I advise members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the Leinster House complex to participate in public meetings. I will not permit a member to participate who is not adhering to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, a member who attempts to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting. In this regard, I ask any members partaking via MS Teams that prior to making a contribution to the meeting they confirm they are on the grounds of the Leinster House campus.

Members and witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make her, him or it identifiable, or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if speakers' statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

Today's topic, which we have been looking forward to for a while, is an engagement to discuss the European Union-Morocco association agreement. I welcome our witnesses to the meeting today. From the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, we have Ms Orla Keane, who is director of the Middle East unit, and her officials.

The format of the meeting is that we will hear Ms Keane's opening statement and it will be followed by questions and answers with members of the committee. I ask members to be concise in their questions to allow all members the opportunity to participate.

I invite Ms Keane to make her opening statement.

I thank the Cathaoirleach. Good afternoon to committee members.

I am the director of the Middle East and North Africa unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. I am joined by my colleagues, deputy director, Maeve Killen, and desk officer, Hannah Tracey, who are here in a support capacity.

Our unit is one of two Middle East and North Africa units within the Department's political division. My unit is responsible for matters relating to Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and North Africa, including Morocco and Western Sahara.

I welcome the opportunity to engage with the committee this afternoon on the EU-Morocco trade agreement. I am aware that this is a matter of interest to the Houses of the Oireachtas. I will aim to summarise key points in my opening statement and a longer version has been made available to the committee.

By way of background, the EU and Morocco established a free-trade area as part of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association agreement which was signed in 1996 and entered into force on 1 March 2000.

In 2019, a Council decision approved an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the amendment to Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their member states of the one part and the Kingdom of Morocco of the other part. I will refer to this hereafter as the agreement in the form of an exchange of letters or the agreement. This was intended to establish a legal basis to grant the tariff preferences laid down in the association agreement to products originating in Western Sahara.

In a judgment of 4 October 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU, upheld the decision of the general court to annul the 2019 Council decision. The court ruled that the implementation of an international agreement between the EU and Morocco in the territory of Western Sahara must receive the consent of the people of Western Sahara rather than the consent of the population of Western Sahara. The people of Western Sahara refers strictly to the indigenous people of Western Sahara who are the sole holders of the right to self-determination with regard to that territory. The majority of these people have been displaced, with an estimated half living in camps in Algeria. By contrast, the population of Western Sahara was considered by the court to refer to the current inhabitants of that territory, the majority of whom are non-indigenous.

The court ruled that the consent of the people of Western Sahara to such an agreement may be either given explicitly or, in certain circumstances, implicitly. In the particular case of a people of a non-self-governing territory, the court ruled that the consent of that people to an international agreement may be presumed as long as two conditions are satisfied. First, the Agreement in question must not give rise to an obligation for that people. Second, the Agreement must provide that the people receive a specific, tangible, substantial and verifiable benefit from the exploitation of that territory's natural resources which is proportional to the degree of that exploitation and consistent with the principle of sustainable development. The Agreement must also provide for a regular control mechanism.

The court also ruled that the effects of the 2019 Council decision were maintained for a period of 12 months from the date of delivery of the judgment until 4 October 2025.

Under Article 266 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Council is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the October 2024 judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU. Some agreed modification of the Agreement in the form of a Exchange of Letters was, therefore, considered necessary in order to ensure that the EU was not in breach of its international obligations.

In July 2025, the Commission submitted to the Council a recommendation for a Council decision concerning the opening of negotiations on the amendment of the 2018 agreement. A number of member states, including Ireland, expressed concerns at that time about the approaching October 2025 deadline. The negotiations between the European Commission and Morocco on a new agreement took place from 10 September to 15 September 2025, resulting in the initialling of a draft agreement in the form of an exchange of letters. Member states were asked, on 2 October, to vote via written procedure on whether they agreed to the adoption of a Council decision on signature and provisional application of a new agreement to enable the granting of tariff preferences to goods originating in Western Sahara. Ireland voted in favour, indicating that we would not stand in the way of EU consensus and in order to ensure that the EU complied with its legal obligations. The EU and Morocco signed the new agreement on 3 October 2025 and its provisional application began. The process has not yet reached its conclusion. The next step requires the consent of the European Parliament. The new agreement in the form of an exchange of letters replaces the prior agreement.

Ireland's engagement on this issue was guided by the October 2024 judgment of the CJEU and by principles of international law. This includes Article 3(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the Union's contribution to the strict observance and the development of international law. We place fundamental importance on this provision.

At a number of points in the process, Ireland registered procedural and substantive concerns about the European Commission's handling of this process. Ireland's procedural concerns related to the Commission's management of the process and the truncated time member states were given to consider the complex issues involved.

On substance, Ireland expressed concerns regarding the issue of consent of the Sahrawi people and the practicalities of implementing arrangements foreseen in the new agreement.

In particular, we had concerns about the control mechanism intended to verify that the benefit granted to the people in question is correctly received.

Throughout the process, Ireland reiterated its view that the compatibility of the new agreement with the fundamental principle in international law of the right of peoples to self-determination should be paramount in the implementation of this agreement. Ireland's position on Western Sahara has been, and continues to be, guided by the aim of achieving a just and lasting political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. In agreeing to the signature and provisional application of a new agreement, Ireland sought to balance its substantive and procedural concerns against the need to support the EU in complying with its legal obligations as an active and responsible member of the EU. As noted, the process has not reached its conclusion. The next step requires the consent of the European Parliament. Ireland has continued to follow up with the relevant EU institutions with regard to an expected date for this next step. We have so far received no indication of a timeline.

For people watching, we have a brief introduction to the topic and why we are dealing with it that might be useful. Western Sahara is a disputed territory on the north-west coast of Africa. Since Spain withdrew from Spanish Sahara in 1975, Western Sahara has been the subject of a territorial dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front, which operates primarily from the border regions of Algeria. Morocco controls 80% of the territory, while the Polisario Front controls the remaining 20%.

