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Dáil

Supplementary and Additional Estimates. - Vote No. 73—Emergency Fund Grant-in-Aid (Resumed).

Contributions 186–381 of 381. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

The then Minister for Agriculture also referred to what Deputy Corry and Deputy Mullins talked of. It is an interesting ringing of the changes. The motion supported by these two Deputies was:

That the time has arrived for the revision of the Ultimate Financial Settlement of March, 1921, between Great Britain and the Free State; and that meanwhile, in consequence of the depressed state of agriculture, a moratorium be granted in the matter of the Land Annuities.

Deputy Corry does not say "do not pay." Being better educated he talks of a moratorium. However, that is old. That is 1929. That was when the enthusiasm was being engendered for the policy. That was the period when the Fianna Fáil Party decided that they had better take up a gentleman called Peadar O'Donnell, who first seriously promoted such a policy. He is the originator of the non-payment of the annuities. We have that proved in a document, published as a Paper of this House, recording that gentleman as saying at a meeting of people who were Deputies or who had at some time been Deputies and who had not taken the oath, and were not going to take the oath, but some of whom subsequently took it—a heterogeneous collection of people—that "Government as an idea does not appeal to me, a Government in action is required. Let us," he said, "take some form of tribute, such as the land annuities, and refuse to pay it and then we will get strength." He knew his crowd. Fianna Fáil got their strength on that, with, of course, an odd man here and there to go around and make himself out as the sainted exception. Deputy Moore is in favour of making the farmer pay. But he does not know whether there is a legal case for retaining the annuities. Apparently, he thinks it right that the country should be put into turmoil over the retention of the land annuities, whether there is a legal case or not. He will vote solemnly for the two million to help the country out of the difficulties he got it into through his supporting the retention of the money.

The policy moves on. The papers of August 1st last contained reports of a series of meetings held all over the country. Although the points are not all the same, I should like to quote a few extracts. The President, strong for lucidity, went to explain the economic situation to a big meeting at Limerick. He said:

Over and above what we can consume in this country in the way of agricultural produce we have to find a foreign market for the surplus. Where should we sell it?

That was a rhetorical question and nobody in the crowd answered him. This is his own reply on that. After it, can one wonder the crowd felt bewildered?

We should sell it to whatever country is prepared to make a bargain with us for it on the terms that we will take from them what they want to sell if they take from us on decent terms what we will sell.

However, one point is clear, there is a surplus to be got rid of. Apparently we are going to make trade bargains on that surplus. The Press report goes on to say:

In that connection he reminded them that we bought four or five million pounds worth a year more from England of her manufactured goods than she bought from us.

If that is so, one of his Ministers will have to be called to account because I had asked a question previously on that very point and had been given two sets of figures which showed that in the twelve months June, 1931, to May, 1932, the balance was two millions against us in this sense that England bought from us two million pounds worth of our stuff more than we bought from her. That, too, was a bad year from England's angle of view. If the trade of the years 1928, 1929 and 1930 is averaged, balancing United Kingdom goods exported here against Irish Free State goods exported to the United Kingdom (and Northern Ireland), on the average Great Britain bought from us from seven to eight million pounds per annum more than we bought from her. The President's figures are, however, good enough for a Limerick open-air meeting where refutation is unlikely and so he quite in accurately says:—"We bought four or five million pounds worth of goods from England more than she bought from us."

There was a second point stressed at these meetings. The Minister for Defence and the Minister for Justice see eye to eye on at least one thing. The Minister for Defence still feels that we are in the happy position in this country that we are not going to starve, no matter what action the British may take. We have more food of some descriptions than we can very well consume. Listen to this—manna for Dundalk:—

If we eat it all we would have to build new doors to get in and out of our houses.

That is economic truth as it is spoken in this crisis by a responsible Minister.

The Minister for Justice, who "is going to see this fight through," as he announced at the beginning of his week-end meeting, says:—

The worst that can be said is that we will have a superfluity of food. We will have too much to eat. People will eat butter who perhaps have been eating margarine for a long time, and people will get fresh meat who otherwise would have to wait until Christmas to get a bit. I am dealing with the thing in its worst aspect and I am putting it before you in its blackest colours.

It is when one understands the mentality that was responsible for that that one can pardon the Minister for Justice as we know him saying this:—

At first he favoured arbitration as a means of settling the dispute between the two countries, but now, since the British had forced the fight, and when he saw that wonderful spirit shown by all sections of Republican opinion throughout the country, he was against arbitration.

What follows here is in inverted commas:

"I am ready now," he added, "to see this fight through and I think we will all remember with pride the stand which has been taken spontaneously by the Irish people and by all Republicans."

In that connection I should point out that one paper reports the President as saying at Limerick that the Irish Government had submitted their claim about the annuities to lawyers "who staked their reputations on the opinions they gave." I am assuming that these reputations are now in the Suspense Account with the annuities and possibly their emoluments also are there held.

Comment on this

Is this a comic turn?

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The Attorney-General made his debut in Cork and he announced:

I do not want to disturb the serenity of the proceedings at Ottawa, but I think we will get very little out of it, and I think you will find that time will tell that we were wise in boldly proceeding with our policy of tariffs and not waiting for it.

Having said that, the Attorney-General went on to plead in this most extreme way:

We are entitled at least to ask from the Opposition at this crisis that if they will not give the backing of their tongues, let us have the mercy of their silence.

He requires more even than that mercy from what we have seen of him. Deputy Flinn had a personal experience. He said: "It was the commonest experience of life that so long as the weak would cringe so long would the bully kick." I am sure his mind then was going back to his old days in the British Army. The Minister for Justice had this to say to the people at Galway:

"He had got letters and even telegrams had reached him urging him to stop certain people from speaking in public as they were speaking and to stop certain scribes from writing as they were writing, but he had not responded because he had enough confidence in the good sense and patriotism of the Irish people not to fear their listening to any speech or reading any paper."

That can be read two ways. I also have the same confidence in the Irish people. Deputy Derrig, the Minister for Education, on one point showed some appreciation of fact, some so-briety of judgment. He said "that the cattle situation was a very difficult problem to deal with, but they hoped to deal with it by intiating other measures that would enable farmers to turn their hand to assist them more beneficially to the country." He said further—and I wish Deputy Norton were here to hear this—that "while he was not going to enter into the merits or demerits of nationalisation he would say that when the State took over and ran an industry, that industry was going to be very expensive, perhaps far more expensive than it would if it were run by private individuals." The Minister for Lands and Fisheries added and obviously had to add an atmosphere of mystery to the whole thing. "I am not going," he said, "to divulge at the moment what those defensive measures will be, but you may rest assured they will be taken to meet any attempt by England to defeat the Irish people. There is no reason for fear and no reason to beg for mercy." These extracts summarise the policy expounded by the first mob of Fianna Fáil orators let loose on the country after the Government had forced this policy through the Dáil.

The President is satisfied that we are going to have a surplus of agricultural produce and that there is a problem as to how to dispose of it. The Minister for Education is specially concerned about cattle. For the rest of them, the Minister for Defence is happy in the thought that everybody is going to be rotund and merry, and the Minister for Justice feels also that the worst thing that can happen to us is that we shall die from satiety. The Minister for Lands and Fisheries has defensive measures up his sleeve which will not be divulged until the proper time comes, and the Attorney-General all the time demands the mercy of our silence. What is all this rubbish about having more food than we can consume? What does it amount to? There is probably going to be cheap food of various types in the country. Who is going to bear the brunt of the cheapness but the man who produces it?

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And he is going to get none of the £2,000,000.

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And if he is going to get none of the £2,000,000 and if, as producer, he gets not what he is accustomed to get, but something less than the cost of his production, is next year going to see him continuing his production? Apparently we are all going to be like camels piling up sufficient in our humps to last until we get to ordered conditions again. The Minister for Defence has said and he is now joined by the Minister for Justice that we have more food than we can consume and the implication is that though we may lose our exports we are going to be better fed. It must be obvious to the merest tyro in economics that, if I have a surplus in production and if I have to sell it at less than the cost of production I will go out of production next year, and that is well known to those Ministers who put before the public this nonsense about having more food than we can consume. The President, at any rate, is perturbed about the surplus.

