We will now resume the meeting in public session. This morning, we will engage with the Corporate Enforcement Authority to examine its financial statements for 2024. On behalf of the committee, I welcome the witnesses. We are joined by Mr. Ian Drennan, chairperson; Ms Mary Daly, director of finance and ICT; Mr. David Hegarty, director of legal and policy; Ms Fallon Judge, director of civil enforcement-acting director of criminal enforcement; and Ms Suzanne Young, director of governance and support operations. We are also joined by the following witnesses who are attending in a representative capacity. From the Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment, I welcome Mr. Colm Forde, assistant secretary, commerce, consumer and competition division, and Ms Deborah Dignam, principal officer. We are also joined by officials from the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, including the Comptroller and Auditor General Mr. Seamus McCarthy, who is a permanent witness to the committee, and Mr. Shane Higgins, audit manager.

Before we begin, I will explain some limitations to parliamentary privilege and the practice of the Houses as regards reference witnesses may make to other persons in their evidence. The evidence of witnesses physically present or who give evidence from within the parliamentary precincts is protected pursuant to the Constitution and statute by absolute privilege. This means that witnesses have an absolute defence against any defamation action for anything they say at the meeting. However, they are expected not to abuse this privilege and it is my duty as Cathaoirleach to ensure that this privilege is not abused. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory regarding an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks and it is imperative they comply with any such direction. Witnesses are also reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. I call on the Comptroller and Auditor General to make his opening statement.

The Corporate Enforcement Authority was established in 2022 replacing the previous Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. The staff and assets of the office transferred to the authority along with the ongoing business caseload.

The authority’s principal statutory functions are to encourage compliance by individuals and businesses with relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2014, to investigate suspected breaches of company law and to enforce compliance where required. It also exercises a general supervisory role over the activity of company liquidators and receivers in the discharge of their functions and may take follow-up action, as considered appropriate, based on the findings of the liquidators and receivers.

The authority’s financial statements record total income of €7.1 million in 2024, almost exclusively in the form of grants from Vote 32 - Enterprise, Tourism and Employment. This was around €4 million less than provided for in the Vote for 2024 due to difficulties the authority experienced in staff recruitment, uncertainty around estimation of legal costs and delays in the development of the authority’s case management system ICT project.

The authority’s total expenditure in 2024 was €6.8 million, 61% of which related to staff costs. The authority employed an average of 58 staff in 2024. Its investigative capacity was augmented by a number of seconded members of An Garda Síochána, whose core salary costs are borne by the Vote for An Garda Síochána. Overtime payments earned by the seconded gardaí are recouped by An Garda Síochána from the authority. The 2024 financial statements of the authority were certified on 29 April 2025 and received a clear audit opinion.

I now invite Mr. Drennan to make his opening statement.

I thank the Cathaoirleach agus baill an choiste for the invitation to appear before the committee. My colleagues and I look forward to assisting the committee with its important work. I am grateful also to the Comptroller and Auditor General and his colleagues for the important work that they do in auditing our annual financial statements and in providing independent assurance to the committee. The timing of this meeting is opportune in that later this year will mark the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001, CLEA, which is the statute that first provided for a dedicated enforcer of the Companies Acts.

In return for the privilege of limited liability, company law requires certain minimum standards of conduct and probity from companies and their officers. Where those standards of behaviour are not met, restriction and disqualification are important public protection measures. Through a combination of liquidators’ court applications and sanctions imposed by the Corporate Enforcement Authority, CEA, through undertakings, over the last five years alone, almost 500 company directors have been sanctioned. The undertakings regime, which was introduced by the Companies Act 2014 and which is administered by the CEA, has in addition resulted in substantial savings in terms of High Court time, liquidators’ litigation costs thereby benefiting company creditors and directors’ litigation costs.

Through our civil enforcement processes, in any given year, we deal with hundreds of complaints and statutory reports. We secure compliance in a cost-effective and proportionate manner by means of persuasion, warning and, where necessary, by exercising our statutory powers. Our civil enforcement activities typically involve assisting shareholders and other members of the public in vindicating their rights under the 2014 Act, securing compliance with companies’ transparency and accountability obligations and regularising directors’ loans issues for the protection of shareholders and creditors.

The CEA’s criminal enforcement activities since establishment have included arrests, the submission of files to the Director of Public Prosecutions, DPP, and the charging of individuals with criminal offences on foot of DPP directions. Those activities in turn have resulted in guilty pleas, criminal trials and criminal convictions for both company law offences and other offences. Certain of those convicted of offences have in addition been disqualified from acting as company directors, which, as referenced earlier herein, is a public protection measure. In addition to the foregoing, we have participated in joint operations with our colleagues from the Garda National Economic Crime Bureau and co-operated with other colleagues within An Garda Síochána on various matters of mutual interest.

In circumstances where the 2014 Act extends to approximately 1,700 sections, navigating that body of law can be a challenge for any company director. Cognisant of the fact that over 90% of Irish businesses are micro-enterprises and reflective of our statutory mandate to encourage compliance with the Act, in addition to providing guidance materials detailing the principal actors’ rights and duties, the CEA also publishes supplementary guidance on topical issues as and when the need or opportunity arises. In addition, principally through its membership of the Company Law Review Group, CLRG, the CEA contributes to the ongoing review of company law and, where appropriate, the formulation of advice and recommendations for amendment to the Minister. For example, the CLRG’s enforcement committee, which I have the privilege of chairing, is currently examining the issue of inspectorships.

As referenced in our 2024 annual report, certain interpretations and propositions regarding our criminal enforcement mandate were advanced during that year. Having considered those matters carefully and with the benefit of a joint opinion from two senior counsel, both of whom specialise in criminal law, the CEA satisfied itself some time ago that the proposition that in criminal matters, the role of those charged with the CEA’s governance is confined to setting the organisation’s strategic priorities is incorrect.

Indeed, were that proposition be to correct, it would give rise to a situation in which the chairperson of the authority would be accountable to the Minister, the Oireachtas, the committee and the courts for investigative activity conducted by CEA officers in the CEA’s name, using CEA resources and generating risks within the CEA, over which she or he has no lawful authority or control. For a variety of reasons, including those relating to legislative intent, public policy, governance, financial control, risk management and accountability, that would be deeply problematic. Having dealt with those matters, our focus has returned to where it should be, namely, on delivery.

