Statements re Minister for Finance’s announcement on banking of 30 September 2010: Questions
Contributions 1–129 of 260. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
The following arrangements apply pursuant to today's order of the Dáil: a Minister or Minister of State shall take questions and the proceedings, if not previously concluded, shall be brought to a conclusion after 80 minutes.
Comment on this
We would all like to sympathise with the Minister on his recent sad bereavement on the death of his uncle.
There are a number of questions I would like to put to the Minister arising from the discussions since the announcement on "Black Thursday" of the level of the banking crisis. I will begin with my first question. On yesterday's Dáil record, the Taoiseach referred to the €31 billion in promissory notes, which the Minister initiated in respect of Anglo Irish Bank on his announcement on the Tuesday before Easter last, and which in the case of Anglo Irish Bank now amounts to €25 billion.
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Or will amount to that. I understand that €6.4 billion of that will be listed before the end of the year. The amount in the case of Irish Nationwide Building Society is €5.3 billion of which, I understand, €2.7 billion will be announced before the end of the year. The amount in the case of the EBS is €250,000. The Taoiseach referred to this as a mortgage. At the time of the Minister's announcement of these as promissory notes, it was not absolutely clear what their impact would be on Government accounting. When I visited the Department of Finance——
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I am anxious to accommodate as many Deputies as I can and if they ask succinct questions rather than make long preambles, we can have can have a dialogue across the House.
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I now understand that this is the equivalent of a national mortgage of €31 billion and that these mortgages have been negotiated at loan rates of current market rates, which at the time they were issued, and will be issued, run between 4% and, unfortunately, 6% plus. Therefore, that means that the €31 billion will carry an annual interest charge of €1.5 billion. Does the Minister accept that there will now be an annual charge of €1 billion to €1.5 billion in our national budget statements for the next ten to 15 years? Can he confirm that?
I understand that the adjustment or the interest charge for this year, which started some time around May when these promissory notes were issued, is €700 million. Has that been included in any revised estimates of the deficit for 2010? Can the Minister tell us how that will be treated in the final 2010 accounts?
I have a number of other short questions.
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I want to give the Minister notice of my second question.
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If the Deputy does not simply give notice of the question, she is asking the question.
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I want the Minister to be put on notice that I want to ask about the directors and executives of the banks. I want a comprehensive statement from him about the situation regarding proceedings, particularly in view of the fact that the former managing director of Anglo Irish Bank has taken refuge in the courts of the United States and on what implications this has for any kind of accountability by this gentleman and others, who have been directors or chief executives of banks. What will the Minister do to ensure that this particular individual is made accountable to the Irish system? He has now got refuge in the United States.
Comment on this
First, in regard to the promissory note, which is an important question, to understand the exact circumstances surrounding the note — Deputy Burton fairly accepted the correction on that — the position is that to date, €18.88 billion in promissory notes have been issued to Anglo Irish Bank in three notes issued on 31 March, 28 May and 23 August. The note issued on 31 March bears an interest rate of 4.1745%; the note issued on 28 May bears an interest rate of 4.5693%; and the note issued on 23 August bears an interest rate of 5.1316%. The outstanding note will have a value of €6.4 billion. It will be issued before the end of the year and the interest rate cannot be fixed for that as of yet.
That amount will represent a sufficient amount to ensure that Anglo Irish Bank can meet its regulatory capital needs. The final value for the note will be settled when the bank's loan transfers to NAMA are complete and the bank's capital requirement can be more fully determined subject to the relevant EU approvals within the context of the restructuring plan for the bank.
The overall final value for the note will be paid to the bank in instalments over an estimated ten to 15 years. The duration of the repayments to Anglo Irish Bank will depend on the final value of the note and any interest rate accrual on the promissory note. It is important to understand that the actual payment of the interest is deferred in cash terms.
Comment on this
No, but I refer to the actual payment of the interest not just the capital; the interest also is postponed in cash terms to the end of the repayment term. However, in accountancy terms, the obligation to pay the interest is treated to have arisen when the obligation accrues. The repayments of the note will be made on an annual basis until the final principal value of the promissory note, together with the appropriate interest rate on the note, has been covered.
