Apologies have been received from Deputy Catherine Callaghan and Senator Craughwell. The joint committee is meeting today for a briefing on Cyprus's EU Presidency and defence policy. On behalf of the committee, I welcome H.E. Mr. Louis Telemachou, Ambassador of Cyprus to Ireland, and Mr. Alexandros Ghobrial, attaché responsible for the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of Europe. They and their colleagues are very welcome.

The format of the meeting is that I will invite the ambassador to make an opening statement. This will be followed by questions from members of the committee. Each member has a seven-minute slot to ask questions and for the witnesses to respond.

I advise members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the Leinster House complex in order to participate in public meetings. I will not permit a member to participate where they are not adhering to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, a member who attempts to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting. In this regard, I ask any member participating via Microsoft Teams that, prior to making their contribution to the meeting, they formally confirm that they are on the grounds of the Leinster House complex.

Members and witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that any such direction be complied with.

As the witnesses will probably be aware, the committee will publish their opening statements on its website following the meeting.

We are joined in the Public Gallery by the ambassadors from Malta, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Austria, Poland and Slovenia. You are all very welcome. Tá fáilte roimh go léir.

I now invite His Excellency, Mr. Telemachou, to deliver his opening statement.

Cathaoirleach, honourable Members of the Oireachtas, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to address the committee today and to present the concrete deliverables of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union under our first pillar, namely, autonomy through security, defence and preparedness. From what I understand, this is a first for the committee in inviting a President of the European Union. I am very proud and honoured to be the first one. I hope that this practice will continue. Ambassadors from fellow member states are here to witness this.

The message of the Cyprus Presidency is clear: Cyprus delivers. At a time when Europe faces war on its continent, instability in its wider neighbourhood, hybrid threats, organised crime, irregular migration, maritime insecurity and growing geopolitical uncertainty, the European Union must be able to act with unity, credibility and speed. For Cyprus, security is not an abstract concept. Lefkosia, our capital, remains the last divided capital in Europe. It is a living reminder that peace, sovereignty, territorial integrity and respect for international law can never be taken for granted. This experience shapes the way Cyprus understands Europe’s security agenda. It is why we believe that European autonomy must be practical, operational and results-oriented.

Under the Cyprus Presidency, this ambition has been translated into concrete outcomes. In the field of defence and security, the Presidency, taking into consideration the 360-degree threat approach, namely, the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, advanced the implementation of the security action for Europe, SAFE, instrument. Through three packages of Council implementation decisions adopted on 11 February, 17 February and 10 April 2026, SAFE financial assistance became available to member states, including Cyprus. This means that Europe is not only discussing defence readiness, but is financing it, operationalising it and helping member states strengthen their capabilities. This is a tangible contribution to Europe’s defence preparedness, to the European defence industrial base, and to the Union’s ability to respond to current and future security challenges.

The Cyprus Presidency has also delivered on one of the European Union’s most urgent political and moral priorities, namely, support for Ukraine. On 3 February 2026, the Council reached an agreement with the European Parliament on the regulation establishing the Ukraine support loan for 2026 and 2027. This loan will help Ukraine address its urgent financing needs as Russia, the aggressor, continues its war of aggression. On 23 April, the Council adopted the amendment to the multi-annual financial framework, MFF, regulation for 2021 to 2027, the final legislative step required to allow the disbursement of the loan to Ukraine. This enables the Commission to begin disbursements in the second quarter of 2026. This is more than a financial instrument. It is a political message that says Europe stands with Ukraine, and Europe can mobilise when history demands it. For Cyprus, a member state that continues to experience the consequences of illegal invasion and ongoing occupation, Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are not distant principles. They are fundamental principles of European and international security. Borders cannot be changed by force. International law cannot be applied selectively.

The Presidency also contributed to the adoption of the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia. This included 120 additional individual listings and is the largest package of listings in the last two years, together with strong economic sanctions targeting sectors that continue to fuel Russia’s war. Furthermore, on 11 May 2026, the Council adopted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for the systematic illegal deportation, forced transfer and forced assimilation of Ukrainian children. This was a clear European response to crimes that struck at the heart of human dignity.

The Cyprus Presidency has also delivered in the field of internal security. On 5 March 2026, it led negotiations that resulted in the adoption of Council conclusions on the EU drugs strategic framework. On 5 May, the Presidency achieved a general approach in the Council on the revision of the regulation concerning administrative co-operation in the fight against tax fraud. Through this revision, the European Public Prosecutor's Office, EPPO, and the European Anti-Fraud Office, OLAF, will be able to receive directly the information they need to support investigations into cross-border tax fraud. In simple terms, the Presidency delivered a stronger European response against organised crime, tax fraud and threats to the Union’s financial interests.

The Presidency also delivered on addressing hybrid threats. On 9 March 2026, it led negotiations resulting in the adoption of Council conclusions on enhancing the EU’s capacity to address hybrid threats. This matters because the threats that Europe faces today do not always arrive in conventional form. They may target our institutions, our infrastructure, our information space and our democratic resilience. Preparedness is therefore not a technical luxury, but a democratic necessity.

