DEBATE ON TREATY RESUMED
Contributions 150–295 of 295. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I still cannot rise without interruption. There is no other assembly in the world where a member on equal terms with the others would be consistently interrupted each time he got up. It is not the position that would appeal to people with public representatives. I think it would be a very much better indication of good faith if the members who have interrupted might refrain and put themselves under that much restraint while I am speaking. I cannot believe it will do them any real good. Surely most of you will admit I am not getting a chance. Our [recte On the] question of submitting the documents to a committee I don't believe they will have concluded in time for the morning. There is one finance memo alone took a committee of experts several days to prepare. It is a vital document. There are many other documents but they are not vital in the main issue. If the committee does not get to work at once they will not be ready for the public session in the morning. Anything I have to say will have to be said in public. I have been put in this position that I will have to appeal from the unfairness of the Dáil to that decent body the general public.
Comment on this
The President spoke about the publication of these documents. These documents cannot be published without the consent of the other side. That was the agreement from beginning to end of the conference.
Comment on this
I left it altogether to the delegation. What they do is altogether a matter for the delegation. I don't suggest publicity outside so far as I am concerned.
Comment on this
I think we are rather talking at loggerheads. Regarding this private session we want to get over any difficulty that might cause a difference of opinion to members of the Cabinet without giving unnecessary details to the public. Moreover, the Treaty being signed may have been influenced by the state of the army or of the exchequer. Therefore if we are going to talk over the why and wherefore of the Treaty's being signed it is inevitable these questions should come up. Instead, however, of getting down to fundamentals we have been talking around the question. A few moments ago I asked for every document and the Minister of Finance thought I was finding fault with him. If that is so he must have misunderstood me. I am sorry but I meant absolutely no reflection on him. I asked for 3 vital documents, but with regard to the finance document which took several days I suggest that for another day. I submit this matter altogether if giving up the documents can be cleared up as between the President and the chairman of the delegation. We want to have these undercurrents swept away. We want to be as one if we can. I do not know if any proposal was handed to the delegation or not. It might be possible a project was made that many could accept and I could not. I am a doctrinaire republican if you like. The point at issue is to get the necessary documents. That will stop the President from saying the other side were unfair and the other side from saying the President was unfair. That is most unworthy of this Assembly. We are led to understand that the delegation came back after doing a certain thing they were not empowered to do. That is the suggestion of the President; if not actually suggested he went very close to it. If the President is wrong then it is for the Dáil to reprove him if they think fit. We want to see the documents to prevent this blaming of one side by the other. If we go back to war again and I am afraid we shall have to then matters relating to the army and finance must be discussed in private. Better to postpone to-morrow's public session till 3 o'clock and if we can't meet then postpone the public session to the morning. I want the documents which are of importance in the acceptance or refusal of this Treaty.
Comment on this
Miss MacSwiney's point of view is absolutely correct. We are not asking the committee to go through all the documents relating to the Treaty but the documents necessary to find out the relations between our own Cabinet and the delegation.
Comment on this
We meet here in order to transact the affairs of the country at a time of crisis, but this meeting has changed into the aspect of a trial or impeachment of certain persons for what has taken place in the past. Is this true or is it not?
Comment on this
I can clear up one point. I am a member of the Cabinet and the delegation. There was no agreed document between the Cabinet and the delegation. At a Cabinet meeting we discussed a document and the members of the delegation went back to London with certain personal impressions from that discussion. There was no agreed written statement. The members of the delegation in London differed themselves as to the interpretation or impression they took away from the discussion.
Comment on this
The thing we are discussing is whether this Treaty is acceptable to the country or not. With all respect to the members of the Cabinet if they are not prepared to fight we can chuck them out and appoint a new Cabinet. We are doing damn all.
Comment on this
This is the most painful experience I have ever had in my life. I was compelled to make a public statement with reference to the Treaty because everybody would assume that the plenipotentiaries and the Cabinet would be in agreement if I did not. The matter would have gone by default and it would have appeared that we would have all agreed that this was an acceptable Treaty. It was not acceptable to me as one. The suggestion that I also would have accepted that document was based on my own attitude which is an independent one in the Cabinet. I have my own view. I stated I went to get peace that we could all stand by. A final document was brought over to us on Saturday. I believe if the document was altered in a certain way it could be made the basis of an agreement which could be accepted by all. That I do not say was the opinion of all the Cabinet. I misled nobody. There was no doubt as to what my position on fundamentals was.
Comment on this
We cannot change one comma of the Treaty. We must ratify or reject it. There was a document discussed on Saturday which formed the basis of a treaty. That discussion took place in the Cabinet and our plenipotentiaries went back and put in an alternative to that which would command approval of a unanimous Cabinet. It is true that a united Cabinet was prepared to recommend to you a settlement which would give Ireland an external association with the British Empire, involving the King of England as head of the States, and voting an annual contribution to his Civil List.
Comment on this
I would like to ask the chairman of the delegation four questions. He mentioned in his statement that there were other points he wished to exchange for the Crown and inclusion in the Empire. No. 1 is this, What were the points that the chairman of delegation said he would want in exchange for the Crown and inclusion in the Empire? No. 2. Does the chairman of the delegation agree that he gave an undertaking to the Cabinet that he would not sign the Treaty before submitting it to the Dáil? No. 3. Was the chairman of the delegation aware that the English Prime Minister intended sending the letter of [recte to] Sir James Craig on the 5th instant; and if so did the plenipotentiaries sign under duress? No. 4, Are we to understand in view of the statement of the Assistant Secretary for Local Government that the delegates drew up wholly or in part the clauses referring to the partition of Ireland?
Comment on this
I will answer those if Mr. MacDonagh will pass them over. Since this issue has been put before the people it has been represented as one between a Republic and what we have secured. That is a false issue. From the official note of the Cabinet meeting of November 25th it is agreed that Ireland should recognise for the purposes of association, the group of states making up the British Commonwealth, and that a sum be voted annually to the King's Civil List as head of that group. So that the choice is between what we have signed, and what the Cabinet were prepared to accept and in which they were willing to recognise the Crown and vote sums to the Civil List.
