Building National Resilience and Cyberdefence: Discussion
Witnesses urged Ireland to treat digital resilience as a national capability, defining essential services’ minimum operating requirements and testing recovery across sectors and shared dependencies, rather than relying on compliance alone. They highlighted AI’s dual-use risks, weak SME and operational-technology security, and the need for practical public cyber education, stronger board-level ownership, and investment in skills and research. Cyber Ireland also presented the sector as a strategic economic and defence asset, calling for an industry strategy, a research centre and better access to security clearances. The committee indicated it would follow up the lack of a national security-clearance system; witnesses also identified shortages of entry-level placements and pathways into cyber careers.
Apologies have been received from Deputy Donnchadh Ó Laoghaire and Senator Diarmuid Wilson.
The joint committee is meeting today to discuss building national resilience and cyberdefence. We are joined by: Mr. Puneet Kukreja, resilient nation leader and head of cyber at Ernst and Young; Professor Tom Acton, professor of business information systems at the University of Galway; and from Cyber Ireland, Dr. Eoin Byrne, cluster manager, and Mr. Pat Larkin, advisory board member. They are all welcome. The format of the meeting is that I will first invite Mr. Kukreja, then Professor Acton and finally Dr. Byrne to make their opening statements. That will be followed by questions from members of the committee. Each member has a six-minute slot to ask questions and for witnesses to respond.
I advise members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the Leinster House complex to participate in public meetings. I will not permit members to participate where they are not adhering to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, members who attempt to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting. In this regard, I ask members participating via Microsoft Teams that, prior to making their contribution to the meeting, they formally confirm they are on the grounds of the Leinster House campus.
Members and witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory regarding an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.
I invite Mr. Kukreja to deliver his opening statement.
Comment on this
I thank the Cathaoirleach and the committee for the invitation and the time it is giving the issue. The committee is asking the right question at the right moment. Governments everywhere are grappling with how nations can navigate uncertainty when disruption is faster moving, increasingly interconnected and capable of crossing organisational, sectoral and national boundaries in an instant. For Ireland, that question is especially timely during our Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Examining it deliberately, before a crisis tests us, demonstrates leadership. EY’s submission rests on one central thesis: Ireland should treat digital resilience as a critical national infrastructure capability because every essential service now depends on digital systems, which must continue under pressure in the event of a disruptive attack.
The need is shaped by three converging challenges: geopolitical volatility, rapidly evolving technology, including AI, and systemic cyber and dependency risk. The concern is not that any one challenge in isolation will have an impact. It is their potential to reinforce one another and create consequences that extend across organisations, sectors and borders.
The goal for Ireland is sovereign cyber resilience. Sovereign does not mean isolated or domestically owned. It means sovereignty of outcomes: knowing what must continue, which dependencies matter, how recovery will happen, who must be engaged and whether the State can retain control under pressure. This is not a new demand on the State. It builds on the direction Ireland has already chosen. The national strategy on the resilience of critical entities published earlier this year establishes a national approach to strengthening critical entities and maintaining the essential services they provide. It recognises the increasing interconnection and interdependence of critical infrastructure and the need for national and sector-wide co-ordination.
I now turn to engineering resilience across interconnected systems. Our submission takes the next step: engineering resilience across the interconnected digital, physical and AI-enabled systems on which essential services depend, and demonstrating that resilience through testing, not plans alone. Ireland’s regulatory and policy foundations, including NIS2, the critical entities resilience directive and the Cyber Resilience Act, are necessary and welcome. They establish responsibilities and raise the required baseline. The next step is to convert those compliance obligations into operational evidence: proof of what will continue to work under stress. Compliance provides the foundation; resilience engineered provides the discipline for determining whether essential services can continue, degrade safely and recover. Resilience engineered is a policy and operating discipline which defines the essential services that must continue, establishes acceptable operating tolerances, maps the dependencies on which they rely and tests recovery under realistic pressure. Its purpose is to provide evidence of resilience before a crisis, rather than discover its limits during one.
Our submission sets out nine recommendations. If the committee prioritises three, they should be, first, to define the minimum viable state for each critical service. By this I mean what must continue, what may safely degrade and what must be restored first. Second, build and test recovery capability before it is needed and, third, build on Ireland’s existing emergency management and cyber exercise arrangements with a repeatable, cross-sector resilience-validation approach. The objective is not simply to conduct more desktop exercises or update policies and impact assessments. It is to measure whether essential services continued under stress, dependencies and escalation arrangements worked, recovery met agreed tolerances of the defined minimum operating state and identified weaknesses were managed under pressure.
I will now discuss what I describe as the space between the stools. Significant resources are already being committed across Departments, regulators and critical operators and that effort deserves recognition. The opportunity lies in what I call the space between the stools: shared dependencies and cross-border responsibilities that do not sit naturally within any single organisation’s mandate or budget. Often, it is these areas where accountability and responsibility are unclear that bad actors look to identify and exploit. Addressing that space will require deliberate, co-ordinated and multi-year investment, aligned to the services that matter most and the evidence needed to demonstrate resilience. That is the difference between a collection of individually well-prepared organisations, Departments and agencies and a genuinely resilient nation.
My colleagues and I are here to help the committee work through the technical and practical choices in whatever detail is useful. By treating digital resilience as a critical national capability, engineering it and testing it, Ireland can navigate geopolitical, technological and cyber disruption with genuine confidence. That is the resilient nation.
Comment on this
I thank the committee for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion today. I am a professor of business information systems in the school of business and economics at the University of Galway. Cybersecurity is my research expertise area. Together with a colleague, Dr. Mona Isazad Mashinchi, I lead our MSc cybersecurity risk management programme. We are now in our fourth year. As a small nation, we need an ecosystemic approach to resilience. I am here to talk about how we are a Lego piece in the cybersecurity ecosystem. My briefing document outlines where the gaps could be, what we can do, and where we need help.
I want to begin by making a broader observation. Cybersecurity is not only about attacks on companies, infrastructure or government systems; it is a bigger concept embracing people, processes and technologies. My document expands on those. We see increasingly sophisticated activities in cyberspace designed to influence people and societies, using social media manipulation, disinformation and the deliberate creation of discord in societies. The objective can be to increase polarisation, fuel unrest, promote extremist views and weaken social cohesion. These are long-term activities that can gradually undermine trust within society and between societies. A resilient nation must encompass these broader views of cybersecurity.
I want to make three main points about building Ireland’s cyber resilience: preparedness, managing cyber risk, and building national capacity. The accompanying briefing document expands on each.
On preparedness, cybersecurity is no longer simply an IT issue. Ireland is highly interconnected, as Mr. Kukreja said, with critical infrastructure, healthcare, banking, telecommunications, transport and major businesses all dependent on digital systems, as they have been for a long time, and supply chains. A serious cyber incident can therefore have consequences well beyond the organisation initially attacked. We have seen this with the HSE breach, and internationally with the ransomware attack that brought Costa Rica’s government to a standstill.