Let me recount three phases through which we have gone in this matter. First, it used to be said that, though it was recognised that Britain could impose taxes on the surplus we exported to her markets, the British never would in fact put such taxes on, that they never would dare do this. The phrase used in this connection was: "They do not buy from us for the love of us. They get from us only what they cannot get elsewhere, and they, therefore could not tax our produce." But now we know that they have taxed them so we must hastily shuffle off that track. The next move is to the argument that we can discover alternative markets for our produce. But I notice there is now used in this connection a phase and a setting that were not used before the beginning of this month. There was an exhortation by the President in Limerick last Saturday to the people "if they saw an alternative market, let them grab it." There was also his statement yesterday that while we are searching for an alternative market we need this money. Apparently we have not yet got those alternative markets although when Fianna Fáil was politically in the wilderness its paper every week discovered a new avenue to new purchasers. We were then advised that we could get our surplus produce disposed of anywhere we liked. It was so good that there were people who, on economic grounds, were ready to buy all that we could send to them. Wher are they now? The third phase we have now reached. Since our first hope has not been fulfilled and Britain has in fact taxed our goods and because our second also has led to disappointment and we realise we cannot get an alternative market, we have got to work a huge economic change, a complete change in our production so that for the future we will not be depending upon foreign sources for some of our supply and will not have to sell abroad as much as we are now selling. That will be probably found in the end as false and as deluding a suggestion as either of the other two. For I must repeat and stress again that there was a time, and not so long ago, when there would have been an uprising of back and front benches of Fianna Fáil if anybody dared to assert that England might find it impossible to tax goods of ours going into that country. It was regarded as the last word in treachery, and equally it was regarded as the height of folly, to say such a thing in the situation as it then existed. The facts are there now to provide the answer. It was equally a subject for mirth if one suggested that if there were alternative markets they would have been found out by good business men long ago.

We were told again and again that it was only because of certain shady influences that were around and about the Government and the country that these markets had not previously been found, and the statement was made by a man who is now a Minister that if it were not for actual dishonesty on the part of the Government these markets would have been found long ago.

Now we cannot, as we have a new Government, attribute the failure to find these markets to any of these shady influences. Where are we to find a market for anything we have surplus to our own requirements? What does this surplus amount to? A sum of £28,000,000 used to come into this country as payment for goods produced here which we could not sell at home. We received, as a matter of fact, more than £28,000,000, but allowing for supplies of agricultural produce that were imported into the country, the balance that remained after paying for these supplies was £28,000,000. We had an income of £28,000,000 annually from that market. That market has very nearly gone completely. We are just on the brink of its complete and entire annihilation. We are going to feed the people of this country with that £28,000,000 surplus and neither the Minister for Defence nor the Minister for Justice appears to think that there will be any reaction from that on the producer.

This debate has centred mainly round the land annuities. I want to bring the House to a realisation of the fact that if the land annuities were out of the way, if the land annuities question were settled and done away with, we still are faced with the loss of that market in which we ordinarily disposed of £28,000,000 worth of goods. We have conferences going on at Ottawa. We sent a delegation out there. We sent them out unprepared. We sent them out having received no notification from any Government except Australia and Southern Rhodesia. We are going to do everything on the spot. We are going to have conversations and memoranda passing while things are allowed to drag along here. The Conference meetings have been proceeding, and in their proceedings where are we? I must say that, when I first heard that this economic conference was to be held at Ottawa, while I realised the precarious position in which we had placed ourselves by our antics on the oath, I had believed that Ottawa might not, in the end do us much harm, because I thought that all the discussions at Ottawa were going to be coloured over by one great anxiety—a drive on the part of the Canadians and Australians with regard to the entry of wheat into the British market—and that in the wheat melée our other interests would not be prejudiced. The Conference has been under way now for nearly a fortnight and we have this surprising fact suddenly emerging—that both the Canadians and Australians have made up their minds that wheat is no longer the pivotal point upon which deliberations are to move, so far as they are concerned. They have both stated— although one more resolutely than the other—that neither preferences nor quotas for wheat matter much to them any longer. The Australians have stated that through their farmers and through their representatives at the Conference. The Canadians have stated that clearly through their farmers, but not so clearly through their representatives at the Conference.

If Deputies read the papers, they will see that there is still a push being made with regard to some small preference or quota in respect of wheat by Canada. But what has the Conference turned upon in the main? In the main, it has turned upon meat and dairy produce. The Committees divided themselves on the first day of the Conference along the following lines: that where Britain was to argue her points to the Dominions, Britain preferred to meet the Dominions singly, and for these discussions would not meet the Irish Free State at all. When it came to the Dominions urging any point, the arrangement was that the Dominions were to argue that point—whatever it might be—as one combined group. For that combined group the line of division there was a division on the views on the subjects to be discussed and Committees were set up (1) on meat—that is to say, beef—and certain other products of a meat type, (2) on butter and eggs, cheese, bacon and (3) on other things in which we are not interested and which I shall leave aside for the moment. The Dominions were to make their case on each of these subjects and present their reports as a group to Britain as to what preferences in each subject they wanted on the British market. What was the Free State position in that respect? We are told that, on their own initiative—I suppose they got in first by a short head—they decided that it would be embarrassing for the British, while present conditions lasted, if they took part in these discussions, but they intimated that they would like to be associated with the Committees because it would give them information on which they could found trade agreements with the other Dominions, excluding Britain. And so the situation out there developed to the point —day after day, one can follow it in the papers which record what has happened—that the Committee upon beef has almost reached conclusions and is presenting these, probably to-day, to the British Government and that the Committee dealing with butter, eggs, cheese and bacon has reached conclusions upon the first two of these things and is likely to reach conclusions on the others at once. These memoranda are being presented to the British. In these memoranda, we do not join because we are not permitted to join. A conference therefore that, to anybody who had experience of previous conferences and of the controversies that went on between the Dominions and Britain, appeared certain to them upon the position of wheat on the British market, has now suddenly turned into a drive by the Dominions to get in Britain a preferential position for their meat, bacon, butter and eggs. New Zealand is pressing her case on those points. Australia is pressing her case vehemently on those points, and Canada is pressing her case most vehemently on cattle, but also with some vigour on the other points. The Irish Free State on these points of vital importance to her economic existence has no representations to make because she will not be allowed to make them. One other point must again be stressed. It is not the land annuities that is stopping progress at Ottawa. If the land annuities question were completely cleared off, the Ottawa problem would still remain. The British say "You broke one agreement, that about the oath, and we will make no further agreements with you; why should we imagine that a treaty made in Ottawa would have more sanctity than a treaty made in London?" This House may be witnessing, without knowing it, the complete annihilation of our cattle trade. It is certainly witnessing, if not the annihilation, the partial destruction of our trade in butter and eggs and everything allied with bacon, a new and surprising item that should be taken into consideration when Ottawa is being thought of. The English made great preparations for this conference. They had committees going upon it. Their economists wrote about it and, in the main, the economists' views as to what might emerge from the conference were summed up in the monthly review that appeared in June. Most of them had the same point of view—that there should emerge from the Conference a Commonwealth group, tied together by material bonds, by mutual preferences given at that conference, one to the other. But it was also asserted on behalf of the British group that there were two other groups that had to be borne in mind. One was in the Argentine. It is stated that the amount of British money located there is not less than £500,000,000 sterling. The other was the Scandinavian countries. The Scandinavian countries were only dragged into the argument by these writers because they believed that, possibly, Denmark with some shade of difference in the preferential treatment would have to be allowed a good and secure footing in the British market. Towards the end of last week, the trade supplement to the London "Times," summing up the results of the Conference to that point, said that there had emerged this, as the big item. It was recognised that there was every likelihood of a preference being given on meat and the only point left for consideration was whether they would get from within the Common-wealth all the meat they wanted. And in that contest this phrase, which must sound very ominous to Irish ears, or some suggestion like it—I do not pretend to quote accurately—was used: The British consumer for a long time past has come to realise that chilled meat is a great deal better than frozen meat, that chilled meat commands a better price than frozen and has better qualities than can be looked for in frozen meat and that if it is not yet commercially possible for New Zealand and Australia to send meat in chilled condition rather than in frozen condition, there was, luckily, the Argentine, where £500,000,000 of British capital was sunk, willing and able to supply all the chilled meat that Britain could eat. We are footing around with the oath and the discussions at Ottawa are going on the basis of a preference in the British market for meat, butter, eggs and all pig products while we are not being asked by the British what our views are on anything. We have ourselves, in an excess of delicacy, decided not to put forward to the British any demands as to what we want on the British market. There was a delicacy that was late in coming but, at any rate, it shows that those who had no appreciation of the position when sitting in a Government front bench here have, in Ottawa, an appreciation of the ludicrous position in which they have placed themselves. They there realise that you cannot damage your best customer in his pride or break an honourable engagement with him and hope to get a favourable trade agreement with him while that is going on. According to the last account I have read in the London "Times," three points fall for consideration almost immediately at Ottawa. Is any larger preference than 10 per cent. going to be given to Dominion products? The answer to that was, undoubtedly. The second question is to what range of goods not now brought under these preference rates must the preferential rates be extended and that is also why it is clear that the preferential rates should be extended to articles coming within that preference and the third was to the operative date and as to whether that could not be brought nearer again extending this period to the earlier date of the 15th November.

