ORDUITHE AN LAE—ORDERS OF THE DAY. - PUBLIC SAFETY BILL, 1927—THIRD STAGE (RESUMED).
Contributions 1–173 of 355. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 25 of 1927 ›
I rise to move the following amendment:—
To add to sub-section (1) the following words: "but such proclamation shall not come into force until each House of the Oireachtas has passed a Resolution approving of such proclamation."
Deputies will notice the provisions of the sub-section. I put my amendment down by way of asserting the democratic principle that the Oireachtas should remain in control until the last possible moment, and that they should be the final voice to decide on questions of emergency. My objection to this section as drafted is that under it, it would be possible for the Executive Council, with the two Houses sitting here, to issue a proclamation without first allowing that proclamation to come before either House. That is, in fact, the effect of the section as it stands, and I hope that that is not the intention of the Executive Council. Under this section, assuming this Bill was law at the present moment, we sitting here today might not be informed that a proclamation would be issued to-night or even while we were sitting. Under the Bill there would be no obligation on the Ministry to submit to us the proclamation or the grounds on which they intended to publish it. I hope that that is not the intention of the Government and I hope that they will give an assurance during the discussion on this amendment that there is no such intention on their part.
Comment on this
I would draw the attention of the Deputy to sub-section (4) which states that "Every proclamation made under this section shall be forthwith published in the "Iris Oifigiúil" and shall also be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made." I would like the Deputy to consider that the circumstances which, in the opinion of the Executive Council, warrant the issue of this proclamation are grave circumstances, very grave circumstances indeed. But the usual course in connection with matters of this kind is to allow such a provision in the Bill to negative the proclamation. That is the usual course. Otherwise, if the Deputy's suggestion were put into force, it would mean first the summoning of the Oireachtas and secondly an actual decision of the Oireachtas in favour of the proposal. The Executive Council is accepting responsibility in this and in other cases for Executive control. There has been at least one occasion here in which it would have been inconvenient and difficult, perhaps impossible, for some Deputies to attend the Dáil. There is an ample safeguard when a motion can be made disapproving of the action of the Executive. The proclamation is then of no force or effect any longer. I think it would be unwise to adopt the suggestion that has been made in the amendment. It would delay the proceedings which, as I said, are proceedings to deal with a grave emergency, and grave emergencies need prompt measures.
Comment on this
The President referred Deputy Rice to sub-section (4) of this section. He proceeded to read (4) in so far as it went in support of his argument such as it was. The President should have continued to read the sub-section to the end, which says that the House may pass a resolution revoking such proclamation, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under such proclamation. That is the point. I suggest that Deputy Rice's amendment is a reasonable amendment and an amendment that should be inserted in the Bill. If there is necessity for declaring a state of emergency it is very easy to get the House together. It is very easy to get the necessary sanction for the proclamation. The President knows that, and in order to get that sanction, if necessary, the President can move for an all-night sitting with an adjournment for three hours' rest and to sit all the following day and night. In view of those possibilities, I cannot see why he should have any objection whatever to the very reasonable amendment moved by Deputy Rice.
Comment on this
As the President and the House will see, I have an amendment down—it is Amendment 45, and Deputy Hewson's name is joined to mine. It is to delete all words after the word "expire" at the end of sub-section (4) which the President mentioned. My objection is practically the same as that of Deputy Rice in his amendment. If the President will give me an assurance that when we reach sub-section (4) he will be prepared to accept my amendment, or words to that effect, I, for one, would not persist in supporting the amendment we are now discussing. That amendment proposes that before the proclamation is made the two Houses should be called together and that the proclamation should not take effect until the Oireachtas deems it necessary to have such a proclamation. The effect, as I say, is somewhat the same as the proposal in my amendment. In my amendment, while a proclamation may be made without the calling together of the Oireachtas. Yet anything that is done during the period that will have elapsed between the proclamation and the calling together of the Oireachtas should not be valid unless ratified by the Oireachtas. From the nature of the President's remarks one would think that he would be inclined to accept my amendment, because he did not, as was pointed out, read the whole sub-section.
It is because of the last two lines in sub-section (4) that in my view the whole section, as well as the sub-section itself, is a bad one. If a proclamation can be made then, whether the Oireachtas ratifies that proclamation or not, anything done by way of an Executive act during that period is to be valid. It simply comes to that: that for that period the Executive Council is supreme. Though I am not going so far as to say that it would be likely, even if they so desired, that anything should be done that they could not stand over subsequently, at the same time I think it is a wrong principle that even for any period sole authority should rest with the Executive Council. It is quite possible under the Bill, as it now stands, that a citizen of this State might be brought before one of these special courts and might be executed, and there would be, according to this section, no responsibility on the Executive Council. At any rate, nothing could be done subsequent to that action to fix responsibility upon them, because it is expressly stated in sub-section (4) that, without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under such a proclamation, such a course shall be taken by way of laying it upon the Table of the House. I think it is open to the Government to accept either one or other of these proposals, both of which I venture to say, are reasonable and democratic proposals. Either let no proclamation be made before it is passed specifically by the Oireachtas, or if a proclamation is made let no act that shall be done under that proclamation be valid unless it is subsequently ratified by the Oireachtas.
Comment on this
I do not know if I would be in order in answering Deputy Redmond now. I understood the proposal was the amendment moved by Deputy Rice, and I proceeded to answer that. I would like to know if I am in order in answering Deputy Redmond's case now?
Comment on this
Deputy Rice's amendment, No. 43, governs amendments 44 and 46. Deputy Rice's amendment, I think, is radical and raises the whole section. Therefore, I think we may have a discussion on it.
Comment on this
I would point out to the President that, if Deputy Rice's amendment were passed, there would be no necessity for me to move my amendment.
Comment on this
That is the point. I do not know whether Deputy Redmond has read this section very carefully. I would like to know if he has in mind any Executive Council in any part of the world or any Government in any part of the world that would accept this proposal. What is the essence of it? It comes to this that, taking the minimum number of days, we have three days which is the shortest number of days on which it is possible to call the Parliament together, and 21 sitting days of the Dáil. We have four sitting days per week, and even if we were to add an additional one we would have five weeks after the issue of the proclamation. Now a proclamation is not issued lightly, but if Deputy Redmond's amendment were to be seriously considered it would, in effect, mean that an emergency proclamation which has got to be issued is going to be held up for five weeks. Surely that is not seriously put forward.
Comment on this
I would like to draw the President's attention to the fact that last night we passed a section adopting as part of the measure that persons arrested under this Act shall remain in custody for two months. If that is so, will there not be plenty of time to call together the two Houses?
Comment on this
The Minister has again referred to this as an emergency proclamation, but it is not an emergency proclamation. It is a proclamation authorising the establishment of special courts. Now one would like to know what is the purpose behind the objection to having a resolution of the House approving of the proclamation? The prisoner is in custody, and the effect of the proclamation is not to add one iota to the powers of the Executive in respect to the arrest of prisoners. It is not adding anything at all to the powers of the Executive in respect to anything except the establishment of special courts. The proposal is that on the issue of the proclamation there shall be established a military court which will try all the persons who are under charge in respect to any portion of this Act. Well, unless one is thinking of executions in a hurry there is no real reason why the necessity for the proclamation should not be supported by the Oireachtas within that time. When the proclamation is issued special courts will be established, and then every person who is charged with any offence mentioned in the Schedule to this Act, including any offence which is declared to be a treason or a felony or a misdemeanour under the Treasonable Offences Act, or declared by this Act to be a misdemeanour, as well as certain offences under the Firearms Act and others—any of these offences which include what may be minor offences under this Act, are then referred to be tried by a military court.
As Deputy McMenamin says, there is already the power to detain, and these persons will be in custody. They will be tried, in the absence of the ratification of the proclamation by the Oireachtas, by the ordinary courts. The absence of the proclamation will not affect their trial. The only thing it will effect is that they will not be tried by military courts, but if a military court proceeds to try and give judgment then there is no appeal and the execution will be carried out in due course of law: that is, if it is a capital offence, or imprisonment will follow if it is a minor offence. If it is a minor offence surely there is no good ground for demanding that the proclamation of the Executive shall have effect immediately, because the trial would go on by the ordinary courts and judgment would follow. But if it is a major offence, then if the special courts are set up the persons will be tried and judgment will be given. If found guilty, execution will follow; then the Dáil might come along and declare the proclamation was not true. That would mean, then, that the special courts had acted on the fiat of the Executive Council. You have removed the appeal from the prisoner and you have left the Executive Council in full control in respect to the disestablishment of the ordinary courts of the land. There is no case whatever, as far as I can see, for the carrying out of this proclamation unless with the approval of the Oireachtas. Certainly the case is not one of the emergency that has been referred to, but somehow or other Deputies have been persuaded that all the provisions of this Bill are emergency provisions dealing with emergency conditions. They are not. They are dealing with normal conditions, except that the establishment of special courts will bring about a proclamation, and it may be inferred that a proclamation will only take place in a state of emergency. When it is effected, it only establishes special courts, which means military courts, and there is certainly no justification for the establishment of these courts without the approval of the Oireachtas.
Comment on this
Before Deputies make up their minds on this section I should like to draw their attention to words occurring at the end of the next section. They are very similar to words in this section, but they give a clearer key to the intention:—
"... but without prejudice to the validity of anything done thereunder, or the continuing operation and effect of any conviction, sentence, order or judgment made thereunder."
Although those words do not appear in this section, the two sections are clearly drafted with common intent, and I think it clearly means that coming to this House, at a special meeting, five days after the proclamation, we might be expected to sit and look at a sentence of twenty years, inflicted in the interim, running out, with our hands tied. It is owing to the very clear indication of that further section that I put down an amendment to delete the wording in both these sections, but if the President accepts Deputy Rice's amendment I would be prepared to withdraw Amendments 45 and 47.
Comment on this
I draw attention to the provisions of the Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act, 1926. In Section 1, sub-section (4) of that Act it provides:—
"Every proclamation made under this section shall be forthwith published in the "Iris Oifigiúil," and shall also be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made, and if either House shall, within the next subsequent twenty-one days on which that House has sat, pass a resolution revoking such proclamation, such proclamation shall forthwith expire."
Presumably it is following that precedent that this section is presented in the Bill before us, but the Emergency Powers Act of 1926 gives certain powers to the Executive to do certain things, m an emergency, causing arrest and detention, giving certain officers powers to arrest in exceptional circumstances, power of entry into a dwelling-place, establishing special appeal courts, and so on. These are definite things of a continuing nature which can be remedied if any fault has occurred in the Executive Council. If anything that has been done under these emergency powers has not the approval of the Oireachtas they can be remedied, but when you execute a man you cannot remedy it. When your military courts have passed a judgment on a hurried conviction, and an execution has taken place, all the resolutions of the Executive Council will not bring the man to life again. I point out, too, that after the establishment of these special courts, all persons who are in custody waiting trial for any offence scheduled in the Bill are to be sent forward to the special courts notwithstanding that they may have been before a civil court, and that there has been a jury disagreement. The majority of the jury may be convinced of the man's innocence, a minority differing. Then, as a matter of automatic effect, that man is to be sent to a military court immediately, and to be tried before a military court. We do not know yet what kind of regulations will determine the course of the hearing at the military court. We do not know whether it will be public or private, but the military court will be in operation. The consequences may be the execution of the prisoner, and then afterwards the Dáil may decide that the state of the country is not such as would justify the setting up of the special courts. I think it is necessary to emphasise and re-emphasise this aspect of the case. In effect, military courts will be established, and will be acting even though the Oireachtas may believe there is no reason for the establishment of military courts.
Comment on this
Deputy Johnson's point would be quite sound if you admit his two assumptions: one that the Executive Council would set up those courts in time of peace without any reason, good, bad or indifferent and also the assumption that military courts will find wrong verdicts. I do not think that is justifiable. There is no more reason to assume that than that the ordinary courts of the land would find wrong verdicts. Let us look at the procedure suggested. There is a serious state of affairs making it necessary to set up the military courts and a proclamation is issued for good reasons. The Dáil is called together after three days. Even if you shorten this period of twenty-one days to seven sitting days you will get something normally like fifteen days. There is a serious situation in the country and for fifteen days there is a debate going on here. There are speeches on all sides. The Dáil is debating the whole thing for fifteen days. In a serious state of affairs the Executive Council should have the right to act promptly. What happens? Even with the goodwill of everyone, it can be held up for fifteen days, that is, even if you inserted "seven" instead of "twenty-one" days. If there was a small minority, and even a small number of Deputies wanted to prolong it, it must go on for fifteen days. That is a procedure that will not appeal to any sensible man. I do not assume that military courts are going to sentence people in the wrong. I do not assume that the Executive Council will issue a proclamation without good and sufficient reason. If these two conditions are present, everyone with a sense of responsibility will realise that not only are you bound to do justice in time of emergency but you should do speedy justice in such circumstances.