Allow me also to highlight an important moment of the Presidency: the informal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council in defence ministers’ format, held in Lefkosia on 8 June 2026. During the meeting, EU defence ministers discussed support for Ukraine, including the strengthening of Ukraine’s defence industry and deeper EU–Ukraine defence co-operation. Ministers also discussed maritime security, freedom of navigation and the challenge posed by Russia’s shadow fleet. In this context, the Cypriot Minister of Defence, Vasilis Palmas, presented the Presidency non-paper, entitled "Safeguarding Europe’s Seas: An EU Maritime Readiness and Resilience Framework". This is one of the Presidency’s important strategic contributions. The proposal does not call for new institutional structures. Instead, it focuses on better co-ordination, coherence and synergies among existing EU instruments, policies and mechanisms. Its aim is practical, namely, to safeguard the sea lines of communication on which Europe’s trade energy supplies and military mobility depend, and to protect critical maritime infrastructure such as undersea cables, pipelines, ports and offshore installations. For Cyprus, an island member state at the south-eastern edge of the European Union, maritime security is not theoretical. It is a strategic reality that connects energy security, digital resilience, defence readiness and freedom of navigation.

The Presidency has also advanced work on military mobility, presenting a compromise proposal that maintains ambition while taking into account the concerns and priorities of member states.

In parallel, Cyprus has encouraged further reflection on the practical implementation of Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, so that European mutual assistance becomes more credible, co-ordinated and operational in times of crisis.

It is important to discuss an example of Article 42.7 during the Cyprus Presidency. In March, in the middle of the Cyprus Presidency, there was a rocket attack by Hezbollah from the soil in Lebanon directly into the territory and soil of the Republic of Cyprus. We had a disturbance of the Presidency for one month when our meetings had to stop because of the airspace. What happened? Because we did not have in place an Article 42.7 that is actually ready to be implemented, we had help from Greece, Italy, Spain, France and the Netherlands, for which I am very grateful, in protecting the island from further attacks at the time of the Presidency. It important to deliver Article 42.7 because there was not a co-ordinating mechanism in place for these different naval ships that arrived from these different countries to co-ordinate. We had these five ships trying to protect us, for which we were so grateful, but the EU lacked the co-ordinating mechanism for those five navies and five air forces to co-ordinate in order to protect what the article is saying. This is why it is very important for me to explain the practical example.

These deliverables show that the Cyprus Presidency is moving files forward, building consensus and producing results. From SAFE to Ukraine, from sanctions to hybrid threats, from tax fraud to migration, from maritime security to military mobility, known as the military Schengen, the Cyprus Presidency has demonstrated that Europe can act and that Cyprus could lead at that time.

Our objective is clear. It is to contribute to a European Union that is more autonomous, secure, prepared and capable of responding to a difficult world. The measure of success will not be how many papers we produce or how many discussions we hold. It will be whether, in the next crisis, Europe responds as a Union, not as 27 member states discovering the problem at different speeds and in different ways. That is the spirit of the Cyprus Presidency, and this what we mean when we say Cyprus delivers.

I thank the committee. I have brought with me the Irish Presidency booklet and I am sure members have all seen the priorities. I am very happy to see that security is one of the three priorities. I am very happy that within the security section the priorities established by Cyprus will be taken over by the Irish Presidency.

I thank the ambassador. We will now go to members.

I hope my pronunciation is correct. Kalós orísate; you are all very welcome. It struck me that Ireland and Cyprus have so much in common. We are islands surrounded by water, obviously, in which the northern part of each territory is separated by a border, and we have some very powerful neighbours. In relation to the attacks on Dhekelia and Akrotiri, did Cyprus have any operational control of the response to those attacks?

Yes. I did not say it in my introduction but I would add, in my capacity here and in the context of the Senator's introduction about the similarities, that we are also not a member of a military alliance. This is another commonality that we have with Ireland, which I think is important for this discussion.

The ambassador referred to the French, the British, the Dutch and the Greeks, all NATO members, and stated there was no EU co-ordination for them.

There was not because there is not an established EU practice.

There are standardised agreements, or STANAGs, in NATO and also interoperability. NATO has procedures for command and control. Was Cyprus included in or consulted on the decisions that these NATO member states took in Cyprus's maritime and air domains?

It is a very complicated question and I will try to answer it as clearly as I can. Cyprus does not have a security agreement with NATO, so the STANAGs the Senator mentioned are not available to the Republic of Cyprus or to any operations departments, including the military, from Cyprus. Even if they had used among themselves the NATO operation standards, STANAGs, we would not be able to have access to them or know about it.

For example, on 4 March the Hellenic Air Force intercepted drones in Lebanese airspace. Did Cyprus have any prior knowledge of that?

There was co-ordination, of course, but on the specific question, if these five NATO countries had used a NATO co-ordination mechanism, we would not have been able to know it or have access to it because we have not signed a security agreement with NATO. Of course, the five navies individually were in co-ordination with the Cyprus army and the Cyprus defence forces. That goes without saying.

