would be only a last resort. The best method is that which has been indicated by the Deputy, and that is usually adopted—to go to the people whose business it is to provide the seed and tell them that if it was formerly got from abroad they should make provision now so that they will be able to carry on their business as seed merchants.

Comment on this

I know that it is being done by one of the largest seed merchants.

Comment on this

I said that the Government are only too anxious to help to supplement private enterprise, but we do not want to sap private enterprise. We do not want people to think that they can be saved in spite of themselves by any action which the Government may take; they can only be saved by themselves. Looking ahead, as I said, the first thing we have to provide for is food, and fundamental as regards food supplies are cereals. If we have sufficient cereals, we will be able to prevent a violent dislocation of our food supplies. We will be able to get some sort of bread for the people. If we had to substitute potatoes entirely for bread that would be a considerable difficulty.

As I am talking about food, let me say this again to the farmers. The farmer normally works his farm for his own interest. We want him now to work his farm not merely for his own interest but for the general interest. We appeal to him to put more land under tillage, even though, normally, it is not the way he would work the economy of his farm. By means of guaranteed prices and so on we are trying to make it profitable for him to do so. As somebody said to me the other day: "If you ask the farmers to put an extra acre or half acre of their land under tillage, over and above what they would normally do from the ordinary profit-making point of view; if you ask them to do that from the public point of view and, for the sake of their neighbour, and as I think some other person said ‘for the love of God,' and if they do that it would help us to solve our problems." We want the farmers to approach the matter in that light. We know that our system here is one of small farmers and of small landed proprietors. We want them to keep their farms. If we can help it, we do not want to have State interference with their farms, but they have a duty towards the community as a whole because the land is the fundamental thing on which we live. Therefore, anyone who fails to use his land, as we are urging him to use it, is guilty of a crime, and it is right that he should be punished. We hope that those who commit that crime will be punished in an exemplary fashion.

Comment on this

What about those who will not give their land at £6 an acre so that it may be tilled?

Comment on this

Not merely do we want the farmers to till their land, but we want everyone who has land, cottiers and others, to do so. Take the cottiers. I know the country well and I know that, for reasons which may appear good to themselves, their plots are not tilled. Let us see no cottiers' plots untilled this year. We know that the farmers will help them. If they are anxious to till their plots the farmers, who live beside them, will help them to a certain extent. They used to do it in the past, and I believe they will do it again by way of putting in a plough and a pair of horses to help to lighten the labour there would otherwise be in preparing the plot for a crop. As I am talking about cottiers, let me urge on every local body through the country to go out for giving allotments to the fullest possible extent. Everyone in the country who can get a plot, in which to grow food, should strive to have one. The local bodies should do everything in their power to make such plots available. We cannot have too much food, but we can very well have too little.

Now next to food, there is the question of fuel. Arrangements were made about getting in coal, but these arrangements can no longer be depended on. They have already broken down, so that the fuel, like the food, must come from within the country if we are going to be sure of it. Our coal mines would supply but a very small proportion of the coal that we require. They should certainly be developed to the fullest extent possible, but even that would not be considerable. It would be helpful and should be done, but it would not be considerable. Our great reliance for fuel must be upon turf. It is the great alternative that we have. We want two or three times the amount of turf that is ordinarily cut, cut now. Just as this is the sowing season of the year, it is also the time when preparations have to be made for the winning of turf. The Turf Board, with its mechanical appliances, is trying to do what it can, but it is organised to do more than win turf by mechanical means.

An effort is being made to try to organise the getting of hand-won turf, and we have got to a situation in which we will have to reserve for the areas which are far away from the bogs, and from the large centres of population, whatever supplies of household coal will be made available. The rest of the country, the towns, have bogs near them, and it will not require tremendous organisation in order to get the turf cut. There again, just as in the seed question, probably the best way would be to organise those who normally supply fuel, the coal traders and coal merchants, and try to get them to make arrangements to secure supplies of turf instead of coal. The local committees, the parish committees, should try to assist. If we can get local initiative in regard to this matter, local enterprise, we will probably do very much more and very much better than if the State were immediately and directly to take over the actual work of trying to get production. There is organisation being done by the State; there is encouragement being given by the State. The Turf Board has got a task to do, and is trying to do it, but the time is very short. We must get to work now. The Department of Lands has come in to make available bogs which have not been used, and so on, and all that the State can do to see that we will have the necessary fuel will be done.

With regard to clothing, we ought to be able to manage fairly well. Most of those who were able to get expensive cloths in the past will have stocks or will be able to have supplies at any rate to last them through the crisis. They may not look as well dressed as they did in the past, but they certainly will not be cold. But there are people in this country who have not been able to get expensive clothes. There are people who have not two or three suits of clothes or more, people who have only one suit, and that threadbare. Those are the people who are in danger as regards clothing. Every effort is being made to see whether Irish wool, of which we have considerable quantities, can be used. Unfortunately, the plants which are used for spinning and weaving worsteds and so on are not capable, or so I am told, of using Irish wool, but every effort is being made and will continue to be made to try to utilise Irish wool for the making of clothes. If we have a standard pattern or some style that is unusual we must just put up with it so long as it keeps us from the cold. Those are the fundamental things.

Transport is essential too, because there is no use in having goods in one part of the country and needing them in another part if you are unable to transport them. The complete failure of petrol supplies, which may happen, would be a serious dislocation at the present time. We know that we were able to have our transport in the past before there was petrol. We have the trains. The trains want coal, but they can be adapted—I do not know whether it can be done quickly; it has been done in the North—for the use of turf, if we have it in sufficient quantities. We have to use our railways to a greater extent than before. Where there are horsedrawn vehicles they have got to be used, and every one of us must be economical in the use of liquid fuel in transport. If we do reconcile ourselves to those changes which will necessarily come about, we will find in the long run that we will not be very much worse off. Our difficulties then, the vital ones, and they are considerable, can be overcome to the extent that would enable us to continue to have a reasonable standard here, if only we can deal with the question of distribution. We have to try to give to individuals the right to get and the method of getting their share of the goods that are in the pool.

We are going to have considerable unemployment here in this country, and it cannot be avoided. Bit by bit, our industries are likely to have to stop, a number of them, for want of raw materials. We must try by every possible device, to stretch out the period during which those raw materials can last, so as to prevent the unemployment which will come if a number of those industries close down. I am afraid that a number of them will close down ultimately, but let us try to put off the evil day as far as we can by devices of various kinds which may be resorted to. There will be a new type of unemployed. Formerly the people who were unemployed were, in the main, people who could have been put on unskilled tasks of various kinds. Very many of the people who are going to be unemployed now will be quite incapable of doing the ordinary labourer's work. We will have a number of unskilled workers who will be unemployed too, a much greater number than there was up to the present, and we must try to find occupations for them. There has been a section dealing with the problem over a number of years; we are fortunate in that we have a section, with a Parliamentary Secretary in charge, who has long experience of this problem. The effort to find occupation for those who become unemployed is constantly being made, and a review is being taken at present of the possibilities of finding employment, but remember that, in the areas in which there had been unemployment in the past, that effort over a long period of years has practically exhausted the immediately useful work, work which is valuable to the community when you take into account the value of the work that is done and the cost of doing it. The amount of work with a large labour content, work of real value, has been greatly diminished.