Comment on this
The Minister suggested that there would be fifteen days during which it would be held up. I do not know what he means.
Comment on this
I mean this: if the Deputy inserted seven instead of twenty-one days, you take three days for the issuing of the proclamation into account, and the number of days on which the Dáil and Seanad would sit it would be fifteen days, at least, from the issue of the proclamation.
Comment on this
I am not quarrelling as to whether it would be seven or fifteen days. What I want to get at is what would be held up? Will not the prisoner be in custody? It is not a question of powers of arrest but a question of the method of trial. The prisoner is already in custody when these special powers are being asked for. What will the delay be occasioned by? By nothing but the time of trial. If the prisoner is, as he would be, in custody for a period, according to the Bill of two months, if it is considered desirable, what would be the urgency or necessity for getting him brought to trial for a space, according to the Minister's calculation, of fifteen days? I cannot see the urgency or necessity for this. If the prisoner is in custody and if the only question is as to the mode by which you shall try him, where is justice going to suffer? What considerable danger is the country going to run the risk of if, in order to await the full ratification of the Oireachtas, fifteen days shall have to elapse? When the Minister speaks about a prolonged debate in this or the other House, while I agree with him that it might be, let us say, inconvenient for the Executive or for individual Ministers to have such a debate, I would ask Ministers and Deputies to realise what they are doing by this section. They are abrogating the Constitution. They are taking away one of the greatest, if not the greatest right of the individual citizen, and that is the right of trial by civil and not by military court.
Is the period of fifteen days too much to spend in discussing a matter like that, especially when, as I have pointed out, nobody can suffer by this delay? All that would be delayed would be the actual trial. If the Dáil or the Oireachtas did not consider the emergency sufficient, then the prisoner would still be in custody, but he would be tried by a court other than a court set up by the Executive Council. I do not approve of the description "military court" given to these courts. They are not military courts. They are not even courts-martial. They are Executive Council courts, courts nominated by the Executive Council and by Ministers, courts from which there will be no appeal, no certiorari, no power of relief, no power of revision, nothing to stand between the decision of that court and the fate of the prisoner. All we ask is that before such court are set and before such extreme departure is taken, depriving the individual citizen of his fundamental right, such courts should be ratified by the Dáil, even though there may be long and, perhaps, heated debate. The course of justice would not be interfered with. It would be merely a question of delay in the mode of trial whereby the prisoner is sought to be brought to justice. That is what is considered to be an extravagant or factious demand on the part of representatives of the ordinary people. I do not know to what state the government of this country is coming. I do not think that anything could be fairer than to suggest that, with a prisoner in custody, in a position in which he could not continue the course that he has been continuing, even only on suspicion, the Oireachtas should take fifteen or twenty-one days to determine this great question affecting the liberties and lives of individual citizens. I say that that is not an extravagant or undue demand to make upon the Executive Council.
Comment on this
Of course, it is not. It happens that we had two very painful examples within the last eight months of the type of person in respect of whom this Bill has been introduced. I would like to know if all the precautions which Deputy Redmond wishes to make for the lives and liberties of the people were taken in respect of the late Vice-President. Whom was he tried by ? A jury of his fellow-countrymen? Whom was he sentenced by? Judges, I suppose. What is this Bill introduced for at all? What is its purpose? Do we want more examples before we pass a Bill dealing with that sort of thing? How many examples are we waiting for?
Comment on this
I did not interrupt the Deputy. The Deputy and everyone in the country knows the people whom we mean to deal with under this Bill. I stated on Second Reading who they were. I gave sufficient evidence there to justify any person who wished to restore order in the country, and I gave sufficient reasons for the introduction and passage of this Bill. The lives and liberties of the people will be as safe after this measure has passed as they are now when it is under consideration or as they were twelve months ago. I gave an example and a particular reason for the institution of military courts. Deputy Redmond has not got all the knowledge concerning military courts or courts-martial.
Comment on this
Some of us have a lot more, and during a considerable period when there was disorder throughout the land there was not a single case proved in this Dáil, or anywhere else, that the military courts which we established at that time had done an injustice to any man. When an emergency exists prompt measures must be taken. I cannot say this too often, namely, that this is a measure to deal promptly with disorder, to put down attempts to overthrow the State and to sap and undermine its institutions. These measures are just as unpalatable to us as to the exponents of liberty who have spoken against them here, but we have courage enough to tell the people when they are necessary and that we are going to bring them in and make them law.
Comment on this
There is an insinuation in the statement made by the President that those of us who are opposing or endeavouring to amend the Bill are refusing to give sufficient powers to protect the Ministers of State or public officials. That is wrong, and the President knows it is. If the President wants to protect the lives and liberty of the people he is not going to do it by the passage of the measure as it stands. If you want to give protection to the Ministers, a protection which would have saved the life of the late Vice-President, you will require to have a more efficient police force to carry out the measure if passed in its present form. No member of the present or the last Dáil took any exception to the amount of money demanded by the late Minister for Justice, or the Ministry, that would enable the Government to set up the most efficient police force possible. I challenge the Minister to name anyone who made any objection to that in the late or present Dáil. I am prepared, and always have been, to vote whatever money is necessary to create a more efficient police force, because it is by having a more efficient police force and compelling them to protect the lives of Ministers and public officials that you will get the desired effect. There are members of this House and many people outside who believe if we had more efficiency in the police force the late Vice-President would be alive to-day. That is what many people outside are saying publicly and privately. It is by making the police force more efficient and not by bringing in drastic and ridiculously-worded measures that you are going to bring about the state of affairs desired.
Comment on this
In consequence of the statements made by the Minister for Lands and Agriculture and the President, I would like to call the attention of the House to the fact that yesterday when we were discussing Section 16 I proposed that the time of three months for an arrested person should be reduced to fourteen days. The reason given for the rejection of that amendment has been now departed from. Is there any logic in the House and are we to be told when we make a statement that we should be in a place of detention? When I proposed that the three months be reduced to fourteen days I was told that period was not long enough, and that at least two months was necessary to make inquiries as to whether the man should be detained. The President spoke of urgency. If a man is dangerous he should be arrested. No harm can be done as long as he is behind prison walls. If it is necessary to have fourteen days to make inquiries surely it would take a longer time to decide on the mode of trial. If the Government had agreed to my amendment under Section 16 I could see the logic of the case made to-day, but in view of the case they made yesterday they have swept from under them all grounds of logic and reason for refusing to accept this amendment.
Comment on this
With regard to Deputy Davin's speech I want to say what I think could be better said from the Opposition than from the Government Benches. I think it is not fair to the police force to charge them with inefficiency, and make them responsible in the way the Deputy did. We knew the late Vice-President, and we knew his almost reckless courage. Once after a somewhat stormy meeting, on which we both had spoken on opposite sides, I offered him a lift home—there was a nasty crowd outside—and he said no, that he would walk home. He was the Ministerial head of the police force, and how could they protect him when he choose to take those risks? It is not fair to them. They sorrow for his death as keenly as we do. I do not think that what Deputy Davin said was intended in the spirit in which it may be read in to-morrow's papers. Deputy Davin is a man of generous mind, and I do not think he wished to hurt the feelings of the Gárda Síochána, as would happen if what he had said had gone without comment. The police are, for a young force. extremely efficient. and I am quite confident they did all in their power to protect the late Vice-President, and that it was through no default on their part he was murdered.
Comment on this
To my mind there has been a good deal of talk that is not applicable to the amendment. It would be very regrettable, indeed, if a situation should come about which would make it necessary to issue a proclamation in accordance with this section, and that the Dáil should be called together to decide whether these courts should be established or not. I should like to be clear as to the situation that will confront the Dáil under those circumstances. I think there is a good deal in the plea made by Deputy Redmond that no decision should be taken by a court until the Dáil has met and declared that the court was legally entitled to function. That is a matter we must seriously think about. When the Dáil is called together, and we come here, we will know that a certain number of individuals have been arrested, are in custody, and are to be tried on a certain charge. We will have to face up to our responsibility, and declare by a vote here whether these courts are to be set up or not. Perhaps a good many Deputies might be prepared to declare these courts should be set up, and some might not. We would have, I am afraid, a very unsatisfactory condition of things here. The debate as to whether this proclamation should be rightly issued would centre around the fact that a certain number of individuals were in custody, and likely to be brought to trial on a certain charge and the possibility that our act might have certain consequences for certain individuals will undoubtedly place the Dáil, if it ever has to face that situation, in a very difficult position. I can visualise that position.
Comment on this
They need not actually at that moment be under arrest. Some may be under arrest, and others may be in the course of being arrested. That is what seems to me very likely to take place.
Comment on this
If they are not actually under arrest I cannot see, inasmuch as they are not in custody, that it is not possible to wait actually until the Executive are armed with authority from the Dáil to set up these courts. The Minister for Agriculture made a statement that if there is to be justice, then speedy justice is best and justifiable. In cases, perhaps, I am not disposed to quarrel so very much with the principle of what he says. It may be if a state of emergency were declared and these courts were set up that it would be far better if every individual Deputy was prepared to take his responsibility for the setting up of these courts. I am quite well aware that when we come to that we will have the same case made as is being made here to-day and the same differences of opinion. One body of representatives will think that the circumstances are such as to justify the setting up of the courts. Another body of representatives may think the contrary. It might be that the more disagreeable task, will have to be shouldered by one group and the less disagreeable by another. That may not occur for a number of years but it is not unlikely, knowing human nature and understanding the peculiar psychology of many of our people.
In all those circumstances I can to some extent appreciate the attitude of mind of the Executive Council, that they might as well take responsibility for doing this, on their own shoulders because eventually it will be pushed on to them. I am not inclined to agree with that point of view. I prefer, as far as I am concerned, that the responsibility for doing that should be put on every member of the Oireachtas. In any event if they are not all prepared to take the responsibility no more odium will come to the people who have got to do this kind of work than would come to them if they took on the responsibility without being armed with authority from the majority of the Oireachtas. While the period of 21 days might be a period that perhaps in certain circumstances the Executive might think too long to wait, I think we should be able to arrive at a shorter period, a period that would really not be too long, before bringing into existence these special courts and at the same time a period sufficiently long to enable the Oireachtas to come to a decision. I think the President ought to try to meet that point of view and if he did he would to a considerable extent meet the claim that these courts are to be set up at the behest of the Executive Council and are to do a certain kind of work for a certain short period at their behest. It would show that the courts are going to be legally constituted courts which, if there is justification for their being brought into existence, will have the support and the approval of the majority of the Oireachtas. In the meantime before the decision of the Oireachtas is come to no decision would be taken by these courts which would not be taken if the decision of the Oireachtas had been given.
Comment on this
I interrupted Deputy Baxter a moment ago with the intent of adding to the point that he was making. The Deputy was making the argument that if we discuss this Bill while persons are not under arrest, we can discuss the matter without any advertence to individuals. If we accepted any amendment such as Deputy Redmond and Deputy Rice propose, definitely it may mean, that by the time the Oireachtas assembles, we will have all the talk centring round individuals. The individuals will be under arrest, and Deputy Redmond makes what appears to him to be the valuable point that this section gives no power of arrest.
Comment on this
The Deputy might let me conclude and he can make his own argument when on his feet. He makes the valuable point that this gives no powers of arrest. It has not been insinuated that it gives any powers of arrest, but hereafter, when the Dáil comes to discuss the proclamation which has been made, it may then discuss that proclamation apart from individuals. There need not necessarily be people under arrest. But Deputy Baxter is right in saying that the most likely contingency will be that there will be individuals awaiting trial. Deputies will have their discussions coloured by the fact that it is so and so's fate that is being decided, and surely it is better to decide the issue in vacuo. It is better to decide it without advertence to individuals. It is better to decide it on the terms of the general proposition as to whether or not these powers should be given rather than to wait for the application of the powers when certain individuals are under arrest.
We are told that we can get an easy discussion on that. Look back on the last couple of days and see what discussions we have had centring around some unconscientious action that some muddled Executive Council might take about some trade unions. Think of all the hypothetical cases that might be ranged around an individual awaiting trial, and how his case might be made the exemplar of more of these imaginative trades unionists who might be charged with all sorts of crimes which the Executive Council might set out, operating under the powers of the Bill. We have had talk of executions. It is, apparently, being put to the House, insinuated, that what is being asked for is in effect the power of swift execution before the Executive Council has to meet the House. Just take the situation that would confront us, a situation so bad that some Executive Council would decide that the death penalty was necessary. In the first place, the Executive Council deciding that, would have to find out whether the offence triable before a special court was one which warranted death. There are not many offences named in the Schedule which do warrant death, but an Executive Council afraid to come to this House to face a discussion on a proclamation under the terms of which executions might take place in the future is going to execute and then come before the House. Are they not signing their own death warrants? I go further than saying that they are signing their own political death warrants. They are surely signing their own political death warrants, and they will cease to be Ministers of this State in a very short time.