In November 2020, the UN-mandated ceasefire collapsed and low-level hostilities resumed along the 2,700 km sand berm that separates the Polisario Front and Moroccan-controlled territory. Actual hostilities remain at a low level. The United Nations recognises Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory under international law. Ireland's position on Western Sahara has been, and continues to be, guided by the aim of achieving a just and lasting political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

I inform the officials that there will be seven minutes for each member, which is the time limit for questions and answers. I ask them to keep an eye on the clock to keep us reasonably well-disciplined.

I thank Ms Keane and her team for the briefing note supplied. For the sake of clarity, the free trade agreement does not impose any future obligations on Western Sahara should the indigenous people achieve self-determination at some point, which is not going to happen in the near future. I am trying to get my head around this agreement. It is not imposing obligations on a people who are not necessary living in their homeland at the moment. Is that correct?

One of the things we outlined to the European Commission in the negotiations on the new agreement was that this was an issue of concern for us and a number of member states. My understanding is that the intention of the process was not to prejudge any eventual outcome over what is a disputed territory.

Are there any precedents or considerations for other trade agreements, or anything that might happen in other areas that are coming down the tracks? Perhaps there is a similar situation where a displaced people might be impacted by a trade agreement that is in place or is coming down the tracks. Is this a unique situation in terms of Ireland and the EU?

To the best of my recollection, that was not raised during the discussions that took place in Brussels. We are aware that parallels have been drawn with certain other circumstances but there are individual circumstances in situations that may be regarded as somewhat analogous. However, no analogies were drawn in the conversations in Brussels.

We are satisfied that our position as a State on Western Sahara is not compromised by this trade agreement.

We did make clear to the Commission at all times in the process our position on Western Sahara. We were provided with certain assurances by the Commission during those discussions. We are still waiting for some of that information from the Commission and have been following up with the various EU institutions that have been involved in these negotiations. It is fair to say that there is a variety of views among EU member states with regard to this issue. There are, in some cases, diverging views. I do not think Ireland is alone in taking the position it has taken.

This question might lie outside today's discussion. In terms of free trade agreements and dispute settlement mechanisms, this free trade agreement has a traditional arbitration-based dispute settlement mechanism. Comparing the EU trade agreement with that in place with Canada, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA, includes permanent investment courts. That free trade agreement was subject to legal challenge and attracted a lot of political discussion. Why would one trade agreement with the EU have one dispute mechanism and another have a different dispute mechanism? Does the EU have a definite, standard approach to trade dispute settlement mechanisms or is it just something that comes through in each individual case and it depends how it is negotiated?

The Deputy's question relates to an issue that cuts across a number of different EU trade issues. I would be happy to get him an answer to that question. It is not something that falls within my own particular remit as the Middle East director.

I am okay with that.

Which countries within the European Union share Ireland's view on this issue?

I would be reluctant to go into some of the internal discussions that have taken place among member states, but the public positions of most EU member states are relatively well-known on the issue.

Perhaps we should confirm that it is not a disputed area. The United Nations has recognised that there is no legal basis for Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara. Is that not the case?

The UN has described Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory under Chapter 11 of the UN Charter.

That is key. Ms Keane referred to the European courts. They recognised the Sahrawi people and the Polisario Front as the privileged interlocutor who, according to UN Security Council Resolution 658, are the sole legitimate representation of the Sahrawi people. That is the distinction Ms Keane made between the people and the population. In terms of the people, the European courts recognised the Sahrawi people and, indeed, the Polisario Front as the interlocutor in relation to those people. There was no engagement, as I understand it, from the EU Commission with the Polisario Front or even with any other direct representative of the Sahrawi people in the process of developing this new trade deal. Is that the case?

My recollection is that that question was posed to the Commission during the discussions we had on the new agreement. I am not aware that we have received a comprehensive answer on that question. The Polisario Front is, of course, one of the parties to the dispute that we engage with on a regular basis.

What we are really talking about here is this EU ruling. The Polisario Front is recognised by the EU ruling so it is not that it is simply one of the parties but the key party in this.

Ms Keane made that distinction between the population and the people. It seems that the deal is going to mean increased expenditure by the EU in the territories that are currently occupied by Morocco. It is almost more privileged investment, but with no distinction made to specify that will go to the people of Western Sahara. Rather, it will go to the population, who are, in many cases, Moroccan settlers and Moroccan businesses that have been extracting resources and trading. There is a danger that this could fast-track, encourage and incentivise further trade by settlements in the non-legally occupied territories. Is that not a danger? There are clear parallels when we consider the position Ireland has taken on settlements in the West Bank, for example.

The distinction between the people and the population was one made by the CJEU. That guided us in our interactions with the Commission on the negotiations on the new agreement. My understanding is that the control mechanism is supposed to address some of the concerns that the Senator has raised. We are still waiting for more information from the Commission as to what that will look like.

On paper it effectively allows these to be benefits. Is that why the concerns mentioned for Ireland are on the control mechanism? If it is the case that this privileges and benefits businesses within settlements rather than the Sahrawi people, does it raise a concern from the Department's perspective in terms of its compatibility with the ECJ ruling?

The CJEU referred to the consent being implicit or explicit. It also referred to how the benefits to the Sahrawi people from the agreement would be accrued and how that would be monitored in terms of implementation. Those were both considerations we raised in the discussions we had on the agreement.

On implicit and explicit consent, MINURSO has been there decades waiting for a long-promised referendum. It is one of the longest running pieces. Is it the position that Ireland and the EU still support the referendum? If so, why was it not seen, or was there any discussion at a moment where a big trade deal for Morocco hinges on potentially explicit consent? It would obviously be a key moment of leverage to encourage Morocco to support and facilitate the whole deal of a referendum. It seems explicit. Why was implicit rather than explicit consent made as a choice? I know it is the Commission’s decision and not the Department's. I am curious as to what responses Ireland got and where the discussion was.