As observed by the working group in 1998, as far as the enforcement of company law is concerned, the sound of the enforcer's footsteps on the beat is simply never heard. In marked contrast, in recent weeks alone, an individual has been disqualified for five years on foot of behaviour judged by the CEA to present a significant risk to the public. A further two directors have been sent forward for trial and indictment in respect of alleged accounting-related offences. The CEA has lodged an application with the High Court seeking the disqualification of a liquidator based on concerns regarding that individual’s behaviour.

The CEA launched our new digital offering, our "Enforceable" podcast, to promote the benefits of incorporation and inform and educate our stakeholders on their rights and duties under company law. In 2026, therefore, the company law enforcer's footsteps are clearly audible on the beat, in company boardrooms, in the civil and criminal courts and now on streaming platforms. However, in circumstances where what we do is funded by the Exchequer, quantity is nothing without quality. That is why, in seeking to ensure that our processes reflect best practice, we look to both domestic and international comparators, and indeed we have just returned from a visit to our counterparts in the UK Serious Fraud Office, where we had particularly fruitful discussions regarding their approach to ensuring high-quality investigative processes.

Today's meeting is also timely in that we have just published our strategy statement for the period 2026 to 2028. The overarching theme of that strategy, which was developed following consultation with key stakeholders, is increased impact and added value. That overarching theme reflects our ambition as an organisation and will be achieved through optimising our delivery of effective enforcement, empowering our stakeholders and investing in our people. The key deliverables under that strategy will include enforcement processes underpinned by our commitment to professionalism, high-quality and continuous improvement, a further enhanced organisational presence achieved through effective and impactful communications, including new digital offerings, at our CEA conference, which I am pleased to say this year will take place in the convention centre, well-informed stakeholders who are equipped to meet their responsibilities and empowered to exercise their rights under the 2014 Act, further strengthening relationships with our peers, counterparts and partners, respectively, and a highly skilled, educated and fulfilled workforce, together with a strong and recognised value proposition for those considering a career with us.

With the support of the Minister, Deputy Burke, and the Minister of State, Deputy Smyth, and their officials, expansion of the CEA’s governing body is imminent. That expansion represents the next step of the organisation's continuing evolution and coincides with the launch of our new strategy. The CEA is a very different creature from the ODCE, which opened its doors on the 28 November 2001, with a staff of just 15. We now stand at an approved complement of 92, and in that context, the new appointments will provide substantially greater bandwidth at authority level to drive our new strategy and deliver greater impact and added value to the public, whom we serve.

Before I hand back to the Cathaoirleach, I wish to take the opportunity to publicly thank my colleagues at the CEA for their ongoing hard work, commitment and dedication. I would similarly like to acknowledge the support we have received from successive Ministers and departmental officials over many years. We look forward to engaging with the committee over the course of the morning and assisting with its important work.

I thank Mr. Drennan. We will suspend the meeting at about 12 o'clock for a short break and then resume shortly afterwards. We will now open the floor up to members. The lead speaker today is Deputy Farrelly, who has 15 minutes. All other members will have ten minutes. On conclusion of that, if time permits, we will open it up again for a shorter round of questions from members.

I thank Mr. Drennnan and his colleagues for being here. I thank them for the work the authority does. It is very important work. As they said, it is quite timely for them to be here after 25 years. Celebrating that is important. We are also here in a context where the media has reported an allegedly toxic culture within the authority. There are reports of explosive exit interviews from former secondees. Indeed, the authority’s own annual report, and even today's opening statement, suggest that at best there is something of a tension within the authority. Would Mr. Drennan agree with that? Where does he think it stems from?

I thank the Deputy. I will ask my colleague Ms Young to speak to the issue of toxicity, or alleged toxicity.

In terms of tension, the model under which we were established 25 years ago, under the Company Law Enforcement Act, is one which, as the Deputy is aware, the legislature provided that the ODC would have seconded to it at the time seven members of An Garda Síochána. Indeed, as the debates in this House at the time showed, there was an understanding or appreciation that that was going to give rise to issues, by virtue of the fact that those secondees would be serving two masters, as was the language that was used at the time, namely, the Commissioner, who would have been most of these people’s line manager all along, and then this new creature, the director of corporate enforcement. That was anticipated and, indeed, there has always been a degree of tension because, ultimately, a Garda member is a Garda member, and their chain of command at the time was through the then national crime bureau, and at the same time they were reporting to this new civilian office that had been established. As it transpired, two years after it was set up, I was working there, so I know from personal experience what it was like. For the most part, things worked pretty well. I was there for two years before I moved on to somewhere else, and civilians and Garda members worked well together. I went off to the Irish Auditing & Accounting Supervisory Authority, IAASA, for about eight years and came back towards the back end of all the Anglo-Irish Bank investigations. I can safely say that civilians and Garda members worked very closely together there in a spirit of significant collegiality on what was a massive undertaking.

Has that changed?

Yes, to some extent. To some extent, these things are always going to be driven by personality. What has enhanced or increased tensions in more recent years is to some extent inextricably linked with the interpretations that I referenced both in the annual report and in the opening statement, namely, certain interpretations of the statutory framework within which we operate, which have never previously been questioned.

I was going to refer to the debates back in 2000, prior to the enactment of the legislation, but I have lost my train of thought slightly.

To bring Mr. Drennan back, regarding the memo of understanding between the Garda Commissioner and the Corporate Enforcement Authority, my analysis is that right now, as it stands, it is not worth the paper it is written on. It requires a review. Would Mr. Drennan agree with that?

I have picked up on where my train of thought was and I will come back to that, if I may, around statutory interpretations. We actually have a very good relationship with An Garda Síochána as an organisation. Mr. Hegarty and Ms Daly have regular meetings with Chief Superintendent Ferry, who is the head of the HR function within An Garda Síochána. We have an excellent relationship with it. Any time that issues need to be escalated within An Garda Síochána, the memo of understanding, MOU, is the mechanism by which that is done. There are no issues around that. I am not sure where the Deputy’s analysis is coming from, but if he can elaborate, I am quite happy to try to address whatever concerns he has.

What is hard to understand is that Mr. Drennan is suggesting that the relationship at management level is really positive and productive, yet, based on the annual report and even today's open statement, there is something going on somewhere.

Yes, there is, but the MOU is more of a governance instrument, if you like.