At the same time, artificial intelligence is rapidly changing the threat landscape. Attacks can be faster, more adaptable and conducted at scale. What might previously have taken a human attacker months can potentially be undertaken in minutes. AI is also creating new attack surfaces as organisations introduce AI tools without necessarily having sufficient understanding of their associated cyber risks. Preparedness therefore has to mean more than compliance or completing a training course. It needs to be continuous, embedded and tested, with meaningful measures of whether it is actually working. We need to know it is working and we need to be able to measure, which is urgent given existing and forthcoming cyber legislation.
My second point is on managing cyber risk. Cyber risk needs to be treated like every other significant organisational risk. There needs to be understanding and ownership at the most senior levels. Boards and senior managers need to understand their responsibilities under cybersecurity legislation, identify practical actions that can make an immediate difference and understand the cost of not being secure. In the age of AI, multipronged attacks and very rapid execution, simply trying to catch up is not viable. Organisations need to identify the straightforward actions that can significantly improve their security and make cybersecurity part of normal business risk management, rather than seeing it simply as a cost.
I would also argue for a cybersecurity leadership voice in every organisation. A chief information security officer, CISO, should not simply be someone to whom the cyber problem is delegated. Cybersecurity needs to remain visible, understood and actively managed at board level.
We help to do that in universities through our educational programmes.
The third issue is national capacity. Ireland has strong foundations. Universities are already providing both technical cybersecurity education and programmes focused on cybersecurity management. There is also valuable collaboration between universities and industry to co-develop and co-deliver, but there are significant gaps. Many people who need cybersecurity knowledge are already working full time and cannot undertake a full degree. SMEs in particular may lack the time, expertise or resources to address cyber resilience effectively. We therefore need more short, targeted and practical learning; stronger executive education for boards and managers; more regular and better pathways into university-level cybersecurity and AI programmes; greater focus on behavioural cybersecurity focusing on people; and, crucially, more expertise at PhD and research level. Capacity requires investment. We need a more targeted funding model that makes it easier for SMEs and management teams to upskill, supports flexible cybersecurity education, and provides funding for PhD students and postdoctoral research in cyber and AI and, critically, the intersection between these two areas.
Linking these three issues, the central message is simple: capacity enables preparedness and preparedness reduces risk. I expand further in the accompanying briefing document, where I also suggest a number of activities we as educators can do as pieces of Lego or cogs in the wheel of a resilient nation. Ireland has the educational and industry foundations to play a significant role in building a resilient nation, but we need to expand those foundations, connect the different parts of the ecosystem and invest now rather than relying on catching up. Senator Craughwell’s position paper on cybersecurity provides the landscape for the years ahead.
Comment on this
I thank the Cathaoirleach and members of the committee for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion on building national cyber resilience. Cyber Ireland is the national cybersecurity industry cluster organisation. We represent over 220 organisations across Ireland's cybersecurity sector, including Irish cybersecurity companies, leading multinational firms, research groups, higher education institutions and public sector stakeholders. We are driving the development of Ireland’s cybersecurity sector to become a leading European cyber industry. Our perspective is straightforward. Cybersecurity is a core pillar of national resilience, economic security, critical infrastructure protection and defence and security.
The cyber-threat landscape continues to evolve, with increasing risks from cybercrime, hostile state actors, ICT supply chain vulnerabilities and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence security. Furthermore, our digital and physical infrastructure are interdependent. A cybersecurity incident can disrupt critical infrastructure – such as energy and transport networks – that both civilians, business and governments rely on.
Although Ireland sits at the western edge of Europe, we are at the centre of the European digital economy and infrastructure with the headquarters of many of the global technology multinational companies based here, the hosting of data centres and the transatlantic data cables that run through Ireland’s waters. These assets are fundamental to our economic prosperity but increase our exposure to cyber and hybrid threats. Europe is scaling its defence and security capability in response to heightened geopolitical risk, and with this comes increased demand for cybersecurity solutions. The new European Competitiveness Fund has a proposed €125 billion budget under resilience and security, defence industry and space. Against this backdrop, Ireland's cybersecurity industry represents a strategic national asset.
Cybersecurity is one of the clearest examples of a dual-use capability. The same technologies and expertise used to protect hospitals, utilities, businesses and government systems are often directly applicable to national security and defence. This creates a significant opportunity for Ireland. The cybersecurity sector already contributes over €1 billion to the economy annually and employs 8,000 people. Cyber Ireland has found we have the potential to more than double this over the coming years to €2.5 billion in gross value add while employing 17,000 people, simultaneously strengthening the State's national resilience.
To capture this opportunity, Cyber Ireland believes the following actions should be prioritised. First, Ireland should actively develop its cyber industry, with a dedicated cyber-industrial strategy supporting skills, research and indigenous companies, similar to the national industry strategy for semiconductors. Second, we must develop the next generation of cyber talent. Building national cyber resilience will require thousands of additional cyber professionals across the public and private sectors over the coming decade, including advanced technical skills. Third, we need increased investment in cyber research and innovation, specifically, increased funding for the proposed national cyber research centre of excellence, in line with other research centres such as AI, quantum and semiconductors. This centre of excellence can provide a testing environment, cyber ranges and nationally relevant research capability for resilience. Fourth, Ireland should support the potential of cybersecurity solutions for dual use enabling indigenous firms to access growing European defence and security markets, but we must also address barriers, including security clearances, that limit participation for industry and researchers into European cybersecurity and defence programmes. Finally, national resilience depends on deep public-private partnership and collaboration. Much of Ireland's critical infrastructure cybersecurity expertise and innovation capacity resides in industry, making partnership essential.
Cybersecurity is a necessity for national resilience, but it is also a strategic economic opportunity where we can drive innovation, create high-value jobs and also contribute to European resilience.
Comment on this
The gentlemen are welcome this morning. I thank them for the important and significant work they do in this space.
I have a number of questions. I will ask them collectively. Whoever wants to take them, please feel free to do so. AI and its development were mentioned. How much can we quantify AI as a tool that would be of benefit to us and a tool that would be harmful to us? Where do the witnesses see us at the moment in relation to AI as a positive and AI as a threat? The next question may be more relevant to Joe and Josephine Bloggs on the street. I am getting an increasing number of calls from members of the public who have an issue even in relation to simple things like online banking and fraud across that space. It seems to be on the increase. How much of a threat is that going forward? Should we be doing more as a country and a Government to educate our citizens in that particular space as well?
Comment on this
They are two important points. I will talk about AI, dual purpose, opportunity and threat, and then I will take on what the public needs to know when it comes to fraud.
We have said for about two years now that the way AI is being developed is a double-edged sword. There is the positive edge and then there is the negative edge. The positive edge is that from a cyber perspective and a resilience perspective, it now gives us the opportunity to go in and model defences. It actually increases and helps shorten the gap between human skill and what technology can do. It gives us the opportunity to provide machine-to-machine defences in the hands of the human, with a human in the loop. While it is doing that, it also is expanding the threat landscape. Why it is expanding the threat landscape, and that is where the threat comes from, is that 25-plus years of knowledge and expertise has been collated and contextualised and now can be used to launch new and different types of attacks. That knowledge has also been accumulated for the defenders because they can now have that 25-plus years of skill from across the world with multitudes of researchers and practitioners to then help. Where AI is at the moment is a force. What controls we put into it and how we then use it depends on ourselves, the industry that is using it and the people who are going to be trained into it.