What is likely to be the fate of men carrying through an execution which is supposed to be an illegal and unauthorised one, and then going out as ordinary citizens, to walk through the streets of this peaceable city? That is the contingency the House fears, and that is the slender foundation on which we have all this fabric of horror and suspicion reared. I have already alluded to the Schedule. If special courts are going to be set up they are going to be set up to try certain offences. The offences are treason, the carrying of arms, offences under the Firearms Act, murder or attempted murder of certain people named, and any offences declared by this Act to be a misdemeanour. No act or offence declared by this Act to be a misdemeanour warrants the death penalty. So we find that in respect of the only sentence which cannot be remitted, death, there are very few offences in which the special courts have that power.
They have it under Section 24 with regard to treason and murder and, under Section 27, with regard to certain offences relating to firearms. Those are offences for which an Executive Council is going to be so mad as to establish a special court—even pick a special court —which will give a death sentence and see that it is carried out. And you are going to have an Executive Council mad enough to do all that, but which will be afraid to meet this House. Yet the Executive will have to meet the House within at least three days of the death warrant being carried out.
We are discussing this section in the same atmosphere as was previously created with regard to trade unions. If you count on a completely mad Executive, a completely corrupt and subservient military court and a completely inefficient police force, anything may, of course, happen. But there are checks on all these things. There are cheeks on the special courts and there are checks on the Executive Council. The biggest check on the Executive Council is that the Dáil has to be summoned by the proclamation.
The case against accepting the amendment is definitely what the Minister for Agriculture stated—that there should be a prompt reply to certain types of crime when committed and that there should be prompt and exemplary sentences. But let nobody's imagination run away with the idea that death is the only exemplary sentence which, if carried out promptly, will have that effect. The mere fact that military courts are functioning and that sentences are being given, even though there is a review by the Dáil afterwards, in the sense that there is a debate as to whether the proclamation was rightly issued and whether the military courts were properly established, will have a deterring effect.
I have referred already to the police. I hope there will not be many who will follow Deputy Davin's line—that he is going to excuse his own inaction by an attack upon the police, that he is going to salve his own conscience for doing nothing and preventing people who desire to do something getting the necessary powers, by merely saying that if the police had been more efficient the Vice-President need not have been killed. Will the Deputy point out what standard of efficiency the police force will have to attain to protect every citizen of this State against a sniper's bullet? Let him think in what different ways people might have been murdered in this country. Let him examine all the different things which might have been done leading up to the murder, and he or anybody in this country can see whether he is justified in blaming the whole thing on the police.
Comment on this
Deputy Cooper and the Minister for Industry and Commerce appear to take exception to the statement I made regarding the efficiency of the police force. Until ten minutes ago, I had refrained from expressing that view but I came to that conclusion —a conclusion which other people came to outside—when I heard the statement made by the President in support of the Second Reading of this measure. The President gave members of this House a historical review of the activities of a certain political party and a certain secret military organisation by way of justification for the passing of this measure. When did the President and the members of the Executive Council get hold of that information? Why did they not give members of this House and the country, as a whole, that information when it came into their possession and then justify the introduction of a measure of this kind and not wait until a certain incident had cropped up? That is my justification for the statement which I made here to-day. I am entitled to hold that view and I do hold it in spite of what the Minister for Industry and Commerce has said.
Comment on this
If that evidence, plus a murder, is not justification for this measure, what other evidence, without the murder, would be justification for it?
Comment on this
The root of the trouble in this country lies in the existence of secret military organisations. I stated that in this House three or four years ago, when a similar measure was being discussed and when I introduced a certain amendment. There is no hope of destroying the element responsible for the recent assassination until you cut root and branch out of this country the secret organisations, whether military or otherwise. I moved an amendment to a previous Bill of the same type and, if the Minister for Industry and Commerce will look up the division list he will see whether I was then, as I am now, prepared to give power to the Executive Council to cut root and branch out of this country every element of secret organisations. Until you do that, there will be no use in passing measures of this kind. I know and the Minister for Industry and Commerce knows and those who sit with him on the Front Bench know perfectly well that there are men in the police force—even in high positions in the police force—who have been themselves members of a secret military organisation. That secret military organisation divided five or six years ago. One element went one way and the other element went another way. Does he not agree that it was reasonable to assume that the men who went into the Gárda Síochána should have been keeping a careful watch over the element which remained attached to that secret military organisation? We are told that it is only a little remnant of the secret military organisation that led up to the occurrence responsible for this Bill. Those who remained attached to it should be known to the members of the police force and they should have been dealt with before now and before this Bill was introduced.
Comment on this
Their movements should have been closely watched, as they could have been easily watched.
Comment on this
We are discussing amendment 43 to Section 20. On amendment 43, perhaps the whole question of Section 20 arises. But I do not think we can have a Second Reading debate on amendment 43 or on any other amendment. The question of the efficiency of the police force does not arise, and now that statements have been made by Deputy Davin, by the Minister and by Deputy Cooper, we may let that point rest and endeavour to confine the discussion to the question which arises on amendment 43— whether, after the proclamation has been issued, it will be valid without an approving resolution of the Dáil.
Comment on this
May I point out again that what is proposed in the amendment is to give the Oireachtas another opportunity before finally suspending the Constitution. The Bill says that in regard to certain sections of the Constitution, the power of suspension lies, for at least a period, solely with the Executive Council. The amendment, in effect, provides that power to suspend the Constitution may be proposed by the Executive, but can only be exercised with the approval of the Oireachtas. The Minister for Agriculture defended this proposition on the ground that the military courts are perfectly sound and reliable.
Comment on this
I did not. What I said was that I had as much right to assume that they were sound as the Deputy had to assume that they were unsound.
Comment on this
Pardon me. My position was that I was just as much entitled to assume that the military courts are sound as the Deputy is entitled to assume, as he always does, that they are unsound.
Comment on this
Inasmuch as I have never assumed they were unsound, he has no right to assume they are sound —just about as much right. On the very face of it, these courts are to consist of "three or more members, of whom one (who may be or not be an officer in the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann) shall be a person certified by the Attorney-General to have legal knowledge and experience, and the others shall be officers of the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann, not below the rank of Commandant." They may be, and I am sure will be, perfectly honest men in regard to the weighing of evidence, but they are not experienced in the weighing of evidence—they are not men of judicial temperament. Most of the men at present—I do not know what the case will be in five years—are men who have gone through a fierce political and military fight, and they have very definite prejudices and antipathies. With all the desire in the world to be honest, one must recognise that they are not of the judicial type, and are not trained in the weighing of evidence. One person must have legal knowledge and experience, but if he is one of those who are in the Army, as he may be, according to the section, his experience will not have been of the kind that is required in a criminal court. If there was at any time in the mind of the Executive Council any belief in the necessity for having a judiciary of experience, away from the influence of the Executive, and, as I said yesterday, standing between the Executive and the citizen, as a protection for the citizen, we ought to be slow before we give power to the Executive to abrogate that protection. The Constitution proposed by the Executive Council shows that they did at one time believe it was desirable, even necessary, that there should be some surety that the courts would not be military courts. Article 69 of the Constitution provides that
"All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their functions, and subject only to the Constitution and the law."
Article 70 says:—
"No one shall be tried save in due course of law, and extraordinary courts shall not be established, save only such military tribunals as may be authorised by law for dealing with military offenders against military law. The jurisdiction of military tribunals shall not be extended to or exercised over the civil population save in time of war, or armed rebellion, and for acts committed in time of war or armed rebellion, and in accordance with the regulations to be prescribed by law."
At that time there was a belief in the Executive Council and in the Oireachtas that there ought to be special provisions made in the Constitution regarding the trial of prisoners, and it was provided that there should not be extraordinary courts established save in certain circumstances. According to this section we are going to forego that; we are suspending that, or leaving the right to suspend it in the hands of the Executive Council. Inasmuch as the only reason for the establishment of these courts is a speedy judgment, all the more reason is it, in my opinion, that the Oireachtas should have the right to say whether the circumstances, as defined by the Executive Council to the Oireachtas at the time, satisfied the Oireachtas that the Constitution should be suspended.
Comment on this
Deputy Johnson seems to me to be appealing to our sense of beauty in matters of the written Constitution, as if the Constitution is a piece of lyric poetry that was to ensure definitely perfect peace and liberty, and fill everyone with a full appreciation of the liberties and rights of others, whereas, as I have said before, it can be of no use to us if the institutions that it is supposed to set up and guard are destroyed. I submit to Deputies that the reason for this particular section is that we are trying to persuade the Dáil that the information which the President gave in his Second Reading speech, and the acts which we have known have taken place, show that a conspiracy exists in the country of such a nature that it is quite possible that in a serious state of affairs later on, when it would be absolutely necessary for the safety of the State that justice should be dealt out and fully administered, the proper administration of justice would be prejudiced and destroyed by the very conspiracy that was bringing about the dangerous state of affairs.
What Deputies are called upon to decide in dealing with this section is whether the information given them and their knowledge of the facts and the possible tendencies that lie there are such that they can contemplate, at some particular time when it is necessary that justice should be fully administered to the people, that the courts are likely, as a result of the conspiracy, to be reduced to a condition in which justice will not be capable of being properly administered, and whether, granted the possibility of such a state of affairs, they are going to contemplate the setting up of military courts so that justice can be dealt out. It seems to me that if Deputies are convinced that there is any possibility of such a state of affairs being brought about, then the only thing they can do is to give the Executive Council the powers sought in this section. The Executive Council will have the fullest and the completest possible information—at any rate will have the responsibility for safeguarding the State at that particular time and for handing that responsibility on to whoever takes it from them. They should be put in a position to say that the time had come when the conspiracy had jeopardised and perhaps destroyed the courts for the ordinary administration of justice, and be enabled to take a decision to set up military courts. Anybody who wanted to argue against the necessity for taking such action as that would have to make his case against the Executive Council, which standing up to its responsibilities was taking the kind of action that it considered necessary for the preservation of the State.
It does seem a fair and reasonable proposition that the Executive Council, which is responsible for the safety of the State at the moment, should be given the power that Deputies may consider would be required by it. I submit that that is the only consideration. Niceties as to whether the Executive Council in such a position should be controlled within five or seven or twenty-one days cannot be compared with the question as to whether you are going to arm the Executive Council with power to take such action as that, and to stand up and defend that action if possible; and if they are not able to defend it, at any rate to hand over in a healthy and safe way the Government of the State to whatever other Council will take its place.
Comment on this
I rise to support the amendment. No argument put forward from the Government Benches, to my mind, carries any weight against the proposed amendment. No explanation was given by any of the Ministers in support of the original section which would hold water. This proposed amendment would act as a useful break on precipitate action by the Executive Council. We are assured that no Executive Council in the world would take precipitate action in such an emergency. Very well. Why want such power as to rush a man to his doom in a few days? There is no disguising the fact that it is executions that are prompting this sub-section (4). We are not fools on these Benches not to see quite plainly written across that section that executions may be required. I will not go any further than that. I feel inclined to but I will not.
The Minister for Industry and Commerce pointed out the invidious position the Executive Council would be in if they came up here, having prisoners in custody, to get special courts and these prisoners got severe sentences which were carried out. If they asked for these courts and they were turned down by the Dáil they would have to resign and go out as ordinary citizens, and what would their lives be worth? In effect that was the way he put it. I put it to this House that if they rush men to their doom and a vote of this House, although it cannot censure their action, disapproves of the courts continuing any further, can any Ministry with any honour retain office for one hour further? They would have to go as private citizens. Then the very argument put up by the Minister for Industry and Commerce applies, and their lives would not be worth an hour's purchase.
It was rather unfortunate what the President said with some heat in reply to Deputy Redmond. "Who tried the Vice-President"? he asked. "Was there a judge and a jury"? I wonder does the President and other Ministers want to come down to the same level and compare themselves with assassins? Is not that the standard of comparison made by the President himself?
Comment on this
Well if not, words have no meaning to my mind. I take no other meaning out of what he said, and I doubt if many Deputies in this House took any other meaning out of it. I do not know what other meaning could be taken out of it. Either of the amendments proposed by Deputy Rice or Deputy Redmond would relieve the Executive Council of a very irksome responsibility. I think it will be difficult for the Executive Council to justify the tenacity with which they are sticking to their original proposal if they do not concede the very reasonable amendment proposed by Deputy Redmond.