Comment on this
To make my point clear I drew up proposals which I would submit to-morrow and which I was prepared to stand by. There was a question of either a make or a break, and in case they had broken we would have published our proposals as counter-proposals. I had intended to propose in the Dáil articles of agreement as an amendment to the proposed Treaty and give them to you for acceptance. They represented the distance to which we could go. We were prepared to accept external association recognising King George as head of the group with no reference to Ireland. Further, that we could give him a sum for such services as he rendered as head of the group. I, for one, would be prepared to give him that. If you have a managing director of a group there is no reason why one member of the group did not give him a contribution. We here would be well rid of him at that price. The difference between us is this. On one case we have the King as King of Ireland, and the Irish Ministers as His Majesty's Ministers. In the other case you would not. In the first case you were prepared to accept the King of Great Britain as King of Ireland, under promise to keep faith with him as if he had a national right to expect faith from you. I would have been prepared to sign a document which would make Ireland an external associated State of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not a new idea, but an old idea with us from the very start. The meaning precisely of such an agreement would be this: we are not part of the British Commonwealth but we would have the right to enter into a League of Nations and, if we wanted to, into association with France and England and other nations of the League. If England, Spain and France formed themselves into a group they could recognise the King of Spain as head of the group, but the President of France would not be head of the state and the people of Spain would owe no allegiance to the President of France. By accepting the King of England as head of such group it meant a thing which you could do and a thing which you cannot do without sacrificing your independence. It would be ultra vires as a matter of fact to pass the motion to-morrow. It would be ultra vires to ratify the motion because it is absolutely outside our power, or the power of any Irish Parliament to vote away the independence of the country. We were elected to be guardians of the independence of the country. We were not elected to change the form of government by swallowing this Treaty, and then handing over the government of this State to a foreign head. If you do, it will be a nullity. Either as a political party, or as we are the Parliament of this nation, you can't do it; and if I were a President like the President of America I would deal with any government [that] put up such as that as a usurpation and use all the army at my command to prevent it until the people had decided for themselves to change their form of Government. This Dáil can do other things, but it cannot ratify this Treaty. It can do as the British Parliament is doing. You can pass a resolution if you like recommending it to the Irish people but you cannot accept it (?) until you refer it to the Irish people. I have got here the proclamation of the last election. It might be said there was some excuse for the action of the First Dáil. But after that they had a General Election and I was asked, and I said to the people that they were voting for nothing less than the substance of freedom, and they were voting for nothing less than the legitimate choice of the people the Republic established by the vote of the people. Ratification is disestablishment, is handing over power to another country of which we here are the guardians. The treaty we are prepared to sign is a treaty consistent with our independence. This is not consistent with our independent state. In paragraph 2 put in it was stated our representatives can only treat with you as representatives of a foreign state. They had to swallow it to the extent and they were forced not to make us say we were the representatives of a mere political party or what Mr. Lloyd George says an assembly of the elected representatives of Southern Ireland. It is not Dáil Éireann, thank God. The country will be spared the dishonour of an assembly like this voting definitely away the power which was given them, of voting away their birthright. They can't do it. That's why I object.
Comment on this
To-morrow I intend to move that you cannot ratify this Treaty. It is ultra vires to move definitely a resolution of ratification as a legal instrument. If you did it would be nullity. If the chairman of the delegation agrees to move a resolution that you recommend it to the Irish people you can do it but you cannot pass an act of ratification. There is a big difference between them. If the chairman of the delegation moves the ratification I will oppose him, and I will substitute that which I am ready to stand by. It is simply this, I am trying to recover ground that was lost. My proposition is this that you unanimously stand behind this agreed document and that we offer this to the people of Britain as a basis for lasting friendship. It is right to say that there will be very little difference in practice between what I may call the proposals received and what you will have under what I propose. There is very little in practice but there is that big thing that you are consistent and that you recognise yourself as a separate independent State and you associate in an honourable manner with another group. You enter an association in which the King of Britain is not King of Ireland, the armies of Ireland are not His Majesty's forces, and the Ministers not His Majesty's Ministers but Ministers of the Irish nation also.
Comment on this
President de Valera says that the Dáil cannot consider even the ratification, yet on the official agenda of the Dáil we have here issued under the President's authority a motion for the ratification of the Treaty. This must be out of order. We want a proper direction. We should have a ruling as to which is right, this document issued under the authority of the Dáil Cabinet or President de Valera.
Comment on this
We are meeting and speaking to absolutely no purpose. It would be far better if our Cabinet put something before us such as the President's proposition to avoid a discussion in such a form as would disturb the general temper of the meeting. The fact before the country really is this: that they are more afraid of a split amongst us here than they are afraid really of war. If we continue in the way in which we are speaking now we will do no work to-night. We have already set up a committee to look into this question of documents. I suggest that having regard to the possibility of a split that the Dáil appoint a small committee on whom we could place the onus that even if we do not meet to-morrow in public session that we shall not scatter from this meeting without making that body responsible as a liaison or arbitration body, to act between the opposing sections of the Cabinet. One thing such a body could do this evening, with the President and chairman of the delegation, they might settle what work we can usefully do in private session. They could clearly define what aspects of this Treaty and the present situation will come before us in public session and let us know in private session.
Comment on this
I do not wish to impose my views on the Dáil, but without something being defined as to what we are going to talk about we are getting further along that road of ill-feeling we have been travelling. It is for the general body of the Dáil to pick somebody to hold the reins between the two sections of the Cabinet.
Comment on this
I would like to lay stress very strongly on what the Chief of Staff said about the danger of a split. I think we have been talking round and round the subject. I would like to give you, as one of what you may like to call the die-hards of the Dáil, my opinion from beginning to end about this conference. It has been said to me that I was either a fool or wilfully blind if I did not see that entering into that conference gave away our whole case, and that the sending of delegates to London meant a compromise. I was some time in America and the very day I arrived back in Dublin I was struck by the atmosphere of compromise. I was told the Republican ideal was given up. I was told the President on the first day he went to meet Lloyd George gave up the idea. I very well contradicted it. I will give you my impressions of what that conference meant. Nobody has ever so gravely told the people of the evils of propaganda than Mr. Arthur Griffith. He told us England put a paper wall around this country, and on the inside she told Ireland what she wanted us to believe about the world, and on the outside she told the world what she wished the world to believe about us. He has told us of the evils of British propaganda. I don't think anyone in Ireland was more cognisant of this evil than Arthur Griffith. The first great rend in that wall was my brother's suffering and death in Brixton, and next to that the greatest thing done for Ireland was this conference. Not because it signified compromise, but because it tore the last remnants of the paper wall from the face of the world and let us see each other. I never believed we could get recognition of our Republic from this conference. I did not vote for delegates going there with any ridiculous dream that Lloyd George would say straight away, "Take your Republic and God bless you". But I thought it possible Lloyd George would realise that it is better to have Ireland as a friend. I realised we would have to give up something. I thought very naturally England would fear our proximity to her, and that we might have to make defensive alliances for one. I would not ask the country to refuse even if they had to give an offensive alliance, to be done for ever with Great Britain. On one thing we determined, that was that we would not give way on allegiance, or partition of our forces. I want to say, that even with my die-hard proclivities, we could to-morrow drag him another bit than to-day and go on until you brought him to the pitch our delegates brought him last Monday night. When you had brought him to the last ounce and he refused to go to the limit which was the lowest limit we could take then say, "Very well I go home and put it to my Dáil." I do think they were guilty of weakness but I don't think they were guilty of dishonour. Nobody should say so. They did not mean to be dishonourable. They felt that [they] had to choose and choose within half an hour, and the only thing is that they chose the weak instead of the strong thing. But I do think it is a wrong thing to say an insult to say that when they were sent to London they were sent to compromise. They were not. The Minister of Finance read a document to-day; it was practically their credentials, the credentials to the plenipotentiaries from the Government of the Irish Republic. The President speaking in the Dáil yesterday about the oath to do the best he could for Ireland. He made other remarks which we can only regard as signs of weakness on his part. We were a body of about 120 and I defy any body of 120 to keep their mouths shut as closely as they ought. I have openly stated that the terms of reference were inside an Irish Republic and it would have leaked out and Lloyd George would have refused a conference. But everything we have gained seems to have gone in flash. First in going into the conference we did not compromise. On the day we appointed those plenipotentiaries I spoke and I said there was an air of compromise both outside and from inside the Dáil. I said any man who meant to compromise should speak then or forever hold his peace. Every one who votes for the passing of this Treaty acts dishonourably if he did not speak that day. I do not believe it was wrong to send those delegates. I do not believe I compromised my principles in so doing because it was a magnificent piece of strategy to draw the attention of the whole world on our cause. I believe on last Monday when Lloyd George bluffed our delegates at 3 o'clock in the morning they did not believe it was bluff. At 3 o'clock in the morning one's brain is very very tired. We know and they know now that they were bluffed. When he said to them at 3 o'clock, "You will sign or we will declare war", they should have said, "Very well do your worst". He said we are not sorry to sign we will have to submit it to Dáil Éireann [sic]. They think the thing they have brought back to us is a good thing. It might have been five years ago if it were brought to any one of us then. Though we might not have taken the oath we might not have thought it dishonourable, but after January 1919 no man having sworn an oath to the Republic can withdraw from it. What have we small nations but our honour? We can't fight big nations physically; we can fight, as has been proved, treachery or intrigue only beat them by standing out honourably. How can anyone of us swear you will be faithful to George V unless you owe him faith? But you have absolutely no right to say that by sending plenipotentiaries and [sic] we hamper ourselves and the Dáil. I want to make my position clear. On the point of order
Comment on this
On the point of order no one has a right to stand up and denounce this Treaty without formally moving a rejection.
