Today's meeting is to discuss EU enlargement, which is a key part of our work programme. As part of this module of hearings, the committee will engage with ambassadors and diplomats accredited to Ireland to discuss their countries' perspectives of current developments in the accession process. I am very pleased to welcome representatives from the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Moldova, namely, H.E. Dr. Uran Ferizi, ambassador, and Dr. Flamur Krasniqi, both from the Embassy of Albania, and Ms Aliona Rusu, who is the political counsellor in the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova, which we can almost see from here as it is almost next door to us on Mount Street. Our aim is to have an informative discussion about your perspectives on the process, where each of your countries is, issues you might have, things you feel are going well, and anything like that, to enhance our understanding of the process to date, but also to explore what is left to be done in respect of each of you.

The enlargement process remains a merit-based one rooted deeply in the Copenhagen criteria, and it is encouraging to see enlargement re-emerge on the EU agenda. It is a key part of our work programme. I think a lot of committee members have expressed frustration at the slow pace of enlargement, and I am sure the witnesses will have a perspective on that. We are looking forward to our Presidency coming up in July. When we held the Presidency in the first half of 2004, we had the largest ever enlargement of ten countries into the European Union, and it was a real privilege for us to be a part of that. We have had only three enlargements since then, with Bulgaria, Romania and, in 2013, Croatia. I remind members that this session is only scheduled for one hour, so please be concise and to the point in your interactions.

I have to read a note on privilege before we begin. Witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make any charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative they comply with this direction. I am sure this is not a necessary warning but we are obliged to read it out. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I stress to members that today's sessions are intended to be informative of our work on this subject and to garner an understanding of the perspective of each candidate country on current developments and challenges.

I will start with the witnesses' statements and then go to members for questions.

Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh agus a chomhaltaí oirirce an Chomhchoiste um Ghnóthaí an Aontais Eorpaigh. It is an honour to represent the Republic of Albania here today and to update the committee on our progress towards European Union membership. Ireland's own transformation through EU integration remains a powerful example for us.

We deeply appreciate Ireland’s consistent support for enlargement and for the European future of the western Balkans.

Albania’s accession process has entered a decisive phase. Our objective is clear: to conclude negotiations by the end of 2027 and achieve full membership by 2030. Since opening negotiations in October 2024 with the fundamentals cluster, Albania has opened all six clusters and all 33 negotiating chapters within just over a year. This reflects sustained political commitment, institutional preparedness and administrative capacity. We are now transitioning from opening chapters to closing them - a phase that requires deep implementation, measurable results and a solid track record.

The most important milestone ahead is the European Commission’s interim benchmark assessment report under "Cluster 1 - Fundamentals”. These benchmarks, covering judiciary reform, anticorruption, fundamental rights and internal security, are the backbone of our accession process. To address them, our Parliament recently adopted a comprehensive package of 12 laws. These reforms strengthen anticorruption safeguards, introduce Albania’s first lobbying law, reinforce whistleblower protections, enhance transparency in public office, decriminalise defamation for journalists acting in good faith and align our criminal code with key EU directives on organised crime, money laundering and terrorism. This is not legislative activity for its own sake; it is part of a broader institutional transformation.

Justice reform remains central. Independent institutions such as the Special Structure for the Fight Against Corruption and Organised Crime, SPAK, are delivering concrete results in high-level corruption cases. Asset recovery, investigations and final convictions are increasing. These reforms are designed to be irreversible and are anchored in independent institutions and constitutional guarantees.

We recognise that implementation is what ultimately builds credibility. We continue to work closely with the European Commission to address areas where further progress is needed, including media freedom, electoral standards and the informal economy. Under the EU growth plan, Albania has completed all core reform measures and has received substantial financial support to advance infrastructure and economic convergence. Our recent membership in the single euro payments area, SEPA, reduces transaction costs for citizens and businesses. We expect further integration steps, including participation in the EU roaming area, which will bring tangible benefits to our citizens even before full membership.

Albania maintains 100% alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including sanctions against Russia and Belarus. As a NATO member, we actively contribute to regional and European security.

For Albania, enlargement is not simply a technical process; it is a strategic investment in stability, democracy and shared European values. A credible, merit-based enlargement policy strengthens not only candidate countries but the EU itself, particularly in today’s geopolitical environment. Albania seeks no shortcuts. We seek fairness, clarity and recognition of our progress. Our reforms are deep and our commitment is long term.

Albania sees itself as a future member of the Union and as a contributor to a stronger, more secure Europe. We deeply value Ireland’s long-standing support and partnership, especially the steadfast backing and leadership we anticipate during its upcoming Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which will help to advance the enlargement agenda at a critical moment. We look forward to continuing this journey together. I thank committee members and welcome their questions.

Esteemed Chair of the committee and distinguished members, it is a great honour to address the Joint Committee on European Union Affairs of Ireland, a country whose European journey remains one of the clearest examples of how EU membership can transform a small state into a confident, competitive and influential voice within the Union. Allow me to say how much Moldova welcomes Ireland’s upcoming Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2026 and express our appreciation for Ireland’s openness in placing enlargement among the priorities of its Presidency. In today’s geopolitical environment, this is not simply a policy choice; it is a strategic investment in Europe’s security and unity. For Moldova, the clarity and ambition of Ireland’s approach send a powerful signal that enlargement remains credible, merit-based and forward-looking.

Moldova comes before the committee with a strong and unequivocal mandate for European integration. Following the referendum and presidential elections in 2024, and the parliamentary elections in 2025, both the executive and legislative branches are fully aligned in their commitment to bring the Republic of Moldova into the European Union. This is a national direction, democratically validated and institutionally consolidated. We deeply feel we have a narrow window of historical opportunity before us. Accession for Moldova is not an abstract geopolitical aspiration; it is about safeguarding our democracy, strengthening the rule of law and ensuring our state remains resilient in the face of constant hybrid pressure, from foreign information manipulation and cyberattacks to energy blackmail and illicit political financing. In this context, there is a clear understanding in our society that this is a decisive moment and that we must move forward with reforms while the enlargement momentum is present. Our administration may be small, but it is agile and highly co-ordinated. Since applying for EU membership, we have consistently demonstrated that what initially seemed impossible - responding to the Commission’s questionnaire, completing the screening process and preparing negotiating positions - can be achieved through discipline and political will. Our accession co-ordination mechanism is streamlined, politically backed at the highest level and capable of delivering reforms at speed. Our targets are ambitious but we have proved we can deliver.

While we are grateful for the possibility to front-load the work and start technical negotiations with the European Commission on the benchmarks for each chapter, we sincerely hope that this year we will be able to formally open accession negotiations on all clusters. We are doing our homework so that, once political consensus among member states is reached, there will be no technical obstacles on the Moldovan side. We look ahead to Ireland’s Presidency in 2026 as an important milestone to consolidate further progress in the negotiations.

