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Special Committee Civil Liability Bill, 1960

SECTION 9

Bill Civil Liability Bill, 1960
Enacted

No. 30 of 1960 ›

I move amendment No. 7 :

Before section 9 to insert the following new section :—

"(1) In this section ‘ the relevant period ' means the period of limitation prescribed by the Statute of Limitations or any other limitation enactment (including sections 31 and 47 of this Act).

(2) No proceedings shall be maintainable in respect of any cause of action whatsoever which has survived against the estate of a deceased person unless either—

(a) proceedings against him in respect of that cause of action were commenced within the relevant period and were pending at the date of his death, or

(b) proceedings are commenced in respect of that cause of action within the relevant period or within the period of two years after his death, whichever period first expires."

This amendment has two objects. Firstly, we want to avoid the difficulty that arose in the English case of Airey v. Airey, decided by the English Court of Appeal in 1958, so that it will not be possible to argue that a cause of action that has survived the death of a person may be taken against his estate although the ordinary period of limitation has expired. Secondly, we want to apply the section to all causes of action, whether they are in contract or in tort. At present, causes of action in contract survive under common law and the period runs from the accrual of the cause of action and the date of death has no effect. We propose a period of two years after the death instead of six months after representation is taken out. This, we think, is a reasonable period.

By the way, I should mention that if there is delay in taking out representation the person aggrieved may apply to the court for the appointment of his own nominee as administrator in order that there may be somebody to sue.

Does the Committee consider that a period of 2 years as a maximum in the new section 9 is satisfactory ?

Comment on this

I thought one year might be sufficient time.

Comment on this
Mr. Costello

There are always circumstances arising which will explain why persons cannot take proceedings within a particular time and very often injustice is done if the time is too short. People are not aware of their rights. They may be in America or elsewhere and come back to find their rights gone.

Comment on this

Sometimes there is a saver to that effect that, say, " unless the person can show just cause ". I wonder if the committee would consider that.

Comment on this

Absence overseas or disability.

Comment on this

Unless the applicant could show to the satisfaction of the Court that he had moved within a reasonable time.

Comment on this

It it proposed to extend the time or reduce the time ?

Comment on this

It would extend the time to cover the altered circumstances.

Comment on this

Even after putting it in, your idea would be to extend the time beyond the proposed two years in certain circumstances.

Comment on this

Provided the applicant had satisfied the Court.

Comment on this

I would not be very happy about that because the Statute of Limitations makes no provision for extending periods of limitation on satisfying the Court that extension is desirable.

Comment on this

If a person were suffering from some disability like Deputy Lindsay suggests, would they not have somebody to sue for them ?

Comment on this

They would have somebody. It must be remembered that you are dealing here with claims against estates of deceased persons and if it desirable that such claims should be cleared up in a reasonable time. It would be undesirable to allow for extension of time.

Comment on this

I agree, for the Parliamentary Secretary's reasons.

Comment on this

I think we can accept the new section.

Comment on this

We are satisfied then to accept the two years.

Comment on this