Emergency Powers (No. 139) Order, 1941—Motion to Annul.
Contributions 1–136 of 256. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
Sir, last night I was forced by the rules of this House to use a phrase which is somewhat ironical in the context of this debate: I moved to report progress. I had been dealing with the fact that early in the period of Constitution making and in the second stage of Constitution making in this country we had at least adhered to what had been the common view of the nations of the world with regard to judicial process. The people here were presented with an image of a free Constitution that seemed to have been preserved with decent reverence, and the people were given a Constitution which seemed to guarantee rights and which would seem to have the two fortifications, that those rights could not be taken away by easy constitutional amendment and that, saving that, there could be no encroachment on the people's rights until after those who seek to encroach upon those rights had passed the barrier of an independent judiciary. It was found that the Constitution did not mean exactly what was on its face. Recent applications before the courts in connection with constitutional matters have only succeeded in tightening the net of the Constitution around the citizens. We have had with increasing pace development going on which is away from the courts and away from the independent judiciary and tending to put all power into the hands of the Government of the time. The courts discovered that under the Constitution it was possible that this House could pass a law and, no matter how much that law might encroach upon the spirit of the Constitution, if they found it was properly passed, when one made application to the courts, then the courts would declare that they had no right to interfere.
In any event, for peace times we did preserve the appearances of a resort to the courts and for quite a number of matters it has been the wish of the Government, so far, that such ordinary matters as civil processes should be left to the play of the independent judiciary. There has been an entirely different story when we approach the area of criminal matters. There is no necessity for me to go in detail over what was said last night. People here will have in their recollection and will know from the laws we have passed here that even in peace time it is possible for the Government to schedule any number of offences that they like and for people who are charged with those offences to be brought before what are called Special Criminal Courts. Special Criminal Courts, as constituted at the moment, consist of military officers. The list of scheduled offences may be added to from time to time and, whether or not the list be added to, on a particular occasion, it lies with the Attorney-General, who, under the Constitution, is a servant of the Government, dismissible by them at any moment, to declare to the courts that he thinks that in the interests of peace and order a particular individual or individuals charged with a particular offence, not being a scheduled offence, should also be brought before the Special Criminal Court and, under a later section of that Act which was brought under review in the courts, which had to be amended and now appears as a special Act of the year 1940, it is possible for the Minister for Justice, by simply writing in a person's name on a particular form of detention order, to cause people to be detained, and to be detained for unspecified periods.
But still there was kept some sort of tenuous attachment to the courts. As far as the people who are charged with scheduled offences, or in fact those who are charged before the Special Criminal Courts either for scheduled offences or at the behest of the Attorney-General, are concerned there is always a right of appeal to the courts of the land. When it comes to the detention at the will of the Minister for Justice there is an appeal to a special commission on which there is at the moment one judge. That special commission has terms of reference with regard to freedom heavily biassed in favour of the Government. A man will not be released by such commission unless that commission is satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds—not legal grounds—no reasonable grounds for the man's detention.
These were the peace time activities of the Government. They are things that may be done completely outside such emergency as invasion or state of war or time of war. It has to be noted that, however much speeches from the Government side last night seemed to indicate that they were dissatisfied with the laws of evidence and with the procedure adopted by the courts up to date in certain matters, they are disposed to leave the courts to deal with such ordinary things as will suits and rights of property and claims for damages when people have been knocked down on the roads. They left all those to be dealt with by these rather out-of-date rules of evidence and by the procedure which apparently they do not like; but when it comes to doing such an irrevocable act as killing a person for any of the offences in the schedule to the Military Court Order, the Government are not satisfied with the rules of evidence which they would still allow to be applicable to ordinary suits and are not satisfied with the ordinary rules of procedure.
We have not reached the stage of invasion yet in which the Government may do anything they please, nor have we reached the stage of actual war in which the Government may establish the ordinary courts martial and send people to be tried by what have been described in the text-books as committees of officers—simply repelling force by force. That is a right which every State claims for itself in a period of turmoil, a period of actual war, or in the somewhat indeterminate region of "a time of war." Being in that time of war, the Government got the authority of this House to deal with the emergency that exists and they were given general powers—such a generality of powers that the courts have even questioned that the limitations which this House, under the Emergency Powers Act, set upon the generality of that Act, are not ultra vires the Constitution as to some degree weakening the full comprehensiveness of the powers the Constitution gives to the Government in such a time. However, without any knowledge of what we were doing—certainly without any full appreciation of the repercussions of what we were doing—this House passed the legislation necessary to bring a time of emergency about, and in that time the Government are free.
It has been stated here, and claimed, that they have legal justification for this order which is now being criticised. So they have, but I assert—I asserted it yesterday and I do so again —that they got the permission and the sanction of the courts for it on false pretences. The arguments used in the courts were based entirely on this, that what the Government were now doing was in their minds necessary in order to counter something which was in some way attached to the emergency in which we found ourselves, a state of war which prevails outside the bounds of this country but which has repercussions inside this country. I waited to hear the case made on that, and one phrase which fell from the Minister for Justice, meagre and all as it was, was some attempt at justification, but that phrase was immediately withdrawn by the Taoiseach, that is, the phrase about organisations in this country which had endeavoured to bring in external persons to embroil us in a particular way. That is now out of it; it is not for that reason that sanction is sought for this order. I want to know what it is then for.
Certain reasons have been given by the Minister for Justice, and these I can deal with in a moment, but in any event I think it would be admitted by all that the situation as put to this country in 1937 when the Constitution was passed was that we were going to resort ordinarily to the courts and we decided that the courts ought to be fortified in the ordinary way. We get people with legal training and experience and we prevent them being imposed upon—no suasion, no pressure, no threat. They were to be free and independent, and, established in that way in the Constitution, they were to judge cases. Now we have moved somewhat, and, on the statements made here yesterday, not because of anything connected with the present war. So far as the Taoiseach's speech is concerned, it was a speech for amendment of the law of evidence in regard to a murder trial held before the war started, or to be held when the war has finished, and in no way attached to the emergency. But what have we done? I have stated already that, in regard to the Offences Against the State Act, we at least kept the link with the courts but that we had done something which removed these cases from the control of an independent judiciary. The first hearing was not to be by judges. We did definitely go away from trial by jury, but we did keep the resort to judges, so far as ordinary offences under the Offences Against the State Act were concerned, to the ordinary courts of criminal appeal, so far as internment was concerned, to a commission biassed in its terms of reference in favour of the Government, but still having on it one person of legal attainments.
Comment on this
We have progressed further than I thought. Now we take a further step. We are now going to have men tried before a court of officers only. If that court of officers finds a charge proved, it can pass only one sentence, that is, death, and, having passed the death sentence, on facts presented to them, there is no appeal to anybody.
That might seem to satisfy even the person most fervent in his enthusiasm for strengthening the Executive, but we go a step further. Up to this point, we have at least said that both these courts, the military court and the Special Criminal Court, are masters of their own procedure, and we have laid it down with regard to the Special Criminal Courts that they are to be governed by rules of evidence and the procedure that operates in the ordinary criminal courts of the State. Now we say to them: "The rules of evidence do not count so far as you are concerned," and we say to them, in particular, that "If statements are taken"—in one phrase, we say "If they are taken voluntarily"; in a second phrase, we say "If they are got under any enactment"; and in a third phrase, we say "If they are got anyhow—we, the Government, or we, the Dáil, order you to hear such statements," and in Section 5 of that order, we have indicated that we do not expect them to regard, and do not bind them to regard, any rule of evidence whatever.
It is not the order itself which is under examination at the moment, but by another order we have also told this court to try certain people together. Up to this point, it was the habit to leave the courts to decide for themselves what was the fair and just thing to do with regard to trials, but to a particular court we have said: "Try four men together." Let us take that analogy. We may hereafter say of these people, just as we say about evidence: "We do not think that any ordinary rule of procedure ought to bind them," and the Government may add to that order some day by amendment not merely that statements ought to be received, but that evidence of a hearsay type, evidence which is clearly hearsay, ought to be received. They may go on—there is no necessity for them to go on because Section 5 will cover it all—and say: "If you get proof that evidence has been beaten out of a man, take it."
The whole revolution has now pretty nearly been accomplished. We start off with our appeal to courts of independent judges, under a procedure which has established itself in the minds of thinking people all the world over, and triable by evidence which has established itself to the satisfaction of most people in this country, and which, when reported on in England recently, brought no change, and we are substituting for those courts of independent people and that particular type of procedure and evidence under which they operate—this. We are to have three officers, and I want to stop here for a moment to ask people to refrain in future from pretending to believe in the phrase used about these officers. There is no necessity for anybody at this stage to rise to the heights of vituperation risen to when these men were put in power before, but, having an appreciation of them in their own particular status, one can say that it is not often you find the people to whom you have given the education and training of an officer suddenly disclosing the qualities of a judge. We are told that these people, because they have tried innumerable cases already, are now almost on a par with the judges of the land. I suppose in some future Courts of Justice Act we shall find the qualifications for a judicial officer enlarged by the inclusion of a period of service as an officer on the Special Criminal Court.