Comment on this
All I want to say is that there was no compromise meant by sending those delegates to London because a suggestion has been thrown around to [recte that] the President as leader compromised. You did not swear your oath to the President but to the Republic. When you sent the delegates to London you didn't send them to compromise. That did not directly or indirectly involve a compromise. We believe it would show the world the justice of our case. If England was prepared to go a certain distance there was no reason why she should not go the rest. Moreover, look at the effect of it: you have got out of prison men condemned to death for murder and those who were called leaders of the murder gang in Ireland sat at the same table with the British Prime Minister on equal terms. If we have gained nothing else we have won a magnificent victory. We won much, we lost a lot of it when the Treaty was brought back before the world.
There was a lot of talk when the Treaty was brought back, but if we present to the world to-morrow a united front then the country will follow us. I think those who put before themselves a measure of expediency should ask themselves is it worth while sacrificing expediency. If they declared war on us to-morrow we are not a bit worse off than we were six months ago. For God's sake and the sake of the dead let us keep together. We who stand for principle cannot give in to you who stand for expediency, and expediency can always give way to principle. Therefore, if there is to be a split, it is because you who stand for expediency have accepted something which we who stand for principle cannot give way. If there is a split the evils of that split will be on your shoulders not ours. It is for you to come up to our standards; not we to come down to yours. Therefore I would ask the signatories to submit to the decision of Dáil Éireann. We may have a united front then and the people will come after. If we put it to the people to-morrow a lot, perhaps the majority, would accept. Cannot you remember what we were told about the slave mind? Can you not realise the slave mind it took a 100 years to create, it will require a few years of freedom to bring us back. Our people are still of the slave mind, but they will do what we ask them to do. It is for you therefore who think of compromising or mean to, to speak out and you will have the country behind you. I would oppose sending delegates if it meant compromise. You did not answer my challenge on 14th September; not one of you who believed this meant compromise spoke; therefore it's your bounden duty not to split the country now.
Comment on this
In my opinion no good purpose is served by making speeches in the private session that can be made in the public session. I, as one of the signatories, will state my position to-morrow; it is the least compromising position in all Ireland. I suggest it is only waste of time making speeches that can be made in public session.
Comment on this
I have a suggestion to make: it is that you appoint a committee from the rank and file to consider this division in the Cabinet, and see if we could not get any way out of it to maintain unanimity. I suggest the rank and file of the House exclude all the members of the Cabinet (laughter); that the Speaker summon this meeting immediately after tea to evolve some programme, or some modus vivendi or operandi that will save us from the disedifying scene witnessed this morning. I believe if the rank and file get together they will furnish as much brains in the assembly as there is in the Cabinet (laughter and applause). I believe they will discuss the matters in dispute in a much more decorous fashion than at present. I will move that a private meeting of the rank and file be held after tea, and that the Cabinet and everyone be excluded.
Comment on this
If it is not a Dáil meeting it is not for me to have anything to do with the convening of it. The motion before the House is that a committee be formed to accept the responsibility for acting as a liaison committee between the two sections of the Cabinet, with a view to defining what work may usefully be transacted in the private session and to decide what issue will face us in the public session.
Comment on this
I hold that is quite unconstitutional. We have a Parliament now and we cannot resolve ourselves in [recte into] a political party. I am here as President until you remove me. There will be no other Cabinet as long as I am here or else I will be a private member. I am in charge and if you wish to remove me well done, but so long as I am in charge no man will come in and order me about.
Comment on this
The President has indicated that he is going to make certain proposals in connection with to-morrow's meeting. I think we should have them in writing.
Comment on this
I was going to make proposals to recover the ground that was lost, which I wished to make in private session. I am trying to retrieve the position. I spent last night getting these proposals together. If we could modify them to get something that would be purely unanimous as a counter proposal, I believe we'll win with this thing. We'll do the something we would have done if there was a break. If there was a break I would have published counter-proposals to theirs. They will not go to war for the difference. The one is a thing the Republic can do, and the other is a thing we can't do.
Comment on this
This meeting is summoned here to reject or endorse this Treaty and there is no third course open. The British Parliament has either to accept or reject it. Everybody here is going to vote one way or the other. We took your responsibility and you must take ours.
Comment on this
Mr. MacDonagh has handed me four questions. The first one is, "What were the points the chairman of the delegation said he would want in exchange for the Crown and inclusion in the Empire?" The answer is trade, principle of defence, alteration of the oath and partly Ulster. (2) "Does the chairman of the delegation agree that he gave an undertaking to the Cabinet that he would not sign the Treaty before submitting it to the Dáil?" No. The chairman of the delegation gave an undertaking to President de Valera and Cathal Brugha that he would not sign the document he had with them. He also told them before signing he would try to get back to the Dáil.
Addressing Mr. MacDonagh, Mr. Griffith said in reply to an interruption, "I know you very well, Mr. MacDonagh. I am answering your question straight."
(3) "Was the chairman of the delegation aware that the English Prime Minister intended sending the letter to Sir James Craig on the 5th instant and if so did the plenipotentiaries sign under duress?"
I was aware he proposed sending a letter on the 5th instant. I think he could have held it back for a week or so. I would not have signed without bringing it to the Dáil, if I could have brought it here. But I would have recommended and in the sense I did sign under duress.
(4) "Are we to understand in view of the statement of the Assistant Secretary for Local Government that the delegates drew up wholly or in part the clauses referring to the partition of Ireland?" I don't quite understand that we drew anything up. They drew them up. We altered some of them at the last moment.
The House adjourned for tea at 6.30 p.m.
On resuming at 7.25 p.m. on Wednesday, the Speaker said:
Comment on this
In resuming the business a difficulty is when you resolved yourself into a private session we had no regular agenda and the result has been that the discussion has been rather desultory and not directed to any particular point. It was understood before we went into a private session that the business was to discuss certain definite aspects of the question before us which were better discussed at a private session and these aspects have not been brought before us in any regular form by any one up to the present. I am now going to ask that in entering upon any portion of the discussion the members should commence by sending to me notice of the particular subject which they wish to bring under discussion and I will take these subjects in order. I would like those who wish to speak in future to keep that in view. What you wish to speak about concerning a private session put it down and bring it to me and I will put those subjects before you in the best order I can. Mr. Barton has proposed to make a statement on the reason for his signing the Treaty. That is one subject which I suppose in his judgement is best stated in a private session. Mr. Gavan Duffy has proposed for discussion the following two matters: (1) That the public session be postponed till Friday. (2) To correct the statement that the proposed Irish Constitution will be created by a Dominion Act.
Comment on this
I would like to ask you one question about the committee appointed to go into the documents as I understand they have come together.