Let us now see our side. There is going to be a preferential rate for beef in the English market, and we are not going to get that preferential rate, which means that there is to be a preference against Irish beef in the English market, even if the land annuities were out of the way. A higher percentage than ten per cent. can be given in this preference, and where the preference is higher than the ten per cent. already given it will be against our goods if the land annuities were out of the way. That is a situation in which we meet to discuss giving power to the Executive Council to spend two millions of money in any way they like—two millions of money raised from where we do not know, but probably raised by those new tariffs devised and which means raised by the people of this country. Hence it means that instead of getting a remission of two million pounds from us this year we will have two million added with the additional four and a half millions mentioned in the Budget which are to be paid by the people, so that we shall find ourselves down eight and a quarter million from what was promised. No longer do we hear they cry that Britain dare not tax our exports or the reassuring cry that there are alternative markets. Now we are to have a new situation. The whole economy of the country is to be turned topsy-turvy from which it is hoped that something new may emerge.

What are the new plans? Deputy Norton tells us there are none. Everybody knows that there are none. Their plans, of course, will be new tariffs with what result they do not know.

Deputy O'Neill dragged in appropriately enough reference to the Russian situation. I find it impossible to equate what is taking place there with what is likely to happen here. What has happened in Russia? There you have a country with resources that are illimitable in comparison with what we have. The people joined their forces under a military bureaucracy. They had a plan for ten years' time and they are depending upon confiscation to a great extent. I fancy in Russia also they did not find the peasants there were threatened with having too much to eat.

The peasant who is only a serf has been brought under the machine of the bureaucrats. They have been thrown out of their homes to rot and die; their farms confiscated, and more fortunate people put above them. And in the end, what happened to Russia? They have year after year to impress upon the farmers the necessity of supplying the Government with enough goods to send abroad in sufficient quantities to purchase their imports. Why does Russia now want these goods for export? Because it became plain to her that she must send something abroad to get the machinery and other materials that she wants for the re-creation of her State. They have robbed the peasantry of their property and their goods and of their food. The Minister for Defence thinks that we will have enough food to force down the peasants' throats. The Government will create new markets and a highly organised industrial State will be erected upon what there was before. Russia has not been able to do, despite her illimitable resources, in ten years what this country sets out to do in two years and with the expenditure of £2,000,000 in two months while the Dáil is out of session. There is to be an expenditure of £2,000,000 of money in two months. I wonder is the rate to be progressive and is there to be an extra £12,000,000 a year, and when will the end be. As Deputy O'Neill said in Russia at the back of the revolution and at the back of the Russian movement you had people who thought all this; they had some plan. They were noted throughout the world as the Intelligentsia in that particular area. We have not seen any evidence of that profundity, of that experience in business or of that capacity in handling anything that would make us believe that the group opposite has either the knowledge or capacity of the Intelligentsia in Russia backed up with the illimitable resources and food crop and business plans applied to the objects to which they set their hands.

That is one example. I will now take another. Some of the Central European countries have been the bane of Europe's existence for years past because of their instability that expresses itself there in money wasted economically and politically as a result of all these things. Only a couple of years ago the whole of the countries of Europe were brought together in order to try to rehabilitate Austria. Plans were concocted and presented to them at a meeting at Geneva for their approval. The plan was that Austria had unfortunately founded herself upon the production of cereals and the markets were saturated. And the countries that seemed best able to weather the storm that had burst upon European communities were the countries that had gone in for the production of live stock and live stock commodities. Therefore the economic friends of Europe gathered together there decided that Austria must be given the help required to enable her to change over from wheat growing to cattle raising. And the League of Nations by means of funds at its disposal rendered assistance, financial, economic and agrarian to that country. A couple of years passed and yet Austria was not much nearer to a change over from cereals to cattle and now they have no League of Nations help and no money except what they gathered from their own people. They had experts but we have only those to be found on the front bench opposite and yet we are to get this country turned round from its present methods of production to something else whatever that may be so we will not have to look for markets for export of agricultural produce and will not need to buy some of the other stuffs that come in here to-day.

According to the peculiar statement made by the President in Limerick "We should sell to whatever country is prepared to make a bargain with us on the terms that we will take from them what they want to sell, if they take from us on decent terms what we will sell." Where is the place that will do that? What are we going to sell? Whatever we sell we will not be selling it to Governments unless we sell it to Russia. What Government is going to make any agreement with us? What is likely to happen is not that Governments will buy from us but merely that we will have to go to the best possible trade in whatever country it may be.

There is no country in the world which at the moment has not got most favoured nation agreements, and if that is so how can we get better prices in these countries? We have only to turn to the trade returns to see what, in the face of the most favoured nation terms, we have been able to sell to those countries. Of course there are countries with which we could make special agreements, assuming there is a country that wants to make an agreement with us about any item of our production and wanted to give us favourable terms. Every one of those countries, it must be remembered, is tied to its surrounding countries by most favoured nation clauses and whatever they give to us, in the way of special treatment, must be immediately given to every other nation with whom they have most favoured nation agreements. And do you think that the nation that has erected a tariff barrier against butter is going to come forward to give us a lower tariff for our butter? If they did that for our butter it would automatically break down their regulations for all other butter coming into their country. I do not think these things have been thought of. It is a case of going ahead helter skelter; new markets are to be opened up and all the rest of it. Do they expect that new tariff barriers are going to produce new markets? What is the new system of production going to be? I see that the wheat nonsense that we heard so much about at one time is now being resurrected. I see that the wheat nonsense, which we thought had been overlaid for all time, has now been resurrected, and the people in the West of Ireland are going to be helped to grow wheat and efforts are to be made to enable them to direct energies to a new form of occupation. The Limerick people also are to grow wheat. As Deputy Norton asked, is there any plan? The one glimmering of sense that there has been since the Dáil rose last was the statement that came from the Minister for Education that if there was going to be nationalisation it meant more extravagance and more expense in the long run. I only hope that it will be borne in on Deputy Norton's mind that the Government is against all these policies of nationalisation that that Deputy seems to favour so much. We are told often about the mandate that Fianna Fáil looked for from the electorate. I want to read one that they may have forgotten. Item 6 of their programme was:—

To negotiate trade agreements that would secure for our products preference in foreign markets, always subject to the condition that the protection required for the maintenance and development of our own agricultural and manufacturing industries will not be lessened.

Then this follows:—

"The people of Britain and ourselves are each other's best customer. Our geographical position, and other factors, make it unlikely that this close trade relationship will rapidly change. Machinery and other capital equipment for our industries will have to be purchased from abroad. We can in these purchases accord a preference to Britain in return for a preference in her markets for our agricultural produce."

A later poster, which promised security to everybody in the country, promised this specifically to the farmer:—

"A guaranteed market and guaranteed profitable prices for a large part of his marketable produce, increased competitive power resulting in increased exports."

Now we are against increased exports, only because it has been found to be folly. We are going now to saturate the home market with everything produced and to buy only from the home market.

We have got no indication from anybody as to how this money is to be raised, nor have we got, from those responsible for the plan of the two million pounds fund, any idea of how it is going to be spent. Does the House know that Senator Connolly has nailed America to our mast? America, it seems, is going to help us in all this struggle! Senator Connolly is regarded as the economic brains of the Ministry. We had a little specimen of the protrusion of those brains to-day in the Bill that dealt with the Control of Manufactures, and it was not a pleasant spectacle. Worse than all, we have this in addition, that behind all this talk and footling arguments there is this—the most dangerous thing which we have to contend with. There is a belief that members from these benches opposite are inspired. They do not need to think out plans; that it is only human frailty to think out the road on which they propose to travel. The divinely inspired man can set his feet anywhere. The divinely inspired man—the enthusiast—is the most dangerous man that any country has to deal with. The enthusiast and his doing run all through the pages of Greek and Roman literature. He is always depicted as the man who did the most damage—the man who believed himself inspired by God to do certain things. In our times that is the type of man who fills the asylums and mental homes. That is the kind of mentality which we are dealing with, the mentality that scorns plans, that believes it can do anything. We cannot even take example from nations around us, for people who believed themselves divinely inspired found to their country's cost that the inspiration was lacking when the moment of trial came. It is not an unusual feeling that runs around. I quoted in this House before, and I want to quote it again, that there are people who believe that "politicians as a whole believe that if only they can be possessed of sufficient political power, they can do anything." And then the single phrase follows "Even to the avoidance of the logical consequence of their own economic actions." It is said further by the economist who wrote that "that the politician believes that, given complete power, he can in a short space of time bring about a complete change in the institutions of the society in which he finds himself." Then, as this economist remarks at the end of that phrase, "this naïve idea will be found to be at the root of every modern Utopia and every modern aim."