The question of explicit or implicit consent was raised by the CJEU ruling. It is Ireland's view that the UN process should guide the outcome of this discussion. As I said earlier, there are a number of differing views within the EU and its members states. While the issue of the UN process was raised by Ireland and a number of other member states within the negotiations, it is not necessarily something that was raised by all of the member states that engaged on these issues.

What is confusing is that, as I understand it, it is being provisionally applied, even though there are huge areas of information still outstanding, as Ms Keane described it. Is there ongoing legal advice happening? We know there has been discussion within the Parliament. It has not been referred to the Parliament yet as I understand it. What is the trajectory for that? However, there has been discussion in the Parliament about it referring it back to the European Court. We know that cases have already been lodged in respect of the process on labelling. I may come to that if there is a second round, as well as the substantive issue. Is the Council still engaging in legal consultation? While there are different positions with different countries, only some of those positions are compatible with international law. Is that not the case?

Following the 4 October 2024 ruling, there was a one-year period, as the Senator understands, where a replacement agreement had to be negotiated or else it was deemed that the previous agreement would fall. It is probably fair to say that the Commission's handling of this process fell below the standards we would expect. The time available for member states to discuss the complex issues the Senator has outlined was truncated. However, we were in the hands of the Commission as regards that process. We sought assurances. We have requested that information and followed up on a number of occasions since the provisional application and continue to do so. We are still awaiting that information, and we are in the Commission's hands in that regard.

When we say we had to comply with law, an option would have been to allow suspension of the agreement until the legal concerns had been addressed. Would that not have been an option?

We were weighing a balance of our obligations. The first obligation for the EU is in compliance. Without an agreement in place there would be a lacuna of sorts. The other option was a new agreement. At the time we took the decision to vote in favour of the new agreement, we said we were taking a balance of considerations bearing in mind we also did not want to stand in the way of EU consensus on the issue.

In relation to that legal obligation language on the issue, it is specific. It does not seem-----

No, we will come back.

We will come back on a second round. I might come back on labelling specifically in the second round.

What is the position of the Kingdom of Morocco on the ECJ ruling?

The Chair would have to ask the Kingdom of Morocco that question.

Do we have any sense? Does it have an issue with it?

Morocco obviously takes its own view on the territory as one of the interested parties to the dispute. I would not want to attempt to characterise the Moroccan position. It is probably fairly well known.

I do not know it. I do not mean to press Ms Keane. If she does not want to be pressed, that is okay but I am not familiar with it.

As one of the parties to the dispute, Morocco has a particular view on Western Sahara as a territory.

That is fair enough.

I thank all of the witnesses for coming in today. I have heard what the EU has mandated but I would like to know Ireland's view of the rights of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination.

Ireland's position on Western Sahara has been and continues to be guided by the aim of achieving a just and lasting political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Our engagement on this issue continues to take account of the role and insights of the UN Secretary General's personal envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura. We have always said that any outcomes should be consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, including the fundamental principle in international law of the right of peoples to self-determination. In this spirit, we will continue to support UN-led efforts to achieve a solution to the long-standing dispute.

I understand part of the Commission's proposal would be to provide development aid in a manner that does not distinguish between the indigenous Western Sahara people and the illegal Moroccan settlers. How does funding illegal settlers sit with the Irish Government, because that is happening at the moment?

I want to be careful in the language I use about Western Sahara. It is deemed by the UN to be a non-self-governing territory. There is a balance of considerations in relation to the issues under discussion.

Okay. In that regard, Senator Black's occupied territories Bill would also have banned the import of goods or services from occupied territories of the Western Sahara. Ministers have consistently shifted the goalposts on the occupied territories Bill over many years. One of the original reasons was a fear that it would lead to a court case in Ireland that they might lose. I am just trying to get my head around it. In Palestine we have legislation to ensure we are compliant with international law, not supporting settlements and occupation, and that would not support the fear of legal challenge. However, in Western Sahara we have a trade deal struck down on a succession of occasions that will provide support to settlements and occupation that is supported in the name of unanimity and there is no fear of proceedings or costs. For the benefit of cynics, will Ms Keane explain this perceived hypocrisy and why is there such difference between the two countries?

That is a political question.

Yes.

I am in the Chair's hands. Does he want me to address the occupied territories Bill and related issues?

I am happy for her to do that.

We understand there are similar concerns related to understanding of the two issues. They are different situations with different legal considerations in both. We try to deal with each on its merits. I am not sure I can go beyond that in terms of what might be seen by some as incoherence.

Fair enough.

I do not have any more questions.

We will move on. Senator Ahearn can come in after. I call Senator O'Loughlin. She might confirm that she is on the Leinster House campus.

I thank the Chair. I appreciate that. I was going to go down to you------

The Senator might confirm she is on the Leinster House campus.

Yes, apologies. I was just getting ready to go down to you but I was called quicker than I expected.

No problem.

Can members hear me?

We can, perfectly.

Okay, that is fine. I thank the Chair. I thank Ms Keane for all of the information so far. It is certainly interesting. I can appreciate that there are many challenges in regard to the agreement and doing the right thing. I will put some questions, and I confirm that I am in the precincts of Leinster House.

In regard to where Ireland currently positions itself within the EU discussion, I appreciate that Ireland has raised concerns already. I would like to know if we are continuing to raise concerns about the human rights implications in relation to the current agreement. I will group a few questions together.

On the Court of Justice of the EU rulings in the trade agreement regarding Western Sahara, I would like to know Ireland's and the Department of foreign affairs's interpretation of that. What safeguards does the Department believe should be put in place to ensure the compliance that was raised?