Take the current €18.88 billion for present purposes, it is expected that note will be paid off over ten to 15 years depending on whether the interest is paid annually or added to the principal. Under the terms of the promissory note, the note will be paid in full at the time of any winding up of the institution. This condition is in line with the required process for the winding up of any business.
An interest rate is included in the terms of the note to enable the bank to value the note at par on its books and therefore achieve the capital benefit the bank requires to meet its regulatory capital requirements. The principal value of the note, together with the appropriate interest rate, will be paid in instalments over ten to 15 years depending on whether the interest rate is paid annually or added to the principal.
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Will that be about €3 billion a year——
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No, I would not accept that figure.
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No, but in GGB terms it has been calculated, for example, next year as being a sum of about €1.5 billion for accountancy purposes even though there is no cash sum of that amount transferring.
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That is the interest whereas the capital sum is approximately €3 billion a year.
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We are both right and wrong. Deputy Burton is talking accountancy while I am talking money. The capital sum is already paid for general government balance, GGB, purposes. That is why there is a spike in the GGB this year. The interest will be factored into the GGB next year, although the amount actually paid next year will not reflect that.
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Please Deputy Burton, allow the Minister to finish his reply. I also want to open the session to other Members.
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We need a PowerPoint presentation on this.
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The interest rate of the promissory note is currently fixed according to the ten-year bond yield.
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Will the outturn for this year be higher because of the €700 million adjustment in respect of interest this year?
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To date in 2010, the Government has committed to giving cash of €31 billion, as I outlined already, in the three promissory notes. As the actual cash is not being paid up-front to the institutions, interest must be paid so the institutions can value the notes at par on their accounts. The terms of the notes allow interest to be rolled out after the principal sums have been repaid. The interest rate is based on the ten-year Government bond yield.
The payment of interest on the promissory note is expected to be rolled forward after the principal payments. For general government accounting purposes, the interest must be accrued to the years in which it arises. The accrued interest, therefore, in 2010 is currently estimated at just over €700 million——
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Deputy, please allow the Minister to continue without interruption because we need to progress to other questions.
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——even though there is no actual payment reflecting that. This will rise to approximately €1.5 billion next year, but again no actual payment will reflect that, before declining in future years. It is from there I suspect the Taoiseach developed the analogy of the mortgage although I do not think such an analogy is necessarily useful in this context.
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Deputy, please allow the Minister to address the second question. We have been on only one question for 15 minutes.
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The reason the notes carry interest is so they can be valued at par-for-capital purposes.
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Not everyone would agree because——
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——there is a longer period of zero-rated bonds.
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It is estimated the annual debt interest costs on cash borrowings, based on current interest rates, will be approximately €200 million beginning in 2011. The cumulative interest costs on the cash borrowings will increase as the further €3 billion in cash payments are made each year.
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No, Deputy Burton, please. Other Members are indicating and we have spent 15 minutes on this first question. I call Deputy Noonan.
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First, I wish on my behalf and of my party to sympathise with the Minister on the death of his uncle.
To move on to prose after all that poetry. The Minister will appreciate an issue arises concerning the reliability of forecasts by the Department of Finance. The forecast for growth in the last budget transpired to be seriously wrong. The forecast on which all parties relied for their economic policies before the 2007 general election was seriously off-line too.
When the bank guarantee was introduced, the Minister told the Dáil that night that the total liabilities for Anglo Irish Bank would be approximately €1.5 billion. Later on, when Anglo Irish bank was nationalised in January 2009, the Minister's forecast had gone up to €4.5 billion. During 2009 it began to creep up even more with the Minister claiming between €8 billion and €10 billion would be needed. Suddenly, the figure was up to €20 billion, drifting even further to €24 billion. We are now at a range of between €29 billion to €32 billion as being the absolute liability. Who was giving the Minister this information? Was it coming from the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator, or solely from Anglo Irish Bank? Was he relying on information provided by his Department? Will he trace the instalments of the estimates he communicated to the House? Will he explain why his estimates of liability were so wildly wrong?
