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Seanad

Prohibition of Forcible Entry and Occupation Bill, 1970: Committee Stage.

Contributions 144–299 of 299. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Bill Prohibition of Forcible Entry and Occupation Bill, 1970
Enacted

No. 16 of 1970 ›

John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

No, far from satisfied, but we will go on all night until we are satisfied.

Comment on this

It is rather farcical. There are many human beings sitting in this Chamber and there are three, or four, or five lawyers carrying on with this sort of thing and to my mind, even though I am a lawyer, I cannot help agreeing with the late Taoiseach, Seán F. Lemass, in many of the remarks that were attributed to him at least with regard to lawyers, particularly during the war period when they were finding ways out of his efforts to prevent the black market and all the rest of it. As a profession we let ourselves down if we waste the time of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas with this sort of thing, whether an Act of 1381 is still in force or whether it is not. Who gives a damn whether it is in force or whether it is not. Secondly, as I pointed out here last week, it is not even possible to get a copy of the wretched Act which was written in 1381 in Norman French which no one now can speak. In Russell on Crime, the 12th edition, which is one of the major books on crime, he tries to quote from some of these Acts; he does not purport to quote from the Act at all. He quotes from what he describes as Chapter VIII of Roughhead's edition. Who Roughhead was I do not know. When he wrote it, I do not know but——

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

The Minister should have found all that out if he was going to quote it to us.

Comment on this

I am not interested in this quite honestly——

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

If the Minister is not interested then do not bother us with it.

Comment on this

I am not interested in whether this wretched Act of 1381 is in force or whether it is not.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Stop telling us what is not interesting.

Comment on this

It would be better if the Minister were allowed to continue his speech without interruptions.

Comment on this

I do not care twopence whether it is or not. The view of Attorneys General since 1955 has been not to prosecute under Acts 600 years old. Quite frankly, I think they are right. If they were to prosecute, even if they had a copy of the Act, which they have not, the first question, as I pointed out here last week, that the defendant or his counsel would get up and ask is: "Prove the Act. You are prosecuting me under an Act: prove it." There is provision in our legislation that one can prove an Act of the Oireachtas in a particular way without calling on, say, the Clerk of the Dáil or the Clerk of the Seanad to prove that it has actually passed both Houses. I think the provision is that if it is published by the Stationery Office, or something on the face of it appears to be an official document, then it can be regarded, in the absence of proof to the contary, to have been passed by both Houses and to have been signed by the President. But what are you going to do with an Act of 1381 which was originally written in Norman French which no one now can speak? There is no extant copy of it. The writers on these topics rely on Mr. Roughhead, whoever he is, and his edition of what he believes was said in these Acts; he may well be accurate but I am afraid that is not sufficient to sustain a criminal prosecution.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

The Minister accused the lawyers—I presume on this side—though he did not take the trouble to exempt the ones on his own side, both of whom made long speeches here on the last day, and whom I expect to hear quite rightly contributing to this debate——

Comment on this

Carry on.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

"Carry-on" is a word that the Minister has learned from Senator Ó Maoláin. I would advise the Minister to drop it from his vocabulary because it will not make him any friends. I hope the Minister will not take it amiss if I say that he has wasted the last ten minutes by avoiding dealing with the point which Senator Robinson and myself have made. I am not interested in the advice which an Attorney General may give the police about the advisability of using a particular statute to prosecute or not. I think that Paddy McGilligan was probably very well advised when he told the Garda in 1955 that it was taking a risk to bring a prosecution under a statute 600 years old and if the present Attorney General were to give the Minister that advice he would be well advised too. That is not the point. The point as to whether the prosecution is likely to succeed or not is a perfectly different question from the point whether this statute is in force or not.

Comment on this

It is not a matter whether it can be enforced or not.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

The Minister is doing himself no credit by approaching a serious legal question on which people's liberties may hang in this way. Either the statute is in force or not, or there is doubt about whether it is in force or not; there have been occasions in the past, as the Minister knows, when statutes were passed here in order to repeal large loads of ancient lumber. Nobody had bothered to find out to what extent they were still in force, but just to be on the safe side they were repealed. The Minister knows that there are Acts of that kind. If he wishes, I will produce them for him tomorrow. We have had Acts of that kind. I suppose we will have them again in the future. I should like to know from the Minister what is the point of view of his Department or the Attorney General's office today. It is no use citing the Attorney General of 1955 because, if I understood the Minister correctly, he gave no opinion on whether the Act was in force or not. He merely gave an opinion on the practical advisability of using it for prosecutions and on practical experience which had been gained when it was used in prosecutions. But what we want to know is are these old Acts in force or not. Does the Government regard them as being laws here or not or are they in doubt about it? If they regard them as being in force, or if they regard the matter as doubtful, then their plain duty is to repeal them because the existence of these old Acts, if Senator Robinson is correct, and I do not doubt that she is, is plainly contradictory to the sense of this present Bill.

I said a while ago that there was a usual principle that a later statute repeals a former one, but it is not invariable, and there is a large area of doubt and of borderline here. Let there be no sneering at lawyers because, if I may make a remark about what people are quick to do, as the Minister did a minute ago, I find that people who sneer at lawyers the most are the quickest to run to them when they are in trouble and, as long as there is going to be a straw in this world, there will be people there to chop it or, as long as there is a hair in the world, there will be people there to split it. The legal profession is as decent and as honourable as any other one and it ill becomes this Minister, who is a member of it himself, to be throwing dirt on it. His own party have not been slow in recruiting them, and the means by which they recruit them are well known.

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

Would the Senator recommend a course in Norman French in his university?

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Let Senator Ó Maoláin not make the House ridiculous. He knows perfectly well I do not teach French and he knows perfectly well also that, if there was any difficulty about enforcing an old statute, I would be the first to recommend either amending it or repealing it and replacing it with a new one. That is what I want the Minister to do if he is advised that the statutes which Senator Robinson has mentioned are still in force. If they are still in force, and if this statute does not repeal them, it may very well be that this statute will not succeed in repealing them unless it does so expressly. The general principle that a legal statute repeals an earlier one is by no means universal. There is another principle which has equal defenders to the effect that a statute passed for a particular purpose cannot be repealed by a sidewind of a later statute. It might very well be, for all I know, that somebody would argue that the particular purpose involved in the ancient statutes mentioned by Senator Robinson cannot be repealed by the sidewinds of this Forcible Entry Bill. I am not purporting to decide these questions now. I would not attempt to do that off the cuff, so to speak.

What the Minister is doing by taking up this attitude is doing something which Fianna Fáil are always accusing us of trying to do; he is putting bread in the mouths of lawyers. He is making material for litigation. This is the third occasion today on which we, on this side of the House, have tried to simplify and straighten out a difficulty in a Bill which is going to produce either injustice or difficulty, or both. The Minister, it is true, accepted amendments in the other House.

I wish the Minister had been here last week towards the end of the debate, or when the debate had ended. Perhaps, it was the Parliamentary Secretary who was representing him who was here after the debate had ended. The question was what hours or days we were going to sit this week. We were asked by the Leader of the House to agree to finish by Friday. There was objection to that from this side and I asked: "How could we possibly give an indication when we do not know what attitude the Minister is going to take to our amendments?" I wish the Minister had heard the hearty guffaw we got from his own benches at the suggestion that he might have a flexible mind about amendments, at the suggestion that he might be prepared to accept rather than reject them. It does him no credit, let me tell him.

I want to try to do him and his Department justice. I observe that in the Courts Bill the Government themselves have put down an amendment which goes a very long part of the way, if not the whole way, to meet the point which we made on the Second Stage of the Courts Bill.

Comment on this

The Chair does not see the relevance of this to this amendment. It is something on another Bill.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I have been provoked by the suggestion made by the Minister, backed up by various grunts and growls on the other side, that we on this side are wasting time by "lawyers' rubbish" and by the "carry-on", a weak as well as an inelegant expression.

Comment on this

The Senator should not allow himself to be provoked into irrelevancies.

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

It makes me laugh to think of lawyers turning away bread.

Comment on this

It makes me laugh. The two men who are flanking the Leader of the House are lawyers.

Comment on this

These interruptions should cease. Every Senator has ample opportunity to speak on Committee Stage and Senators should allow the Senator in possession to speak without interruption.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

This particular intervention I shall conclude quickly. I want to know from the Minister what the Department's view is and what the present Attorney General's view is on whether or not the statutes mentioned by Senator Robinson are in force, or whether there is a doubt about it. If the advice is that they are in force, or if there is some doubt, I want to ask the Minister whether he will introduce an amendment expressly to repeal them, because they conflict, if Senator Robinson is right, with the purpose of this Bill.

Comment on this

I want to think about this for a moment and I am prepared to do it on the basis of forgetting completely about the 1381 Act, or any other Act that the Minister feels he cannot put his hands on, or on which he cannot give an answer now. If we forget about the old Acts, then the situation is that the only Act which is going to make forcible entry a crime in certain circumstances is the Bill before us at present when it is enacted. In that situation it seems to me that all the arguments made earlier on these two amendments as regards the discrimination between different categories of people are all valid. On the basis that the old Acts are gone and that we need not consider them— and I am not saying this for the purpose of excusing the Minister from giving a reply to the queries put by Senator Kelly—surely the situation is, as has been argued here already, that, while no new right is being given to the owner of superior interests under the Bill, an exemption from the provisions of this Bill is being granted to such persons.