Comment on this

The wave of prosperity!

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That is what we are up against. The Deputy is one of the enthusiasts—the men who believe they are inspired. Let them continue to believe that they are inspired if it will give them aid, but let them be a little more lenient with this House and give us some glimmering of their plans, some idea of their objectives, some idea of the time which we will have to go through before the new situation arises and some definite idea of the amount of money that will be required to keep people sustained before the change over takes place. Two million pounds we are told. Yes, that is during the period that the Dáil is out of session. That is a period of two months. I asked before, is it going to continue at that rate? Is it going to be a million a month and, if so, for how many months? We are going to raise it by tariffs, probably. And there used to be an argument that these tariffs would only hit our opponents and not ourselves. I ask, what is the difference between the tariffs for the purposes of the Budget and the new tariffs which are going to raise some millions and that off our own people's backs? In that connection, I would like to end with a quotation from a phrase used by the greatest anti-tariffite this House has, Deputy Dowdall. Deputy Dowdall accompanied the Attorney-General on the platform when the Attorney-General pleaded for the mercy of silence, and after the usual preamble that we were winning and were bound to win, he said:

There was one happy condition in their fight and that was that they had got the common people behind them, pretty well the whole of them.

He continues:

The people who were with the enemy in this fight were the people who had money, who had businesses, who had something to lose. Well, he did not mind if they did lose it.

That, from Deputy Dowdall, is good.

It was out of the common people of this country that they made their money and it was their duty to join in with them.

I want this last phrase to sink into the minds of the people who heard the Minister for Industry and Commerce elaborate arguments to show that tariffs would not be taken out of the people here and that tariffs would not bring benefit to the industrialists, but only benefit to the country and to the employee. Deputy Dowdall said:

And of the firms who had got tariffs, who were waxing fat on them and were getting more money than they ever expected, he would say, without putting any tooth in it, that they were damned swine if they did not back up the Government to win this fight.

Let us end on that. Tariffs are going to be used to get this money and there are certain people waxing fat on them and they are what he called them if they do not back up the Government in this fight—the people who have anything to lose, with businesses and with money are what Deputy Dowdall described them if they do not back up the Government in this fight. That is the best answer I can make to what I started with—the other cry that people were acting treacherously in this whole matter if they spoke out their minds and said that, clearly, this was not a national issue but mere sordid grab in order to get certain people's reputations made and to legitimatise a certain person's past, and that we do not conceive it to be any way on our national consciences that we should speak our minds out on such a matter as that.

Comment on this

This debate has ranged over such a wide field that I do not propose to take the points in the order in which they have been made by the different speakers. I can only deal with a few of the more important matters that have been referred to. The first criticism has been that sufficient information has not been given to the Dáil as to the purpose to which the money that we are asking for in this Vote will be applied. It is not possible to give, as I indicated at the very start, any detailed estimate of the amounts that may be required as the emergency develops, and, in a sense, it is not advisable that we should indicate, in advance, the exact nature of the steps that may have to be taken. Everybody recognises that one of the difficulties in a democracy shows itself most clearly in times of crisis and, particularly, when these crises affect relations with an outside State. I have heard suggestions made during the debate that we are aiming at a dictatorship of one kind or another, and suggestions, particularly, that I, personally, had always leanings in that direction. I want to say, at the very start, that, so far from having any belief in dictatorial forms of government, I am a firm believer in demo racy as the only form that is able to last through. I am a firm believer in democracy as the best form of government in the long run, and it is because I believe in democracy in the long run that I do not want to see the hopes of democracy in general blighted by trying to persist in times of crisis in what is, in fact, an unreasonable demand upon democracy.

Everybody who has given any thought whatever to forms of government has realised that democracy is weak in times of crisis of this kind, and special provision has almost always been made in democratic forms of government to give the Executive powers which will make it stronger than it would be under ordinary democratic rule in these particular times and for these particular occasions. If we have got to reveal, in advance, to those who are opposing us, to the external opponents of this State, every step that the State proposes to take in its self-defence, it means that, for the most part, these measures can be countered and they will not, in fact, be measures of defence at all. Therefore, even if it were possible, and I candidly admit that it is not possible, to give in detail any estimate that could be depended on in relation to all the various measures that may have to be taken, I would say that, in a time like this, it would not be advisable to give it, and I have given the reason. You will have, in times like this, either to lose your chances of success or you will have to give to the Executive ample powers to take protective measures. The Executive will have to come before you afterwards and give an account of its stewardship. Within two months or so, the Dáil will meet again, and the Executive Council will have to give an account before the Dáil of whatever steps it may take and of whatever money may be spent. What we are asking for, then, is not an unusual measure of trust. You are, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance, Deputy Flinn, said, expressing your democratic rights here and now in giving over, for this time, discretionary power to the Executive in accordance with the terms of that Estimate. The general purposes are indicated. It is not possible and it is not advisable to give more information than we have given. If you have not an Executive Council worthy of trust, then you should get some people who are worthy of trust. Whatever people you get, if they are to deal with a crisis like this effectively, they must be trusted for the time. That is our case as regards the giving of information.

With regard to the emergency itself, most of the hardship that has been referred to as existing at present is not in any way due to this emergency. It is the result of conditions which have been gradually getting worse for years. It is not now we have indicated that we thoroughly realised the plight the farming industry was being reduced to. We have been trying for years to get the people, and the Executive that was here, to realise that the condition of the farming community was getting so bad that it could not possibly continue, and leave our farmers with anything like a decent chance of getting a livelihood. We begged the former Executive Council to use the resources of the country and, particularly, to come to the help of the farmers. For instance, that was the plea we made when we brought in our de-rating proposals, that the very existence of this country depended upon the condition of our farmers, and that it was the duty of the community as a whole to stand in and to prevent that industry from being destroyed. That was the purpose of the Stabilisation of Prices Bill which was introduced a short time ago. That has been our attitude for the agricultural industry the whole time. I say that the conditions that have been referred to by Deputies on the other benches are conditions, in so far as they exist at the present moment, that have been developing, and that would have been here in any case, whether this particular state of tension with Britain existed or not. If we had speeches such as were made here, in two or three months time, then it might certainly be argued that the condition was one that had directly arisen out of the present situation. It is not possible to state truly that the depression and the distress in our agricultural industry are due directly to the present situation with Britain. We saw that situation developing, and it was one of the reasons that made us make part of our campaign in the last election that moneys which were not due from this country were not to be paid, because the country could not afford to make these payments. The magnitude of these payments relative to our income was stressed in speech after speech. The statements of British Ministers admitting that were adverted to. The statement of a former Prime Minister of Britain, Mr. Baldwin, was quoted, in which he admitted that we were exporting, on our revenue, sums far greater than sums Britain herself would export.