Moldova’s accession is not only about Moldova. It is strategically important for Europe as a whole, and for Ukraine in particular. In times of crisis, Moldova has proven to be a security provider. We have hosted hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees, managed our borders responsibly, strengthened efforts against organised crime and illegal migration, and aligned ourselves consistently with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. We are committed to full alignment with that policy before accession. We have also built resilience under extreme circumstances. Moldova has gained first-hand experience in countering foreign information manipulation and interference, resisting cyberattacks and navigating a sustained hybrid war environment. We have reduced our dependence on Russian gas from near total reliance to zero in a very short period of time. This transformation required political courage, institutional co-ordination and societal resilience. These experiences will make Moldova not only a beneficiary of European security, but a contributor to it.

At the core of our efforts are the European Union’s fundamental values. Moldova’s European path speaks to the enduring attractiveness of the EU model based on democracy, rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. We fully internalise the principle that everything in the accession process begins and ends with the fundamentals. Justice reform is therefore our central priority. This year, we plan to continue advancing the external evaluation of judges and prosecutors, clarifying and strengthening the anticorruption institutional architecture, further aligning our legislation with EU and international standards on justice, democracy, rule of law and human rights, and accelerating the digitalisation of the judicial system.

These reforms are essential to ensure that the transformation is deep, credible and irreversible.

Distinguished members, Ireland’s European story shows that small states do not lose themselves in the Union - they gain strength and voice. Moldova shares these convictions, and we approach accession not as a symbolic end point, but as a transformative process that will strengthen both our country and the European Union. With this committee’s continued support and enlargement firmly anchored in Europe's strategic agenda, including during the Irish Presidency this year, we are determined to make decisive progress on our European path.

I thank Ms Rusu. I will now move to members' questions. Members are aware they have five minutes for the questions and answers. The first person I have listed is Deputy O’Donoghue. Before I call him, I want to say that I will soon have to step out to take a speaking slot, as does Senator Davitt. Is there somebody who will volunteer to take the Chair while I am absent? I suggest Deputy Butterly take it.

Okay.

Is that agreed? Agreed. I will only be gone for ten minutes.

I welcome the witnesses and thank them for giving us the background of where they are and where they want to go. One of the positive offshoots geopolitically of a world in turmoil, is that enlargement seems to be back on the agenda in the EU. I have two questions. I would rather hear from the witnesses than have them hear from me.

There are problems in the EU in the way that we make decisions. There is no doubt about that. The bigger we get, the more compounded that is going to be. Are our witnesses supportive of institutional reform within the EU in how the bloc makes decisions so we can do it more quickly? What do the witnesses see as being the biggest hurdle for their countries in meeting the accession criteria that Ireland could assist with when our Presidency starts?

Something I forgot to say earlier was that, although we were here to give evidence, we were also open to receiving feedback and suggestions. Members are very welcome to offer those; we are very receptive to that.

When it comes to reform, we are working towards full membership, and we are aware that the European Union is undergoing its own debate and internal dialogue about its future. We are very supportive of that. We acknowledge the difficulties at the moment, but we have not reached the stage yet where we are decision makers. We are doing our homework.

It was an unfair question anyway.

Yes. If I understood the Deputy correctly, he asked what Ireland could do to support us. It can do a lot. I should start by saying that Ireland has already done a lot. It is one of our staunchest supporters in principle but also in action. What Ireland can do is just keep that up, for a start. Second, it can convince other members who can be sceptical. Across Europe, there is some scepticism towards enlargement. The way that Ireland has articulated the benefits of enlargement with previous accession states, but also future members, is convincing. It is also slightly impartial and different coming from Ireland to one of our neighbours. In the past, Ireland has shared its own experience. We have had so many meetings with members of the Irish Government and various committees, and we have learned a lot. We hope to continue that.

First of all, what the Republic of Moldova expects for this year is opening negotiations on all six clusters. We have opened the technical discussions on clusters 1, 2 and 6 and we are waiting for the benchmark for clusters 3, 4 and 5. We are very much looking forward during the Presidency of Ireland to having all six clusters opened.

We want to join a strong European Union, and we follow with interest the discussions on reforms. We have already started to implement the main three roadmaps according to cluster 1, namely, the roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration and the functioning of the democratic institutions. Ireland has already started to help us in capability building. There is a programme organised by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, with the involvement of the Institute for Public Administration from Ireland and an institute from Montenegro. Already, 15 public servants from Moldova have participated in that. We look forward to continuing that programme.

Cuirim fáilte roimh na finnéithe go léir. Any time we have dealt with enlargement over the past number of years, the biggest issue countries have had is the fact that they have not always been met half way. It is fair to say that there was probably a considerable amount of time when enlargement was a phrase and not a reality that anyone could see happening. There was a fear, particularly among the French and others, of an easternising. As Deputy O'Donoghue said, the geopolitical circumstances, particularly as regards Ukraine, have led to a change.

It is fairly obvious that the Copenhagen criteria have to be met. The countries are working through their clusters, for want of a better term. I will ask about a number of matters. The biggest issue that was stated was that if we were not giving countries an opportunity to join the European Union, we were not leaving them with many other options. Therefore, there are other places and forces at play, and they will be looking to take people within their sphere of influence and whatever else. Moldova, in the public domain, has had its own particular issues, down to the fact that Russia is its neighbour and, obviously, is huge.

In relation to the forces within Albania and Moldova that would be against them moving towards the European Union, what are the biggest issues in meeting the Copenhagen criteria? Beyond that, and particularly in Moldova's case, what are the countries doing in relation to those forces that are against them joining the EU? I am referring to combating everything from cyberattacks right through to hybrid warfare, disinformation and misinformation. Those questions are for whoever wishes to take them first.

I thank Deputy Ó Murchú. It is true that the enlargement process has an end, but as I said earlier, we are not doing it for accession’s sake. We are doing it because we want to reach those European Union standards. It is true that benefits that come along the way are an encouragement and an appreciation of the work done, but they are also an instrument for telling the citizens that the system works.

Are there any forces inside the country? In the case of Albania, we like to quote the 92% approval rate of the European Union. We are very much for it.

In the cross-section of society, there is agreement that this is the road to be taken, whether one supports the Government or the Opposition. A progress report by the European Commission in November 2025 gave a realistic and balanced evaluation. It put Albania among the best and most advanced western Balkan candidates in its alignment with EU standards. It recognised credible progress in justice reform, the fight against corruption, modernisation of the public administration, energy, and alignment with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. It appreciated the macroeconomic performance, but it also identified areas that required further acceleration. These included media freedom, electoral standards, environmental and consumer protection, and tackling the informal economy. We look at these objectively. We accept them and we intensify the co-operation with the Commission to address these points. In 2 February this year, we introduced 12 Acts in Parliament that were designed to close these remaining critical gaps under the fundamentals cluster. We expect a positive report in the interim benchmark assessment report, IBAR. It is encouraging that the Cypriot Presidency's stated intention is to seek swift Council consensus on IBAR, which would lead to the provisional chapter closures.