Before I heard Senator Alexis FitzGerald I thought I had understood the Minister's point but, as Senator Alexis FitzGerald was unable to grasp it, I doubt my ability to grasp it. I understood the Minister to argue that his difficulty was that he wanted to treat landlords and tenants in exactly the same way and that, under this definition section, he was doing that because, while he was exempting landlords under the general description of "any person having an estate or interest in land", he was also exempting tenants. What the Minister has not dealt with adequately to my satisfaction is the question of this pyramid of interest which can arise and does arise very frequently. I could understand it more readily—I do not say I would necessarily accept the argument—if the Minister said: "Listen, I am concerned here with simply two classes of people, landlords and tenants. I want to ensure that both of those are treated in the same way and I want to ensure that the criminal law is not going to be—I think the phrase he used was— the dominant theme in landlord and tenant relations." I could understand that provided the Minister, when he was talking about a landlord and a tenant, was talking about the tenant who was in occupation and the landlord as being the person entitled to the reversion immediately expectant on the termination of the occupancy of the tenant. In that sense I could see that there would be something to be said, possibly a great deal to be said, for the Minister saying: "Right, as far as these people are concerned, the tenant who is there in possession, even if his tenancy has expired and he is overholding, that person, and the landlord who would be entitled to possession when that tenancy is gone, remove any application of the criminal law to those individuals. Let them battle it out under the civil law."

There is quite a case to be made for that but the Minister does not do that or, at least, he does that, but he does not stop there. He also, by virtue of his definition, gives the same exemption for every superior interest over and above the landlord who would be entitled to possession when the tenancy is gone. I want to give this kind of example, and I shall try to make it so simple that even lawyers will understand it, never mind non-lawyers: if we have a situation where A is the fee simple owner of land, A makes a fee farm grant to B; B then is the person entitled under the fee farm grant to possession and occupation of the land; B goes further and makes a lease for 999 years to C—there you have a situation straight away where you have the fee simple owner A, who is not entitled to possession; you have the fee farm owner B who, likewise, is not entitled to possession because he has made a lease to C. At this point C is entitled to possession because he has a lease for 999 years. C then goes on and makes a sublease to D for, say, 600 years. There you have three people above D none of whom is entitled to possession. D is the only one entitled to possession. Let us assume that D decides to develop the land and he gives licences out to various builders and as a result 100 houses are erected on that land and each house is granted a lease of, say, 550 years: now you have a situation in which you have 100 owner/ occupiers of houses. Above them you have the sublessee D, the lessee C, the fee farm grant owner B and the fee simple owner A. Suppose, somewhere along the line, the lessee C died intestate, a widower with five children all of whom, by virtue of the Succession Act, have an equal interest in his share of the rent, you then have a situation where you have the fee simple owner—possibly his interest is scattered amongst various people—the fee farm grant owner, whose interest may be scattered among various people, the first lessee, whose interest is scattered and the interest of the person who has died intestate and which is split five ways. Under all that you have 100 houses erected on that estate. All of those people, the fee simple owner, the fee farm grant owner, the lessee, the original sublessee and the people entitled to their interest, have an estate or an interest in the land. None of them is entitled to possession, or none of them ever will be entitled to possession, in the forseeable future. Is it reasonable that all of those people should secure exemption under this Bill? But that is what is being done.

There is no point in the Minister reducing it to the simplicities of the situation by talking about a landlord and a tenant. It is not only a landlord and a tenant who are concerned here. There is a tenant, on the one hand, and a whole pyramid of interests, on the other hand. One solution for the Minister's difficulty would be to say: "Let us reduce it to the very simplest and clearest issues of a tenant, on the one hand, and a landlord, who would be entitled to possession after that tenancy has ended, on the other hand." In that framework the Minister's argument might be understandable. I have not considered it very fully but you would at least have something balancing something else there instead of a whole pyramid of interests, on the one hand, and a single tenant on the other. If the Minister would look at that suggestion between now and Report Stage he might be able to come up with another definition which would get him out of the difficulty he obviously is in. I agree fully with Senator Kelly in this. The Minister is in this difficulty because of the way in which this Bill is worded. If the Minister intends going through with the Bill as it is— again I agree with Senator Kelly here —something must give; obviously, what will give is the desire to keep the relationship between landlord and tenant completely outside the criminal law.

Senator Eoin Ryan, when speaking on this amendment, said that the Bill was intended for certain purposes, but that it may be used for purposes not intended. Then, if my memory serves me correctly, with a lofty wave of the hand Senator Eoin Ryan said: "That cannot be helped." I disagree fundamentally with that attitude. That is exactly the attitude that seems to me to be coming across from the Minister. To my mind, that can be helped and this is the place to help it. Whatever jeers, jibes or sneers may be made at lawyers in this House or in the other House, it is our job as Senators to give what help we can because of whatever expertise we have in these matters, as well as from our own personal experience in dealing with problems of this sort. Of course, it can be helped and we are trying to help it by urging on the Minister at least to consider these amendments or something similar.

Comment on this

The last example that has been given by Senator O'Higgins makes me wonder whether this discussion is worthwhile at all. I have no personal experience of purchasing property or the building of houses, but I know that the common practice is that, if anybody wishes to purchase an estate, be it big or small, the first thing he does is to consult his solicitor——

Comment on this
Alexis Fitzgerald Mr. Alexis FitzGerald Fine Gael

Good, too.

Comment on this

——with the idea of establishing title. I do not think that any man in his sane senses would contemplate building 100 houses on an estate, as described by Senator O'Higgins, with a pyramid of interests.

Comment on this

The title would be perfectly sound.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

It happens all the time.

Comment on this

It does not happen down my way.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Tell us about the Loop Head title?

Comment on this

I never heard of it.

Comment on this

It might be one of them.

Comment on this

I do not think any man in his sane senses would build that number of houses and subsequently find that he had a pyramid of owners breathing down his neck. I have never heard of a case like that. I have some experience of local authorities and they certainly would not put a house anywhere where they would not have a clear title to the land. We have a situation here where we are splitting hairs. There have been innumerable Acts passed by successive Governments through the Houses of the Oireachtas before tonight. One would imagine that this Bill before us tonight was the most momentous piece of legislation that was ever put before the Oireachtas.

We have obviously upset the lawlords here. I venture to suggest that if we were to take the advice of our four law-lords here, and enact a Bill precisely as they desire us to do, there is not the slightest doubt but that there would be people in the Four Courts who would bring it before the Supreme Court and have it turned upside down in as little time as it would take you to say "Jack Robinson". Everybody would like to see perfection in law and it would simplify people's problems tremendously if this could be done. I do not know of any case where Daniel O'Connell's coach-and-four could not be driven through most Acts enacted by the Oireachtas——

Comment on this
Alexis Fitzgerald Mr. Alexis FitzGerald Fine Gael

It will be driven through this Bill as well.

Comment on this

——and ordinary people know that to their cost. Whether or not the Minister's opinion is as good as the people who are advising him, I could not say, but his opinion and the advice he has got is likely to be as good as the advice he is getting here tonight. I have been in the Seanad for a few years now and I have heard one accusation after another against the Government from a lot of people who have a lot of talk out of them tonight. No less than a couple of months ago they accused the Minister of copying British law, that every law that was enacted here was a copy of a British statute, that we should be bold enough to bring in our own laws as they affect our own people and that we should leave all this antiquated British law behind us. We hear ourselves tonight being hammered with Acts of 1381, 1429 and others. I do not know whether it is British law but I accept it as British law because of all the quotations we have had tonight. This is what we were told we should not be doing. Here tonight we have taken two hours to discuss this section and we do not seem any nearer to the end of it. What we are doing tonight is usurping the functions of the Judiciary and if the Bill is not good enough for the Judiciary no doubt somebody will find out whether it is or not.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I know Senator Honan is gallantly coming to the aid of a hard-pressed Minister and I do not despise him for his contribution at all, but I should like to say this about the duty of any Member of either House whether he supports the Government or is a Member of the Opposition. There is no question of usurping the function of the Judiciary. It is not very long—I will get back to this section in a moment but I should like to come to what Senator Honan has said—since a very lengthy resistance was put up by the Opposition in both Houses to the Livestock Marts Bill. One of the constant themes of the Opposition on that occasion was that there were sections in that Bill which were repugnant to the Constitution and they were subsequently shown to be right.

Last December a Bill was passed by both Houses in one day. It was the Bill to give special powers to the Dáil Public Accounts Committee. I do not think I am betraying any party secrets when I say that on our side we were told this was an all-party attempt, this was one of these Dáil things which surmounted party feeling, that we must facilitate the Government in what they wanted to do—we were not whipped into this point of view—but this is the word which went round, that we were to facilitate this. It might have been better for us had we neglected that advice. It might have been better for us, instead of letting it go through, as Senator Honan would wish every Bill to go through, if we had sat down and said: "No, we will have a look at this thing——

Comment on this
A Senator

Hear, hear.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

——and we will see if there is something in it which is repugnant to the Constitution or which is objectionable in some other way." Had we done so I believe that the country, let alone the Government, would have been spared a minor crisis. It is little to our credit that we allowed that Bill to go through in one day. I willingly accept my share of the blame for that because I, like the other lawyer Members here, am supposed to have the kind of training which would enable me to spot the weaknesses in a Bill of that kind and I accept my share of the blame for that. Therefore, I will not accept blame from Senator Honan for doing the opposite, for doing what I take my duty to be, and I am sure I speak for Senators FitzGerald and O'Higgins as well. I believe I speak also for Senators Ryan and Nash on the far side.