What sectors of Irish trade or industry will be most affected or impacted by this agreement? Ireland is concerned about the EU becoming overly dependent on Morocco for migration co-operation, which is an important part of it. I appreciate this is not finalised at this stage, so are we currently pushing for any amendments? Has the Department of foreign affairs consulted civil society in Morocco or any representatives of the Sahrawis?

In regard to the interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU, I certainly attempted to set out the judgment in my opening statement but I can recap that if the Senator would like. The court ruled that the implementation of an international agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco and Western Sahara must receive the consent of the people of Western Sahara rather than the consent of the population, as referred to. The "people of Western Sahara" refers strictly to the indigenous people of Western Sahara, who are the sole holders of the right to self-determination with regard to that territory. The majority of these people have been displaced with an estimated half living in camps in Algeria. By contrast, the population of Western Sahara was considered by the court to refer to the current inhabitants of the territory, many of whom are non-indigenous.

The court ruled that the consent of the people of Western Sahara to such an agreement must either be given explicitly or, in certain circumstances, implicitly. In the particular case of a non-self-governing territory, the court ruled that the consent of that people to an international agreement, in respect of which it has the status of a third party and which is to be applied in the territory to which its right to self-determination relates, may be presumed so long as two conditions are satisfied. The first is that the agreement in question must not give rise to an obligation for the people and the second is that the agreement must provide that the people receive a specific, tangible, substantial and verifiable benefit from the exploitation of that territory's natural resources, which is proportional to the degree of that exploitation. That benefit must be accompanied by guarantees that the exploitation will be carried out under conditions consistent with the principle of sustainable development. The agreement must also provide for a regular control mechanism enabling it to be verified as to whether the benefit granted to the people in question under that agreement is, in fact, received by that people. As I mentioned earlier, the court's decision was maintained for 12 months from the date of its delivery and that for the 12 months following the judgment, therefore, tariff preferences could continue to be applied for goods originating in Western Sahara being imported into the EU.

In relation to the sectors affected, if I understand the question correctly, the overall agreement relates to all aspects of EU-Morocco trade. I would be happy to get the Senator more details on the nature of Ireland's trade with Morocco, if that is helpful. I do not have those figures with me now but we would be very happy to send them to the Senator afterwards.

That would be great. I thank Ms Keane.

The amended agreement relates specifically to the provision for Western Sahara but the overall trade agreement refers to all sectors. Similarly, the issue of migration is something that is covered in the overall EU trade agreement and I am happy to find more information for the Senator on that topic.

In relation to engagement with civil society, in general we are always very happy to engage with parties who are interested in these issues. I cannot recall any recent engagements with civil society but we do have regular engagement with the Polisario.

I thank Ms Keane.

I thank the Senator. One of the things that might be useful for the committee is a picture of the trade that goes on between the European Union and Morocco - the volume, goods, services and that kind of stuff. What is at stake? Clearly, the impact of the collapse of one agreement affected tariffs on the import of goods from Morocco, so that would have consequences for Morocco. It seems to me that one institution of the European Union did its job really well, which is the Court of Justice of the European Union. It seems, to a lay person, to be a very commendable reading of the topic. It is doing its best to uphold the kinds of values that Ireland would uphold in relation to the treatment of occupied territories, where situations have not been resolved. As Ms Keane said, the European Commission, the other institution of the European Union, perhaps has not conducted as rigorous - that is my language, not Ms Keane's - a resolution in relation to this. It has not reached the standard that would normally be expected. I think that is close to the language Ms Keane used on it but she can dispute that.

In relation to the process.

In relation to the process. Then, the other institution, the European Parliament, has not voted on it yet. That is, I think, a reasonable summary of the situation. I call the Vice Chair, Senator Garret Ahearn.

I will wait, Chair.

Okay. I am next. There were a couple of points I wanted to make. We had two European Union Commissioners here today, who appeared before a combined meeting of the agriculture committee and the EU affairs committee - Commissioners Serafin and Hansen. Mercosur came up and the importance of rules-based agreements in a world that has gone mad on agreements based on coercion, threats, blackmail, etc. They talked about checks and balances in Mercosur - there will be others who might argue with that - and that it is an agreement based on rules. I am asking an official a political question but from Ms Keane's sense, is there any movement towards creating an EU-Morocco trade deal where it is possible to build in the kinds of checks and balances that would allow countries like Ireland to be satisfied that the interests of the Western Saharan people - not just the population - are taken into account, and that they could be built into an EU-Morocco trade agreement?

To the best of my knowledge, there is no intention to negotiate any new agreements. This agreement is the one that we have. This amended one is the one that is under consideration at the moment. There are regular discussions around EU-Morocco trade, including last week at the EU-Morocco association council that took place in Brussels, which covered a range of areas. There are differing views among member states, as I said earlier. We have made our position clear throughout these discussions and the EU institutions are aware this is an issue not just of interest to Ireland but that our Parliament in particular has taken an interest in it, and we have conveyed that to the institutions.

It is my understanding that a number of other parliaments around Europe have also asked questions about the agreement. We made clear in the discussions we have had with the institutions, and with the Commission in particular, that these are issues that are under consideration. The agreement itself, and the EU's relationship with Morocco, covers a much wider range of issues, including security, trade, migration, etc. They all come together in a certain balance when it comes to the agreements that are finally reached.

I will not comment on the broader political issues.

The agreement is unusual but it is also a good thing. I do not think the European Union has any similar trade deal, on the same level as this, with any other north African country.

Morocco is one of the EU's largest trading partners in north Africa.

It is an important trade deal to do. Ms Keane has outlined some of the reasons for it, particularly in the present climate. However, this is a committee of the Parliament and the Commission will probably take cognisance of what is said here on the public record. It is about trying to strike a balance between ensuring people's rights are upheld and not letting an opportunity pass. Again, it is a question of values and interests, and the values have been very well articulated here.

The next speaker is Senator O'Reilly.