Exception was taken to the statement made by Deputy Davin in reference to the police. I am not going to make that statement. Deputy Davin can, of course, speak for himself, but my interpretation of his statement and of his intention at the time he made it was different from the interpretation put on it by other Deputies. I gathered that if there was a little alertness that unfortunate incident might have been averted. Deputy Cooper said——
Comment on this
I do not know if Deputy Belton would agree with me, but I tried to conclude that question as to the police, and what Deputy Davin meant, at a particular point. Deputy Davin made a statement, the Minister made his statement, and Deputy cooper made a statement, and I do not think that the position would be improved by any more discussion about it. It is not really relevant to this. In fairness to Deputy Davin himself, I allowed him to make a second statement. Perhaps if Deputy Belton did not try to interpret Deputy Davin at all it would be just as well.
Comment on this
I was not going to labour the point, but I want to connect certain statements made in the House. Deputy Cooper said that the Vice-President took unnecessary risks. There is not a member of this House nor a man, woman or child in Ireland who will not say he took unnecessarily foolish and made risks in view of the information disclosed by the President on the Second Reading of this measure. Now, if a man asks for trouble he will get it, and if he goes into danger there is no use crying out when his fingers are burnt. The Minister for Industry and Commerce, I am afraid, "blew the whole gaff." He asked what state of efficiency would you want the police force in this country to be in to save a man from the sniper's bullet. Will this Bill save a man from the sniper's bullet? Will any legislation you pass here save a man from the sniper's bullet? The Ministers know that there are men in this country who, if they are driven to it, will walk up in the street in face of a battalion of soldiers, blow the brains out of a man if he drives them into a corner, throw their revolvers on the ground and say, "My life is forfeit." That is what you are driving these men to. You are not dealing with criminals or with an underground of ruffianism, but you are dealing with the remnants of the I.R.B., that Ministers manufactured into being members of the I.R.B., and who now, according to their definition, are criminals, but who are men imbued with the loftiest ideals of patriotism. We may disagree with their methods and you are going to have revenge, perhaps, for some difference of opinion with you when you were at one time fellow-members of the same organisation.
Comment on this
Does the Deputy suggest that the men who assassinated the Vice-President were not criminals?
Comment on this
Nobody suggested that they were not criminals, but I have a suggestion to make, and it is that Deputy Rice's amendment should not be forgotten.
Comment on this
I think the interruption is unworthy of any remark, and I will treat it as such. This is a terribly grave step that the House is taking, and perhaps it would not be extravagant language if I were to describe it as a step on which the destinies of the country will depend. We were told. until we got this Bill, that we had a perfect harvest of law and order, but if the Government really want to restore law and order they should go cautiously, and when they are met with suggestions by men who are as anxious to restore law and order as they are they should consider them seriously for none of us wants to live in a criminal lunatic asylum, nor do we want our children to be brought up in one. We all want law and order, but I think that the Bill was forged in a criminal lunatic asylum, particularly this section, which is the tit-bit and the kernel of the whole thing. It puts it in this way: "There are certain fellows we want to get hold of, and we want to get hold of them when the Dáil is not sitting. We want to set up our special courts, and put these fellows over the top, and even if our action is not approved of we cannot be censured or called to order for it." In what I might call plain, agricultural language, that is the position as it appears to me. That is and will be the position of the man in the street.
This proposed legislation puts Buckshot Forster in the shade. Whether it is people of a certain political outlook or of an opposite political outlook who do certain acts in this country, these acts go all over the world as the acts of Irishmen to Irishmen, and we have to bear the shame and disgrace, or the opposite, according to whether they are well-advised or ill-advised. Amendments are put down to this Bill in perfect faith, reasonable amendments that will not allow justice to be cheated, as has been pointed out by Deputy Redmond and Deputy McMenamin. You get your man; you have power to keep him for two months; during that two months you can employ either of two courses, having the machinery of Executive government; you can summon the House before you act or you can be responsible to the House after you act. What is more reasonable than that? Did any organisation go to the people and ask them to put into the hands of seven or eight men the lives, liberties and property of the citizens and the destinies of the people? Nobody did so, because neither his life nor his property would have been safe if he had dared to stand on a public platform and advocate that. But having got in here, the Government wants to manipulate the House. It is not the Executive Council that the country will look to but the Dáil. The whole 153 Deputies cannot be members of the Executive Council. They are members of the Dáil. They can raise any question that interferes with the liberty of the citizen. But the people were asked to vote for them to protect the liberty of the citizen. No Deputy has a mandate to place the liberty of the citizen in the hands of seven, eight, or ten individuals, I do not care who they are Deputies who vote for this measure vote for something that, in my opinion, they have no constitutional authority for, and I hope that the legal luminaries on the Government Benches, who take good care to be out when this is being considered, will answer this question, put, not from the bar or from the library of the courts; where I understand all legal points are decided, but put straight from an ordinary class, the principal and, I must add, the most honourable class in the country—direct from the plough. What authority have you to vote for a dictatorship of one man, or seven men, or ten men? Who gave me authority to do that? I got 9,000 votes at the last election. Did any man vote for me to do that? No, and they will repudiate—and they would not be worthy citizens if they did not—every Deputy who votes to hand over the lives and liberties of the people to seven or eight individuals, who did not use moderation in days gone by. If they had, there would be less need for this measure now.
Comment on this
I wish to support the amendment. I cannot see any reason why the Minister, or the Ministry as a whole, as I suppose there is collective responsibility, would not accept some of the amendments that were put down to this section. There is no reason why the first amendment should not be accepted, and let the responsibility for the proclamation be the responsibility of the Dáil instead of being that of a few Ministers. In the course of the 21 days during which a resolution annulling the proclamation might be passed here, we might find that the courts had been set up, men arrested, tried, sentenced to death, and executed within 21 days before the Dáil had come to a decision. I think the amendment aims at guarding against that state of affairs, to protect the citizen from execution before the elected representatives of the State had an opportunity of considering the matter and coming to a decision. I think the amendment is a reasonable one, and should appeal to any man who desires to do right, and that Ministers should not be allowed to overload themselves with greater responsibility than is necessary to maintain law and order, and all that it includes. It is an appalling state of affairs to find a Ministry wanting powers for the whole 21 days. Under the proclamation courts would be established, arrests made, and trials and executions could take place in that period. Can the Minister for Local Government tell us, as we have only him here, and he is not likely to be in charge of either of the two Departments concerned——
Comment on this
I suppose having past experience, the Minister might be able to give us some answer.
Comment on this
No one has criticised it yet in the matter of unfair actions of military courts. Much has been stated against military officers and their capacity for acting in these courts.
Comment on this
I am not criticising the attitude of the Minister in the past. I referred to the fact that having past experience he might be able to reply now. Is he not aware that, under the proclamation we might have from the Executive Council, in the very near future, men could be arrested, tried by these military courts, sentenced to death and executed before the Dáil assembled? That is not impossible. There is nothing to prevent that. Even if the present Executive Council would not agree to such a course being taken when this Bill comes into force, is there any guarantee that the Executive might not be displaced by others, who might not be so lenient as the present Executive professes to be? It must be realised that there are many other Deputies than the 46 that go to form the present Government Party. The whole position needs review. I think it is the opinion of every man who desires to see State affairs proceeding normally, that Deputy Rice's first amendment to this section should be accepted, and that the Executive Council should take no action, nor allow any court to be set up nor any trial or execution to take place, until the Dáil has given them authority to do so.
Comment on this
All this talk about the possibility of persons being taken within a few days for the purpose of being executed is avoiding the real issue, which is that these sections are put in, in the first place, as a protection against an attack on the civil courts by the conspiracy we are dealing with, and in case of the expectation of these courts not succeeding in protecting the civil courts, securing that justice shall be properly and effectively administered. It is simply running away from the question, as to how our civil courts are to be protected, and what steps are to be taken to secure the proper administration of justice, if the operations of our civil courts are prejudiced in any way. Deputies are running away from the consideration of what should be done in these cases when they talk about the execution of persons who are caught within a few days. Section 24, sub-section (3) says:—
Every sentence and every order and judgment of a special court shall be carried out by the civil authorities and officers by whom and in the like manner as a life sentence, order, or judgment of the Central Criminal Court is required by law to be carried out.
As far as I know anything of it, that does not provide for a hasty execution, the summary carrying out of a sentence by a military court.
Comment on this
Would the Minister say if there is anything in the section to debar the Executive Council, or the court, having the execution carried out within the 21 days?
Comment on this
I rose to put the section and I was proceeding to put it when the Deputy rose. He should have risen before I did, if he wanted to speak.
Comment on this
The Deputy cannot remain standing while I am on my feet. I rose to put the section and I had begun to put it. I looked round and had no evidence that any Deputy was going to speak. I propose to put the Question now.
Comment on this
Amendment 44 hangs on the amendment just discussed.
Comment on this
The Committee divided: Tá,
Do you agree with this result?
I want to register my protest against Section 20 as it now stands. I also want to register my personal protest against military courts. We ought to have had in this country quite a sufficient experience of military courts, an experience which should certainly influence us not only against establishing these courts, but even against the very phrase "military courts." These words convey very bitter memories to many Irishmen to-day, and, in my view, there is nothing more calculated to revive some of those old feuds, and some of the very recent feuds, that existed in our country than the use of this term "military courts." The intention apparently is to prolong the period of remand at present, and it gets away from what, I feel sure, most of the Deputies desire, namely, that if crime is committed there should be speedy and adequate justice.
Comment on this
On a point of order. I wish to point out that the question of military courts comes up in Part 4 of the Bill. I would ask for your ruling whether that should be discussed now.
Comment on this
That Section 20 stand part of the Bill.
Comment on this
I suggest that it would be better to discuss the whole question of military courts under Section 22.
Comment on this
For the information of Deputy Alton, it is as well to read this section:—"Whenever the Executive Council is of opinion that it is necessary in order to secure the due administration of justice and the sure punishment of crime that persons charged with any of the offences mentioned in the Schedule to this Act should be brought before and tried by special courts established under this Act in lieu of the ordinary courts, the Executive Council may by proclamation declare that Part 4 of this Act shall come into operation." I will ask Deputy Alton now to turn to Part 4.
Comment on this
To save the Deputy the trouble of instructing me on the Bill, I desire to say that I have already read it.
Comment on this
The Deputy requires instruction or he would not have interrupted me. I want to say that I challenge the wisdom of the whole scheme of the Bill. This is not the time to introduce legislation of this kind. We know that at the moment the atmosphere——
Comment on this
On a point of order, are we discussing this particular section, or the wisdom of introducing the Bill at this particular time?
Comment on this
The Deputy must confine himself to the section.
Comment on this
On a further point of order, where in Section 20 are the words "military courts" set out?
Comment on this
The proclamation certainly mentions a special court which, after all, is a military court. Of course I can understand the Deputy's interruption if he has not read the Bill. In my view, this proposal is an attempt to filch from the people their natural rights and privileges. We have been told that the people are our masters, and that all power comes from the sovereign people of Ireland. I submit that in this part of the Bill we are proposing to abrogate those powers absolutely. As I said before, whilst I find myself in agreement with some portions of the Bill I take particular exception to Section 20, and I now make my protest against it.
Comment on this
I also have some criticism to offer on this section and on much the same lines followed by Deputy Anthony. I presume that in dealing with the section I will have the opportunity of saying some things that I might have said if I had taken part in the discussion on the amendments that have been dealt with. In the course of the debate the President stated that the Executive were willing to take all the responsibility in this connection and to relieve the Dáil of any responsibility in connection with the ratification of the proclamation necessary to set up such courts. I do not know that the members of the Dáil would be anxious to be relieved of their responsibility in that matter. I do not know that it is quite fair to suggest, as it has been very frequently, that any section of the House is willing to evade its responsibility in this or any other connection. This Bill is a very serious one, and whether Deputies support it or oppose it they all realise that it is a very grave measure. I think there should be some general agreement as to the safeguards necessary if the Bill is to be put into operation.
During the course of the debate yesterday Ministers referred very frequently to the check that would be on this legislation, when enacted, as a result of Parliamentary control. I submit that a clear case has been made for rigorous Parliamentary control in this connection, having regard to the very grave nature of the Bill itself. I am in agreement with Deputy Anthony in regard to what he said about military courts. Within the last few days I heard a very eminent lawyer, who had very considerable experience of military courts, discuss them. He said that while they were very just, and composed of men who were always anxious to do their duty fairly, that the members of them were entirely ignorant of the law. He referred to the courts set up by the British Government in this country. We have no reason to think that the courts to be set up by our own Government, and consisting of military officers in this country, will be any wiser in the administration of the law than the officers who adjudicated in similar courts previously.