Comment on this
What I want to know is this we have wasted practically all day. I believe we have wasted half-a-day. We adjourned into a private session to discuss certain things. The plea put forward was that there were certain things which should not be discussed in public and that several of us wanted information about finances, about the military strength and otherwise. There has not been a question asked the Minister of Finance about finance. There has not been a question asked the Minister of Defence about the army. We have been talking all day. Anything we have discussed could as easily have been discussed without any advantage to the enemy in public session. There has not been one single question about finance or the army asked. I propose now that the matters for the private session be confined to subject which would be of advantage to the enemy if they were made public.
Comment on this
I believe Mr. Barton is going to make a statement that may lead to statements for or against the Treaty by the general body of members. If any such statements are to be made they are to be reserved to the proper time and place and not be taking up the time of the private session.
Comment on this
I don't think it is right to suggest that. I have already asked that the Chief of Staff would make a brief report on the state of the army in the case of war; secondly, that the Minister of Finance be asked to make a brief report on our present finances.
Comment on this
Perhaps Mr. Seán T. O'Kelly would include a request from the Minister of Economics with regard to the position of the country.
Comment on this
I could probably save a lot of time if he would indicate what I should give in the report. Naturally, I can't say off-hand what we could do and naturally I can't refer at all to future arrangements without giving an opinion which perhaps some people would regard prejudiced opinion. I can have a statement on short notice as to our present liabilities and how what money we have is committed and what balance we have. That is a matter of detail in which I have to get my staff to assist me as I didn't know the request was to be made. I get a weekly statement for myself. I can't now at this hour of the evening get the last week's statement which by referring to I could indicate the position very briefly. In reality there is nothing that need not be public about that. But for the purpose of a public session it need not be referred to at all. I can say off-hand for instance that we have something about £200,000 odd on deposit receipt or held under some scheme of deposit receipt here in Ireland. I could not say the exact amount off-hand because naturally for the past couple of months I have not been able to give my personal attention to matters of detail that I did give when I was here in Ireland, although every time I came over I had some consultation with my financial people here. Now it would probably be wise for me to refer to the question of holding of the money in future and the question of future loans. I am just making a little statement which would give the members a chance of seeing what they want. If it is in the mind of any member to raise a question as to what I thought of the future loans I would have to take conceivable circumstances into account. That would be only my opinion and it may be a prejudiced decision. If the few Deputies who mentioned the financial position indicated what lines I could go on I could have a statement pretty early in the morning.
Comment on this
I didn't ask any question about finance or anything else. The plea was put forward that we should have a private session because some members wanted to know about finance and other questions. We have not discussed any of them to-day and I propose that we confine ourselves to these questions.
Comment on this
It will save probably a number of other questions if I say I heard it suggested by somebody to-day that perhaps it had relation to the possible amount of money that was due by England to Ireland. If that is suggested I can only refer any Deputy to the secretary of the delegation because our whole financial case is contained in a memorandum put forward which as mentioned by me to-day is of very vital importance. It took a great deal of time to prepare. Assuming that you are going into arbitration with Great Britain this document on finance handed in would be the basis of a claim and the claim I may say against England is put at the figure of £3,000,000,000.¹ If anybody is going to put it higher than that
1. In another copy the figure £3,000,000 is given.
Comment on this
With regard to the army if any Deputy here has any question to ask let him ask the question and I will give the answers to-morrow. The only statement at present in my possession is a general statement. We have a very efficient Headquarters staff, each man of which has a certain section to look after and being efficient and patriotic men and each doing his best for the Republic you may take it for granted that we are in a much better position to fight now than when the Truce started.
Comment on this
I submit the question relates to the army department and not to the Minister for Defence. One of the questions would be how far the army was affected by those disagreements in the Cabinet. I was approached by a member of the I.R.A. as I came here to-day and told if I voted for that Treaty I would be shot.
Comment on this
You may take it that the army regard themselves as soldiers and will abide the decision.
Comment on this
With regard to the question raised by Deputy Fahy, I may state that Deputies from Cork City and County were presented with an order from the Headquarters staff of South, namely, that if we didn't vote for the rejection of the Treaty we were guilty of treason to the Republic and presumably the consequences were about the same, even that we would not be given a trial. We can presume what the consequences would be. Now it is desirable I think that the Minister of Defence would answer the question as to how far the divisions in the Cabinet which I still maintain are not divisions in the Dáil as yet how far those divisions are affecting the army and if the Cabinet as the responsible government of the Republic have really taken into consideration the effect of their action on the army. The question from the South is most pertinent in this case and it is most important for the Minister of Defence to consider this and give an answer to us who are threatened to be shot like dogs if we take a certain action here. Whether we take that action or not I think should be a matter for our consciences. It is serious I should think for the army that these divisions in the Cabinet are permeating the army already and we should like an answer to that.
Comment on this
As one Deputy from the South who has also received that notice I must say that I got it. Whatever I think of the wisdom of sending it I don't think it was meant in the same way as Mr. de Róiste says. The distinction made this morning was, I take it, that we were elected definitely for a Republic and in consequence our constituents are at perfect liberty to tell us what they think. We are told that the First Southern Division sent up to Headquarters a demand for the rejection of the Treaty proposal. It was for the Headquarters to say whether that was exceeding their powers; secondly, we were told it was our duty to accede to this demand; that to act otherwise would be treason to the Republic. I don't think there is a threat to be shot in that. We would want to remember that we are a nation but an infant nation and as I have already spoken in this assembly on a former date about the analogy of our case with America, I tell the members of this Dáil now that a similar situation arose in America in 1778. And Washington and the army said the country was not to weaken and if the army does the same to-day God bless them.
Comment on this
It is an extraordinary thing first to deny a thing and then to justify it. I got that notice. It is a definite threat that I would be shot if I do a certain thing. I do not raise it from a personal point of view because it does not matter to me in the least. Any vote I have to give will be given on the merits of the case and actuated solely by the dictates of my conscience. The point is, the question raises the extent to which the army as a whole has been affected. I don't think it has appeared in the Dublin press I read it in the Cork papers to-day there is quite a feature made of a report of a meeting of the Brigade Commandants of Dublin announcing a decision that was arrived at by the majority to follow Mr. Griffith. That I think can further indicate the tendency of the army. I raise this to impress upon the Cabinet as a whole, to impress upon them the danger to the army of their present differences. I have already written to the officer from whom I received it to that effect. It does not matter to me a bit.
Comment on this
The threat is not confined to one side and it is a serious thing that the Minister for Defence will have to consider; as Minister for Defence he is responsible to the Dáil and he is responsible for the discipline of his army and his chiefs of staff and I say to him that now is the time for him to put strict disciplinary measures into the chiefs of staff because no matter what Government remains in power here we can't have an army divided and furthermore it is scandalous that there should be sides taken, and some of the principal men, not alone have they sent parties around the country trying to influence members of this Dáil but they are using sinister threats outside. It is not confined to either side. It is for you, Mr. Brugha, to say that the army responsible to you and you to this Dáil that they act loyally to this Government and to nothing else.
Comment on this
It may be that certain Deputies down in Cork are using these arguments against acceptance of the Treaty. The army in Clare have not said a word about the Treaty. They look upon themselves as soldiers. The civil population are out for the Treaty.
Comment on this
The army in Cork consider that they are soldiers but that they are nevertheless citizens and they are entitled to give their opinions.
Comment on this
I think the army in Cork is just as entitled to express its opinions as the G.H.Q. The Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, the Chief Inspector of Training and the Assistant Chief of Staff have all laid themselves out in this morning's press as being in favour of the Treaty. The officers and men of the First Southern Division have sent up a demand for the rejection of the Treaty here and if there are any army questions affecting southern Ireland the Divisional Commandant requests permission to come in here. There are statements made by the Adjutant General and by others that any man going down to Cork will be shot. I can say for Cork that's a lie. There are points to be cleared up about the army. When I voted for certain delegates to London it was on the understanding that we were playing for time. It was not to get a Treaty such as this that has been presented to us. I had no doubt at all about it. There is some undercurrent about this. I must say that the amount of arms we were getting would not enable us to carry on very far but I think owing to our efforts we can carry on.