What are we doing here? We are not producing a manifesto, we are not producing a pamphlet or a book of instructions on how to lead the good life; we are trying to make law here, and where are lawyers to be used or where is anybody's intelligence to be used in a case like this except they are trying to see where the thing is weak? We say it is weak. It is weak and bad. I have explained to the Minister several times, and I cannot believe there is anyone in the House so unintelligent as not to be able to see the point what the discriminatory effect of this provision will be if it is passed.

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

Is the Senator suggesting that the Minister is unintelligent?

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

No. On the contrary. On the occasions that I have passed personal remarks about him they have included the remarks that I believe him to be not unintelligent. I said I do not believe anyone in the Seanad is so unintelligent as not to see the point that we are making.

If this passes without either Senator Robinson's amendment or mine, I confidently predict that this Bill when it passes into law will not work the way the Minister wants it to work, if it is not shot down by the Supreme Court. I make no prediction about the Supreme Court definitely shooting it down. But either the Supreme Court will shoot it down or it will not work, one or the other. That is my firm prediction about it.

Comment on this

I should like to make some remarks on the comments of the Minister when he was asked about the earlier statutes on forcible entry, whether they are still law in this country. I agree with Senator Kelly that he did not really answer the question. He quoted from the 1955 advice to the then Minister for Justice that it would not be very wise to implement them or that they might not work.

He also said that they were very old, they were written in Norman/ French and nobody could get an authoritative text on them. The Minister's attention might be drawn to my own recollection of the Criminal Justice Bill which came before the Dáil but has not yet come before this House —and I hope it never does. In that Bill there was a long Schedule repealing very old statutes, among them Magna Carta of 1214 written in Norman/French and this does not seem to have prevented the parliamentary draftsmen from taking cognisance of these old statutes, from repealing sections of them or not as the case might be. It is very bad that there is this lack of clarity here.

The Minister is obviously unsure whether the early statutes do or could operate in this country. He is not clear whether we can, as in England in the last few months and the last few years, have numerous prosecutions for forcible entry, forcible occupation, conspiracy to forcibly enter and, as I have already quoted, an improvement of the civil procedure there. If it is possible to operate these old statutes quite effectively and quite without any opposition in England I cannot see why it is not possible to do so here.

This is all a side issue to the major principle of the reason for putting forward these amendments—that whether these old statutes are operative now, and that seems to be in doubt this new statute is departing fundamentally in principle from the definition of the meaning of the word "owner". Under the Forcible Entry Bill an owner is included as a person who could be guilty of a crime of forcible entry or occupation. Here under the definition of "owner" we find that any person having an estate or interest in land need not have an immediate right to possession, they need not have even a remote right to possession. They may have a very extended interest in the property, yet they are exempted from the provisions of this statute.

The Minister has failed entirely to even explain, never mind convince anybody of the necessity for this. Like Senator FitzGerald, I just cannot follow his argument when he talks in a vague way that this would mean that the relationship between landlord and tenant and mortgagor and mortgagee, would all be suddenly brought into the criminal courts. Why is that not so in England then? Why is it not so here at the moment under the existing law, if that is the existing law? I just cannot follow that argument and I do not think other Senators on this side of the House have followed the argument.

On those lines and for the reasons put forward, I propose to withdraw my amendment because I am not satisfied with the wording of it. It requires a slight change in the rest of the section deleting the brackets in the next sentence and I propose to reintroduce it on Report Stage. I hope the Minister will then be clear on the position.

Comment on this

I should not like to embarrass the Parliamentary Secretary but I should like to hear the Minister reply to the point which I raised as regards landlord and tenant. Can we have an indication as to when he will be back.

Comment on this
Michael F. Kitt Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for the Gaeltacht (Mr. Kitt) Fianna Fáil

He will be back shortly.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I am not going to withdraw my amendment but I would be glad of your guidance, Sir. Is it the case that if I press it to a vote I am prevented from raising it on Report Stage, that if I wish to raise it on Report Stage I must withdraw it?

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

If it is a question of putting down matters for Report Stage, I object to the withdrawal.

Comment on this
William Alexander Sheldon Acting Chairman (Mr. Sheldon) Independent

Senator Robinson did not say that she was entering the same amendment, but an amended amendment.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Since we have not reached finality on that point and since the Minister is back, perhaps he would briefly tell us——

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

The Senator did withdraw the amendment.

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

Is it withdrawn?

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

That is the point before the House. Does the House wish the amendment to be withdrawn?

Comment on this

Senator Kelly was indicating his intention when the objection came from Senator Ó Maoláin. Earlier I had asked to hear the Minister in reply to the point which I had made in regard to limiting the definition to a tenant and landlord who would be entitled to possession after the termination of that tenancy rather than the entire pyramid.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

The Chair would like to facilitate the Leader of the Fine Gael Party. However, at the same time, the amendment was withdrawn. Therefore, the debate on that subject has concluded.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Will there still be a debate on this section?

Comment on this
Alexis Fitzgerald Mr. Alexis FitzGerald Fine Gael

Was the amendment withdrawn? I did not think you could withdraw an amendment, save with the permission of the House. There is unmistakably opposition from the Leader of the House to the proposal to withdraw it. The amendment has not been withdrawn because it was opposed.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

The question before the House is whether the amendment be withdrawn.

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

If the same amendment is being put down for Report I object to its withdrawal.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

But it is not withdrawn, as long as it is not unanimous.

Comment on this

Then I think that the Minister is entitled to deal with this point.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

The question is "That leave be given to withdraw amendment No. 6".

Comment on this

If it is still before the House, I repeat my request to the Minister. In order to minimise the difficulty, would the Minister consider looking at this again with a view to cutting down the definition of "owner" on the landlord side, so as to cut out this pyramid of superior interest that may arise, and limit it to a landlord who would be entitled to possession on the termination of an existing tenancy?

Comment on this

I shall certainly look at that. There are very serious difficulties in it. I shall look at it more closely between now and Report Stage. However, straightaway, on listening to Senator O'Higgins, I wish to say before I start that I have no brief for fee farm grantors or the like. What Senator O'Higgins should bear in mind is that a fee farm grantor, for example, has a right under the grant he gave to repossess any part of the property, assuming that the rent is in arrears or that some other condition of the grant is broken. He cannot repossess it physically, or enter physically, as against his grantee, because his grantee, in Senator O'Higgins's own example, may be number two in a pyramid of five. The actual physical re-entry under the terms of the grant would be against number five in that pyramid, one or other or all of 100 owner-occupiers. The fee farm grantor has a legal right to re-entry as against any part of the property. For example, if you are buying one of those 100 houses that have been built on the field that originally was the subject of a fee farm grant, you would be well advised—and I am sure that Senator O'Higgins would agree with me—to ensure in your requisition that you get a receipt for the fee farm rent, even though your purchaser will never really be involved in that at all. For that reason it is not easy to cut it down to the person who——

Comment on this

I do not like to interrupt the Minister, but I do not want to interfere at all, and I do not want the Minister to interfere at all with the ordinary case where there is a lease or a fee farm grant, and there is a breach of covenant or a default in payment of rent. The civil remedies and the remedies for repossession, and so on, are there. That does not come into this. Here we are dealing with a question of exempting these people from coming in under the terms of this Bill. That is all. I want to limit it to that only.

Comment on this

I am sure the Senator will appreciate the difficulty that in the example he gave the exemption under this Bill could not be confined to what he called the No. 4 man there, that is the man who made the 100 subleases, because No. 2 or No. 1 could be entitled under the terms of his grant, or under his predecessor's entitled grant, to physical re-entry as against any one of 100 existing semi-detached owner-occupiers. That is something that immediately springs to my mind as a difficulty. At the same time, I get the Senator's point. We have both gone a long way from where we started, and I am quite prepared to consider it between now and the Report Stage.

Senator O'Higgins rose.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

I am sorry, Senator. The debate on the amendment is concluded. Do Senators desire to withdraw it? I allowed Senator O'Higgins to ask a question to facilitate the——

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

The fact that a Senator withdrew, or offered to withdraw, his amendment, concludes the debate, whether the House gives leave or not. The second question is that the amendment must then be put. All I can ask now is whether the Senator is pressing the amendment——does he wish to it put?

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I move amendment No. 6:

In subsection (1), line 28, after "any person having an estate or interest in land", to insert "where no inferior estate or interest exists entitling the person having such inferior estate or interest to the occupation, use or enjoyment of the land".

I understand the situation and press the amendment, although it is only a formality. It precludes me from raising this matter in the same form on Report Stage.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

In the same form, if it is negatived.

Comment on this
Acting Chairman

Amendments Nos. 7 and 10 can be debated together.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I move amendment No. 7:

In subsection (1), lines 29 and 30, to delete "(including a person who remains in occupation of land after the determination of his tenancy therein)".

Yes, amendments Nos. 7 and 10 belong together. If the House would allow me, I think that the sensible thing would be to begin with amendment No. 10 for the purpose of explaining its intention to the House. These two amendments illustrate one-fourth of the cleft stick into which the Minister has worked himself.

Comment on this

We are discussing them together, although they are different sections?