When it comes to fraud, deepfakes and online banking, it is continuous education and exercise.
I equate it to the Covid period with hygiene, which was to wash your hands, come home, make sure you do not bring shoes into the house and make sure you wash your clothes. The same concept of cyber hygiene is what we have been speaking to organisations about for over a decade and a half, such as making sure their servers are patched, which means there are no security bugs left in it and the software is updated. The same thinking has gone into homes. If you use a personal laptop or machine, make sure to address those hygiene issues when it comes to cyber and the technology you bring into your house - patch your devices and do not access unknown data points.
Similarly, it is the knowledge going out and saying that deepfakes do exist. If you get phone calls and someone starts asking for your banking details, absolutely do not give them out unless it is verified. The banks have done a lot of work in this area and so have most organisations and departments when they undertake cyber-training programmes for employees. Those employees are citizens and citizens go and live in houses. The work organisations are doing helps. Public awareness of frauds and deepfakes also helps but we can always do more in having that knowledge and expertise sent out in simple terms. Like we have with human hygiene, we now need to look at cyber hygiene.
Comment on this
To address the question on citizens and what they need to do, what they need to do know and whether we can do things better, it is a good news answer because there are a set of things that are quite definitive and easy to do to close off some of the vulnerabilities and weaknesses cyber presents for the average citizen. For example, how to set your phone up so it does not automatically connect to unsecured networks, or changing the password on your home Wi-Fi if you are using the same password that came with the device when you first bought it, which is probably printed on the back of it. Those simple things are quite addressable. There is more that can be done.
We see the same things appearing with a lot of small to medium enterprises and a blurring of the lines between personal use of machines. Where they store their photos in the cloud and business use of their device tend to be the same device. Some of the main problems, such as not using multifactor authentication, can easily be closed off. They just need to know how to do it, to know that it is a top priority, how to use good passwords if they have to use them and how to set up biometrics to use a thumbprint to get into the device. Those things are quite doable in a very short time.
Comment on this
Do citizens need more help in that regard?
Comment on this
I think they do. As our society ages, a lot of people will have grown up without much technology. They present an extra challenge. That is part of our job. It is to simplify the problem and how to close it off so they do not even have to think about it. It needs to be done in such a way that it becomes normal language, non-technical and commonplace like brushing your teeth.
Comment on this
To follow on from the last point on making people responsible and prepared for the basics like passwords and security at home, who is responsible for educating people on that? Who is responsible for getting that message to people? There is certainly a generational divide. There are many other divides but there is a clear generational one. Who is or should be responsible for informing people and making sure they are individually prepared before we get to the larger stuff?
Comment on this
The higher level education system of which I am a part is responsible for educating the people in front of us but that tends to be the youth or executives who come on board for MBAs or executive education. That is not everybody. Even within that, it is only a small, thin slice of the population, even carving it up by ages. There is a set of people coming through who have grown up with technologies literally in their pockets who do not think twice about it. They know how to do it and do it automatically but their parents may not understand it and their grandparents certainly do not. Our remit needs to be broader to embrace and have models for that type of activity where we can reach out to groups and it does not cost them any money to do it. If we bring them on board for half a day or a day, we can move from zero to eliminating a lot of problems.
However, the problem is that the education model in third level tends to be one person giving instruction and many people receiving it. There could be 100 people in a room. That is not going to work with that age group. It needs to be many to many and applied hands on, looking at an individual's setup, what they do daily and trying to conquer a few problems right there and then in the space of 15 minutes. A lot can be conquered in a short time but it takes that hands-on, one-to-one approach. It is a much broader remit.
Comment on this
I will move on to EU cybersecurity legislation in general. My question is about the greater obligations that will be placed on companies and organisations for their own cybersecurity. How are we going to ensure, or who will be responsible for making sure, it does not become a box-ticking exercise and that actual work is done? I am conscious that for a lot of people, in their day-to-day work, they wonder how to comprehend this or how to actually prepare for cybersecurity in their own organisations, rather than it just being a board has ticked the box and said they have done X, Y and Z, or checked the risk register or anything else. Who makes sure it is being done correctly? Otherwise it is paper not refusing ink.
Comment on this
In my experience the messaging that has gone out around the legislation is much-needed but organisations have been struggling to adopt a common framework and approach because the supply chain risk is really challenging. Apart from compliance and legislation, supply chain poses risk upstream and downstream to organisations. The general messaging industry is using is that this is a framework, it is legislation and compliance, and it is best practice because it is based on internationally recognised best practice such as National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, the Center for Internet Security, CIS, and CyFun, the European initiative. The argument is if you implement this for organisational resilience and your organisation's ability to survive and withstand cyber threats and attacks , you then demonstrate compliance. Compliance follows best practice and organisational survival. That is the message. That has been well-received within industry because there is a recognition of the frameworks.
There is some complexity and the consultation employed by the Central Bank and the Digital Operational Resilience Act, DORA, means you need to work where individual compliance frameworks overlap and incur unnecessary complexity. If organisations fit within multiple regulatory frameworks, what are the reporting obligations, which has priority, etc? Industry consultation that been used under DORA is probably a good framework for the NIS directive. The COREs the National Cyber Security Centre is breaking out for vertical specialisation are positive as well. The messaging has to be that this is about organisational resilience and survival and if these frameworks are used, they demonstrate compliance after the fact.
Comment on this
My question links to the interconnected threats this poses to many different groups. If there is one group that just appears to be ticking a box but is not actually doing it, does it recognise the threat is not just against its organisation but the cascading effect on others? While one area might be weak, is it aware it could threaten other areas of the economy, society and the functioning of Ireland as a country as a whole?
Comment on this
Supply chain obligations under the compliance frameworks and genuine supply chain concerns regardless of compliance are driving that behaviour at the moment. Historically, supply chain due diligence has been a tick-box exercise - spreadsheets flowing upwards and downwards. The reality and the obligations under the legislation now mean third-, fourth- and fifth-party supply chain due diligence needs to be much more onerous. I think we are seeing that.
Cyber Ireland has seen a lot of demand from bodies like ISME, where smaller SMEs are looking for some sort of security certification framework - not something like ISO which might be too onerous - so SMEs can demonstrate up the supply chain that they exercise good cybersecurity hygiene and have good frameworks in place, etc. The supply chain pressures regardless of compliance are starting to force that discipline down to make sure it is not a tick-box exercise. Compliance will then reinforce and amplify that.
Comment on this
I thank the Chair. I thank all three witnesses who presented. I will ask a broad set of questions to all three organisations.