We are asked to take these three officers, and what is our fortification instead of the fortification which is regarded as sound the whole world over—the independent status of the people, the code of law sanctioned by many years, and the mental outlook of the people who are appointed? We are asked to take three officers. The Minister for Justice says, can we not believe that they will be fair. Of course they will, according to their lights. But is that sufficient? The Minister says that there is the Attorney-General in the background in his office. Of course there is, and at the top there is a review by the Government. That is the full wheel of revolution.
The situation now is that we get the Government to review after three people, who hold their status and their position entirely at the will of the Government, have tried the accused before them on the case presented by the Attorney-General who, under the Constitution, is a servant of the Government dismissible at a moment's notice. As if that was not enough, we tell all this group of people, entirely and completely surrounded by Government influence, that they are to disavow all and any of the rules of evidence if they think they hamper them in coming to a decision. We go a step further and indicate that this Dáil, through the Government, will intervene and say to these three men: we will not even leave you free to decide your own procedure: you will try the four men together whether you like it or not, and whether you think that is a fair and just way to have these four men treated. Is is any wonder that counsel for the State claim that this was trial by the Dáil, or that the Chief Justice should say that most of the arguments advanced against that sort of system in court had better be directed here.
Those who regarded the courts, in connection with the liberty of the subject, as a sort of Maginot Line must now remember that the line is down, or at least is very badly broached. The people who were established to be the resolute defenders of certain rights can now turn around and look gloomily over an area that they cannot control and ask who did it? The Dáil did it. They can say that we gave the Executive of the day these powers and put them out of commission. There is very little difference between the attitude that has been adopted here and closing the courts down for the time being. The Supreme Court is open, but the courts have not much to tell to those who resort to them. They can simply tell them that they have no power, and can do nothing against the orders passed here.
To come back again to the fundamental point. What does all this mean? I have laboured what seemed to me to be obvious only because the Minister for Justice said that no one could call what we are doing in this drastic: that it was only a very ordinary change that might be expected at any time: that we were only dealing with certain trifling laws of evidence. He did not care where they came from or got their sanction. The Taoiseach does not believe that. He thinks this is something of a fundamental change. Why is it looked for? The Minister used a phrase which was discarded by the Taoiseach. The Minister referred to the explosion at Dublin Castle, to the man who was left for dead on the roadside and who recovered, and to the leaflet from the I.R.A. These were the only three things he brought into question. The Minister, I think, by way of an interruption did not pretend that, if the order had been in operation at the time of the explosion, he would have been able to make any one amenable to justice for the explosion. He hinted, I think, that if he had the order he might have got the attackers of the man left for dead on the roadside. I do not know whether he holds that, under it, he is going to get identification and conviction of those put forth for the leaflet.
The Taoiseach, in the course of an interruption, did speak of an organised campaign of murder, and when asked for evidence of that he said there was one murder inside the last 12 months. I do not think there has been one of the type we are referring to. The Minister's phrase was that if people here get away with this sort of thing there will be more murders. In fact, the murder that is in everybody's mind happened well over a year ago. There was, at least, a 12 months' period between the disappearance of a particular man and of the finding of his body on the mountains. In that period, when apparently the police were baffled and when no one was being brought to justice for that murder, there was no outburst of murder. I agree that it is not wise to wait until murders take place, and that it is much better to prevent them. According to counsel for the State these men are on trial by the Dáil. Has this House got anything that would lead it to believe that there was an organised campaign of murder? There are four men whose fate, to a certain extent, depends on what we do here. Certainly, their fate will, to a very great degree, be interfered with, and the processes of law will, to a certain extent, be warped in their application to these men if this House passes this particular order with regard to the evidence.
I came into this House eager with curiosity over one matter. I had these four men specially in mind. I know that before Christmas they were put on trial before the Special Criminal Court, and that it was agreed that it was a fair and proper thing to do to have them tried separately. Then there was a breakdown in the trial, and suddenly we find these people grabbed under an Article of the Constitution which entirely hangs upon a state of emergency and on something connected with the war. These men are grabbed under that and sent before, no longer the Special Criminal Court, but before a military court, and this House, through the Government, gives a direction to try them together. Now we are going to warp the law of evidence against them. What amazing change took place between, say, December and four or five weeks later which brought about that change in procedure? The crime with which these men were charged had nothing to say to the war situation or to the state of emergency. Why were they not put before the military court first?
Comment on this
It was decided yesterday that merely Order No. 139 might be discussed. The committal of these four men to the Special Military Court was made under another order.
Comment on this
I am not prejudicing these men's case in anything I say. I do not want to prejudice their case and there will be no complaint put up on that score.
Comment on this
Remember that, according to the courts, this is trial by the Dáil. We know that four men are going to be tried.
Comment on this
We are, according to the courts. I am sorry. I should not have said according to the courts but according to the statement of State counsel.
Comment on this
The courts did not say that, but State counsel did. Trial by the Dáil! May I put the thing hypothetically, although it will be quite clear I have the four men at the back of my mind? Surely an explanation would be demanded of the Government in the circumstances I have spoken of. When any criminal, any man charged with criminality, is brought before one court and a certain procedure is adopted with regard to him, and then, within four weeks, he is put before a different court——
Comment on this
There has to be an explanation given here tying this order to a time of war, to a state of emergency. None has been given. The thoughts I have given voice to here may be ascribed to the fact that I have, for some years past, walked the courts and I have got the sort of feelings bred by close association with people of a professional type who do not like to see all the procedure and the practice that they are accustomed to swept aside. I am quite prepared to admit that particular type of feeling may be in some people. I ask you to believe it is not very strong in me, for the reason that I had some experience as a member of the Executive before I got any experience in the other sphere. Notwithstanding all I have said against these orders, I would be prepared to give the Government all these powers if they made a case to me and could give me some evidence, here or secretly, that there is an organised campaign and that that organised campaign is so widespread and has such terroristic aids that the forces of the law are powerless against it.
I will ask for one other safeguard. I had the humiliation of being in this House and having to discuss what I considered an abuse by the Government of certain powers we granted to them. I have listened to the argument that I never objected to the generality of these powers when they were first promoted. I have learned a lesson since then. We gave the Government exceptional powers on many occasions, and without very much of an exceptional case being made, and those powers were scandalously abused. It is a funny thing that in this year we should have decided that the laws of evidence are not good enough and the procedure of the ordinary courts is not good enough, yet one remembers that, at a time when the Special Criminal Courts were established, those who were charged with a very foul murder, the murder of young More O'Ferrall, were brought before the ordinary courts and the ordinary rules of evidence was the only strength relied on against them, while Deputy Belton and others were charged before a special military court for refusal to pay rates. We know well how the powers of the Military Tribunal were used against the Blueshirts when crimes that certainly in the public mind were ascribed to the I.R.A. were taken no notice of and, when complaint was made about them, we were told the Executive was powerless in certain matters. There was no resort then to changing the law of evidence and there was no application of the Special Criminal Court to these people.
We remember another matter. At a time when crime of a political type was being committed, a certain group of farmers was brought before a Special Criminal Court although the ordinary courts of the land were open and district justices all over the country were sitting to take informations and the preliminaries in these proceedings against them. We know well how in this House we were persuaded to pass a censorship measure on the promise that all that would be censored would be news, not views, and we know how scandalously that has been abused.
Comment on this
I will, in this way. Having been fooled so often by that group, I have some hesitation in giving this vast accumulation of powers to the people who abused those other powers in such a way—and that is the most relevant remark I have made on this matter. Why should they ask for our confidence? Supposing we say we will start all over again, that we will start at the point where we will forget any abuse that has occurred. We will not accept the Minister's view that this is a light change; we think it is a big change. Three people here have said:
"Make a case here and now and we can forget all about abuses and about the misuse of powers. We can recognise that we are giving a very big extension of powers, making a fundamental change in the courts, but we will still say that we will give you these powers if you give us any case. But remember, you are asking us to set aside the courts of the country and replace these people by three officers controlled by the Government, with the case promoted by the Attorney-General also controlled by the Government and the only appeal to be to the Government itself."
We are not merely asked to do that, but we are asked to pass a special law. That is what this order means.
We are changing the law of evidence to this extent: get a statement from a man and prove—I do not know how that proof is going to be given—that it is voluntary. The ordinary way to deal with that would be to show that the statement was involuntary, that the person had been threatened and abused or that the statement was induced. Under this order the man giving the statement need not be brought before the court. It is open to the Guard to say that he got the statement, that it was acknowledged and made voluntarily. Apart from that if the statement has been taken under any enactment, then it may be produced. Remember what that means. Under the Offences Against the State Act it lies with any member of the Civic Guard—not an officer—to stop, question and detain a member of the public if that Guard suspects that that member of the public has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offence. What are the offences? A number are put down in special terms, but the last phrase comes to this: that a person is seeking to attain some legal objective by illegal means.