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I heard the Minister say that he was prepared to look again at the points which have been raised in regard to the definition of "owner", so far as concerns the question of superior interests. I hope that he will look again also at the question of owner so far as it concerns the person now contemplated by the words "including a person who remains in occupation of land after the determination of his tenancy therein".

My recollection is that these words which I propose to delete were inserted in the Dáil. Whether they were or not the benevolent intention was to give a certain immunity from the application of this statute to somebody who was an overholding tenant. The idea behind that is presumably exactly the same as the idea which the Minister explained some time ago in regard to not allowing landlord and tenant law to become a matter of concern to the Garda, and I presume what the Minister has in mind here is that a tenant who finds himself a defendant in an ejectment suit or perhaps has had an order for ejectment made against him will not be committing a crime if he barricades himself in and refuses to give up possession.

That, to my mind, is a perfectly fair thing to do. The reason why I want to delete these words is not because I am against them but because I wish to extend that principle to a wider class of persons, including the people the Minister has in mind in using the words which are given in amendment No. 7. I am in favour of the principle behind the words in brackets in amendment No. 7, and the reason why I propose to delete them is because the essence of amendment No. 10 would be to widen the application of that immunity. The reason why I propose it is this.

The Minister has put this whole legislation, both in the Dáil and the Seanad, on the basis that he was out to put a halt to the activities of subversive organisations. I do not think I am doing him an injustice in saying that the subversive organisation element in this thing was uppermost in his mind all the way through. So far uppermost was it that he gave us here last week examples of the kind of advice which these subversive organisations hand around to one another. He explained that they said: "It does not matter what you agitate about. When one thing drops out of the public gaze, seize on something else. Agitate, agitate." I quote from column 256, Vol. 71 of the Seanad Report: The Minister said:

The basic instruction with regard to agitation in general terms runs something like this: "Agitate at all times. Pick on any topic, it does not matter what it is. If there is a shortage of something or other in the country, if there is a lack of something or other in a particular locality, pick on that and stick to it."

I only mention that because it is an instance of how intense the Minister's concentration on the subversive organisation element of this whole discussion has been. So far as his desire to contain subversive organisations is concerned, I am with him 100 per cent. The reason why I put down these two amendments is because I take the Minister at his word that he is aiming at subversive organisations and I want to exclude from the purview of the Bill, so far as possible, people who in the typical case, in 99,999 cases out of 100,000, would have no connection good, bad or indifferent with a subversive organisation.

I know the Minister had these people in mind when he acquiesced in the words in amendment No. 7 being put into the Bill, including a person who remains in occupation of land after the determination of his tenancy. In other words, he is giving an artificial meaning to "owner," because somebody whose tenancy is determined is not an owner in law in any shape or form and could only be deemed such by an artificial interpretation which the Minister proposes to provide out of compassion.

What I am proposing to the House now is that the Minister should go further than that and that anybody who has been at any stage lawfully in occupation of a premises, should be not immune from civil proceedings but immune from criminal proceedings under this Act even after the conditions which rendered his presence there lawful have terminated. I will give three or four examples of that and the House will see what I am getting at.

The tenant whose tenancy has expired and who is perhaps defending an action or has had judgment issued against him in an ejectment is the most obvious case. There are other people, some of whom were mentioned in the Dáil, and I could not understand why the Minister would not see this point or did not appear to see it. This is the case of the permissive occupant. There are plenty of permissive occupancies in the country—people who do not pay rent, are not really in a situation or in a relationship of tenant with anybody but who are simply allowed, as a matter of grace and favour, to live in a particular premises or to use a particular premises.

These permissive occupancies are not tenancies and when the permission is withdrawn, which it may be at any time, the person's rights there are at an end. The typical permissive occupant is somebody who digs his heels in and stays on—and I think the Minister admitted this in the Dáil. He would be the kind of person who would regard the place as his home even though he was not paying rent and though he enjoyed no tenancy relationship. That kind of person is not associated with a subversive organisation. I am not saying that the owner of the property ought not to be entitled to have a civil remedy in order to eject such a person. That has to be the case. The main burden of the Minister's song has been, "This Bill is intended to secure us against subversion," and the kind of person of whom I am talking is not a proper target for a criminal statute, the intention behind which is to protect us against political subversion.

The same applies to somebody who might be lawfully present in a premises as a licencee of a person who was a tenant of the premises. There have been cases under the Rent Restrictions Acts involving members of a tenant's family where the tenant had died. There was a time when the word "family" in the Rent Restrictions Act was very narrowly interpreted so as to mean only parents and children, which would mean that none but the spouse of the deceased or the children could claim to be family so as to retain an interest in the premises under the Rent Restrictions Acts. But the definition has been judicially extended since then so as to embrace people a bit further removed—a niece or perhaps even a niece-in-law—and these are lawfully entitled to protection under the Rent Restriction Acts.

I can visualise a case in which somebody who is either not a member of the tenants' family on any definition or is a member so far out and who has been there for such a short while that no court would regard him as a member of the family for the purposes of protection by the Act, would still dig in his heels if the tenant died and say, "Well, I am here now and I intend staying here", and resist any attempt by the landlord to put him out. I am not saying that the landlord should not be entitled to have his own civil law remedies to eject this person. This is the kind of person who is not in the typical or any case associated with subversion and the Minister ought to look at the Bill again and redraw the definition so as to exclude persons of that kind from the operation of this criminal sanction.

Another example would be a mortgagor who has reached the end of the road. The Minister spoke about mortgagors earlier and he said one of his difficulties was that many people did not know what they were. He then gave a succinct and graphic description of a mortgagor—somebody who owes money on his house.

There comes a time when a mortgagor reaches the end of the road and when his equity of redemption is gone. It is not a thing which lasts for ever. A mortgagor who has at one time been in lawful possession of his house and is in no way associated with subversion, even when his equity of redemption is gone, should not be placed in the same situation, for the purpose of this penal statute, as if he were a member of a subversive organisation taking possession of the place forcibly in order to demonstrate a political point of view.

I hope I have said enough to enable the House to see the point. I do not disagree with the spirit behind the words which I would have deleted by amendment No. 7. I am merely hoping that because of amendment No. 10 the Minister will see his way to accept it. We will be able to extend the idea behind these words so as to include other clearly recognisable categories of persons who are not in one case in a 1,000 associated with subversive groups and whom it would be, therefore, sensible, logical and in conformity with the Minister's own policy to leave out of the application of this statute.

Comment on this
Alexis Fitzgerald Mr. Alexis FitzGerald Fine Gael

I should like to support that but very briefly by telling the House that I am aware of one particular case in this city where a man died leaving his shop subject to a mortgage in favour of his relations. At this moment and for many years his widow has been carrying on the business by permission given her to do so by the mortgagee who is a relative of her late husband. She never had a tenancy, is not staying on, is there as a mere licensee and she is managing to bring up her family as such. She is not exempt. Although I would join with Senator Kelly in recognising the compassion which lead to this particular amendment, I do not think it goes far enough to take in a variety of cases that could occur to one. That is a case in this city of which I am aware at the moment. If she came home one evening and found through some mistake that she had to break her way into her own shop—you may say this is academic and theoretical—strictly speaking she would bring herself within the range of the criminal code as this is drafted.

I am sure Senator Nash could give many other examples of a similar type of situation. We are all aware that on the industrial front you may have a factory at a particular point of time too large for the entrepreneur who is manufacturing and it may suit him to let somebody into part of his factory pending the further development of it but he cannot let the other party in on the basis of giving them any legal right, because this would obstruct his complete development. He, therefore, makes a licence agreement with the other party for some years or, perhaps, it may be on a semi-permanent basis but the property interests involved of the owner are such that he cannot afford to allow any legal right in the other company and there is a licence position existing between them. That licensed company could in certain circumstances be brought inadvertently within the scope of this criminal code. These are two cases that occur to me. Others may occur to other Senators.

Comment on this

With regard to amendment No. 7 those words in brackets now sought to be deleted "including a person who remains in occupation of land after the determination of his tenancy therein" were inserted by an amendment put forward by me on Committee Stage in the Dáil as a result of the Second Stage speech of Deputy O'Higgins. I agreed with what he said in that an overholding tenant should be put in the position of an owner for the purposes of the Bill. I inserted those words and I am surprised to see a suggestion now by Senator Kelly that they be deleted. Amendment No. 10 put forward by Senator Kelly appears to be consequential on amendment No. 7.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

The other way round.

Comment on this

One assumes that if the words went out, amendment No. 10 would then be necessary or is it the other way round? Amendment No. 7 would not be necessary if amendment No. 10 was in.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

If amendment No. 10 was in, amendment No. 7 would be otiose. The words in brackets would be superfluous.

Comment on this

Amendment No. 10, as I understand it, seems to deal principally with the rather broad question of what are generally called permissive occupiers.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

There are different classes——

Comment on this

I will go on to deal with it. In normal terminology we regard as a permissive occupier somebody who had what would generally be regarded by laymen as a sort of a tenancy in the place. He worked as a gardener or something for many years and as part of the perks of his job he was given the gate lodge. He lived there free of rent but at all times subject to the owner of the property. If that permission were withdrawn, he would be in a somewhat different position to an overholding tenant who is covered by the words in brackets be cause he was never a tenant and he would be a sort of overholding permissive occupier, if there could be such a thing.