I recently received a report on cyber activity over the last three months. It is quite frightening the number of attacks there have been in the country within the sectors of energy and utilities, transport and logistics, healthcare and pharma, hospitality, retail, consumer, technology, telecoms, professional services, the non-profit community and an unknown sector. The attacks tend to be ransomware, which is still fairly significant in a lot of those. I know that Cyber Ireland has done a lot of work in looking at SMEs and the SME sector. I am interested in the witnesses' views on where we are with operational technology, OT, as against cyber IT, which everybody seems to understand.
In the area of academia, Professor Acton's programme in Galway is probably one of the first of its type in the country where he is training future CISOs. Has he looked at the politics, with a small "p", that will exist in an organisation? The CISO role is now going to move into the boardroom whereas the chief information officer, CIO, will not get access to the boardroom. Will that cause tensions within organisations? Is the CISO likely to be listened to when it comes to board members? Mr. Kukreja deals with top-level management almost all the time and he has quite a strong track record in firefighting situations in this country. How ready are our board members to take on board the advice? Putting it all together, we talk about cyber in this country and we sometimes conflate artificial intelligence into that discussion. Have we really taken cyber on board or do we need to invest more money?
Comment on this
I will start with the technology piece. For the committee, operational technology is the technology associated with cyber physical, which is most typically talked about in terms of manufacturing and critical national infrastructure but is actually much more expansive than that. It feeds into healthcare and even into banking with ATM networks and so on. In our experience it is about ten to 15 years behind where IT is in security maturity. As members will appreciate, IT security is not necessarily in a good place right now so it is a significant vulnerability for critical national infrastructure and Ireland's manufacturing sector. It has different business drivers from IT security in that it tends to prioritise availability, for example, the production line keeps going and the water network keeps flowing first, whereas IT technology tends to prioritise confidentiality, integrity and availability. It is almost the inverse whereby OT prioritises availability, and integrity and confidentiality come last.
There is a very weak set of skills around operational technology. It is a major challenge. Cyber Ireland has been focused on trying to establish a special interest group and has reached out to organisations like Irish Manufacturing Research to try to collaborate to build capability. It represents a significant threat to overall national resilience and security. Threat actors are now focusing on that area. We saw this in manufacturing with Jaguar Land Rover, and in utilities we saw it with the Polish power grid, which was under threat recently. It is a significant threat and gap that needs significant capability development and capacity development. Lots of companies are looking to try to acquire OT expertise but it is very limited. My own business looked in Ireland and we found one business that we acquired. That is it. There is a significant need for investment, skills development and awareness around it.
Regulation will force the organisations using OT to try to up their game. This too encompasses operational technology in its scope, which means that perhaps practices that did not implement appropriate cyber hygiene and cyber controls will now need to be put in place. The challenge is there is not the skill set or resources to know how to do that. We need to invest significantly in developing those skill sets. In a lot of cases it is a cross conversion of IT skills. If a person has good networking and system skills, and if there is job displacement coming from AI into the IT sector, there is an opportunity to retool a lot of those resources into the OT space. AI does not naturally fit in OT because AI is probabilistic and nondeterministic. The manufacturing environment or a power grid need a deterministic outcome. There is a significant need for investment and focus in the area.
From an economic perspective, it also offers Ireland a significant opportunity because the OT space is poorly populated with software providers, hardware providers and skills providers. The opportunity exists for Ireland to become a particular leader in this space. Ireland has been playing catch-up in the IT security space. It is doing really well but playing catch-up nonetheless to get the higher levels of capability. In the OT space we have an opportunity to be the leader in this space if we grab the opportunity.
Comment on this
On the question about what the third level sector is doing in terms of communication, the CISO and the board, in the University of Galway we have two MSc programmes in cybersecurity. One is in adaptive cybersecurity, which is a highly technical programme that develops much-needed skills on the applied side. The programme I am involved in is the MSc in cybersecurity risk management. One of the important pieces there is to use the type of language of the boardroom. Not only do we educate our students about how to identify, manage and mitigate against risk, it is also about how to do it and communicate it in a way that resonates at boardroom level. We are a business school and that is the angle we come from. That is our background and history. In that sense, we are trying to generate an awareness at boardroom level of what the issues are and simplify the language on it.
What is vitally important is what happens if you do not pay attention, which business goals these things affect, what we can do about it and, going back to Mr. Kukreja's point, how we can measure whether it has worked or not. This is something that still needs an awful lot more work. This is an area where we have some PhDs working now. What we are missing is the capacity over the next three to four years to develop those skills, and develop those PhD skills, to say what the issues are that are going to be in front of us, not necessarily today but in three or four years' time, which are showing themselves. One of those I mentioned earlier. It is more a focus on behaviour of people and what they do. People will nod, they will listen and they will say, "Yes, I will change my password", but they will still reuse the same password or they will add the numbers 1,2 3 at the end of it. These types of activities are personal and people behaviours. We need to overcome those and we need to research that better. We need more investment there.
Comment on this
It is brilliant that we have this set of witnesses again in our discussion on cybersecurity at the committee. I will pick up on some of the wording Mr. Larkin used in one of his answers to Senator Craughwell. Mr. Larkin said that we have a significant national vulnerability at SME level and there are threat actors facing it. This is not a surprise to us given what we are hearing through other hearings and through our own work. Where does Ireland sit versus our European partners, in a kind of league table, around the amount of tax we receive and our resilience? Are we near the top, in the middle or near the bottom? There is a lot of talk of us playing catch-up and doing well but where does that fit into the constant evolving threat that is taking place and our definite work in meeting that? Who is making the more progress? That question is to everyone.
My second question is also to everyone. Are we structurally set up at State level to tackle this effectively? Currently the NCSC is under the Department of environment and communications. Should it be under the Department of Defence? Would that make much of a difference for the witnesses n terms of where they are at in industry and academia in representing the industry?
Comment on this
I was at a previous committee arguing that the NCSC should be moved from communications to either of the Departments of justice, the Taoiseach, or defence. It has moved, and this is more reflective of how we treat national security. Given that move, it is hard to argue that it should be moved again. That was positive. In that previous committee, we argued for investment in the National Cyber Security Centre, which was made. It is not to the level the cyber industry would have desired but it was significant nonetheless. The industry has seen significant benefit from that investment because the NCSC is very collaborative with industry. It is part of the Cyber Ireland board and we contribute a lot on policy and feedback on that. This is very important.
In terms of ranking, there is an international benchmark, which is the International Telecommunication Union, ITU, global cybersecurity index. This is brought out every number of years and updated. It is quite holistic in the sense that it is a comprehensive framework. It assesses countries nationally on capability. It does not just look at the SME sector or one particular sector; it looks at broad capability.
It is fair to say we are mid-table on that. I have not looked at the recent index on it, but we were mid-table. Again, that reflects an opportunity to improve. Since those assessments were made five or seven years ago, we have made substantial progress in terms of bodies like Cyber Ireland and capability in the National Cyber Security Centre, etc., that should ultimately improve those rankings. I would say that is fair.