This section is one of the most repugnant in the whole Bill, and whether the Government agree with me or not I am quite satisfied that the very general opposition there is to the Bill throughout the country is largely because of this particular section, because it opens up an avenue to feuds, bitterness and recollections that are painful to everyone in this country. Military courts in the old days were known, in many cases, to have sentenced men to death. These sentences were carried out, although it was generally known all over the country that the men so sentenced were entirely innocent. While I am not at all anxious to suggest that mistakes of that kind will be repeated. I do suggest that the setting up of courts with men who have no knowledge of the law—two members of the courts, at any rate, will not be bound to have any knowledge of law—is a very dangerous procedure. While I grant that there is a grave situation to be dealt with, I feel this proposal is entirely too drastic, and that at any rate, if military courts are to be justified at all they ought to be composed entirely of people who would have legal knowledge and who would have, as was suggested some time ago, the method, the ability, and the knowledge required for summing up the evidence tendered at these courts. I sincerely trust that even yet the arguments that are being advanced in favour of a revision of this proposal to establish rough-and-ready courts to dispense rough-and-ready justice will be accepted in the light of the case that can certainly be made for such a revision.
Comment on this
This section proposes to set up special courts and outlines the methods by which they shall be set up, namely, by proclamation. For my part I would like it to be understood that if the Executive Council have reason to believe from information or reports—information which perhaps they are not able to impart to the Dáil from the point of view of public policy—that some form of special courts might be necessary in case of grave emergency, I would not object, but where I quarrel with the Executive and the Government is as regards the form of the court and the method of the proclamation.
Comment on this
I am not going to deal with the form of the courts on this section, because I have an amendment down specifically proposing to alter that form in a subsequent section, but I would have been disposed to have gone this far with the Government and the Executive Council in this section, to have permitted them, as far as I was concerned, to obtain powers to set up certain special courts, even by way of proclamation. I object entirely, as I think I have stated on the discussion of the last few amendments, to the mode of such proclamation. To this section two amendments have been proposed, one by Deputy Rice, the other by myself, the effect of which would have been practically identical and which would have altered this section but would not have altered, in my view, its main purpose. The purpose is that if, in the opinion of the Executive Council, the emergency is such that special courts should be set up, they should have the power to set up these special courts by proclamation, but that proclamation should be subject to the approval, whether by ratification or otherwise, of the Dáil or the Oireachtas and within that period in which they might get that approval no act that would be done should be legalised by this section. Therefore I am constrained to vote against this section, because not only are the Government requiring special courts but they are insisting upon every letter of their proposal in the section.
Now, I thought that there was a possible means of accommodation when I suggested to the President that I would be prepared to allow the time which was stated here as twenty-one days to be shortened, but even there, neither he nor any of his colleagues would abate one jot. It is against that attitude as much as against the distinct proposal contained in this section, which is nothing short of this, that for a certain period the Executive Council shall be the sole masters of the lives of certain people in this country, that I propose to record my vote. I think that there might have been accommodation.
I think that what Deputy Rice and myself asked in our amendments was reasonable, and would in no way have interfered with the working of the section, and, further, that the proposals that we made were sound, constructive proposals which the Government might have been well advised to have adopted. Instead of that they have chosen the other course. They have chosen to insist on every word in this section which will enable a proclamation to be made setting up these special courts which will ensure, as the last two lines of sub-section (4) provides, that no matter what takes place during that period—however short that period may be, it does not really matter or affect the argument—the Executive Council shall not be held responsible for any action that will take place. I object to that, from the point of view of the Ministers themselves. It is placing them, I think, in an unnecessarily invidious position. I object to it also from the point of view of the fundamental basis of our constitutional rights. This State is supposed to be governed by representatives elected by the people, who elect the Executive Council, which is responsible to that representative assembly, and through them to the people. This takes away such responsibility. I think in that respect it is injurious to the proper regard and respect which should be expected from the people of this country towards the Constitution and the State in which they live. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, I will vote against the section as a whole, not because I think that it might not be advisable to give the Executive certain powers to set up courts by proclamation, even if they so desire, but that it should not give them powers to set up courts by the method and in the manner of the proclamation proposed in this section.
Comment on this
I think the Minister for Agriculture gave us the keynote of this Bill and this section when he stated "speedy justice." He did not tell us what he meant by speedy justice, but we, in this country, have had many examples of speedy justice, and I, for one, do not want any repetition of that speedy justice. In dealing with this section we have to take into account the sections we have already passed. We have to take into consideration that it is provided in those sections that several political organisations and some semi-military organisations, and any organisation the Executive have a mind to declare unlawful, are to be suppressed and put outside the law. If the sections are put into operation they will immediately mean arrest, imprisonment, the breaking up of home life, of social life, and all those things, and it will be up to these citizens to decide whether they are to be quietly taken from their homes and cast into prison, or whether they are to make some kind of resistance. Personally, if I were one of these I would say, "If I am to be taken, I will be taken forcibly; I will not be taken quietly." That is the position of this, and it is bound to lead to turmoil and civil war, and the result will be the sacrifice of human life on both sides. That is the state of emergency the Executive pre-supposes to exist before this section is brought into operation. That being so, they have got to take into consideration the state of mind in which these courts will assemble. We have had experience of military courts in the past. Deputies who took part in the 1916 Rising are fully aware that from the military point of view the Rising was an absolute failure. Had it not been for the incompetence and blindness of the British militarists of that period we would have been laughed at as fools. At the most, we would have been looked upon as over-zealous people.
The rising that was a failure was made a success because of that speedy justice that was meted out to Padraig Pearse and his gallant comrades. We do not want to see a repetition of that in this country. So far as I am concerned, I do not want to give powers to any Executive to set up courts which will be in operation for a number of days before this assembly will know anything about it and which will be able to administer that speedy justice to which a Minister referred to-day but did not define. Questions such as banishment from the country are matters that can wait. The only speedy justice that cannot wait is the speedy justice of execution. We who know something of military courts cannot expect much justice from them. The President tells us that there will be a check on the Executive. I presume that he means that this Oireachtas should be a check on the Executive. Look across the benches and see the check on the Executive. Deputy Baxter told us that when the Oireachtas meets to consider the proclamations some will think that this is right and some will think that that is right.
We are told we are not prepared to shoulder our responsibilities. I submit that some Deputies are not prepared even to think at all, or, if they do, they are not prepared to give vocal expression to their thoughts. We have had no contribution to this debate from those Deputies. We have not had even the usual "hear, hear" from Deputy Gorey. They have sat tight, and when Bunty pulls the strings the marionettes come into the Division Lobby and vote as they are directed. During the time in which we are discussing the most important section of the Bill, where are its supporters? They are lounging about somewhere, listening for the bell to summon them in to vote and to give away what is most important and vital to all citizens, namely, the right to be tried by their peers. We talk about the British régime in the past, but all through that régime we never had a measure containing clauses of this description which would put "Bloody" Balfour and the rest of them to shame. I hope when the Division is called that Deputies will realise that there is a greater duty than the duty to Party, that there is a duty to humanity and liberty, and that they will answer that call by voting in the proper lobby and not act merely as machines.
Comment on this
I oppose this section, as I believe it is the most tyrannical one in the Bill owing to the fact that it gives effect to all that is despotic and unwarrantable in it. It is news, both in this country and elsewhere, to discover a Government establishing military courts when no necessity for a state of martial law exists. When we had military courts in this country they operated under a state of martial law, and many of our citizens in those days were tried by those courts. Many of them were sentenced to death and many of them to terms of imprisonment, but there was a right of appeal from such courts. In this particular case, by proclamation certain courts are to be set up without any right of appeal from their decisions. Let us not be worse than those whom we once called foreign despotic brutes across the water.
One gentleman, who has been a past member of the Government Party and who is not here now, once made that reference to the people whom we were then fighting, and I am sure when he made it it was in accord with the minds of the people with whom he was associated. There is no necessity in any country for setting up military tribunals unless in times of revolution accompanied by the use of arms. We have no revolution here now and we are not promised one. There is nothing at the moment that would justify this particular section being put into operation. Ministers may say that it is all right to set up military tribunals to protect the State from the guns of assassins but, no matter how much we deplore it, I do not think that the assassination of one individual, be he Minister or otherwise, justifies the setting up of military tribunals. Deputy Gorey may laugh.
Comment on this
I am not laughing, but when the Deputy says that one is not sufficient I want to ask him how many would be sufficient?
Comment on this
Of course he can, and I believe every time he laughs he is satisfied. I want to say that not one of those who constitute the Ministry has put up a concrete case to show why we should have military tribunals to try prisoners without giving them a right of appeal. Even on that point alone, every Deputy who thinks rightly and who has at heart something more than the retention of the Government, who has at heart the interests of the citizens, will vote against the section, whereas those who vote for it merely in order to retain confidence and preserve the Government, will vote against the expressed will of the people in relation to this particular measure. There is not an individual, who is not a partisan outside this House, who does not condemn this piece of legislation.
We may have declarations and manifestations in support of this particular measure from the Ministerial benches, but they are such as have been acquired from partisans, because Ministers do not go down amongst the people of the country and do not acquire the information which ordinarily Deputies acquire. If they did, they would not be so determined or so anxious to force their views on this House and to have a section such as this inserted in the Bill and put through the House by means of what has just been described as a voting machine. Every Minister realises what it means to have military courts. I realise it. I saw many men going before military courts long ago, men with whom I was associated and whom I knew would not, and did not, get justice from those tribunals.
Comment on this
They were British military courts and we know that they did not give justice. That is known to the President and every Minister. Justice was not given by these military tribunals to the people who were at their mercy. We cannot say that even in a court chosen from our own Army to-day there will not be prejudiced individuals. Some men who have been in custody before would probably be marked men and may be arrested again. These may be men who were interned only and no charge preferred against them, men who gave good service in other days and who are likely to become an eyesore to some of the officers of the law in the future. We know instances where men were sadly abused while in the custody of certain officers of the Irish Free State.
Comment on this
The Deputy will say no more on this particular section. If his attitude of mind towards the Chair is that when he makes a remark outside the discussion and is called to order he tells the Chair that he has made a remark and it cannot be stopped he will say no more.
Comment on this
I want to emphasise my objection to this section. It is difficult to say which is the worst section in the Bill; every section seems to be bad. One is inclined to believe that Section 20, like other sections that have been passed, was born in a panic—perhaps panic might not be the correct word, but it was born at a time when it was not reasonable to expect, because of what had occurred, that those responsible for the measure would have that sobriety of mind necessary in dealing with alterations of the Constitution such as is proposed in Section 20 as well as in preceeding sections. Whether the section was born in panic, or was due to disturbance in the minds of the Ministers or not, the fact remains that an extraordinary effort is being made for the purpose of upsetting the Constitution and depriving the ordinary citizen of his fundamental rights. When a Minister stands up in justification of the measure and says that there must be liberty in the country, and that those who are opposed to that must realise their position and take responsibility for their actions, one wonders is he alive to the fact that he is endeavouring to justify the deprivation of the fundamental rights of the ordinary citizen. Say what we will as regards the constitution of the officers comprising the court, we know that the name of a military court in this country is abhorred by all peaceful, decent citizens. We know from experience in the past that the person who is going to be tried before a military court is going to be summarily dealt with.
A Minister in contributing to the debate used the unfortunate expression "speedy justice." That may be afterwards explained as meaning, not speedy justice, but speedy action. We have Deputies only recently returned by the electorate coming into this House and indicating by their votes on this very important measure that they are carrying out the desires of their constituents in supporting the Bill. No man can say what the effect of this measure will be before this day twelve months. We all know that history has a happy knack of repeating itself in this country. One can imagine what will be the outcome of Section 20 being applied to military courts set up to administer speedy justice, or, perhaps, as I have said before, speedy action. What are you going to have as a result of another swing in the political pendulum? People may say that what occurred in the past happened because the executions and actions of military courts then were the outcome of foreign régime. It must be remembered that during the time this House is not in session those sections may be put into operation, and there may be many arrests, deportations, and, perhaps, executions. With a swing of the political pendulum you may have another political party in power imbued with the same spirit as some may be imbued with in passing this Bill, and feeling that they too would be justified in taking extreme action. Where do the ordinary persons, business men, artisans and labourers not concerned with political activities come in? It would be little consolation if it was found necessary that justice must be done, and done speedily, if after that speedy justice is carried out we awaken to the fact that mistakes are made. Other Deputies have stated that this is the most important section in the Bill, but, so far as I am concerned, I do not, as I have said, know which is the most important, they are all so far-reaching, they all mean so much, and they all seem to be contributed to in such a flippant manner.