If I can go back to the earlier point that I was making before I lost my train of thought, in more recent years, analyses and interpretations have been advanced which, in effect, suggest that notwithstanding that Garda members are seconded to the Corporate Enforcement Authority, it has no supervisory remit respect of those individuals. That is fundamentally at odds with the statute, number one, and number two, it would be illogical because, as I said earlier, it would mean that I would be coming here before the committee, as elected parliamentarians, to be held accountable for activities over which I have no control. That would be fundamentally problematic. It would be deeply problematic in terms of the operation of the legislation. As I said, we took advice on those issues. We did not believe those analyses were reflective of the statutory framework in place and, indeed, that had never been challenged previously. We took advice from senior counsel, as I referenced in the opening statement. Clearly, I cannot go into the nature of the advice, but I can go so far as to say that our understanding of what the statutory framework means and how it should work has been confirmed. That was about a year ago, and we have moved on from it.

Has a capacity review ever been undertaken within the authority?

In general or with respect to Garda members?

In general.

Absolutely. I started in 2012 and I did one then. Back then, we had two accountants. We had no stand-alone digital forensics. We had seven Garda members. That was unsustainable because, for example, if our Garda colleagues executed a search, we had no means of analysing the digital data, which clearly was considerably less than it would be now. We had two accountants, and the nature of what we do is all about numbers ultimately.

Pretty much immediately upon appointment, the first thing I did was a capacity review. As I said earlier, that resulted in support from successive Ministers and Governments. We are now up to seven Garda members. We have a stand-alone digital forensics unit, which is probably as good as you would find in any professional services firm. We have significantly enhanced our complement of An Garda Síochána members. On top of that, while at the time we had three or four lawyers, we have multiples of that now.

I am intrigued by the number. There were seven Garda members at that time.

Yes.

A response to a parliamentary question this week stated that there are seven Garda members right now as well. That number has not grown. While the number of sanctioned posts have increased, we are seeing significant gaps within the secondment level there. The narrative is that Garda members are open to being seconded to the CEA and are happy to work there, but that is not really portrayed in the response with regard to the detail, certainly at inspectorate level where there are significant vacancies. When will there be a full complement of seconded Garda members?

I might just go back a little there. Initially, the seven figure the Deputy referenced was originally agreed and was pursuant to a Government decision back in 2001. The model has subsequently changed. The Deputy referenced tension. There was undoubtedly tension over the years in circumstances where, on occasion, I wrote to HQ in the park to say we had vacancies and ask whether they could they be filled. The Garda is a big organisation of 15,000 or 16,000 people so, naturally enough, you take your number in the queue. Every so often, those pieces of correspondence would issue under freedom of information and there would be a story about it or whatever. The tensions were considerably overblown.

Leaving that aside, when the CEA was in the process of being established, we did another capability or capacity review, whereupon it was agreed an appropriate complement would be 16. In essence, that comes from the fact we previously had two units. They work in units of four, with a sergeant to make five, and an inspector. Back in the day, we had two units of three plus the inspector, which made seven. We increased the unit numbers to four, plus a sergeant to bring the number to five. There are three units, which is a total of 15, and there is then the inspector and so on.

To some extent, we have suffered from the success or quality of the people we have had. We had one really good inspector who, no sooner than he had arrived-----

When does Mr. Drennan think there will be a full complement?

Ms Judge carried out an interview process with An Garda Síochána recently. We are waiting for a number of members to be deployed. The timing of that is a matter for HQ in the Phoenix Park. Mr. Hegarty is working with Chief Superintendent Ferry on the deployment of an inspector, which we hope will happen shortly - I cannot say "imminent" but it is coming shortly, as far as we understand - because Chief Superintendent Ferry has given us an undertaking that someone will be given to us from the next panel. We have a couple of sergeants lined up from recent competitions as well.

There is the potential to see a number of changes in the next quarter. Is that correct?

Certainly, for the inspector positions, the hope is it would happen in the first quarter. I understand the inspector competition will be run in the near future. I have been in contact with Chief Superintendent Ferry. Obviously, I emphasise the importance for us of getting an inspector in. My understanding is that we will get somebody from that competition.

I thank Mr. Hegarty. If I could just jump back, I had another response this week with regard to legal costs within the authority. There will always be significant legal costs in an organisation like this but what jumped out at me was that €348,000 of those legal costs, out of about €1 million over the past two years, was related to non-enforcement matters. What does that mean? What kind of costs are they?

Approximately €30,000 of that related to the joint opinion I referenced earlier, on what we might call the interpretations issue. I will defer to Mr. Hegarty on the exact numbers but, broadly speaking, it references certain litigation in which we are involved at the Workplace Relations Commission, WRC. That is a significant portion of it, I think.

In terms of the joint opinion referenced by Mr. Drennan, €34,440 is the amount that was expended on that. It was a joint opinion and it was turned around by counsel quite quickly. It was of massive significance to the organisation.

The second category relates to advices and litigation that is ongoing at the moment. I want to answer the Deputy's question as I am conscious of his limited time but there are certain things where litigation is pending and I would rather not itemise them too much.

Okay.

Counsel has been retained for that. Counsel was paid for work in 2025 in relation to that. The fees have certainly been front-loaded for that activity. There were other people commissioned to perform certain other work related to that as well. That relates to that-----

How many cases are with the WRC right now?

There is one case with it at the moment.

That figure relates to one case.

It does.

How much of that €348,000 is related to WRC cases?

In total, approximately €272,000.

Okay.

Just to add to that, since the ODCE was established in 2001, this is the first WRC case we have ever had. We take this very seriously. Other costs have been referenced that we cannot go into. In due course, I would be quite happy to come back here and talk to the Deputy in more detail about it. This is evidence of the seriousness with which we deal with these issues. When we are in front of the WRC for the first time in 20-odd years, we take that very seriously.

On the full complement of Garda members, do Mr. Drennan believe that has had any impact on the progression of the FAI case?

I cannot speak about individual cases and I set that out in the correspondence in terms of the committee's own Standing Orders. I cannot discuss individual cases. I am sorry.

With regard to spending, there was a significant underspend in 2024 based on the accounts. The projection was €11 million and the ultimate outturn was €7 million. I am still very much learning here but, for me, an underspend is nearly as concerning as an overspend at times. Specifically with regard to non-pay underspend, where did that come about or why was the full allocation not spent?

I suspect the Deputy is being slightly self-deprecating. Our two broad categories of expenditure are pay and non-pay. Our pay is clearly driven by vacancies, and at any given time we will have some. In terms of non-pay, we carry out two types of enforcement, civil and criminal. The marginal costs associated with criminal enforcement is quite low because, as the comptroller referenced earlier, salaries are met by An Garda Síochána irrespective of what level of investigative work is being done. The marginal costs include travel and subsistence and overtime, which is in and around €400,000.