I welcome Ms Keane. Will the population of Western Sahara receive an equitable proportion of the benefit from the utilisation of its nation's natural resources and infrastructure as a result of this deal?

My understanding is that the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling was clear that the benefit should be proportional to any exploitation of natural resources.

Does Ms Keane think that will be the case? Is it the case as of now?

That was the expectation we made clear to the Commission in terms of any provisions it puts in place as part of the new agreement.

The EU is Morocco's largest partner, with nearly 60% of its national trade done with the EU. This deal has been condemned by a number of organisations, most notably the Sahara and Sahel Observatory, which has stated that it has undermined the UN peace process and has gone through despite a previous ruling from the CJEU. We have discussed that previous ruling but will Ms Keane comment on the claim the agreement is undermining the peace process?

We would not be comfortable agreeing to anything we would characterise as being of that nature. At all times, we have sought to ensure our position is reflected in the balance of anything agreed. Since the Council decision in 2019 to amend the protocols, there is a different legal regime in place. Obviously, the ruling from 2024 took a view on that. We take account of that ruling in terms of how we address the issue.

Has the deal gone through with the consent of the indigenous people of Western Sahara and not simply the current population?

That issue is at the heart of some of the things we have discussed this afternoon. The agreement is negotiated with Morocco and the CJEU ruling relates to how the people of Western Sahara are given agency in relation to that agreement.

Are those who are in exile in Algeria being consulted?

My understanding is that the CJEU ruling foresaw that consultation of that nature would take place. I am interpreting slightly there.

Is international law being maintained and safeguarded?

That certainly is something we have sought to ensure in all our interactions on the new agreement.

Will this agreement perpetuate an assurance that the status of Western Sahara is and always will be controlled by the indigenous Western Saharan people? What safeguards are there to ensure their sovereignty and independence?

As I said, our position is always that we are guided by the aim of achieving a just and lasting political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. That is something on which we have concentrated.

Will Ms Keane comment on the concerns raised regarding the European Commission's handling of the process?

When it comes to the process, those are concerns we have shared and have raised with the Commission. These are sensitive and complex issues and the process was quite truncated. As I said earlier, it is fair to say it fell below the standard we would expect. There are also some outstanding issues of substance-----

I thank Ms Keane for being so forthright. Will she comment on the reaction in Europe to Ireland being opposed to the Mercosur trade deal and in favour of this deal? "Vibe" is the wrong word to use, although not the worst one, but "impression" might be better. What impression did that create in Europe?

I have a very wide brief but I am afraid the Mercosur agreement does not come within it.

Would Ms Keane like to comment on the mixed messages in this regard?

It is not something that arises in the course of my particular work.

Okay. My next question was touched on by my colleague Senator O'Loughlin. It is a question anyone listening to this discussion will want answered. How will this agreement impact specifically on Irish trade? Obviously, it will have an overall impact in terms of Morocco being a major trader with the EU but what are the specific implications for Ireland, good, bad or indifferent?

It has a proportional impact on our overall trade with Morocco. We have been strengthening our relations with Morocco. We have a good bilateral relationship with the country, which was strengthened by our opening of an embassy in Rabat in 2021. Among the aims of the embassy's work are actions in the trade and economic area. There is a lot of work taking place together with different partners in Morocco across the relevant areas.

Will the deal offer further potential and, if so, in what specific ways?

There is always a solid basis for trade with a third country when there is an EU agreement with that country. In this case, the agreement with Morocco provides the foundations for all the trade that happens between Morocco and Ireland as an EU member state.

People listening to this discussion are interested in these kinds of practical questions and they have a right to have them answered. This committee deals with foreign affairs and trade. Is there a sector of our economy that could potentially benefit specifically from the agreement?

Our trade with Morocco is spread over a number of different sectors. As I said to the Chair, I would be very happy to provide the committee with some more information on that. I can provide detailed facts and figures on the areas of focus.

Could Ms Keane cite one or two off the top of her head for the benefit of people listening to our discussion?

There are a number of areas relating to food, agriculture and aviation. There is no one dominant sector, as I understand it.

I appreciate that Ms Keane will be providing further details but it is good that people listening to our engagement know that agriculture and aviation can potentially benefit.

Those sectors, among others, may benefit. There is a very wide degree of ambition regarding the trading relationship. Efforts are under way through our own embassy and through the Moroccan Embassy here in Dublin to grow those areas. We are looking at a number of different areas.

That is really good news. I thank Ms Keane.

Ms Keane referred to the European Commission process not meeting the standards that would be expected. I wonder what that means. Can she put flesh on the bones of that comment? I think she really needs to do so. What did the Commission not do in this piece of work that we have come to expect it should do, based on its other work?

This is a complex area, obviously, so we had a degree of sympathy with our Commission colleagues regarding the level of work that needed to be done to meet what was, in effect, a 12-month deadline. There were discussions at official level in July last year during which Ireland and a number of other EU member states raised concerns about the then pending deadline of 4 October. Unfortunately, we did not hear again from the Commission until September. We did not have a lot of information in advance of the discussions that took place between the Commission and Morocco about the nature of those discussions.

In effect, we were considering the information in a very truncated timeline, which meant we had limited options in terms of how we might address some of the concerns that we had at that point.

Would Ms Keane characterise that truncated timeline as the major deficiency?

Yes. To be fair to the Commission, it was working with a specific timeline of one year but we would have liked to see the documentation relating to the process at an earlier point than we received it. That is probably fair to say.

Turning the coin around, if the agreement did not go ahead would Ms Keane be in a position to comment on whether that would result in penalising the people of Western Sahara?

There would have been a number of implications if the agreement had fallen because of the failure to comply with that one-year deadline. For overall EU-Morocco trade it was mentioned during the discussions that there would have been a penalty for anyone who was trading from Western Sahara who might have been getting the benefit of the tariffs. If there was not an agreement in place, then there would be a reduced tariff benefit. Of course, that is balanced against those who feel that Western Sahara should not be included in the agreement. The reality is that Western Sahara is included in the agreement. Those preferential tariffs would have fallen if there had not been a new agreement negotiated within the one-year timeline.