The unemployment problem is going to be somewhat the reverse of what it used to be. Our unemployment now is going to be mainly in the large cities and industrial centres. In the past, there was a good deal of unemployment in the West of Ireland and elsewhere. There will be some of that still, but there is useful work for a large number on the land, producing the things that we want, cutting the fuel and sowing the crops. In the cities, we are going to have a much more difficult problem of unemployment than we have had in the past. Some of it we will be able to relieve, as I have said, by schemes which are under consideration, but unfortunately the number of them will be relatively small, in comparison to the number who are idle. What is to be done with the administrative classes, the executives? What is to be done with the skilled technicians, the craftsmen, and so on? That is another difficult question. It will be almost impossible to find useful employment for them, but they must live, and an effort must be made to give them their share of the pool. As I say, that is under active consideration at the moment. The first thing is to try to delay as far as possible, by various devices, the unemployment of this class of workers who cannot be put at the type of manual work, and so on, which we have been able to make available, to a certain extent anyhow, for the unemployed in the past. The next step must be to try to get, from the pool of works which have been under constant examination, those works that would be of some value, but we will have to be content with a smaller labour content in those works and a smaller general community value in the future than we have been in the past. Things that we would not have attempted in the past, as being quite uneconomical, if I may use the word, will have to be undertaken now in order to try to get occupation for those people who, in increasing numbers, will be available for work of that particular kind.

On the question of distribution then the whole point is to get the people having a right to claim—and secure them a claim, if possible, by getting services from them in return—a share of the goods that are in the pool. Another part of the distribution is to see that they get a fair share of the pool. That brings in the whole question of rationing. I have already spoken at considerable length, and if I were to deal satisfactorily with the whole question of rationing, its difficulties, and what has been done, I am afraid I would have to make a speech as long as the one I made last night or the one that I have made this morning, so I am afraid I will have to leave it over to be dealt with by another Minister.

The Minister for Supplies has already dealt with it, but apparently it is necessary for us here to repeat and repeat and repeat; otherwise we will be told there is no thought given to the difficulties and problems ahead, that there is no attempt to plan, and you will have all those phrases which are very easy to put in tabloid form, but it is quite a different thing when you have got to point out, as we have to, the variety of circumstances that come in when dealing with any of those complex problems, because they are complex, and do not lend themselves at all to be dealt with in tabloid form. I will end then by saying that everything which it was reasonable to do has been done, that the Government are not prophets, that they are not people who can, by a wave of a wand or a conjuror's trick, end blockades, get goods from people who are not prepared to bring them, transport them over the seas, and so on. Everything that men could do has been done with care and energy, and anything that has not been done or any of the difficulties that have been encountered are facts of the situation over which neither we nor any other Government here would have control.

Comment on this

If the Taoiseach says it is the desire of the Government, not merely to ensure equitable distribution, but to give every person a right to what is available for distribution, a right to something that is in the pool, will he say why a declaration of policy of that kind is followed by an order sweeping 60,000 people off the fragmentary unemployment assistance they have been getting?

Comment on this

One of the things we want to make sure of is that there will be available for work on the land during the season when the land has to be tilled an adequate number of people and that these people will not be attracted off the land into work which is not nearly as important for the community as is work on the land. That is one consideration. Accordingly, we have to see to it that there will be people available for work on the land and that there will be every possible attraction to bring people back to the land. People have been coming into the city within recent times, coming off the land, and if work was made available for them on the land they would be prepared to go back there rather than stay in the city. We want to do everything in our power to relieve the problem that confronts us in the cities and in that connection work on the land would be very helpful.

Comment on this

But they cannot get work on the land.

Comment on this

Does the Taoiseach believe that, by rationing food, the poorest sections of the community will get their just share if the Government do not at the same time in some way ration the purchasing power of money? Does he believe that the interests of the community will be properly safeguarded if certain industries and services are permitted to be operated by private individuals for shareholders' profits? The industries I have in mind are the flour-milling and bacon industries, and I have also in mind such things as banking and credit.

Comment on this

The Deputy has raised a number of questions which would require a long debate here to deal with, and he knows that.

Comment on this

I could say a good deal more to the Taoiseach about private interests and private profits.

Comment on this

If I were to go into all the matters raised by these questions, I would have to spend a very long time. It is not a matter that could be dealt with merely by way of an ordinary answer.

Comment on this

I could say quite a lot on the subject of private profit and the public welfare.

Comment on this

I thought it would have been unfair last night to ask the Taoiseach, with only a few minutes to go, to explain to the House the position with regard to bellmen's coal. Perhaps it was unfair to the Taoiseach that I allowed him to complete his speech to-day without reminding him of his ambition in that respect last night. I think the question of coal is the real point that shows up the present situation. Therefore, I should like the Taoiseach to view one or two matters with regard to it before he makes any attempt to give an explanation of the situation. There is this to be said about coal, that it is not a question of going back into the past and in that respect it is not like the question of tea. Coal is an entirely different question; it is only a question of to-day and of the last two months. In view of the importance attached by the Minister for Supplies to the coal situation, in view of the explanation he has given about the way he treated coal in the fixing of prices, and in view of the extraordinary reaction to my simple question the other night, I think it is a thing that requires to be most calmly and carefully considered.

The Minister for Supplies, on the 12th March, when starting to deal with the general question of supplies, held up his hands to the House and said he wanted to approach the discussion of supplies in the calmest possible way in order to give the greatest amount of information to the House. He dealt exhaustively with tea and coal, but does anybody know what the position is with regard to supplies of tea or coal following his very long statement? Deputies do not know whether we imported more tea in 1939 than in 1938, or whether we got more coal in 1940 than in 1939 or 1938. I want to make the point later that so far from the national interest being injured in any way by the people knowing the amount of coal and tea we got in within the last two years, the national interest has been very badly served by the withholding of that information.

As to tea, I asked the Minister for Supplies whether he was not aware that the price at which tea was imported in 1938 and 1939 was 1/6 a lb. That amount, I submit, covered the buying of the tea, the transport charges until it reached the ship and came alongside the quay in Dublin, or wherever else it reached here, and the cost of all insurance and freight, even the excessive war insurance charges. In the year 1940 the import price was 1/7¾, 1¾d. up. I asked why, in these circumstances, and in view of the fact that there was not a shortage of tea in this country last year as compared with previous years, such an extraordinary rise took place in the price of tea. The Minister explained that he could have standardised the price of tea but that would have been unfair to the poor. The Minister must not know anything of the position with regard to tea and the poor at the present time. The fact is that there has been an enormous rise in the price of tea, particularly for the poor. We were told by the Minister that the poor used to pay 2/- a lb. for their tea and, in fact, were able to get tea at 1/4 and 1/6. At the present time the poor are paying 2½d. an ounce for tea, or at the rate of 3/4 a lb.

As regards people in a better position, I heard of one lady who went to a shop after her friend told her she got tea there at 2/8 a lb. She asked to be supplied with tea and the shop assistant wanted to know "Is it the 4/8 or 5/- tea you want?" Naturally she was shocked and she asked was it not a fact that they were selling tea at 2/8 and was informed that they were, to their old customers. The poor are actually paying 2½d. an ounce, or 3/4 a lb., for their tea and the better classes are being asked by reputable houses in the city "Is it the 4/8 or the 5/- tea you require?" I think it was Deputy Colonel Ryan who told the House about someone travelling in County Tipperary offering tea wholesale at 4/- a lb. at a time when the cost of tea alongside the quay, when there was an adequate supply imported here, was up by only 1¾d. The Minister gave a very lame excuse as to why he could not control that, and then, when Deputy Byrne or Deputy Norton asked some other question, the Minister said: "Let me proceed with my speech without interruption", and that the explanation of why he was going to proceed with his speech without interruption was that he did not accept my statements as facts. I want the House to realise that it is a fact that, in 1940, the import price of tea, with every charge, insurance, freight and cost, paid up to its landing on the quay at Dublin or elsewhere, was 1/7¾ per lb.