If an ordinary Guard thinks about an ordinary citizen that that citizen is about to attempt to attain some legal objective by illegal means, then he can stop him, interrogate him and eventually detain him. Once that man is detained he can be asked to give a record of his movements and state all he knows that would involve any other person and, if he does not make such statement, he has committed an offence. If you get a statement under these conditions, then it is a statement got under an enactment. You can get a statement of the so-called voluntary type or a statement made under the compulsion of the criminal law and a man will commit an offence for which he may be jailed if he does not answer. If that is not wide enough the last paragraph says in effect: "Get a statement anyhow, beat it out of a fellow and produce it as one beaten out of a man." I am asked to believe that the police will not take them, that the Attorney-General cannot put them before a court and that the court will not receive them. There is one case that we cannot mention here openly. Surely there should be some precautions taken with regard to that type of statement? The man who makes such a statement should be produced, unless there is good reason given to the court to explain his absence. It ought to be made certain that the statement is not an induced one; that the statement is a voluntary one, that it has not been beaten out of a man and that it is something in the nature of evidence.
We are asked to do that and we have done it, and, if we do not take some further steps to remove this also, we have ordered the way in which certain men's trials are to be conducted. Now, this may be the first step along a certain path. The whole course of the procedure here has been a swerve away from the ordinary courts and a swerve over to a group of people, all of whom are under the control of the Government, and we have shown two other steps in an impressive way outside that. We have deprived these people, first of all, of the power of establishing their own procedure of trial, and we have ordained a procedure of trial, or some part of it, and have told them: "Although you are under the control of the Government, and of a fair-minded Attorney-General, with, as a background, a corps of fair-minded police, we tell you nevertheless that there is a statement which, in the ordinary course, the Attorney-General would not put in"—and which, I imagine, the police, in view of their attachment to the courts, would not be very easily persuaded to put in—and we say to that court: "You are to take that statement and use it in evidence against these people."
The Minister for Justice, and the Taoiseach, speaking afterwards, talked yesterday about the revulsion of popular feeling that there was against the old-time trials, and said that that was why this matter was tightened up, and the Minister for Justice talked about some matters that happened two centuries ago. I suggest that that is what we are getting back to now—just about two centuries ago—in connection with this matter of the laws of evidence. The Taoiseach says that he has not had time to examine the history of the growth of the laws of evidence, but if he does find time to do so he will find that he is not in the beginning of the 20th century in this matter but back in the Seventeen hundreds—back in the days when people were being charged with being witches and where they were burned as a method of proof: if they survived the burning, then they were witches and, therefore, could be properly dealt with; and if they did not survive the burning, then it was just too bad but they had had a just trial. You are back to the time also when they used to put babies, whose parentage was somewhat in doubt or who were supposed to be under the influence of evil spirits, on red-hot griddles in order to see whether that particular method of purgation would not clear their character, and thus many of these innocent children lost their lives in order to prove something which the people of those days thought was proper.
We have not gone the full pace back to two centuries ago, but we have gone a little bit back, and if it can be shown that the powers now demanded are necessary, the Government will get the help of the people here. Let it be shown by the Government that these powers, drastic as they are, are necessary and demanded by the circumstances of the time, and the Government will be treated handsomely by the people on this side of the House; but we do not want this drift back across the centuries, nor are we impressed by the very foolish type of case made by the Minister for Justice yesterday, or the academic case, with regard to the laws of evidence, which was made later on by the Taoiseach. I have quoted very often in this House and elsewhere the statement about legal procedure that was made by one of the great men of history, a great American, where he said that:
"It has long been a grave question whether any Government, not too strong for the liberties of the people, can be strong enough to maintain its existence in a time of great emergency."
That was the phrase of a great man, Lincoln, who was trained to the law, but who, while he was a great executive, found himself obsessed by the thought of danger, surrounded by dangers, and who knew that he had to balance between whether the Government could be so tyrannical or so despotic as to be too strong for the liberties of the people, or whether it could be too strong to sustain its liberties in a time of emergency, and he acted strongly and against the law of that time, and has got the decision of history, because everybody recognises that the circumstances of his time demanded drastic handling.
We in this House are the representatives of the people. We are the people to whom, as Deputy Costello said, the courts "have thrown back the ball" in this matter, and whom the courts have told in effect: "You are now the only people who stand between the superfluous abundance of despotic power put into the hands of the Government and the liberties of the people, and it is for you to take care of the liberties of the people." This is the last place where that case can be made, and, so far as I am concerned, it is not too late. I am prepared to let the executive part of my experience triumph over the legal part of my experience, and to give these powers if I get any glimmering from the Government that they recognise that these are very drastic powers that are asked for, and if the Government will make a case equal to the occasion and give us reasons that will enable us to justify ourselves before the people for the giving of these powers. The people have trusted us, and before we give such powers we must be given some sort of case equal to the extremity of the powers that are asked for, and if that case is not made, I shall vote for the Labour resolution.
Comment on this
In opening the discussion here yesterday on this motion, the Taoiseach said that he welcomed the opportunity of coming before the House and making the Government, case in favour of the drastic powers sought in this order. I would have preferred that the Government, on their own initiative, should, before this order was made, have come to this House, as their predecessors did in 1931, and made the case in favour of the order before it was made, and produce evidence to the representatives of the people that there was justification for seeking such very drastic and revolutionary powers. If the Government still believe that the members of this House, irrespective of their own Party, with its clear majority, have any right or authority here to challenge or criticise, even constructively, the policy of the Government, I think that in this case, without waiting for the motion put down by Deputy Norton, they should have taken that opportunity and made the case under these circumstances.
With one exception, I know of no murder, which can be styled an organised murder, that has taken place in this country since the emergency arose. That murder, which, I am personally satisfied, was an organised murder, took place as far back as September, 1940. Now, the Minister for Justice was asked here last night, when speaking, not alone about one organisation but organisations—unnamed organisations—to furnish a list of the crimes that were committed in recent times and which, in his opinion, would justify the powers sought for in this order. He talked about organisations, and the Taoiseach, speaking later in the debate, said, amongst other things, as reported in the Irish Press to-day—and I am sure he would not be reported wrongly there:—
"There are organisations which have to be closely watched from the external point of view in order that our neutrality and the peace of the country may be preserved. On the fringe of one of them was a group toying—while keeping constitutional —with the question of other people being brought into the country. When definite evidence was obtained they would be put on trial for treason."
Now, I think it is in the interests of the good government of this country and the preservation of the peace of the country that the organisations should be named here in this House so that both the young and the old in this country may have the names of the organisations which are regarded as illegal and dangerous and so that they will keep, if they are good citizens, far away from these bodies. Now, therefore, I request any subsequent speaker for the Government to name the organisations, illegal or semi-constitutional, that in the opinion of the Government are regarded as dangerous. If evidence can be produced, either now or in the future, to prove that any persons associated with those organisations, or even individuals, can be connected with the agents of any foreign Power for the purpose of bringing outsiders into this country, I for one—and I think all my colleagues too—will give every support possible to the Government in dealing with such treasonable activities. I refuse to admit that any patriotic Irishman, whether he is in any of the organisations which the Government spokesmen have in their minds or whether he is not, would consciously be a party to bringing into this country any outsiders to interfere with the authority given by the Irish people to an Irish Government to rule the Irish people.
I remember—I think I can get some of my colleagues in this House to confirm this—listening to a statement made by a Minister less than six months ago to the effect that a certain illegal organisation, the I.R.A., had been disorganised and broken up. I know of nothing that has happened since I listened to that statement which would make me believe that any change has taken place, or that that organisation has any real power of a dangerous character at the present moment. I know as much about what is going on in my constituency as any member of the Government. I certainly would not suggest that I know as much about the activities of that organisation or any other organisation outside my own constituency, but I am firmly convinced that this organisation called the I.R.A.—not named by the Minister or by An Taoiseach so far in this debate—is not a greater danger to-day to the peace of this country than it was five or ten years ago. At any rate, is there any murder that can be styled an organised murder on the criminal records of the Department of Justice other than the one I suspect was committed in an organised way in September, 1940? If so, we are entitled to the information, and as far as possible to the evidence, that such a murder was an organised murder of a political or semi-political kind. An organised murder can be committed by two or three or less than six persons.
I want to say—I was tempted to say it before, but I cannot let this occasion pass—that I deprecate very strongly the attitude of Deputy Dillon in coming into this House, and, not for the first time in public, giving his impressions or versions of discussions that have taken place at meetings elsewhere, meetings of a body of which he is a member and whose business is supposed to be regarded as confidential or of a semi-secret or secret nature. I object to any member of that body coming in here and giving his version of what transpired there for the purpose of propping up an argument suitable to his own point of view in a debate of this kind.
Comment on this
Yes. He asserted here twice during his speech that I was furnished elsewhere with evidence by somebody—he did not name him—to prove that there was collusion between the Irish Republican Army and agents of the Nazi Government. I assure members of this House that I never saw such evidence, and I invite any Ministers who may feel it their duty to do so to say if I was, either privately or anywhere, furnished with such evidence. I say it is a rotten state of affairs that any prominent member of this House should come in here and point a finger at me, as he did last night, stating that I was in possession of such evidence.