Comment on this
A definite accusation has been made against me and
THE SPEAKER said Mr. Walsh was first on his feet.
Comment on this
I don't see any grave reason about any member of the I.R.A. or the I.R.A. as a body giving a well considered expression of opinion on a matter that involves their own lives and their own outlook. But I must confess that the document which I hold here in my possession leads me to the conclusion that on exercising my judgment on an all-important question before the country I may be subject to certain treatment. That is very clearly set forth. Unfortunately I fear that that viewpoint is confined to neither side. The case made is that in any final fundamental decision which may be good for the country that the army should interpose and save Ireland. In other words, that the army should prevent the Dáil from expressing their opinions. We are all keen on saving our country. None of us can gain anything by going back to the Parnellite split or the Redmondite split. We have all suffered our share and we all hope the right thing will be done for the dear old motherland but it is essential at this stage that those at the head of the army, and I would include the President, should speak out definitely and state the limits to which they are prepared to tolerate any action on the part of the men who constitute our army.
Comment on this
I think it is absolutely wrong for the army as an army to send any notice to any members of this Dáil. And if I were directly in charge I would make it my duty that every member of the Headquarters staff who sent that thing to the paper I would immediately ask for his resignation off the staff and I would do the same with the Southern Division.
Comment on this
The Deputy from Cork said that the Adjutant General had said a certain thing. I am the Adjutant General and while I have been that I have done nothing and said nothing except what was within the spirit and letter of strict discipline. There is nobody on the Headquarters staff more unpopular than I am because of that and I am unpopular chiefly because I insisted, on the instructions of the Minister of Defence, that the army was not to interfere as an army in any matter that was not purely an army matter. The remark was made and it was made to me and I repeated it not seriously because I didn't believe it about a man from Cork being shot. I am not in Cork, fortunately for Cork (laughter). I went down to Cork when it was difficult to go there and when it was dangerous to go there. A statement was made and a specific name was mentioned. I didn't repeat it except to two or three and the remark was if Mick Collins goes down to Cork there are men there to shoot him. And a woman in Dublin said, "If there is not a man good enough in Cork or in Ireland to shoot Mick Collins I will do it myself" I don't think I ever told that to the Minister for Finance because I took it to be a statement of an excitable woman in a period of great excitement. With regard to the statement which appeared in the Freeman to-day it says: "We understand". This is the first I know of it. Any statement I made as a solider about my opinion was made to the President and it was made in the presence of the Chief of Staff for the members of the General Staff. The President knows what these statements are. I don't know who is responsible for this thing in the Freeman. I am not. I knew nothing about it. I was not approached about it until it appeared in the press this morning. It says, "I have good reason for stating that the following accept the Treaty: The Chief of Staff; Deputy Chief of Staff; Assistant Chief of Staff; Director of Training. These are known in the army as the 'Big Four'. Two of them are members of Dáil Éireann and will speak for themselves to-day. In addition the following are believed to take the same view: Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, Chief Inspector of Training", of whom I have never heard.
That is all I have to say about it. Anything I have said or any act or word of mine in connection with the army was within the spirit and letter of military discipline and nobody knows that as well as the officers of the First Southern Division. I am anxious that this matter should be fully and thoroughly investigated and any place an army officer asks me about the question debated I told him that as far as he was concerned he was a soldier. When I was summoned to this meeting of the Dáil I thought it my duty to consult the people who elected me to the Dáil and I went on Monday evening to Carlow. I met the officers of the Comhairle Cheanntair. I met the people who proposed me, seconded me and elected me. I met the Brigade Commandant and he spoke on this matter and I said, "I have been discussing this matter with people I have a right to discuss it with. I can't discuss it with you. Your duty", I said, "was clearly stated in the public statement issued by the President that the army was not affected". I as a member of the army am not affected. My business is to obey the person giving the orders. I am very sorry that this question is brought in here. I am speaking in the presence of officers to whom I have issued instructions and officers who had carried them out. A most unfair and unjustifiable thing has been stated about me. A gentleman from Cork said there were counter-threats and that he would insist and I will insist too that the names of persons whom he has in mind be given to the Dáil and that these members get their opportunity of answering that any members of this Dáil knowing of these threats let them make a statement to the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Defence will deal with them in his fashion. I did repeat to Seán MacSwiney, the Deputy in Cork, the story that I was told I again repeat that I took it as a joke and I thought that we had at least in Cork a sense of humour. Notwithstanding all the bitterness introduced in the debate to-day I still maintain mine.
Comment on this
Anything about the army should be addressed to the Minister of Defence. We are met here to decide the most important thing any body of Irishmen ever met to decide and here we are quibbling about what somebody said. I was told last night that I would be shot if I voted for this Treaty and I am not kicking up a row about it.
Comment on this
I must absolutely dissent from the last speaker. The first is a newspaper speculation. The second is an attempt to prevent the members of this Assembly from registering their votes. I think in no country in the world would there be a greater criminal act committed than for an assembly to allow its military to decide in advance what decisions they should arrive at. And I think the responsible Minister should see that those responsible for that attempt, should see that those people are properly rebuked or dealt with, and that they should be made to realise that their position is in the army, that the position of men who come here to act as legislators and who are to decide those issues not in accordance with instructions they get from the military themselves in any part of Ireland but in accordance with what they conceive to be the dictates of their conscience in the interests of the country. I think it is a serious and a grave matter and instead of attempting to turn it into a trivial matter which the last speaker did I think this House ought to realise it is a grave matter and I think we ought have some statement from the Minister of Defence as to what he proposes to do.
Comment on this
As one of those who received those notices I wish to say I received a second disclaiming it. I received the first stating that I should consider what I was doing. I received a notice to-day saying the notice I got a couple of days ago had no authority whatever.
Comment on this
As one of the Brigade officers concerned I signed my name to that document. We didn't send it up as a demand. We sent it up to ask for certain consideration for a certain view-point of ours down in the South for the consideration of the Cabinet and we also [sic] I think as far as I remember our O/C apologised to the Chief of Staff for his action which might not altogether be in accordance with military discipline. We didn't think it was our business as military men but we thought we had a duty as citizens of the Irish Republic. It was not with a view to dictate to the politicians that we sent on that. We just wished to put our view point before them. And I don't see it that anybody should infer that it should be thought by any member of the Dáil that we wished to dictate. Much as we like and respect the man who wrote that note I am not in agreement with him.
Comment on this
I think that the Deputy for Cork was referring to a different document to the document that was taken exception to by certain Deputies. That is the document that has been addressed to the members of this Assembly from Cork, but from the Cork No. 1 Brigade area not from the County of Cork. As a Deputy for Cork if I received such a document as this I couldn't be in attendance at this Assembly.