Comment on this

Surely the Deputy understands that the average price for the year has nothing whatever to do with the price prevailing now? The price could fluctuate from the lowest to the highest point in the course of the year, without altering the average price.

Comment on this

The Minister can give a serious explanation of that to the House, and I believe it is wanted.

Comment on this

I invited Deputies to arrange for a debate on prices. They told me they wanted a debate on supplies and I objected to other questions being brought in when I was speaking on supplies. If Deputies want a debate on prices, it can be arranged. I am quite willing to discuss prices.

Comment on this

I think the Minister's polite words were "to let people go on telling lies about it".

Comment on this

I am quite sure that will happen, too.

Comment on this

That was in respect of coal. I cannot dissociate the question of supplies from the question of prices, and I do not know whether anybody in the House does, because what is it that regulates the question of supplies to the working class but price? The Minister tells us that he is going to introduce orders by which, if a policeman sees one throwing a crust of bread to a dog, one may be arrested, so precious is bread. If bread is precious, surely what buys bread is precious, and there is this drain of 3/4—an increase of 1/4—per lb. to the people who are buying tea in the poorer parts of the city. It is spread over the whole situation. The Minister will not tell us that the tea being sold to-day, and which has been sold at this price for some time, is tea imported in January and February at the increased price.

The Taoiseach then intervened. He apparently saw that there was some kind of difference between the question of price and the question of supply, and he said that the question of supply can be dealt with. I should like the question of price to be dealt with, even as regards tea, but as regards tea the damage to a large extent is done. Whatever dislocation of distribution has taken place has raised the price and has brought about the conditions I mention throughout the city. Other people know the position in the country. I suggest, however, that the position with regard to coal prices is not irretrievable, and I ask the House to consider in what way the Minister himself regards the question of coal. When dealing with the proposal for an economic council—I am quoting from the unrevised Dáil reports of 11th March, column 407— on the general question of prices, the Minister said:—

".... the Prices Commission is not functioning at the present time in relation to the day-to-day control of prices.

He added that he was.

Comment on this

Read the whole thing.

Comment on this

The Minister said:

"The Prices Commission is not functioning at the present time in relation to the day-to-day control of prices. I am functioning through a section of my Department. The powers conferred upon me by the Emergency Powers Act are much wider than those conferred by the Prices Control Act under which the Prices Commission was set up."

At column 408, he said:

"The prices branch of my Department, acting upon my instructions, is endeavouring to ensure that the price of any commodity will not be increased except in consequence of some increased cost arising outside of this country."

He was dealing there generally with prices, and he then proceeded immediately to particularise the position with regard to coal. I propose to quote a number of extracts to show how elaborately and clearly he wanted to set this price principle out. He said:

"I do not know if I have made that clear. When one sets out to consider the prices that will be permitted to be charged for coal, one decides that there has to be allowed in the price any increase in the wholesale price of the coal and any increase in the price of the transport of coal to this country."

He then said, at column 409:—

"I say here that in every case where a price was fixed for coal by my Department regard was had to the stocks in existence at the time, and the price which might have been directed in consequence of the increased price of coal abroad or the increased cost of transportation was reduced to ensure that no additional profit would be taken on existing stocks."

There may be some correction required there, but I think the general intent is clear. At column 410, he said:—

"I say there has been no increase in the price of coal with the consent of my Department except in consequence of an increase in the wholesale price in England or an increase in the cost of transporting it from England."

Further on, he said:—

"... whatever price the Mines Department fixed for the coal to be supplied to us is the price we have to pay. That price had gone up and up as the cost of production in England has increased. Furthermore, the cost of importing that coal from England has increased considerably because transport and freight charges have risen, and risen considerably in the case of ports like Cork, and others which are farther away from the ports of shipment in Great Britain. All those increases have had to be reflected in the price."

At column 411, he said:—

"When increases in the pit-head price in Great Britain or in the cost of transporting coal to this country took place, my Department took under consideration the extent to which retail prices here should be increased, and, in deciding on the extent to which they should be increased, they had regard to the quantity of coal in stock purchased at a lower price, and fixed a price which was firm, having regard to that increase in the pit-head price and to the quantity in stock. At least that is what they set out to do."

Following this statement of the principle governing him in dealing with prices, and following the statement that he had very considerable powers, which implied all the powers he wanted, we are surely given the impression that the coal situation has been particularly examined, with these fixed prices—the price to bellmen, 63/- per ton, being a satisfactory guide—and one would imagine that, with that examination, the situation was clear and perfect, and that the Minister would be able calmly to give information to the House that would show that there was necessity for such a charge and that would allay the feelings which he thinks Deputies are stirring up by asking questions with regard to the position. The Minister dealt exhaustively with coal. Deputy McGilligan, on the previous night, had made the point that the Minister for Industry and Commerce had intimated that, in January, the import price of all coal was 44/8 and, in February, it was 45/11—an increase of 1/3; and that the price being charged to bellmen was 52/- on 10th January, 58/- on 18th January, and 63/- on 11th February. That is, the price charged per ton to bellmen rose between 10th January and 11th February by 11/- per ton, although the import price has risen by only 1/3.

Comment on this

The Deputy is again making the same mistake. What has the average price over the whole month to do with it if the price goes up in the middle of the month?

Comment on this

Then it should be cheaper at the beginning and dearer at the end?

Comment on this

The average price over the whole month has nothing to do with the price now.

Comment on this

I will take the Minister back and ask him if the average price of coal over the last six months of last year has nothing to do with the price being charged for coal to-day. We got in six months' supply in six months of last year. What is the average price for that? Has it anything to do with the price charged to-day?

Comment on this

If you take the price paid for a ton of coal, you cannot regard that as the average price; it is the price for the ton.

Comment on this

The average price at which imported coal is sold to people must be related to the average price of the coal.

Comment on this

Why does the Minister for Supplies base the increase he is going to charge people for coal on the increase arising out of the import price of coal? I shall state my position simply. The price charged to bellmen for coal—which coal, as the Minister indicated, is 20 per cent. of all cargoes taken into Dublin and dumped in the pools at the quay—has to be related to the cost of the coal when it came alongside the quay.

Comment on this

To the cost of the coal in these dumps.

Comment on this

I admit that there are charges for taking the coal out of the ship and putting it on the quay.

Comment on this

Substantial charges.

Comment on this

18/-?

Comment on this

There is no question of 18/-. The cost of that coal, c.i.f., is not 45/-.

Comment on this

It was 45/11 in February and 44/8 in January and, for the six months ended 31st December, 1940, it was 39/4.

Comment on this

The Deputy does not seem to understand what an average price is. I am prepared to intervene and deal with the matter if the Deputy gives way. If the price of an article at the beginning of a year is £1 and at the end of the year is £5, the average is £3. But that does not make it the average over the year.

Comment on this

When the Minister was on his feet, I put him a question. I asked him to explain why, when the average price of coal in February was 45/11, when bellmen took the coal away from the quays they were charged 63/- a ton.

Comment on this

They were never charged 63/- for coal which was 45/- c.i.f.

Comment on this

45/11.

Comment on this

Or 45/11 either.

Comment on this

Perhaps they were charged 63/- on the 11th of February for coal that came in in January at 44/8.

Comment on this

They were charged 63/- for coal that came in at 52/6. That was the c.i.f. price of the coal in the bellmen's dumps.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

Which is 20 per cent. of all cargoes.

Comment on this

Yes, and they are getting coal more cheaply than anybody else is getting it.