One could understand that on yesterday, when dealing with a section similar to Section 20, we were obliged to sit until 10.30. One cannot refrain from thinking that reprisal is coming on reprisal, and that, perhaps, the reason we have got to sit here until 8.30 in the morning is a reprisal, because of the fact that we have had the temerity to question some of the sections in the Bill. If it is true to say that we are guilty only of showing an anxiety that this Bill will not have a reactionary effect on the whole country, nobody can say we are constitutionally wrong in criticising it. Nobody can say that in criticising the Bill, after we have fulfilled all the obligations laid down by the Constitution, we are exceeding our rights. If our actions are to be open to a reprisal such as I have mentioned, surely that fact would tend to confirm the contention that those who set themselves to draft these sections were not in the sobriety of mind they would normally have been in if they were dealing with a measure such as this under other circumstances.
I can understand their heated feelings. Perhaps, if other people had the responsibility of government and had to meet the state of affairs that the present Government had to meet, they might feel in the same estranged state of mind that some of us believe Ministers were in when drafting these sections. If we go so far as to say that, it is no justification whatever for such a Bill. I think we are justified in saying that such sections as are contained in the Bill would never have seen the light of day except for the circumstances which obtained. I do not know whether panic is the correct word to apply to that state of mind, but I do believe that the measure will not carry out the intentions of the Government, but will absolutely destroy even that which the Government hope to achieve.
Comment on this
I rise to oppose Section 20 of this Bill. One of the main reasons I do so is that I believe the power given to the Executive Council is entirely too great under this section. I believe the power given to the Executive Council is a power of dictatorship for the time being. Dictatorship in the case of life and death and dictatorship by any Executive Council for the time being is a proposition for which no Parliament in the year 1927 could reasonably stand. There is a principle involved when an Executive Council for a certain time will not be responsible to a Parliament chosen by the express will of the people. That is the first objection which I make to this Bill. To-day, when President Cosgrave said his Government were saving Parliamentary institutions, I could not help thinking that they were doing the very opposite and that it was the people on these benches—people who are taunted with evading their responsibilities—who were saving Parliamentary institutions. If there is any section of this Bill which a reasonable man detests more than another, it is the section authorising the setting up of special courts which in reality will be military courts. Any man who has lived in this country for the past eight or twelve years knows what is meant by a military court. Moreover, the men who occupy positions as military officers to-day came through the Anglo-Irish trouble and also through a period of internecine strife. The military tribunals which they served on in the past were held at midnight by the side of a fence in the years 1920 and 1921. No man can expect an officer who went through such a period to have any very accurate idea of the law, and he cannot be expected to sit down a few years later in a camp, perhaps behind barbed wire entanglements, and mete out even-handed justice. It is not to be expected from a military man, and it is not fair to a military man to put him in that position. We have been told that we are evading our responsibilities and that we are standing in the way of those who are trying to save Parliamentary institutions. But I claim that we are the people who are trying to save Parliamentary institutions, and who are trying to save the people from military courts and despotism.
Comment on this
Question—"That Section 27 stand part of the Bill"—put.
Do you agree with this result?
I move amendment 47:—
In sub-section (1), line 6, to delete all words after the word "force" to the end of the sub-section.
The virtue, if I may so call it, of this section lies, like the last one, in the concluding sentence, which again, like the last section, exposes the very pretence of the earlier wording of the section, which it is hoped to pass off as a provision to preserve citizens' lives. It is as plain as a pikestaff to me that this and the previous sections, which constitute Part III. of this Bill, are worded to give the dominant political party, for a period of not less than three days, and possibly as much as five days, liberty to run riot with the lives and liberties of their late political friends and present political enemies through these courts before this House can possibly intervene. Anything done within that time under the Proclamation stands valid even as to its continuing effect. I call particular attention to these words in sub-section (1), "continuing effect," which appear to me to cover the case of a man hauled before a military court within the three days or five days intervening between the Proclamation and the reference to this House and receiving a long sentence of penal servitude or something of a like nature. Although, as soon as the matter comes before the House, the Proclamation and everything done under it may stand condemned in the clearest terms, still his sentence continues, as far as I can interpret the wording, without the possibility of revision. If merely temporary measures or precautions were intended by these sections, these indemnity clauses would have been omitted. I think that their insertion points clearly to the motive of the clauses, and that they are a very serious warning to those who are asked to pass them.
There is another matter that I should like to refer to: that there are outside the House at present at least fifty Deputies elected only the other day by the vote of the people, and we are quite safe in assuming that this Bill is directly contrary to the mandate that they received and to their opinions. Inside the House we have a minority varying between twenty and thirty-five against the provisions of the Bill. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that, on balance, this Bill is against the lately-expressed wish of the country at the General Election, and is being rushed through in the face of that very clear expression.
Comment on this
According to that argument, we should say that we can do nothing, that we have to hold our hands and say that by reason of the decision given in the late election we must only mark time—that we are not in a position to do anything; that nobody has any authority to do anything. If the Deputy will take the trouble to look up the legislation passed since 1922 he will find that in any Act in which provision is made for the Oireachtas to object to an order or proclamation by the Executive Council, exactly the same terminology has been used, and that this is not any new method of giving an unusual indemnity to the Executive Council.
Comment on this
I think the President is in error. If he refers to the Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act, 1926, Section 1, sub-section (4), he will find that the words to which particular attention is drawn by Deputy Hewson, "continuing operation and effect," are not included in the provisions of that Act. It reads:—
"Every proclamation made under this section shall be forthwith published in the ‘Iris Oifigiúil' and shall also be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made, and if either such House shall, within the next subsequent twenty-one days on which that House has sat, pass a resolution revoking such proclamation, such proclamation shall forthwith expire, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under such proclation."
That is understandable. Once the power is there to establish the courts and give them effect if the House or Houses then declare that such proclamation is not to be effective, that does not make invalid, or should not make invalid, Acts which have been sanctioned in a tentative fashion by the Oireachtas. But there is a very great difference between making valid acts committed with the authority of the Oireachtas, even though that authority was of a temporary nature, and following it up by saying that "anything done thereunder or the continuing operation and effect of any conviction, sentence, order or judgment made thereunder" is to operate. "Continuing operation and effect of any conviction" is, I think, much the more important feature of the portion of the lines which the Deputy desires to delete, because it means that, notwithstanding the decision of the Oireachtas as to the unwisdom of setting up special courts, the proceedings of these courts, and the judgments and sentences of these courts must continue, and there is no appeal from them. If within that time there is a sentence of five, ten or fifteen years, there is no appeal, and the judgment must remain, and the only method of revising the decision of these courts will be by the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. That is a very great distinction, and I think it is not correct to say that in any previous Act such words have been used, certainly not in the Public Safety Act of 1926.
Comment on this
Question—"That the Schedule stand part of the Bill"—put.
Do you agree with this result?
I move amendment number 48:—
In sub-section (1), line 16, to delete all words after the word "Council" to the end of the section and substitute therefor the words "a tribunal consisting of three members who shall be judges of the High Court."
The effect of the amendment would be to substitute one class of civil court for the proposed court consisting partly of military officers. As I said on Section 20, I would be prepared to give powers to the Executive by way of the institution of special courts, even by proclamation, if that proclamation was subject to ratification, or had to be preceded by ratification by the Oireachtas. But I would not be in favour, in any circumstances, certainly not in circumstances which seem to me to present themselves to-day, of granting the powers set out in this section.
The amendment reads:—
To delete all words after the word "Council" to the end of the section and substitute therefor the words "a tribunal consisting of three members who shall be Judges of the High Court."
That means that the whole section should be deleted after the word "Council," that one court shall be established as a special court, and that that court shall consist of Judges of the High Court. While putting forward Judges of the High Court as members for this special court, I want it to be understood that if it is considered wiser to make the whole judiciary available for this purpose I would not stand in the way. If the Judges of the High Court were not easily available, owing to the pressure of their normal business, I would be inclined, in the first place, to ask them specially to act in these courts, and to set up some substitute for the conduct of ordinary business, because, to my mind, this is more important than the conduct of the ordinary business of the State. But, even if that would not suit the desires of the Executive, I would be prepared to have any other judges, whether they be Supreme Court or Circuit Court Judges, available for a similar purpose. It might be said that this proposal of mine may place the judges in a particularly awkward —shall I say dangerous—position. As I said on the Second Reading, I have no doubt that the judges in the Free State are willing to take the responsibility, and to do what they consider their duty by the State. From the position they are in, as men learned in the law, as men who have been thought fit to occupy the positions they do at present, I am confident that they could view it in no other light but as their duty to act, if they were so requested.
The object of this amendment is to do away with what, personally, I regard as the most invidious proposal in the whole Bill. This proposal to institute military courts—I shall deal with the term in a moment, as they have been so described up to this—is, to my mind, wholly unnecessary. Not only is it unnecessary, but it goes very far indeed towards upsetting the bedrock of our Constitution. Article 70 is, if not directly, very pointedly, abrogated by this section. Article 70 has already been referred to in these debates, and I think on this particular amendment it is worth referring to again. Article 70 of the Constitution reads:
No one shall be tried save in due course of law and extraordinary courts shall not be established, save only such Military Tribunals as may be authorised by law for dealing with military offenders against military law.
And not satisfied with making it clear that civilians and ordinary citizens shall be tried exclusively by civil courts, the Article goes on further to state:
The jurisdiction of military tribunals shall not be extended to or exercised over the civil population save in time of war, or armed rebellion, and for acts committed in time of war or armed rebellion, and in accordance with the regulations to be prescribed by law.
If a time of war were to come about, or if there were armed rebellion, then, even according to the Constitution, we should be justified in instituting military tribunals to deal, not merely with offences by members of the Army, but with offences by citizens in their civilian capacity. Does the Executive Council really claim, from their knowledge and information, that there will be a period of armed rebellion? If so, then let the military courts be established. But, if they say that there is not a likelihood of there being a period of armed rebellion, then I ask, what is the purpose of bringing in military tribunals at all? We have heard a great deal said by way of praise, with most of which I substantially agree, about the Civic Guard. There would be even more sense, shall I say decency, in proposing that courts such as these should be composed of officers of the Civic Guard, rather than officers of the Army, because the Civic Guards are a civil unarmed forced, while the military are not. I fail to see the purpose of bringing military officers into courts to determine charges against civilians in a time which is not proclaimed by the Executive Council to be a time of war or of armed rebellion.
Mention has been made of these courts as military courts, and I think the other day my friend, Deputy Cooper, stated that, as far as he was concerned, he would almost prefer to be tried—I think that is a fair paraphrase of his words—by a British courtmartial than by an ordinary court of justice. With that sentiment I am in agreement. Though the President seemed to question my experience of courtsmartial to-day, and I do not profess that it is anything like what his might be, at the same time, having been for five years in the British Army, I know something about British military courtsmartial. This I do know about them, that every sentence by a British courtmartial, and the whole proceedings of that courtmartial, are brought before the Judge-Advocate General, that he has to determine, after reading those proceedings, whether the sentence should be allowed to stand or whether it should be quashed, and that even if he upholds the decision of the courtmartial, there is a further appeal to the King, through the British War Council. Therefore there are two powers which may intervene between the sentence of a British courtmartial and its execution. As far as the military courts that were in existence in the Free State —I am now talking of our own military courts—were concerned, I understand that there, too, there was a possibility of revision by a person in a position somewhat similar to that of the Judge-Advocate General in the British Army.
We cannot discuss this amendment or this section without referring to Section 24, because Section 24 provides that there shall not only be no appeals from the sentences of these courts, but that there shall be no possibility of review or revision by way of certiorari. We are asked, therefore, not to set up courtsmartial like those that exist in the British Army, governed as they are by a code of British military law, and subject, as they are, as I have pointed out, to some form of revision or review, but to set up, not military courts at all, but nothing more or less than Executive Council courts. According to this section, "As soon as may be after every occasion on which this Part of this Act comes into force there shall be established by the Executive Council..." They shall determine presumably, not only whether the three members of the court are to be military officers, but from what I can see on the face of the Bill they are to determine who these military officers are to be. They will be in a very different position from judges, whether of the High or the Supreme Court, or even District Justices, because they will be nothing more or less than servants of the Executive Council. They will not be independent judges. They will not be in the same position as members of the Judiciary in that respect.
The taunt has been and will be thrown—and it is natural, I suppose, that it would be in a debate of this kind—in the face of anyone objecting to these courts that the objector is saying that the decisions will be unfair or unjust. I say nothing of the kind, but I do say that there should be some power to revise these decisions. The decisions of these courts will be final, once and for all, and one of the reasons why I am proposing that the courts should consist of High Court Judges is that there would be power of revision by way of certiorari, or even, for that matter, by way of appeal. If the Government had made anything in the nature of a case for the establishment of courts like these, one would be loth to take any action against them, but they have made no case. They may have made some case for the establishment of some form of special court, but they have made no case for the establishment of any form of military court. Why should they not be civil courts? How will the military courts effect the purpose of this whole Bill any better than civil courts? On the contrary, would there not be far greater respect for civil courts, for this reason, that it is only too obvious that military men, and especially men who may be appointed under this Bill, of only the rank of commandant, cannot be expected to have even the same experience of the world, much less of law or of evidence, or even of the administration of justice, as any of the judges occupying the benches of the Free State Judiciary?