Comment on this
I don't know what undercurrent of irritation is troubling people in regard to the army whether they feel that the army is in the same confused position as to [sic] the Dáil seems to be. The army first came into this matter when the President sent for the members of the Headquarters staff to ask them for certain opinions with regard to the army strength and he subsequently asked for their opinions with regard to the Treaty and then he asked us generally how the army stood. And he was told by me for my own personal self and for the members of the Headquarters staff who were present that whatever our duties were as members of the Dáil or in any other capacity or whatever way we discharged those duties that we were absolutely soldiers and that we stood by the army in whatever position we held then and if there came any changes in whatever position the Government thought we could best serve the army. That is the position with regard to the Headquarters staff. With regard to this notice which appeared in the Freeman's Journal to-day I want everybody to understand that the G.H.Q. staff or no member of it had anything to do with it. And it came as big a surprise to me as the note that I saw issued by the O/C Cork No. 1. As far as I am personally concerned I don't think there is a single member of the army who can say that I spoke to him or expressed my opinion with regard to this Treaty. Two of them came to me last night to know what I thought of it. I told them that they should meet people of different views. That if they went to certain people they would get excited and I told them that they could go to bed and that they would hear all about it. Re the document that came from the First Southern Division I support every word that Mr. Seán Moylan said about it. The tone and spirit of that note was such that nobody could take exception to it. The officer who wrote that note has been the man who was perhaps so far as I personally was concerned at any rate an education and an inspiration in the army. The work that he had [was] amongst the officers in the country and he submitted that note which I submit was eminently reasonable. That does not prejudice the position that [recte of] that officer or prejudice the position of the officers in the 1st Southern Division with regard to their duty as soldiers. I am very much surprised at the officer in charge of the Cork No. 1 Brigade and I am perfectly sure that when he realises the want of discipline that may be read into that note that he will realise it. I am sure that the officer will stand by duty as well as any officer in the First Southern Division. The Commandant of the 1st Southern Division is in town and I would like that this meeting if it so wished would hear what he had to say with regard to the army.
Comment on this
I have spoken to some other officers since of that Division and the Dáil may be perfectly satisfied that the First Southern Division will stand as soldiers with the generosity of service that the country has always got from them. As to that note from the Cork No. 1 O/C the legends that have grown around this the article in the Freeman's Journal is at the bottom of all this.
Comment on this
With reference to my meeting with the Headquarters staff I want to make it clear I didn't ask them for their political opinions. I brought the chiefs of the staff to find out from them to see how they stood as regards the strength of the army. I asked would you be for continuing or not. It was only in that particular way that the question of the Treaty or anything like it came in. I didn't discuss the Treaty.
Comment on this
That must have been very much misreported in Dublin. I was told that every man in the Headquarters staff at the meeting, which discussed this question of the ratification of the Treaty, that they had decided with one dissentient to urge for the ratification of the Treaty. The people in Dublin who have asked me for the position of affairs I have told them this. I always mentioned the fact that I understood it so that they had met and discussed this question. It was told to me and I used it in telling the people what way the Treaty was likely to go. When I saw the document coming from the First Southern Division it struck me only then that the report of the action of the G.H.Q. staff might lead to the ruin of the country. It might lead to the general disruption of the army all over Ireland and I urged on some of the officers I happened to meet, officers who were members of the Dáil, to use their influence to prevent any such meetings to discuss matters of this kind. I presume once the matter was brought under the notice of the Minister for Defence that he take action, as it was his duty to do, to prevent the army headquarters from being turned into Sinn Féin clubs or political gatherings.
Comment on this
The Deputy speaking at present is making statements about matters which never happened.
Comment on this
I don't know. I am making it only as I was told, as the police say, "on information received". Everybody in Dublin discussed it that the Headquarters staff met and decided with the exception of one vote the question of the ratification of the Treaty.
Comment on this
I called that as my duty to know the strength and to find out the fighting strength of the army. It was purely and technically a committee that came to me to discuss how they stood and to find out from a purely military point of view how the fighting strength stood, leaving aside all other questions whatsoever. It was absolutely necessary to get the opinion to bulk as to how long they could hold out, what fighting strength they had, and so on. Any misrepresentation of that meeting as a meeting that agreed to a certain line of action with one dissentient is not the thing. They gave their judgement on army questions purely and simply.
Comment on this
I would like to ask the President what was the reply given to this question about the effectiveness of the army in the case of a renewal of the war?
Comment on this
I have been sent two questions. One is: What is the position of the army as regards the morale of the army? That is a question I am asked. Now as regards the morale it is as high as ever and probably higher. We know what this paper (the Freeman) wants propaganda.
You may take it for granted that as long as I am in the position that I hold at present that I will put down any indiscipline in the army. It has not been shown to me yet that there is indiscipline. Let any member of this body let me know of any threats that have been sent to them and I will see that similar threats are not used in future. Now as regards the army I will give you all particulars.
Comment on this
I suggest that if people want to know these things through curiosity or to fill up their own minds with information that they should not ask them. I suggest a general statement is enough.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA here went into some matters in detail and Mr. Brennan (Clare), Mr. Dolan, President de Valera, J.J. O'Kelly (Sceilg), Mr. MacEntee, Séamus Robinson and Eoin O'Duffy spoke on the question.
Comment on this
I must say that the day any portion of the army does not obey the Government then there is an end of your fight for freedom.
Comment on this
If the army as a national army does not obey the Government, and until this Dáil is dissolved any man who does not obey the Government if there is any scrap of an army left to arrest him he will be arrested.
Comment on this
I propose that a public session be postponed till Friday. I will take this matter later. I have a second motion. This may seem to many people a small point. It was said this morning that if this Treaty were passed it would be put into operation by an English Act of Parliament. Now I don't want to speak on the merits or demerits of the Treaty. If this Treaty is accepted or rejected let us understand what we are accepting or rejecting and I think statements should not be made which don't hold water such as the statement which it is an insult to listen to that if this Treaty is to be put into force it will take the shape of an English Act of Parliament creating us into a dominion. Now if you look at the last clause of the Treaty it is very ambiguous and vague. It says that if the Treaty is approved it shall be ratified by the necessary legislation. It is perfectly obvious that it will be necessary from the point of view of getting matters straight that the English government pass an Act of Parliament repealing their Act of Union, but it is not true to say that because they repeal this therefore they propose that an Irish Constitution should take the shape of an Act of Parliament. The very fact that they call this thing a Treaty makes it a document which turns it into a fact by ratification and requires no Act of Parliament. I am sure it was mentioned in good faith. It is not fair to add to the burden of those supporting the Treaty by making their position worse than it is.
Comment on this
There is nothing in this that does not make it likely to be a Dominion Act. There was a treaty in the Boer War and that treaty was put into an Act. You have no guarantee in this document that it will not be such an Act that will be imposed upon you and if you get your guarantee then of course that point goes by the board.
Comment on this
In the case of the Boer War you had a treaty made in the field of battle between victor and the vanquished. It was not a treaty at all. They took good care not to call it a treaty. The point is that if this document is put into operation there is nothing in this Treaty justifying the British Parliament in pressing a Dominion Act. I am not going to prophesy what they will do. But I can say this with a full assurance that if they seek to limit our powers by a Dominion Act that is a thing against which the Irish Government can protest against in the face of this Treaty. There is no Dominion of the British Empire which was founded by a treaty with the people of England. There was none. When I was over with Lloyd George he wanted me to take home with me the Treaty of Vereeniging in order to study it. I didn't take it. I didn't want to study it. There were orders in council which gave Dominion Home Rule to South Africa and I certainly believe there was a Dominion Act establishing the Union of South Africa.
Comment on this
Years after probably. There is nothing in this document which shows that the British government will not dictate our constitution.
Comment on this
The Boers were defeated in 1902. In 1905 they were given temporary representative government being according to British law conquered territory. Consequently, according to British law they could be dealt with by an order in council. After that the Campbell-Bannerman government came in in England and they were given by order in council responsible government. There was no Act on that occasion at all. In 1909 the various states of South Africa decided to federate, Natal and Cape and so on, and the federation which they formed was given effect to by an Act of the British Parliament. It might be described as a Dominion Act and that is the Act now under which the Dominion of South Africa holds its constitution.