As the ambassador mentioned, I want to add that we have full support in Moldova for European integration. The report for enlargement published last year by the European Commission records all the results that Moldova achieved. Having the last electoral exercise for the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections in the last two years, we probably became an example of how to counter disinformation and fight against cyberattacks and hybrid attacks. We are doing our best. Of course, it depends on the EU members how we will proceed with the negotiations and then with the accession. If there is a blockage, it probably should be first of all decided inside the EU. Then, we are ready to proceed with the reforms and all the benchmarks, and to open negotiations and to close them as soon as possible when the European Union is ready to work with us.

I welcome the ambassador and the counsellor. It is good to have them both here. I will put a few questions to His Excellency and then to Ms Rusu. We have the EU Presidency coming up and it is an important time for us. The committee is spending quite a bit of time engaging with the Minister, the officials and, of course, other stakeholders. It is a really important time, particularly because of the multi-annual financial framework, MFF, funding and what is happening in the world now.

Are there any specific clusters where Albania would welcome support from the Irish Presidency to gain momentum in moving towards the 2027 target? One of the things we were talking about last week was how we could engage civil society in the EU Presidency and ensure that people get to see this as something important. How is the Albanian Government engaging civil society and ensuring public support as this journey moves forward? People are naturally concerned about change and are afraid that there may also be challenges. His Excellency mentioned that we all needed to work together and learn from one another. I agree completely. What will Albania bring to the table for EU membership? What will the EU gain from having Albania? I will go to Ms Rusu after that.

What Ireland can do during its Presidency is to help us achieve getting the first stage of the fundamentals cluster through. That is the most important thing. If the interim benchmark assessment report comes out positive, that would be very helpful for us, especially chapters 23 and 24. These are the most important of all the clusters. We have adopted all these laws through Parliament and we look forward to the Commission's evaluation hopefully being a positive one. That would reflect not just legislative alignment but also effective implementation of these laws and institutional sustainability. We hope that we will not reach that stage until June, but keeping the momentum is very important.

When it comes to public opinion in Albania, 92% of the people are very much for the EU. This is not just in politics but also civil society and across the population as a whole. There is continuous dialogue and communication between civil society and Government. However, I think there is a problem when it comes to the European Union as a whole in terms of the perception of enlargement and whether it is a good thing. According to the Eurobarometer, 56% are for it but only 32% feel adequately informed about it. Member states, but also candidate countries, have a responsibility to explain the strategic value of enlargement to the EU as a whole.

On the question of what Albania bring can bring, we may be a small country - a bit like Ireland relative to other countries that may feel bigger - but what we lack in size, we make up for in character and values. Albania has been a contributor to peace in the Balkans going back a long time. As part of NATO, we are providers of stability and security in Europe. Across the Euro-Atlantic area, we have shown that we can work with many others, as is the case with the Commission on the enlargement at the moment.

Tá fáilte romhaibh. I have a couple of follow-on questions. Other ambassadors are coming in later and we have talked to them in public session and private session. Some express frustration about the delays in many cases and how that has trickled down to their populations. The ambassador mentioned the levels of support in Albania.

Would he see that as a contributing factor to that support slipping away if this dragged on? He gave the date of 2027 and actually joining in 2030. Does he have a view on that going on for another decade? Also, have there been any discussions on the freedom of movement restrictions when Albania becomes a member of the EU? We have seen such requirements for other countries that have joined. There is a time limit on it. I wonder whether that has been discussed with Albania and what is the feeling about that.

To Ms Rusu on Moldova, there has been talk of frustration about the delay and so on but there has been some reporting lately about public sentiment in favour of joining Romania to form a single country. I believe the Moldovan President made comments that she was in favour of it. Is this something that is seen as preferable to going through the accession process and as a means of coming under the EU and NATO umbrellas at once? I believe that is an ongoing discussion within the country. Is that seen as a fast track into NATO? How strong is that sentiment within the country?

I thank Deputy Crowe. When he asks about the support in Albania, my training as a mathematician forbids me from making a prediction about what will happen in future and, looking at numbers, whether this 92% will go down or stay where it is. It is important that we are not stuck in limbo in the current position because this would undermine the trust in the European Union not just for candidate countries but also for member states as well. It would not be a good sign of a merit-based process. When we ask whether support is slipping away, there is some enthusiasm in Albania about integration because since the opening of chapters in mid-October 2024 with the fundamentals, Albania has held seven intergovernmental conferences and all the 33 chapters were opened in record time. That provided some fuel for this enthusiasm and provided Albanians with a roadmap for where this might lead. This was strongly supported by the Commission but also by member states, so we are positive. We do not want to think about getting stuck. We are looking ahead with a clear aim of accession to membership.

I am sorry, but I forget the second question.

It was about the freedom of movement restrictions that other countries have had. Has that come up as part of the discussions?

I am not aware of it. I do not think we have had a problem. There is very close co-operation between Albania's police force and European police forces and there has not been a problem that I am aware of.

I mean that if there is full accession and Albania joins the EU, there could be a restriction on the population moving for a certain period. Has that come up at all?

Not that I am aware of.

Okay.

Moldova joining Romania is not an official topic. Nothing official has been discussed. Moldova is a sovereign and independent state and by becoming a member of the EU we will probably be in the same family with Romania. By joining the EU, we can join Romania in a way. It was a topic discussed in society after an interview where the president answered the question of whether, in the event of a referendum on joining Romania or not, she would say "Yes". This was in the context of a last case that Moldova would do better to join Romania than go back under Russian influence. Officially, we are a candidate state to join the European Union.

Some would see it that if the country joins Romania, it would then automatically be a member of NATO. Is that the thinking of people who are in favour of this approach?

Generally in society we do not have 50% support for joining Romania, for example, so there is nothing official we could talk about. The Deputy mentioned being under the NATO umbrella. We have the support of Romania on all sectors for implementing the reforms in the form of expertise and technical assistance. Romanian is an official EU language, which makes it easier for us to implement the acquis and the reforms but Moldova does not have any official discussions about somehow being under the NATO umbrella with Romania. We are a neutral state, first of all. This neutrality, in a way, did not help us at times as because of it, we did not invest enough in our military capacity. We just need to improve our military capacity. In answer to the Deputy's question, there is no official discussion about being under the NATO umbrella or joining Romania.

Okay.

Does any other member want to come in? If not, I will ask a few questions of my own.

Beginning with the ambassador, you mentioned the obligation to explain the strategic value of enlargement. Does Albania feel it needs to explain to Europeans the value of enlargement or is it not something that is obvious? I feel very strongly that enlargement is good for the EU, good for individual states and good for states joining. Is that something you feel is a pressure? The next part of the question is do you feel the delays in processing that damage the credibility of the exercise within Albania?

Explaining enlargement to the sceptics in the EU may seem unnecessary to us who see the value but there are others who do not quite see it so readily. There is also an active campaign of misinformation and disinformation in Europe - whatever you may call it - that can whip up that anti-enlargement sentiment across many countries in the EU. It is therefore important to make it clear, without being patronising, that this is not a charity job but an investment in a more prosperous Europe to increase the market area and the area of stability and of prosperity. It is important to show accession is based on clear criteria and measurable results and that these steps are being assessed step by step and also achieved. It is good for EU countries but also for candidate countries and not just Albania and Montenegro which are front-runners but also other countries in the western Balkans. That is important. Does delay harm the credibility of this enlargement? I think so. It creates a vacuum for other bad actors to move in and sow division.