It was because we could not afford to make gifts of this character that we said to the farmers, that if there was to be any relief these moneys must be retained here, because we cannot give the help required to this principal industry if we are compelled to export such large sums every year. We asked why we should export these moneys, if they are not in fact legally due. Notwithstanding the assertions made on the opposite benches, I still hold that they are not legally due. I hold to that after having studied as much as a layman could the opinions expressed on both sides. Here and now I contradict the suggestion made by Deputy Fitzgerald, and I think by Deputy Hogan, that I believed in my heart that these moneys were legally due. I believe quite the contrary. I believe the case made by our lawyers is a sound case. The British themselves did not attempt to take the opposite view. If they did, then their attitude would be a different one. I take up the attitude that this country cannot be committed without the consent of Parliament to payments such as were made. Parliament was not consulted. This was a secret agreement. It was marked secret. That does not matter. Several documents are marked secret. They are secret until revealed. I am not making any point about what is written on the face of the document. That document as a whole was not revealed to the Irish people. It was not revealed to this Parliament. You will find nowhere on the records of this Parliament that that document was discussed, or that the consent of the Parliament to the agreement was got. Is it not an extraordinary thing that this document of 1923, which is made by the British the basis of their claim, was never once referred to in the case which was made by the late Attorney-General and by the lawyers on the other side? Their plea was quite a different plea, the plea that Deputy Hogan makes, until this agreement was brought to light. It was only brought to light, as far as I was concerned, when it was mentioned in Mr. Thomas's dispatch. A search had to be made for it in the files. It was not extent until published in the British and the Irish records. In no volume of records can you find that agreement published. It is not a White Paper. It does not appear in the Dáil records. There was a passing reference to it when an estimate which was on the Order Paper was brought in in 1923 in which Deputy Cosgrave made some excuse for not bringing it in until the Dáil was about to adjourn. He said that it was a small matter and not really worth talking about. "In this estimate," he said, "we are going to pay the annuities for a little time. This estimate is one which is concerned solely with accounting transactions as to which no controversy can arise, and I hope that the Deputies will accept the estimate and enable me to make the payments." That estimate appeared in the House when there was in the offing the Ultimate Financial Settlement, to which the people were looking forward as the final clearing of accounts between the two countries. I have spoken to some Deputies who were on the opposite benches at that time, and they admit that they did not understand the full significance of what they were then doing. This estimate was passed as lightly through the Dáil as it was possible to pass it—an estimate for paying over £3,000,000 in land annuities every year. Nowhere in the Dáil records and nowhere in the public records can you find that agreement as a whole. It was referred to in passing a piece here and a piece there. I think the British Government, as I said already, asked that it should be submitted in some case or other, and that certain parts were to be pasted down. Why was this kept from the Irish people? The ex-Minister for Agriculture will say "Oh, they did not implement it."

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

I said that it was not kept from the Irish people.

Comment on this

It was kept from the Irish people. Show me where the full agreement was brought before the Irish people. Show me anywhere in the records where it came before the Dáil and where the Dáil sanctioned that agreement.

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

Did I not answer that already?

Comment on this

It has not been done and you cannot show me anywhere that it has.

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

Is the President challenging me now?

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

That part of the agreement dealing with the land purchase annuities and dealing with the transfer of the annuities to England was brought specifically before the Dáil and explained by President Cosgrave. It is on the records that the payment was in pursuance of the agreement. On that the President was cross-examined by the leaders of the Labour Party and the Farmers' Party, and it was made perfectly clear to them. All that was quoted here in the House the other day.

Comment on this

I think I have the volume of the official debates dealing with it, and I have told you the way it was introduced.

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

Was it not brought before the House?

Comment on this

The question is: Did the House sanction that agreement? The House did not.

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

I do not like to interrupt, but with great respect to the President who has practically challenged me, the question was whether the House understood definitely that in pursuance of that agreement we were paying over the land annuities. That is the question. As the President himself said, whether it was secret or not does not matter twopence; for the purpose of this argument, the other clauses of that agreement do not matter twopence. What we are concerned with here is whether that part of the agreement dealing with the land purchase annuities was brought before the Dáil.

Comment on this

Does not the President know that in 1923 the Land Commission was a reserved service?

Comment on this

What is clear on the face of this is that by the device of getting an estimate passed for a single year the Dáil was led to commit itself, apparently in Deputy Hogan's view, to the payment of these annuities. That is a position that I, for one, will not accept. The position we take up is that the people of the Free State cannot be committed by the Executive Council to continue payments of that kind without the ratification and full approval of the House.

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

What about Section 12 of the Land Act of 1923?

Comment on this

Section 12 of the Land Act of 1923 was also deliberately made ambiguous.

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

Nobody understood it?

Comment on this

There was the appropriate fund, but the appropriate fund might mean anything, and it was held by some people to be the ordinary fund until the final settlements were made. The Ultimate Financial Settlement was then in the offing. What was thought to be the legal foundation of that payment? Why did not your lawyers refer to it in your own document?

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

As an agreement between us, it had no legal effect.

Comment on this

That was not the line of policy the Deputy proposed to take. The line of policy was this— that the British Government is only a broker. They said that this is only between the stockholder and the farmer. On the one side, the Irish farmer, and on the other side the stock-holders, and if the land annuities are not handed over, the Irish farmers are breaking one of the Commandments. That was the case made and not once in the whole dispute until it was revealed by Mr. Thomas did this document appear in the arguments of the people on the opposite side as a legal basis on which the British were entitled to the land annuities; I refer to this document of 1923.

Comment on this

We have never stated that it was.

Comment on this

The British have stated that it was. And Mr. Thomas is well able to state the British case. The British case is stated by him.

Comment on this

Why does the President invite an answer here in this House from these benches?

Comment on this

Apparently, the members on the opposite side and others have quite misunderstood. There was no intention in my mind of conveying that those who spoke were making the British case at all. I was not following on that line. I was simply stating that Mr. Thomas was making the British case and, as Deputy Hogan has stated, they were making it quite well. They have relied on a document that was never mentioned by the people who are making a case here.

What were the lawyers in for? Was it to state a moral case the lawyers were engaged by the last Executive Council? They were to state the legal case, and not once in that whole case has England's right to keep the annuities, based on that agreement of 1923, been referred to. It was not referred to once. What was referred to was the Ultimate Financial Settlement. The Ultimate Financial Settlement is the form that the British rely on for the payment of these moneys, and the Ultimate Financial Settlement is referred to, and how? As if it had no effect whatever. I forget the exact words, but it meant this: That it had nothing to do whatever with the payment of the land annuities—that it was only concerned with the payment of income tax, or something like that. Yet this document is put away quietly by the lawyers who advised the preceding administration as to the basis of this claim—that is, the secret document of 1923. Our answer is that the people can only be bound in matters of that kind by their Parliament, that no Executive Council and no Minister has a right to give away the revenues of this country without full Parliamentary sanction.

That is our position. The British Government may take up a different position. I know that their Executive in regard to treaties and foreign relations has very extensive powers. We are not accepting their constitutional practice as it applies to this or to any other matter. A week or two before the Ultimate Financial Settlement of 1926 was signed you had a resolution amended and passed here in the Dáil. The former President, Deputy Cosgrave, himself, introduced an amendment which was of a declaratory nature, to the effect that the Executive Council could not, in matters of that kind, commit the State without the sanction of Parliament. A week or so after bringing in that amendment in the Dáil, and after having it passed by the Dáil, members of the Executive Council go over to London and sign an agreement called the Ultimate Financial Settlement. They keep that Settlement hidden for eight or nine months from the Irish people and the Irish Parliament. It was only revealed here after it was first revealed in the British Parliament in answer to some question. Now the British may say "that does not concern us; that is an internal matter as to what may be your constitutional practice or rules. We have got your signature here to a certain document and we are going to hold you to it." Where are we to come in? Are we going to continue a payment of that kind? Is the nation going to continue that payment under an agreement executed in that fashion?

I gave an example here before. Suppose you had a company, and that the manager of that company, believing that certain moneys were due, paid over these moneys and agreed to continue the payment. Supposing a new manager came along and, on examining the matter, doubted whether these payments were due, took legal advice on the matter and the legal advice given was that the moneys were not legally due. Supposing the first manager, in attempting to sign any agreement of that kind, acted ultra vires, what would the new manager be expected to do? What would the Board of Directors, charged by the shareholders, so to speak, be expected to do? Would they be expected to continue the payments? Would they not, naturally, take up this attitude: "These payments are, we are advised, not due from us. The party that claims the payment has to make good his claim and until he makes good his claim we will not pay the moneys"?

That is the attitude we took up. We said that the Irish people cannot be justly committed by that agreement. It was referred to in the British House of Commons, where it was partially revealed on one occasion as a purely provisional agreement. This is the purely provisional agreement, confirmed by a document which one of the representatives of the late Government said had no reference whatever to these payments. It is in such circumstances that we are expected to continue to pay this money. We said to the Irish people: "We do not believe this money is due. You cannot afford to pay it; you cannot afford to make a gift of that magnitude. It is bad enough to have to pay it if you are committed to it, but when you are not committed to it why should you pay it?"

We went before the electorate and we said, as a part of our programme, that, convinced as we were that these moneys were not legally or morally due from the Irish people, we would not pay them until Britain had made good her case. We proceeded, the moment we were elected as a Government, to carry out that programme with scrupulous regard to the pledges we had given. We said we would not pay until Britain had made good her case and as long as this Government is in power we are not going to pay until Britain has made good her case. That is the position. That was known to the world pretty well. The British might not have had what you might call official notice of our intention until I gave it in a dispatch. That is true. It was in a dispatch of mine I brought that matter up.