Comment on this
I understand that the responsible bodies in the British Constitution are the King and Parliament. Have we any guarantee that they are going to call it a Treaty at all? We are calling it a Treaty.
Comment on this
I don't see what is the use of discussing this in private session. The reason it is called a Treaty at all is because it is signed as a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland.
Comment on this
The curious thing I notice about this is that the word Treaty is blocked out in the only signed document I got and in the Press the word Treaty is used. I pointed it out to the members of the delegation.
Comment on this
The draft Treaty as signed was not described as a treaty. It was described as articles of agreement and in that form it was signed by the delegation. On the following day it was observed that the word treaty was not used in connection with this draft, although the word treaty was frequently used by Lloyd George and a communication was made to Downing St. pointing out the omission and suggesting that there should be added to the words "Articles of Agreement", "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland." That was agreed to by the British. These words were inserted and they appear in the copy before me.
Comment on this
At the head of my copy it is blocked out and "Articles of Agreement" are at the top.
Comment on this
All this can be discussed at a public session. We are now on our trial because we are not constitutional lawyers. Did anybody suggest I was a constitutional lawyer before I went over there? I saw some of our barristers and they looked damn poor fry before some of the other fellows. They didn't do as well as some of the fighting men did before them. How do I know what our lawyers are going to do without law? We noticed on the following day that this document didn't bear the words "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland". We immediately arranged for it to be put in. If we are expected to be constitutional lawyers and to know how all free states in the world came into existence now is not the time to tell it.
Comment on this
It was for that purpose that article 3 of the instructions were put in so that we could go at it line by line.
Comment on this
If these points are going to be made we will meet them and beat them tomorrow. In the copy of the Treaty between Ireland and the British Government you make that ground of omission an object for attack on us.
Comment on this
I beg your pardon, I am not attacking anybody. I am looking after the interests of Ireland. If there is anything wrong in this Treaty and if this Treaty be ratified I want, at least, to see that we don't be held up as fools. We don't want Lloyd George again to trick us. I don't want the British Government to trick us. I won't trust them. There is an old saying, "Is mairg a bhíos go holc agus bhíos bocht na dhiadh" and I say that because I do distrust them and not because I want to attack anybody here. I have the highest possible respect for my colleagues, every one of them. There is not one of those men who is not the soul of honour and who is not doing his best for Ireland, and I am fighting now not to be beaten by the politicians in England and by English statesmen. We want to prevent ourselves being tricked by England. We want at least to get something and not to be a laughing stock if it is accepted.
Comment on this
President de Valera said the word "Treaty" was blocked out at the top of the page. It is not.
Comment on this
I will bring the copy I have. It was not the Minister of Finance I wished to say a word against. I was anxious about the Treaty. I was trying to get recognition for the Republic and when I saw this thing I said at least it would be a good thing to have a Treaty there signed by them. But I wondered what was the meaning of this and therefore I feel that the necessary legislation which they will put in is not what the plenipotentiaries imagine.
Comment on this
I don't wish to continue the discussion as to the kind of instrument which we are to ratify. But The Times never refers to this as a treaty and when it published the articles it never published the word "treaty".
Comment on this
Is this in order to discuss this Treaty and try to bias the judgement of the Dáil before this matter comes up for discussion? Speech after speech has been made condemning the Treaty here and some speakers will repeat their speeches tomorrow. That is not fair play. I insist that you must rule this out of order.
Comment on this
I claim protection of the Chair. This is a point that those who are to ratify the Treaty should have.
Comment on this
The Times has always been regarded as the official or semi-official organ of the British Government. If the head of this instrument whatever it may be called were really a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland then The Times had no right to publish that Treaty with the title out.
Comment on this
The Morning Post of the day that it was signed and the Morning Post can only have got this document presumably from Downing Street, and it heads it "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, Articles of Agreement".
Comment on this
We were assured by the plenipotentiaries that this was a Treaty signed and that we hadn't power to do anything but to accept it or reject it. But Article 18 clearly shows what was in Lloyd George's mind. It says, "This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty's Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary legislation."
Comment on this
I am not a tactician. I never tried tactics on debate. I don't believe in that one bit. But if I got that document I would be suspicious of it. But I think it right that every member of the House should know about it. If they can get a guarantee that this thing should be ratified by a ratifying Act and that there will be no interference let them get that guarantee.
Comment on this
I thought this private session would be used to come to some sort of common understanding. I think the Treaty should be considered if there is some defect in it if it is called a treaty. The point is whether we can get the English to recognise it as a treaty. We should treat it in a friendly spirit the spirit of calmly making the best thing we have of it.
Comment on this
I agree. It was for that purpose I came here. I am not doing party work and have nothing to do with party or faction work. I am working purely in the public interest in the widest sense. I was going to make a proposal which I would put as an amendment to Mr. Griffith's proposal if I could get anything like a substantial agreement which would end the war and keep us united. If we are not united we can't carry on the fight successfully.
Comment on this
I would like to know what is in the President's mind as to the nature of his proposals something that may be satisfactory to both sides before we take definite action tomorrow.
Comment on this
I have again to refer to the past so that you might understand the future. As I said, until the difference in the Cabinet arose when a break off didn't occur on the matter of insisting on the question of whether we remain inside the Empire or the question of allegiance, I would have faced the possibility of war with all that I know it means. On this the word "gambling" was used in the Cabinet. I was asked will you gamble on war and I said, "I will", because I know in the long run the smallest gamble knowing that there were people who would not be satisfied and that you couldn't get a peace answer. I was ready to gamble on the possibility of war. If the break occurred my idea was that the probability was that the British proposals would be published. We would put up our counter proposals and show the world and see are the British going to make war on us because we won't give an oath to their King. Because that is what it amounted to. I referred today to trying to batter down a stone wall and I suggested external association. I was ready to break if we didn't get it because I felt the distance between the two was so small that the British would not wage war on account of it. You say if it is so small why not take it. But I say, that small difference makes all the difference. This fight has lasted all through the centuries and I would be willing to win that little sentimental thing that would satisfy the aspirations of the country I would wait longer not because you had the national aspirations satisfied. Of course, those are entitled to their opinions as to this document that was referred to this morning. That document came to us and I think we could not have this allegiance. If we could get this external thing external association my whole hope was that I would be fighting not on this side but on the side of the plenipotentiaries for acceptance. Now I want to try if I can to recover that situation and going over the Treaty and looking at it and comparing it with these proposals I ask you can we mould these proposals into a document that might include what we could accept. I have managed to draft a thing and I think there is only one snag in it and that is the "Ulster" question. In this Treaty we are fighting Great Britain and not Ulster. Having got this Ulster claim in I don't know how we could go back of that except to make a declaratory statement in the beginning that we don't recognise the right of any part of Ireland to secede, still for the sake of so and so we are willing to accept it. The other thing is this take step by step this document I hold in my hand and the British document. I worked out something which I think would be a basis of constructive work so that when we come to ratification instead of proposing that Treaty which would divide the country I know it won't satisfy everybody it won't satisfy those who want an isolated Republic that can only be secured by beating the enemy down or by the other thing. I know other people say, "We will hold on". It is quite admissible. There would be only one danger of my producing a document of this kind in a public session. They would say it is neither fish, flesh nor good red herring. But I think there is a document that we could all subscribe to and we could say to the British people "We can't accept that we can accept this that can't bring peace, this can". We know there are some who will never be satisfied. After all what do they want? Is it not friendship between the two peoples? What good is it to Lloyd George to have a majority in this country if there is a strong minority who will continue as before? The British people if they are wise will be willing to give the extra bit of a jump. He (Lloyd George) would be afraid as a politician to sign a document which would be leaving Ireland outside the Empire. But when it is a definite offer when it is said, "Will you join us as a free people? Are you going to make war on us with a forced Treaty?" It would be difficult to get an assembly like this to agree to any such document. There are in my proposals certain paragraphs which would be accepted by everybody. I know the plenipotentiaries would accept it. I see only one hope therefore in the situation and that is that we should, when Mr. Griffith proposes that we recommend the Treaty, propose an amendment saying that, "This will not satisfy a large section of our people but we here as their representatives believe that this will and we will unanimously recommend this and therefore there is peace in it". If you like I can get copies in here. The only thing about it is I don't expect we will be unanimous. But presented with the fait accompli that we are presented with, and with the danger of a division, my own feeling is that a plebiscite in the country, at a time with the papers against us, that our people would accept that Treaty under duress. I believe they would (Hear, hear). I have that feeling I may be wrong. We know if they did there would be an intense feeling against by the others. I don't want to influence anybody. I know if that were put before the people they would, as a matter of fact, accept it. They would not be wise. There were other things to be put before the people. I am anxious that they should not accept anything less than they can get. It will not mean war. That is my proposal. If any proposals are not definitely opposed to the principles that anybody holds they will come with us and try to have an unanimous decision on the matter. It is the only way I see out of it at the present time. I let the Minister of Publicity know that this is the work that I was engaged on when I was accused of using the Government staff for a party purpose.