Comment on this

If that represents 20 per cent. of all cargoes and the average price of the coal taken in in February is 45/11, how does the average for the 20 per cent. work out differently from the average for 100 per cent.? The Minister thinks this is an important question. On the 12th March—again quoting from the unrevised records—when the Minister had spoken a lot about coal, I asked him if, before he passed from coal, he would deal with the question raised the previous night. I said "The Minister for Industry and Commerce said that the import prices for coal in January and February were 44/8 and 45/11 per ton, respectively, but the bellmen are being charged 63/-. There is also the point that the import price rose between January and February by 1/3 per ton but between the 18th January and the 11th February the increase to bellmen was 11/- per ton." The Minister had indicated that he would allow no increase except in so far as it was an increase in the cost outside or transport or insurance charges——

Comment on this

I am prepared to give the Deputy the complete cost of a ton of bellman's coal.

Comment on this

I want to be allowed to state the matter simply when the Minister stops interrupting me. The Minister said he was not concerned with the figures I got from the Minister for Industry and Commerce as to the cost of coal delivered in the country, that he was not going to explain the figures because he had not examined them, that he had fixed the price of coal "on the basis of information supplied by the accountants upon my staff who examine the cost of importing coal and relate that cost to a reasonable retail price". He complained that I was trying to relate one set of statistics to another, that I was doing it in order to confuse the public and to cause discontent, and he went on:—

"If the Deputy believes that, he can do his damnedest to try to cause discontent amongst the poor in Dublin. He can go out with his red flag to cause revolution if he likes.... Everybody knows what Deputy Mulcahy is up to. He is taking a figure supplied by the Trade and Shipping Statistics, which has no relation to the price of coal delivered to a merchant's yard.... The price of coal to bellmen is being subsidised and he can tell what lies he likes."

The Taoiseach sometimes suggests that he likes Deputies to take an interest in things and that this helps. He seemed to suggest that it was not satisfactory to have information withheld which might be given. He undertook to give the House information with regard to potatoes and butter. I think the Taoiseach might check up the figures he gave the House last night with regard to potatoes. However, I want to deal simply with coal because it is important.

If the Minister tells us that he is not going to allow prices to increase here unless in respect of increases outside, will he give us a chance of examining the figure he is considering as bringing about the increase outside? I cannot bring my intelligence to understand that the price charged for bellmen's coal in December, January and February has not some relation to the cost of buying the coal in Great Britain, bringing it over here, and landing it at the docks. I cannot understand that the cost of buying it, transporting it across the seas, insuring it across, and landing it alongside the quays here, which includes taking it out of the mines and loading it into trucks, bringing it to trains and loading it in ships in Great Britain, is not a substantial part of the cost of the coal.

Comment on this

It is, of course. But the cost at the beginning of January does not determine the price now.

Comment on this

The money that was paid out for all the coal that is landed alongside our quays in the six months from July to December, if paid for at a flat rate, would come to 39/4. The total amount of money that was spent could be obtained by multiplying the amount of coal that came in here by 39/4 a ton. The January tonnage coming in was related to an import price at 44/8 and in February, 45/11.

Comment on this

The price of bellmen's coal in January was not 63/-.

Comment on this

The price of bellmen's coal from the 11th February was 63/-. Does the Minister disagree with that?

Comment on this

These are the prices: 39/4 up to the end of December, for the whole period; for the month of December, 41/6; for January, 44/8; for February, 45/11. Yet the price that bellmen paid for coal was 50/- in December, 52/- from the 10th January, 58/- from the 18th January, and 63/- from February 11th. People are entitled to ask why there was a jump from 52/- to 63/- between the 10th January and the 11th February and on what that is based.

Comment on this

It is based on an increased c.i.f. price of coal.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

By 11/- per ton?

Comment on this

On coal which increased 1/3, if we take the increase from January to February, 4/5 if we take the increase from December to January and which, over the average for the six months ending 31st December last, increased by 6/7.

Comment on this

I think the Deputy's average figure is misleading.

Comment on this

Last night the Taoiseach took up a lot of his time dealing with the question of potatoes and butter and the export of those commodities. He talked about how exasperating it was that people should misrepresent facts and said that by misrepresentation the public passion and anger were stirred up, with possibly great danger to public order. He said that, at any rate, it prevented people from going about on their ordinary business with their usual energy and full goodwill. There would have been none of that if these figures had been published over the period. Now, here we are and the Minister for Supplies thinks that I am having a very bad effect on the people of this town, that I am confusing them, that I am causing discontent among the poor, that I am putting on the red cap of revolution, and that the Government will have to go to the trouble of exposing my tactics and prevent me from succeeding. That is not the way to do the business as we want the business done. From the Chamber of Commerce in Cork, the Minister appeals to the trade unions in the country to resist the tendency to increase wages, as it would react on prices and react again on wages. I submit that here, in the price of coal to-day, there is a glaring scandal. I know enough about adding two and two together to be utterly unpersuaded by the suggestions that have been made in interjection by the Minister.

Comment on this

The Deputy does not wish to be persuaded.

Comment on this

I suggest to the Taoiseach that it is important enough to be put down on a sheet of paper and read out here in the House and printed as a White Paper or as an official statement from the Information Bureau. It should give the basis upon which the price of coal is computed at the present time. I submit that it is of the greatest and most urgent importance to do that.

Comment on this

In three days' debate it could have been given.

Comment on this

Not in three days' debate on a different subject. I could give it in 30 seconds.

Comment on this

Could it not have been given, then?

Comment on this

Yes, on half a sheet of paper.

Comment on this

And was it not important?

Comment on this

I was not asked for it.

Comment on this

If the Minister has it on half a sheet of paper and has anything to say, I am certainly willing to listen.

Comment on this

The margin between the c.i.f. price of coal sold to bellmen and the price charged to them was normally 14/- a ton. That was made up as follows: discharging the coal from the ship, 3/- per ton; payment of harbour dues, 6½d. per ton; cartage of that coal from the quayside to the merchants' yard, on the average, 2/- per ton; an allowance, considered reasonable, of 1/2 per ton in respect of short weight; and an item of filling and "topping off", 1/10; making 8/6½ as the total of these costs. The difference between 8/6½ and 14/- is 5/5½. That is the allowance to the merchants for payment of rent, rates, taxes and office staff, as well as profit. Since we made this present arrangement in respect of bellmen's coal, the margin between the c.i.f. price and the price charged to bellmen has been reduced to 10/6. That is the element of subsidy to which I refer.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

How is it reduced to 10/6?

Comment on this

The price is now fixed.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

What was the reason for the reduction?

Comment on this

The reason for the reduction was that we were allowing the merchants to sell at a slightly higher price to other people in order to sell at a slightly lower price to bellmen.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

What about the 2/- charged from the quayside to the merchant's yard?

Comment on this

Has it not to be carted to the dumps?

Comment on this

The Minister said "to the merchants' yards." Does he mean to the dumps.

Comment on this
Daniel Morrissey Mr. D. Morrissey Fine Gael

He said "landing on the quayside, 3/-; and from the quays to the yard, 2/-."

Comment on this

There is no cartage from the dumps to the yard.

Comment on this

The margin is now 10/6.

Comment on this

Is that for coal that has been shipped from England in the past couple of weeks?

Comment on this

Yes, there is no other coal being sold.

Comment on this

How can the Minister justify stocks in last August being sold at various prices to-day in Cork?

Comment on this

I would be prepared to sit down now for another three or four minutes and listen to the Minister explaining why—when I ask, on the c.i.f. price given by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, why an increase there of 1/3 makes an increase of 11/- to bellmen—I should be told that, by relating one set of statistics to another, I am confusing the public, causing discontent—doing my damnedest to cause discontent—among the poor of Dublin, putting on the red cap of revolution and telling lies?

Comment on this

The Deputy knows quite well that the average import price of coal for the month of January has nothing to do with the price at which coal can be sold now.