The Oath has been mentioned here to-day. Until it was brought up here again the other day there was not a word heard about the Oath. There was not a word about the Oath from the British when I saw them last. It was not referred to at all; there was no reference whatever to it, but now it is being brought up once more. As the Oath has been brought up again, our attitude with regard to it is and will remain this, that it is purely a domestic matter, that it is not an infringement of the Treaty. The issue, so far as we are concerned, is this, that it means for us internal peace to have that Oath removed. My attitude towards all oaths in matters of this kind is that even if we had a Republic in the morning and there was a question of taking an oath to the established form of government which would exclude any member of the community from being represented in that Assembly, I would object to the Oath. I believe that is consistent with right democracy. I believe that oaths of that kind are contrary to the real, fundamental nature of democratic government and representative government and, on principle, with the knowledge I have got of the working of these things, I would object. I say once more that the Oath has nothing to do, good or bad, with the question of secession.

This brings me to the other challenge that has been put up. It is suggested somehow that if there was not this political background to the present situation there would be no difficulty. What exactly is the political background? Since we were elected as a Government we have tried as scrupulously as we could to honour our pledges. Of course, Deputy Desmond Fitzgerald sneers at mandates. He sneers at us because in a matter that affects the interests of the people generally we go forward as a Party and ask the people to elect us to carry out a certain programme. The people elect us and we proceed to carry out that programme. If we do that we are sneered at. I am quite willing to admit that if a Government has been elected to carry out a certain programme and if it fails to carry out that programme, having really tried—if it is incapable of doing it—it has nevertheless done its duty. I can easily conceive occasions when one's duty to the people would best be done by saying definitely to them, "I cannot carry out that mandate," by telling the people plainly and flatly that you cannot do it, by saying to them, "I was wrong when I thought I could do it. I have tried and I have failed."

Speaking for myself, I have not come to that position either with regard to the land annuities or any of the other issues—I am very far from it. I believe we can implement our policy by pursuing it determinedly, by not expecting to have omelettes without the cracking of eggs. There are, of course, some people who would always like to have their omelettes but not to crack any eggs. I, for one, fully realise, and I told the people more than once, that it will require determination on our part to succeed with this programme. If we have that determination and if we go ahead with it, we can succeed That is the position. If we fail, it will not be because the thing is impossible in itself but because, for some reason or other, we thought we were going to have an easier road than we are going to have and then, when we find out the real nature of the road, we give up. No nation can make progress if it enters lightly on difficult tasks and then gives up.

We have to survey as best we can the road ahead. It is possible we have not all foresight enough to anticipate every difficulty. There is no human being who has. Unexpected difficulties will crop up, but the main difficulties, at any rate, ought to be apparent to any person. It ought to be apparent to anybody that the British Government were not lightly going to surrender the £5,000,000 a year which they were getting easily. They were only going to surrender it when the securing of it meant hardships or difficulties for them of one kind or another, which they were not prepared to face. That is the truth.

In holding these land annuities I knew perfectly well that we were going to be faced with a situation somewhat like this. This situation, remember, might have arisen if there was never a question of land annuities. I pointed that out before. Deputy Fitzgerald said that Great Britain in doing this was only exercising her sovereign right. I suppose no matter what coercion one State exercises on another it is only exercising its sovereign right in doing it. Leaving that sort of argument, the full force of which I do not understand, aside, it is obvious that Great Britain, if she wanted, could have put on tariffs against us for any reason. Owing to the fact that we were, in order to build up industries, putting on tariffs that were shutting Great Britain out to a certain extent from our market—it was not done in any spirit of enmity to Great Britain, but because it was vital for the maintenance of our people here that it should be done—there is no doubt that the British by that would be losing to a certain extent their present market, and the British might have in retaliation started a campaign such as they have started about the land annuities. If we are not prepared to defend ourselves in the case of the land annuities, and to put up with the hardships that arise in connection with the campaign, would we do it in case of retalition for the system of tariffs we were forced to adopt in order to build up our industries? If we are not prepared to stand by our rights in matters of this kind, then it is quite clear that the British, any time they want to force us into any line of action that suits them, or prevent us from taking a line of action which does not suit them, could resort to this weapon.

One thing that has appeared from this situation is the amount of our dependence upon Great Britain and the danger of that dependence and the necessity, in the national interest, as quickly as ever we can, to get out of that position of dependency. The question is: can we do it? I dare say it is true that Deputies on the opposite side will be as anxious to do it as we are. It was preached for many years that we should try to find alternative markets. I dare say if there were favourable markets they would have been found in the ordinary course of business. They probably would. I am willing to admit that. I should like to say now, and it is well that people should know it, that I see little prospect of establishing alternative markets (Deputies: "Hear Hear"). That is the truth. I see little prospect, but one thing I do see is that it is worth a tremendous effort to try. I want to satisfy myself that everything that can be done to look for them, to find them, to establish them, will be done. I do not think we ought to be blamed for doing that. There is nothing that I can see——

Comment on this

It is a waste of money.

Comment on this

I have heard of many things that were tried before and yet it is by trying again you get there. We are not satisfied that it has been tried as thoroughly as it should be tried. If we fail, you will have your day of trial. You can say you were better able to anticipate the situation than we were. Well and good, we are willing to face that. We will have to account when there comes to be a question of expenditure of money in trying to get these markets, and if there is failure to get them, you will have your day of trial and will be able to say, "We told you so." With the full knowledge that we have of the difficulties, that is not going to prevent us having our try and we will stand the criticism of any failure that may result from it. I said we are trying in this case to take defensive action and we want this money in order to do it. From day to day it may be necessary. I hope myself that it will not be necessary to spend much of this money. I assure Deputies on the opposite benches that if there is any mistake made as far as we are concerned probably the biggest criticism that will be made is that we have been too conservative or will be too conservative. I believe that we are much more likely to be open to just criticism on the ground of being too conservative in a situation like this than being the reverse. I do hope that, though we are getting powers to use that money, it will not be necessary to expend much of it. But, if we should decide that it is necessary to expend it, then it will be there, and we will not be held up for want of money. If I were a member of the Opposition, I would say, "Give them their chance; do not hamper them for want of means to carry out their policy; give them the opportunity they have asked for; if they succeed, well, at least, the nation will benefit; if they fail, we will be able to bring them anyhow before the bar of public opinion." I think that is fair. I do not think that members on the opposite benches by giving this power to the Executive are, from the narrow point of view, or even from the wide point of view, doing anything that they need regret, anything that they need have any qualms about. I believe it is good policy on their part and good policy for the country.

I have, however, digressed somewhat. It occurred to me to deal with this question when I mentioned the Oath. There is this political background. Were it not for that, you could walk up quite easily to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and say, "We are hard up; do not be too hard on us over this £5,000,000; do let us off; it is very difficult for us to pay." In the first place, I do not think that either Mr. Ramsay MacDonald or any other British Minister is as soft as that, or that petitions put in that form are likely to be listened to very much. I do not believe it. I may be wrong. They may be more generous and soft-hearted than I have found them, or than I give them credit for. But, at any rate, it is suggested that they would be that generous and soft-hearted that we had only to show we were going to be good friends with them and everything was going to be all right. I have said that is not my experience. As far as the political background is concerned, they know what the political background is just as well as Deputy Hogan. He knows that we went to the electorate and gave a definite pledge to the electorate that there would not be any further constitutional move, if you like to put it that way, than those we mentioned to the people without again consulting the people. In other words, that the Treaty as such was not an issue in that election. Neither was the question of secession. It was plain by our actions that we did not consider that the issue and our attitude towards the question of the Oath and of the refusal of an Empire tribunal would be the same if I was as loyal a supporter of the Treaty as Deputy Cosgrave for the simple reason that I believe that within the Treaty we had the right to remove the Oath. As regards the whole situation, I believe that we have a perfect right to say that whilst we are the Government that is our line, but we are not going to say to anybody, and if we did we would be foolish in saying it, that a future Government—ourselves as a future Government or anybody else—is not to go any farther. That question has been mentioned many a time in many generations of Irish politics — the question of "thus far thou shalt go and no farther." Only one answer can be given by conscientious Irish nationalists, and that is "No man is going to set bounds to the onward march of the nation."

