DEBATE ON TREATY RESUMED
Contributions 1–149 of 295. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I suggest that if there is any matter that requires clarification in the minds of members that they should ask questions. Now I would like everybody clearly to understand, and the delegation on the one hand and we on the other have agreed to this, that the plenipotentiaries went over to negotiate a Treaty, that they could differ from the Cabinet if they wanted to, and that in anything of consequence they could take their decision against the decision of the Cabinet, but of course they would know the consequence. They would know what they were deciding against. If I was on the delegation I would have taken a different view from Mr. Griffith on one point. Now I wish to explain to you that a Cabinet team has to work so well together that at critical moments like this it should be unable to act together as one man when you have fundamental differences that you cannot get rid of. I have only one thing to say, one thing I feel hurt about, with respect to the delegation, and that is that a Treaty was signed in London, and when I heard of it first the signatures were appended to it. As I came in the door of the Mansion House I was given a signed copy of the document, and it had already been given to the Press in London. It was then about 7.15. Now it probably would not have altered the final position a bit, but what I did feel was that if I was of any use to my country it was that I was able to keep the two groups together. I considered myself of no other avail. I considered at least I might have the chance of getting that unanimity which was so essential at the moment. My tactics would have differed from those of the delegation. I stood away from the delegation because I thought the tactical position was stronger. I do not hesitate to admit to anybody that I went out for peace from the moment of Lloyd George's letter to me. I went out for peace if I could secure it honourably, and I felt it my duty to do so. I struggled for it. I battered down the wall of the isolated Republic to do it. I saw that I would have to batter down that wall. I said when I was elected as President that as far as I am concerned my oath was taken to the Irish people I mean my oath was taken on the Irish side it was referred to this morning in the Independent. Some of you I know voted for me as President because I was for an independent Republic, that in the eyes of many meant an isolated Republic and I was also voted for by people in the country who thought that if there was anything like that which is now before the country I would not use my influence to get it rejected. I therefore represented two groups. When I went down to Clare I primarily represented the Republic and I felt that my first obligation was to the group in which I stood, and everybody knew that I stood definitely for the Irish Republic. I have tried to keep the country together as well as the members here together, and I have also showed that I never made a statement that I was altogether for the Republic or nothing. I was careful on that point if you go through anything I have said at any time. I have been perfectly consistent. I have been classed as a moderate. So I am. I believe I am a moderate. I frightened some members here in the Dáil before I was elected as President when I said, "This oath to me is not going to bind me to do anything but what I consider right and honourable and best for the Irish people". It was on that consideration you took me, and on that consideration I am going to stand. I felt at the same time in honour bound if I could by any honourable means to get an isolated Republic. It was my duty to the people to do it. That has been my effort all the time to get that, and if I could not it was a question of tactics to leave it in the hands of others who might be able to do it. Expecting peace by negotiation I started to break down that wall. I opened a path. The plenipotentiaries were sent because they were likely to be people whom the British Government would be induced to try and do business with. I knew the men perfectly. It would not be quite the team I would have sent were it not there might be personal differences among members of the Cabinet which would prevent them working together as a team. I suggested they were the best team I could get, and I felt that we could do the work here because we were in constant communication. At a certain stage a certain question was being put to the delegates. I saw that the question was coming. I do not like hobble skirts. I would have opposed the oath for this Assembly if I could because I do not believe in binding yourself up in hobble skirts, for human nature is such that you come to the time when you kick them off. Then this question had to be decided. I was here and I was considering the whole circumstances. I would have said "No", though I might not have said "No" before. I would have said "No" in the circumstances because I felt I could have said "No" with advantage to the nation. On October 25th I wrote this:
"I received the minutes of the seventh session and your letter of the 24th. We are all here at one that there can be no question of our asking the Irish people to enter an arrangement which would make them subject to the Crown or demand from them allegiance to the British King. If war is the alternative, we can only face it, and I think that the sooner the other side is made to realise that the better."
That decision was taken with the full knowledge of the consequences and I took it that time because I said to myself if they publish their proposals we will put up ours and stand behind, and let them go to war if they dared. If they did we would be perfectly right. If I am in prison and a man says to me you can go out and walk round the roads if you give me your parole that you will not escape I would say I will not give you my parole. I will use my chance to get out of the prison house anytime I can. If you ask me to give my parole I would say no and do your downdest.
Comment on this
Yes. Now a man will say to you, that is all right for yourself, but are you going to decide like that for hundreds of thousands of other persons. I give only one answer to that. I know what I would do for myself. Then if they ask me to decide for them I will decide for them as I would decide for myself. They have ultimately the right to decide for themselves. That is my position. That letter of mine to the chairman of the delegation drew from the delegation a note which I could not understand to tell you the truth. Would you like me to read it all or only portion of it?
Comment on this
Letter to me from the delegation dated October 24th, 1921. (Reading) "Your letters reached me this evening. It is impossible for me, with the engagements we have this evening and the time at my disposal to deal with all the matters. I have got a meeting of the delegates and secretaries. The delegates regard the first paragraph of your letter No. 7 as tying their hands in discussion and as inconsistent with the powers given them on their appointment and Nos. 1 and 2 of 'Instructions to Plenipotentiaries from Cabinet' dated 7th October." I could not see that for one. I simply gave the decision. The delegates considered that was tying them and they sent this letter in protest signed by everyone of them. Another paragraph was: "Obviously any form of association necessitates discussion of recognition in some form or other by the head of the association." That is a perfectly true statement but they were to form an association that would be compatible with the aspirations of the Irish people. We went over the form of association that would be consistent with the aspirations of the Irish people. There was nothing in my letter which should have drawn that answer. (Reading): "Instruction 2 conferred this power of discussion but required before a decision was made reference to the members of the Cabinet in Dublin". That is perfectly true. We simply told them what position we would take. I didn't wish to limit their powers of discussion. I was the strongest advocate that they should have full powers of discussion. There was no use in sending them if they were to be figureheads. There was no question of withdrawing powers. (Proceeding): "We strongly resent, in the position in which we are placed the interference with our powers". Again I hold there was none. "The responsibility if this interference breaks the very slight possibility there is of settlement will not and must not rest on the plenipotentiaries. As to your coming to London" it was suggested by the Minister of Finance that I should go over. I had the same reasons against it then as I had at first. I said if circumstances arose which would alter my previous decision by bringing up new points I was willing to go. (Reading): "As to your coming to London, we think, if you can come without being known, it is important you should do so immediately. But if you cannot come privately do not come publicly unless we send you a message that in our opinion it is essential." Of course it would be out of the question my going privately. In reply to that I wrote: "Yours of October 26th received. There is obviously a misunderstanding. There can be no question of tying the hands of the plenipotentiaries beyond the extent to which they are tied by their original instructions. Of course a Cabinet decision cannot be withdrawn or varied except by the Cabinet as a whole. It is because this should go without saying that I am surprised any misunderstanding has arisen. The delegates must understand these memos of mine, except I explicitly state otherwise, as nothing more than attempt to keep you in touch with the views of members of the Cabinet here on the various points as they arise. I think it most important that you should be kept aware of these views, for when the delegation returns there will be a question of a Cabinet decision as to policy. My going to London I am glad that your view agrees with my own on the matter. You may take it that going privately is impossible".