Comment on this

So little do I know about it that I am going to ask the Taoiseach to give the House an opportunity of understanding this question better. I think it is most important that the House should understand this question better, because the question of prices cannot be left in the position in which it is, either with regard to tea or coal, or some other things, for the future. I say that the present position with regard to coal—what we are discussing now with regard to coal—is part of a present, a very vital present, that bears on the future. We are told by the Minister what the line is going to be with regard to control of price plans in the future. That is in columns 408 and 409. Deputy Corish said that he had put forward a suggestion to the Minister, which would help, and that it was turned down—a suggestion for controlling prices. The Minister replied: "I am going to do better than that." Deputy Corish then said: "I hope so." The Minister then said:—

"I am going to arrange that every retailer selling a commodity in respect of which difficulty has arisen or may be anticipated will be registered, and that it will be a condition of registration that reasonable prices are charged, so that a retailer who is proved to have been guilty of a gross over-charge will be removed from the register, and by removal from the register kept from engaging in that business so long as that condition of affairs exists."

If that is the machinery that is going to be set up to control prices in future, and if the Minister for Supplies is going to be the person who will say: "Your licence is to be taken from you", then I suggest that it is of the greatest possible importance that the House should be given a formal opportunity of having more confidence in what figures are being manipulated to decide what a reasonable price is. I want to say no more about coal now. I hope I have impressed the matter sufficiently on both the Minister and the Taoiseach to make them realise that it cannot be left there and that, if it is left there, then the responsibility for what may happen or what will happen, and the responsibility for the misunderstandings that arise here and that will continue to arise, will rest on the members of the Government and particularly, I think, on the Taoiseach.

In addition, I would suggest that there are certain classes of imports and certain classes of exports that are vital to the maintenance and subsistence of the people of this country, that a list of these should be made and that the regular monthly statistics of imports and exports, and their prices for these things, should be given. I do not understand—and I am prepared to have it explained privately or in any other way—why it is that we cannot have our export lists published, but where it is possible to have the complaints and exasperation, where it is possible to have the charges that we have had, arising out of things like coal, butter and potatoes, I think we ought to have it clearly explained what are the dangers of publishing these things so as to give us an opportunity of knowing whether the dangers of keeping them quiet are not very much greater. If the Minister for Supplies was not simply play-acting about the red flag, disturbances, and so on, the other night, then I appreciate that there must be a danger there. I do know that there is a serious danger that if the present prices of coal and tea are going to continue in the poor districts you are going to have to deal with the question of how these people are to subsist at all. That is all I want to say on the supply question, although there are some other things that it might be desirable to say, but I prefer to keep my general remarks for the Central Fund Bill. I do appeal, however, to the Taoiseach to see that these things are brought more clearly home to us, and I ask the Minister for Supplies and the Taoiseach not to resent the opportunity that I propose to give them to examine into the whole question of coal.

Comment on this
Hugh Victor Flinn Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance (Mr. Flinn) Fianna Fáil

I have listened with a certain element of disturbance, not so much to the facts, as to the atmosphere of the discussion which has taken place in this matter. I certainly do not desire to say, in relation to it, one word for controversial purposes. I think that discussion of this kind on supplies, and on all the surroundings in relation to preparation in this matter, is a discussion which should be one of co-operation. This Dáil, although it is divided into two or three Parties, represents, through all these Parties, all the people in this country—all the people of very different opinions, of a very different segregation of interests, people who, in many cases, have not recognised in the past a commonalty of purpose: men, for instance, in farming, who represented half a dozen different types of farming, whose interests were so separate and different and in some cases contradictory that this divergence has been probably at the basis of the fact that there has not been and, in all human probability, never will be a Party which, as such, will represent farmers and be allowed to speak in their name. It represents also the opposite side of life, in the new industrial organisation—the largely new industrial organisation—which has been built up and in relation to which there has been, necessarily and naturally, a difference in interests—with propaganda on one side or the other, where the farmer might think he was being exploited for the purpose of introducing artificial industry, and the industries complaining that they were not receiving that support which they might from the farming consumers. In the same way, there have been all sorts of diverse interests in this country represented, on the one hand, by the people on the bottom end of the unemployment assistance register in the boroughs; represented, on the other side, by people of wealth and substance, with access to culture and access to amenities of a kind which simply do not come within the purview at all of these people.

Why I have emphasised all of that difference in the composition of the electorate of this country and of this Dáil, which represents it, is because at this moment a condition has been produced in which it does not matter whether a man is on the bottom end of the unemployment register or the governor of a bank, whether he is an industrialist or whether he is a farmer, or what kind of farmer, because they are all facing a common danger in an enclosed space which covers nothing but themselves and the productivity of their own land. I feel that in facing problems of that kind every co-operation, not merely of word, but the cordial co-operation of spirit, will be necessary in order that we may avoid the dangers which face us, which may be only sparks in wet thatch if we do what we ought to do, but may otherwise be the seed of a conflagration which will involve this country in all the social and revolutionary consequences that are going to fall upon the rest of the world, and which we by taking thought now and by having charitable co-operation with one another may just avoid in this country. I think that a good deal of the cross purposes, the cross-firing and the recrimination which occur sometimes in discussions of this kind do not really go as deep as they appear upon the surface. But they have immense news value. A little cross word in this House which those who have been concerned in it have forgotten at once, in the next day in the Press may seem the whole principal work of a meeting of the Dáil. And very much in the same way, some odd word of that kind which passes backwards and forwards here, one word borrowing another, a spark borrowing a flame, has more to do with interfering with the validity and the use of discussion than almost it is possible to exaggerate.

I would like to feel that there was nothing kept back. I would like to feel that the Opposition had perfectly sound grounds for feeling that there was nothing kept back or that the explanation of the reason for keeping back was in their possession. A suggestion made by Deputy Mulcahy that private discussion, that personal conference, should be used as a preliminary to debates of this kind in this House, for the purpose of enabling that heat of suspicion and criticism to be avoided, would, I think, be a suggestion which was worth carrying out. I personally have had experience, in relation to matters in my own Department, which could have been subjected to misrepresentation.

Comment on this

May I suggest to the Parliamentary Secretary that we did not get much encouragement from the Minister for Agriculture in regard to that?

Comment on this

If it came to that, I would say the Minister did not get any encouragement, that is, if we were to start being controversial. I am perfectly sure that in one minute and in one word I could have this House in uproar—and everybody knows it—by merely choosing the word which would incite, the angry word which would answer the interruption which I might regard as impertinent. I have had cases in my own Department which would have been liable to misrepresentation upon which, in ignorance of the facts, men could have properly put an interpretation which would not have been a correct one, and when these matters have been brought to my knowledge previous to a discussion in the House and when I have asked the Deputies concerned to come into the office and to examine the files confidentially, not merely has there been no such misunderstanding but in no single case has there been anything, as far as I know, in the nature of disclosure of the material. I know certain Deputies in this House who make it a rule never to put down a Parliamentary Question until they have raised the question with the responsible person. I think that is a very sound practice. What I am suggesting is that in those matters, whatever they are—and they may be many —about which the members of the Opposition may feel there is some explanation or something which they want, the first thing to do would be to write down: "The following is alleged to me; the following is the position as it is represented and, prima facie, appears to me. I would be glad of an explanation in that matter.” If that opportunity were given to the ministerial and governmental machine, whether either by interview, by explanation, by exchange of memos or whatever it is, I feel that when the two sides came to discuss it in the House they would be discussing it as two persons both of whom recognised the good faith and good intention of the other and in the knowledge that the difference would be a difference of opinion in the matter of judgment, not a matter of morals. I suggest, to any extent to which that is possible, machinery of that kind might well be used.