It is a very simple question. Did Cyprus have prior knowledge of the Hellenic Air Force intervention in Lebanese airspace?

I do not know.

The reason I ask is that we are unable to defend ourselves and it seems that we will rely on our European partners to provide defence. I am concerned about the sovereignty issue and if we have any knowledge of how our partners will operate. There are constitutional issues for us.

The ambassador mentioned the 360 degree threat assessment. I was in Larnaca in 2016 at the height of the intervention in Syria by the Russians, who I think had a permanent airbase at Latakia in Syria, not far from Larnaca. I think by air it is probably ten or 15 minutes. Would Cyprus have perceived that Russian presence in Latakia as the primary threat to the security of Cyprus?

On the issue of sovereignty, let me be very clear. Whatever was done within the Cyprus airspace and the Cyprus maritime waters, the Republic of Cyprus was in full control with the partners that they helped. I imagine that every single thing that was done was in full co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus through the relevant authorities.

On the 360 degree threat assessment, at the time Latakia airbase was not considered to be a major threat to the Republic of Cyprus. It was a threat to the security of the region but not directly to the Republic of Cyprus.

I ask this because-----

By the way, it does not exist any more.

Yes, I know. They are gone. Türkiye got rid of them. I understand the preoccupation with the threat that Russia poses here but Cyprus had the Russians based permanently ten minutes airtime from Cyprus, and Cyprus did not consider it the primary threat. That is very interesting from my perspective in terms of how we judge what the threats are.

Yes, but that was a different time. That was before the invasion of Ukraine.

In terms of these interventions, Mr. Telemachou said the Presidency was interrupted for about a month. During the attacks and then the subsequent intervention by the Greeks on 4 March, did-----

It was not only by the Greeks, as I said, it was by the five-----

Yes. During that time, did Cyprus close its airspace? Did it close its airports?

Yes. There were moments when we had to close our airports.

Why did Cyprus close the airports?

It was for security of aviation.

Why? What was the reason?

It was because there were missiles coming from Lebanon from Hezbollah.

Were those missiles Shahed drones?

I do not know what they were but they were dangerous for aviation. We had to close for security reasons.

Constantinos Kombos-----

My boss.

-----made a statement that they were Shahed drones. I ask this because it was reported that we had military grade drones in Irish airspace in proximity to the capital city, and we did not close our airspace or the airport.

I get the symbolism but I cannot comment. First, I do not exactly----

Based on Cyprus's experience of the Presidency of the EU and its focus on security, would Mr. Telemachou consider it strange for a country not to close its airspace if it spotted drones operating in that airspace?

Cyprus would close its airspace because we would consider it important to do so for Cyprus, for our guests, for the Presidency and for the security of aviation.

Cyprus is to receive just over €1 billion in Security Action for Europe, SAFE, funding. We have decided to spend almost €6 billion on heavy armoured vehicles. I do not know what the perceived threat is. Does Ireland expect to be invaded by a large mechanised formation? I do not know. I suspect we should be spending that money on drone technology and other things. What does Cyprus propose to spend its €1.1 billion on?

First, we intend to spend on capabilities. This involves developing local readiness. That means not only buying things, but developing local industry to produce anti-drone technology, radar systems and logistics systems. It is not just about taking this money and buying things from, for example, France. It is also about developing our own industries in order that they are capable of producing things that are necessary to meet our defence requirements.

While I am not exactly familiar with the specifics, the second point is that anti-drone and drone technologies will be a big part of it. I cannot reply with figures. I am sorry about that.

I thank Mr. Telemachou. I really appreciate that.

Before we move to Deputy Stanley, may I ask Mr. Telemachou about Cyprus's approach to building capacity and enterprise within the country? Does the Government of Cyprus intervene by way of providing subsidies or grants to those industries?

The state aid rules are very strict. We have a commission for state aid. We contribute as much as is allowed under EU regulations. We have somebody who takes care of the state aid regulations to ensure we are not in conflict with any EU regulations we are obliged to comply with, including those relating to defence.

Does Mr. Telemachou feel there is a need for a subsidy if those enterprises are to do what the Government needs them to do?

Yes.

I welcome the ambassador and his fellow ambassadors from most of the Mediterranean countries.

All the Mediterranean countries are here. We have full Mediterranean support.

The ambassadors are all very welcome.

Of course, my colleagues are also here.

I had the pleasure of visiting Mr. Telemachou's country about 25 years ago. I sampled the hospitality in Larnaca and Limassol. It was lovely.

Senator Clonan referred to our similarities. Cyprus is on the south-eastern tip of the Union, while Ireland is on the far-flung north-western corner. We are very similar, however. Our islands are partitioned, with parts occupied by a larger neighbour. The similarities struck me when I was Cyprus.

Cyprus is a member of NATO. What level of co-operation with Turkey was there when the missile struck the British base? When there was a high level of threat, was there a level of co-operation with Turkey? Turkey is shaping up to be a member of the European Union. What level of military co-operation is there with Turkey?