Frankly, I do not see that happening in Albania but I would not like to test it. Our road is clearly marked. We are here for EU membership and accession. We are doing our homework. Whenever inefficiencies or something that needs to be addressed are identified, we accept them and we work on them.

That is clear from the progress Albania has made. I congratulate the ambassador on that. Some members of the committee had the pleasure of being in Moldova in September during the elections. The result very much pro-European but would it be fair to say there is a substantial anti-European element within Moldova? Does Ms Rusu find the delays in processing Moldova's application for membership feed into that narrative or is this not a problem? How does Ms Rusu see the delay in enlargement affecting public opinion on Europe in Moldova?

An optimistic response on enlargement from the EU would of course help but generally, according to the results of the referendum, the majority of people support European integration of the country. Even in the Transnistrian region, a big part of society supports this. The political parties in opposition also in a way support the European integration process. They are not really against the European process. A positive response from the EU would help but if not, that does not mean we will stop.

Does Ms Rusu see Transnistria - or Gagauzia - as a further challenge to accession, given there is a province or section of the country where the central government essentially does not exert control? Does she see these as challenges as part of the accession process?

The reintegration of the country and integration into the EU are two parallel tracks. The Transnistrian region, in a way, is part of this European integration process. As an example, we can show 70% of exports going to the European market and people who travel to the EU with Moldovan passports, which gain free movement inside the EU. Now, they are supplied with gas from the European territory coming from Hungary, Romania and so on. Of course we would like to have reintegration before accession. This would be the ideal but if it does not happen, European integration is parallel to the reintegration of the country. This can happen after accession gradually and sectorally. There is a one plus one format now of dialogue with the Transnistrian so-called authorities. Last week there was a meeting in Tiraspol on that. They managed to have an exchange of information including on the European integration process. The Moldovan authorities are trying to explain the benefits and how they can be part of that.

I apologise; like everybody else, I had to speak in the Chamber. The Prime Minister of Albania said recently Russia was not going to attack any other EU country and Albania, as a member of NATO, would be an answer to any of those questions. I understand not just with Moldova, which I will ask about, that Russia is actively trying to discredit the country's EU accession and spread misinformation. Aside from Transnistria, my question for both witnesses is how serious is the Russian attempt to block their EU membership? Do they see any other EU member states being proactive in trying to block, if they can answer that diplomatically?

When it comes to Russia, I do not think I need to give a lecture on how good it is at sowing division and creating trouble. Of course in Moldova and Ukraine it is very obvious because the fighting is on the screen. When it comes to the Balkans, it does it through ways and means that are not so obvious. We see it in regions that would have been stable otherwise without the interference from Russia or its proxies. That applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and even to North Macedonia, which was once a front-runner. To paraphrase somebody else, they were once the future. It made so many sacrifices but it is at the back of the queue now. Russia is a big problem in the Balkans. The sooner we realise not just the obvious interfering but also the not-so-obvious, the better informed we will be to fight it. Russia has also ways of interfering in the EU and other bigger states. We have seen it through parties that are EU-sceptic and which do not see the value in enlargement. Countries as a whole we do not see a big problem as such. We are trying to work with all the countries in the EU. We respect the voting mechanism and unanimity. We are trying to work with all of them to convince them of the value of not just enlargement but in particular of Albania being part of it.

On Moldova, there is a lot of disinformation from the Russian side. Moldova is countering all of the instruments Russia is using. During the electoral campaign and before Russia was trying to finance different political parties in Moldova. The Moldovan authorities managed to counter that and investigate the members of those political parties. Some were even convicted.

Was the story about payments true or was it just a rumour - payments to people to vote?

I think the amount was €100 million for one electoral campaign, which is a lot. There are a lot of cyberattacks. I should also mention the electrical grid attack, which caused a blackout at the end of January, for example. Moldova is doing its best to diversify the sources of electricity and already has a non-Russian gas market. Moldova banned a lot of Russian TV channels, which were propagandistic. It is more about political parties being somehow directed from the Kremlin but Moldova is countering that. The results show the Moldovan population supports the pro-European parties and does not give much support to the pro-Russian political parties.

It has been suggested the European Union should change its accession policy given the threats we face to fast-track countries that are nearly closing the chapters and let them finish them up later. I would support that personally.

No other members are indicating at this stage. Given that we had allocated an hour, I will draw a line under it here. I acknowledge the presence of the ambassador. I know he has travelled and taken great time to be here. I thank him for his time and congratulate him on the progress Albania has made in a short period. To Ms Rusu, I know H.E. Ms Costachi has been a very good friend of this committee and attended with the Deputy Prime Minister when she visited Ireland recently.

I am sorry she was not available to be here today but I thank Ms Rusu for being here. Again, I reiterate our thanks to both witnesses. We will resume in a moment with the Georgian and Turkish ambassadors. I am proposing we suspend for a minute and we might take a photograph, if it is convenient for people.

As I said in the first session, the purpose of today’s meeting is to discuss the potential enlargement of the European Union and engage with representatives of candidate countries that are going through or are engaged with that process. As with the first session, it is about informing us about the experiences of the witnesses’ countries and allowing the witnesses to help enhance our understanding of the progress and process to date, as well as explore the challenges that remain. I am pleased to welcome representatives from the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Türkiye regarding EU enlargement this afternoon: H.E. Ms Sophie Katsarava, ambassador of Georgia; and H.E. Ms Esra Cankorur, ambassador of Türkiye. We are delighted to hear from them. I will take their opening statements in that order, if that is okay. There will be five minutes for each opening statement. They have already been circulated to members of the committee.

Before witnesses give their opening statements, I am obliged to read a notice to remind witnesses of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in respect of an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply. I am sure that warning is not necessary but we are obliged to give it.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside of the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. We have no members joining online.

I stress to members that today’s sessions are intended to be informative for our work on this subject and to garner an understanding of the perspective of each candidate country on the current development and challenges. I invite the witnesses to deliver their opening statements.

I sincerely thank the distinguished Chair of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Union Affairs, Deputies and Senators for the opportunity to address the joint committee at this critically important moment for our region and in the lead-up to Ireland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Returning to Leinster House evokes vivid memories of my visit in 2018 when I addressed the joint committee on foreign affairs as a member of parliament and chair of the foreign affairs committee. Today, I have the distinct honour to represent my country as the ambassador of Georgia to Ireland at a time of profound transformation in our region and across the wider international landscape.

We meet at a time when the international order faces its most serious challenges in decades. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the European security architecture, while conflicts and instability elsewhere continue to generate far-reaching humanitarian, economic and political consequences. This February marked the fourth year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has caused destruction, suffering and displacement. I once again reaffirm Georgia’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For countries such as Georgia, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of conflict are not abstract notions but, rather, essential pillars of international stability. In this environment, steadfast support for international law, effective multilateral co-operation and principled engagement are indispensable to safeguarding peace, security and democratic values across our continent and beyond.