Later I wrote a letter to Mr. Griffith with regard to procedure on November 17th and I said even if we are able to arrive at an agreement with them in substance the form of procedure will be of the utmost importance. The consistency of our position must be maintained on our side but that is the whole thing in this that association which would in fact mean something very like what has been signed. Such an association with I think proper and delicate handling could be brought about which would be quite consistent with our position. I say anything they could do constitutionally they could not deal with it otherwise than by a Dominion Act. The one catch the big catch in that Treaty proposal is that when it comes to a Dominion Act you are not going to have that Treaty; you are going to have resolutions in the British House of Commons, when it comes it may be a Dominion Act. We will see if that position is reached. It will not be easy to devise procedure which will satisfy both sides. In order that they might start from their own angle we gave the plenipotentiaries a roughly drafted treaty which they might proceed for as a basis. It is most unfortunate that we have had these differences of opinion. I believe it is the grandest chance for making peace a peace that we would all be delighted with, from the point of view of our strength and everything else has been lost in a few hours and it is not because I am against peace but because I am for real peace (Hear, hear) that I am taking this attitude I have taken, and I hope that when this matter is thrashed out that it may be possible for us to yet make a final effort to get real peace. Now, having said that, I think I have said all I have got to say about it. The plenipotentiaries, I repeat, had a perfect right to disagree with the Cabinet and a perfect right to sign but when Mr. Griffith came over I came up from Clare when he came over he gave me a document which was very near the final stage. I told him definitely I could never sign that document. At the Cabinet meeting on the following day the matter arose again and Mr. Griffith pointed out clearly and [recte that] he would not break on the Crown. I was willing to break on the Crown because I said again, "we will present our two documents", but he said he could not in his conscience break on the Crown because it meant going back to war and he did not think we were in the position in which we could fight a war. It was pointed out by certain members of the Cabinet that it would have meant a split inasmuch as they would not in any circumstances accept the Crown and it was up to him was he going to split the country on such a proposal. That was the position. It was suggested, as I was strong on breaking off if necessary on the point, it was suggested that I should go over now and a new situation had arisen, and I was ready to go over to break, at least I would have been ready but for one thing that was against it and that one thing is that Mr. Griffith coming over on a breaking question my going over would be interpreted as anxiety on our part and likely to give in. I did not want this interpretation to be placed on my action, and that extra little bit I wanted to pull them and hoped they would be pulled, could not be done if I went and therefore I was balancing these. Now Mr. Griffith in discussing with another member of the Cabinet said, "well then I will not break on the Crown but I will not sign". It would be presented to the Dáil and therefore I felt that I was presented with a fait accompli in the signed document. We have been presented with a fait accompli in that signed document and that is the whole difficulty and I would do anything I could to try to restore the position to what it was but I could not allow it to be understood by the country that I was assenting to that document and that the Cabinet was assenting to the signing of that document.
Comment on this
The other member of the Cabinet to whom he refers was myself. There was some rather heated passages between the chairman of the delegation and myself. Now, at the finish as the President has pointed out, the chairman, when I put it up to him that this would mean a split and by the way I may say this, first at the Cabinet meeting and I repeat now what I said at the Cabinet meeting the last few days, I am satisfied for what I know of each individual member of the delegation, that they have done according to their lights, what they thought was the best for the country, and although there were heated passages between Mr. Griffith and myself and between Mr. Collins and myself it was merely because we differed in opinion. It was not because I doubted their honour. I never suggested such a thing. Mr. Collins said to me and to those of us which [sic] are against the four fundamentals that were in this Treaty that has been signed and which are in the document presented to us, "If you are not satisfied with us, get another five to go over." Now if the undertaking that Mr. Griffith gave later on that is the one the President has spoken about, that he would not break but that he would not sign: he would come back to the Dáil if the undertaking had not been given I would have taken Mr. Collins at his word and I would be in favour of another five going over, but it was because the undertaking was given that I was satisfied and went back to Galway in a happy frame of mind because I knew if they could not satisfy their consciences they were going to come back and leave it to the Dáil.
Comment on this
I have a suggestion to make, apart from anything Mr. Griffith says or I say afterwards. I think it would be right for the members of the Dáil to be in possession of what I call the essential documents and I suggest that there are three essential documents the semi-final document from the English side to our side which we brought back to Ireland, and the document from our side to the English side which followed that and which give what I call the best impression of what occurred and the final document from the English.
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of course I don't know whether I would be in order in speaking. Perhaps Mr. Griffith
Comment on this
One thing, as I said at the beginning, is to keep the minds of every member clear as to what happened in the beginning. There was a suggestion that the plenipotentiaries exceeded their powers. President de Valera has explained to you now that they did not do so and that he did not intend to make that suggestion. We did not exceed our powers. We had powers to sign anything we considered it well to sign and the power of the Dáil was the power of ratification, but we were not going to sign anything we did not think the Dáil might not honourably and properly accept. During the whole of the time we were there we sent every night a courier to Dublin, with details of everything that happened, to the President. I understand that copies were made. I think there were five copies sent one for each of the Ministers, so that day by day each of them was acquainted with all that was going on, public conversations and private conversations.
Various documents passed between both sides. Copies of these documents, every scrap of paper that passed, were sent to the President and the Cabinet. On the Saturday before we signed we had arrived at a crucial stage. We had fought in the beginning, we had tried the Republic, we had tried neutrality and we tried a proposal which hereafter will be read to you. We had driven them from position to position on other points, but on this they were standing on a rock. I came back on the Saturday. I had written the day before to the President that now we were up against the Crown and Empire and we had to face it, and I asked for some suggestions from the members of the Cabinet in Dublin. I got none.
Comment on this
I am sorry for interrupting you but the Minister of Finance took over a special document which I had sent along. It was not a complete document but it covered the vital points.
Comment on this
We will get that document afterwards. I merely want to get the facts clear in the minds of the members here. I came back on the Saturday to Dublin. I attended a Cabinet meeting. I went back to London that evening. I told the President we brought back what seemed to be the final proposals of the English Cabinet. I said we were now up against this question of the Crown and the inclusion in the Empire. I told him that I would not break on the Crown if the other points we wanted were conceded, because if we did we could not carry our own people with us on the mere point alone and we would throw all the Dominions against us. I said I would not take that responsibility. We suggested for the President himself to go to London but for reasons which I know are perfectly cogent in his mind he decided not to go.