Until there is another election we have promised to act within certain bounds and certain lines. We are keeping within them. That is all we are to be asked. We can, in fact, enter into no further commitments and we can give no further promises. If this Government were to give a promise what would it be worth? Does not the whole thing depend ultimately on the sentiments of the mass of the Irish people? Does not the whole thing depend ultimately on whether the advantages to be got in this association of equal partnership, as they call it, are such that the Irish people would prefer them to the advantages of complete independence? That is what it depends on and neither I nor anybody else can make a promise as to what the Irish nation will consider its advantage in five years or ten years' time. If this connection which exists at the moment with the British Empire is going to persist it will persist because of its inherent advantages to the Irish people and for no other reason and it will not persist because I or somebody else may presume to give a promise as to what the Irish people will do. Having said that, I do not hesitate to state what my attitude is. Deputies on the opposite benches used to sneer at me because I at one time said I was not a doctrinnaire republican. I think Deputy Hogan says that I am not a republican at all. When he wanted on one occasion to express how little something was he said "as much as I was a republican." Of course, we could go into a long argument as to the meaning of "republican." All I have ever striven for as far as Ireland was concerned at any time, and I have made no secret of it at any time, was the right of the Irish people to determine freely for themselves what should be their governmental institutions and what should be their political relations with outside States. That is all I ever worked for. The day the Irish people can freely make that choice— when I say freely I am not looking for that sort of freedom that can only be got in another world; I am looking for the sort of freedom that can exist in this world — I say that when the Irish people are given an opportunity of freely determining for themselves what their governmental institutions shall be and what shall be their political relationships with other States I, for one, will be satisfied. I never bothered a bit about forms of government. I have referred to democracy in a broad sense. I am in that sense a democrat, but I have never made any particular fetish of one form of government over another. Why did I stand for the Republic? For the reason that the Irish people in the face of desperate odds did by democratic choice choose the Republican form of government and there was none other that I could see that they could have if they wanted it. To all those who say that there was no Republic I would say there was a Republic as far as a Republic could be established by the will of the people themselves. Those of their representatives who could meet met and declared a Republic. At another election it was definitely put before the people to support the Republic. Those who say there was no Republic are right in the sense that it did not get international recognition but it is wrong to say that it did not exist because it was not internationally recognised.

If the foundation of government is the will of the people themselves in their own country, then there was a Republic here and there is no getting out of it. At the very start when the Sinn Féin organisation was formed, when there was a controversy with one of the national elements at the time as to whether there was to be a republic or not, my own attitude was that the form of government was for the people themselves when they had got a free choice and, in the circumstances, I could see no choice made by the people if they had a free choice except that of the Republic.

Comment on this

I would ask President de Valera did he say that the Irish people had no right to do wrong and that if there was a question of whether a thing was right or wrong he would look into his own heart.

Comment on this

That is all tommy rot. Parrot phrases are of no value to anybody. These were simple phrases that were used during a certain period as useful for propaganda for the gentlemen on the opposite benches. Somebody had a sneer to-day—I think it was Deputy Desmond Fitzgerald— about looking at his own heart. About three minutes afterwards one of the Deputies on his own benches said that he was able to judge of the situation as to what the Irish people wanted by examining what he himself as a typical Irishman wanted. Except people are willing to play with phrases there is nobody going to be deceived by nonsense of that sort.

I think I have explained both my own personal attitude and the position of this Government and what it is committed to before the people and if it is going to secure a political background then let it be so. What does anybody else want I would like to know. I have indicated that we can give no promise and that if we did it would be of no value—that until the coming election the constitutional position we put ourselves in we are prepared to abide by. Otherwise, I would have gone with quite a different programme to the election. We would have put quite a different issue to the people and what the issue will be at the next election remains to be seen. The one thing I am certain of is that if my sole aim was to get finished with any connection with Britain, good, bad or indifferent then I would welcome such action as the British Government has taken, because of this position of dependence. They are using this position of dependence in order to show how much we owe them and how impossible it is for us to get away from them. I tell you that there is another side to that which tells us something else. It tells us that we must get away from them if we are going to have our independence. If every time there is an issue between us they are going to use coercive measures of this kind, then, clearly, no matter what hankerings anybody may have after the connection, the thing for us to do is to get rid of it as quickly as possible.

The statement of the present Attorney-General in England, Sir Thomas Inskip, has been referred to. I have got a newspaper report of that statement and one of the first things I see in it is "What God has joined no man can separate."

Comment on this
Mr. Hogan

Is that all that you can see in that statement?

Comment on this

We shall come to that later. Belgium is much closer to France, yet Belgium exists as an independent State. Denmark is closer to Germany, yet Denmark can exist as an independent State. We are much farther from Britain, more distinct and separate from every point of view, geographically and otherwise, than is Belgium from France, or Denmark from Germany. What is the use of anybody talking nonsense of that sort?

Comment on this

That is the whole problem.

Comment on this

What is the whole problem? All I can say is that that is a statement that will appeal only to the unthinking.

Comment on this
A Deputy

Why do they not adopt that in the case of Northern Ireland?

Comment on this

Exactly. I was just going to remark that it is extraordinary that the very people who say that no man can separate Britain and Ireland, although the Irish Sea is between them, these self-same people did not see when they were even separating six counties from the other twenty-six in Ireland that there was a joining by God, if ever there was one.

Comment on this

You certainly did your part in that.

Comment on this

Nonsense. They not merely partitioned six counties from the other twenty-six, but Ulster, that sacred Ulster of theirs, they partitioned as well. When they talk about no man separating what God has joined, let them think of what they did in this country. The next thing I find in the statement is:—

If there could be a clear and sincere declaration of the desire and intention of the Irish Free State to stay within the Empire on the basis of their constitutional position and in a spirit of loyal partnership, no annuities or debts could cloud the prospect.

That is all very fine, but when we claim co-equality in that partnership we are supposed to have, then they say: "No; you are bound and fettered by the agreement which was made with us in 1921. You are held to be static in that position. It does not matter how the rest of the Common-wealth may develop. No matter how much we indicate to you about that co-equal partnership, in fact you are subject to us in the manner we have prescribed and compelled you to accept by our superior force." They cannot have it both ways. I do not know what may be the attitude of the Irish people. I cannot foretell what the attitude of the Irish people would be towards a real co-equality in partnership. If there was a united Ireland here dealing with Britain, I do not know what the attitude of the people would be. I cannot tell. He would be a very wise man indeed who could tell, but from our history there is one thing I can say: there will be no satisfaction in that partnership and cannot be as long as this country is divided against the will of the majority of the people. I feel I can say this also: that as long as there is a tittle of diminution from the full co-equality, then the Irish people's judgment will not be in doubt. What it may be in the other circumstances, I do not presume to tell. If there was an election to-morrow, I would take my chance in complete independence, and I would sacrifice—the people may not agree— the advantages of the partnership for the advantages of independence. I would be willing to put up with the disadvantages just as a man might be who was asked whether he wished to be a serf in the lord's demesne or to be a cottier. He may say to himself: "If I am a serf in the lord's house I may have plush seats and I may have occasional wines and so on. But if I become a cottier in my own home I will have to give these up. I may have to depend on plainer food." He might have to use plain furniture instead of the carved mahogany of the lord's mansion. He might have to depend on plain, deal furniture in his own home. If I were asked to take my choice in that way—I am not asking anybody to follow me, that must be decided by the people—if I were asked to take my choice, I would choose to be as Denmark and Switzerland are and to be in the position in which these countries are rather than be in a position where, if I have the advantages of the partnership, I have very many of the disadvantages as well. At least there would then be a hope of being neutral in big Imperial wars, a position in which we cannot hope to be under the present circumstances as far as I can see. It is a rather important choice for the people but no person with any sense of responsibility or any sense of truth can go farther than I have gone to give a clear unequivocal statement of our position. This Government maintains that position as long as this Government is in office. When we surrender our office, our responsibilities are surrendered also, and let those who come after us deal with their period of office. I hope that will help to get rid of any misunderstandings there may be

Now we come to the immediate question of the solution of this difficulty or the settlement, if you like, of this dispute. I explained to the House on a previous occasion that there appeared to be only two ways, one arbitration and the other negotiation. Arbitration has broken down and on what? Sir Thomas Inskip says that I am resolved not to agree to a tribunal wholly drawn from the Empire. He later says: "He will not agree to the wide choice offered within our world-wide and varied Empire of an arbitrator." He evidently wants to make out that I am given a wide choice. I am giving him a wider choice. It is not I who am narrowing down the choice. He can pick his people from anywhere he chooses, but as far as we are concerned, we insist on the right to pick ours anywhere we choose.