For Georgia, security and stability are lived realities shaped by painful recent experience. We have endured occupation and invasion, resulting in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons who remain unable to return to their homes. These events have left deep and lasting scars on our society, wounds that require time, patience and sustained commitment to heal. Our foremost objective is to prevent their recurrence and ensure that these wounds are neither reopened nor deepened.

For us, security is inseparable from peace, resilience and the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We firmly believe that the primary responsibility of any government is to ensure stability, security and prosperity for its citizens, the essential foundations for sustainable development and long-term national resilience. In today’s increasingly complex and unpredictable global environment, this responsibility has become both more demanding and more urgent. Governments must protect their societies from threats while preserving the conditions necessary for economic continuity and strategic stability.

Since regaining independence, Georgia has pursued a determined path of democratic transformation and institutional reform. A milestone in this journey has been the conclusion and implementation of the EU–Georgia association agreement, including the deep and comprehensive free trade area, DCFTA, which has significantly advanced our political association and economic integration with the European Union.

Concrete achievements include visa-free travel for Georgian citizens, enhanced political dialogue across key sectors - transport, energy, security and human rights - and Georgia’s integration into European frameworks such as the trans-European transport network and the energy community. Co-operation has been further strengthened through the common aviation area agreement, participation in EU programmes including Horizon Europe and Creative Europe, and partnerships with EU agencies such as Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. Together, these milestones define an ambitious and forward-looking agenda for EU–Georgia relations.

Georgia has consistently delivered on its commitments under the association agreement and the DCFTA. Substantial reforms have been implemented across economic and industrial policy, public procurement, customs, taxation, digital transformation, enterprise development, research and education, and social policy. To date, approximately 55% of the association agreement commitments and around 73% of the DCFTA obligations have been fulfilled.

Work is under way on the 2026 national action plan for implementation, while the 2025 progress report has been finalised and will soon be made public. As an EU candidate country, Georgia continues to contribute actively to the European Commission’s enlargement package and regularly submits reports under the visa liberalisation action plan and the visa suspension mechanism.

European integration remains a fundamental national choice for Georgia, enshrined in our constitution and firmly supported by our people. Candidate status, granted by European leaders, stands as historic recognition of this commitment.

Enhanced connectivity has become a central pillar of our co-operation. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia plays a vital role in promoting security, stability and resilience in the Black Sea region and beyond. We remain committed to contributing to the EU’s strategic approach to the region and advancing the objectives of the global gateway initiative.

We welcome the EU-funded study on cross-regional connectivity linking Europe, the Black Sea, the south Caucasus, Türkiye and central Asia, which underscores Georgia’s constructive role. We also welcome the designation of the Black Sea submarine electricity cable project as a project of mutual interest, a strategic initiative launched by Georgia to strengthen clean energy co-operation and diversify supply routes.

Georgia continues to modernise its transport and energy infrastructure in line with European standards. Since 2022, we have participated as an observer in the transport community, and since 2017, we have been a full signatory of the energy community treaty. Our energy policy prioritises renewable sources, efficiency and long-term sustainability, supported by comprehensive legislation and strategic planning.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has renewed momentum for EU enlargement, highlighting the strategic importance of deeper co-operation with associated partners. In this evolving geopolitical context, Georgia remains firmly committed to reform and constructive engagement with the European Union. Striving for peace, stability and the protection of sovereignty has rarely been more consequential. At a time when the rules-based international order is under strain, Georgia’s policy is guided by responsibility, restraint and a steadfast commitment to regional stability, an approach fully aligned with the EU’s strategic vision for the Black Sea region.

Despite the continued occupation of parts of our territory by Russia and ongoing security pressures, Georgia has acted in good faith in aligning with EU restrictive measures and maintaining close co-operation with relevant EU institutions.

We believe sustained dialogue is the cornerstone of strong partnerships. Georgia stands ready to continue engaging openly and constructively with the European Union, addressing all issues in a spirit of mutual respect and shared responsibility. We are confident that a strategic, balanced and forward-looking approach will enable our partnership to advance in line with our shared values, common interests and European aspirations.

Dia daoibh. It is a pleasure and honour for me to address the Joint Committee on European Union Affairs. I warmly salute you all. We value that this timely meeting on EU enlargement is being organised ahead of Ireland’s EU Presidency. This year, we are also celebrating the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Ireland. Parliamentary diplomacy and dialogue plays a crucial role in fostering mutual understanding and trust not only between Türkiye and Ireland but also between Türkiye and the EU.

The constructive and visionary approach of the Oireachtas and the European Parliament is important in achieving concrete outcomes in Türkiye-EU relations. In this context, we count on the valuable support of the distinguished Members of the Oireachtas, as well as the Irish delegation at the European Parliament, in pursuing an encouraging and balanced approach towards our country within the accession process and contributing constructively to Türkiye-EU relations.

The renewed momentum in the EU’s enlargement policy presents an important opportunity and has to be supported by a merit-based accession process, underpinned by a strong credible political commitment from the EU. At the same time, it is essential that the enlargement process remains a unifying framework and does not become a source of tension among member states and candidate countries. Ensuring transparency, fairness and equal treatment throughout the process is of key importance, as is avoiding selective or politically fragmented approaches to maintain consistency vis-à-vis all candidate countries.

Türkiye has been a candidate country to the EU since 1999 and started accession negotiations in 2005. As of today, 16 chapters have been opened for negotiations and one chapter has been provisionally closed. Unfortunately, Türkiye-EU relations came to a standstill again on 15 July 2019, due to the decisions taken by the EU Council on the pretext of Türkiye’s drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean.

With these decisions, high-level dialogue meetings on political, economic, energy and transport, as well the association Council meetings, were suspended. The pre-accession financial funds were cut and the European Investment Bank was invited to review its loans to Türkiye. However, in 2025, constructive steps were taken in the relations, such that high-level economic, trade, migration and security, climate, science, research, technology and innovation dialogues were held. We are glad to see that this momentum is maintained and strengthened in the first quarter of 2026.

Lately, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Ms Marta Kos, paid a visit to Türkiye last month and held high-level fruitful meetings. These contacts highlighted the importance of revitalizing Türkiye-EU relations in order to overcome geo-economic and geopolitical challenges at a time when the international system is being contested. With this understanding, Türkiye is determined to maintain the momentum in its relations with the EU. However, as the EU's current approach to Türkiye is still shaped by the parameters of 2019, the full potential of our relations has yet to be achieved. Considering that we are no longer in the political and strategic environment of 2019, Türkiye-EU relations need to be addressed with a renewed and holistic strategy.

At this point, I emphasise that EU membership continues to be a strategic objective for Türkiye. Every major crisis in our shared neighbourhood, along with the challenges related to security, defence, migration, energy and connectivity, underscore the strategic value of Türkiye-EU relations and the need for broader and institutionalised co-operation. In this context, we call on the EU to demonstrate its political will, adopt an holistic and visionary approach and translate dialogue into concrete action to strengthen the relations.