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I had not made up my mind until you had given the undertaking that you would not sign.
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Mr. Cathal Brugha and you were speaking to me on the subject then and they asked me if I would not break on the Crown I would not sign that document and I said I would not. I also said that I intended and the minutes of the Cabinet meeting will show what happened
"... President and Dáil to reject."
"The Minister for Defence was in perfect agreement with the President. The only matter upon which he could disagree would be the question of recognising the King of England as head of the Associated States."
"Mr. Griffith would not take the responsibility of breaking on the Crown. When as many concessions as possible conceded, and when accepted by Craig he would go before the Dáil. The Dáil was the body to decide for or against war."
"The President took his stand upon these Irish proposals which meant external connection with the Crown. He suggested the following amendment to the Oath of Allegiance:
'I ........................ do solemnly swear true faith and Allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State, to the Treaty of Association and to recognise the King of Great Britain as head of the Associated States'."
Comment on this
That was taken down by Mr. Duffy across the table. I was only showing how to get around the thing that was objectionable, but surely nobody would take a thing like that until it was presented.
Comment on this
Let me finish them (Reading):
"(c) Delegates to carry out their original instructions with same powers.
(d) Delegates to return and say the Cabinet won't accept Oath of Allegiance if not amended and to face the consequences, assuming that England will declare war.
(e) Decided unanimously that present Oath of Allegiance could not be subscribed to.
(f) Mr. Griffith to inform Mr. Lloyd George that the document could not be signed, to state that it was now a matter for the Dáil, and to try and put the blame on Ulster.
(g) On a majority vote it was decided that the Delegation be empowered to meet Sir James Craig if they should think necessary. The following voted for and against:
FOR
President de Valera Minister for Finance Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Economics Minister for Local Government
AGAINST
Minister for Defence Minister for Home Affairs
(h) It was decided that the President should not join the Delegation in London at this stage of the negotiations."
Continuing MR. GRIFFITH said:
Comment on this
Now there is the position on the Saturday. We went back to London and we met these people on Sunday and fought straight up and down all day. We nearly broke on Sunday night. We did make a break as a matter of fact but we went back again on the Monday morning and we started in. That Monday evening Lloyd George was sending his final reply to Craig. Craig had called his Parliament for the Tuesday and with the definite assurance I had got Lloyd George the previous week held back for another week. We fought all day and he had two letters written to Craig and they were going off at 10 o'clock that night. One letter was informing him that the negotiations were broken off with us and the other was putting this proposal to him and is now my Treaty. We had the alternative and we had to face the alternative of making the decision. Then I tried to get them to put it back for a week to get back to the Dáil. I could not get it done. We had to take a decision. We were plenipotentiaries. If we did not take a decision then if we left the place the people of Ireland would have very properly come to us and say, "We entrusted you with powers to make a decision and you hadn't the courage to do it. You have thrown us back into war without our knowledge." We did make a decision and we made the decision when they came to us they said, "Will you be within or without the Empire". We said if you give us this and that we will propose that to the Dáil. Under these circumstances we have signed that document and we have come back with the document now. Attempts have been made to create in the public mind the impression that we went there pledged to the Republic and pledged to bring back nothing but a Republic. I want you to recollect all that happened. I would not have gone there, nobody in his senses would have gone there, in such circumstances. If we wanted the recognition of the Republic as a preliminary we could have said so. We were sent to negotiate a settlement. When we were sent I stated to the Cabinet I would strive to bring back a Republic but I could not bring back the Republic. No member of the Cabinet had the slightest misunderstanding.
Comment on this
We went there to get the best settlement possible consistent with the honour and the interests of Ireland. That is how we regarded ourselves. We believe we had got the best settlement consistent with the honour and interests of Ireland. An attempt has been made, not by President de Valera but outside, to make it appear that we went there with more or less definite instructions to take a Republic and nothing but a Republic, whereas we were sent there to do our best, in effect to make a bargain. In a speech at the Dáil on August 17th. Mr. de Valera, spoke of mutual give and take, said they were ready to meet and adjust this on the basis of mutual give and take. In the same speech he said. "If it was demanded of me that before going to negotiate with the British Prime Minister I would first of all have to renounce our independent right I would not have gone. If, on the other hand, seeing the claim that they are putting forward I made a demand before I went, that Britain ought to acknowledge our right absolutely then I might have been held to be unreasonable because then there would have been no question of, or necessity for, negotiations". Once you start negotiations you are going to give away something and you are going to get something. At the general election the question was put to the Irish people to say what form of Government they wanted how they wished to live so that they might have an opportunity of working out for themselves their own national life in their own way and the answer the people gave was unmistakable. "I do not take it", said the President, "for the form so much because we are not Republican doctrinaires as such. It was for Irish freedom and Irish independence". Well, we have brought back Irish freedom and Irish independence (No, no and question). Ireland is as free as Canada and Australia (No). I don't mind the members arguing with me. I object to being interrupted. We say and we contend that we have brought back a satisfactory answer. It is for the representatives to decide whether we have not but let them argue it out hereafter. If we were to bring back the full demand we would not have been sent at all. President de Valera met Mr. Lloyd George last July and Mr. Lloyd George made certain proposals to him. These proposals involved the acceptance of the Crown and Empire. President de Valera did not immediately reject them.
Comment on this
He thought it consistent with his position to bring them back and place them before the Dáil although they involved acceptance of the Crown and Empire. He considered he was bound to lay them before the Dáil.
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The point is just what I did with Lloyd George's proposals. I was against his idea from the start. If I could get peace by negotiation, a peace we could stand by, I was out for it. Now, I got those proposals. I saw that they would not bring peace, and I am against these because they won't bring peace to Ireland. I flung them back at him. I didn't even take them from his room. I said these are no use to us. I went away and I suggested to our representative in London that as they were signed anyhow it was something in writing that we had from the British Government. There would be a thing we could proceed from and I thought it would be useful to have that signed document and I suggested that when he met the Prime Minister's secretary that he might suggest that he might as well send them back. They are signed documents. I rejected them there and then and if you looked at my reply after the Dáil had seen them you would see that I confirmed that rejection. You will see in my note it says: "The anticipatory judgment which I gave you. I am now able to confirm, having submitted them to Dáil Éireann" or something to that effect. I did not see there was any use in proceeding along that line at all. I had tried to tell Lloyd George that there was no chance of getting along on that particular line. I suggested an association.
Comment on this
I think it is most unfair for the President to get up and make a speech in the middle of a speech.