I do not know whether it has struck members of the Executive Council or not, but when it may be suggested that it would be invidious to put judges in this position, is it not far more invidious to put mere military officers in this position? Did they join the National Army to sit in judgment on their civilian fellow-countrymen? It is a different matter to sit in judgment upon the soldiers of the National Army, for that is part of the execution of their duty, but I wonder how many young officers at present in the National Army ever dreamt when they were joining that force that they would be called upon as members of the Army, in a time which had not been proclaimed a time of armed rebellion, to sit in judgment, with the possibility of having to pass sentences of death, upon their civilian fellow-countrymen. I think that instead of it being a hardship to ask the judges to perform this duty, it would be a far greater hardship to ask officers of the Army to do it.
The whole principle involved in this section permeates and vitiates the whole Bill. If this section and the previous one, which provides for the machinery of the proclamation and the method employed by that machinery, had not been in the Bill, I for one would not have voted against the Second Reading of the Bill. It is almost entirely upon the ground that where no sufficient cause has been shown our Government thought fit to substitute military for civil courts, courts which will administer only, I admit, in certain contingencies, but which may administer in the case of all the offences under this Bill—it is because of that that I have strenuously opposed the passage of this measure. If I could be convinced, if there could be any argument brought forward even now by the President or any other member of the Executive Council to show me what the civilian courts could not do that are expected to be done by these military courts, and how these military courts could effect the purpose of this Bill, the purpose of it being the detection and the prevention of crime—if I could be shown how these military courts could effect that purpose any better than civil courts, I do not care of what composition, I would mend my way.
We have had no indication as to what the urgency, what the necessity—I do not like to use the word, but, shall I say, what the excuse?—is for bringing the military into it at all. Is there a likelihood that under this Bill there will be a state of armed rebellion? Is that the view of the Executive Council? If it is their view, then they need not alter the Constitution at all, because it is provided in Article 70 that in a state of armed rebellion or in a time of war military tribunals may be substituted for civil ones. If there is not such a likelihood, then why bring in the military? I do really appeal to the Government. I appeal to them because I think they will command respect from the people whom they are endeavouring to serve if they will not insist upon the introduction of these military tribunals. It may be said they will act in a fair way. That may be so, but still you have the fact remaining, and you cannot get away from it, that because they are military tribunals they will not be trusted or respected by the people.
Furthermore, you have the great outstanding possible injustice that there will be no power of revision, no power of review, no appeal; there will be nothing, not even by way of certiorari, from a decision which may be made in error, which may be made even in good faith. Are the circumstances such as to demand that drastic remedy? I do not believe they are, and I think that if the President would reconsider this section and would set up any form of civil court—if he would even, if he thought it necessary, appoint special commissioners for the purpose—it would be very desirable. The special commissioners may never have to meet; I hope that they never will. But would it not be possible to set up some form of civil tribunal, either composed of judges as I have outlined in this amendment, or composed of those learned in the law and who would be willing to act as special commissioners if the emergency arose? This section, to my mind, goes to the root of the whole Bill. It controls and governs everything in the Bill, and as long as this section remains, not being shown either the justice or the necessity for it, I will feel bound to continue opposing this measure.
Comment on this
As Deputy Redmond's amendment would practically have the same effect as another amendment standing in my name, I think I might as well speak to this one. It is only about three years ago that this country learned, to its entire disgust, that the Army, or, rather, the commissioned ranks in the Army—officers of the Defence Forces within the meaning of this section—contained two opposing secret societies, one apparently approved, if not actually approved, by the Executive. There is an old proverb which speaks of the efficacy of setting one class of person to catch some other sort. That may be at the root of this section; but even then to allow military officers to have the interpretation of the dangerously vague and far-reaching wording of this Bill, which would fully exercise the capacity of any lawyer, with civil judges in any degree, or even magistrates, available, is a proposition I cannot endorse. A state of emergency or urgency which has several times been suggested by Ministers to be a condition precedent to the use of many of the powers of this Bill, should justify the suspension of any part or even the whole of all ordinary civil business in order properly to staff these courts. Reference has been made to the fairness of the British courtsmartial. Speaking from a little contact with British officers at one time or another, I know the great aversion they have always had to be dragged into the domestic affairs of this country, and I would venture to suggest of the average British officer that, on his part, he would have less animus against, say, a Republican, than one of our factions to-day would have against the other. Free Staters and Republicans have been so embittered against one another that I would not count either of them a fair judge of the other, whether military officers or otherwise.
Comment on this
I do not think that the kind of speech that Deputy Hewson has delivered merits any reply. He is one of the people who does not realise what has occurred in the country, or if he realises it, objects to it so bitterly and regrets it so bitterly that he will refuse to let his mind accept the consequences.
With reference to Deputy Redmond's speech, the Executive Council appreciates fully the importance of having all crimes tried by ordinary tribunals, if possible, and we appreciate fully that one conviction by an ordinary jury in the Central Criminal Court would do more to break up any criminal conspiracy than ten convictions by military tribunals or by any special tribunal. We put these powers into the Bill in the hope that we will not have to use them, and in the hope that they will enable the ordinary processes of law to be continued, and we make these provisions fairly strong and fairly drastic in order to obtain, if possible, that effect. Ordinary tribunals would be more respected by the public, perhaps as courts, than military tribunals. But in this case we are not so concerned to obtain the respect of the general public. What we want to do is to put a cold shiver of fear down the backs of the terrorists; and there is no doubt that while, during the civil war, no single innocent person was convicted, the sureness and speed with which the military tribunals operated did put a great many people amongst the Irregulars, who were no cowards, into a blue funk.
We want to have the position that nobody will attempt to extend his activities in such a way as to prevent or interfere with the ordinary operations of the ordinary courts. It would be no use. I think, to put into a Bill merely a provision that there should be a court of three or more judges. I think that if we are to obtain the effect that we desire to have, and if we are to have any good hope of not having to use the powers here, we must provide that there shall be a tribunal that may be described as a military tribunal. There is going to be no condition of war or armed rebellion. The possibility of that, I think, has been very effectively put an end to. The people who, perhaps, are constitutionalists to-day are not constitutionalists through any conviction except the conviction that it was no use to go on with war, and it would be less use to attempt to resort to war again. There is going to be no war or armed rebellion. If there were going to be a condition of war or armed rebellion, as Deputy Redmond has said, this Bill and the provisions of this Bill would be unnecessary.
Comment on this
Does the Minister want to convey that the constitutionalist citizens of the State to-day are constitutionalist citizens because they realise that they could not get on otherwise? Is that the allegation?
Comment on this
There is going to be no such thing as war or armed rebellion. As I said, if there were there would be ample powers and there would be no need for this Bill.
Comment on this
The Deputy must allow the Minister to make his speech.
Comment on this
I could not attempt to enlighten Deputy Hall; that is a task that is beyond me. We have here a terrorist conspiracy and a terrorist conspiracy is a difficult thing to deal with by the ordinary laws. People who had no reason to be in dread, one would think, following the assassination of the late Vice-President, showed, by the care with which they have spoken and written about that event, that they were in dread. And while, as I have said, the best way to deal with the terrorist conspiracy, just as the best way to deal with any ordinary sort of crime, is by the ordinary law and by the ordinary courts, we must make sure, if we are to prevent an extension of its operations, that it can be dealt with; that if the conspirators are caught and that if there is evidence against them their punishment will be sure.
It would be much better to take no steps at all than to take steps to bring people to justice and have the machinery break down. There has been a suggestion that people might be dealt with unfairly or that these courts might be set up when there is no need for them. I do not think that there is any person who is anxious to have special tribunals set up. I cannot visualise a position where any majority in the Dáil would stand for continuing in force a proclamation under which these courts operated if it was not felt to be necessary. The present Executive Council have consistently endeavoured to get rid of abnormal powers and of the need for abnormal powers. We have sometimes been accused, because we would not make a compromise. We could at times have made compromises and got out of immediate difficulties which would have had the result of postponing the supremacy of the ordinary people. We propose these powers and we would propose to use these powers just for the very same purpose as we used the very much wider powers which the state of armed rebellion and civil war put into our hands. We used very wide powers and we did this for one purpose only, and that was to secure the supremacy of the ordinary unarmed civilian.
It is all very well to be tender and careful about people who have been in a conspiracy. But when certain measures have been adopted against the people, you must first think of the ordinary citizen, the majority of the ordinary citizens, and you must be prepared to be stern and severe with those whose actions are a menace to the liberties of the ordinary individual and whose actions are an attack on all ordinary individuals in the State.
Comment on this
I would like to hear from the Minister, in order to cut this thing short, an answer to the gist of Deputy Redmond's speech—that is, why should not the members of the Judiciary or the Bar who are trained in the legal profession be members of these special courts? I understand that was the gist of Deputy Redmond's speech.
Comment on this
It appears that notwithstanding all the steps we have taken to inform people, there are still some individuals in the country who have an idea that the British Government is still here and that the British system and the British methods and the British atmosphere are still with us; that the Judiciary is part of the Executive and so on. Now I would like to correct that view and to correct it very strongly. The judges whom we have appointed are as independent of the Executive as the judges of the Supreme Court of New York or of the United States——
Comment on this
I suppose we know how to behave ourselves. I said that the judges whom we have appointed are as independent of us as the judges of the Supreme Court of New York or the United States are of us, and I suppose they are quite independent of us. Our Judiciary are as independent of the Executive Council as is the Supreme Court in the United States.
I attended some conferences before this Bill was introduced, and I have not been the first person to announce that. It was after these conferences, or as a result of them, that this section crept in, bringing in other persons than a military court. It was not in our original Bill. My legal advisers have informed me that it is not in the terms of appointment of any of our judges, that it would be something extra to ask the judges, and I am not going to ask them. The Executive is not going to ask the Judges of the High Court, the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court or the District Justices—I am not going to ask a single one of them—to act on this tribunal. So far as the judges of the High Court are concerned, it must be some other legal person who would be appointed if you want a judiciary of that sort. That is my answer. I understood it was plain and thought anyone would understand it—certainly a lawyer. I would not have put down the proposal myself in the first instance.
Comment on this
Perhaps the President did not hear me. I specially used the word request. I said, while speaking, that I could hardly believe that, if the judges were requested to do this, they would decline.
Comment on this
The Executive would not request them and I would not ask them. I thought I made that point clear. Deputy Redmond understands that there are certain people sometimes who go to court, who make the pretence of not recognising the court and who, in common with their practice of seeking to bring down every institution in the State, show their contempt of court and perhaps sometimes keep out of it. Now the judges are not going to be asked by this Executive to go a single iota out of the terms of their appointment, and their business as judges is not to decide an issue of life and death. That is a matter for a jury. We do not want to place any judge on our bench in an invidious position, either to act now for a short time and then go back to the bench or to be afterwards under consideration for appointment to the bench. We want to keep our judiciary above reproach of any sort or kind, and I suggest to Deputies that they cannot have it both ways. I should like to say that I regretted very much to hear Deputy Hewson say what he said about the army and British officers.
Comment on this
I assume that Deputy Hewson is an Irishman. I may be wrong, but I assume that he is an Irishman. I have known of courtsmartial by British officers in which they have perjured themselves, but I do not know of any of our officers who perjured themselves, not one. It is not with a view to scoring that I say that. We have made our peace with the British. That business is all done and finished with, but it is certainly an exhibition of the slave mind for a member of this House to get up and practically paint the officers of another army as higher characters, as nobler beings and as better gentlemen than the officers of our army. That is certainly not the work of an Irishman. I am surprised at it, and I hope the Deputy will see his way to reconsider that statement.
Comment on this
I have to disagree with the President in this matter. I also resent Deputy Hewson's statement, but I understand that Deputy Hewson has not got the slave mind. That is my opinion. Deputy Hewson is speaking here for a very small and embittered faction who are sorry that the English have left this country, and when he speaks about the Free State Army as a faction I want to tell him that it was a faction that defended rich and poor, gentle and simple, Catholic and Protestant in this country. I want to tell him, too, that I know his form perfectly well. There are Deputies now in these times who are quite ready to attack the Free State Army and the Free State Police because it is safe to do so. They are in no danger from them. They are disciplined forces. They are the servants of the people, they are the servants of this Government, and they will be the loyal servants of any other Government that comes in. Hence it is safe to sneer at them and call them a faction, but if the guns were to go off and if there was real trouble again between Republicans and Free State forces the small faction that the Deputy represents would be the first to whine for the protection of the Free State Army.