One of the major gaps we have, as the Deputy identified, is we do not have an SME cybersecurity standard and some of the standards are probably not affordable or implementable for SMEs. Hopefully, that has been remedied. The National Cyber Security Centre and Ireland have taken part ownership of the cyber fundamentals framework, which is coming from collaboration in Europe. The aspiration is that a basic version of that would be a SME cybersecurity framework, which would allow a basic level of certification of SMEs. That would help with an independent benchmark and the demonstration of SMEs to a board that they have good cyber hygiene. More importantly, and it one of the reasons that, for example, we are collaborating with ISME, is to allow demonstration up the supply chain to say “We have good cyber hygiene, so therefore deal with us”. That will be an important element and is on the agenda. I am not sure what the timeframe for it is.
Comment on this
If we look at the threat equation, globally it has changed. Since the launch of AI, open models are now able to articulate the threats and contextualise them, and there is now known knowledge and information that the guardrails around those AI boundaries are continuously being breached. The threat equation has absolutely gone up.
To look at organisations and board members - there was a question asked earlier on preparedness - what board members, the industry, organisations and departments are all dealing with is a continuous flux of ageing infrastructure, applications that need to be patched in quite a simple way because there were holes within them as they were built and as technology has developed, and there is the continuous influx of third, fourth, and fifth parties. The perimeter we have within the organisation has now become elastic. We have cloud providers, data centre hosting in-country and global hosting. Given the change in the threat environment and the elasticity of the perimeter, the ask of organisations is absolutely increasing. NIS2, the CER directive, and the CRA all do an amazing job, but they provide what they were specifically built for. It is about the interconnection and overlap of those and investment that goes into ensuring that once the control is ticked off, it is absolutely implemented.
That is where the concept of resilience engineered, which we talked about, comes in. If we say a control is there, how can we evidence it? How can we ensure that stress, not only within the organisation but across the organisation and common services, has been tested? How do we ensure the space between the stools, as we call it, where multiple organisations are dependent on service provider A, B, C, or D, should that exposure then result in a mass event, the concentration risk will be exposed? Have we tested it and will we be able to respond at speed?
Comment on this
Was the OpenAI threat an evolution the industry could see coming, or has it dramatically shifted the level of threat in a surprising, game-changing manner?
Comment on this
There are always signals to ask, when a new technology is developed, what the guardrails or harnesses put around it will be. If we look at what is publicly available in reports from a majority of the large or big AI, as we talk about it, outside of the models, knowledge and context being improved and developed, the guardrails that were broken, which we all know about, are no different from the guardrails currently in place. They are around what protects my server and network and the identities used to access. To put it simply, we all know that the walls need to be higher and to exist. It is just that the rabbits can now jump higher. What is the reconstruction of the walls and those controls and where does the onus now lie? It is across industry, into the manufacturers, if I can call them that, but also into the consumers.
Comment on this
I thank everybody for being here and bringing such useful and poignant information. I am aware of some of the challenges that exist in terms of our defence and cybersecurity. I want to break it down a little with regard to some of the terminology used.
Investing in our cyberdefence is primarily an investment in protecting our people. Any investment in cybersecurity or developing cyber resilience will be there to help us protect our jobs, economy, critical infrastructure, and even our democracy and people's access to credible information. It is a very live risk we are facing. My challenge is, even with the testimony of the witnesses, we are talking about research institutes and SMEs. We are the Joint Committee on Defence and National Security. What role do the witnesses see the Defence Forces having in creating and building on our national cyber resilience? The remit of this committee is quite narrow in that regard and given that many of the issues which have been mentioned relate to national security, this sits under the remit of the justice committee. What is the ask of the Defence Forces?
Comment on this
It is part of reimagining national defence. It is embracing that cyber is the fourth realm of warfare now. We have air, sea, land, cyber and then space. The role of defence is particular. At a pragmatic level, the Department of Defence "be aware" document that was circulated to every household, contributed towards building citizen resilience at a simple level. It was broader than cyber and was about major emergencies, but that was a good, concrete example of wider societal awareness about resilience.
There is a trend and shift happening. The language used around hybrid attack, etc. has really been thresholds of attack and thresholds of response to those attacks. We are moving to a point in time where cyberattacks are having significant and greater impact, and have moved up the realm of attack and response in some respects. They are not seen as soft, non-kinetic-----
Comment on this
Generally, the Government, society and the political body. We cannot have infinite defence because infinite defence, ultimately, is a very resource-intensive requirement. We need to move to deterrent.
Comment on this
We need to move to deterrent and deterrents do not always have to be kinetic. There are conversations happening at a European level around responding to cyberattacks, particularly where they are of state-origin or are state-aligned, and the notion of active cyberdefence, which increases deterrence. I am speaking personally, not necessarily on behalf of Cyber Ireland here. I am speaking personally and obviously with ex-military experience. There is a move ultimately to say that we need a deterrence level in response to state-sponsored or state-aligned cyberattacks.
Comment on this
Agreed, but that deterrent needs to be agile-----
Comment on this
-----continually. As Mr. Larkin mentioned, the threat is ever increasing. The technology behind those threats is increasing at such a pace and can be turned so quickly against us by bad actors who would choose to do that.
To focus a fine point on it, where is the responsibility? The last thing asked was where the onus now lies on responsibility in terms of the Defence Forces? What capability gap needs to be filled by the Defence Forces? How are we certain it is not currently being filled?
Comment on this
The historical role of providing resources of the National Cyber Security Centre is wise and prudent and should continue. The establishment of the cyber command should bring a capability to say it is not just response and defence. I assume there would be some notion of active cyber defence or offence, if we want to call it that, to increase the deterrence capability. Simply sitting continuously being attacked with no response and no implication is naive, whether that is at a national or European level.
Again, I am speaking personally not with my cyber hat on here. We need capability because the realm of cyber is now moving to the more traditional realm of attack and defence.
Comment on this
Correct, but what I am also trying to get at is that if we are on the outside as regular citizens, are trying to view what is happening in cyberdefence and are looking at what might be happening in the joint cyber command, there is lots of information we will not have access to. I am trying to be balanced in this because I recognise that there is a massive threat. I also recognise, and I am repeating myself, that technology is evolving so quickly it is going be really challenging for any state to keep up with the rapid acceleration of that, unless it has all eyes on it and a dedicated structure to do that. What I am trying to say is that even from the outside, when it comes to defence and national security, it is hard to assess what is a gap in capability versus what is a gap in information. We will not always get all of the information. It is about having trust that more capability is being developed by the Defence Forces to protect our citizens than we are openly aware of.
Comment on this
It is part of a patchwork of sovereignty. There is a broader sovereignty argument that simply says we have the capability for defence, including counter-attack if it ever came to that. It is part of that sovereignty patchwork. It is hard to look at defence in isolation in terms of cyber because it is so pervasive in the national resilience capability, so it is part of the patchwork. Looking at the broader sovereignty argument, we have sovereignty against a deterrence capability if needed. Where we were under persistent continuous attack from a nation state from a cyber perspective, we should have the capability to respond, disarm and even counter-attack appropriately to defend Ireland. That would be one example.