Comment on this
I felt obliged to lay them before the Dáil and that was the point. In letter 14, written by the President on September 19th he wrote:
"A treaty of accommodation and association properly concluded between the peoples of these two Islands and between Ireland and the group of States in the British Commonwealth would, we believe, end the dispute forever and enable the two Nations to settle down in peace, each pursuing its own individual development and contributing its own quota to civilisation, but working together in free and friendly co-operation in affairs of agreed common concern."
which of course was perfectly clear. In letter 16 he wrote:
"We have received your letter of invitation to a Conference in London on October 11th with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of Nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations. Our respective positions have been stated and are understood, and we agree that conference, not correspondence is the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding. We accept the invitation, and our delegates will meet you in London on the date mentioned to explore every possibility of settlement by personal discussion".
We explored every possibility of a settlement for eight weeks and in the end we brought back this Treaty. Now I know what is going to be said about it. If we brought back heaven and earth we would be blamed. Before I went away I said: "Whatever the plenipotentiaries bring back some one is going to kick them", and I said, "If so I am going to kick back". We have brought back a Treaty and as to the definition of a treaty, when the Boers in 1881 beat the English what they got was England insisted that the Boers' right was established and England insisted on controlling the foreign affairs of the Boers and putting in a British President and insisted on the right to march her troops across the Transvaal, and the Boers agreed to that. When they asked for a Treaty in '84 on these lines the English Government replied, "No, we are only making a convention". A treaty is an instrument between two sovereign states. England has concluded a Treaty with us the first she has concluded in her history. That Treaty gives Ireland an equal status with England, Canada or any country in the Commonwealth and places them on an equal level. The guarantee Ireland has now for her security against England is the joint guarantee of Canada, Australia and the Dominions. Any invasion of our rights is an invasion of theirs. In questions of foreign policy, peace or war our voice is equal to that of England. We have brought back the name of the State, the army, the flag, and it is for Dáil Éireann to say whether they believe that is dishonourable to Ireland and whether they will declare war; but we were not prepared to say to the people that Ireland is not to go to war against that; but if they do I will follow in the ranks but I will never lead under such circumstances.
Comment on this
The matter he is dealing with now could have been dealt with in a public session. He is defending the principle. Have we not got into something of an impasse? Was not the matter with which the session was to deal in private to decide whether the delegates had exceeded their powers or not?
Comment on this
That we are discussing in private session the Treaty itself. The chairman of the delegation had not originally opened his statement.
Comment on this
That is not contrary to order, inasmuch as these are shut out from discussion at the public session.
Comment on this
I am stating views which I will state in public session. The thing I want you to remember is this to decide whether we exceeded our powers. I understood President de Valera to agree.
Comment on this
The private session was to know how it was broken. I think both sides have a fairly good idea as to the real facts and there is no longer any necessity for a private session.
Comment on this
If you wish to make a representation to a member, in order, while he is making a speech you must make it by note of hand and privately.
Comment on this
I want to understand that the difference between us and the members of the Cabinet at home in the end was not the vital difference between the Republic and the Crown. It was a difference of the degree of recognition of the Crown; a difference between the degree of the Oath of Allegiance; and on that principle, that small difference to ask the people of Ireland to go back to war is a thing I will never do. What we got was better. There was no vital difference of principle and what we signed, I signed it not under a threat of war I would not have signed it under any threat of war if I believed it dishonourable to the country, but if it had not been for the immediate prospect of war I would have come to the Dáil before signing it. I stand by it on the merits and I believe the Irish people if they accept it will a month hence see the British troops out and our own army in.
Comment on this
then said he had only that morning received a letter from Mr. Lloyd George which he would read. Having failed at the moment to find the letter Mr. Griffith added I cannot delay the discussion. I have the letter somewhere and will read it later.
Comment on this
There was an arrangement that there would be Whips and that the people who wished to speak would make arrangements through the Whips. I don't wish to enforce any rigid order now in this private discussion but when we meet again in public it will be necessary to have much more rigid order than at the opening this morning. It was very difficult for a person presiding over an assembly of this kind to call to order those who have principal responsibility for the affairs of the country. But instead of that he must expect to have their fullest co-operation in maintaining order. I wish to point out that there is nothing gained by departing from order and that the gain is only imaginary. There will be time enough and we can take all the time necessary. From every point of view I appeal to you to assist in having these proceedings conducted in the best possible order. With regard to the grave and important decision you have to come to, the more carefully you set about it, from every point of view the better. Constant contradiction and corrections raise the temperature and that is what we have to avoid. There is no gain to anyone in raising the temperature of the discussion. In the country we want to have it at a proper level. Where there are Whips it would be possible for those who wish to make speeches to arrange it and that is better than to stand up on the spur of the moment.
Comment on this
then read the following letter received that morning from Mr. Lloyd George adding that it was written to cover questions of doubt that might arise:
"10, Downing Street, S.W. 1. 13th December, 1921.
Sir,
As doubts may be expressed regarding certain points not specifically mentioned in the Treaty terms I think it is important that their meaning should be clearly understood. The first question relates to the method of appointment of the Representatives of the Crown in Ireland. Article III of the Agreement lays down that he is to be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada and in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointment'. This means that the Government of the Irish Free State will be consulted so as to ensure a selection acceptable to the Irish Government before any recommendation is made to His Majesty. The second question is as to the scope of the arbitration contemplated in Article V regarding Ireland's liability for a share of War Pensions and the Public Debt. The procedure contemplated by the Conference was that the British Government should submit its claim, and that the Government of the Irish Free State should submit any counterclaim to which it thought Ireland entitled. Upon the case so submitted the arbitrators would decide after making such further enquiries as they might think necessary; their decision would then be final and binding on both parties. It is of course understood that the arbitrator or arbitrators to whom the case is referred shall be men as to whose impartiality both the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State are satisfied. The third question relates to the status of the Irish Free State. The special arrangements agreed between us in Articles VI, VII, VIII and IX, which are not in the Canadian constitution in no way affect status. They are necessitated by the proximity and interdependence of the two islands by conditions, that is, which do not exist in the case of Canada. They in no way affect the position of the Irish Free State in the Commonwealth or its title to representation, like Canada, in the Assembly of the League of Nations. They were agreed between us for our mutual benefit, and have no bearing of any kind upon the question of status. It is our desire that Ireland shall rank as co-equal with the other nations of the Commonwealth, and we are ready to support her claim to a similar place in the League of Nations as soon as her new constitution comes into effect. The framing of that constitution will be in the hands of the Irish Government, subject of course to the terms of the Agreement, and to the pledges given in respect of the minority by the head of the Irish Delegation. The establishment and composition of the Second Chamber is therefore in the discretion of the Irish people. There is nothing in the articles of Agreement to suggest that Ireland is in this respect bound to the Canadian model. I may add that we propose to begin withdrawing the Military and Auxiliary Forces of the Crown in Southern Ireland when the Articles of Agreement are ratified.