Is that preferred to the most-favoured-nation tariff?

It is better than the most-favoured-nation tariff. The most favoured nation is the baseline tariff.

Will Ms Keane elaborate on the difference?

The preferential tariffs would mean that there are certain preferential tariffs in place for goods coming to the EU from Morocco. If the agreement was not in place, those preferential tariffs would not be in place. They would have fallen if the agreement had not been renegotiated.

The geography of those tariffs includes the Western Sahara.

Western Sahara is covered by the agreement, as covered earlier, yes.

We will move to our second round. I call Senator Higgins.

In terms of compliance with the law and having a period of time in which trade could continue but preferential tariffs might briefly not be in place versus getting the agreement right, it strikes me that there is a balancing there that maybe could have been done differently if we want compliance with the law. Although Ms Keane has been very clear that Ireland wants it to be compliant with the law, what is not clear is that this deal is compliant with the law. We know that two cases have already been lodged against it.

I will address this language of benefit. It is the UN position that it is the Sahrawi people who are the sole holders of the right to self-determination, this is not a disputed question, and the court said that they should receive the "tangible, substantial and verifiable benefit". With absolute respect, I understand that the Commission has not even verified if they spoke to the Sahrawi people. Ms Keane said that is something the Department is still trying to find out from the Commission. We do not even know if there was engagement by the Commission in relation to the people who are absolute centre stage in this ruling.

With regard to the declaration, is it the case that all we are hanging on to at the moment to suggest that this new agreement meets that double standard Ms Keane talked about, or that standard of specific, tangible and verifiable benefits without any obligation, is a declaration from the EU, and that Morocco has not even signed up to that declaration?

I will answer the Senator's first question first, which relates to the Chair's previous question. There were two competing legal considerations to be made by Ireland and other member states in relation to the vote that took place on 2 October on approving the new agreement. Had a new agreement on this issue not been concluded by the court's deadline of 4 October 2025, EU importers would, under EU law, no longer have been able to claim the preferential tariff rates on goods imported from Western Sahara. Instead, EU customs authorities would have been required to collect duties on those imported goods under the same non-preferential tariff rates related to all goods imported under the most-favoured-nation rules of the World Trade Organization. However, in doing so the EU would have been in breach of the agreement in the form of the exchange of letters, which continue to be binding on the EU as a matter of international law, notwithstanding the court's annulment of the 2019 Council decision. Being conscious of this position, the European Commission, therefore, was obliged to bring a new agreement. There were two competing legal considerations there and we had to weigh both of them in the decision that we have taken.

In relation to the additional information provided by the Commission, we received some information from the European Commission but we have not yet received comprehensive answers to all the questions.

On that core point about "tangible, substantial and verifiable benefit", I think a key point was made by Senator O'Reilly about it being proportionate. As I understand it, when we look to the exploitation of the resources there, most of the benefit of that is accruing to settlers or settlement-based and Moroccan companies currently. Is that the case in terms of the volume of trade that is happening from Western Sahara? It was mentioned that there is some humanitarian aid. I think €9 million was proposed to go to the Sahrawi people who are living in the refugee camp. That is 50% of the population of Sahrawi people. I have seen a letter which suggests that actually this aid has been cut down to €6 million, so even if it increases it literally might be the case of it being cut and then increased again under the agreement. Is €9 million, or €6 million if it is the cut figure, going to 50% of the Sahrawi people who are living in refugee camps? How can that be proportionate to the billions in trade from goods from Western Sahara which we know is largely benefiting Moroccan-based companies? It is not that we hope it would meet the standard; it cannot meet a standard of proportionality, surely. Is it the case that the Commission has declared that it does? Could Ms Keane confirm that Morocco has not actually signed up to a declaration confirming that it believes and agrees that the agreement should give that proportional, substantial and verifiable benefit to the Sahrawi people?

I understand the questions. They are reasonable questions and they echo some of the questions that we asked in the discussions. I would have liked to be in a position to give the committee more information. We sought additional information in advance of this hearing and at other moments where we were engaging with this committee and we have not received it yet. That is something we can continue to pursue. We pursued it at multiple levels. It was an issue that we raised during the preparations for the EU-Morocco Association Council but I do not have additional information on those provisions that I can share at this point. It is difficult for me in that context to prejudge whether the provisions that are going to be in place are sufficient or insufficient.

On the declaration piece, will Ms Keane confirm if that is a unilateral declaration from the EU?

Again, the declaration is one of the elements that is foreseen under the new agreement but I am afraid I also have very limited information about the nature of the declaration at this point.

As I have heard it, it seems to be that it is unilateral at the moment, so perhaps one of the parties will not agree to this premise of equitability or even proportionality.

Going back to the context of the point on the UN peace processes that are under way, if there is such a large trade deal, and it is a huge trade deal for Morocco, has there been discussion about whether this should have been used as leverage in relation to the long-awaited referendum? I am concerned. Ireland pulled our representatives from the MINURSO mission. We took out our representation I think in the same year that we opened the embassy in Rabat. We stopped being part of the MINURSO mission in relation to trying to push for the referendum. Multiple times France has blocked the inclusion of a human rights observation function, which I believe Ireland does support, and perhaps Ms Keane could clarify this, as part of the MINURSO mission. Is it not the case that if we allow, through provisional application, the situation on the ground to become worse, it creates a climate that places the people of Western Sahara in a very vulnerable position, particularly at a time when we know the United States and Morocco are currently pushing for a new proposal? If we were to take a stand in relation to the international law, that could strengthen the hand of those seeking to champion a just position which relates back to that right of self-determination. Will Ms Keane just comment on this because it is the background context here. Doing nothing does not mean nothing is happening. Doing nothing means potentially a bad agreement which deeply benefits Morocco and which we know certainly is already being challenged as being incompatible with international law. It weakens the hand of the Western Saharan people in discussions about their future that are happening right now.