The big marginal cost is in civil enforcement because that is mostly superior court litigation. At any given time, we have to have the cushion to deal with this. For example, if you look at the Independent News & Media inspectorship, that cost the best part of €6 million. We need to be in a position whereby if we are seriously considering litigation at that level, we do not have to be thinking about whether we can afford this. That buffer will always be there. By definition, a buffer of that scale will not be used. They are the sorts of things that come along every decade or thereabouts but you have to be tooled up to deal with them.

With ICT infrastructure, I have cited projects that have not progressed or have been delayed significantly. Could we be told a little bit about where they stand right now? Is the Nuix project still progressing? Are funds available? What will that project be used for?

Nuix is in place.

It is in place and done. It is finished. Is that correct?

Absolutely. Nuix is a massively powerful eDiscovery system. When we execute a search or get electronic data from any other source, that is fed into this software application called Nuix. It has very powerful capabilities to analyse data. We have had that for several years.

The Deputy might be referencing the case management system the comptroller referenced. As this committee will know better than most committees, IT systems have the potential to go wrong and when they go wrong, they can be very expensive. We are doing this slowly and we want to do it right. I might ask Ms Daly to elaborate on this but notwithstanding that we are quite a small organisation, one of the complexities is that we do a lot of very different things. The supervision of liquidators is very different from Mr. Hegarty's area of processing legal files, which is very different again from a criminal investigation. It is not like the Companies Registration Office, for example, which does one thing and one system will meet all of those needs. We are trying to develop what is a very complex system that has to serve a whole range of user needs and do that right. As the Deputy will know from his experience of dealing with other issues, design is critical. If you do not get the design right, then you are in trouble.

Is it still on budget and on time?

It is certainly on budget. Ms Daly will elaborate on the timeframe.

At this point, we are at the scoping stage. We have spent considerable time looking in-house at what we want and agreeing it. As Mr. Drennan alluded to, there are a lot of complications between the different streams of workflow. Cases can also move from one area to another, so it has to be wide enough to be able to capture that. We have done considerable work in-house.

We have also engaged external analysts to come in and look at our process flows, map those and create documents ready for tender. We are at a very early stage of the project.

I thank Ms Daly.

The witnesses are very welcome. The CEA was established to give Ireland real teeth in terms of tackling complex corporate wrongdoing. Will Mr. Drennan outline how many investigations it has carried out since its establishment? How many of those have led to enforcement action, prosecution or director restrictions? How does that compare to what it inherited from the ODCE? I know there is a lot in that but I am trying to get at how the CEA has found it since the transition. How does it measure performance in the organisation?

On a point of clarification, because this is a point of lack of clarity we encounter from time to time, our remit is not corporate crime in the broader sense. Our remit is company law which is obviously a subset. Corporate crime can involve fraud, embezzlement and all that sort of stuff. Company law is our mandate and our remit.

We talked about restrictions and disqualifications. As I said in my opening remarks, they relate predominantly but not entirely to insolvent companies. The process that was put in place by the 2001 Act was one whereby directors of insolvent companies would automatically be subject to restriction application to the courts unless the ODCE relieved them of that. That was something that had not previously existed. As I said, in the last five years about 500 company directors have been restricted and disqualified. Obviously it is much more weighted towards restrictions than disqualifications because disqualification, as the term suggests, is a much more serious and punitive measure. It means you are off the road entirely as a director and auditor and so on, whereas restriction means you have stabilisers on the bike, as it were, and you can only be director of a company if it meets minimum capitalisation thresholds. That is a creditor protection mechanism.

In terms of numbers, that is a non-discretionary line of work of ours and is driven entirely by the number of insolvencies that result in a liquidator being appointed in the economy. Obviously, when the economy goes through a downturn, the number of liquidations follows on foot of that and a number of reports come in so it is quite cyclical in nature.

Mr. Drennan says it is quite cyclical in nature. Where does he reckon we are on that cycle at the moment?

If one reads a lot of the bulletins that issue from the audit firms and so on, the predictors are that insolvency is going to start to swing up again. That may well be the case but we will be six or 12 months behind that in terms of when the liquidators are appointed and the report comes in after that. We will always be probably 12 months behind that.

Obviously if a director is not compliant with their obligations that is somewhere the CEA can step in. Is that correct?

Yes.

I cannot remember if it was last year or the year before when it became part of a director’s obligation that they had to upload their PPS number as part of their verification for identity. I understand that from an anti-money laundering, AML, point of view and everything that goes with that. However it points to a wider conversation around whether it is becoming too cumbersome and whether there is too much admin and paperwork around being a director? Where does the CEA see that heading?

The legislative provision whereby directors have to provide PPS numbers is ultimately a policy issue. I am not going to comment on the merits or otherwise of that policy. Directors are required to furnish that information to the Companies Registration Office, CRO, which in turn deals with that. The Deputy is right that it is partly an AML measure. Without that information, it can be very difficult to identify who you are dealing with because people can register companies as Gaeilge, can register names in English and can use their middle name or a name that is not their middle name, and it makes it very difficult to identify, if we are examining a particular individual, if we have picked up everything they might be involved in.

Since that policy initiative was implemented and directors are now obliged to provide their PPS numbers, has the CEA encountered any anomalies or examples like that where there might have been somebody who was struck off as a director and then subsequently re-registered as Gaeilge? Have any cases like that arisen?

I might ask Ms Judge to speak in a minute on the generalities of it. The PPS number is required to be reported to the CRO, so that office is the first line of defence. On people who have been disqualified, the names of those who are restricted or disqualified go on a public register that is maintained by the CRO and we would follow up.

Does the CRO refer cases to the CEA for action?

It would, yes. If it identifies an issue that is suggestive to it of a breach of company law that falls outside the relative narrow remit it has, it will refer it to us.

Has Mr. Drennan a number for how many referrals per annum the CEA gets from the CRO? Obviously its relationship with the CRO is vital.

It is, yes. I apologise for putting Ms Judge on the spot. Has she any idea?

I would not have the full number. To put it in context, we do not just wait for referrals from the CRO in relation to individuals who are disqualified or restricted. On a monthly basis, individuals within the civil enforcement team carry out a search to identify any individual who has been restricted or disqualified because obviously you can be disqualified for other non-company law offences which has a knock-on effect. Then our team would engage with those individuals to ensure they had taken appropriate measures to come off the companies they are involved with and then we would follow that through to make sure it happens.