I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant, D. Lloyd George."
Comment on this
I want to ask a question. Is it a fait accompli or what are we talking about, and if at a public session or any other session will the President say if he intends to submit an alternative to the Treaty proposed at the present time if he intends to submit a policy as an alternative?
Comment on this
The suggestion I have to make was to meet things that Dáil members had been expressing views about. Dáil members have stated that they were in the dark about certain things. At no stage while I have been a member of the Dáil have I denied information to any member who asked me on Dáil matters. I have no intention of doing it now as I think that the vital documents should be in their hands. I am not certain that the delegation met to consider among themselves that we have to agree with the British authorities about that. I don't think we have to agree with them about a document that we put in as a joint document when there was agreement in the one they put in in reply to the final document. But it would be of importance to the Dáil that these documents should be in their possession. If the delegation think they are in honour bound not to submit them I can only say we should first arrange to get permission to submit them. There is one point about the signing of this. It is only a point. It occurred about half past one o'clock in the morning and a question was asked direct across the table from Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. Griffith. We had been fighting about the alteration of certain clauses and he said: "If we alter those to what you want will you recommend this document?" Mr. Griffith said, "yes". That committed us as well as the signatures. When we were asked for our signatures I thought it was an advantage to have their signatures and if we came back with an unsigned document they would be able to say, "They have not signed it: they're codding you".
Comment on this
I want to answer a question. I was asked whether it was a fait accompli. I say that I of all people if there was one member of the Dáil or one person in Ireland who had a tremendous responsibility I had it. You will all admit that my duty would have been were it not for another point of view to have been with the delegation. I was captaining a team and I felt that the team should have played with me to the last and that I should have got the last chance which I felt would have put us over and we might have crossed the bar in my opinion at the high tide. They rushed before the tide got to the top and they almost foundered the ship; and as I was captain I have a right to show that it was not through my fault as captain that it has been done. It was a fait accompli but the position can be restored somewhat. I have a proposal such as I would have tried to write. If they broke I would have written final proposals and I would have been as much against Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack if they went on one side as I would against Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins on the other. It is possible to get what will really be such as we can accept. There are differences that may be regarded as shadows, but they are more than shadows the things that matter for us. If to the Crown and His Majesty's Ministers in this country these things are not shadows for them; but the Irish Army and the Irish Ministers if they are mere shadows, why should they be grasping for the shadows, and why should not we? I wanted to clear these shadows because they meant an awful lot. We have the country supporting definite proposals. It will be the mischief to get the English out of the position they are in. If we go we will be divided and a Provisional Government set up in Dublin Castle will be as a matter of fact legally as much a usurpation as the other on the present proposals. I want to get proposals and it could be done by delicate handling. I am excusing myself to the Dáil as the captain of the ship and I can only say it is not my fault and I am trying to recover the position. My proposals may not suit one or the other and if you don't reject them I will do my best.
Comment on this
The Minister for Finance has made a statement. I am not in agreement with that and it will be necessary for me to say so now, otherwise it might be charged against me that the statement was made, that I did not contradict it and my objection might go by default. The Minister of Finance stated that Mr. Griffith made his reply that he agreed and that we were as much committed as when we signed. I say we were not. No member of the delegation was committed except Mr. Griffith until he signed. My reason for saying it is not my own personal recollection. I will quote Mr. Griffith's letter¹.
1. This letter is not entered on the record.
Comment on this
A private word meant a public signature. It was for himself. But it is all over the world that the men have signed. That is the difficulty.
Comment on this
If this conveys the idea of a Government and of an Opposition the difficulty some of us feel is where is the Government and where is the Opposition? It is within the province of the Dáil to ask the Ministers to resign and have a new Cabinet.
Comment on this
Until you remove me I am President. I have a right to ask any Minister to resign, and when I got that document, only I felt it would have given a wrong impression if the Dáil had not met so soon, I would have asked these members to resign, because you must have a united Cabinet. But this cannot continue beyond this session. We must have an agreed Cabinet. It is for that reason we are working in this way and as Ministers talking at each other.
The Meeting adjourned for luncheon at 1.20 p.m.
On resuming after luncheon the Speaker took the Chair at 4.20.
Comment on this
I want to express the feelings and the oppressions of a private member upon to-day's proceedings. It does seem to me that it is a most extraordinary thing that Ireland should be thrown into the vortex of a great cleavage and on the brink of war for the trifling, small, pettifogging points that have been brought up to-day. I think, members of the Dáil, that we must realise that we are here with a very grave issue before us one that affects the future of Ireland for generations to come. And it is not because a certain point of punctilio and procedure may have been neglected by the plenipotentiaries that their country is going to be thrown back into the vortex of war; and I as a private member demand that before we come to discuss this Treaty that we are supplied with all the agreed statements that went from the Dáil Cabinet to Downing Street in order that we may know exactly what is the issue, so that this discussion and to-morrow's debate will not be fought and decided upon a false issue. As we came in to-day we heard certain members of the public shouting, "Up the Republic". Ever since this controversy arose the impression on the public mind has been that one section of the Cabinet has been standing for the Republic, and the other standing for the Treaty. That is not the issue, and this decision will not be allowed to be decided upon that issue. Now there are some other points raised. We are told that this Treaty should not have been signed before it was brought back to the Dáil. It is not a question that the plenipotentiaries were within their rights in signing it, but the wisdom of their doing so has been questioned. I want to point out what an unenviable position Ireland would be in to-day if that Treaty had not been signed. If Ireland's delegates had not signed it, neither would the British delegates have signed it and our delegates would have come back here. The same cleavage would probably have occurred, and we would have been just where John Bull wants us to be split in two and England committed to nothing. But despite the fact that the cleavage has taken place Britain through her delegates is committed to certain big things, and Ireland can have those if the Dáil agrees to have them. She would not have these within her reach if that document had not been signed. I do want to ask the responsible members of the Dáil to remember that they are not dealing with school children and that Ireland is not going to be treated like a class of schoolboys. Ireland will not stand trifling with great and sacred national issues and the man who thinks that at this stage that things which may mean life and death for the nation are going to be decided upon small petty points does not understand the temper of Ireland. Ireland means to have peace to-day if she can have it and Ireland will sweep aside any man or any body of men that stands between her and peace with honour.
Comment on this
Therefore I trust that in any future discussions we may have that the members of the Dáil will rise to the seriousness of their responsibilities and remember that this is not either a class of schoolboys or a debating society, but that it is the Parliament of the Irish nation, where the future of Ireland is going to be decided for generations. If we keep that level we will be keeping these things in their proper perspective.