The other significant recent development in relation to the issue of Western Sahara is the renewal of the MINURSO mandate that took place on-----

Could Ms Keane explain that briefly?

Certainly. The UN Security Council on 31 October 2025 extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year until 31 October 2026.

What is MINURSO?

MINURSO is the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Irish Defence Forces personnel served in MINURSO from September 1991 to July 2021. The final personnel were withdrawn following an operational review of overseas deployments, including peacekeeping commitments. This is a matter for the Department of Defence so I will not speak further to that point.

Coming back to UN Security Council Resolution 2797, we are glad the MINURSO mandate was extended for one year because the alternative is that there would not have been a UN security mandate for MINURSO and we think it has been playing a valuable role. We are also guided by the views and comments of the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura. After the adoption of Resolution 2797, he noted that it is significant because it "demonstrates a renewed international energy and [determination] to resolve this conflict of 50 years". He has also been clear in some of his subsequent statements that the resolution does provide a framework for negotiations but does not prescribe an outcome. We would share the personal envoy's view that the renewal of the mandate and the resolution was, by and large, a positive development. It has certainly been the view of the personal envoy that the resolution provides a basis for him to continue his work following a period when there has not been a lot happening in relation to these issues. We will continue to support him in his role and see what comes from that.

I will take a third round afterwards if I can. It is a very specific question.

No, there will be no third round.

If I could, Chair, then-----

Very quickly.

I was actually really looking not for what is happening there-----

Quickly.

There are two things. Could Ms Keane outline that issue on labelling? As I understand it, one of the problems is that things that are meant to be labelled as coming from Western Sahara are now getting labelled as coming from specific towns, which are generic names, if you like. It is as if something was coming from Ballymore or Blackrock rather than saying Ireland if you know what I mean. That is a dispute on labelling.

There is also the question on referral to the EU Parliament. Is Ireland pressing for this to be referred to the EU Parliament when we know there are considerable concerns and where there has been discussion about potential referral to the European Court of Justice, ECJ? What Ms Keane described about that self-determination-----

Okay. We got that.

Getting that recognised at the European level and by countries like Ireland is what will mean that it does actually get followed through.

I thank the Senator.

On the question about the European Parliament, it is the next step in the process that this would go to the European Parliament. As I understand it, it is not a question of referral. The next step is that the agreement goes to the European Parliament for its consideration. We have asked the European Commission about the dates for that and we have not received a reply.

The labelling issue is quite complex. I do not have all the details on that at the moment, but we would be happy to get more information on the question of labelling as it pertains to the EU-Morocco trade agreement and convey that to the committee after the hearing.

Okay. One conclusion, it would be fair to say, and I do not think I am taking too much on board myself here, relates to the interaction with the European Commission. Ms Keane has come as a senior official to a committee of the Irish Parliament and is unable to answer a number of questions because the European Commission has not answered the questions she has put to it. I suspect that is not good enough for a parliamentary committee of any parliament. That might be reflected somehow in correspondence back to the Commission.

Second, I will come back to the chat this morning on the EU in the European Union affairs committee and the agricultural committee. When we talk about rules-based order and rules-based agreement on the one hand, the United Nations seems to have taken a very specific view on this that is not shared by the Commission, as far as we can garner. It looks like it is just going to go straight to the European Parliament for a vote, and some of the key questions that have been asked by some countries, including Ireland, have not been answered by the Commission. It does not reflect well on the Commission and it is not healthy for the Commission.

Does the Vice Chair want to come in?

Most of the technical questions about the legalities of the agreement have been being asked, as have questions about Western Sahara. I think people who will be watching or listening to this might be interested in this line of questioning. Ms Keane spoke about the embassy opening in 2021. I was in Morocco a couple of years ago and the ambassador was James McIntyre. Is he still there?

The current ambassador is Helena Nolan.

He was there at the time, and he was an exceptional diplomat. We invest an awful lot of money in embassies across the world. We opened a number in 2025. Can Ms Keane outline the change in terms of the relationship from trade opportunities that have happened in the last three or four years with the embassy in Morocco leading up to this agreement and how that has improved opportunities for Ireland?

It always makes a big difference when we have an embassy on the ground because it allows us to have a greater understanding of how things work and to establish relationships across a range of different areas from political to trade and economics. Supporting the economic relationship between Ireland and Morocco is a big part of the embassy's work. That has been a significant focus of the embassy's work in the years since it opened. There are opportunities across a range of areas. The embassy has supported a number of delegations, both Irish delegations travelling to Morocco for trade purposes and Moroccan delegations travelling to Ireland with a view to expanding trade. It is a country where there is scope for significant expansion of trade and economic opportunities. That is very much the focus of our own embassy and it would probably be fair to say of the Moroccan Embassy in Dublin too. The embassy has identified a number of different areas where there is scope for expansion. We would be happy to provide the committee with some additional information on that after the meeting.

I presume food, agriculture and beef are opportunities for Ireland. With this trade agreement, what sectors within the EU is Morocco prioritising or which does it see as opportunities? Can Ireland play a significant role in that? We are obviously well known across the world for quality of food and quality of milk and butter. Are there other areas within the EU that Morocco sees as priorities within this potential trade agreement?

It is a very fair question. It is a very wide-ranging agreement. I am conscious that the EU-Morocco Association Council met in Brussels last week. It did cover quite a variety of areas, which is why I am a little reluctant to single out one or the other, but I will be happy to share the EU common position for that meeting with the Senator. He will see that the EU-Morocco relationship covers a wide range of areas, including issues that are relevant for regional stability and security. It does cover the full range of economic interests. When it comes to the EU-Morocco relationship, they vary depending on individual member states. Certain countries, including larger member states, have very large trade interests with Morocco and other countries, like Ireland, are growing and expanding that trading relationship. That is information we would be happy to share with the Senator after the meeting.