Comment on this
I say that Deputy Dillon would be quite right in coming to his own Party meeting and making such statements, and even though he would not be correct I would not have the same objection to Deputy Dillon making that assertion there as I have to his making the statement here in public, and having it handed out over the British Broadcasting Corporation in the midnight news last night and at 8 o'clock this morning. I know from experience that Deputy Dillon is capable of believing any story told to him by anybody so long as the type of story serves his own purpose, but he is not going to make a "cod" out of me here in this House, and I object to his making "cods" of any of us for the purpose of propping up arguments in a debate of this kind. I am sure the Minister for Defence or any other Minister will not welcome the kind of argument he used to support them in steamrolling this order through the House. I have no evidence, privately or in any other way or no information of a reliable nature, to lead me to believe that there has been any such conspiracy, but if the Government has evidence or reliable information I will not discourage them from dealing with the people whom they believe to be responsible, and putting them before the proper court for trial and punishment. Deputy Dillon says he has evidence and that I am supposed to have been given evidence on this matter. Deputy Dillon has evidence and information, as we all have information if we want to argue from the other angle, that there are thousands of British-born citizens here in this country who are using their eloquence and their powerful influence from day to day to try to convert our people to a point of view which would involve us in the war, and I suggest that he is one of their ablest spokes men inside and outside this House.
Comment on this
The members of this Party will give greater support to the Government, inside and outside this House, for the purpose of helping them to maintain the national policy of neutrality, than any Deputy, particularly a Deputy who advocates our entrance into this war on a particular side. I cannot understand the attitude of people who use their eloquence and their influence to drag us into the war on a particular side, and I do not care which side it is—young men who have not the courage to go and put the uniform of the country they are supporting on their backs, and go out and take their chance where the war is going on. I know many young men who are advocating our entry into the war on one particular side, who were not born in this country, but are living comfortably in this country at the present time, and who have not the courage to go and put on a uniform and risk their lives in favour of the policy they are advocating. I am forced to say those things because of the impertinence of Deputy Dillon in making insinuations here that we are the dupes of the I.R.A., and that we have evidence that the I.R.A. is in collusion with agents of the Nazi Government. I hope it is the last time Deputy Dillon will use words of that kind inside this House. If he uses them outside, we will give him an opportunity of proving the allegations he has been making here under cover of privilege. From day to day I come up against people who hold the view that if you do not publicly express your opinion in favour of the British point of view you are automatically pro-German. Deputy Dillon is one of that type. That is not the correct way of supporting the national policy of neutrality, or giving a proper lead in that direction to those who are responsible for implementing it.
One of the striking things in connection with the discussion on this motion was the conflicting points of view expressed in this House by the Taoiseach and by the Minister for Justice in connection with the reasons for the bringing in of those drastic powers. The Taoiseach, for instance, said in the concluding portion of his speech that he was willing to bring this order back to the House after six months' trial and leave it to the judgment of Deputies to say whether it should be altered and, if so, in what way it should be altered. The Minister for Justice, speaking earlier in the debate, said that it was possible that he would have to come to the House again in the near future and look for stronger powers to deal with the situation that he sees through his glasses from the Department of Justice. The Taoiseach said that he was looking for the powers contained in this order to deal with an external situation; with the danger that he sees of this country being dragged into trouble with an outside Power; whereas the Minister for Justice said that he wanted the powers sought for in this order to deal with matters of a purely internal nature. The Minister for Justice and the Taoiseach must not have been talking very long together before they spoke in this House in support of this particular order or of the drastic powers sought in this order.
Plainly and bluntly, what we are asked to do here is this. In the first place, we are asked to trust the Government, to trust the servants of the Government who are responsible for the operations of the military court and the powers that are sought to help the State servants to make their case before the military court. We are also asked to rely upon the sense of justice and the ability, as the Taoiseach said, of the members of the military court. I respect the members of the military court so far as they are competent officers of our National Army. The Minister for Justice, to my surprise, made a case in support of these men, because he asserted— I hope I am not misrepresenting him when I say so—that they had carried out their duties efficiently since they were appointed in 1931. Personally I would have less objection to the composition of this court if it had with one or two of its members a man of legal knowledge and experience. I understand that even as far back as the civil war days those sitting on courts martial had the assistance of a judge advocate-general. I am not sure that I am correctly informed. But, if a court consisting of laymen had even the assistance or guidance of a person with the experience of a judge advocate-general there would be probably less ground for objection than there is to a court consisting altogether of laymen without any legal knowledge or training of any kind.
The view I take of a court of this kind is that, no matter even if they have had previous experience of dealing with cases where serious charges were brought before them, these officers of this particular military court are bound, under the conditions laid down in this order at any rate, to follow the advice or the direction of the State counsel who appears before the court on behalf of the Attorney-General. Is there any Minister or member of the Government Party who will say that the officers of a court trying cases which are likely to be referred to them will act contrary to the directions or advice given by the State counsel, especially on a question of procedure? I certainly would not dream of suggesting that officers would act in a way that would be contrary to the instructions or advice given by the State counsel, wherever and whenever submitted, when challenged by defending counsel on a question of procedure. I would imagine, for instance, that with the powers contained in this order the court would take the advice of the State counsel as to when unsigned statements might be submitted against a prisoner who was being tried.
Now we are asked to trust the Government in the first instance in giving drastic powers of this kind. The members of this Party, in the light of the experience of the working of the Emergency Powers Act, cannot agree to trust the Government because we believe—and Deputy Norton has cited cases to prove it—that the Government have abused the powers given to them under the Emergency Powers Act and made use of that Act for the purpose of getting certain things done in this country which should have been done by legislation or after open discussion in this House. We are asked to trust the servants of the State who will be responsible for helping the Government to carry out the terms of this drastic order.
The Minister for Justice I am sure will admit that very serious cases have arisen, even in recent times, where as a result of wrong information and bad evidence people have been sent to prison in the wrong. I daresay he will not deny that servants of the State have been dismissed for being inefficient; servants of the State who in the ordinary course of events would be responsible or held liable for the operation of an order of this kind. I will quote one case—the Quinn case—where a man was brought before a court on information and evidence supplied by the Gárda, found guilty on bad evidence and sentenced to penal servitude. The man concerned was subsequently released as a result of information which came into the possession of the Minister for Justice and the Government and a big sum was paid in compensation for the wrongful imprisonment of that particular individual.
Comment on this
I say that a person charged with any crime must have all the safeguards it is possible to give him so that he may get a fair trial. If that man was brought before a military court, assuming a military court would be qualified to try him, I take it he would have been sentenced to death, if the death sentence was the proper sentence to give him for the crime with which he was charged. If he were shot, there would be no question of bringing him back to life. The fact that he was imprisoned wrongly was admitted. I daresay that this was all done by somebody who took an irresponsible view of his duties as a servant of the State.
Comment on this
I should like to remind the Deputy, as I am sure he should like to know exactly what happened, that a jury tried that particular case. The man was identified by bank officials, so that there was really no blame attaching to the court or anybody else. There was a miscarriage of justice, but it certainly was done in a bona fide manner. Bank officials gave evidence of identification and the jury found the man guilty.
Comment on this
I am aware that it was a jury case, because I know a man who was a member of the jury. The case was brought forward by the State. It was a State prosecution and State servants were responsible for producing the evidence. I only cite that case. I could cite others to prove that mistakes can be made by servants of the State in charging citizens with crimes of which it was afterwards discovered they were not guilty. One of the most serious things I see in the order is that an unsigned statement can be produced in this military court at any stage of the trial and put forward as evidence, unsupported evidence, against the prisoner. Is it possible, for instance, that an unsigned statement can be submitted to the court before sentence is passed on the prisoner? The order says it can be put forward at any stage of the trial. Am I to assume that a statement of this kind can be brought forward without giving the defending counsel a copy of the statement, or the name of the person responsible for the making of it? In other words, will it be possible for defending counsel to get copies of the statements that are being submitted?
Comment on this
Will it therefore be in the power of the defending counsel to subpæna a person before the court for the purpose of proving that he was the person responsible for making the statement?
Comment on this
And to give all the supporting evidence he can against the prisoner or for the prisoner, as the case may be? If these unsigned statements are to be put forward at the last moment, without previous advice to defending counsel, there is no justification whatever for having a defence at all in a court of this kind. Is the Minister making that clear?
Comment on this
I am making it clear that, as far as the defence is concerned, the laws of evidence have not been interfered with. Any right they had in regard to cross-examination is still there.
Comment on this
I made it clear last night that this order is to provide for an absent or a dead witness. It is in case he may be either abducted or shot. I am satisfied—and every Deputy here can be satisfied—that the court will insist on knowing why the witness is not produced. We are not dealing in the abstract with this situation: we are dealing with what we know are likely things to happen. The witness may be either abducted or shot. I produced some evidence that there is a possibility that that may happen, and that is what is being provided for here.
Comment on this
Then the court can make up its own mind. We are not asking the court to do anything but consider these statements and hear any evidence. If the witness is in court and will not give evidence, we are not telling the court what they are to do about it. That is a matter for the court to decide.
Comment on this
How can defending counsel subpæna a witness to appear before that court unless he is given the names of the witnesses for the prosecution beforehand and copies of the unsigned statements submitted and which are to be used against the prisoner?