Comment on this
I think Mr. Milroy's remarks are most uncalled for. I think every man has come here to give his opinion according to his own conscience and nothing will deter us from doing so. We all know what the consequences will be but we are here to act according to our conscience and the members of the Dáil will not be dictated to. These remarks of Mr. Milroy's are a threat to the members here and we will not stand it.
Comment on this
I wish to make one point and one only, and it is a point that I think should save time in this Assembly. We have heard this morning a great deal of talk as to why this last final document was not shown to the captain of the ship before it was signed. Now the answer to that to my mind is that that final document could never have been produced to the Cabinet or An Dáil otherwise than over the signatures and backed by the recognition of the plenipotentiaries. There was first an objectionable defence clause, an objectionable trade clause and an objectionable clause with regard to the North-East and Lloyd George said: "If I have to fight I will keep any friends I have in Ireland, but if you will sign this document I will bulk these three things. Your improvements on the defence clause, your improvements in the trade clause, and your improvements on the Ulster clause and I will give away in these three things if you sign". The final document could never have been produced to the captain of the ship otherwise than over the signatures of the plenipotentiaries.
Comment on this
I would like to ask one question. We have been here since 11 o'clock this morning, and we have heard a lot of arguments, but I don't know yet what the difference between us is. Are the President and the people who are voting with the President taking the stand on this Treaty, that there should be a Republic or are they taking their stand on this Treaty that there should be something else? I think every member of the Dáil is entitled to know definitely what we are going to vote on. We want to know exactly where we stand and what we are voting for. If we are voting on the question of a Republic we understand the position, but if we are voting for something else we must understand what it is.
Comment on this
We want now to get every document concerning this matter. The Minister of Finance suggested that there were three documents that we should have and I suggest that we should get them without further delay. I also suggest that we should get every bit of correspondence between the delegates and the British Prime Minister. I don't see when we are in private session why anything should be kept back from us. The Minister of Finance suggested this morning that they should consult the British delegation as to whether they should give us those documents. I maintain that we have the right to ask that these documents be submitted to us in secret session. Every member of the Cabinet is bound to submit to the Dáil, and the Dáil is bound to submit to the country, and I demand every single document, private letters and everything else written by any member of the delegation or received by any member of the delegation during the course of the negotiations. I am quite sure that the Dáil will support me in that. We must know where we are. Mr. Milroy suggested that we were not schoolboys or schoolgirls or a debating class. We are here with a full sense of our responsibility and we don't need Mr. Milroy or anyone else to tell us what our responsibility is. I call on the President and on the delegation to produce every document and the crossing of the "t's" and the dotting of the "i's" that has passed on this matter.
Comment on this
Mr. Speaker, I have to explain one point. What I have said this morning has I hope not been deliberately misunderstood, but it has been misunderstood. What I said this morning conveyed this. We as a delegation went into private sittings with the members of the British delegation. Reports were made. We agreed on both sides that these sittings were to be private; we agreed in this sense that there were to be no secretaries taking official notes. I have no intention of breaking my word wherever it was given or whatever it was given for. I have here on this file every document that passed between us, but there were no private letters between any of us and members of the British delegation. Any one of us would not have regarded any such letter as being private from his colleagues at any time.
Comment on this
I never meant that at all. I meant every detail that was submitted to the Cabinet and British delegation must be submitted to us now.
Comment on this
I do claim your protection, Mr. Speaker, for not being interrupted when I am speaking. I think that you ought to give me at least that much consideration. I have suggested that vital documents be produced to the Dáil. I have suggested it because I wanted clear issues. I didn't get any support from any member of the Dáil in that. I suggested it twice and no member of the Dáil suggested that it would be an acceptable thing. I shall read a vital document that was agreed on by the Cabinet, and I shall read them all if you like.
Comment on this
With the permission of the Minister of Finance I suggest that we should have one copy of these three documents before we go into public session to-morrow the statement that the whole Cabinet signed, the agreement that they were willing to accept, the one that they refused made by the British delegation, and the final Treaty so that we can compare the three of them and see where the difference lies.
Comment on this
Not only that, but I have here my own documents which I used at No. 10, Downing Street, with my own notes and changes. I am prepared to go over every word of it. I have no wish to conceal anything and I have never done it. I say these documents are the vital documents and it is only a question of our word given as delegates. I ask the delegation if they thought they were committed to the British delegates in publishing these things. I believe we are not in these final documents but I believe we would want to get their agreement to publish the earlier documents. I for one would be for publishing and giving them to the members of the Dáil. The delegation should think how far they are in honour bound to ask for permission to publish the earlier documents, and we could withdraw now and consider that. I consider we are bound in a few particulars but I do not think we are bound to withhold any kind of publication of the latter documents because they were given under somewhat similar [sic] circumstances from the earlier documents. I only want to make it clear that I have a certain doubt as to whether I am committed to give certain documents without letting the other party know that I am giving it. I have no objection if they are published throughout the world; but for the moment I am in the position of a delegate who agreed we would not do certain things and I want the other delegates to know I am doing it. So long as I am clear on my conscience on that point I don't care. If the other members of the delegation think they were committed to inform them it is for us to decide, and I think at any rate all the delegates ought to withdraw to consider that point, but I am perfectly clear in my own mind that the latter documents were not given under the same conditions as the original ones, and the original ones are really not of vital importance because all the original documents were documents hedging on both sides; you were fencing with them and you were putting in perhaps a problematical point, one that you might get some agreement on, or might be successful in getting some discussion on. Any person who ever took part in negotiations knows that you do such things as that. There is nothing whatever to be concealed not only from the members of the Dáil but from the whole world. We have all the documents to the smallest extent, even to any meeting where one of our couriers went to hand a document or their secretaries handed in a document to us. But without committing members of the delegation I believe that certain documents on this file cannot be disclosed. Every document is here that we handed in, even to the original published correspondence and a copy of every letter that came from the Cabinet to us and went from us to the Cabinet. More than that we have some newspaper cuttings which questions were asked about and an article I wrote myself.
Comment on this
I would like to make one suggestion. It seems to me that the proposal to publish a document or two at random does not get us any further. I would suggest that the right thing to do in order that everybody may understand that the delegation has nothing to hide from the members of the Dáil to go through the whole file and to report what documents they consider vital and to give them over to the Dáil. Some of those documents are vital and some are not. It is perfectly easy to satisfy everyone by appointing a committee from this meeting to go into the documents and to report what documents they consider vital, or in fact if they consider all the documents vital. That would settle the difficulty and bring us down to business.
Comment on this
There is one document which is the really vital document. It is the difference between two sections of the Cabinet. There was a draft treaty prepared at the Cabinet meeting and approved of by all the Cabinet at the Saturday meeting.