I will begin answering the Deputy's question by saying that, as he will know, Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus. It is very strange that Turkey wants to become a member of the European Union while refusing to recognise one of the member states, the member state that currently holds the Presidency. There was a very strong report in the European Parliament yesterday on this exact issue. I will just start by saying that.

Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus so there are absolutely no connections, co-ordination or discussions with the Turkish Government at any level at any point other than through the UN. The answer is quite clear. There was nothing----

There was nothing either officially or unofficially.

I am aware of nothing, either official or unofficial, taking place between Turkey and Cyprus in respect of the missile attack.

That is obviously a huge issue for people living in the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus has been through the Presidency and our State is just about to take it over. Is it safe to say that missile attack was the high point of the threat Cyprus faced? This is just an observation from a layperson on the outside but would it be fairly accurate to say that the target was the British base? At the time, there were moves by Britain to join the coalition of the willing, or the coalition of the unwilling, in attacking Iran. Was that the real target, because it was a direct hit on the British base? I saw the British base when I was there. I was fascinated by the size of it. Is it fair to say that this base was the target rather than Larnaca, Limassol or some other area in the south of Cyprus? Was it really an attack on the British base more so than an attack on Cyprus?

That is a fair question. I do not know if it made an official statement or if the information was leaked but, according to Hezbollah, it was an attack on the British base. Let me answer in another way, however. Some 30,000 Cypriot civilians live in the territory of the British bases on Cyprus, what the treaties call the sovereign military bases. This drone was actually attacking one of the civilian villages, Akrotiri. People have gardens, yards and shops, including grocery shops, there. While it can be said that this rocket was aimed at a military base, it actually entered a completely civilian area where a Cypriot population lives. They have nothing to do with protection and are not part of the war. The civilians who were attacked had nothing to do with the war in Iran. That must be taken into account.

Cyprus is an island nation with a large maritime area. I am fascinated by the Russian shadow fleet. As Mr. Telemachou will know, there was an incident in what we will call the French-British channel within the past week. A vessel was intercepted. My understanding is that it was carrying oil. Have there been any hostile actions from what would be termed Russian vessels or parts of the Russian shadow fleet in the waters surrounding Cyprus?

As far as I am aware, no.

There have been none.

As far as I am aware, there have been none.

With regard to drones and the short air distance between Cyprus and Russia in comparison with the distance between here and Russia, did any Russian drones enter Cyprus's airspace during the Presidency?

I am not aware of that being the case. However, I am aware of other countries' drones, which are equally devastating. To answer the question, one has to protect one's airspace whether it is from Russian drones or from Hezbollah drones.

I agree.

However, while I may be wrong, I do not know of any Russian drones entering our airspace.

To clarify, there have been no hostile actions from a maritime fleet owned or controlled by Russia, nor has there been evidence of drones in Cyprus's airspace during the Presidency.

I will ask a general question with regard to EU budgets. I know we are talking about defence and all of that, but I ask Mr. Telemachou to bear with me for a second.

How concerned is Cyprus about EU budgets? There will be greater emphasis on military spending and defence. Is the Cypriot Government concerned about a possible shift away from agricultural, environmental and social projects in Europe towards more spending on military and security? I do not argue against that per se. Obviously, negotiations will start on the Common Agricultural Policy and Cyprus is an agricultural country as well. How does the Cypriot Government view this?

I thank the Deputy for his pertinent question. First, I will clarify whether Cyprus is classified as a net contributor or net receiver in the budget. When we entered the European Union in 2004 we were net contributors to the budget. The financial crisis and the collapse of our banks meant we became net receivers. Now, with a new budget, we are again becoming a net contributor. That means we are giving more money to the EU budget than we have received.

Second, Cyprus is not classified as a frugal or non-frugal country. Cyprus belongs to the classification of countries that think the EU budget must be increased, as far as it can, so that a lot of demands from the European public can be met. One of the demands is that we are very secure about spending money. I have explained the reasons for that. We have no reservations about money being put on the security aspect of the new financial framework agreement. I know this something that is very difficult for Ireland but in Cyprus there is no public debate against that and the Cypriot Government does not have a hurdle in doing so.

I thank His Excellency and we appreciate his presence. This is a very useful engagement. This EU Presidency, like any Presidency, has two elements - the policy at a European Union level and the security of the Presidency. Primarily, at this moment in time, most committee members are mostly preoccupied with the latter, albeit the former is very important. I might ask some questions in relation to that.

This is possible at any event or in any location, but the security context was very different during the Presidency from what might have been anticipated. I am sure that it was a very worrying time for the people and Government of Cyprus. The primary threats that we as a committee are concerned about - as are probably the Irish people and perhaps many of our neighbours - during the course of our Presidency primarily but not exclusively relate to potential drone interference in Irish airspace, which has the potential to disrupt civil events, visits by foreign diplomats and Government officials, as well as cybersecurity attacks.