Our main expectations from the EU are the complete revocation of the Council conclusions of 15 July 2019 and, accordingly, the resumption of high-level political, energy and transport dialogue and association Council meetings, which serve as primary platforms for discussion and dialogue in critical areas; that the remaining restrictions on the operations of the European Investment Bank, EIB, in Türkiye be lifted; that the negotiations on the modernisation of the customs union be launched; that the Türkiye Investment Platform be enabled to be fully operational; and that the long-standing visa-related difficulties faced by business people be addressed to facilitate mobility and strengthen the economic relations. We value Ireland’s constructive contribution to Türkiye-EU relations on all these issues.

A brief look at the economic and trade ties will reveal that the EU is Türkiye’s number one trading partner and Türkiye is the EU's fifth largest trading partner. Two thirds of foreign direct investment in Türkiye originates from the EU. The customs union, in effect since 1996, represented a significant turning point in our economic and trade relations. However, the customs union also has problematic aspects stemming from its implementation, the most significant of which is the trade diversion and unfair competition risk arising from the reluctance of some countries with which the EU has signed free trade agreements to sign similar agreements with Türkiye, partly due to the advantage of accessing the Turkish market through the EU. This situation applies to the current EU-Mercosur and the EU-India free trade agreements.

Challenges facing the current global trading system such as trade wars and increasing protectionism are, in fact, driving Türkiye and the EU towards greater co-operation. Indeed, Türkiye is not only a candidate country but also a strategic partner of the EU in terms of the security and resilience of global supply chains. The common challenges we face in today's world make it impossible to manage trade relations with rules established 30 years ago. In this context, updating the customs union will offer significant opportunities to both sides in digitalisation, trade in services, sustainable development and next generation trade policies.

It is understood that the EU also aims to maintain its competitiveness, strengthen its position in the technology race and reinforce its innovation ecosystem in the face of a changing world. However, certain EU policies and legislative initiatives aimed at enhancing competitiveness may have the potential to undermine our high-level trade integration. As a customs union partner and a candidate country which has already adopted the majority of the EU’s trade regulations, and thus is an integral part of Europe’s value chains and industrial and innovation ecosystems, Türkiye’s inclusion in EU policies and legislative initiatives aimed at enhancing competitiveness is crucial.

With regard to the EU’s security and defence efforts, I emphasise that we all have a stake not just in EU security but European security. These efforts, therefore, need to be inclusive and collective. In this vein, as a NATO member and EU candidate country, Türkiye’s participation in the security action for Europe, SAFE, mechanism would be a symbolic step, representative of the EU’s broad and strategic vision for European defence and security.

As Ireland is preparing to assume the EU Presidency in the second half of the year, I extend our best wishes. This will be the eighth time Ireland will hold the Presidency. It, therefore, brings significant experience and institutional memory to the task, especially at a time marked by numerous challenges. Indeed, Ireland will assume the Presidency during a challenging period. We are facing multifaceted global challenges that require unity, strategic vision and effective co-operation within Europe. These evolving dynamics also dictate a fresh look at Türkiye-EU relations. In a rapidly changing global environment, it is in our common interest to advance our co-operation on the basis of mutual benefit, strategic foresight and fairness. In this context, we are ready to work closely with Ireland and the EU in a realistic, constructive and forward-looking way.

Moreover, the upcoming EU Presidency will coincide with the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Ireland. This convergence of milestones offers a unique opportunity to further strengthen both Türkiye-Ireland relations and Türkiye-EU ties. We are hopeful that the Irish Presidency, with a constructive, positive and encouraging stance, will contribute to advancing Türkiye-EU relations through concrete and forward looking steps. In terms of the enlargement policy, we expect the Presidency to support a merit-based and credible accession process; ensure continuity and consistency to keep the momentum of the candidate countries; treat all candidates fairly and equally, in line with objective criteria and mutual interests; and ensure that the process remains free from short-term or narrowly defined political influences. In fact, Ireland’s support remains valuable not only during its Presidency, but at all times, in promoting a fair, balanced and strategic approach towards Türkiye within the EU framework.

We wish Ireland every success in its preparations and look forward to maintaining close dialogue and co-operation in the period ahead.

I thank the ambassador. I call members for questions and answers.

I welcome Their Excellencies. Since their arrival in Dublin, they have both been great exponents of their cultures and traditions and have been warm and welcoming hosts, trying to explain each country's position to Ireland. I have been to Türkiye a few times as a tourist. I had the pleasure of sailing on the Bosphorus for a little while. What a fabulous tourist product Türkiye has and a fabulous safe city. It has been a great pleasure.

Ireland and Georgia have links, again through its well-vaunted tourism on the Black Sea and through its agriculture, particularly Georgian wine. There are quite a few Georgian wines. Anyone who is fond of an odd beverage will know there are exceptional wines coming out of Georgia and there have been for quite a while. A friend of mine is a large wine merchant and he is always singing the praises of Georgian wines and products.

Türkiye and Georgia are two countries that have quite a lot in common with Ireland from the point of view of agriculture and tourism. Where they are located, at the crossroads of Europe and Asia on the Black Sea, is important and strategic. During the Irish Presidency, it will be important to ramp up the dialogue and face head-on the complications stalling the progress at present. What can Ireland do during our Presidency to progress their paths to EU accession? After our term is finished, I am hopeful their paths will be eased somewhat and that we will have a better plan for where they are heading.

I thank the Senator for his kind words about my country. As I tried to explain in my opening statement, when it comes to Türkiye's application to the EU and the accession process, there seems to be a number of things to be done, which I highlighted. I do not want to go back over them but Ireland can play a good role. We do not want to put too much work or too many tasks on Ireland. Whether so many things can be achieved has to be decided by all the 27 members of the EU. The more we are in dialogue and try to empathise and learn about where we come from, our points of view and why our policies are as they are, the more we can achieve under the upcoming EU Presidency. This is not only for Ireland, as I mentioned, but also after Ireland's Presidency, a more forward looking, fair and principled approach to the accession process for the candidate countries is important.

I thank the Senator for his kind words. I hope that one day he will also visit Georgia as a tourist, but not just as a tourist. I have had the privilege of meeting the Senator a number of times, and we had discussions about Georgia and our bilateral relations. It would be great if the Senator could visit Georgia with a delegation.

I cannot miss the opportunity to mention our wine, which is our pride. I hope to see more Georgian wine on the Irish market. We are working very hard to promote Georgian wine here in Ireland.

Interestingly, my response will be similar to that of the ambassador of Türkiye. Ireland can play a very important role in meaningful engagement with Georgia and in understanding the context. We see that there is a gap and a lack of communication at the moment, which creates misunderstanding, especially at times when clarity and communication are more important than ever.

The session today is about the progress achieved and the challenges we face. We want to be honest with all of the members, and we are. We talk about progress, but we also understand there are challenges. One of the challenges I would like to emphasise is understanding the perspective, understanding where countries are coming from and understanding why countries take the decisions they take. It is about understanding the context, and the unique vulnerability and complexity of the specific country. It would be extremely helpful if Ireland, during the upcoming EU Presidency, addressed exactly that point on open, transparent and meaningful engagement and communication.