Comment on this
I appeal as an ordinary member to those present and to the members of the delegation not to living [recte bring] in those small petty questions before the Dáil.
Comment on this
I was in America and a similar contest was forced upon me and similar suggestions at the back were being passed about. And there have been suggestions made as if I at one time wanted to do something and then that I left the delegation in the lurch.
Comment on this
The President has made a certain proposition. I wish to hear the chairman of the delegation's views on the proposition.
Comment on this
This is exactly the same proposition we put up twice to Lloyd George and we fought it for two weeks. The fact of it is this, the Treaty is a thing you have to take it as it stands. The fact of this Treaty [is] we have to accept it or reject it. We have got to take it as it stands.
Comment on this
I am anxious to say something in explanation and just to put briefly what the position is. I am glad the President has given us the proposal. We put this proposal. In some ways I think some of the things we have secured from a verbal point of view are better. We put this before the other side with all the energy we could. That is the reason that I wanted certain vital documents and these will show that the same proposals that the President has now drafted have been put already. The suggestion is that we can act on this thing in this way if we wish the ratification will be moved here. It will be supported. But let it be rejected. Let this thing be put up as what the Dáil will agree upon. That is what we are told here. But I for one want to have it on record that we have put up this already and that we have failed to get it. There is no other delegation that would have got a better or a greater treaty than the delegation that went.
Comment on this
The thing is this, no Irishman can ever go on a delegation again thinking he is speaking for a straight decision one way or another. Let the Treaty be rejected and let those who take the responsibility for its rejection put that to the country. If war is to follow I accept that decision, and in whatever capacity my services can be of assistance I accept that capacity, but I should never be in the same position but I would always do one man's part in any work I had to do for Ireland. But let it be understood that no delegation should go back to these people whom we distrust. I know the answer they would get "You can go to the devil; you can't speak for anyone; you can't deliver the goods". In my opinion they won't treat with any other delegation. There should not be and there is no hesitation on my part to face the two straight issues contained in the document. We recommend the ratification of the document. If it is rejected as a most humble individual I will do whatever part my nation requires of me to do in whatever capacity I can serve her interests. But let there be no mistake about it, that we stand for a definite position. We don't stand for nothing. If we chop this thing the British Parliament will chop it. If there is any defect in it from a legal point of view the men who have that particular kind of knowledge will I suppose be seeing to the details of it in that particular kind of way. Let there be no mistake about the alternatives. We have heard about external and internal association. Association means association with them. When I am speaking about the thing itself that is what I would regard as the disaster of this thing. I would prefer to see the document rejected absolutely to passing these proposals, and having taken responsibility for that rejection it means that we are challenging them as a nation to a military decision. Well, I believe they are prepared to give belligerent rights if we made that a condition. We could ask them. If we don't want these rights we need not ask for them. The decision will be in our own hands. But let the thing be an absolutely straight one. Let us clear them out or they clear us out. But let it be understood that we have done our best for the document before you, such as it is. I have done my best to secure absolute separation from England. I have done the best I could in the difficulty for many years. Documents and formulas I could not understand. If I went again I couldn't make any stronger fight for this document than I made for the others. I can't understand these phrases that have been brought in here. I am standing not for shadows but for substances and that is why I am not a compromiser.
Comment on this
I would suggest that every member here would carefully consider that when in the morning we meet we will present a united front to the enemy, and then we will have no occasion to split the country or to split ourselves either.
Comment on this
I suggest that we have got as far as we could get and it would be a great deal better for us from every point of view to adjourn.
Comment on this
I propose that tomorrow be a private session. I think it would be better now to have a public session on the day after tomorrow.
Comment on this
Have the discussion in a friendly way on what rejection means to the country. I think some of us know more about the facts than others. As a matter of fact we have had no discussion yet on the Treaty or on the benefits that would be conferred by it on Ireland or on what its rejection means to Ireland. Each member has a very serious responsibility placed upon him to consider these things in a cool and friendly way.
Comment on this
Have the committee power to have these documents typed and circulated if they consider them worth it?
Comment on this
You have appointed the committee and it is presumed they know what they are going to do.
Comment on this
The point is very pertinent all the same. Now as to the statement of the Minister of Finance. Suppose you make a proposal of this kind the British will feel that they have a certain duty to the delegation that went over and met them and they will say, "Well we are letting them down badly if we don't stand for the other and reject this thing". It must be some form to appeal to the two nations. It can't be, therefore, the question of the delegation at all, it must be simply the form a sort of appeal to the two nations. It is only a popular appeal to the two nations.
If the Dáil was not fairly unanimous upon it you could not do it. It is my last effort and it is a poor one. It is only a bad best.
Comment on this
There is one thing I would like to keep out of this thing. From the position that we have had to take up we should not be forced into a position and nobody should force us into a rotten invidious position and because I say a certain article will not be accepted. Let no man here put me into the position to argue for anything less than full freedom for Ireland. I couldn't say in my heart that I would regard the Irish nation committed to anything less than full freedom. I could not say in my heart that anything would satisfy me personally less than full freedom. I believe there are world forces in this present thing. These are all things I could say in the public session. But if we go arguing on this I want to say a word on this showing that we have put up the same thing to the English and it was not acceptable to them. We were not able to prevail on them to accept it. Don't put us in the position of doing anything else than what we tried to do. If we went to Lloyd George he would say: "If I accept this document (No.2) you will come back after and say, 'we can't accept this now, I want my Republic' ". That would be in reality the position as I see it. And I am not going to be put into the position so to speak of saying that the British would not accept some of this. The correspondence shows that we have already tried it. And I, as one man, can do no more.
Comment on this
In declaring the House adjourned I would like on behalf of you to express the hope that a real effort will be made to conduct this discussion in future in every way worthy of the nation we belong to. It is easier to exercise a little personal restraint than to meet the enemy in the field.
Comment on this
I think in fairness to us, the Dáil should ask for our resignations.
(Shouts of No, no)