Turning to the general question —and again I want to say that I do not desire to take up any matter in any purely debating sense—I think if a debate of this kind were used in a way in which men frankly and without attempting to cover themselves in any way from the debating consequences of the thing, were to express their own simple opinions, a great and valuable contribution might be made to the solution of this problem. The real difficulty that we have to face at the present moment is not, in my opinion, the lack of prevision but fundamental changes which have been made which prevent that reasonable prevision, made upon one basis of fact, being effective in a different and a new condition. I do not believe at the present moment that there are two Governments in Europe—that there are two Governments in the world—who, if they came together to exchange the whole of the knowledge they possessed, could give a reasonable prophecy of what is going to happen in the world in relation to this war in the next six months.

I am perfectly sure that there is no Government in the world which, looking back over the last 18 months, must not have on its files, as the expert opinion of its most informed advisers, a picture of the future which is hopelessly outside what has, in fact, happened. I can give a very good example of that in the origin of the phrase "the phoney war." That comes from that nation of extraordinary ingenuity in phrases—America. It came from America in these circumstances. At the beginning of the war it was recognised that machinery, and above all reproducing machinery, was at the bottom of all production for the purposes of the war, and particularly the highly specialised machinery for machine tools. The whole American machine tool industry descended upon England en bloc looking for orders, and after some months they went back to America. It was they originated the phrase “the phoney war.”“It is a phoney war. We cannot sell one single machine tool in England.” That was the origin of the phrase, and that represents the knowledge and the outlook, backed by the whole of the information that the British Government had, in relation to the war. When the Americans offered increased machine tool production, they were told that machine tools were not wanted. At the same time, I know from very highly developed industrial firms in England, who went into the market to provide munitions for the Government, that the contract prices were so keen, due to the lack of demand for these things which are now matters of life and death, that these highly developed and efficient firms could not get any contracts.

If that is the position in relation to the inside knowledge of one of the principal contestants in this war, what is to be thought of the limitation of knowledge of anyone outside? What are the limitations of the reaction of that knowledge on public opinion in a country like this? In practice, the effect, as far as we are concerned, of what I am saying is this: What was the backing of public opinion? What was the knowledge distributed throughout this State? What was the backing of public opinion behind that knowledge, which would have enabled the Government to do, if it chose the drastic things that we are now told it should have done? This country was in the position of a family or, if you like, a business which has had the whole of its free assets, the money and reserves which were not directly involved in the carrying out of its business on its then basis, invested overseas. The money did not belong to the State, but broadly speaking to banks and others not responsive to a public opinion which would be represented by the Dáil or by the Government. If you go back for a little time to the Report of the Banking Commission you will find that that Commission showed, through its majority, that monied opinion, people who were entitled to speak for those whose reserves were invested overseas through the banks and otherwise, were hide-bound—I am not using the word in any sense that is meant to be offensive, but simply as a strong word. They were rooted implacably and unbreakably in the belief in sterling balances that the continuance of that investment overseas, and the maintenance of the currency in which that investment was made, was an essential of security to this country. Responsible monied and commercial opinion, bankers who could advise their depositors, or those responsible for their deposits, were unbreakably of opinion that Irish money should remain locked up in sterling and in overseas investments.

I am speaking to some extent against myself in the matter, because I would have been fairly reckless in an attempt to do something, but all responsible opinion was on one side. At no time, at which it was possible to convert any large proportion of the assets into essential goods for re-import, was the public opinion of those who control the sterling assets ready to accept the idea that the Government should exchange them for something else. The time passed, and now there is a fairly wide range of growing recognition by those who were dyed in the wool of another opinion, that had we attempted to straddle between dollars and sterling, or attempted to convert those savings of generations into consumable goods, on the whole, we would have been wise. But at no time at which it was possible to do it did that opinion exist.

I want the House to look at the question of how far it is possible to convert. Unless the conversion was on a large scale it would not be worth doing. I want to look for one moment at the question of how far it would have been possible to convert the only things with which we could buy goods, into a promise, a free promise to pay, which would have enabled those goods to be bought. We have anything from £100,000,000 to £200,000,000 — nobody knows exactly (and I say deliberately that the Government should know exactly)—invested in these securities. Nobody knows exactly how much is invested in industrial securities of various kinds in England — semi-gilt edged, realty, industrial, and so on. The price in the market for those securities is just a nice balance between the number of people who are prepared to buy and the number of people who are prepared to sell. That is what keeps the balance. A very small excess on one side or the other will drive the price up or down. The reasons which make people sell are fairly well known to those who work in such a market. If Irish investors, as part of a policy, through their banks or otherwise, had gone into that market to attempt to sell, in any given time, any considerable quantity of those investments, the fact that they were doing that and the reason why they were doing it, would be well known— in other words, that the liquidation was for a purpose and that that liquidation would come to an end. The effect of the liquidation in the ordinary way would be to tear down the prices, and the knowledge in the market that it was torn down as a consequence of an act of ours which was going to stop at a certain time, would have meant that those who are in the market would be aware that that was a temporary happening and that they were perfectly free to scandalise that market if they chose. Any attempt at any large-scale realisation would have meant that we would have borne in the price of our securities, not merely the ordinary loss of a forced sale, but something very considerably more than the ordinary loss of a forced sale.

When we turn to sterling, we turn to something upon which, immediately we touch it, the whole money machine reacts. It would have been made quite clear, by those who are interested in the maintenance of standards of that kind, that the goods which we bought would reflect the price of any action which we took in that matter. I do not want Deputy Hickey to interrupt me. I am speakng to a certain extent for Deputy Hickey. I am speaking for the honest, though I think quite erroneous opinion, in relation to money matters which Deputy Hickey represents, an opinion which is very widespread, an opinion which in my view has to be fully taken into account. If I start answering the Deputy's questions we should not get very far. In practice, sterling and securities, if we had attempted to use either of them, would have re-acted against the purposes for which we were going to use them. That is my reason to some extent for being less sure than I otherwise would be, that any good could have been achieved. I know that advice was given that the Government should buy many millions of dollars. I know that advice was given that securities of one kind or another should be bought. I know that advice was tendered that goods of one kind or another should be brought into this country. In principle, I believe that advice was good but I am very doubtful now as to how far it would in fact have been effective if it had been taken. The one thing of which I am absolutely certain is that the responsible commercial and monied opinion, which owned, or which advised those who owned, securities, and, through the banks, sterling in England, at no time at which it would have been possible in any significant amount to convert these securities or sterling into goods, would have been prepared to back the Government in any action of that kind.

Comment on this

The solution is Government control.

Comment on this

If the Deputy could make a better speech on his side than I am doing now, he will not be doing badly. The fundamentals may be the same, the conclusions may be entirely different. However, for whatever reason, that period passed and we reached a stage in which sterling could not be converted into dollars. Securities, if they are now sold, or the interest upon those securities as it accrues, cannot be converted into goods. Yet people feel even now that they might sell securities and take their money back. It will have no effect except to dilute the value of goods and property in the country. Assume for one moment that I were to sell £10,000 worth of English railway stock, and that I got in return for it a cheque from the new owner on an English bank. That would be a promise by that English bank on behalf of the community to redeem that money in goods or services or something of that kind. As a piece of paper, it is of no use whatever. It is a promise to exchange that for something of value and, as far as we are concerned, the only things that are of any value to us now are consumers' goods. I cannot exercise that claim in England. I cannot get coal for it in excess of the amount which the maximum efforts of the Government are getting in. I cannot get beyond that an ounce of rubber, copper, timber or wool. I cannot get any of the things we want. That claim is sterilised and cannot be exercised. It is a promise in the name of the stability and the security of English commerce to be redeemed in goods. That claim is, in effect, repudiated. It is inoperative and, so far as we are concerned, it is repudiated.