Comment on this
I thank Deputies Noonan and Burton for their sympathies.
My Department did not get its forecast wrong in last year's budget. Its forecast for growth this year has been substantially correct to date and borne out by events. What has caused our current fiscal difficulties has been a marked deterioration in the general international climate in the years ahead. The difficulty in the current fiscal position——
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This is a three-year budget. The Department got it wrong for 2011.
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This is important for the country. The Department did not get its forecast wrong for 2010. Yes, there are difficulties with the medium-term forecasts which derive from international factors. Markets are saying that too. If the Deputy has difficulties with the Department's forecasts, he knows with whom he can consult.
Before the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank, I relied on information supplied by my Department as supplemented by the exercise conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers. Immediately prior to nationalisation, an intensive exercise was carried out on Anglo Irish Bank by PricewaterhouseCoopers which made up the framework of the decision to nationalise it.
After nationalisation, I relied on information supplied by my Department, as assisted by the bank's board and management. There was a change in the bank's management upon nationalisation.
For the subsequent information establishing a deteriorated loan book in the bank, I relied on information supplied by my Department, based on the analysis which NAMA had conducted on the bank's books.
Comment on this
When consultants, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, advise the Minister on matters like this and it subsequently turns out their forecasts are wildly incorrect by large margins, does he still pay them? Does he keep them on his list for subsequent employment? Does he believe a payment system based on accurate results should be introduced? Does he feel those who do not do what is written on the tin should have their invoices honoured?
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That is the public service approach.
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The Minister should read their reports. I do not think he has anyway.
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The science of forecasting is a difficult one.
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To establish finality in this matter, it was essential to establish the National Asset Management Agency. Accountants examining a bank's books are very dependent on the word of the institution and its officials in arriving at their conclusions. There is no suggestion the accountancy firm in question was in any way conflicted by the institution; I assume it was reliant on information supplied by the bank's own officials and management. Until NAMA was established, it was difficult to get to the bottom of the exposures in the banking system.
The announcement I made last Easter on the preliminary assessment made by NAMA of the banks' exposures was also reliant on information supplied by the institutions themselves. It was only until NAMA, as required by legislation, was able to conduct an individual valuation of each loan that the true extent of the exposures was established.
With regard to the figures that were supplied on 30 September, these were supplied following very detailed consultations regarding Anglo Irish Bank between NAMA and the new board and management in place at Anglo Irish Bank, the regulator's view on the capital required and the National Treasury Management Agency's assessment. All of these bodies participated in the computation of the final figure for NAMA and, as the Deputy knows, the transfer of assets to NAMA was accelerated through an accelerated valuation procedure.
Comment on this
Are there penalties in law for people involved in banking who knowingly supply false information to the Minister, the Department, the regulator's office and the Central Bank? When will we see some action in the pursuit of people who knowingly supplied false information on which major decisions were taken? This is now costing the taxpayer €32 billion, which is seeping back into the national accounts through the promissory note mechanism to which Deputy Burton has drawn attention and magnifying the problems the country is facing at present. Is there law that covers this and does the Minister intend to take action?
Comment on this
One would have to examine the precise circumstances in which information was forwarded, the individuals who forwarded the information, the extent to which they intentionally misled or the extent to which they were guilty of wishful thinking. The Deputy will appreciate that I am not privy to all those facts. If there are matters which require criminal investigation, they will be investigated in that context. It is not clear that there are criminal exposures here.
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The fraud squad has been there for almost two years. What is happening? There are 40 people in jail in America.
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He is in a Cabinet that includes the Minister for Justice and Law Reform and the Attorney General. On the direction of the Government the Garda Commissioner sent the fraud squad in there in January two years ago. What is happening?
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I understand that it is investigating various matters in Anglo Irish Bank, which are not related to the matter which the Deputy questioned me about a minute ago but which relate to matters which occurred at that institution in 2008 and perhaps in previous years. These matters are being investigated and the necessary files will undoubtedly be submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions in due course.