We dealt with this at some length in the Dáil and I explained at the time that my difficulty was that while I had every sympathy with that man in this particular situation, if I were to accept an amendment on the general lines of exempting permissive occupiers because this is a criminal statute and because the interpretation of it where there was any doubt whatever would be entirely in favour of the defendant, we would be faced with a situation that mere invitees and mere licensees would be exempt also. The case would immediately be made, and I am sure Senators Kelly and FitzGerald will agree with me on this, by whoever was defending them that these people come within the permissive occupant exemption because they went into X's office, shop or whatever it was ostensibly in the ordinary course of business. They were legitimately there for five or ten minutes. It was only then that they decided they would bar the place up and squat. The trouble is if you use the words simply exempting permissive occupants or if you use the somewhat longer version of it that Senator Kelly has in his amendment No. 10, you are still up against that problem, because of the fact that defendants must get the full benefit of any doubt or ambiguity and that people who were originally invitees or licensees will become exempt. I do not want to exempt them because I want to try to prevent that sort of activity of people going into a premises ostensibly on legitimate business, spending five or ten minutes there and then when a sufficient number of their friends had entered also ostensibly on that business locking themselves in or throwing out the staff.

There is a further point with regard to amendment No. 10 that I feel Senator Kelly may well have put down inadvertently to the wrong section because amendment No. 10 is expressed as an amendment to section 2. But section 2 is the section which prohibits forcible entry. If you have a permissive occupier whether he is the long-term sort of occupier we have been talking about or whether he is the invitee or licensee type, one thing all these groups have in common is that they entered lawfully. It was not in any case a forcible entry. Therefore, the question of any of them committing an offence against section 2 could not arise whether or not they might commit an offence against section 3.

With regard to the question of these sort of long-term permissive occupants, people who might have spent 30 or 40 years in a house, as they often do, under a permissive occupancy or a tenancy at will as it is called, I gave a good deal of consideration as to how I could exempt them without exempting the other groups to which I referred. I was satisfied at the end that they were, in fact, exempted under paragraph (c) of section 2 and under the last part of subsection (1) of section 3 because undoubtedly they entered there and they remained thereon in pursuance of a bona fide claim of right. If a man is in possession of a house for 30 or 40 years, as people very often are, even though it is a permissive occupancy, he himself, his family and, indeed, all his neighbours and associates would certainly regard him as being there under a bona fide claim of right. Therefore, that type of person whom I would be very anxious to exempt and to protect with regard to his property is, in fact, exempt and by not accepting a more general amendment of permissive occupancy in general I am avoiding the difficulty that would arise of exempting people who for a mere five or ten minutes were invitees or licencees.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I do not think the Minister is right in the last thing he says. By the way, I do not want this debate to get into the topic of permissive occupiers alone. I gave at least two other categories of persons apart from permissive occupiers and overholding tenants who I think should be outside the purview of the Bill. I do not think the Minister is right in saying that exemption (c) would cover a permissive occupier who refuses to get out. First of all, the Minister is optimistic in supposing that a permissive occupier whose position is determined will be recognised by a court and have a bona fide claim of right. I do not think a judge would be disposed in most cases to accept that somebody is in good faith if he is told in simple words that his commission is at an end and, secondly, the Act should not apply even to somebody who is in bad faith. This is the point. Let us bear in mind that we are being asked to pass a statute to counter subversion. Let us keep that in the forefront of our minds. Even an overholding tenant, an overholding permissive occupier, an overholding mortgagor or licensee who is in bad faith in regard to what he is doing— as I said earlier, a cranky old woman who barricades herself in in bad faith and will not come out, knowing that she has no right to be on the premises. She certainly is not a meritorious case in the civil law but neither is she an appropriate object of this new criminal statute. I believe that such a person should be left outside the purview of the criminal statute and the Minister will be leading the House astray—un-wittingly perhaps—if he gives the House the impression that the exemption under (c) in section 2 is going to be any good for the purpose of what I am talking about.

People who once upon a time, whenever it has been, were lawfully on the premises—I will not say they should be allowed to stay there, by all means let the person who is entitled to the enjoyment and occupation of the premises eject them by the processes of the civil law—are in the typical case not members of a subversive organisation and are not there for subversive purposes and should not, therefore, be the object of prosecutions under this Act. That is a very simple point and if the Minister were willing even to indicate a readiness to reconsider between now and Report Stage I would say no more except to mention his two other arguments. He appeared to say that somebody who is an invitee would be somebody who might come into a place of business and ostensibly do business for five or ten minutes and then say: "Hands up, all out, this is a stick-up or this is a sit-in" or whatever it is and order the staff out. I will not give this opinion off the cuff. I will have to go and look it up but the law of invitees will not extend to or protect somebody of that kind. These expressions "invitees and licencees" are usually used in the law of occupiers liability for accidents which happen to people on their premises. A member of a subversive organisation who comes on to my premises affecting to be doing business with me but really for the purpose of squatting there is someone to whom I own no duty in the civil law of occupiers liability in the way that I would to an ordinary invitee who is coming to do business with me bona fide. I may be wrong about that. I do not insist on it. I will look it up before the next Stage but I believe for the moment that an invitee, in other words, is someone who is welcome to come on to your premises to do business with you or to visit you. Somebody who comes on to your premises only ostensibly to do that but really with the intention of doing something unlawful which even under existing law interferes with your ordinary business would be a trespasser in one form or another. I do not think somebody of that kind is an invitee and I do not think the law governing invitees would apply to him and I would not have the same duties to him in regard to care in my premises as I would have to an ordinary invitee.

Although the Minister's objection is honestly meant, I do not think it is a very strong one and if he were disposed to accept that this exemption from the application of the Act should be widened, I do not think it is beyond our combined ingenuity and that of his Department to draft an exemption which would be satisfactory.

In regard to the sequence of these two amendments there is nothing surprising, as they appear to say, in my moving to delete something which was there because of what Deputy O'Higgins said in the Dáil. The reason I am deleting it is purely consequential on my anxiety to produce a different provision in amendment No. 10 which will be wider than the one mentioned in amendment No. 7 and will, therefore, render it unnecessary. I have no objection to the phrasing of amendent No. 7 as it stands; it would just be untidy. If the House were to accept amendment No. 10 and not accept amendment No. 7, the result would be an untidy result. It would not be fatal but it would be untidy; that is all I have got against the lines which I propose to delete the amendment. I am perfectly certain that exemption (c) in section 2 will not cover the kind of person I mean, who is not in the typical case a subversive person, and I do not believe either that the Minister's anxiety is based on the possibility of an invitee or somebody coming on and ostensibly doing business but really intending to occupy the place unlawfully being let off the hook by the acceptance of my amendment.

Comment on this

One difficulty I see in this amendment relates to one of the early squatting cases here in Dublin when the Carlton Hotel in Harcourt Street was taken over. Let us suppose that some people went into an hotel and rented a room for the night. We will all agree that they are in lawful occupation but their real intention in going in was to avoid the effects of this Bill. Next day they told everybody to clear and they barricaded themselves in. Would they not be protected? They would seem to me to be protected if Senator Kelly's amendment came into effect. I see what is at the back of his mind but the whole difficulty that I fear is that if you close one door with a view to protecting what we call innocent people, then you are opening another door and letting in some guilty people. Even people who go into a hotel and book the functions room are in lawful occupation. Let us assume then that they barricade themselves in. Would they not escape all possibility of prosecution if this amendment was accepted? I say this subject to correction.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Again, I say this subject to correction. Offhand, I would say that Senator Nash is probably not right about this. If I were to go into my bank in the morning with the intention of staying behind until the doors were closed and then robbing it—I might do some legitimate business before closing time, lodge money or draw money or transfer from one account to the other—I do not believe, subject to correction, that my presence there is lawful if I have come in with the ultimate intention of robbing it. I believe I am right but I do not think it is beyond the ingenuity of the Minister and his Department and of the combined forces in this House to produce a satisfactory provision which will exempt from the application of this penal statute people who in the typical case are not associated with subversion. That is the whole point. Could I just hear what the Minister's reaction is? Is he going to meet us——

Comment on this

I shall have another look at it. We have looked at it already and there are a number of problems which we have come up against. I am not certain that we are going to solve them at this stage. I shall certainly have a look at it with a view to trying to do that between now and the Report Stage.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Will the Minister look in particular at whether he is right or wrong? While not actually contradicting him, would the Minister look at what he said about an invitee problem?

Comment on this

If there is any doubt, Senator, as to whether I am right or wrong, the defendant must get the benefit of it. At least I am not being dogmatic that I am right and that you are wrong. If there is even some doubt as to whether I am right the defendant must get the benefit of it and the thing is blown out anyway.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Could the Minister not put it beyond doubt, that is the point? The reason why I suggest that the Minister might look at what he said about the invitee position—he might be right about it, but I do not think he is—is that an ostensible invitee might use the amendment in order to get himself outside the application of the law. If the Minister would look that up to see whether he is correct about it,—and I suspect that he is not —but if he is will he consider fairly and squarely whether my amendment could not be further amended by him so as to meet the object which I believe——

Comment on this

I will look at it with a view to trying to do that.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 8:

In subsection (1) to delete all words after "tenement)" in line 32 down to and including "owner" in line 34.