I will break this down into two questions. It would be fair to say the European Union was not particularly committed to enlargement for some time. It would also be fair to say that Türkiye was not particularly committed to it either. It is a question of what can be done from the point of view of improving relations. I do not know if anyone has a major issue with that. It is what we want to see.

I want to raise the issue of Cyprus. What would be the Turkish Government's opinion on facilitating a greater level of co-operation and what is almost a solution to partition, which is the bizonal, bicommunal solution that a number of people have worked for over many years?

We went on a delegation to Georgia. We were very impressed with the place, although we understand the issues that it has. We visited some of the border areas and saw the “borderisation” the Russians have engaged in. We had been told that on the issue of the foreign agents Bill - forgive me if I am using the wrong term - there was some element of misunderstanding, but it was then put back into operation again. All the promises we had been given about the relationship with the European Union went out the window, so there would even be an issue of trust for this committee on the basis of the history we have been through. I understand what the ambassador is saying, which is that we have to see where a state is coming from. I ask Ms Katsarava to give some sort of explanation of the backsliding.

If we can get all of that answered in three minutes, I will be highly impressed. We might start with Türkiye and then go to Georgia.

I emphasise that the problem of Cyprus did not start in 1974. Unfortunately, in some circles in the media today, because there has been a long gap and the negotiations have been going on for a long time within the UN, and so on, it is presented as if everything started in 1974, and certain terms like “invasion” and “division” are used. That is not the truth. If we really want to understand-----

Excuse me. We are probably not going to get complete agreement on all of that. The big issue is in relation to facilitation. I attempted not to use any of that language.

The Deputy mentioned facilitation.

I meant facilitation as in helping to find a solution.

I just wanted to give background information. Unfortunately, the EU side made a mistake by allowing the Greek Cypriot side to join the EU back in the 2000s. We consider this a mistake. If the EU wishes to help contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, then it should first and foremost acknowledge the existence of the Turkish Cypriot side as an equal part in the Cyprus solution. They were equals in the very beginning in the 1960s, when they gained independence from the UK and established a republic. Later, in 1963, things began to worsen. The UN came into the picture, and later, Türkiye had to intervene, using its guarantor rights. The way to work towards a solution is by starting to acknowledge that there are two sides on the island, two equal peoples, and then maybe we can proceed with that.

There will be difficulties with all of that. Türkiye would not be against the facilitation of the bizonal, bicommunal solution to partition.

If it is done in the right way. If one wants to help in the settlement of the Cyprus question, then, as I said, we have to acknowledge there is not only one side on the island.

I am glad that the Deputy has been to Georgia and seen the occupation line. This is one of my messages in every meeting that I have here with the distinguished Deputies and Senators. It is about the security challenges that we are facing and the ongoing occupation.

I will give some background. Looking back to the period since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it is entirely understandable that the whole world’s attention and energy were focused on the war because of the gravity and scale of the tragedy. They demanded unity and decisive action, and there is no question about that priority. At the same time, Georgia found itself in a particularly sensitive position as a country that has continued to be occupied by Russia for decades. We hoped there would also be some space for understanding the complexity of our situation, but that did not happen. Instead, there was a cascade of criticism coming towards Georgia.

I am not going to go into those details. The whole point is that every country has to take certain decisions at certain times, especially when it has to protect the most precious thing, stability, to avoid any sign of destruction. As I said, the region is extremely sensitive and volatile, and that is the whole region, not just Georgia. We need to see that bigger picture. There are sometimes instances when governments have to make decisions and choices in the spirit of defending statehood.

I will not go into details of the law but it is about transparency as every institution is required to be transparent. The same is applied by the law.

I thank both witnesses for their presentations and being here today. Given that accession negotiations have been stalled since 2018, what steps does Türkiye consider essential to create the conditions for re-engagement under the accession framework? How can Ireland help in that regard? It is a long time since 2018. It has been seven or eight years. How will Ireland, during its Presidency, be able to support and help Türkiye at this stage?

Is the Deputy referring to the accession process?

Yes.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, the first step is to revoke the decisions taken at the European Council meeting on 15 July 2019 in which some restrictions were imposed on our relations. Of course, the resumption of high-level dialogue on political, energy and transport issues would be useful because if we do not talk or are not in dialogue, how can we proceed? A number of other measures can be taken but, for me, the most important thing is to go back to dialogue. As I said, Commissioner Kos visited Türkiye last month and she had some fruitful meetings. It should continue that way. High-level dialogue, in all of these areas, should be established.

All remaining restrictions the European Investment Bank has with regard to Türkiye could be lifted. There is also the matter of the customs union, which we would like to go over. I think Ireland will understand us in that regard. Economics and trade are important for every country. Launching the negotiations to modernise the customs union is important because, as I mentioned, this agreement was reached 30 years ago. The world is not functioning with the same rules as 30 years ago. We have to go through it and overcome the challenges that have not been dealt with until now. Although I have not been here long as Turkish ambassador to Ireland – it has not even been one year – I notice that Ireland tries to bring balance and fairness to international issues and many subjects. When it comes to Türkiye’s journey with the EU, we need that fairness and balance. We need a more effective and new holistic approach to Turkish-Irish and Turkish-EU relations. Ireland can help in that regard.

I thank both witnesses for being with us today. I apologise that I missed their opening statements but I had to attend another committee meeting. I have read them, however. What outlook and opinions do the public in both Georgia and Türkiye have on the European Union, how the EU functions and the benefit EU membership would bring them? Fundamentally, do the vast majority of people want membership? What is the public's outlook in that regard? This question is for the Turkish ambassador in particular, given the whole process has been going on for so long. Is there a certain amount of disillusionment among the public?

I note the update that H.E. Ms Cankorur provided about the ongoing talks regarding enlargement. What are the next steps that are necessary to allow the full resumption of accession negotiations? Does Türkiye have a plan to fulfil the remaining conditions for visa liberalisation? I apologise if that question has been asked previously. What results can be expected in this regard?

Turning to the Georgian ambassador, what guarantees can Georgia offer to convince EU member states that democratic reforms are possible? How will those reforms be implemented?

To take a slightly different tack, what steps are being taken to further align transport and energy infrastructure with European standards? Energy infrastructure is such a hot topic at the moment and it is important we progress it together. What steps are being taken in that regard?

I will start with the public views. Georgia’s European aspiration is enshrined in the constitution. The Georgian public has been supporting the European Union for decades. It is public knowledge that this has been a priority in the several decades since we regained independence. It is a part of our lives. This is exactly how the public views European integration, especially after visa liberalisation, which I mentioned in my opening remarks. That was a huge motivation for the public because it meant closer integration with the European Union. Obviously, visa free travel is a huge benefit, and it was granted to Georgia years ago.