Comment on this
On my and my party's behalf I offer my condolences to the Minister on his recent family bereavement.
My question relates to the bondholders, both senior and subordinate. Is the Minister aware that the terms of securities allow for the possibility of them not being paid back if a bank is insolvent? Clearly, that was the case here. Is he familiar with the term "the value of your investment can go down as well as up"? We hear it every day on the media. Does that apply in the case of securities other than sovereign debt?
Comment on this
The Deputy correctly distinguished between senior bondholders and junior or subordinated bondholders. As I indicated in my statement on 30 September, much has been said about the various obligations in Anglo Irish Bank with regard to different bonds. The senior debt obligations rank equally with deposits and other creditors under Irish law. The Deputy referred to the terms on which they were issued and the prospect of insolvency for the holders of that debt. Clearly, in the event of the insolvency of an institution, the holders of that debt would be on the same footing as depositors. There would be no distinction between depositors and the holders of that debt.
Comment on this
Does the Minister have a legal opinion on that?
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Yes, that is the advice of the Attorney General and they are the terms on which these instruments are issued both——
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These instruments are commonly issued under English or Irish law and that is the position in English and Irish law. The Deputy does not need an opinion from the Attorney General. His research assistant should be able to establish that much for him without recourse to an opinion from the Attorney General. That is the position. The Deputy has research assistants in the United Kingdom as well as Ireland so he is in a better position than any other party in the House to determine that issue.
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Shame on the Minister for using such terminology.
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I simply refer to the existence of an entity called the United Kingdom. I did not refer to its union with any part of Ireland.
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I am simply pointing out that the Deputy has the research capacity to check this out without having to trouble the Attorney General further on it. The matter is very clear in law. That is the position with regard to senior debt.
With regard to junior or subordinated debt, it is commonly issued on the express terms that it is deferred in the event of an insolvency as against the claims of the depositors and the senior bondholders. It is in a postponed category in an insolvency. That is the reason the word "subordinated" is commonly used in this context — it is subordinate in an insolvency to the claims of the other instruments. As I made clear in the announcement on 30 September, appropriate burden sharing by holders of subordinated debt is a principle with which I agree. The losses in Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society are substantial and those bondholders must accept a very sharp discount in the value of their instruments having regard to the events that have happened, the terms upon which they were issued and the fact that these institutions would not be able to survive in the absence of taxpayer support.
My Department, with the Attorney General, is working on resolution and reorganisation legislation which will enable the implementation of measures which can address the issue of burden sharing by subordinated bondholders in institutions that are not listed on the Stock Exchange and which are wholly nationalised by the State. That legislation will be consistent with the requirements for the measures to be recognised as a reorganisation under the relevant EU directive in other member states. I understand that the management in Anglo Irish Bank will be carrying out an exercise to re-purchase the debt at a very substantial discount. That is the current position.
Comment on this
I had not taken the Minister to be a wee Englander. I always thought he was reasonably sound on the national question but I will watch that space in future.
Does the Minister accept that he could have introduced emergency legislation before he nationalised Anglo Irish Bank to ensure that the taxpayers of this State would not be in hock to the bondholders of Anglo Irish Bank to the tune of €34.3 billion or, as I believe it to be, €37 billion? He could have prevented that if he had acted proactively through emergency legislation. He certainly had enough notice about how bad the bank was.
Comment on this
No, I do not accept that. Were it as simple as that, I would have been advised to do it by the Central Bank, my Department, the Financial Regulator and the National Treasury Management Agency. None of these advised me to take that action; all of them advised me not to take such action.
It is worth noting what has happened in the few weeks since I made the announcement on 30 September with regard to subordinated bondholders. As a result of this and although the Government has made it very clear that it does not apply to banks that are listed on the Stock Exchange, the markets have already read through this decision to the other Irish banks and have categorised their subordinated debt as junk in status. That does not affect the funding position of those banks at present since they are not in the market for subordinated debt and they have carried out substantial liability management exercises. However, it illustrates the dangers of this loose talk about bond default. It is clear that were the question of senior bond default to be even contemplated, it would have created a run on the banks and on the State's funding and a financial collapse for the country.