The purpose of this amendment is to have deleted from the definition of "owner" the words "Any person acting on behalf of the owner". I think we have seen during the past couple of hours that, excluding this extension, the definition of "owner" is loose enough and vague enough and, to say the least, unsatisfactory enough. To extend it to cover persons acting on behalf of the owner is in the estimation of my party a highly dangerous thing to do. We believe that it can cover practically anybody.

Our main concern, however, is that we can see this as permitting an unscrupulous owner to employ a still less scrupulous person as his agent to do on his behalf some distasteful work of ejection or some work which might incur for the owner public odium. We see it further as encouraging the development of private law enforcement bodies acting on behalf of private commercial concerns. It needs no great imagination to realise how the approach of such bodies could differ from the approach of the Garda Síochána who now enforce the criminal law. The Garda are guided by a sense of service to the community, they have a proud tradition to uphold and their training enables them to uphold that tradition.

Private forces may not be guided by such noble traditions and their main concern would be to give satisfaction to the persons who paid them. Furthermore, under this Bill if enacted they will be fortified by the knowledge that under section 6 the defendant whom they would be employed to eject would be responsible for any damage that they may do to his property or to himself. There is no reference in the Bill to the fact that such persons acting on behalf of the owner would be forced to produce any sort of authorisation or any identification to show that they were authorised to act on his behalf. That would be very unfair indeed to the occupier in this regard.

I see this Bill in toto as making a law to protect the strong against the weak and I thought we had got away from that sort of thinking several decades ago. I noticed that the Minister's main objection in the other House to amendments of this kind was that in several instances the owner could not act on his own behalf. I think he quoted limited companies and wards of court and such like. With respect, I think the Minister was talking about civil law and the objections he raised could be covered by having recourse to the civil law.

My party feel that our fears are very real ones in this regard, and only the Garda Síochána should enforce the criminal law. We have very sincere fears and we have very sincere motives in putting down this amendment. Perhaps the Minister can convince us that our fears are groundless. I hope he can see his way to accept our amendment.

Comment on this

I should like to support this amendment, because I agree with Senator Desmond that it imports into the Bill the idea of private armies, of owners being able to engage others to forcibly enter their property to dispossess others and that these people so engaged would be given complete exemption under section 2 of the Act because they would be included in the definition under section 2 (a) as the owner of the land or vehicle. That is the purpose of this definition, to extend "owner" to anyone whom the owner might engage to act on his behalf. I would agree with Senator Desmond that in a civilised society with a highly qualified police force we do not want to give power to owners to engage people on their behalf in this way.

We saw an example of that which has been overtalked perhaps—the Hume Street affair. A private army was able to go in and create considerable damage there and these K Security people would be owners for the purposes of this Bill and could not be prosecuted for forcible entry. Yet I think that they might well be one of the groups against whom this Bill might be directed.

Going back to an ironic feature of this Bill and to a sense of history, if the House did not accept this amendment and if we allowed the section to stand as it does to include any person acting on behalf of the owner, we would be granting exemption in this Bill to the barons and their armies which the early Acts were brought in to defeat. They were brought in to curtail the common law and to deny to powerful people the right to engage others on their behalf to enter private property, even if they had the right to possession. They had to either bring a civil remedy or go to the proper authorities—go to the police and have them carry out their dirty work.

For these very serious and fundamental reasons, because I would dislike intensely granting an exemption of this sort to the agents of private owners, I should like to support this amendment.

Comment on this

The words which this amendment seeks to delete are essential to the definition of "owner" so as to exclude from the scope of the offences created by sections 2 and 3 anything done by a person acting on behalf of the owner of the land or the vehicle. If the definition of "owner" was restricted as proposed in the amendment a person entering or occupying land or a vehicle in the course of his duties undertaken on behalf of the owner, who would normally be his employer, could find himself committing a criminal offence. This would be a ludicrous position and one for which there could be no justification whatsoever.

It has been alleged that under the Bill as drafted, security firms acting on behalf of an owner are being given the right to force their way into the property of the owner and to behave in a reprehensible way and that they are being given the full protection of the law for such behaviour. This is, of course, quite untrue. Nothing in this Bill confers on any person any right to enter or occupy land which he does not have at the present time. Moreover, there is nothing in the Bill that condones or authorises behaviour which is contrary to the existing criminal law, nor is anything done by the Bill to exempt persons from the civil consequences of their tortious acts.

In the Dáil I gave a fairly extensive list of instances where the acceptances of this amendment, or a similar one proposed in the Dáil, would give rise to quite ludicrous consequences. It would be the first time in the history of our law that an owner of property could not act through some employee or some agent. The very obvious consequences that spring to mind are so ludicrous that if they were fully appreciated by the proposers of the amendment they would scarcely press it.

One of the most obvious examples that one can give is that of a limited company. A limited company has a separate legal personality of its own. It is a person recognised in law as quite distinct from the individuals who happen to be shareholders or directors of it. Since a limited company, which physically is no more than a certificate in the Companies Office in Dublin Castle, cannot go in to exercise its rights in relation to its property it must act through its agents or servants even though one of these might be a director who owns 99.9 per cent of the shares and who, to all intents and purposes, was the company and was the owner of the property. He would be precluded and that company would be left, as, indeed, every company would be left, in the ridiculous situation that it could not enforce any right in relation to its own property.

You have the example, too, of a situation where, say, an old woman owns certain property and somebody moves into it; she is obviously not going to be in a position to do very much about it. You have the situation where a great deal of property in this country is beneficially the property of wards of court, persons who may be very young or persons who may be of unsound mind and confined to mental hospitals or similar institutions. All their property is vested in the President of the High Court or in their committee as the case may be. How is the President of the High Court expected to go around to vindicate the rights of his many wards? It simply could not be done.

These are just examples that spring readily to mind. Another example that springs to mind is the question of what does a building society or a local authority, for example, do. They are in much the same position as limited companies. You would have the rather ludicrous position that a corporation could probably only exercise its rights, if it could exercise them at all, if the mayor, aldermen and burgesses physically went there all together and exercised their rights. If it was the case of a council, I do not know what they would do. I presume all the members would have to go together to exercise their rights. The same thing would apply in regard to a building society. If a building society owned property from which it sought to eject squatters or trespassers it simply would be precluded from doing so.

The purpose behind the amendment does not take into account these practical difficulties but, unfortunately, I have to face up to the practical difficulties. To accept the amendment would create an immense amount of extra problems of a far more serious nature than anything it would solve. In fact, I do not think it would solve anything. There were vague statements about private armies. The only example ever given of an alleged private army is some security firm which apparently assisted in getting squatters out of a house or houses in Hume Street in the course of which it was alleged excessive force was used. It may well be that excessive force was used in that case. In fact, it probably was, because one of the people concerned, if not the chief man in the organisation, was prosecuted, convicted and penalised or fined for some act that he did in the course of this affair. That should bring home to us the fact that security firms or anybody else who might be employed by an owner of property have no rights. They are not given any extra rights by this Bill. They are very much subject to the ordinary law and in the only instance that is quoted where a security firm was used in connection with a matter of this kind one of the members of that firm apparently infringed the law and was prosecuted and convicted for it, which is proof surely—I suppose in fairness to the appellant I should not refer to it and I withdraw any suggestion that he acted improperly under the circumstances.

Comment on this

You must get Senator Ó Maoláin's permission to withdraw it.

Comment on this
Thomas Mullins Tomás Ó Maoláin Fianna Fáil

Permssion granted.

Comment on this

The fact that there has been only one alleged instance of the excess referred to shows that is not a problem. Such people are subject to the ordinary law which is, of course, enforced against them in the same way as it is enforced against any other citizen. Therefore, this amendment would not solve any problem. It would, in fact, create an enormous number of other problems. I have already mentioned some of them and I am sure if I spent some time thinking about them I could produce dozens more.

Comment on this

I just want to ask the Minister one point in connection with this. I take the opportunity on this amendment to ask it because this is really in point here. I do not want to add to what has been urged on behalf of the amendment. I fully understand the case that has been made for it. The exemption, so to speak, provided here by the definition of "owner" refers to "any person acting on behalf of the owner". There is no requirement in this definition that that person should be authorised by the owner. Once he declares himself to be acting on behalf of the owner it seems that he comes within the definition and, therefore, he comes within the exemption. Whatever about the remedy which is suggested in the amendment of deleting the words "acting on behalf of the owner" completely, it seems to me to be essential that "acting on behalf of the owner" should be limited to "acting on behalf of and with the authority of the owner", so that a person merely by claiming to act on behalf of the owner would not come within the definition and get the exemption.

Comment on this
Alexis Fitzgerald Mr. Alexis FitzGerald Fine Gael

I think the Minister has made a number of very dubious statements in his remarks with regard to the law. With regard to the amendment, I do not think the amendment would achieve what is sought to be achieved by the proposer of it. I do not think the words are needed in the section to avoid the difficulties that the Minister has referred to. It is a very well established proposition of law that anyone can do anything through his agent unless the statute in question deprives him of the right to do it through his agent. Even if these words were not here the agent in my view— and I think this is a correct statement of the law—would be able to act on behalf of the law assuming he was, as Senator O'Higgins has said, an authorised agent. All these words do is cast in some doubt whether he needs authority to act.