Comment on this
The meaning of the order is quite clear, that unsigned statements can be produced at any stage of the trial and used against the prisoner, and if defending counsel is not made aware of the statements beforehand and the names of the witnesses, how can he make a case for bringing the witness before him?
Comment on this
He can get the name of the person who makes the statement and a summary of the evidence, and can subpoena if the witness can be produced; but we are providing for the case in which he cannot be produced.
Comment on this
Or is murdered or kidnapped. These are cases we are providing for.
Comment on this
The Minister has cleared up some points, at any rate, that certainly were not clear from the wording of the order.
Comment on this
I am very glad that the Deputy is asking me questions in this way, and I am very glad to get the opportunity to clear up these matters. There has been a lot of misrepresentation—not deliberate, maybe—and certain debate in the abstract instead of in the times in which we are living.
Comment on this
I have had the opportunity to talk to people who can interpret these things better than I can. I said to myself, at any rate, that this is a terrible state of affairs, as it deprives counsel on behalf of the prisoner of the right to cross-examine a person who made a statement against the prisoner. Cross-examination of a prosecuting witness very often brings out information not previously brought out——
Comment on this
——in any other way to any other person, and which may help to get the prisoner released.
Comment on this
Of course, he could not have that right if defending counsel did not get a copy of the statements and the names of the witnesses who gave them.
Comment on this
And the defence in court will have the right to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution?
Comment on this
Certainly. Of course, if witnesses will not give evidence, that is another matter. If the witness will not give evidence, no one can cross-examine him.
Comment on this
It is my opinion that a court consisting of officers without legal knowledge or training will, in cases of this kind, feel themselves bound, as servants of the State, to follow the advice or direction of the Attorney-General, and that is a weakness I see in the constitution of the court.
Comment on this
Will the Deputy let me make that clear? They are bound to do no such thing as follow the advice or direction of the Attorney-General's representative. It is a matter for them. They may do and often do, but they may take the other view. They are not bound.
Comment on this
I would have more faith in a statement of that kind if I knew that some member of the court was a man with legal training and experience.
Comment on this
He is the same as the court clerk in a country court or a circuit court. He has to sit down and stand up when he is told, and he has no right to decide the issues put before the court. I am glad, at any rate, that the Minister for Justice has cleared up one or two points. When we are asked to give these extraordinary powers to the Government in existing circumstances, knowing as we do that they have already abused the powers given by this House very freely in September, 1939, under the Emergency Powers Act, we suspect—and I think we have good reason to suspect from previous experience—that the Government will use these powers for the purpose of dealing with other issues and other types of cases.
I myself suspect—and it has been suggested to me—that the Government, if given these powers, would not hesitate to use them against trade union leaders who may be held responsible for encouraging strikes for increased wages in contravention or opposition to the powers contained in Emergency Powers Order No. 83. I can imagine a citizen of this State—perhaps the wife of some man on strike—coming along and making a statement to the Government or to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and getting that Minister to arrest a trade union leader, put him before this court, and intern him for the period of operation of Emergency Powers Order No. 83. Would the Minister for Justice say if there is any possibility of this order, or the powers contained in it, being used for that kind of thing? I am asking the Minister for Justice because I know he is a very straightforward man.
Comment on this
I would like to make it clear that there is no intention of doing any such thing, and that the only cases coming before this court are cases set out in the Schedule, and in those cases they must be considered by the Government before they come before the court, and they are subject to review again. There is no case of sending a man there unless the Government first consider it. I can assure the Deputy that.
Comment on this
When the Emergency Powers Act was under discussion in the early period of the emergency, we asked the responsible Minister at the time for an assurance—and the Taoiseach gave us an assurance—that the Act would not be used to deal with industrial matters; but we find that it has been used, in the case of the infamous Order No. 83, to prevent the workers of this country getting increased wages, while the bankers, with their safes bulging with money, were given increased charges. Then we have the Minister for Local Government and Public Health quite recently making use of it in order to prevent schoolchildren getting mid-day meals.
Comment on this
I knew Deputy Norton was ignorant, but I did not think that Deputy Davin shared that ignorance. Better look it up and see what that order purports to do.
Comment on this
I am very glad to have on the records of the debate an assurance from the Minister for Justice on the point I have mentioned. It is not necessary to say this; it would hardly be necessary for any Deputy to say it: we are prepared to give the Government all the powers and support they reasonably need in order to maintain the national policy of neutrality in this country; but we are of the opinion that the very drastic powers sought for in Order No. 139 are not justified either by the wording of the order or by the speeches which have been made in support of it by the Taoiseach, the Minister for Justice, and any other member of the Government who has spoken on the matter up to the present time.
We are not dupes of the I.R.A. in matters of this kind, as suggested by Deputy Dillon, nor are we the dupes of anybody else. We have the right, on behalf of the people we represent, to endeavour to preserve the liberties of every citizen under the Constitution. It was for that purpose, and for no other purpose, that we put down this motion, challenging the right of the Government to equip themselves with drastic powers of this kind without coming to the House and making a case for them. We can all thank God, as sensible citizens of this State, that we have lived in comparative peace since the emergency arose. I can remember no period of equal length since the State was established in which there was less crime, political or otherwise. One of the greatest consolations I have had in going around the country since the emergency arose has been to see Irishmen who differed so strongly in the years from 1922 to 1938 coming together in the ranks of the National Defence Forces —the L.D.F., the L.S.F., the Red Cross and other organisations—forgetting their differences and lining up, as they never lined up before, in support of the national policy declared by the representatives of the people in this House.
Comment on this
If times and circumstances were normal, it would be difficult to justify this order to the ordinary man and I, for one, should not attempt to do so. The times and circumstances—notwithstanding that some of the speeches to which we listened in this House yesterday and to-day would lead one to believe otherwise—are not normal. I think that that was what Deputy Costello had in mind when he said that, though all his education, training, and experience of 27 years as a lawyer, urged him to vote against this order, he would, in present circumstances, vote for it if a coercive case could be made. I do not know whether it would be possible to make a case which would be absolutely coercive on Deputy Costello, Deputy McGilligan, or any of the other lawyer Deputies who have criticised this order, to the extent that they would vote for it, because, naturally, that would depend upon the amount of detail as to the true situation in the country which they would require to have divulged. The Government knows that the situation requires this order, that it is a grave and menacing situation. But there are limits to the revelations which the Government may make without damaging the public interest or, I might almost say, without endangering the public safety. Furthermore, in making the case for this order, the Government is hampered in a way in which the critics of the order are not, for we, on these benches, must confine ourselves to those matters which are within the public knowledge. Even here, we must restrict ourselves so as not to appear to reflect upon cases which are already sub judice or which in the near future may so be. Therefore, as I say, I do not think that any person would attempt to carry conviction to every critic of this order. But I do think that we can carry conviction to the mind of the ordinary citizen who is concerned with the safety of himself, his neighbours and the State in which he lives.
Reference has been made in a number of speeches to the statement made by the Chief Justice in delivering judgment in the Supreme Court upon the motions of which this order has been the subject when he alluded to the fact that certain of the arguments which had been adduced in that court might more properly have been adduced here in the Dáil. I think that the true intent of the statement made by the Chief Justice has not been apprehended by those who have referred to it. What he said was that the Oireachtas had declared a state of emergency to exist and that, in recognition of the fact that a state of emergency did exist, it was prepared to entrust wide powers to the Government. Therefore, the only question which would appear to arise for consideration is whether, in fact, that state of emergency, acknowledged to exist, is of such a nature that we are entitled to get all the powers we feel to be essential if we are to protect the institutions of the State and the citizens of the State themselves. I do not think that it can be contested that there is a national emergency. I cannot conceive that, in the whole of its history, this nation was ever confronted with a graver peril than it is confronted with at present. After centuries of struggle, we have enjoyed 20 brief years of freedom, and, to-day, we find ourselves with war all around us, closing in on us from every side and our geographical position and strategical importance an ever-increasing temptation to those who are locked in this life-and-death struggle. In the midst of this we stand, a little State of less than 3,000,000 people, passionately and, I might say, fanatically determined to remain at peace. Some of us wish to be at peace for one reason, some for another, but, so far as I can ascertain the minds of the ordinary plain man and woman, there is a deep-seated instinct telling them that this nation, whose population contains so few young and adolescent elements, cannot endure the blood sacrifice of war and continue to survive. They feel deeply and instinctively that the preservation of our neutrality is a matter of life and death for our race. For that reason, no matter what other instinctive claims of blood, of gratitude and self-interest demand, they are resolved, under Divine Providence, to remain at peace. We may not all agree with them in that resolve. There are some Deputies who disagree, and because this is a free country, and this free Assembly, as far as I am concerned, they are entitled to express their views. But in any event, whether individually we agree with that resolve or not, the Oireachtas and the Government have hitherto acted upon it so that the maintenance of peace is the paramount policy of the State. Any conspiracy which, without the consent of the people, is designed to embroil them in war is a menace to this State, and the gravest menace of all is the conspiracy which not only seeks to embroil them in war but challenges at the same time the very foundations of our Government and our State. That is the kind of conspiracy which we are now facing. It is in this situation that there exists a national emergency of the gravest character. The assertion, that there exists a national emergency of the gravest character, is challenged, at least by implication in this motion, by the movers of this motion, and by the critics of the order.