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It is not loose talk; it is public debate.
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Public debate has done a great deal of damage to this country and that was confirmed——
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I too would like to offer my sympathy to the Minister on the death of his uncle.
I do not regard forecasting as a science, as the Minister has referred to it, nor do I regard his scenarios as any aspect of science. I would like to ask one or two macroeconomic questions. If one takes as a departure point the most benign of the ESRI's models for exiting the recession, which suggests that in 2014 Ireland will have a growth rate of 4%, an unemployment rate of 10% — which depends on sets of assumptions relating to how the deficit is managed — the Minister is dealing with the current deficit and the achievement of targets over four years and, at any given time, the contribution to the deficit by the ghost of Anglo Irish Bank. None of us on this side of the House and in this party ever referred to it as a viable bank present, future or past and I am not sure that many others are hanging on to that illusion now, which is certainly neither scientific nor practical. There is the contribution, therefore, of the €1.15 billion, which people can understand and which will rattle on as the interest on the promissory notes that have been transferred to a different form of liability. The Minister is interesting when he suggests no cash changes in this regard. On the other hand, for European Commission purposes and for reputational purposes, it counts because it affects the figure the Minister throws up.
That leaves us in a position, which I want to put forward out of practical concern. If one takes what is happening in regard to the deficit and the figures published, the greatest disappointment relates to income tax and that is connected to the increasing unemployment figure and the cost of unemployment is related to social welfare expenditure. While the interest rate on the promissory rates will remain a constant, if unemployment increases, the deficit will increase and, therefore, the Minister is speaking of inflicting grief largely sourced from, and facilitating, the legacy of his banking solution, at a cost of rising unemployment.
I hope we have agreed that forecasting is not a science. The Minister has to be able to say what is the connection between the projected deficit, the projected or assumed range of economic growth rates and the unemployment rate. Perhaps he will want to tell us when Ireland envisages returning to the international bond market. Surely a strategy for converting Irish savings, which are at an enormously high proportion at the present, no matter what way they are measured, would be a domestic source of funding for practical spending with the added advantage that it would be retained within the economy and with a high multiplier.
Comment on this
The Deputy asked a wide range of questions. I will begin with a point of agreement before I proceed to the points of disagreement. I agree with him that forecasting is an art rather than a science, although I use the metaphor of meteorology regularly, which is a science.
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Weather forecasters are better.
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Is the Minister sure he does not want to consider astrology?
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No, we are not quite in the country of tossing a coin or consulting an astrologer.
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We are in a considerably more certain country than that.
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Some of the Minister's outcomes sound like that.
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There are one or two clear matters.
Deputy Higgins asked when we intend to return to the international bond markets. We intend to return in January.
Comment on this
Has the Minister a strategy for handling the savings available to him?
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The international bond markets will make a judgment on the credibility of the financial track we adopt in the next few weeks, which is of fundamental importance to the future of the country.
With regard to the question of employment and growth scenarios, clearly, in drawing up the fiscal plan allowance has to be made for growth but we must start by reflecting on the fact that we saw a substantial collapse in our revenues in 2008 and the gap between our receipts, including all the moneys the State receives, and our expenditure has remained substantial in that period. The annual cost of the bank rescue will be between €1.5 billion and €1.7 billion. That was made clear by me in the House last month. That figure is less than 10% of the gap that has opened up between what we bring in as a State and what it costs to run the country day by day——
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What is it as a proportion of the growth rate?
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——and even if one leaves aside the question of the expenses of the State and considers the interest bill the State has to pay on accumulated debt, the bulk of the interest bill relates to money we have borrowed for capital or current day-to-day purposes and not for banking purposes.
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The interest rates relate to the banking crisis. The Minister's analysis is faulty.
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I agree with the Deputy that the stress the banking system has been under and its fragility has contributed to increased interest rates for Ireland.
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I do not take issue with the Deputy in that respect.
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The Minister wrecked our fiscal position.
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If one wants to wreck confidence in Ireland, collapse the banking system altogether.