I just want to carry this one step further so that the House will feel that there are not any loose strings to it. I deposit that cheque in the Munster and Leinster Bank and what happens? A book entry is made that the Munster and Leinster Bank is prepared to pay £10,000, balanced by a promise to pay by that other English bank to the Munster and Leinster Bank £10,000, a promise to pay which the bank cannot exercise, and which I cannot exercise in any overseas goods. But I can go out into the market and buy somebody's farm, and when I have bought his farm, what happens? Remember this is £10,000 of goods due to me, a cheque on a perfectly reputable bank in England. You may have it in bank notes if you like, you can put it as far up as you like from the point of view of security. I can go out and buy somebody's farm. The farm is there all right, and the man who owns the farm and its productivity has transferred that farm to me in return for a promise to pay which he cannot execute.

Why I have gone to that elaboration is because I want the House to feel the genuine feeling of disturbance which anyone ought to feel—the head of a house, or a family, or a business, or a State—who finds that that small picture I have given represents the whole of the free savings of this country for generations in so far as they are outside this country. In a moment of disturbance, loss of work, accidents in the House, or anything of that kind, a man turns to his reserves, he turns to his money in the bank. All our money in the bank, every resource that we have that is free, over and above the things that are required for the continued operation of our business as it is outside this country, is inoperative, is sterilised, and, so far as we can see, for the duration of the war must be left out of our calculation.

That is what I meant when I said that, with all the differences there may be in this House, the position in which we are now is that every man, with all those differences and all those interests, is faced by the common fact that he is inside a wall around his own country in which for everything that he eats, for everything that goes into his life, he must look to the productivity of his own soil and to the existing resources of this country.

Comment on this

I agree with you.

Comment on this

That may or may not help me. In regard to the facts, Deputy Hickey, and a great deal of the disturbed opinion in the country in relation to financial matters, and myself, are in agreement. It is when you begin to reason from those facts as to what the remedy is that we may find ourselves in dispute.

Comment on this

That was not realised all along.

Comment on this

What I do say, and I say it at once, is that in this emergency, faced by that fact, by that common necessity of all of us, it is the duty of this State to regard every resource in the State, every piece of property, and every man as having a common duty to the whole; and that, to the extent to which it is necessary, the State and the people not merely have a right, but they have a duty to exercise their claim upon that property to see that during the duration of this war no person, except by his own fault, will suffer in any way in which the full use of these resources will render unnecessary.

Quite naturally, people are thinking in terms of taxation, of loans, of restricted profits, and all the rest in relation to how that problem is to be dealt with. What I have been at some pains to show is the complete unreality of any such consideration as taxation, loans, grants or anything else of the kind. The things that matter are the stocks which we have of consumable goods, the productivity of agents of production which we have in our hands, the men or other resources which we are prepared to use to get out of those stocks and out of those productive capacities a continuing production to maintain our people. Taxation, loans, and all the rest, must simply be regarded as manipulative machinery by which the intention of the State to use its resources for the purpose of its people is carried out.

That has been happening in certain countries pre-war. The whole control of the use of money, of the use of credits, of the routing of goods and so on, in what we might call national socialist countries, for some years has been strictly controlled for a purpose of that kind. A man might own £100,000 and have it in the bank. He might be a big manufacturer employing 4,000 men; he might be making umbrellas or motor cars. A time came when he sent a cheque to his bank in favour of X. What happened then was that his banker asked him what X was going to do with the money and what that cheque was for; if it was for iron, what the iron was to be used for; if it was not for iron, why it would not be used for iron, because the buying of iron was what was required in the national interest at the time. Taxation was put on, taken and removed from one person to another. Loans were made purely and simply as an alternative to ordinary legislative action in deciding the movement of trade. In exactly the same way, whether we call it taxation or loans or anything else, anything that we do will be simply disguised machinery for doing that. In many ways that machinery was more efficient, more effective, more flexible and more intimate in its use than any legislative machine could be.

There is the old saying that "hard cases make bad law." Any ordinary code of legislation, drawn up for the purpose of doing that kind of work, was bound to take that into account, and was bound to leave on the edges of it hundreds of border-line cases and, under any barrier put up, gaps through which men could pass under this method of legislation for the control of industry, it was possible to meet all those cases, and to close those gaps. I have no doubt that there were grave abuses under a system devised to meet difficulties which could not be met by legislation.

I was talking to some responsible banking people some time ago, and they were quite satisfied that loans would have to be raised. They seemed to be quite willing that loans of an adequate amount would be raised. When I asked them how they were going to get those loans, the answer was they were going to get them in the ordinary way: that is to say, the people with surplus money would loan it. People cannot give in loan what they already are using, or, if they do, they do just as much harm as if they did not give at all. Therefore, they must give their surplus. In the ordinary way, when a loan is put on the market, the man who has money in the bank draws it, the man who has securities sells them, and both put that money into the new loan. If I have £10,000 on deposit in a bank in Ireland at the present moment and I give the Minister for Finance a cheque for it, the bank has to sell the sterling or other securities which it holds against that deposit. If I try to sell an Irish security I am merely transferring from one person in the country to another the obligation, and the effect is that you simply carry on again. The bank has to do the same thing for me. If I attempt to sell overseas sterling securities I find myself in the same position: that of getting back into the possession of the bank, for the purpose of lending to the Minister for Finance, a promise to pay which is as inoperative as a call on sterling.

Therefore, if a loan in this country at the present moment were to be raised on the basis of selling £10,000,000 worth of sterling which backs a deposit in the bank, and £15,000,000 worth of industrial securities held overseas, the effect would be that the Minister for Finance would get £25,000,000 worth of promises to pay which he could not exercise. No doubt just in the same way, as I have told you, that I could go out into the market and buy a farm with a £10,000 promise to pay which was inoperative. In the same way, to a certain extent, the Minister for Finance could do likewise. Any loan which is raised at the present moment. to be effective for the purpose for which we want it, must be made by someone who has command over and above the amount which is required for his own consumption of stock of goods here, or a capacity to produce them. In other words, again you have reached the position in which every loan has to be an exchange of existing goods, services, stocks, or capacity for consumers' production. I think if that position is recognised, the House will begin to recognise how great is our difficulty and how complete must be the co-operation of all kinds, and among all classes, in order that transferences of this kind may be made without friction, may be made efficiently and for the benefit of the public.

You come into exactly the same atmosphere when you come to the question of food. There is in this country at the present moment a three years' stock at least of cattle for ourselves and of cattle in preparation for export. You have the cattle which should go out this year, the cattle which should go next year, and you have the calves coming on. You have a very considerable area of this country at the present moment under those cattle or under food for them. and in addition to that, due to the change which has taken place in recent years in which people have gone over to a certain type of tillage production, there is a stock of other food. Therefore, anyone surveying the whole area of this country and its productive capacity, and taking into account the population which would be dependent for food on it, and regarding it simply as a farm whose purpose was to produce some good food for the whole of that population would say, without any hesitation whatever: "This land can produce that food."

I think that is the first thing that has to be quite clearly understood. You may not have oranges, you may not possibly have tea. You may not have a grape fruit or various other things which do tend to brighten the daily menu, but in the essentials: in butter, eggs, bacon and in good bread, in meat and in things of that kind, the totality of continuing production, looked at over a period of three years ahead, is certainly adequate, even allowing for the fact that there may not be that maintenance, up to full standard, of the productivity of the land, due to certain shortages of manures. There are certain areas in this country too rich to be tilled at the present time, or almost too rich to be tilled. The wheat campaign, and the change in the specialised types of wheat that have been used for those specially good areas, have shown that it is possible to grow cereals even upon land so extremely rich. When you allow for the land which is above the average and the land which is below the average, even allowing for the falling away of manures, there is no question at all, envisaging at any rate a period of three years, that the population of this country could be maintained, in frugal comfort at any rate, on that land.