I have said that there exists a conspiracy which seeks to embroil us in war. I think, of that fact there cannot be any denial. The history of this conspiracy in latter years should be within the recollection of us all. As the Taoiseach informed the House yesterday, the heads of it issued an ultimatum declaring war on another State with which we were, and are, and desire to remain at peace. In pursuance of that ultimatum this organisation carried on a campaign of outrages designed, in my belief, at any rate— others may not take the same view— to provoke an attack upon us, to embitter the relations between us and our neighbours, and to bring about what that organisation desired, an actual state of war between this country and Great Britain.
Comment on this
The date was late in 1938 or early in 1939. This, then is the avowed aim of the organisation with which this Government has to deal. Would those who have attacked and criticised this order, and who spoke as if we were back again in 1931, or back again at the beginning of, say, 1938, ask themselves what would have been the position in this country, and in this House, if this unlawful organisation had succeeded in its objective, and we had found ourselves faced with a threat or a reprisal from Great Britain? What would be the position, perhaps to-morrow, if they brought about what I believe they are striving to do? But it is not only external war this organisation aims at. It claims to be waging war against this State. Let us not talk here as if we were dealing with some partly innocent victim of hard circumstances. Let us realise what we are up against. This organisation is anxious not merely to bring about war between this country and another, but it actually claims to be waging war against us. Civil war they would call it, perhaps, but armed rebellion we are entitled to describe it here in this State. In pursuance of that rebellion it has raided our magazines, attacked our forces, murdered our police, terrorised our citizens, and claimed the right to exercise the power of life and death over all our people. In the minds of those who are behind this conspiracy this Legislature, and the Government responsible to it, is a usurpation. Remember, too, it has no qualms about courts or rules of evidence. It governs by martial law and drumhead courtmartial. As the Minister for Justice indicated yesterday, it arrogates to itself a competent military authority, to whom the forces of State, upon which we rely to protect our territory, to defend our liberties, and to safeguard our lives, are "enemy forces."
Let us know where we stand. While the Taoiseach, members of the Government, and members of the Defence Forces are going around begging, imploring and urging our young men to flock into the Army, into the L.D.F. and into the L.S.F., remember, when they do that, they are asking those boys to put themselves in peril of their lives at the hands of this competent military authority, which regards them as "enemy forces." This organisation goes further, and warns all citizens, who are bound by the laws of God and man to render obedience and assistance to the law, that any one of them who fulfils these solemn obligations will be shot, if this competent military authority so determines.
What this organisation has been guilty of in the past few years should be well known to us all, but lest we forget, because I think some of us have forgotten, let me remind the House of some of the things that have happened within the past few years. Deputy Davin seems to attach some importance to the date of the ultimatum aimed at overthrowing the authority of this House, as if that mattered so long as the policy of the organisation is to-day what it was then. But, if that point is going to be made, that these things were done before war became imminent all around us, let us remember what has been done since the actual outbreak of the war. We had, as I have already reminded the House, the raid on the national Magazine, the primary reserve of the Defence Forces of this State, a raid which admittedly was planned and carried out by this organisation and about which, perhaps, the country may hear, and the House may hear, something more in the near future. Then we had the attack on the police officers at Holles' Street, the men who were carrying State despatches. Let us all throw our minds back to that morning when we heard of that cowardly attack, when these two men, armed merely with revolvers, were set on and ambushed by men armed with machine-guns who were prepared to shoot them down in order that they might secure the despatches which these officers, as servants of the State, were carrying. Let us contrast the atmosphere in which and the freedom of expression with which we have been debating this order for the past two days with our feelings that morning when we heard of that attack and realised that there were men who were prepared to stick at nothing, not even murder, if they could only secure their aims or ends, whatever they may be.
Then within a short period we had the bomb outrage at Dublin Castle. I heard Deputy McGilligan talk of that as if were a mere fiddle-faddle. Of course Deputy McGilligan did not happen to be one of the 14 detective officers, servants of the State, whose duty it was to enforce the laws passed by this House, laws which represent not only the policies of those on the Government Benches but decisions of the House as a whole—for whether Deputies vote against these laws or not they represent their corporate acts, and every Deputy here is bound to stand behind the servants of the State in their efforts to enforce them to the last drop of his blood. Here were 14 men sleeping innocently within this building and here was this deadly machine planted there by the agents of a conspiracy. To-day, as I have said, listening to Deputy McGilligan one would have thought it was a child who had let off fireworks on Guy Fawkes' Day for all the significance he attached to that outrage.
Then we had the murder of the police officers at Rathgar following shortly afterwards. It seems to be forgotten now, but remember that a short time previously, when the memory of these incidents was fresh in the minds of this House, this House amended the Emergency Powers Act to enable the Government to make an order under which were set up the special courts to which the Emergency Powers Order No. 139 refers. When the Government made that order setting up that court, the day after these police officers were murdered at Rathgar, we had not anybody coming here telling us that, after all, the five officers from whom that court was to be drawn, were men who had no legal training or legal experience. They were not then sneered and flouted at as Deputy McGilligan sneered, flouted and jibed at them to-day. No, there was not a word then, because everybody realised, with the fate of these police officers in front of them, that there was in fact a dangerous conspiracy and that the danger of that conspiracy is not to be measured and gauged by the fact that a murder took place this year or last year but that the danger and the menace are to be gauged by the fact that the conspiracy exists and that it is still under the control of the same desperate men.
Comment on this
The Deputy did not do anything to apprehend them, whether they are locked up or not. Following this we had the attacks and the armed raids on the banks and the post offices. Of course, we have this jibing and jeering from the Deputy as to their all being locked up. Well, if the present order had been before this House some time, say, early in 1941 and I was making the same argument we would have the same interruption from Deputy Davin: "Are they not all locked up?" Perhaps he thought they were all locked up. But we were not such fools as not to know that some of them were at large and the difficulty was to apprehend those that were at large. If anyone thought that these desperadoes "were all locked up," the outbreak of armed outrages, of armed robberies of banks and post offices and the murder of some of the servants of the State must have awakened him from that dream. We had this menace growing to such an extent that we had to make it one of the offences triable by the court. We had to make the act of engaging in robbery under arms one of the offences triable by the court and punishable by death. Following this outbreak of outrages, when the net of the law had closed round one of the men who had been responsible for some of them, and when we tried to apprehend him we had an Army officer, and I think a Gárda also, wounded, but in any event he and his associates did not scruple to turn their guns upon the officers of the law and put them in peril of their lives. That was followed afterwards by the attempted murder at Dundalk. Of whom? Of a man who had become innocently involved in one of the operations of this conspiracy and who, when he was arrested, just simply said, "I was engaged by so-and-so. My lorry was engaged by so-and-so to come and remove goods— I did not know what they were—I was engaged only to transport them from this place to that." Because he gave that evidence in court, in order to exculpate himself, he, one night, after having made a journey, when he was coming home to his wife and family, was stopped in the darkness on the road by a man who appeared to be a fellow-motorist seeking his help and succour because the car had broken down and when he, like any other ordinary decent citizen, pulled up his vehicle and got down to help the men who seemed to be in difficulty he was asked was he so-and-so, and when he answered, "yes", was immediately fired on, wounded in three places and left for dead on the ground. All this occurred within the space of the last two years. Then we had the attempted bomb outrage at the Gárda headquarters in Cork. We have not heard a great deal about these things because, for one thing, newspaper space is limited and, for another, we do not think that the activities of this organisation or any other organisation of the sort, should secure any undue advertisement.
Comment on this
"Hear-hear," says the Deputy but all the time the Deputy and other people who would say "Hear-hear" with him have been asking us and taunting us to make a case for this order. We had hoped that it would not be necessary to say too much about these things but since we are told that no case has been made we have to refresh the memory of Deputies as to what has actually happened and what ought to be within their own knowledge. I was saying about the outrage at Cork. Then we had the kidnapping, imprisonment, torture and projected murder of the one-time head of this unlawful organisation. That is surely fresh within the minds of all the Deputies. Deputy Norton, in fact, referred to a certain statement which has already appeared in the Press in connection with these proceedings.
Comment on this
I am simply referring to the fact that it is now public knowledge that a man was charged and convicted of having kept prisoner this person who, by our laws, is a citizen of the State—albeit he may be in rebellion or in revolt against the State and, therefore, amenable to the laws of the State. But, in any event, he was a man who, being under the law a citizen of the State, was unlawfully imprisoned and put in peril of his life by the members of this organisation. I could go on and I could say some other things because this does not complete the list. There are other matters known to the Minister for Justice, known also to the Government which, for one reason and another, it is not in the public interest to refer to at this stage.