In relation to the first of those, one issue I have been concerned about is the slow delivery of anti-drone technology. We have received assurances that relate primarily to the Defence Forces, which are only responsible for military installations, with Baldonnel and the Curragh being the main bases. The primary responsibility for intercepting drones lies with An Garda Síochána or the police. Is it the case in Cyprus that the Cypriot army or Cypriot defence forces are responsible for intercepting drones, or is it civil policing? This is to get an understanding of the different systems.

One of the security concerns that we had during our Presidency did not come from drones, believe it or not, but from military interference by Türkiye when we had the defence meeting. On 9 June, a defence meeting took place, which was attended by ministers from France, Greece and, if I am not mistaken, Italy, with their planes. They tried to come to Cyprus to participate but Turkish military planes tried to intercept their airspace. That is also a danger. The situation was unacceptable and it was raised during the meeting. It became more complicated than just drones. I wanted to put in that parenthesis to let the Deputy know that the environment situation is not the only one. We do not only have one enemy. There are many threats.

The Deputy asked about anti-drone technology and who is responsible in Cyprus. The so-called national guard of the Cyprus Army is responsible for anti-drone weapons and putting them all in place. I am very thankful that the ambassadors of all the states are here, including Spain, Greece, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The Netherlands is not here, although that month they sent ships to help us with the anti-drone system.

Very good. There are so many diplomats at the time of the World Cup. We have our own little World Cup collection here of diplomats from various countries.

The ambassador made an interesting point and it is something this committee needs to consider. I am not certain but I expect it is unusual that the primary responsibility in this country for intercepting drones, given that it is a security issue, seems to heavily rely on the policing side rather than the defence side. I say that without any preconceived position on how we should proceed but it is an issue for us to consider here domestically.

Again, we are particularly concerned about this because of the high presence of tech companies and so on. Did Cyprus experience any major cybersecurity threats whether successful or otherwise during the course its Presidency? Was external assistance required to address those threats? Was there adequate capacity in the Cypriot cybersecurity infrastructure to deal with this?

There were some cyber threats that came from our friends on the non-governmental side in Lebanon, as I understand it. There have been other cyber threats but I do not know from where they originated. I know that there was capacity in Cyprus with the help of the European allies. There were threats but I do not know exactly from where and sometimes they do not announce it for the public, but there were cyber threats and not only during the Presidency.

Did anything significantly disrupt the Presidency?

No. Not in terms of cyber threats, as far as I am aware.

Security also relates to peace. I am sure that during the Presidency it would have been important to the Cypriot Government to use the opportunity to address the Cypriot situation. I know that during the last elections in northern Cyprus there was a bit more discussion on how discussions would proceed during the course of that. Will His Excellency make a brief comment on whether there was much discussion, through the EU, of the Cypriot situation and are there any updates he can give? It is partially a foreign affairs issue but it is also a security and peace issue.

Yes. I am glad to outline the latest developments in relation to the Cyprus problem. It started at a very low basis. The previous leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community said that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a two-state solution, which is unacceptable under international law and Security Council resolutions. A new leader of that community has been elected as part of the electoral process. He seems to not completely accept the solution of a bizonal or bi-communal federation, but is more ready to discuss a move towards that solution.

We have the appointment of a special representative of the UN Secretary General. She is a former foreign affairs minister of Colombia. She is actually on the island now. She has held discussions with the leaders of the two communities. May I remind members that the President of the Republic of Cyprus is also the leader of the Greek Cypriot community in those negotiations. There are discussions about having a five plus one conference very soon. She is going to Türkiye. She has been in Athens. She went to Türkiye two or three days ago. The Government of Türkiye was very negative, saying again that the only solution would be a two-state solution. The process is ongoing.

Ms María Angela Holguín Cuéllar, the special representative of the UN Secretary General, is on the island and doing this subtle diplomacy. There is hope that, very soon, negotiations will start for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Of course, it has to be a solution based on a bi-zonal or bi-communal federation, not only a two-state solution.

Mr. Telemachou is welcome and I thank him for his engagement. It is beneficial to us.

I have a small number of questions. The first one is in relation to Ireland as a neutral country taking over the Presidency of the EU at the beginning of next month and the current trend of militarisation towards Europe in reaction to what has happened in Ukraine. In that context, does Mr. Telemachou think that Ireland's neutrality is respected throughout Europe?

Pardon me, I did not hear the question.

In the context of the ongoing militarisation of Europe and the Ukrainian conflict with Russia, is Ireland's neutrality respected throughout Europe?

In my opinion, it is absolutely respected. To be clear on this, do not forget that Cyprus does not belong to a military alliance either. However, that does not mean that Cyprus is not willing to invest in its own defence and the defence of the European Union, which is not a military alliance. We do not consider the European Union to be a military alliance. In all decisions taken on EU defence, the backgrounds of countries, whether NATO members, neutrals or countries that are not members of military alliances, are respected. I have to say very clearly here that the SAFE regulation does not impact Ireland's policy of military neutrality in any way. It does not compel Ireland to anticipate in a military alliance or common or mutual defence arrangements, which is where Irish neutrality comes into play. The answer is a clear "Yes".