Comment on this
No, no. If I might say as chairman of the Cabinet there have been suggestions of some document that was agreed to by the whole Cabinet. I say there is no such document in existence. I had a habit whenever the plenipotentiaries and the Cabinet came together to try as it were to take stock. There were two sections of the Cabinet holding very strong views in different directions as it appeared in the end; but it was absolutely necessary that we should, in order to get what I hoped I could get, a united Cabinet policy, finally step by step take stock. On this Friday on which I was called from Clare Mr. Griffith brought to me a second document. I looked over it and I said, "I will not sign it", because the decision that conveyed to my mind had been taken back weeks before. Next day we had a Cabinet meeting. This document was produced and working all the time as I was from a point of view which had been sanctioned by the whole Ministry that of external association I looked over this and suggested certain changes. I had not the responsibility of drawing up the final wording. I had the responsibility of looking over them when they came up finally. I suggested certain changes. I asked certain other members of the Cabinet what they thought of this or that in the document. Just imagine there was an oath in one of these documents "And the King as head of the State and Empire". I said, "That is impossible; that is not external association; that is inadequate and if there is an oath at all it should run something like this." I dictated verbally a sort of change in this and it was taken down by one member of the plenipotentiaries.
Comment on this
I know it was taken down by one member from my dictation. I never saw that in writing. Now imagine a person talking of assenting to something he had never seen in writing.
Comment on this
Something I suggested by way of change. There is a question for instance of whether we stand for the Republic or not. I said from the start we stood for external association. I was always on for external association. I had to make up my mind whether we would face war. We had either of two things to do, either to surrender and consider it or let them go and wage war against us. With that alternative I took definitely my decision. This is the document and apparently I can see from the suggestions that my sitting down and reading this over and saying. "That won't do", expecting the final document under the instructions number three would come back so that I would read every line of it. The oath is the oath to be taken by the members of Parliament to the Irish Free State. The Irish Free State Saorstát na hÉireann. That originated in this way. When I was over with the British Prime Minister he looked at my notepaper and he said, "You need not change the name of your state". That was very simple for him. So the Irish Republic as a name being repugnant to them it was suggested I think by Mr. Griffith that the Irish Free State was a good name. I never objected to the name. I believe the Irish people had the right to choose their own name. If the name mattered I would have chosen for instance the Free State of Ireland. Even if we were an outside external association it would have the right to choose its own name. Now this is the oath as I saw it: "I solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State and to the Community of Nations known as the British Empire and to the King as the head of the State and Empire". Looking over that and criticising it simply that they might have our views I said, "It is obvious that you cannot have that or anything like 'and the King as head of the State and the Empire'. You could take an oath of true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of Ireland something like 'to be faithful to the Treaty of Association'." I have not a record of it, but something like to be faithful to the Treaty of Association between Ireland and the British Empire, and to recognise the King as head of there was a question of what the name should be, and I said something such as the head of the Association. The first time I saw it I said that it would not do at all. That it might be recognised individually instead of collectively. That document was taken back. It was the last I saw of it, and it was considerably altered; but I expected that any verbal alteration I suggested in that would come back to me in type form and that I would have an opportunity of going over it line by line and saying that if you go on that we won't have a united Cabinet. We took stock in that and I made certain suggestions and we regarded that these principles were pretty well finished. They went back and the next thing I heard was the signed document.
Comment on this
Let us have it. I don't know of anything else. I am trying to find out what the vital document is.
Comment on this
As far as I am concerned the secretary of the delegation has all the copies. Any documents that are there they are at liberty to have them. If the Dáil wants it I will give the whole correspondence and they can see it all.
Comment on this
It is agreed now that we are entitled to a copy of that document which we want. I suggest that copies of that document be printed and circulated to members before to-morrow morning.
Comment on this
We sent the delegation over with a draft treaty, marked A.A. I expected a whole series of changes from A to Z and the thing they took over to-day might be changed in an hour and turned into quite a new document. Surely a fight that has lasted for 750 years and negotiations that have lasted six months could have lasted for another couple of hours to get satisfied.
Comment on this
Let a committee be appointed to investigate the documents, leave them before us but not to take documents out of their places and simply [sic.], by leading us into a wilderness.
1. In another copy the word "simplify" and not "simply" appears.
Comment on this
I think the one document that is wanted is the last document handed to the plenipotentiaries at the Cabinet meeting.
Comment on this
I say there was none. It is nonsense. There was no such document from the Dáil. I was expecting to get the thing back in a form in which I could go over it.
Comment on this
There was a document given on the 18th November. We have not suggested that there was a formal agreement at the Cabinet. I said at the delegation meeting that we had to come to certain decisions promptly, and I said the document handed in gave a faithful impression of what was our view and what was the view of a united Cabinet. On the 18th November a document was handed in which I propose to read.
Comment on this
I object to this burking of the discussion. We want this document of the 18th November which was before the document produced.
Comment on this
A statement has been made that this document of the 18th November was before the Cabinet for a fortnight.
Comment on this
It is in the matter discussed by the President that I wish to say a few words. There was a statement made by the Minister for Finance and I understand controverted by the President, and it is on that I wish to speak.
Comment on this
I think my motion that the particular document which Mr. Collins wishes to read now is the one prepared [recte proposed].
Comment on this
I have ruled that the motion before the House is that a committee be appointed to examine the documents, and you will take a decision on that motion.
Comment on this
I put that motion that the committee be appointed to report what documents should be disclosed by [recte to] the Dáil.
Comment on this
When that motion is carried does it debar the Minister of Finance from reading his afterwards.
Comment on this
No. It is now moved by Mr. Gavan Duffy, and seconded by Mr. O'Kelly, "That a Select Committee shall be appointed before which the documents and correspondence shall be laid and that it be their duty to report to Dáil and supply An Dáil with a copy of any documents considered vital".
The motion was carried unanimously.
Comment on this
It would be necessary for that committee to know what the Cabinet said about these documents. Now, for instance I was talking a moment ago of one document here
Comment on this
I still insist on my right to say that it has been said that a certain document was taken back and was practically passed by the Cabinet. I say there was no document taken back and passed by the Cabinet in that way. At the Cabinet meeting I got a certain document and I passed certain criticisms on that. I now ask also that I be allowed to speak. I have served every one as well as I can and I think the time has come at least when I should get a certain amount of respect from certain members of the Dáil (applause).
Comment on this
I think it is very unfair for the President to say that about me. He knows there is no one in Ireland has more respect for him than I have. I think that now when a decision is arrived at that he should not try to influence the committee by saying what documents ought to be brought forward.
Comment on this
It does not matter. The President has a right to influence the committee if he wishes.