I appreciate that. It is a very interesting area. The CEA supervises the liquidators and receivers. Can Mr. Drennan quantify how often its supervision leads to more action or corrective intervention?

The starting point is that the liquidator is required to submit a report to us. We adjudicate upon that report. The liquidator has to investigate, among other things, the principal causes of the insolvency. More often than not - maybe on two thirds of occasions - it is a legitimate business failure involving a principal client, competition or whatever, but in roughly one third of cases there will be issues suggestive to the liquidator that restriction is the appropriate course of action. We review all those reports and then we take a view on whether the individual should be restricted. Until 2014, the mechanism was that if we said to the liquidator that they needed to go ahead, they had to go to the High Court to make that application. That was obviously expensive for all concerned. In 2014 the Oireachtas enacted a statutory mechanism whereby undertakings were brought in. It is a bit like penalty points. We can write to the director.

Is it the CEA’s job to make sure companies going through liquidation or receivership act ethically?

The directors or the liquidators?

The directors, I guess, more so.

The directors have been displaced obviously once the liquidator is appointed. Their functions are finished at that stage.

Without going into detail, I know of examples where a company went into receivership and staff members who had been receiving illness benefit found it really difficult to communicate with the appointee and to get an update on their situation, get clarity or get communication. It sounds like it probably should have been referred to the CEA to intervene.

I would not say that is common but it would not be unusual that we would receive complaints of that complexion. If it is something that is suggestive of a breach of the law, we will examine it. If it is more an issue that is suggestive that the liquidator or receiver is not fully compliant with his or her obligations as a member of a professional body, it is more appropriate to go to Chartered Accountants Ireland, ACCA or whatever the case may be.

Okay. How does the CEA know if it is doing a good job? How does it benchmark? I know its statement said it can compare itself with other corporate enforcement authorities across Europe, such as the Serious Fraud Office in the UK, but what KPIs does it measure itself against here?

It depends on what area of our work we are doing. I touched on advocacy earlier. We have a very important remit in promoting compliance with company law, assisting company directors in understanding what their obligations are and explaining to shareholders what their rights are. Mr. Hegarty takes point on a lot of that. What we try to do is ensure the material that goes out, while dealing with highly complex subject matter, is also readily understandable to the lay man or woman who is a company director. That can be a challenge.

The primary KPI for us, when we are talking to people on outreach, is whether this stuff is understandable and accessible, whether it is helping directors to discharge their obligations and whether it is helping them to vindicate their rights. When we assess enforcement action on the insolvency activities we talked about, we are looking for consistency across the review of liquidator reports. When we get to heavy-duty enforcement like criminal prosecution, the KPI is not whether we get a conviction, as that is obviously a matter for the courts; the KPI is whether the investigation was of the required standard.

Okay. I thank the witnesses.

I thank everyone for coming in. There has been a good bit of back-and-forth. A lot of people do not necessarily know the background of a lot of what the CEA does. While there is not necessarily confusion, as it is a relatively new body the structures are not fully known. Are Mr. Drennan and his colleagues happy with the structure of the organisation and how different people feed in?

When the Deputy speaks about "how different people feed in"-----

The Garda.

Yes, okay.

I just mean the agency as it is structured.

Okay, yes. A lot of State bodies, as the Deputy knows, will be structured with a board. That does not really suit what we do because you need a relatively small number of people at the top to make decisions. We are structured much more like organisations like the Data Protection Commission and the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission. That is, broadly speaking, how the CEA was originally established. It has evolved since then in line with the Corporate Enforcement Authority Act but it is probably the most appropriate structure for an organisation that does what we do. Was the Deputy asking me about how we are structured internally?

Yes.

Again, broadly speaking, the structures are largely fit for purpose. We have a review of our criminal enforcement activities we have put in our strategy statement and our business plan for this year because we have two new members coming on board, as the Deputy may be aware. There is a competition running at the moment. That is going to give us a much more significant level of bandwidth at governing authority level. That in turn necessitates or means it is sensible to do a review of how those operations are working.

With that, is Mr. Drennan happy with the powers the authority has?

Yes. We have had a very significant set of powers from day one back in 2001. They have been augmented from time to time, but for the most part we have a very serious set of powers at our disposal.

Why are gardaí required within the authority?

That goes back. Michael McDowell, in the role he held at the time, was commissioned to do a report by the then Government. As I touched on in my opening statement, back then there was effectively no enforcement of company law whatsoever. That was highlighted by the McCracken tribunal. Senator McDowell was asked to chair a committee and it ultimately concluded that in addition to putting in place a stand-alone body that would enforce company law, it would be beneficial for that organisation to have a number of gardaí at its disposal who, in addition to being able to exercise the powers conferred on the Director of Corporate Enforcement, as it was at the time, would also have at their disposal their powers as sworn members of An Garda Síochána.

I have some concern, more from what have I read. Obviously you have to be careful what you read but at the same time I sense a disconnect, which previous questioners alluded to, between what the gardaí are saying on one hand - what we are reading in the newspapers - and then evidently what Mr. Drennan believes is his relationship with senior gardaí. Why would there be such a disconnect?

I echo the view that it is important to be careful what you read and it is important to-----

I know.

That is self-evident. I would draw a distinction in this regard. Our relationship with An Garda Síochána, as an organisation, at the corporate level is very good. Have we had issues internally? Absolutely. I set that out in as transparent a manner as I could in our 2024 annual report, which is my duty. It is an accountability document. I touched on, with Deputy Farrelly, the provenance or genesis of certain of those issues. We have resolved the legal interpretations that gave rise to those issues. That is a year ago at this stage and we have moved on. Are there still some residual tensions? Yes, but we are working through that as well.

We are focusing on 2024 so it is historical for Mr. Drennan but that is the time period we are relating to.

Understood.

Maybe that is why we are leaning back into that time. If the authority has got that case, was there a lack of trust between the gardaí who were working there and the officials? Was there a disconnect? I do not want to use the word "allegation" but there were definitely questions regarding information not being handed over to the DPP by the authority. When you hear things like that, you wonder. Obviously it is stronger than a disconnect when something like that comes out.

I need to be careful how I deal with this.

Take your time.