Another example of sovereignty that probably needs to be considered is that with regard to AI and other security technologies, we should not simply be a consumer of international technology because it can be turned off. As we witnessed even with AI, some of the capabilities coming out of Anthropic were throttled three or four months ago. We need capability not just in terms of counter-attack capability or deterrence capability. It goes back to the argument Cyber Ireland is making around investing into the national cyber research and innovation centre. It is saying that Ireland should be producing its own AI capability and technology as well because the ability to turn that off is at the flick of a switch, whether it is terrorism, geopolitical fragmentation, etc. It is an arms race, as has been alluded to, so we just have to stay in the race. We have to stay ahead of the attacker in the use of AI and AI technologies. Guard-rails are fine but, unfortunately, attackers are not regulated. They will not stay within the guard-rails
Comment on this
I agree. I have spoken about that previously. I definitely think that we need to have a collaboration between universities, research, the Defence Forces, our industry and our EU partners. That is the way to do it.
Comment on this
We need the capability to produce our own AI models and serve our security capability so that we are sovereign in terms of our ability to defend society.
Comment on this
I agree with that all-of-society approach but I am just asking about defence because this is the defence committee. That is our remit so that is my interest in particular.
Comment on this
As nobody else is indicating, I might ask a couple of questions until we go into the second round. The first question is around the lack of a national system for security vetting and clearance. What constraints is that placing on Irish cybersecurity research and collaboration?
Comment on this
There is security clearance gap at the moment. Professionals working in industry and researchers cannot get a security clearance for participation in EU research funding and contracts that require security clearance. That is affecting the research side, such as academics being able to participate in European defence and security research programmes at an EU level where significant funding is being provided under programmes like the European Defence Fund, which is an overall fund of €1 billion of which €100 million is going into research and development. On the industry side, there are many cybersecurity companies in Ireland that are involved with countries, governments and defence forces that require security clearances and, at the moment, they cannot get access to those.
Comment on this
My understanding is a national security authority that should have this responsibility needs to be established.
Comment on this
I think it is only the Department of justice.
Comment on this
I am thinking of it in the context of an ordinary member of An Garda Síochána. It is taking from 18 months up to two years to get basic clearance for somebody who has gone through it - this is for somebody who has not lived outside the State. That is just for an ordinary member of An Garda Síochána. Somebody who wants to join An Garda Síochána today can maybe wait up to two years to get that clearance. What do we need to do here in cybersecurity? Whose responsibility is it? Dr. Byrne is saying it is the responsibility of the Department of justice. What response has been received from the Department as to why clearance is taking so long?
Comment on this
I am not aware of what the actual challenge is regarding the establishment of a national security authority that would have responsibility for issuing security clearances, but it is a challenge that has been on the table for a number of years. It is not anything new to industry or researchers.
Comment on this
I am aware of one company in Ireland that was chasing a defence contract through Europe. Security clearance was not available. No Department has taken responsibility for it so the company set up a subsidiary in Hungary and got its security clearance there.
Comment on this
Surely there are huge risks around that. If we cannot even get the clearance that is needed right, how are we going to meet the challenges we are discussing this morning?
Comment on this
I will speak based on my personal experience. I am an Australian citizen and am really blessed to be in this country with the opportunities it has given us. In Australia, as part of Five Eyes, I was working with and on a number of jobs that required clearance. Australia has set up levels of clearance in line with Five Eyes. Based on our outreach, perhaps we could look at how Australia has done it. As ordinary citizens working with a professional services firm who were there to work in federal government, we required clearance. I had a specific level of clearance that took six months after having put in the paperwork and sponsorship from the employer. It goes through all the police vetting, personal vetting and bank vetting. Depending on the level of clearance, the intrusion into your bank accounts and personal life becomes higher. Six to nine months was the period in Australia in respect of the Five Eyes level of clearance. We do not have to reinvent how it is done. I do not know how the Government or Departments here would do it but there are examples, and I have personally lived through it, where once you have it, the rechecking or the continuous assessment of it is not onerous. Perhaps that is something the committee could take away and have a look at.
Comment on this
It is quite shocking that we are at this stage facing so many different threats, not least OpenAI and espionage and everything else, and we do not have a proper clearance system. We have to get the basics right and that seems to be very basic. It is something we as a committee will follow up with an Taoiseach and the Department of justice.
In terms of the new skills we need, and linking up further and higher education with the labour force that is needed for the future, where do placements or internships come from? Who is doing the internships at the moment to build on the skills to allow even students who are studying, say, computer science or relevant courses? Are there a sufficient number of places for internships?
Comment on this
All universities, including ours, have dedicated placement officers who look after this activity. Typically, if a student is undergoing a degree programme, there will be either a six-month, nine-month or 12-month placement involved in that, depending on the institution and the degree. It is fantastic for the student and these young people to come back so changed, so different and so exposed to what the workplace is like. Those places tend to come in waves. When times are good they are plentiful and when times are a bit tighter it is a bit more difficult. We have the expertise and the engines in our university to chase those and make them happen for the benefit of students. Most of those places are in Ireland; some of them are international.
Comment on this
I can tell you that it is not working across the board, that there are not a sufficient number of places and that all the universities and the HEIs are not working in the same way to get the placements that are necessary in order to do that. That requires looking at. How much collaboration is there between the HEIs? If Galway has a sufficient number of places for internships, is there that collaboration there?
Comment on this
I am unaware of the level of collaboration between the institutions across sharing of those places. I just do not know. All the universities are always chasing more. We are always chasing more places. I think we have that common problem. As to whether we are sharing available places, we certainly do that when it is our own internal colleges and among our programmes. For example, we might have a company that takes somebody from September all the way to Christmas and then a different programme kicks in with a different student from January onwards for that continuity. We are always chasing more.
Comment on this
Is the Government playing its part in that in terms of the National Cyber Security Centre and others? Are there sufficient placements to enable students coming through? Dr. Byrne, I will go to you.
Comment on this
There is consistent talk about a cybersecurity skills shortage internationally and figures in the millions of professionals as regards a cybersecurity skills gap, but the reality is that it is much more nuanced than that. If you look at the Irish landscape, you will see industry and the public sector saying they have a shortage of cybersecurity professionals. However, a lot of those are specific roles with technical skills or professionals with five years-plus technical experience or experience in areas around operational technology. We have been promoting these cybersecurity careers and career opportunities for people and we have a lot of very strong courses coming out of universities.
If we look at really growing the pipeline of talent, however, we need to look outside of universities alone to see how we attract people who are in industry to upskill and cross-skill and provide opportunities for people coming from non-traditional academic backgrounds. What we have seen is that those people who are undertaking introductory courses in cybersecurity are finding it extremely challenging to get their first step on the ladder in their career in cybersecurity because the majority of companies are not looking for somebody with very limited experience to move into these types of roles. We have a gap here where we do not have enough graduate or internship-level opportunities for people to transition into senior cybersecurity roles. You could compare it to a football club. It is like Manchester United buying in the top players from across Europe but not having its own youth academy. That will become a challenge in years to come as well.