The Minister recited a number of examples. He mentioned the case of a limited company and if it could not organise all its shareholders to go together to exercise its rights. It is well established that a limited company actually operates through its officers or agents and does not need the authority of this statute to exercise or claim any rights that may be conferred on orders by way of exemption under sections 2 and 3. He mentioned that the vesting of all property of lunatics and minors is in the President of the High Court. This is not a correct statement of the law. The property is vested, in the case of lunatics or persons of unsound mind, as they are now called, in the committees of the estates of persons who have legal interests involved and who would be, for the purposes of this Act, the owners, and in the case of minors are vested in the guardians of the property of the minors and would be as such the owners within this State within the terms and ambit of this section.

The amendment does not achieve anything because, even if the amendment is passed, all it does is remove the doubt that Senator O'Higgins has raised as to whether it is necessary that these persons acting on behalf of the owner be properly authorised or not. If these are exercised, then duly authorised agents will, as a matter of law, without being dependent upon any of the terms or this Bill, be entitled to claim the rights of owners under it.

Comment on this

There are just a few points I should like to make on the amendment. Senator FitzGerald has just cleared up some of the problems I had in relation to it. The definition of "owner" under this Bill is very important, because it is a word that appears in practically every section, and it is reasonable that we should be clear on what is intended. Quite frankly, it is the lawyers acting on his behalf that causes me great trouble, particularly with regard to section 9.

Senator O'Higgins has pointed out tht there is no formal identification needed under the Bill. This is extremely important, particularly under section 9, the section which gives the right to arrest without warrant. In section 9 (b) the owner of the land makes representations to a member of the Garda Síochána. The interpretation clause "owner" literally means that anybody can make representations to the Garda and it fulfils the requirements of section 9 (b). This is highly dangerous because, as I see it, there is nothing to prevent anybody, Joe Smith, saying to a garda: "I am acting on behalf of the owner", whether he is entitled to act or not. If it achieves the object, with the result of which the owner would be very pleased, he could then be post facto appointed as the agent. I doubt if this is the intention of the drafters of the Bill.

I would possibly agree that the amendment, as drafted, does not necessarily fulfil all the requirements on some of the difficult ones, particularly for people without any sort of legal training, but there is a very serious problem here as to what might arise out of the very broad interpretation. I would be quite happy—and I am sure my colleagues here would be— to withdraw the amendment if we felt the Minister was prepared in some way to redraft, between now and Report Stage, an amendment which would cover his very valid point. I accept there is a problem if you withdraw the agent in the cases he mentioned such as wards of court or limited companies. But there are other problems and I should like the Minister to take our view into account on this, particularly in relation to section 9 which gives very wide powers and could have very serious consequences for the people who were arrested in those circumstances.

Comment on this

In relation to what the Minister said about the problems to which this amendment gives rise, most, if not all, of those problems are covered by subsection (3) of section 1 which provides that—

Nothing in this Act shall apply to an entry or an occupation of land or a vehicle in the exercise of lawful authority or with the permission of the owner.

There must clearly be the permission of the owner or lawful authority. That is wide enough to cover all of the examples that the Minister gave as a reason for not being able to accept the amendment. I would agree with Senator Owens that the wording of this, "any person acting on behalf of the owner", does give rise to the belief that it would authorise the employment of a large number of people to retake property, and that this would be much better done by our lawful police force, the Garda Síochána.

I would emphasise what I said earlier in relation to another amendment, that we are reversing the whole process of forcible entry, that we are now going to exempt not just the owner but anybody acting on behalf of the owner. If has been well argued by Senator O'Higgins that acting on behalf of the owner does not mean even authorised by the owner, that we are exempting somebody who says he is acting on behalf of the owner from forcible entry or forcible occupation, from the criminal sections and provisions of this Bill. That is a departure from the position as it was under the law, if the law is still operative. It is certainly a new provision that an owner and those acting on behalf of the owner could not be prosecuted for forcible entry or occupation. I have said before that was the reason for the Forcible Entry Act and to extend it still further from the individual to any agents the individual may employ specifically to either defend or retake his property is the type of situation which was thought not to be condonable in a civilised society in the 14th century, and I do not see why we should allow it now with a regular police force to look after us.

Comment on this

Perhaps when the Minister is dealing with the query that was raised he could tell us what exactly would happen to the garda who arrested somebody under section 9 (b) if it was a bogus owner.

Comment on this

With regard to the query out of which the rest of the discussion has arisen what happens if the person purporting to act on behalf of the owner is not acting or does not have authority, the simple answer to that is that he is committing an offence under the Bill. I do not see that any form of authority could be perscribed under the Bill. There are no set ways in which persons could identify themselves as agents of owners. The way of making sure that bogus agents or agents of bogus owners are not going to do anything they should not do is to provide that they will commit an offence if they go ahead and try to do it if they are not duly authorised.

With regard to Senator Brugha's query about what would happen to a garda who arrested somebody on the complaint of a bogus owner or a bogus agent, the short answer to that is that the guard would be very slow to make any move at all in this regard unless he was absolutely certain. In addition to the complaint of a particular set of serious conditions under section 9 (b) having to be complied with, each of the other conditions (a) (c) and (d) must be complied with also. The possibility of its happening in practice would, I could honestly say, be nil.

With regard to Senator Robinson's predilection for the 14th century, in so far as I have been able to understand the earlier statutes it would seem to me that the 1381 Act and the 1391 Act were not directed at landlords; they were directed against forcible entry. It was the 1634 Act which extended it to landlords in the sense that we know it now, inasmuch as it applied the provisions of the earlier Acts to leaseholds or to chattels real where before they had been confined to freehold only. In that sense it could be said that in certain circumstances what we would now call the landlord would then have been the lessor for a term of years.

Comment on this

I said that it applied to the barons and I suppose they were the equivalent of the speculators of today.

Comment on this

I do not see anything very different, but this is rather academic anyway.

Comment on this

I should like to know whether or not it is intended that a person acting on behalf of the owner should be a person who is genuinely an agent acting with the authority of the owner. I am not raising this simply as a debating point. It is an important point and I could accept it from the Minister, if he said to me: "I want to exempt people who are genuinely acting on behalf of the owner, whether or not they are authorised". If I see someone whom I am quite satisfied is up to no good and is entering the Minister's car, and if I try to stop that person from entering the car, I may be acting on behalf of the Minister genuinely, but I have no authority. It seems to me that under the present wording I would be exempt. That could also apply the other way: by acting on behalf of the person who is an owner, although having no authority, good, bad or indifferent, a person might succeed in getting an exemption under this Bill which the Minister does not intend him to get. Is it intended that this phrase "any person acting on behalf of the owner" should be limited to a person who is authorised, no matter how formally, or even if by implication the authority is there? Or is it intended that it should cover anyone who, out of the goodness of his heart or the badness of his heart as the case might be, decides to act on behalf of an owner?

Comment on this

The authorisation would clearly have to be there, not necessarily in expressed terms; by implication would be sufficient.

Comment on this

I agree with the authority expressed or implied.

Comment on this

That would be assumed.

Comment on this

Can we leave the way open here for an owner of property which he intends to develop and in which there are people living whom he tries to get out by one means or another? If he asks the leader of the local gang to get these people out of the house, by intimidation or other means, can he be taken as the agent? What authority has that owner to give to that local gang boss, if he is acting as his agent?

Comment on this

He cannot authorise such a person to exceed the law. If such a person does exceed the law, he is liable to prosecution.

Comment on this

In reply to a query from Senator Brugha, the Minister mentioned that the Garda Síochána would be very loathe to move on the submission of a person purporting to be the owner, unless he was reasonably sure that he was the owner. This puts a very unfair onus on a member of the Garda Síochána, who may come upon a very unpleasant situation. Somebody comes along and says to him: "I am acting on behalf of the owner of this property and I want you to arrest this person." This is very unfair to a member of the Garda Síochána. In those circumstances there should be some form of identification or some authorisation so that the member of the Garda Síochána could say: "Can I have your identification? How do I know that you are the agent?"

The point that a person who purports to be the agent commits no offence under the Bill presumably is a fair one. However, I do not know what the penalties for that are; I know the penalties for forcible entry and forcible occupation, but I do not know the penalties for this offence.

Comment on this

Section 7.

Comment on this

It would apply in this case?

Comment on this

I am glad that I have that cleared up.

Comment on this

What would be the offence?

Comment on this

It would be an offence under section 2.

Comment on this

But the owner has not forcibly entered or forcibly occupied, or the agent has——

Comment on this

Unless he got in, got them out, and then tried to barricade them out.

Comment on this

If a bogus agent requests a garda to arrest someone under section 9, what offence is the bogus agent committing under this Bill?

Comment on this

It would not be an offence under this Bill, but it could possibly be an offence of creating a public mischief, similar to bringing the fire brigade to a bogus fire. With regard to what would be the position of the garda, if he was in doubt as to the bona fides of the person making the request, he would not arrest. That is quite clear. That particular problem does not arise. The gardaí are very sensible men.

Comment on this

I agree the gardaí are sensible men. That is why I should like to make sure that they would not be put into this position, because it would be very unfair to them. Now it is not an offence under this Bill: it is an offence under some other Act, and we do not know what the penalties for it are. This makes me more uneasy. It is quite wide open and the power of arrest without warrant is a very serious one for the people who might be arrested. This bogus agent could do this, and members of the Garda Síochána could be put in the position where they might operate section 9 on the recommendation or the request of a bogus agent. If they do so, who is going to charge this bogus agent, if it is proved that he was a bogus agent? My contention is that it would be in the actual owner's interest to say: "Well, okay, he was my agent," although in fact he was not at the time.