This to some extent feeds into understandings and misconceptions. The Corporate Enforcement Authority's statutory mandate, functions and responsibilities are set out in section 944D of the Companies Act 2014. One of those is "at the discretion of the Authority, to refer ... [files] to the Director of Public Prosecutions". The most important word in that sentence is "discretion". That discretion resides with the Corporate Enforcement Authority. At the moment there is one member of the Corporate Enforcement Authority and that is me. I have not delegated that function to anybody else so it follows therefore, as a matter of both law and logic, that a decision on whether a file goes to the DPP resides with me. I am not going to comment on any particular allegations but what I have set out is a statement of law.

Mr. Drennan is saying that there is a different interpretation of what should or should not have happened between him and this person.

I will leave it at that, yes.

Yes, which is a judgment. Everybody's judgment is their own.

It is a little more than a judgment. It is a judgment underpinned by a statement of the law of the land.

Yes, but at the same time the person who made the opposite statement is a professional in his own capacity too.

And again I am-----

It is two opinions, two judgments. Ultimately it is a judgment in a sense, like all law is. On the cases that come into the authority, how are most of them referred?

I am sorry, how are most of what?

How do the cases that the authority investigates come across Mr. Drennan's desk? What is the methodology there?

I might ask Ms Judge to speak to that. She will give you a broad analysis of where they come from.

Any member of the public can send a complaint to us and this makes up a large majority of what we receive. In addition to that there are statutory reports that have to be sent to us. For example, under section 393 any auditor who is auditing a company who has a reasonable belief that a category 1 or category 2 offence may have occurred has an obligation to refer the matter to us. With any SCARP reports as well, process advisers are responsible for producing their reports and sending them to us. They are considered by members of our team. Everything is triaged and then, depending on the nature of what is alleged, it will take various paths through the organisation.

Okay. Is there a public list available of people who are excluded from being directors?

It is on the CRO website.

I am just asking if there is a list available, by individual. I was not sure. They are not allowed to become directors but they are still able to be involved with companies. Is that correct?

No. Just to clarify what we are talking about-----

You are able to be a shareholder. I am just talking about disqualification. What exactly does disqualification mean?

If you are disqualified from being a director, you are not allowed be involved in any part of the business. That does not prohibit you from being a shareholder. You can invest your money where you see fit, but you cannot be involved with the management of the company.

You could be a shareholder, so you could effectively be running it from behind the scenes.

It is the director's responsibility to run the company, not the shareholders' responsibility.

Yes, but we all know how companies are run. It is not necessarily a director who runs a company. CEOs do not have to be directors. Financial controllers do not have to be directors. CFOs do not have to be directors.

They do not have to be directors and it would depend on the matter that is referred to us. If there was an accusation that somebody was acting as a shadow director, that would be an offence if they were disqualified from acting as a director.

They are not allowed to be involved in any capacity. They can just be a silent shareholder.

Yes, you are not allowed to be involved in the management of the company.

If I can add something in there, section 2 of the Act says a director is what they do rather than what they say are, so a person who performs the functions of a director will be treated by the law as a director. If a person is disqualified by the law from being a director, there are serious penalties there. It is a category 2 offence if they commit that offence.

I suppose if someone is making phone calls here, there and everywhere, it can be hard to quantify who is really directing the company. We have that list from an Irish perspective, but what if somebody comes from outside the country? In fairness, a lot of people are doing a lot of great work here that is positive, but I am sure there are people who are not. How do we check people coming from other countries? Do we monitor that as well? Does the authority have cross-references?

If a person is disqualified abroad, they have an obligation to report that to the CRO and they have to file a document saying they are disqualified abroad. If they do not, they become disqualified here, so the obligation is on the company and then the director to notify the CRO that they have been disqualified abroad, so there is a reporting mechanism in that sense. It is incumbent on the company first and then the director and if they do not do that, they are deemed disqualified here.

Being disqualified abroad does not disqualify you here but failure to disclose the fact that you have been disqualified abroad has the effect of rendering you deemed disqualified here.

Yes, but at the same time, would you ever know? How would you know?

In the end, there is a risk for the director if they are found out. It can happen. The danger is-----

Does it happen? Has it happened?

We have certainly had cases where people were disqualified abroad. They were deemed disqualified and made applications for a relief from being disqualified as directors.

Did the CEA ever find anyone who did not announce that they were disqualified?

I have no recollection of that. The Deputy raises an important point, though, which is to make a distinction between regulation and enforcement. If we take the Central Bank, for example-----

I am only using it in reference because the witnesses were talking to Deputy Dolan about changing names and everything else into Irish and it being hard to monitor. Are we saying that if people come into the country, there is no way of monitoring-----

The point to be made is that the nature of enforcement is that, generally speaking, action can only be taken when it comes on the radar. It is not like the Central Bank where you do proactive supervision of banks, for example, by way of on-site inspections and so on. Enforcement is different. It is a bit more like the gardaí. You arrive at the scene after the accident.

Is Mr. Drennan saying there is no way of referencing across-----

How it would inevitably arise is a complaint is received from somebody or information has come from some other source, but we do not proactively examine whether everyone outside the jurisdiction, when they come into the jurisdiction and become a company director, properly declares it. That would be an impossible task.

That is fair enough. I thank the witnesses.

I thank all the witnesses for joining us. The CEA in 2024 got an allocation of €11.1 million. That was then increased in 2025 to €11.5 million and it did not spend all of that allocation. It is a huge cost to the taxpayer and yet there are not really any good news stories to be found. Even googling the CEA, no good news stories are to be found. Despite the significant underspends, the CEA requested an increase in this year's budget of another €269,000 to support restructuring of staff and to hire an additional two members of staff, bringing staff numbers to 92 people.

I take no pleasure in stating that nearly everything I have read on the CEA is negative. There are mentions of arguing with and distrusting gardaí seconded to assist its investigations and of staff complaints of a toxic working environment, which was alluded to earlier on. The CEA's staff survey Great Place to Work score was just 54%, which is well below the public sector average, and personal insolvency practitioners claim they are losing faith in the organisation. I would only have been aware of the CEA and its previous incarnation, the ODCE, due to well-publicised failures such as the collapse of the trial of the former Anglo Irish Bank chairman, Seán FitzPatrick; its inability to verify the chain of evidence in the probe into the Console charity, leading to a ream of charges being dropped; and it spending €6 million looking into Independent News and Media, INM. Despite the negativity and the organisation's rebrand in 2022, only last year, we saw the headline, "Major investigation into FAI and John Delaney derailed by garda exodus from 'toxic' white-collar crime agency". That is the CEA.