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That is what the Minister did. He collapsed the country.
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That is the only policy the Deputy has advocated——
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I apologise to the Leas-Cheann Comhairle for engaging in any direct conversational way.
I am trying to deal with Deputy Higgins's questions. He raised the macroeconomic forecasts of the ESRI. I understand it will publish a document tomorrow. However, the position is incontestable that there is a substantial gap between what the State receives and what the State spends and that what the State will have to spend in the years ahead on banking is a small fraction of that. There is an obligation, therefore, on all of us in this House to reflect on that gap and to see what we are going to do about it. In reflecting on that, the question of the prospect for growth must be taken into account and, in the original plan submitted to Brussels, clearly, an assumption was made about growth, not this year because this year's forecast has proved to be correct, but next year and next year's forecast and the forecast for the ensuing year are seen at this stage to be on the optimistic side. That is the primary reason a steeper correction will have to be conducted this year and that is the primary reason the markets see.
That is why to return to the markets and to borrow — we all want to borrow on the markets to maintain the State services at a certain reasonable level — it will be essential to have a credible financial track way, not just for next year but for the next four years. That is a current obligation of the Government and not, as the Deputy's leader has suggested, some attempt to usurp the mandate of the people or the mandate of the next government. That is a clear and present duty for an Irish Government to perform and if an Irish Government did not do so, it would be faced with a worse correction to execute immediately and no credible plan for an exit.
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I asked about the Minister's strategy for turning the extraordinarily high volume of savings, which is reflecting a fear in the economy, into an available source of funding, which would give him leverage, even with the markets.
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I will reflect on the Deputy's suggestion in that regard in the context of the budget.
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There is science in forecasting but there is also an opinion. We would value it if we got the Minister's opinion and his call on the forecasting because there will be facts and figures and there will be his version of what he thinks they are. We need it in order to be able to work on the figures so I ask if the Minister could provide it in the near future.
I have a couple of questions for the Minister. The threshold for loans being moved to NAMA started at €5 million and has now increased to €20 million. I ask the Minister to elaborate on the reason for this increase. On the issue of restoring trust in the banks, Deputies were being told by constituents that banks were increasing customers' loans in order to bring them over the threshold of €5 million and so put them into NAMA. Has the Minister any evidence of this practice and if so, is it of concern to him? Could this still happen with regard to the threshold of €20 million? I ask for the Minister's comments on how to ensure this cannot happen. We have to be able to trust banks again.
Anglo Irish Bank will be split into an asset recovery bank and another bank. Is this option being considered by the other banks? Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks will also have loans of €20 million which I thought they would be handing over. Can they handle those loans or will they need to consider some form of asset recovery within their own structures? I am assuming they are not considering this option but I ask if it is being considered.
The head of the credit review board spoke at committee about the loan guarantee scheme and the national recovery bank. We are pursuing the loan guarantee scheme because it should have been done two years ago but it is still being considered. He differed with the Opposition on that point but that is fair enough. I ask for the Minister's opinion on whether there should be a loan guarantee because it is essential to move this along. The Minister gave us a promise that NAMA would deliver credit to business and this has not happened. This is a failure that will probably hang around the Minister's neck for a long time. However, the loan guarantee scheme might be of assistance.
The head of the credit review board agreed with me in committee when I asked him about the need for a State recovery bank. Fine Gael calls this a national recovery bank and we called for its establishment about two years ago. We published details of how it could be established easily. Now that the State nearly owns AIB, this could be done through AIB without having to set up a new bank. The concept of a recovery bank is to get money moving back to business. The head of the credit review board wanted it to be considered from the point of view of competition. I do not really mind what way or for what reason it is established because it will benefit business in any case but I ask for the Minister's opinion. Is there a danger of a lack of competition in the banking sector as a result?
Comment on this
The Minister recently published a statement on the paid advice and evidence he had sought on the bank guarantee scheme. Did the Minister receive any advice for which he did not pay and which the House should know about? He might wish to share such advice with the House, if it exists, as it might help us. If any advice exists which affected the Minister's decision it would be helpful to share it with the House. My final question is to do with the issue of trust. People were concerned that Deputies might be approached to use their influence with NAMA. The Minister now has a strong influence over the banks because he has invested a lot of our money in them. Has any individual approached the Minister or his office or any other Minister to influence these banks with regard to debt restructuring and such matters?