There are courses that are available, like the cyber apprenticeship level 6 from FIT, but even finding roles or internships for those people on the course has been a challenge for FIT, which is organising that. Even within Government, the Government and the public sector will always have a challenge in recruiting cybersecurity professionals because of the salaries that are provided in industry. That is maybe an opportunity for the Government to look at graduate and internship roles. There is a challenge specifically with the FIT apprenticeship in that my understanding is that if someone who works in the local authority took on two people in the cyber apprenticeship, it is a two-year course and they cannot hire them after the course because the Civil Service requires four years of experience, so those people then have to leave.
Comment on this
Those are the kind of barriers I am talking about that we really need to examine and get up to speed with. While things might appear to be okay overall, when you lift the bonnet on things that are really happening, they are not happening in that space. That is really impacting our resilience and, obviously, for us, as the Committee on Defence and National Security, it is a national security issue as well if we do not have this pipeline there.
I am conscious I have gone over time. Do you mind if I move on to Senator Gerard Craughwell and you can maybe, in the conversation-----
Comment on this
Thank you, Chair. It is not like you to go over time.
I have a couple of quick questions. As regards Cyber Ireland, Mr. Pat Larkin and Dr. Eoin Byrne have done a massive amount of work on bringing together industry. My question for them is, how successful is Cyber Ireland at convincing the smaller SMEs that they need to come on board, need to be a part of Cyber Ireland and need to get themselves affiliated in some way with it?
I will move on to Professor Thomas Acton. With respect to funding, I know a lot of his students are non-nationals. Attracting indigenous students seems to be a problem. Is that because we have a blind spot here in Leinster House with respect to cyber and making it an important issue for families and the community at large? Is that a problem?
I have a question for Mr. Kukreja. Foreign direct investment in this country is massive. We note that the French, the Germans and the Nordic countries are all moving away from shrink-wrapped software, and moving into open source and developing their own software. Our whole system is shrink-wrapped and wrapped up in proprietary software. Does Mr. Kukreja see a need to change or does he think we are fine to motor on as we are?
Those are three separate issues.
Comment on this
On the point about attracting SMEs to join Cyber Ireland, we are an industry cybersecurity group. Our members are cybersecurity companies, whether they be Irish companies or large multinationals. We do not represent end-user SMEs, but how we approach that is partnering with other industry sectoral groups, whether that be ISME or actual specific sectoral groups. We have done projects around cybersecurity for manufacturing with the manufacturing industry association in cluster 8 as well as in Northern Ireland. That project looked at supporting cyber resilience around OT and manufacturing for these companies, doing a cybersecurity risk assessment but also an OT risk assessment with them. These manufacturing companies are part of a global supply chain, so it is then a matter of seeing how we can partner a cybersecurity industry and solution providers to understand the needs of these manufacturing companies. That is the opportunity we see. It is how industry bodies like us can partner with other end users and sectoral bodies across manufacturing, healthcare and financial services to work with their SMEs to support cyber resilience. If funding were driven into industry groups to support cyber resilience, we could take the approach we have taken for manufacturing and scale it across other industry sectors as well.
Comment on this
I do not want to cut across Dr. Byrne but he mentioned Northern Ireland. We should take note of the fact that Cyber Ireland, largely driven by people like Dr. Byrne and Mr. Larkin, teamed up with NI Cyber and that the island of Ireland is now being treated as a single entity for cyber. That is hugely down to innovative people in Cyber Ireland and in NI Cyber. We should make that point.
Comment on this
I thank the Senator for his question about international students. It is not really anything to do with any sort of lack of foresight. It is simply to do with underfunding of the higher education sector, which has been chronic now for a long time. The result of that is that all the universities will start to chase more international students because of the fee income they bring and to globalise the classroom. We never displace local students but we add more in from an international source largely because of the underfunding. The chairs of the governing authorities of the universities have recently collectively pointed this out and have asked for increased funding.
Comment on this
It is. The good news is that if we only have half the room here who are only too willing to work with one another, we can solve a lot of these issues. We can work with EY. We have already started the dialogue. We were working together on putting together what we could do if we had some resources to do it with, and looking at what problems we could conquer.
Comment on this
On sovereign cyber resilience, I will talk about sovereign here. Our view is that sovereign does not mean isolated or domestically owned. We have used the terminology "shrink-wrapped". For where Ireland is, for us, sovereignty should be of outcomes and knowing what must continue. Let us just take it back to why we are here today. It is about the concept of what must continue, what dependencies matter, which dependencies matter, how recovery will happen, who must be engaged, and whether the State can retain control. With those principles of dependency mapping, understanding what our minimum operating state is and then continuously testing it, with the level of skill, resources and the challenges ahead, that is where the focus and investment absolutely needs to go to ensure that the State can function through stress. With the people we have and the technologies that we have implemented, we can get really good at those. We have examples from Germany and France trying to come up with technologies that will be sovereign to themselves, but let us respect the size of our country. Let us respect the size of our population and then let us look at the skills that we have to build from the ground up, as compared to importing talent who will then call Ireland their home.
The immediate observation for me is trying to build something that is from the ground up, which possibly will be sovereign, will take years to prove itself because we will then need to implement it across critical infrastructure. We have talked about OT. I am sure something that is homegrown will be very good but it will take years to prove itself. How responsible would we be if just in the name of sovereignty and software we let something into one of our grids which then does not perform and could then lead to an event? That exposure could be avoided.
To reiterate, where Ireland sits, the investments we have had from organisations, proven technology that operates given the threat of AI and the opportunity that AI presents, sovereignty should be looked at in regard to whether we can recover, how we will recover, if the dependencies between our critical infrastructure and our private organisations have been mapped and if we will be able to operate through stress. We must look at the testing of resilience across our interconnected ecosystem as compared to saying we need something sovereign just to tick a box. It goes back to the argument of policy is not cyber. Testing is required because assurance that sits on paper and shelves is not evidence you need that you can stand over.
In the same way, sovereign is about retaining control, ensuring we can operate through stress and knowing what absolutely must continue. For us, that is the concept of resilience engineered and that is where for a resilient nation all of it actually comes together. It is an organising idea to take away the uncertainty and doubt.
Comment on this
I thank the witnesses very much for being here today. I have to apologise as I had to go to the Order of Business and then I had another parliamentary commitment so that is why I was coming in and out. In that vein, I apologise if I ask a question that has already been asked.
I want to declare a conflict of interest. "Captain" Larkin and I soldiered together on the young officers, YO, artillery course in 1992, which in the history of the artillery corps is considered a benchmark for excellence. We were voted artillery officers most likely to succeed that year. So here we are.