With all of that on record, the CEA's positive, cheery and breezy opening statement is in stark contrast to everything that is out there in the public realm and everything that can be found on the organisation. It pains me to say that white collar criminals have to be delighted with the dysfunction that there seems to be. For how long have the witnesses been involved in corporate enforcement? Who, ultimately, takes responsibility for taxpayers' money not being used correctly to do what the CEA is designed to do, namely, to tackle white collar crimes? There are cultural audits, legal costs and Workplace Relations Commission cases, all of which is a distraction, both in terms of personnel and the CEA's own time and work ethics and, indeed, the finances from the public purse. Who takes responsibility for that?

I thank the Deputy. I spoke to one of the other committee members earlier on about the budget and the nature of our expenditure. As I explained it, is pay and non-pay. Pay is what it is. We meet the full pay costs as and when we have a full complement. As with any State body, particularly in a competitive climate where you are looking for professionals like lawyers, accountants and so on, you are never going to be at full complement so, by definition, your pay budget is going to come under.

As I explained earlier, our enforcement remit is both civil and criminal. The marginal costs associated with our criminal remit are very low because, as the Comptroller and Auditor General touched on earlier, gardaí, irrespective of whether they are doing one investigation or 400 investigations, get paid. The marginal cost is the overtime and travel, which is €400,000 or thereabouts. The civil cost is where the big marginal cost is because that is primarily High Court and other superior court litigation. The Deputy referenced INM. That cost about €5 million or €6 million. That is an extremely important piece of work that highlighted a range of governance issues at PLC level in this jurisdiction. While a lot of the work we do is at a lower level, ultimately - and the Deputy referenced public confidence earlier on - the public need confidence that, at a PLC level, which is the household names, governance issues are addressed. We had someone walk in the door and make very serious allegations. Those allegations were fully investigated. We brought them to the High Court and the third most senior judge in the country had no hesitation in appointing two eminent inspectors to examine those issues. That is precisely what the purpose of that legislation was.

Does that give confidence to the public? I would very much hope so. As I touched on in my opening statement, 500 directors have been restricted and disqualified, which means putting sanctions on them to protect the Deputy, me and everybody else who deals with them. By the time members got here this morning, they probably dealt with three or four companies, whether they bought a cup of coffee, got on the bus or whatever the case may be. We deal with them every day. It is really important that those companies are run by people who are fit and proper to do that. The restriction and disqualification process is designed to ensure that where those individuals have demonstrated that they are not fit to engage in that activity, they are taken. It is no different to having a driving licence privilege. There are rules and regulations around when you are allowed to do that and when you are not. Company law is no different.

I appreciate that, and that Mr. Drennan has been very forthcoming with information all morning. The point I am trying to get to is that, regardless of the reasons behind the scenes for the rebrand - I know the witnesses outlined in the documentation the strengthening of measures and all of that - we still saw bad headlines only last year. That does not inspire confidence in the public or, if I am being totally honest, in me. I am not saying I am exceptionally experienced in what the CEA does but when you are seeing constant negative headlines like this, it puts a bad taint on it.

I completely understand the Deputy's concerns and I am very mindful of the warning I was given by the Chair at the outset. I would love to be able to discuss some of these issues in more detail but, regrettably, I cannot do so. In due course, not only would I be quite happy to come back to this committee, I would relish coming back to it to be able to speak with a greater degree of transparency and candour on certain of these issues.

Under legislation, the CEA can have up to three members as part of its governing body. There has always only been one, namely, Mr. Drennan himself.

Yes.

I think Mr. Drennan requested at one stage that the additional two members be appointed. Is that process moving on? Where are we with that?

Those interviews, as I understand it, are happening in the next week or two. The positions were advertised. Mr. Forde may be able to elaborate.

The recruitment campaign is a departmental issue. As Mr. Drennan referenced, the competition date closed for applications before Christmas and interviews are due to take place in the next number of weeks. We hope members will be appointed imminently.

I thank Mr. Forde. I will move to the CEA's annual report. It states that the CEA received 272 complaints in 2024, 241 of which were from the public. Are all these complaints documented or were there complaints dismissed and not recorded? If that is the case, what is the procedure for that or how is it decided? Of the 272 complaints, how many have been resolved?

I will ask my colleague Ms Judge to answer that question.

Regarding the complaints, all complaints from the public are taken extremely seriously. All complaints are triaged. Sometimes, if a complaint comes in from a member of the public that has absolutely nothing to do with company law, those individuals are advised accordingly and they are redirected to a more appropriate agency or authority to deal with their concerns. However, all complaints are fully documented and reviewed.

They are triaged. They are assigned to a case officer who will engage with the company as they see necessary.

Is that also the case for the external protected disclosures? Of the eight such disclosures highlighted in 2024, 78% were deemed to require no further action. Does that mean they were not relevant to company law?

I do not have the details in front of me, but they were either deemed to have no element of company law to them or it could also have been the case that they could be more properly dealt with by some other authority. If it was predominantly fraud or theft, it might have been more appropriate to refer the matter to An Garda Síochána.

Without going into specifics, can Ms Judge provide details on those protective disclosures around what they were? That would be great.

I am happy to do so.

The report states that company auditors reported 157 indictable offence reports. What is their status?

All indictable offence reports we receive are triaged by the civil enforcement directors and are then assigned to a forensic accountant. We have seven senior forensic accountants within the CEA. Every report is considered by one of them and then it will depend on what matter is being reported.

I could not find any information in relation to complaints regarding owner management companies, OMCs. Does the CEA receive complaints on them? If so, where we would find those details?

We do receive complaints relating to OMCs. I am happy to provide the Deputy with details afterwards. Again, all complaints we receive in relation to OMCs are fully investigated and advanced in the appropriate manner.

If Ms Judge could provide the details, that would be great.

I acknowledge the witnesses and thank them for coming to the committee. I think everyone agrees that the area they work in is incredibly important. It has also been the focus of public attention for a significant period. That is why members have questions in relation to it. An audit often focuses on risk and governance. This committee, in particular, sees that the area of governance is incredibly important in terms of risk, and I want to focus on those issues.

I have seen Mr. Drennan's title described as CEO and chairperson. Will he clarify what his title is?

I am happy to do so. The-----

The governance structure of the organisation is different from many other organisations that appear before the committee.

It is. As I said earlier, it is more akin in some respects to An Garda Síochána, which has a commissioner at the top. It is more akin to the way the Data Protection Commission was until relatively recently when a number of members were appointed. I fully understand the confusion over the title. The provenance of that is when the 2000-----

Will Mr. Drennan just clarify what his title is?