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It is a long list of questions. The opinions of my officials have been conveyed in the form of scenarios to the party spokespersons——
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They are paid staff; I asked about unpaid opinions.
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As I understand, opinions about the fiscal position have been conveyed and clearly the Government and myself, as Minister, will have to come to a final conclusion on all the opinions in this matter in the context of the formulation of the four-year plan.
I refer to the question of NAMA and why when NAMA individually valued the loans the discount was far higher than that originally envisaged. There are a number of factors, of course, but three in particular have been drawn to my attention. One was the poor level of security obtained by some institutions in respect of assets which should have been secured as part of the loan transaction and I understand that was a particular difficulty in the Irish Nationwide Building Society. A second factor was the optimism, indeed, the recklessness of the original loans themselves, in the context of the estimate which the institutions gave themselves of the loan to value ratio of the loan. A third factor was the extent to which the banks had rolled up interest as part of these loan arrangements. There were also other factors but those three were the significant factors in the deterioration of the original NAMA estimate to the final conclusion of the valuation and the figures given on 30 September.
The plan for Anglo Irish Bank envisages the bank being split into two banks, a savings bank and an assets recovery bank. Clearly, the assets recovery bank will still function as a bank in the sense that it will lend money to enhance the value of its own loan book but it will not engage in substantial additional or other lending. This is not what is envisaged in the case of Bank of Ireland or Allied Irish Banks, although, as the Deputy rightly says, it is the case that the threshold has been amended. It was decided that loans of debtors with a total exposure below a threshold of €20 million in Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, will not now be determined to NAMA. The threshold had previously been set at €5 million. These account for €6.6 billion of the aggregate €80 billion volume of NAMA eligible loans. The rationale for this new threshold is that loans of this size can be efficiently managed by the banks themselves through their network of local representation and relationships. The regulator will ensure that the banks put in place prudent provisioning for these loans. That is the position with regard to those loans.
The Deputy also discussed the issue of the loan guarantee scheme and the national recovery bank. It is important the Deputy understands what a loan guarantee scheme means.
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We are talking about institutions with a proven track record of utter recklessness in the provision of credit and the Deputy is suggesting that the State should give a fresh guarantee to banking institutions in Ireland.
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That is not my suggestion. I asked for the Minister's thoughts on the loan guarantee.
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I am giving the Deputy my thoughts——
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The Minister should not assume what I am thinking.
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I am giving the Deputy my thoughts——
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If the Deputy is suggesting we should look at the option of guaranteeing the loans, irrespective of the consequences in terms of the repayment of the loan, a guarantee means, of course, just that. I believe we must proceed with great care in this matter. There may be some scope, however, for guaranteeing arrangements which facilitate the flow and repayment of credit. I have asked the credit review office to examine this and I understand it is in discussions with the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation, about the scope for such arrangements.
On the question about the national recovery bank, we would all like to see a national recovery bank but the reality is they are having great difficulty raising money in this State. Our interest rates at one stage, prior to the announcement at the end of September was 6.9% on ten-year money and it has fallen far closer to 6% as of today. It is even at higher rates that the banks must raise money because the cost to the sovereign of raising money is always cheaper than to banks. Clearly, the national recovery bank or any bank, will have great difficulty raising funds at those sorts of levels. This is the reason we have to focus on this important——
Comment on this
——fiscal issue. The Deputy has asked a large number of questions and I am trying to conclude. On the question of payment for advice, at the time of the guarantee and of the various banking decisions, the public servants who advised me are not given any specific fee for their advice; they perform their duties as public servants. Various advisers were retained by my officials and they were paid. On the question about representations to NAMA, the position is very clear. From time to time Deputies make representations about banks and these are dealt with in the normal way through the institution but there is certainly no question of using influence or exerting pressure on the banks in that connection.