As for democratic reforms, I reiterate that it is important to have dialogue so that the European Union and Georgia talk. Whether it is individual member states or Georgia, it is important there is dialogue, communication, understanding and an exchange of the most up-to-date information on both the progress and challenges. This is important. I hope that, at some point, we will go back to those formats when there were discussions between the European Union and Georgia, whether a sectoral discussion or any other format. I wish to make it clear again – I apologise if I am repeating myself - that communication is important. It is how we exchange views and information.

When it comes to the Senator's question on energy projects, we are one of the countries in question. I am speaking on behalf of Georgia, obviously. Georgia is investing a lot to improve its infrastructure, precisely because of the location Georgia has geopolitically. It is an important location that connects Europe with Asia. We see ourselves as at the crossroads between Europe and Asia. There is a strong focus on developing infrastructure and supporting energy projects in the region. This is where Georgia also sees its opportunity. There is an opportunity to showcase our potential because of the bridging role we have. It is also important to ensure stability in the country because unless there is peace and stability, it is difficult to predict the future, especially in these uncertain and unpredictable times.

The Government does everything possible to make the environment predictable, including to ensure that these important energy projects, which are supported by the region, including Georgia, are successful and beneficial for both Georgia and the European Union.

I thank the Senator for the question. She will know that Turkish-EU relations have a long history, dating back to the 1950s. Unfortunately, there have been ups and downs. Turkish public opinion still supports Türkiye's European Union location and membership. It is a strategic priority for us and for the Government. However, I think the public see that in each enlargement process there are no results when it comes to Türkiye. I believe the Turkish public feel disappointed that on each enlargement there are some new conditions put in place but no progress achieved. If, however, we go on the right path, I think that disappointment will dissipate. It is understandable there is disappointment, but we need to work on that, both sides together.

With regard to the Senator's question on the visa-related difficulties, yes, Turkish citizens face some visa-related difficulties when it comes to obtaining a Schengen visa and so on. Therefore, one of our expectations is to address these long-standing visa-related difficulties in order that our businesspeople can easily travel to Europe. This is also for the sake of economic and trade relations.

I thank Their Excellencies for their contributions. I wish we had more time to ask more questions. Georgia and Türkiye are both culturally and geographically part of the European family, and I would very much welcome them as soon as possible into the European Union. That said, there are obviously checks and balances, and Ms Cankorur has pointed out that there are two sides to every story.

Georgia has this enshrined in its constitution. However, the Government halted the extension process to 2028, which has led to more than 450 days of protests, so in a sense it is going against that. My understanding from reading reports - I am not as close to this as Ms Katsarava would be - is that members of the Georgian Dream Party are talking about removing, if not actually doing so, that constitutional obligation. I want to go back to what might have driven the Georgian Dream Party to take a more neutral stance vis-à-vis being pro-European. There is the Russian threat, obviously. I am just asking Ms Katsarava for her opinion. Does she feel that Europe as a whole did not support Georgia enough at the time of the Russian invasion? I know we have very limited time on that.

In relation to Türkiye, and again leaving Cyprus out of it, does Ms Cankorur feel that President Erdoğan's policies that have rowed back on some of the agreements made previously are influencing Europe to be less inclined towards Türkiye? That is the current state of play or commentary.

I would also like Ms Cankorur's opinion on the following. Historically, Türkiye has been highly critical of Europe and believes that Europe possibly does not actually want Türkiye to ever join. Türkiye is so much a part of Europe. In that context, does Ms Cankorur think there are certain countries that see Türkiye as, basically, for want of a better term, too Muslim? We had the Albanian ambassador in earlier. Albania is a majority-Muslim country, but does Ms Cankorur think there are certain EU member states that deliberately want to keep Türkiye out of the European Union? Will she comment on that?

Equally, there are valid security concerns. If Türkiye is the border of the European Union, then we are next to, for example, Syria, a conflict zone. Are there valid concerns in that regard?

My final questions are for both witnesses. In terms of dialogue, who should be meeting with the witnesses' representatives or their leadership? Should it be Ursula von der Leyen, who has been quite critical, or should it be the individual leaders of each member state? What role do the witnesses think Ireland could play during the Presidency?

I thank the Deputy for his questions. Again, I will give a little background. I am afraid I will be very brief. Georgia's perspective is shaped by a long and painful history. It is a very important point that I keep making because part of our internationally recognised territories are still occupied by Russia. That has not gone away. Russian military bases have been on our soil for years. Over the decades, Georgia has endured multiple conflicts and attempts at destabilisation and, obviously, that has an impact on the human, economic and political climate, national resilience and communities. As a small country in, again, a very turbulent region, we have carried a particularly heavy burden. I think it is fair to say that only a few nations in our neighbourhood have faced such prolonged and direct consequences of foreign military presence and territorial occupation. These realities continue to impact our community and society.

Despite these challenges, Georgia has consistently worked to safeguard its independence, sovereignty and stability. I hear what the Deputy says. During these years the Government has remained committed to European integration - this is what one would hear - by a certain time, and there is no intention to deviate from that path because the reform agenda is going ahead. I did try to relay in more detail in my opening speech what the European agenda means for Georgia and where we stand on that. That is precisely the reason I think it is very important that the committee members, politicians in Ireland, have dialogue with politicians in Georgia. I will facilitate that process because it is important to know exactly the perspective, the progress and the challenges. This is how I see the questions I hear today, and it is not just today. These questions arise and there needs to be proper formats of dialogue in order that these questions are addressed. Georgia is committed to European integration, and we see that in the years ahead Georgia will be a lot more ready to be a member of the European Union.

As the Deputy will know, Türkiye is located in a very volatile region. I thank him for mentioning that we are a part of Europe but not only Europe. We are a part of Asia, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Aegean, south-east Europe-----

A gateway.

-----and the Middle East, so it is a connecting bridge in between the continents and cultures and economy and trade. With that in mind, Türkiye's integration in Europe is important, and it should be seen in that way in the period ahead. The Deputy mentioned the Muslim aspect and so on, but-----

It is not my view.

Yes. We would like to think that is not the view of certain countries because one of the European Union's slogans in its logo refers to diversity and unity. In order to display that this is not the case, it is up to the European Union to display that this is not how it looks at Türkiye. Türkiye over the years has been a part of all the European institutions, whether it be NATO, the Council of Europe or the OECD. You name it and we are there, except the European Union. There is a point there, that we would not want to see it that way.

We do not want to think that is the reason but it is up to the EU to show that is not the reason.

On the other question about neighbouring Syria and other countries, there are many EU countries that are neighbouring conflict zones, so that cannot be presented as a another pretext.

Thank you very much.

We will draw a line under it there. I thank both witnesses very much for their time and attention to this matter. I had the pleasure of meeting them both before today and of visiting both Türkiye and Georgia in the past. I recognise how much work it takes to be at these committee hearings. I also acknowledge the fact Ms Katsarava and Ms Cankorur were both present at the earlier session as well, so I thank them for their engagement, time and perspectives.

We will go into private session so I propose we suspend for a few minutes to allow our witnesses to leave the room and we will then resume in private session before adjourning until 3.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 25 March 2026, when we will resume the second leg of these engagements with diplomatic representatives of accession countries. Is that agreed? Agreed.