It is chairperson. The title CEO has no statutory basis.

Mr. Drennan is the chairperson of the authority.

That is correct.

He is also the sole member of the authority.

Correct.

How does the authority meet?

What the Act provides is that-----

Has the authority ever met?

I meet myself every day. What the Act provides is that the authority, in the same way as a board, regulates its own procedure. Clearly, when you have an authority of one, you do not need to have formal board meetings and so on with yourself. That would be somewhat nonsensical.

Does Mr. Drennan have board meetings?

Do I meet with myself?

Are formal meetings needed? Surely the oversight of the authority comes from the authority. Is that not its structure?

No, the authority-----

The oversight of the work of the authority and its staff is the authority itself.

Correct.

In terms of the decisions that are made around organisational matters, they are overseen by the authority.

Not only are they overseen by the authority, a lot of them are made by me.

Mr. Drennan interchanged the words "authority" and "me" in his last sentence.

Yes, because they are two different things. The authority is the legal structure. It is the governing body. It is the equivalent of the board of directors of the authority.

In essence, in the day-to-day operations, Mr. Drennan and the authority are the same thing.

Correct.

Does Mr. Drennan understand that from a governance perspective, that is very problematic?

It is set out under an Act of the Oireachtas. I cannot comment on the merits or otherwise of a statutory framework.

My comments are not addressed to Mr. Drennan. I am just saying that an authority with a single member is not a good model.

Again, I am not going to-----

Does the legislation allow for other members?

It does, absolutely. As Mr. Forde touched on-----

Are there directors that sit under the authority?

Yes.

How many directors are there?

At full complement, seven.

Seven. Have there been changes over time?

Yes, of course.

I think there are two members who have legal responsibilities.

Yes.

There was a director of criminal enforcement. That was a position that was quashed.

It was suppressed.

Who made the decisions around having two directors responsible for legal and suppressing another position?

They are my decisions.

Who oversaw those decisions?

To be clear, the authority and the fact that I am the one member of the authority is the equivalent of the board of directors. For example, I sit on the Medical Council-----

There would not be a board of directors with one person.

It is not a board of directors; it is the authority.

No.

For example, I sit on the Medical Council. There are 25 members. That is the board. They make certain decisions. They delegate certain decisions down to the executive. The model that the Corporate Enforcement Authority is based on, is based on the will of these Houses, so I have to work with what I have.

On the day-to-day level, in terms of the change of directors and so on, who oversees that decision-making?

Not only do I-----

Is it Mr. Forde?

They are my decisions.

Is it Mr. Forde from the Department?

No.

Who oversees Mr. Drennan's decisions?

In what respect? Does the Deputy mean the operational decisions?

Yes.

The C and AG oversees-----

No. The C and AG has responsibility for the auditing of the CEA's public finances.

He does. We have an audit committee, which has functions as set out in the code of practice for the governance of State bodies.

Why are there two directors with legal responsibilities?

That is a staffing issue. We have two individuals at that level, both of whom are qualified lawyers. I can go back into the provenance of that.

Do they deal with different legal areas?

Yes.

What are they?

One of them would deal primarily with criminal law and one of them deals primarily with civil law. It is not exclusively that way, but primarily it is. Mr. Hegarty also has-----

Is it a case that one provides legal advice in one area and the other provides legal advice in another area exclusively?

No, not exclusively.

Who is the general counsel to the authority?

We do not have a general counsel.

Who provides legal advice to the authority?

That would depend on the nature of the advice. I would get some advice from Mr. Hegarty, some advice I would get from his colleague and we would go external to counsel for some advice. It depends on the nature of the issue.

That is a decision made by the authority.

Yes.

By Mr. Drennan.

Yes.

Has Mr. Drennan ever received conflicting advice from two directors?

On a daily basis, when you work with smart people who have got experience, you get different views. I would not say it is conflicting advice.

Is it the case that the authority has had conflicting advice from two directors, both with responsibility for different legal areas?

I would not generally seek a legal opinion from two separate people. That would be kind of nonsensical.

Has Mr. Drennan ever done that?

Have I ever sought advice from two people?

Has Mr. Drennan ever sought legal advice from two separate people within the organisation - from the two directors?

I cannot recall specifics.

Does Mr. Drennan see how that is problematic?

Not really, no.

In my view, if you have the opportunity to one person or another, human nature suggests that you would go to the person who might agree with you on one issue or might disagree on another. There is a variance there. I am not suggesting that about Mr. Drennan. This is about governance. Governance is there to protect from the actions of the individual. I see that as a weakness. Does Mr. Drennan see it as a weakness?

The very reason you seek legal advice, more often than not, is if you have a concern that there might be a conflicting opinion that you need to consider. That is how you make good decisions.

The decision to suppress the position with responsibility for criminal enforcement is surprising given the public history of the former office and so on. Why was that decision made?

It might be surprising if it was looked at through a pinhole, if you like. The actual situation is that, as referenced earlier, I sought the appointment of two members of the authority. They will be two people at board level, which, to some extent, will no doubt-----

Who now has responsibility for criminal enforcement in the organisation?

Can I just finish the answer please, if I may? To somewhat ameliorate the Deputy's concerns, in due course, and Mr. Forde touched on it, there will be two members appointed to the authority by the Minister, Deputy Burke. That will then mean that there will be a board of more than one person, that is, three people. As part of the sanctioned request for that and in order to minimise the cost to the Exchequer, what we said was that if the Minister was willing to give that sanction and the Minister for public expenditure-----

Who has responsibility for criminal enforcement in the organisation?

As evidenced by her title at the moment, Ms Judge is the acting director for criminal enforcement?

That position has been suppressed.

It has been suppressed, so we are not filling it. She is-----

The position is suppressed, but there is someone acting in the position.

Ms Judge is carrying the mandate at the moment until the new member of the authority is appointed.

That will transfer to the new member of the authority.

Correct.

Ms. Judge has it on an acting basis.

It is not an acting basis in the normal sense, in that she is not being paid extra for it.

She has it on an acting basis but, ultimately, Ms Judge is responsible to Mr. Drennan.

Is that correct?

Correct.

Ultimately, Mr. Drennan has that responsibility of criminal enforcement.

Obviously. I am the member of the authority with that responsibility.

In terms of cases as they progress through, if it is a matter that involves a breach of company law, am I correct in saying that after initial triage, it then is referred to the Garda resources within the authority?