Comment on this

If you say "un-authorised agent" instead of "bogus agent", surely a person who is acting bona fide, but has not authority, is not committing an offence?

Comment on this

No, but if he forcibly enters.

Comment on this

I am still talking about the point raised by Senator Owens.

Comment on this

In relation to Senator Owen's point, when she asked me what the penalty would be, I assumed that it was the penalty for a bogus agent forcibly entering and putting somebody out. I said that it would be the penalties set out in section 7, because that would be an offence under section 2. However, I missed the point, because apparently what she was asking me was what would be the penalties for passing yourself off to a garda under section 9. While that would be an offence, it would not be one under this Bill, and I could not say offhand what the penalty would be, but probably it would be about £50, or three months imprisonment, or both. I could find that out for the Senator before tomorrow.

Comment on this

Could I ask the Minister what is the difference between the wording "acting on behalf of the owner", which is attempted to be deleted, and what I referred to in section 3: "or with the permission of the owner"? What is the necessity for this wording?

Comment on this

One of the differences that strikes me is that under subsection (3), somebody acting with the permission of the owner is not necessarily acting on his behalf. Somebody acting with the permission of the owner would be a licensee and would not necessarily be the agent.

Comment on this

Does it mean that somebody could be acting on behalf of the owner without his permission? They could be asserting that they were acting on his behalf and it would not be necessary for them to have his permission?

Comment on this

In the sort of example given by Senator O'Higgins they might not have had it at the time.

Comment on this

Can you have a long line of delegation of authority here? "Owner" is being defined, amongst other things, as a person acting on behalf of the owner. If the person acting on behalf of the owner authorises someone else or gives permission to someone else, does that person become owner under the definition ad infinitum?

Comment on this

That is a very general question of agency. I presume he could unless it was ultra vires his powers. At first sight it would seem to be so.

Comment on this

You have, as Senator Robinson points out, this phrase in subsection (3), "lawful authority or with the permission of the owner". But that can be read as "with the permission of the person acting on behalf of the owner".

Comment on this

The lawful authority was intended by the draftsman to cover sheriffs, guards, customs officials and so on.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I move amendment No. 9:

In subsection (3), page 3, lines 2 and 3, to delete "or with the permission of the owner" and to substitute "or by the owner, or with his permission".

The last words the Minister used in replying to amendment No. 8 has virtually made the case I wanted to make in regard to amendment No. 9. This is not contentious; this is really little more than a matter of drafting and I do not propose to delay the House on this matter.

Subsection (3) of section 1 as it stands reads:

Nothing in this Act shall apply to an entry or an occupation of land or a vehicle in the exercise of lawful authority or with the permission of the owner.

The Minister has stated not more than 60 seconds ago that the word "authority" to him implied the gardaí or sheriffs or something of that kind. That is exactly what it means to me too, and I think that is what it means in normal speech. If we are speaking about an owner or somebody exercising his own rights, we do not use the word "authority", we might use the word "right". This is a small point and I am only concerned with having this subsection drafted in such a way as to make it clear that the Act does not apply either to entry in the exercise of lawful authority, which I take to mean, let us say, entry by a garda in pursuit of a search warrant, or entry by a sheriff under a warrant entitling him to enter, or by the owner himself, or by somebody with the owner's permission. My amendment seeks to delete the words "or with the permission of the owner" and to substitute "or by the owner, or with his permission". In other words to bring the owner in specifically, because as the subsection stands there is no mention of the owner at all, except the mention of somebody coming in with the permission of the owner. The expression "lawful authority" in normal usage as the Minister implied does not include "owner". It is a small drafting point. Possibly I misunderstood something but I think the subsection would be better if it were amended as I have suggested.

Comment on this

Could I take this opportunity of inquiring if it is proposed to adjourn at 10 o'clock?

Comment on this

I suggest we deal with this amendment before we rise.

Comment on this

We can deal with it up to 10.30 p.m. It should be finished before that.

Comment on this

I think the amendment is unnecessary because an entry or an occupation by an owner is in terms excluded from the scope of the offences created by section 2 or 3 and, therefore, it is not necessary to refer to it specifically here. In any event, if it were, it must be presumed beyond doubt that if something may be done with the permission of the owner it may be done by the owner himself.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

If that is so, the whole of subsection (3) is otiose because the intent of section 3 would be adequately covered by exemption (c) in section 2. If what the Minister is saying is that the offence under section 2 is not constituted by anybody who enters under exemptions (a), (b) or (c), if somebody enters under exemption (c), he enters in pursuance of a bona fide claim of right and quite clearly anybody who enters and——

Comment on this

I am afraid the Senator misunderstands me. I did not say that. I said that in the terms of the sections themselves the owner is excluded from committing an offence under section 2 or 3. In section 2 it would be (a) because (a) reads: "he is the owner of the land or vehicle, or".

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

The point is not one of substance; it is one of drafting. There is something sloppy here either in subsection (3) of section 1 or in section 2. If the Minister wants sloppy legislation, that is all right with me. I have done my best to point it out to him. Exemption (a) and exemption (c) in section 2 cover all the ground of subsection (3) in section 1. If subsection (3) of section 1 has some purpose, then the recitals of it should be extended to include "entry by the owner" as well as "with the permission of the owner" because, as the Minister has said, the expression "lawful authority" normally means not the exercise of a private right by a private owner but the exercise of some public right by a garda or sheriff.

Comment on this

If subsection (3) remains—as apparently the Minister wishes—should it not be made clear that we are referring here to the prior permission of the owner, not to sanctioning or ratifying later something that has been done in the name of the owner?

Comment on this

I do not think this is necessary, nor do I take Senator Kelly's point. I accept that he makes it in all good faith to try to make this more clear but I do not think it does this. The point is adequately covered either by subsection (3) as it stands or by section 2 or by a combination of both.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I do not wish to string this out; perhaps we are all tired and it might be better if we left this until the morning and the Minister can consider this matter again. A scholar looking at this would be able to reconstruct the process by which it was drafted and he could come to the conclusion either that subsection (3) of section 1 had been drafted first and whoever drafted the exemptions in section 2 forgot to adapt subsection (3) of section 1 accordingly. They seem to cover much the same ground. If there is any point in saying in set terms "nothing in this Act shall apply to certain persons" then let us enumerate them properly. The enumeration that has been made is sloppy.

The only meaning which subsection (3) has is to make it plain that the Bill does not apply to a garda or a sheriff or somebody authorised by an owner to enter the property. Why not include the owner as well? The Minister states that the owner is expressly excluded from the commission of an offence under section 2 or 3. What is the point in bothering with subsection (3) at all because the other people are excluded equally? I do not mind either way but perhaps the Minister would like to speak on the matter.

Comment on this

The Bill set out at the start by saying that the owner was to be excluded from the commission of an offence.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

Where does it say that?

Comment on this

It is set out afterwards.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

It is set out in section 2.

Comment on this

Subsection (1) has a hunk there from line 26 to line 34 telling you who the owner is; then you go on to section 2.

Comment on this

You come to subsection (3) of section 1 before you come to section 2.

Comment on this

The owner was defined there. The purpose of defining him was to exclude him. He is defined at great length and it takes in all sorts of people who would not normally be regarded as owners at all. Having clarified the point regarding the owner subsection (3) was inserted to make it clear that people like sheriffs and gardaí and those who had the permission of the owner were also outside the scope of the Bill. It is not necessary to specify the owner as such.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I do not want to string this out unreasonably. If the Minister is relying on the definition section in the paragraph, or the hunk, as he calls it, dealing with owner, in order to demonstrate to us that there is no need to mention him in subsection (3) of section 1, equally it does not seem to me there is any need to have the words "with the permission of the owner" because the very same hunk further up the section mentions any person acting on behalf of the owner—the matter we have just been talking about. I do not wish to annoy either the Minister or his officials——

Comment on this

Apparently it was decided that acting on behalf of the owner was different to acting with the permission of the owner. One was an agent; the other was a mere licensee.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

I am not saying the two terms are co-extensive but one certainly includes the other because somebody who is acting with the owner's permission is undoubtedly acting on his behalf. The Minister or his Department might perhaps look at this overnight because between the definition of "owner" or subsection (3) or the exemptions in section 2 it seems to me we are ending up with a sloppy set of provisions.

Comment on this

To my mind it is a bit more serious than this. I do not wish to go back over the discussion we had as regards the definition of "owner" but it is relevant to point out that the definition of "owner" here in relation to land refers to any person having an interest or estate in the land and we have discussed earlier this question of a pyramid of interests. Now it transpires under subsection (3) that any of those people, even a person having a very remote superior interest—when I say superior I am talking about a person higher up in the step of the pyramid—can secure exemption for a person by giving that person permission to forcibly enter land. Subsection (3) here goes a lot deeper even than we have been considering. It enhances the importance of Senator Kelly's amendment. It might be a good idea if the House would agree that we should break off discussion at this point and think about it between now and tomorrow.

Comment on this
John M. Kelly Professor Kelly Fine Gael

What Senator O'Higgins says is true, but my amendment would not cure the trouble that Senator O'Higgins is talking about. I recognised this trouble all along but the reason I did not try to cure it here was because the amendment which I put down in the owner section was intended to cure it. However, I am willing to leave the discussion over until tomorrow.

Comment on this