I was thunderstruck last night when I heard the former Minister for Justice, Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, in all honesty, asking us to justify the making of this order by asking us when was the last murder. We have had that question repeated here to-day in this House. Surely to goodness we are not going to judge the merits or demerits of this order by the fact as to when the last murder took place or as to how many murders took place. Have we not enough evidence to show us that this organisation exists, that it claims to have power over the lives and over the properties of our citizens and that it is prepared to stop at nothing to enforce its ordinances upon them?
Comment on this
I was going to ask the Minister if it was a fact that in a number of the crimes he has outlined, arrests and convictions were made by the State before the issuing of the Emergency Order which the Minister is endeavouring now to support?
Comment on this
In some of them only. But I think I have said enough to show that, so far as this organisation can secure it, we are fighting what they would call a civil war or what we can only describe and regard as rebellion and, I regret to say that, when we describe that as a state of grave emergency, we are told by Deputy McGilligan that we have secured the powers that we have got, the powers which the Dáil has given us, under false pretences. It would be a great mistake if the people of this country were led by anything which has been said here, particularly by remarks of that sort, to underestimate the harm and the havoc and the damage which this organisation might do to this State and to its people.
We have been asked also as to the extent of this conspiracy. It has been suggested that it is of no importance, that it is dying, decaying, and that it will ultimately vanish of its own accord. I do not believe that. I do not believe that this conspiracy is going to die of inanition. I had hoped over the past ten years that with each succeeding year the tendency for it to exist would disappear, but I am not certain now that there is not a vested interest in the continuance of that organisation and, therefore, I do not believe that if we treat the members of it with clemency and with mercy, it is likely, as I said, to die in the ordinary and natural course of things, because there has grown up around that organisation a set of vested interests which are fed, for one reason or another, from sources which we cannot particularise and which we can only guess at. But if you ask me, as we have been asked, what is the extent of this rebellious conspiracy, we cannot give you precise details. We believe that the numbers actually enrolled may not be very great. They may not, for instance, run into many thousands, but we do not know because we are dealing with a secret organisation upon the members of which secrecy is enforced by the sanction of death. We believe, however, that those who control the organisation are desperate, unscrupulous and blood-hardened men who will stop at nothing to enforce their decisions on their associates. We have proof of that fact in the cases which were recently tried before the special military courts. We have proof of that fact in the men who have been taken from their homes, even since 1931, and who have been murdered at the order of the heads of this organisation. Until recently, this organisation also was well supplied with funds. Upon some of those who have been arrested at one time or another considerable sums of money were found. That has not been so common recently. Instead there was, as I have already told the House, an outbreak of bank robberies and armed raids upon post offices and other places where considerable sums of money might be expected to be found.
In those raids arms were used, and when it was subsequently sought to apprehend those responsible for the armed robberies, they turned their arms, as I have told the House, and as the House well knows, against the servants of the State, wounded them and generally imperilled their lives. This is the sort of conspiracy controlled by desperate men against which we are fighting. We do not know, as I have said, how many are actually enrolled in it, but I, for one, believe that it has many hangers-on, many on the fringe, many ostensibly law-abiding persons just waiting to see how the cat is going to jump, and I do believe that every time that conspiracy scores a success against the State, it finds from this fringe new recruits, and I do think that recently the inflow from this fringe into the organisation has been increased by recent happenings.
In the course of this debate, I have been astonished at the emphasis which was laid upon the interests of the prisoner. I, for one, certainly contend that every opportunity should be given to the prisoner to prove his innocence and that he should be treated with fairness and equity, but let us not forget this: that the courts of the land, and particularly this special military court, were not established to protect the criminal but to protect the law-abiding citizen. That is why we have established these courts—to ascertain whether a man has been guilty of a crime, and, if he has been guilty of a crime, to assess his punishment. That is their primary office. They are there to give a fair trial, but their primary function is to secure the due and proper enforcement of the law, and, in doing that, to protect the citizen.
We have been told by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney that he was not going to vote for this order because he thought it was contrary to the natural law. What is the fundamental Divine and natural law in this matter? It is stated very succinctly in the Fifth Commandment: "Thou shalt not kill," and the fact that the State exists to see that that Divine ordinance will be obeyed is one of the primary justifications for its existence. What right have we to exercise any authority over any individual born within the four shores of Ireland, if it does not spring from the fact that authority is exercised in his interest, to ensure that he will live his life peaceably, that his life will not be imperilled by the unlawful act of any other man, and the primary obligation that rests upon us here is to secure the general acceptance of that Commandment. All the other things are super-added; they are subsidiary. If rules are made, they are made to ensure that the law will be obeyed. They are made to ensure, of course, that no person will be wrongfully condemned, but—and let us be clear upon this—these rules of evidence were not framed to ensure that the wrongdoer would escape, and the moment they are deliberately availed of, as part of an organised conspiracy, to secure the escape of the wrongdoer, at that moment the State in discharge of the duty which rests upon it—the primary duty not merely of preventing crime, but of punishing crime—must begin to review the procedure under which the escape of the wrongdoer may be facilitated.
Now what is our position? We find that, owing to the terror which this organisation can strike in the breasts of honest citizens, the criminal is escaping and the honest citizen who tries to do his duty by the State is being punished, not by us, but by the agents of this organisation. The choice, therefore, which we are facing is whether we are going to allow this hand that strikes in the dark to paralyse the courts of justice in this country or whether we are going to amend the procedure so as to ensure that no technicality, designed to protect the innocent man, will be generally availed of to allow the criminal to escape. We have come to this pass that, as was said in the courts recently, the conspiracy has invaded the very courts of justice themselves, so that the criminal goes free and the man who is prepared to help the State is put in peril of his life. If that state of affairs were to be permitted to prevail, then I think that all justification for this House, for the forces of the State to apprehend and prevent crime, and for the courts to try criminals and to sentence them, disappears, for all this paraphernalia of the law and the sovereignty of the people would become, to adapt the title of the poem to which Deputy Norton referred yesterday, just a mask for anarchy.
This is the situation which confronts us and, I should say, confronts not merely the Government but this House. This is the situation which has coerced the Government to make Emergency Powers Order No. 139. We believe that that order will help us to deal with this situation. The order can be criticised, and it has been severely criticised, but what would the critics of the order, and of the Government in regard to the order, propose to put in its place? They are as responsible as we are for the enforcement of the law. We are the executive of this House. You finally determine and decide policy. As the executive charged with the enforcement of the law, we tell this House that Emergency Powers Order No. 139 will, if approved by this House, help us to deal with this conspiracy.
We are not denying for one moment that it can be criticised. In normal times and circumstances, I would be bitterly opposed to it, but these times and these circumstances are not normal, and let those who criticise us, and those who propose to annul it, tell us, in face of what they know and what I have brought again to their memory, what powers they should give us instead. It is not sufficient to come in here and slander, as they have been slandered in some of the speeches made here, the officers of the court. It is not sufficient to come in here and tell us that they are in the pockets of the Government. You can lavish and bespatter them with as much filth as you care, but let us remember that there have been men taken from their own homes and murdered in this country, that whole countrysides have been terrorised to prevent evidence of such crimes being given, and let us all realise that it is our job, the job of this House, to deal with that situation, and then let those who criticise us tell us what arms they are going to put in our hands in substitution for Emergency Powers Order No. 139.
Now, there has been one suggestion made, that we should make membership of this organisation punishable by death. But surely that is only begging the question. The whole problem here is the question of proof. If we did, as has been suggested by Deputy O'Higgins and by others, make it a capital offence to be a member of this organisation, and still allowed the courts to be hampered by rules of evidence conceived to deal with an entirely different situation, and based upon assumptions which do not exist in regard to this conspiracy, what use or service would it be to any Executive, dealing with this situation, to make mere membership of the conspiracy a capital offence? Would you not have the same difficulty in regard to the production of your witnesses? Would they not still appear to give testimony—if they appeared at all—under the shadow of death? Would they not still be liable to intimidation? Would they not still be liable to midnight murder, and would they not still be the prospective prey of the assassin if we were to adopt Deputy O'Higgins' proposal; and would we not, at the end as at the beginning, find that that measure was only futile and valueless?
Comment on this
It does not matter. He made another suggestion that we should deal with it by Executive action.
Comment on this
He did not say that. He spoke about the breaking up of furniture to get at a rat.
Comment on this
The suggestion has been made, and if I have wrongly ascribed it to Deputy O'Higgins, without the reservations which he made with regard to it, I am sorry.
Comment on this
Let us consider the basis upon which the rules of evidence rest. They rest upon one assumption: that the state of the Commonwealth is such that every law-abiding person who knows any material fact in relation to a crime which will assist in the criminal being apprehended and punished for that crime will disclose it to the lawful authorities. That is the whole assumption upon which the rules of evidence have been built up. Provided that the assumed conditions do actually exist, I think there is no greater safeguard to the State than the rules of evidence, but the moment that that assumption disappears you take away the foundation from under the whole edifice. If the condition of the Commonwealth is not such that people will give all the help they can to the lawful authorities in enforcing the law: if, on the contrary, the Commonwealth is infested with a conspiracy which is so powerful, so widespread and so desperate that the ordinary common people of the country are terrorised, or can only give evidence at the peril of their lives, then you have got to choose new weapons and to adopt new methods, and that is what we are up against now: that we find we cannot bring the crime home to the criminal once the conspiracy has invaded the law courts.