Is there a view about Ireland's military readiness in relation to security for the EU Presidency?

It is better for Ireland to answer the question on whether it is ready for the Presidency.

I get that, but I am asking whether there is a view-----

My personal view, not as a Cypriot diplomat and not as the representative of the Presidency, is that it is ready. However, in terms of military capabilities, I feel that Ireland has a way to go. This is my personal opinion, though. I cannot position myself here either as the president of the group of ambassadors holding the Presidency or in my capacity as the Cypriot ambassador.

I thank His Excellency for that. I appreciate his candour.

In respect of Ukraine, Cyprus has been a strong supporter of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Is there anything that can be done to enhance that support on a Europe-wide basis coming into the Irish EU Presidency?

Yes. We have quite a few measures. The most obvious is that we are now working on the 21st sanctions package. Also, we have an agreement on loans for military equipment in Ukraine. The Irish EU Presidency is to implement this decision. There is actually great space for our Ireland's EU Presidency to help on this. I am absolutely sure, speaking with my colleagues in the Irish Department of foreign affairs, that this is a top priority of the Irish Presidency.

Before we go to the second round, I have a question. If His Excellency was planning for the EU Presidency now, as in, it would happen in six months' time, what would he plan differently compared with the original planning in the run up to the Presidency? Is there something he would have done that he did not?

Yes. The practice showed that we should have had a plan B contingency plan. We did, but I mean to a more detailed extent. For example, we had to close the airspace for one month. There were no meetings in Nicosia for that month - we had to postpone all of the meetings. If the Cathaoirleach is asking me now if we had to have a contingency plan, we had it, but we should have had a more detailed one in case something happened that was not anticipated. For example, the Iran war was not there when we planned the Presidency. These contingency plans have to be more specific in case one has to close the airspace. Hopefully, Ireland will not need that.

Hopefully, we will learn from that. Obviously, in his meetings with the Irish Government, His Excellency has gone through all of those learnings from hosting the Presidency.

We have. It was a shock for everybody to have to close the meetings for one month. Maybe I am wrong, but I cannot remember the last time that happened.

Has a cost been put on closing down aviation for the period?

I do not have the figures but it was a big cost. A lot of airlines had to cancel their flights, tourism was lower and all the multiplier effects because of tourism. I do not have a figure.

As a committee, we were on our way out to visit Cyprus and some of us got rerouted-----

The committee actually experienced it first hand.

Yes. Some of us spent a day at Heathrow Airport and came back again. There will be another time.

I wanted to ask about another matter. There was no mention anywhere in the statement of the EU-Israel Association Agreement or the discussions on that relationship. I know that Cyprus has a very positive relationship with Palestine going back a number of years. For the Irish EU Presidency, the programme that we are doing here and the interparliamentary conference that will form part of the discussions on the Middle East, was it a priority for Cyprus?

I did not mention it today because I focused my intervention only on military capabilities and defence. I consider the Palestine-Israel section as under foreign affairs. That is why I did not mention it. Cyprus was one of the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine. We have had a Palestinian embassy since 2011 in Nicosia. Likewise, we have an office in Ramallah.

We also have a close relationship with Israel, as is known, but not to the detriment of our special relationship with the Palestinian people. I did not mention it because it falls under foreign affairs, and since the Lisbon treaty, foreign affairs is not under the Presidency, it is under the external action service, so I do not have a mandate to say much about this.

I echo our colleagues and thank Mr. Telemachou for his candour and for his responses. Ireland's exports of alumina to Russia have increased hugely since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. In fact, Ireland is the largest exporter of alumina to Russia. The alumina from Ireland is smelted in Krasnoyarsk by Rusal for use in the reverse-engineered Shahed missiles and drones, the casings of ballistic missiles and parts of the propulsion systems for hypersonic missiles. Does Mr. Telemachou have any advice for Ireland as it takes up the Presidency of the European Union? I feel it is absolutely unacceptable. Does he have a view? What advice would he give us? Does he think it is a sustainable position to hold the Presidency of the EU, to support Ukraine, and at the same time provide one of the foundational metals of missile technology to Putin's war machine?

I thank the Senator. I followed the press here closely and I also know that Vice-President Kallas, the High Representative, discussed this extensively with the Irish leadership. When this scandal emerged, she was in Cyprus on 9 June for a meeting of defence ministers and flew here on 10 June to discuss it with the Government. It is part of her dossier and mandate as the High Representative for external affairs since Lisbon. I am sure she has discussed it extensively. Of course, anything like this a few days before you take up the Presidency does not give the right publicity to the Presidency. I am sure and confident that the Irish Government is taking all measures to deal with and examine the substance of the case, and with the publicity.

Yes, it launched two inquiries in March and says that those may conclude in the coming months. That is the pace it is moving at. I turn to Damascus. For many decades, partially because of the US intervention in Iraq when they ousted Saddam Hussein, we have had a Shia corridor or axis of influence from Tehran, through Baghdad, to Damascus and Beirut, which is extraordinary. However, with the ousting of Assad, that has changed. There is a Sunni regime in Damascus, and my understanding is that the principal actors in that are Wahhabi-Salafist hard-line-----

I remind the Senator that we are here to talk about the EU Presidency and the learning from that.