Comment on this
I want nothing other than that every member here should know truth and the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Comment on this
I ask whether the Cabinet minutes became a real minute until they were approved and signed.
Comment on this
I say there is never a case where a Cabinet's minutes, to my knowledge, has been brought before me to sign for the simple reason that they are left to the secretary as a kind of record of what happened. They are sent out then sometimes to Ministers as Cabinet decisions if orders are given.
Comment on this
I say they are a record. A rough summary of what the secretary thinks has taken place. He is an independent witness. I have found him to be a magnificent independent witness; but the Cabinet minutes are not minutes in the proper sense. The minutes of an assembly are supposed to be things that each member who is present stands by. You cannot stand by a thing when you don't know what is written in it. If the Cabinet minutes are accepted I want to know whether these Cabinet minutes agree with what I think took place. At no time has this matter been brought up before us. I make my proposition to this committee which is to investigate the documents and it is that a long series of documents may be very interesting, but they will mean nothing as far as this controversy is concerned. The real point which has to be settled is whether a certain document which was taken back to London was an agreed document. I say that there was nothing in type that I ever saw taken back to London that represented my views. There were certain verbal things and there is a document here which might be the one and which so far as I can see would represent fairly accurately what I would not break on. If I have such a document under this article 3 of the instructions I would go over it with my pen and make alterations that I would be willing to stand by. I spent a portion of last night drawing up a document very like this except some objectionable things in this have been eliminated. If this were the proposed and signed thing I would not be on the opposite side.
Comment on this
I have got the right to see if this document represents my views. There are two different views on it.
Comment on this
We have got to see that. This controversy is painful to me because I have never engaged in anything of the sort and it would never have occurred if the document had been submitted to me before it was signed because we would have a definite written protest against it. As regards this document here of December 4th I would ask the secretary of the delegation to say definitely what his impression is with respect to the history of it.
Comment on this
I must object. We must get in order some way or the other. When the Minister of Finance attempts to read a document he is howled down.
Comment on this
I hope there are no two differences in this Dáil yet. Now there is evident heat on both sides of our Cabinet. They are our Cabinet still, but we are their masters and if they don't conduct themselves I am telling you this that if we don't conduct ourselves the Irish people will make us. I feel for the President I know he is over-worked and I feel for the delegates I know they too are over-worked; but I would appeal now for coolness and drop this what I call in common language snarling and don't be giving the common people of the Dáil a bad example. If you proceed in the regular way we will get on nicely and I hope with the good judgement of all the members of this Dáil that we will settle this little difference and don't open the breach but let us try and close it.
Comment on this
As a result of the motion that has been passed would you ask for the appointment of that committee and let all the documents and minutes be put at their disposal to clarify their minds and to assist us in clarifying ours. I ask you to insist on this being carried out.
Comment on this
I would like to suggest that the minutes be not put in as minutes till we form a war Cabinet. I would not call a minute a minute until it was re-read at the next meeting and signed by the chairman. Put them in as secretary's notes and I will agree.
Comment on this
I think a member of the Cabinet has at least some right in an assembly like this. Shortly, what happened was this: when the Cabinet met at 12 o'clock on Saturday they perused the instrument which the British Government were prepared to adopt. The Cabinet met at 12 and adjourned at 1.30. They met again at three and adjourned at seven. I think I spoke at 6.30 and at that time I said I won't take that oath; the delegation asked what would they put in instead and the President said substitute your own. I felt then that the delegation did not get justice from us. They were in the heat and thick of controversy with a British delegation in close touch with their own Cabinet, while they were 24 hours from ours. They could not possibly get back the views of the other members of the Cabinet to be in time for the discussion on the matter before them. I will go further and say I believe the President, with all due respect to him, and the Minister for Finance are both wrong when they say the Dáil was not committed to the terms signed by them. The plenipotentiaries have committed the Dáil by reason of their action according to a point of law.
Comment on this
They have not treated you as a nation. Southern Ireland is the term they themselves say.
Comment on this
I did not interrupt the President although there has been no one who violated the order of debate more than the President. Plenipotentiaries were appointed by the Dáil, but plenipotentiaries were unfortunately not appointed by the English Parliament. That was not an accident on their part. It is unfortunate no one knew the precise international law governing the matter at the time. The point made by the President regarding the President of America is not analogous. The President of America was not a plenipotentiary in the sense that our plenipotentiaries were. They were part and parcel of the assembly that sent them there. As far as the Cabinet is concerned I never got any interpretation of international law on the subject. I have made the other two points clear as I understand them and as I believe occurred.
Comment on this
Is there any necessity for ratification when the Treaty is now a fact according to international law?
Comment on this
I am glad that question has been put to me. There is a motion that a committee be appointed. The motion is not that I appoint a committee. Will some member move the appointment of the committee?
Comment on this
I propose Professor Stockley, Miss Mary MacSwiney, Dr. MacCartan, Micheál Ó hAodha, Kevin O'Higgins.
Comment on this
I suggested one representative of the two different points of view be appointed to assist the committee.
Comment on this
then moved that Professor Stockley, Miss MacSwiney, Micheál Ó hAodha, Dr. MacCartan, P. Hogan be appointed as a committee.
Comment on this
I would like one thing we are just getting the discussion into a way that it is going to confuse the real issue and creating suspicions in the mind of every member of the Dáil. I would not like any suspicion to arise. To make things clear perhaps the Minister of Finance or the Minister for Foreign Affairs would tell us of the contents of the document or read it.
THE SPEAKER put the motion to the House and declared it carried.
Comment on this
Who is to supply the documents? I take it the Secretary of the delegation, and checked either by the chairman or the Minister of Finance. I have the letters passed between the delegation chairman and myself and I am quite ready if the chairman is agreeable that they should be made available for the Dáil.
Comment on this
Instead of heated discussion across the floor of this House I think we should consider how we will conduct the public meeting. I wish we could conduct it in the same spirit as the proceedings this afternoon. The President says he intends to discuss an alternative. I would like that the whole situation be discussed as we shall approach it to-morrow, and not appear to-morrow as we did to-day without knowing what we are going to say or likely to say.
Comment on this
There are some things we should like discussed in private session. The Headquarters Staff of the Army may have some statements to make and the Minister of Finance may have something to say. I would not like Michael Collins saying in public session that he signed this document in the full knowledge that the I.R.A. were not fit to continue the war or something like that. We should rather he make it now before the public session.
Comment on this
Mr. Speaker, apparently I am going to be hanged without even a chance of speaking. Whatever else does happen it is obvious to every member here that I may have a case to put yet. I have not stood up once this day without being interrupted. Let the members of the Dáil say it is fair and I am satisfied. Surely it is not fair.
MR. J.J. O'KELLY rose to speak and there were cries of "Order, order".