I was struck by what Mr. Larkin said about deterrence and resilience in terms of the concept of infinite security. I had the privilege of being at a very comprehensive day of briefings and frank exchanges of views in the Pentagon in Washington just over a year ago. The subject of Ireland's defence status arose in the conversation. To be very brief, they said given the resources, our geographical location and the threat environment, Ireland should be investing in deterrence and resilience, which are two phrases Mr. Larkin has come up with over and over again. They said Ireland has a unique skill set to evolve and create integrated, attritive systems across all domains - maritime, air, ground and cyber. In that regard, they made the observation that Ireland has a unique skill set with our digital economy, the multinationals that are based here, our IT and tech expertise and all of the data that we control and hold here. They were of the view that we could become world leaders. I missed the full answer as to where we sit in the European league table. Would the witnesses share that view about Ireland?
The committee has heard that the Department of Defence is considering investing €6 billion in armoured vehicles. I have asked the Minister, the Secretary General and the Chief of Staff, what the hypothesised threat is. Do they believe that Ireland is going to have a ground invasion by armoured mechanised formations? They are either unwilling or unable to answer those questions. Should we be investing that type of money into innovation and the unique skill sets we have to evolve our own unique integrated, attritive systems in all domains as part of our deterrence and resilience?
The last question is related to that. Do they think it would be useful to expand our Reserve to allow for voluntary service from people like themselves? Would any of them be willing to give expression to their citizenship by assisting in our defence and security infrastructure?
Comment on this
I will go with the Reserve question first. It is a fundamental missed opportunity. There was a conversation at one point. In the early stages it was informal, for example, during Covid the ability for industry to offer support nationally in the event of a catastrophic event. That conversation did not really take form or purpose in some respects. In terms of resilience, the notion that industry would contribute to national defence and national protection is definitely a missed opportunity. How that is formed is probably at two levels. There is probably a defence element in terms of the Defence Forces, etc., but, similarly, there is an opportunity for people who might have concerns about militarism or whatever you want to call it in, for example, the National Cyber Security Centre which has much more of a defence rather than an offence remit. Speaking personally rather than on behalf of Cyber Ireland, that is a missed opportunity. It is a capability we could add that would significantly bolster the national resilience piece. There is a militaristic perspective and a national defence capability as well.
If we think realistically about this, if Ireland were kinetically attacked on a daily basis, whether by attributable or non-attributable state actors, we would be very concerned. If bombs or bullets were landing on institutions, commercial or State, right now, we would be very concerned and we would be calling in the United Nations. Yet, effectively, that is happening at a cyber level. It has happened. The seminal event had some level of state attribution. This is not just Ireland. Globally, from an international law perspective, we have got to reconcile it. The term hybrid attack or cyberattack is trying to downplay what is in reality happening. There is an international law dimension that has to come in. There is a deterrence capability that says that you cannot just continuously attack a state, whether it is through non-attributable elements or directly, without consequences. The like-for-like consequences would be cyber offence or active cyberdefence or cyber retaliation, whatever we want to view as a deterrence, working in partnership with international law and all of that sort of stuff. That is where this is ultimately shifting towards.
Language coming from Germany, France, the UK and the US is starting to move towards the realm of active cyberdefence: you attack me and we will, at minimum, counter-attack to take away that attack capability, and even maybe attack in parallel so there is a deterrence at play. There is no deterrence right now. The sanctions regime is weak, international law is obviously fragmenting so you just leave an open playbook. The reality then is we are having to put much more cyberdefence and continuous cyberdefence resources in play to deal with the nation state element. Cyber criminals would be different, obviously, but in some respects that is policing in trying to deter that.
Comment on this
Just to build on the point around the HSE cyberattack, when Covid hit in 2020 the cybersecurity industry wanted to see how it could play its part, not being on the front lines in responding to the healthcare crisis. We in the industry reached out to the National Cyber Security Centre to ask what we could do. It was identified as a key risk that if there were a cyberattack on the health system in the State, and if it were a systemic attack that impacted all hospitals, there would need to be a significant response to this outside of the Government from industry support as well. We put out a call to industry to look for professionals who would be available to the Government in the immediate 24 hours or 48 hours after a significant systemic cyberattack. That was set up. We had a group of 50 individuals who were vetted beforehand for their expertise. That was provided to the National Cyber Security Centre. My understanding is that this was used limitedly in the response to the HSE attack. There was an opportunity to continue that on afterwards but there did not seem to be an appetite there, or the structures in place to allow it. Some of the issues were around insurance and indemnity and if people who were working in the industry were going into hospitals where there were existing contracts with other industry players how would that be managed.
To build on the point about investing in armoured vehicles and where should Ireland look to be a leader, you are looking at the European defence mechanism. Ireland is a relatively small country with a small budget. If we look at other leading countries, Estonia has been a cybersecurity leader for two decades now because it has an existential threat on its doorstep in Russia and the cyberattacks that have happened historically. Estonia has taken a whole-of-government approach to addressing cybersecurity, not just looking at protecting critical national infrastructure but also educating the whole of society and supporting defence in industry. It has now become the leader for the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which is based there, and which Ireland is participating in. It is those types of examples we should be learning from to see should we be investing in cybersecurity to become the leader in defence as part of European networks.
Comment on this
I will add to the points made by Mr. Larkin and Dr. Byrne. The answer to the fundamental question of should we be investing in other things outside the artillery is "Yes". We should be investing in the invisible. We should stop relying on our five human senses to tell us what a threat is. If we see the fin of a drone sitting in somebody's garden, if we can smell the carbon and if we can see it, then we react quite humanly to that. We know we have been attacked. With the invisible in cyberspace, number one, we are not even sure we have been attacked. It might have been months earlier when we had a penetration in our systems. Second, as I mentioned in my opening statement, a lot of people do not even realise they are being attacked. They do not. Their politics are being polarised and their views are being skewed intentionally in one direction or another. I would ask the question: why would a nation be interested in ripping up our undersea cables when they can use those very cables to bring that about, to polarise our society, to get us infighting - and centrist governments are the first to lose here - and to get people fighting amongst themselves and create discord in nations that are not favourable towards others?
Comment on this
It has been a great debate. I would always welcome more advanced skills with which we can continue to build our differentiator, absolutely investing in cyber capability that can then be used within our organisations, and then to export our skills and showcase into Europe and the US that we have a rich pool. I think that will always be welcome. Let us consider all of the conversations. Senator Clonan was in the US and heard that the US also looks at Ireland and our positioning as a country that can very quickly not only develop talent but export talent as well. The cyber companies, with support, that are now operating in the US are a testament that if investment is there and if we look at cyber as an economic development capability, then a lot can be achieved.
Comment on this
Following on from the idea of investing in the invisible, Estonia was mentioned but we also need to challenge the idea very prevalent in our society that countries like Estonia have a very real threat because it is right next door. In cyberspace we are all equidistant from the bad actors. Geography does not play a part. Physical geography does not because in the cyber domain we are all equidistant. I just wanted to follow on from that point.
Comment on this
It is an important point but I will not open this up to the witnesses if that is okay. On behalf of the committee I thank all the witnesses for their time today and the valuable engagement this morning. We will now suspend briefly to allow the witnesses to exit the committee. The committee will then go into private session.