This is completely relevant. Prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and prior to Covid, the primary threat assessed here was from Islamic State and from Sunni Islamist extremists. Since the change of regime in Damascus and because it is one of Cyprus's closest neighbours, was that part of their threat assessment? Perhaps there might have been Islamist attacks on the European Union Presidency encouraged by the Turkish Government.

I would not agree that Islamic terrorism is only Sunni. It is also Shia.

Obviously, Hezbollah launched missiles at Cyprus.

Yes. I would not accept that argument because I think Islamic terrorism, whether Shia or Sunni-----

That is not the point I am making. I am aware that Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed Shia proxy that has attacked Cyprus, so that threat is ever-present. It is a threat that confronts us because they have killed our troops in Lebanon.

Exactly.

They murdered one of our troops less than two years ago. At the same time, you have this emerging potential Sunni threat. I am asking if that was something Cyprus incorporated into its 365.

Of course, there are scenarios, but I am not aware that, when it comes to Islamic extremism, the European Union is dividing between Sunni and Shia. I think that Islamic extremism is one of the real threats to our democracies and territorial integrity, as we have seen in Cyprus. If the Senator wants me to say we are worried that the Sunni as opposed to the Shia are winning the sphere of influence of the Islamic world, I am not in a position to know.

Türkiye interfered in Cyprus's airspace. It is a NATO member. Is Mr. Telemachou aware if there was any interaction between them and the other NATO partners who were operating to defend Cyprus?

Not only that, but the irony of the situation is that I know that the Greek, French and, if I am not mistaken, the Italian ministers of defence were intercepted. There is a parody of this that is not understandable to people who are not dealing with diplomacy.

In the context of the EU Presidency, it is fair to say that, for the past four years, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been the major issue in Europe in terms of security and military preparedness, etc. How does the Cypriot Government see the situation? It is a live discussion. In the past week there has been commentary by European leaders, including Ireland, about Ukraine's potential membership of the Union. How does the Cypriot Government view the situation with Ukraine? I am not an expert, but before the invasion, there was systemic corruption by all accounts. There are questions about media freedom. We now have an openly declared fascist force incorporated into the Ukrainian army. How does the Government stand on Ukraine's readiness for advancing EU membership, which was a live issue during the six months of Cyprus's Presidency? There is obviously going to be an issue for the Irish Government in handling this under the Presidency. Maybe I have the wrong measure of this, but it would appear that a lot of European capitals are taking quite a benign view of all this. There seems to be a bit of a rush to incorporate Ukraine. Moldova is coming in and that is fine, but with Ukraine there were a number of red flags relating to the state of affairs generally before the invasion by Russia. How does Mr. Telemachou see that playing out during the Irish Presidency?

Let me tell the Deputy that I was ambassador in Ukraine for five years until 20 days before the war, so I have had experience of what he is saying about corruption. It was something that was discussed daily in the heads of mission meetings of the European Union. I know it very well. The Cypriot Presidency worked hard to open the first cluster of negotiation chapters of the accession of Ukraine to the European Union because this cluster deals exactly with issues like rule of law, democracy and anti-corruption measures. This is actually the first stage, and this is what we are trying to examine now.

The opening of the negotiations with Ukraine has huge geopolitical significance for reasons we are all aware of, so it should not be undermined. All the capitals in the European Union have accepted that opening the first cluster of negotiations is of huge importance for the direction the country should go in and for the protection of the European Continent.

I would reverse the question a little to ask what has the Ukraine war, or the Russian aggression towards Ukraine, taught us? One of the answers has been the opening of the first cluster of negotiations with Ukraine under the Cypriot Presidency. However, one of the deliverables we have to have is securing Europe. The security was under an autonomous Europe. That was the chapter under our Presidency and the one I see under the Irish Presidency. Security of Europe has to be developed and capabilities have to advance to protect the European Union, including its values and territorial integrity.

I will put it this way. Does the move to defend Europe and deal with the Ukrainian Government on that basis trump and come ahead of the fundamental reforms and challenges in Ukraine being in a state to be able to comply with the rules of EU membership?

I do not think any member state says Ukraine should not comply with the membership - Copenhagen - criteria. Everyone says that all candidate countries will proceed upon merit. It is not a question of us saying "Yes", that because of geopolitical reasons Ukraine should enter as it is now, without reforms. I do not think the Presidency of Cyprus ever said that. We said that, because of the geopolitical necessity, we have opened the first cluster of accession negotiations with Ukraine and we are proud to have done that. Parallel to that, we are trying to deliver a stronger military Europe in the sense of military capabilities so that we are stronger to defend our Continent.

His Excellency spoke about the similarities and differences between Ireland and Cyprus. One obvious similarity is that we are island nations of similar population.

Neither of us is in a military alliance. I insist on that similarity.