If you could, please. I thank Ms Keane.

This is not a new question. It is one I asked, but it was not answered. It was about humanitarian aid. Ireland has set a position against the weaponisation of humanitarian aid. Ms Keane might answer now or provide something in writing to us. It is that concern of, basically, humanitarian aid being included in a trade deal as somehow conveying benefit to 50% of the population and the fact that the aid has been cut, which is by the by. I do not know if Ms Keane has a comment on that or if Ireland has been speaking about that at the EU level.

If I may, that is something on which we might provide some additional information afterwards. Because of the limited amount of information we have on the provisions of the new agreement, I do not want to prejudge what is there. As the Senator said, we have some overarching positions on that issue. I do not want to misrepresent them in this discussion, but I will be happy to provide that information afterwards.

I thank Ms. Keane. It is striking, though, that these meetings were happening last week about the detail of what is getting traded, yet all the provisions of the actual agreement are still somewhat shrouded in mystery.

I should have come to Deputy Bennett first. I apologise.

That is fine. How long did the negotiation of the amended trade deal take?

Our understanding is that negotiations between the European Commission and Morocco took place from 10 September to 15 September 2025.

So the negotiations took only one week?

Obviously, that is not in relation to the entire agreement, but rather the renegotiation.

What was being negotiated? Was it mainly agriculture or was it other items as well?

It specifically relates to the issues that were the subject of the CJEU ruling we discussed earlier in the hearing.

Was meat included in that?

My understanding is that it relates to the provisions in the agreement that relate to Western Sahara.

Okay, and was meat, such as beef, included in that?

Sorry, I misunderstood the question. My understanding is that it related to the application of the overall EU-Morocco trade agreement to Western Sahara, so that is covering all aspects of trade.

What is happening now with the Irish? Are they still working on a trade agreement there or what are the Irish doing now in relation to what has happened?

In relation to EU-Morocco agreement or in relation to our own trade?

Yes, the EU-Morocco agreement.

As I mentioned, the next stage in the process is that the agreement has to go to the European Parliament. We are waiting to hear details on when that will take place. That will be the finalisation of the approval of the agreement.

Will MEPs have a chance to vote on that?

I am not sure what the exact procedure is but it will be consideration by the European Parliament in the usual manner.

When will that be?

We have not received that information yet.

Could we get notified when that is about to happen so that we can alert our MEPs?

When we have the information, we will be happy to share it.

I am not sure we are any clearer. The object of the exercise was to be clearer, and while it is no reflection on Ms Keane, I think we have a lot of questions left unanswered that could only be answered by the presence of Commission representatives in the committee room, and I think we have tried that.

Have we requested it?

Yes. Is there anything Ms Keane did not get to say that she might like to add?

I think I have covered all the areas I had intended to cover, but I am conscious we have committed to providing some additional information to the committee and we will try do that as quickly as we can after the meeting.

Yes, around the extent of Ireland-Morocco and EU-Morocco trade. I know we have a country note for our observers in the Gallery, giving us a little bit of background information on Morocco, and that was useful. One thing Ms Keane raised a few times was the EU-Morocco Trade Association. In case people are watching the debate, will she say a little bit about what that is, who it comprises and what its purpose is?

When we talk about the free trade agreement the EU has with Morocco, the shorthand term that is used is the association agreement. This governs all of the trade between EU and Morocco. Then there are also different mechanisms. The EU has association agreements with a number of countries and there are mechanisms under the agreement that would allow for that, including, for example, the Association Council that held a meeting in Brussels last week between the EU and Morocco.

Who attends that? Who is represented on the Association Council?

It is generally attended at ministerial level. Last week, due to diary commitments, we were represented at official level, so it would have been a mixture of ministerial and official level at last week's council meeting.

If everybody was available to attend one of those Association Council meetings, would the minister of every country of the European Union be present?

Yes, it is generally co-chaired by the High Representative of the European Union and the foreign minister or another designated minister of the country in question.

So there would be 26 or 27 ministers for trade?

They usually take place on the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council, so it is usually the Foreign Affairs Council ministers or someone deputising for them.

And their opposite number from Morocco?

Yes.

I presume then that things like the Polisario Front in Western Sahara and the unhappiness of parliaments of different member states are communicated at that political level. Is that correct?

It depends on the position of the individual member states.

Are they public meetings?

No, they are closed meetings but there is a public communication. There was an EU common position negotiated in advance, which is publicly available. We can share that with the committee.

I do not want to put pressure on Ms Keane but can she recall it?

I have it here somewhere, but it is probably longer than time would allow.

Okay. Has Ms Keane ever attended any of those meetings?

Thinking back to my previous time in Brussels, I possibly went to one or two but I do not usually attend in my current role.

Based on what Ms Keane has told us today, would it be unreasonable to expect, notwithstanding the position of different member states in relation to this, that those positions would be articulated in that forum. In other words, could we imagine an Irish representative saying, "Yeah, this is fine. We have some reservations and we've stated these reservations. We've communicated with the Commission about this. There is the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union on this and it hasn't been addressed sufficiently by the Commission." Is it likely that conversations like that would take place at an Association Council meeting between EU countries and Morocco?

Yes, there is certainly an opportunity for those kind of discussions to take place.

So there is a good chance that, at least at that level, some views are expressed.

The issue of Western Sahara is covered in the statement that was issued after the Association Council meeting. It is also covered in the common position of the European Union that was negotiated in advance.

We might get a copy of that.

Yes, absolutely.

That would be terrific.

I thank Ms Keane for appearing before the committee today and for her really useful contributions and answers, and I thank my colleagues for their questions. We are now going into private session.