Comment on this
—and not the slave mind or anything else. As to the merits of the point put up by Deputy Redmond, I was amazed to listen here at the compliments that were paid to British courtsmartial as distinct from Irish courtsmartial. I have not had much experience of courtsmartial, very little indeed, as I was never before one.
Comment on this
No, I took the greatest possible care indeed to keep out of danger every time that I could.
Comment on this
I know a thing worth two of that. I am not going to ask for trouble if I can avoid it. Does the Deputy know all about me now?
Comment on this
I do know something, however, about British courtsmartial. I do not mind Deputy Hewson or the type he represents, but I do object to Deputy Redmond saying anything which even implies that an Irish courts-martial would be less likely to do justice and to give fair play than an English courtsmartial. I do not think he said that.
Comment on this
But equally I do not think the Deputy made the position clear. He tried to show that the organisation of a British court of this kind would be somewhat different to the Irish courts, and made the one point that there is a confirming authority. Now, there is a confirming authority, and I doubt if the Deputy is right when he says that it is the Judge-Advocate General.
Comment on this
That is what the Deputy said, and I doubt if he is right. The Deputy should know that the right is inherent in the Executive Council to review any sentence, that it is not necessary to give it to them by statute, that it is there always. Deputy Redmond pointed out that finally it goes to the King in England. The King in Ireland is the Executive Council—"The Governor-General acting on the advice of the Executive Council." That right is there in the Executive Council, and the Deputy should assume that the Irish Executive Council would be just as careful in exercising that right as the English Government would be in a similar case, or the English King—not the English King—but the King who is head of the British Commonwealth of Nations, acting in his capacity as King of England. The Deputy must know perfectly well that the functions of the confirming authority, whether it is the Judge-Advocate General or anyone else, are very limited indeed, and that the real authority over any courts-martial in any country is the Executive. That authority is here, and when the Deputy tries to draw a distinction between these courts and the English courtsmartial he knows perfectly well that he is endeavouring to draw a very specious distinction indeed.
Comment on this
I had no intention of drawing any distinction between the conduct of British and Irish courtsmartial for the simple reason that I have never been before an Irish courtmartial and am not aware whether there is any code of law in existence for these courtsmartial. I am aware there is a British military court, but I am not aware that there is an Irish military court. I would be the last one, therefore, to draw any distinction as between the two systems. What I did mean to convey was that there was a power of revision from British courtsmartial. I think I said I understood that there was a similar power in regard to the Irish courtsmartial, but that I cannot vouch for. In regard to the British courtsmartial, the Judge-Advocate General has a very great say indeed, but it is not done in the name of the Judge-Advocate General. The whole proceedings are brought before the Judge-Advocate General through the General Officer Commanding and it is the Judge-Advocate General who says whether the decision shall stand or fall though it is in the name of the General Officer Commanding that it is done. That is the distinction, and if that is a distinction the Minister can have a present of it. I hope, therefore, that he understands that my objection to these courts is that they are courts composed of military officers. I do not know that there is any military code in existence in the National Army.
Comment on this
Does the Deputy agree with me that the really effective powers not alone in this but in any other country is the Executive or the King, as the case may be?
Comment on this
I do not agree with that statement, because undoubtedly there is a power to the General Officer Commanding as advised by the Judge-Advocate General. Apart altogether from that, I was only endeavouring to point out, without condemning these courts, that some Deputies compare them with British courtsmartial. I was endeavouring to point out that British courtsmartial had a certain power of revision and that these courts will have none, because it is expressly provided in sub-section (5) of Section 24 that there shall be no appeal and that no special court shall be liable to be restrained in the execution of its powers under this part of this Act by any other court, nor shall any proceedings before a special court be removed by certiorari to any other court. Further, it is provided that it will be an Executive Minister who shall make regulations in regard to the procedure and practice of these courts. It was suggested the other day by Deputy Cooper that the procedure and practice should be that which is in use at present in the Central Criminal Court. That may be so, but that is not so in the Bill, According to the Bill, it will be the Executive Minister who shall make the regulations prescribing that procedure and practice. My root objection to these courts is that they will be courts ad hoc set up by the Executive, manned by the Executive, composed of, not independent judges, but of members of the National Army, and from which there shall be no appeal or no possibility of revision by way of certiorari. That is my objection to these courts. When it is suggested that the members of these courts would be fair and just in their decisions I am not quarrelling with that suggestion, but I do not want to have it possible that an error may be committed without revision and review, and an error may be committed even by the best. It is to guard against a possibility of miscarriage of justice, to have some form of review by setting up a court composed of judges from which there would be an appeal certainly by the method of certiorari——
Comment on this
On a point of order, Deputy Redmond spoke on this occasion for thirty-five minutes. I did not mind when he was dealing with a question of courts, but when he is going further I think I have a right to object on a point of order.
Comment on this
I was only anxious to answer one point made by the President with regard to the position of the judiciary. What he has stated is quite true and, of course, that is one of the great safeguards of the State, that the judiciary is independent of the Executive. I quite agree that it would be a matter more by request than demand on the part of the Executive if they wanted judges to compose these courts, but at the same time I do not agree that they should not be asked to do so. I think that it is just as much their duty to act in an emergency such as this as it would be the duty of officers of the National Army. I do not say that the officers of the National Army ever had in view the possibility of having to sit on courts like these, trying civilians on charges which might amount to a sentence of death.
Of course, it is true that judges generally and properly have not the right to find a prisoner guilty on a charge which would demand the sentence of death. They are merely there to pronounce the sentence and to interpret the law. The constitutional right is for the individual citizen to be tried by jury, but here you are proposing to do away with the jury and, great as that alteration may be and drastic as it may be, I would be prepared, in view of the possibility of even intimidating a jury, certainly in view of the possibility of the invidious position which jurors might find themselves, to abrogate that right, but only to abrogate it to a court composed of men like judges who would not be in the position of military officers, who would be in the position of having experience of law and procedure, who would be in a dispassionate and in a strictly impartial and independent position from the Executive. It is because of the position of the officers of the National Army and because they are not independent of the Executive that I am strongly in favour of a civil and, if possible, a judicial tribunal. I do not know, but it seems a nice state of affairs that we have come to if our Executive Government are not able to ask the independent judiciary of this country to act on the courts.
Comment on this
I understood that I had explained to the Deputy that the Executive would not ask the judiciary and that it is against their policy for the last five years.
Comment on this
In the course of his speech on this amendment Deputy Redmond held out hopes that, so far as this Bill is concerned, he might mend his ways. He said that he would mend his ways and would vote for the Second Reading if he was satisfied that there was sufficient cause shown why this section and the previous one should be incorporated in the Bill. I think I will show him that there is a good case, and I trust he will keep his word and mend his ways if I convince him that that is so. I will show him, I think, that there is sufficient cause shown. When does this section come into force? It comes into force when, in the opinion of the Executive Council, a crisis has arisen which requires special courts to be set up. It comes into force when that proclamation of the Executive Council has been ratified by the Dáil and the Seanad. We have had that again and again this afternoon, and I do not know why Deputy Redmond could not bear that in mind. If, in the opinion of the Dáil and Seanad, a condition has arisen which makes the two Houses conclude that courts of this nature must be set up in the interests of the country, then surely sufficient cause will have been shown. These courts are not being set up at the moment.
Deputy Redmond's amendment is that there should be a court of three judges. In the course of his speech he has, I think, discussed a great deal more of Section 24 than he has of Section 22, which we are now discussing. I will confine myself for the moment to Section 22. I will assume that the Dáil and Seanad are satisfied that special courts must be set up, and then the question arises as to what is the best form of special court to sét up if, and when, the jury system has broken down. We all want the jury system as long as ever we can. We want to hang on to that system up to the last moment, but, if the occasion arises in which the jury system breaks down and cannot perform correctly its proper functions, namely, the administration of the criminal law, then the question comes before us as to what courts we are going to set up as a substitute. Deputy Redmond said that he would like to see a court of three judges. I am not going to follow him into certain small points as to whether the judges ought, or ought not, be asked, whether it would be a hardship on them or not, or whether, if asked, they would be likely to accept. These things, from the point of view from which I regard them, are beside the point. I would intensely dislike to see any prisoners tried in this country before a tribunal of three judges. I think it would be bad for the country and bad for the future administration of justice, and I have given this matter very careful thought.
I would ask the House for a moment to bear with me while I speak of what is the true function of a judge and the true function of a jury in criminal cases. The function of a judge is to keep his mind open. The duty of a judge is, so far as he can, to form no conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. If he is a good judge he will succeed in so doing, and will charge the jury fairly. He will put before the jury everything that has been, or could be, said in favour of the prisoner, and everything that could fairly be said against him. That is the proper function of a judge. Now, you want to reverse all that. You want to turn the whole of that system upside down. You want to make judges not what they have been always through history in criminal cases, namely, impartial. You are going to make them form their minds, make up their judgment, and bring in verdicts which upset the whole judicial system completely.
If judges were put in that position, if there were a state of trouble which caused these courts to be set up, and if the judges had to revert afterwards to their ordinary duties before a jury, I believe that they would become unfitted for their task, because, instead of being trained in criminal cases to keep their minds absolutely open, they would be forced to form conclusions at the close of the case, and that would be bad. I will not deal with the small and obvious matters such as the appointment of other judges or special judges, as these are matters that can be easily argued. There is another more serious matter. We want, above all things, to have not only our judges independent, as they are, but we also want the whole country to recognise that our judges are independent. We must not only have the fact, but we must also have the reputation.
I believe if a court of three judges were set up, and they found people guilty, and that their verdicts were canvassed by people who read imperfect reports, that the impartiality of the judges would be questioned in a great number of cases. Deputy Redmond said that he would like to see special commissioners learned in the law appointed, that he wanted the whole court learned in the law, that army officers are not learned in the law, that they do not know the law of evidence, and that they ought not to be put on tribunals. Frankly, I am surprised at that argument of Deputy Redmond, because, if he reads the section, he will see that to a certain extent the old method is being carried out, that here you have a man learned in the law presiding over the Court. He is the only man learned in the law, and the only man who is required to be learned in it. You do not want the whole jury to be learned.
In ordinary cases you have the judge who lays down the law for the jury. In these courts, constituted by the military, you will have one man, trained in law, who will rule on points of evidence, and you will have the officers in the position of jurymen making up their minds. It will be stated, probably, that they will be servants of the Executive Council and that they will be carried away by passion, that feelings will become heated, that factions in this country hate each other, and that you cannot trust courts of officers. Courts of officers sat during the civil war. I did not defend any prisoners before them, but I have spoken to many members of my profession who did, and I can stand here and definitely state that I have never heard a single complaint made that one of these military courts brought in an unjust or unfair verdict.
Comment on this
The answer was that the courts were fair, and I am absolutely certain that if Deputy Belton asks he will find that the answer will be the same.
Comment on this
I am not quite sure if Deputy Redmond has been brought to mend his way by the patriarchal advice tendered by the last Deputy. I do not feel like mending my ways. I would be very slow to think that a man with mature wisdom in things of the law and the State generally, such as Deputy Redmond has reached, would be likely to be convinced by the statement of Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney. Certainly he has contributed some new points to the discussion. We have had the Vice-President expressing admiration for the civil courts, and regret that he could not have them always, because he was afraid the machinery might break down if called upon. He there gave expression to a mixed metaphor. He admired the courts, but he was afraid that they would not be able to carry out what he is giving over to inexperienced officers to carry to success. The President said he did not consider it would be right to ask the courts to take over this work. He seemed to think that the fine feelings of the judges should get first consideration as to whether this particular job, which exceeded their terms of appointment, should be imposed on them.
He seemed to think that would be of greater moment than the assurance of a fair trial for prisoners. Instead he entrusts the job to officers of the Army, for whose fine feelings he seems to have little regard, and which, as pointed out by Deputy Redmond, is also outside the terms of their appointment. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney said that it would be absolutely unfair to call upon judges to act, as for the first time they would have to justify their name, which, according to his description of their functions, is a misnomer. I wonder what we should call them if their minds are so mobile that they would be in danger of being distorted if called upon to form a judgment upon evidence. There is a peculiar conglomeration of ideas as to why these civil courts should not be brought into operation. One thing that emerges is, it is perfectly clear that it is the intention of the Executive Council to have military courts, and all the arguments and eloquence against that on this side are futile. No clear reasons have been given to convince Deputy Redmond or any impartial person that there is a need for these military courts, or that they are going to be useful. If there is to be anything like elasticity there should be a change in the next division, and more should be found voting on our side than on the previous divisions.