Therefore, if in fact within that period there is not enough food, then it is due to the lack of the use by the Government of the resources which the people of this country are prepared to put at their disposal, or the lack of co-operation by the people with the Government in exercising those powers which the people have given in trust to the Government. Now in the event of a bad harvest or a bad season, allowing for a year in which it is difficult to make preparation, there would have to be adjustments. People may have to eat things they did not normally eat, or they may have to eat in different proportions and different circumstances things which they did normally eat, but, if there is that co-operation between the Government of this country and the people, which in the interests of the people they ought to give, and which in this emergency the Government have a duty and a right to insist upon, then I see no reason whatever why there should be, as far as food is concerned, a shortage in this country, even though there may now be a visible shortage of wheat between this and next November.

I turn now to a point which will undoubtedly become a matter of much more aggravated difference and discontented comment in the future. What I am aiming at all the time is to see that, if possible, we would build up that atmosphere in which those difficulties will be faced as common tasks and not as matters of controversy. With the freezing of our external assets, and with the physical blockade which is exercised over us in co-operation by both sides, there has been cut off the vastly larger portion of the specialised raw materials upon which manipulative industries and especially newly built-up industries exist, and it is not possible, broadly speaking, to extemporise new raw material which will meet that difficulty. There may be some in which a considerable amount of extemporisation is possible, but, even in the industries in which the larger part of the raw material may be available, there are often critical bottle-necks of small amounts which are going to be very difficult indeed to replace. Remember that for 100 years at any rate a highly competitive examination has been made of industrial processes in the hope of improving them, in the desire to use substitutes of one kind or another for raw materials, and it is not reasonable to expect that even under the pressure of this necessity the inventive power of our chemists and our engineers, more particularly when they are bereft of essential tools, especially raw material, can be stimulated to produce miraculous results of the kind which would be necessary. For that reason we have got to face the fact that, whatever amount of co-operation we receive from the manufacturing industries, to whatever extent the different manufacturers may be prepared to meet each other in the exchange of tools, in the exchange of knowledge, in the exchange of materials or anything else, and to whatever extent we may stimulate invention and all the rest of it, as far as industries which have been dependent on specialised raw materials are concerned, very definite unemployment will exist.

As far as those people consist of unskilled labourers, there are certain works which may be done, and the question of whether they should be done or not I am going to submit quite frankly to the consideration of the House. But in relation to tradesmen who have been used to working in wood, smiths who have been used to working in iron, and operatives who have been used to working in rubber and its derivatives, it is not possible to use these men without the provision of the materials which have now disappeared, and a good deal of the previously highly paid and comfortable class in this country may find themselves experiencing some of the hardships which have previously been confined to the very poor. It is a very difficult problem from the social point of view to have a lot of people who have not been accustomed to hardship, and who have not been accustomed to privation, suddenly thrown into that condition, as compared with other people who have undoubtedly, in many cases over their whole lives, been trained into that amazing and unbelievable patience with which the poor do endure them. When it comes to finding actual works, you have to face the fact that you must not use up in any of those works any raw material which could be used for the consumers' good. Let us take the very simple case of roads. The raw materials of roads are tar, stone, gravel, sand and cement. In relation to a particular scheme under a local authority which was asked to find £200,000 of work, in which the labour content would have been I think only about 40 per cent., I was told they could do that work if I could find them 60,000 gallons of petrol, but without the petrol the work could not be done, because transport was an essential vitamin of that work. Take another case, the case of cement—cement is manufactured here at the present time, and is capable of being manufactured in very much larger quantities. I want to regard that as a home produced raw material which I can use. When I come to investigate it, I find that its wages content is only about one-third of its fuel and power content. Power content is a continuous process, which runs throughout the day, and therefore, having regard to the falling off of available water power in the summer months, to the extent to which it is electrical power, it must be run on coal or other fuel of that kind.

In other words, in dealing with the question of whether and how you can use the segregated amount of resources that you have in the country for this purpose, you turn to one of the particular elements that you thought you had free and you find that, in a very large proportion, it consists of an imported element. Those cement factories are all outside the turf area, I think, and as soon as I begin to transport turf to them I find myself up against the same position. Why I say that to the House is because I want them to face the fact that in laying out any unemployment works we have to recognise that it is not the money side you are concerned with— you can forget that for the moment— but it is the question of the irreplaceable and otherwise necessary raw material which you are going to absorb in the process.

To some extent, as the Taoiseach said, the position in regard to distribution is fortunate. The whole of the unemployment works for the last four or five years, 80 per cent. of them at any rate, have been west of the Shannon. The unemployment in this country, as those familiar with the coloured maps which we sometimes lay out for the knowledge of Deputies are aware, has been largely concentrated west of the Shannon. This new artificial employment will take place largely east of the Shannon and largely in districts which previously did not have it. To that extent the position looks favourable, in the sense that useful works will not have been so completely exhausted; but, unfortunately, the segregation of the people who are concerned in particular areas is such as to make the provision of work for them very difficult. To deal with the whole of them, or any large proportion, having regard to the fact that there is a high proportion of women, will be difficult. To deal with any proportion of them at all by this method is not going to be easy. Even the extent to which it would otherwise be possible this segregation in particular places is going to make it difficult.

I am telling the House this so that when we do come to deal with it, to the extent to which we succeed or to the extent to which we fail, we will be entitled to ask the co-operation of people who know exactly the difficulties and the nature of the inescapable limitations with which we are faced. If any man were gifted with prophecy, even the prophecy of between now and to-morrow, he could make a fortune on the stock exchange. If a Government, or those who control a Government, were gifted with prophecy in relation to what is going to happen, even the ordinary day-to-day happenings for the next six months, we could set out a plan within those limitations. Anyone who has any glimmering or idea of what is going to be the position of humanity when this catastrophe has come to an end, would be in a position now to do things which, in the light of our present knowledge, would be reckless. No member of the Government, no member of this House, and no member of the community, has been gifted in that respect. We have got to reason from the best knowledge we have, and the best guess we can make in relation to this catastrophe.

All the House is bound to expect of the Government in relation to those matters of which it can have knowledge is that it will show a proper judgment in using its resources. Nobody knows what is going to happen. All we do know is that altogether, and as one unit, we are up against a very difficult problem, a problem the little elements of which being exaggerated or misrepresented or misunderstood, may be capable of building up a disturbance in the public mind which will gravely interfere even with the relatively small manner in which we may be able to solve it. I hope, in relation to that problem, we will all recognise the common nature of the task and that we will pull together to any extent we can by co-operation, by the interchange of views and ideas and by frank expressions of the kind I have made, in an atmosphere of a non-controversial character.

We will have to pool our knowledge and experience so that when this is over and this island has survived that struggle—and this island, which I regard as the most stable social, political and economic unit in the world at present, which in my belief has a better chance of surviving it, as an untortured human entity, than probably any other place on the earth—we will all feel we have co-operated to bring the maximum possible common effort to its service.

Comment on this

I hope the Minister for Finance will let his bewildered anxiety over the last speech be indicated to the House and that he will tell us if he understands it and has any plan formed arising out of the problems the last speaker has propounded. I am not at all interested in those large problems of domestic finance complicated by international affairs which the Deputy touched upon, but I do say that if an American newspaper reporter were asked to set a headline for the speech we have just heard, it is in this way he would set it: "If the Axis beats Britain, Éire is bust." That is what that speech comes to.

Comment on this

That is right.

Comment on this

I did not say that; I did not even suggest that.

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