Yes, although perhaps more political representatives in Cyprus are discussing that possibility than in Ireland, albeit we have debates here. However, it is true. I make the point, more for anyone listening than for His Excellency, that, from my political party's point of view, neutrality is more than not participating in military alliances. It also means ensuring personnel are not deployed to conflicts and military situations beyond peacekeeping operations. I am not really directing that at His Excellency, rather at people listening. It is an important distinction that is sometimes subtle. The Irish Government sometimes makes the point about military alliances.

My question relates to naval capacity. What is the level of capacity of the Cypriot navy? An emerging threat the Irish Defence Forces and Department of Defence need to increasingly consider is subsea threats. Traditional, conventional technologies will not necessarily always be adequate and perhaps the level of threat at a subsea level is different in Cyprus, but how does the Cypriot Government propose to develop its capacity in those areas?

I thank the Deputy. It is an important question and one we give a lot of focus to. We are building up our navy for this reason, to protect maritime security and cables, which are important for our and the European economy. We have a lot of cables that connect Europe with the Middle East passing through our waters, like Ireland has with America. It is quite similar. We are investing, first, by increasing the capability and building up our naval bases. We are talking about national security, not EU. I understand that to be the Deputy's question. Is that right?

Yes, it is about domestic security.

In procurement, we have already acquired certain naval ships because we also have a huge space for search and rescue. It is one of the biggest on an island in the Mediterranean. We have a very big search and rescue air zone so we are also investing in anti-sea drones. It is a whole programme. They will not come tomorrow, but there is a plan to invest heavily in the navy. That is the part we are investing in heavily.

My next question is sometimes framed as a security issue. I am not always comfortable with that. There is undoubtedly a humanitarian element as well. Some European countries discuss the migrant crisis as a security issue. There were some reports in recent years and criticisms made of the Cypriot Government, and not only the Cypriot Government, in relation to pushbacks, as they are called, of migrants in vulnerable situations who had arrived in Cypriot waters. I appreciate these issues are complex and every country has to have a migration management system and processes to process people who arrive seeking asylum and so on. However, some criticisms were made so can His Excellency give an update on the policy of the Cypriot Government? I think it was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that raised those concerns. How did the Cypriot Government respond to them?

Pushbacks are illegal under international and humanitarian law and the Cypriot Government does not engage in pushback operations. I will say it clearly and loudly: we do not engage in pushback operations. A number of NGOs have accused all front-line states - it is not just Cyprus, but also Italy, Greece and Spain - of using pushbacks, but these are accusations. With the migration pact we have now developed an extra tool, as the European Union, to deal with the migration crisis, which, as the Deputy said, can also be a security crisis. However, I do not accept that the Cypriot Government has been doing pushback operations. We consider them to be illegal under international humanitarian law. We are a country of the rule of law that follows humanitarian law. We are sensible about international law. The official answer is that we have not been engaged in pushbacks.

Very well. I accept what His Excellency said. Subsequent to some of those points, did the Cypriot Government ensure that nothing was happening, perhaps without the authorisation of the Cypriot Government? Were any checks or anything like that done?

No. The migrant networks or traffickers are operating without the authorisation of the Cypriot Government and abusing all forms of human rights in the world. They put people at risk. They torture people. If people do not pay the right amount, they put people in severe conditions. This is, of course, not authorised, but these are the people we have to deal with.

There was a point in time, not many years ago, around 2023, when 4% to 5% of the population of Cyprus were asylum seekers. Now, we have introduced a speedy examination of asylum cases. The European Union has also, thankfully, introduced certain safe countries, so we can safely return some people who apply for asylum.

However, there was a point when the situation was desperate in Cyprus. As I said, 4% to 5% of the local population were asylum seekers. Now, it has been reduced very much. We have increased our capacity to examine the applications and make sure we are clear early enough whether people are allowed to come under international protection. If so, they are welcome. However, the majority are not eligible for international protection so we examine and clear their cases and tell them they have to go back. This is important.

In Cyprus, migration is a very hot political issue. We had elections three weeks or a month ago and migration was a hot topic. It can also play into the hands of the extreme right. I do not accept that the Cypriot Government is engaging in pushback or that the previous ones did.

I recognise that countries like Cyprus on the front line carry a disproportionate burden and responsibility for supporting migrants. I acknowledge that and I appreciate it is a complex issue, but I felt it was important to raise it, given these are legitimate concerns. I thank the ambassador.

I will leave it there for today but, before I do, would the ambassador like to give us any final advice about anything we have not covered, as we head into the European Presidency next week?

One piece of advice I would give the committee is that we have to make sure we press the Presidency team - not press, but help it - on security as it should be an important issue during the Irish Presidency of the European Union, as the team knows well. Some of the issues should be pressed ahead.

On behalf of the committee, I thank the ambassador and his colleagues for their time and engagement this morning. I thank the ambassadors from Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Slovenia and France and the representative from Austria for joining us this morning.

It is full Mediterranean solidarity, as the Cathaoirleach sees.

Indeed, there is great interest.