Let us turn to the order itself. One would think that this order introduces a completely new principle into legal procedure. What does it do? Under Clauses 3 and 4 it proposes, under certain conditions and in certain circumstances, to draw the attention of the court to an inanimate object. That is what a written statement is: it is a piece of paper upon which there are certain writings containing certain particulars, and all that Parts 3 and 4 of the order do, as I have said, is to draw the attention of the court to these statements. One would think that that was a completely revolutionary departure. One would think that the court, in murder trials, had never had to study inanimate objects before; one would think that a blood-stained piece of rag, whose origin may be much less certain than any one of these attested pieces of paper, had never been put before a court and adduced as evidence against a man in peril of his life.
Comment on this
I say that blood-stained pieces of rags have been brought into court and that persons have been asked to testify as to them.
Comment on this
Who could only say this: that they found that rag in such and such a place: that this was a piece of cloth found near the body of the murdered person. One witness might say that it appeared to fit a hole torn in the coat of the accused person. Another witness, maybe the scientist who is assisting the prosecution, may tell the court that the stains on the rag are blood stains and that this piece of cloth will fit that tear in the accused person's coat. That is what is adduced in regard to the piece of rag. What does the order here allow except a written statement which will be produced to the court and to which the court can pay exactly the same attention as it might pay to that piece of rag? It will hear the case which the prosecution founds upon that statement, or endeavours to support by that statement—I am not going to say that the case will be founded upon the statement. They will listen to the case which the prosecution endeavours to support by that statement, and they will hear the statement controverted and criticised by the counsel for the defence in exactly the same way as they will hear the evidence of the expert witness challenged by the counsel for the defence and as they will hear the authenticity even of the piece of rag challenged by the counsel for the defence. The statement and the piece of rag are on all fours and there is nothing in this order which compels the court to pay more attention to a statement than it might pay to a blood-stained piece of rag.
So, notwithstanding all the things we have heard here this evening, this order is not at all as revolutionary as its critics would try to make out. Think of the circumstances under which this written statement has to be produced. It is not just simply a statement taken, as some people here would want the House to believe, by the counsel for the prosecution out of his brief bag without any warning and thrust on the attention of the court. Not at all. If a statement is to be put in by the prosecution it has to be proved that it is a statement relevant to the offence, that it has been made by an accused person or a person who may be an accessory or accomplice, or a person who is neither an accessory nor an accomplice but an innocent spectator of the crime.
Comment on this
If it is mere gossip, let us assume that the members of the court, no matter by whom it is appointed, no matter who they are or what training they have, will be at least as anxious to see justice done as the Deputy or I would be. If the statement represents mere gossip, I am certain the court will take the gossip for what it is worth and no more. It has to be shown that the statement is relevant to the crime and that it was made voluntarily or was lawfully taken under any enactment, that it was taken down in writing and was acknowledged by the person who made it. Every one of these matters under the order is made subject to proof. Somebody has got to go into the witness box and on oath swear to the truth, swear that these conditions have been fulfilled, and the moment that person goes into the witness box and puts himself on oath he leaves himself open, not merely to examination by the prosecution, but also cross-examination by the counsel for the defence; so that all this talk we have heard to-day and yesterday about a person not being examined, about a statement being extorted under torture or third-degree methods, falls to the ground. The moment there is any hint or whimper that such methods had been employed to enforce a statement of that kind, that moment the counsel for the defence would be put in possession of certain facts and he could use them to upset the whole case for the prosecution. That is the position in regard to Clause 3 and Clause 4.
Comment on this
I am just coming to Clause 5. We have heard a great deal about Clause 5 and we have been told it is the kernel of the order. I am not a lawyer, but I have had on occasions to pay some attention, a good deal of attention, to decisions given in the law courts in relation to orders made by myself or my colleagues, or regulations which have been issued by myself or my colleagues, and I have not found that the courts are prepared to construe one part of an order without referring to the other parts.
Very naturally, I would hesitate to put my opinion against Deputy McGilligan's if it were a case of a person taking advice, but I would be prepared to back my own opinion if a case based on this order ever went to the law courts. The moment it went there, if the counsel for the Attorney-General tried to rely on Clause 5 of this order to the exclusion, from the knowledge and construction of the court, of Clauses 3 and 4, he would be scouted out and the judges would say that the Legislature, the Government, could not have put in Clauses 3 and 4 merely as window-dressing; that these clauses were put in very definitely to limit the powers and the rights of the prosecution under this order; that they were there to lay down conditions which the Government would have to fulfil and, if they were to be ousted by Clause 5, then there was no use putting them in at all.
It is important to note in this connection that the Chief Justice has already adverted to the value of this clause because, while we have heard, in the elegant phrase used by some of the lawyers, that the courts have passed the ball in this matter to the Dáil, and while they did refer to the statement of the Chief Justice as to some of the arguments which had been adduced in court, they carefully refrained from quoting this his statement that "while the changes effected by Clause 3 and Clause 4 of the order were entirely in favour of the prosecution and in favour of it for the reasons I have mentioned, the powers contained in Clause 5 might equally well be exercised in favour of the accused persons". That is one of the reasons why Clause 5 has been introduced in this order. The accused person may wish to put in a statement. If he does, the same conditions are not imposed on him as are imposed on the State by Clauses 3 and 4. The State, under Clauses 3 and 4, has to fulfil certain conditions. Those conditions might not, by their very nature, be capable of fulfilment by an accused person. Therefore, the accused person can avail himself of the wide latitude which is given to him and his defence by Clause 5 of the order. He may put anything before the court and the court may waive in his favour any one of the rules of evidence that would appear to keep from the court any material fact.
Now, again, what are the rules of evidence there for?—just to ensure that the material facts will be put fairly before the courts. I do not want to go into the whole history of the rules of evidence but let us remember most of them are very largely judge-made laws, made because very often careless judges, in the past, dealing with prejudiced jurors, allowed the defence to be prejudiced by submitting mere matters of opinion, and not material facts, to go to the jury as material facts, and the superior judges overruled them. That is how the rules of evidence were built up, but at any rate, let us remember that the whole purpose of the rules is to set the material facts before the jury, and, in these circumstances, where the material facts are very often difficult to get but where, by one means or another, the do come into the possession of the State, are we going to prevent them, by any rule that was framed—again, let me emphasise—to meet entirely different circumstances—are we going by that rule to prevent the material facts being laid before the court? That is the reason for Clause 5—two reasons: first of all, to give to the defence even greater privileges than, I think, the courts will accord to the prosecution under Clauses 3 and 4, and secondly——
Comment on this
Why not make that clear, that it only applies to the defence and not to the prosecution?
Comment on this
Because we are facing that conspiracy which you cannot kill by hammer taps or heel taps. We are not going to make ourselves ridiculous here by tying our hands against men whose hands are not tied, men who have no regard for your rules of evidence or courts of justice, and who deal summary death to any person who will dare to stand up against them. Now, I am sorry to detain the House, but there is another aspect of this order which was criticised. We were told, with regard to Clauses 3 and 4, that statements would be put before the court and that the men who made these statements would be deliberately withheld from the court. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney made a statement which, at any rate, conveyed that as his belief to me, and I asked him did he for a moment suggest that the Attorney-General, who is charged with the conduct of the proceedings before this court, charged with the conduct of the prosecution before this court, was deliberately going to withhold from the court any witness whom it was in the power of the State to produce. Unless you are prepared to say that, you cannot for a moment say that statements are going to be taken from witness and that then these witnesses are not going to be produced.
Remember, again, in this connection, that no person goes before this court except on an order made by the Government. If you say to me that, after all your experience, the Government is going to instruct the Attorney-General to keep back a material witness who can be produced, and that the Attorney-General is going to act on that instruction and will not refuse to serve under a Government which would give him such an order, then I can say no more, because we do not meet on the same plane. I do not believe that any Government or that any Attorney-General would do that, but if, as I say, there are people in this House who do believe it, then I do not think it is worth wasting time in discussing the matter in this House with them. But do let us consider what has happened: why it is that it has been necessary to bring in an order of this sort. Hitherto, the moment it has come to the knowledge of this organisation that a statement has been made to the police, that moment the organisation sets out to intimidate the person who has made the statement or, if it finds it cannot intimidate him, then to put him out of the way, as they say, and the consequence has been that people who have made statements have felt, and have been, in peril of their lives. It has always been, therefore, an inducement and a temptation to the organisation concerned, once it has learned that a statement has been made, to murder the person who made it. Now, so long as Clauses 3 and 4 of this order stand, that inducement, to some extent, will be lessened, and that is why that proviso is made there, so that if the information does come properly and legitimately into the hands of the police or the officers of the law it will not avail, or at least will not so greatly avail, the unlawful organisation to try to murder or intimidate a prospective witness.
Comment on this
Does the Minister say that a person can only be brought before the military court on a Government order?
Comment on this
Then the Attorney-General could bring anybody there, and a private prosecutor could also do so?