Is there anything inexplicable about that? Does it mean that this Government is aiming directly and immediately to bring off secession? It does not. Just as I said a short while ago, that if I were in a Republican State I would oppose an oath being forced upon Deputies in a Parliament of that State, so here I say that if I were as loyal a member of the British Commonwealth as, say, Deputy Cosgrave or Deputy Sir James Craig is, or anybody else, I would still insist that, in a matter of this kind, one party to the arbitration is not going to take his nominees from the area selected by the other. It cuts at the very basis of arbitration.

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

Comment on this

Therefore, I will not change from that position, and I do not think that any Irish person wishes me to change from that position. I do not believe that our opponents on the opposite benches wish me to change from that position, because they know as well as I do that there are questions which may yet have to be submitted to arbitration, and they do not want the arbitrators to be in a position in which there might be bias, conscious or otherwise.

The next question is about negotiation. I think that nobody could give greater evidence than I have given of our willingness to negotiate—to meet and discuss the points of the issue and to see each other's point of view. I have done that. I have been explaining the points of view in public and in private until I am tired of it. I agree with British Ministers in that regard, that mere talk about things will not get you anywhere. You have to get down to details in order to solve the question. I offered when I was in Britain on the last occasion to arrange immediately for representatives of this Government to go over and meet representatives of the other Government, go into this matter in detail and examine its merits, provided that there was a state of affairs which would give any hope of success. What was necessary for success? Here we were coming in, for instance, to-day, taking measures to defend ourselves, as the British were taking measures to defend themselves. If steps like those had to be taken and were being taken while negotiations were going on, what would be the result? Is it not quite obvious that negotiations could not be continued profitably under such a state of affairs? You might as well have negotiations while the war was going on. If there were a truce and one party during the truce was taking steps of one kind or another to defend itself, it would be regarded as want of good faith by the other side. Therefore, I said "All right; we are quite prepared to enter into negotiations; we are quite prepared to examine this matter and give our point of view. Let it be examined thoroughly, step by step, but we must have conditions in which it will be possible to get to some end in the matter." I suggested that if they took steps such as the imposition of these tariffs, it would threaten our existence; it would mean a state of war and we would have to take counter measures to defend ourselves. We could not sit down here and wait until October would come along, when Deputy Gorey's half million cattle would be ready for sale.

Comment on this

Bulls.

Comment on this

I think Deputy Gorey will admit that I was right in saying that we should have negotiations under conditions which would promise success and that we were not going to have negotiations about October or at a period when we would be in our difficulties or when we would be less able to meet the position.

Comment on this

I am sorry you did not delay until October.

Comment on this

We did not choose the time.

Comment on this

You should have consulted me.

Comment on this

Our first payment was due and we had either to pay over the money or hold our ground and say: "We challenge the issue here and now." The time was fixed independently of us. There was no possibility of manæuvring on the question But there would be grave danger of manoeuvring if we entered into negotiations and our hands were tied while the hands of the British were free to inflict what damage they could upon our industry by the continuance of these tariffs. Therefore, I said: "Yes, we are quite prepared to enter into negotiations but we want conditions which will make it possible to succeed and one of the first things is to remove suspicion." I shall say for myself—I am not an over-suspicious person—that I would be desperately suspicious if I saw any delay in the negotiations or any waiting for the time when we would be in the middle of our difficulties, while we were bound in the meantime not to take steps which would mean defensive action. I had no purpose in my mind except to get conditions that would make for success. The tariffs were only just coming on that night and I proposed that they should hold their weapon in the air and let the thing stop. The answer was, of course, "you pay over the annuities." I know the difficulty. I can see the British point of view as well as the gentlemen on the opposite benches can. I saw the case they could make. They made that case. Their answer was, "Very well, there is just one and a half million pounds of annuities which you are to pay over." I said "Our credit is sufficient for that, at any rate." I said also, "Lest there be any question as regards our credit if we are adjudged liable, you have got further security in the fact that the money is being preserved in a separate fund, ready to be handed over at any time." That brings me to another matter. That position cannot continue indefinitely. The complaint is being made that our farmers are paying twice—that they are paying into this contingency fund, on the one hand, and paying by way of the British tariffs, on the other. It is quite clear that we cannot, as a Government, continue to retain this money in a suspense account for an indefinite period. We have kept it there as evidence of our good faith. We are keeping it there for a reasonable time. When a reasonable time has elapsed, we will have to use these land annuities.

Comment on this

You will not give them back to the people who paid them?

Comment on this

Let us go into this question. It is just as well to get it cleared up. It has been suggested by Deputies on the opposite benches—and suggested in a most irresponsible manner when they know what is involved — that the present Government, when they were in opposition and during the election, suggested to the farmers that these annuities should not be paid. No such suggestion was made by anybody I know of. I believe it was made in the Dáil. I have been told it was made in the Dáil, but I do not think anybody took it seriously.

Comment on this

I remember that on the first day I went down to Clare to initiate the campaign for the retention of the land annuities by the State, I made quite clear, beyond any possibility of misrepresentation, that the farmers owed them to the community or to the State, that they were a debt from the individual farmer to the State. Thinking that the farmers would not be attracted by our programme when the individual had to pay to the State, Deputy Hogan— Minister, as he then was—talked about this sort of thing —"It does not matter to the farmer whether he pays across to England or to de Valera. It does not matter a pin as long as he pays." I had myself to get up and to expose that fallacy on the platform by indicating to the farmer that if they were retained in the community Treasury, indirectly, it would be a benefit — a benefit which the community, as a unit, would give to the particular class, to the particular individuals, in their own good choice, and as a result of their own will in the matter. On every platform on which I spoke I went out of my way to hammer home that and to indicate that the retention of the land annuities by the State did not mean the retention of the land annuities by the farmer. If there is any campaign in that regard for the retention of the annuities by the farmer, it is a campaign carried out mainly by Deputies on the benches opposite since this Government came into office, and it is carried out deliberately, in order to embarrass the Government. I have said that it is the duty of the farmers to pay to the State. The State, acting for the community as a whole, and the Executive Council, acting as an Executive, has to do everything in its power to come to the relief of one section, if that section is particularly hard hit now, and to the relief of another section again. But the money must come from the individual into the State first, and there can be no remission of these payments at the present time. Whatever relief can be given otherwise, there is going to be no remission of these payments. It is not hard to give several reasons for that.

It may be difficult for some people to pay. Individual cases may have to be examined in the future as in the past. But it is most important that the individual should get it clearly into his head that his annuities have got to be paid to the State. What would happen if they were not? Suppose that we were likely to give way to this campaign for the individual farmer to keep his annuities. There are something like 87,000 holdings bought out under the Act of 1923. I cannot tell straight off the total amount of the annuities that they pay——

Comment on this

Nearly one million pounds.

Comment on this

£800,000, I am told is the figure. That £800,000 is not included, at all, in the million-and-a-half. If these farmers are not to be put in a different position with regard to the others we would also have to remit their annuities, and that would amount to provision by the State of another £800,000 and much more than that, because my belief is that once the State surrenders its right to receive these annuities for any considerable period of time then it is never going to get them. And if it is never going to get them what is going to happen? What is to be the position? The position is going to be that every step which the State might take in the future—that is the community—to advance money in this way would be nullified, because the example that would be set, by the refusal to pay land annuities, or by the retention of the land annuities by the farmers, would clearly be followed in regard to every other public decision and the State or the community as a whole would be rendered impotent to do what is particularly its duty, its main duty, and that is to give to the individual and to make available for the individual the credit that is possible on account of the collective responsibility of the community. Further land division in these circumstances would be impossible. Therefore, those who have any real regard for the interests of the community as a whole are not playing a fair part, if there are any doing so, who suggest that those land annuities should be retained by the individuals.

The question of doles was suggested. If we were to proceed by way of doles, and to dole out this £2,000,000 to individuals who are hard hit, it could not be done. There is no use in anybody thinking that the money could be used in that particular way. I do not see how it could.

Comment on this

If Deputy Gorey will envisage, instead of saying "why not," the machinery by which we could distinguish cases that are genuine from cases that are false, and if he will give us the machinery by which that could be done, and if he will show us the way that we could help the lame dog, there is no one who would be better pleased than I would if I knew the way it could be done justly and fairly.

Comment on this

Will you agree to the principle?

Comment on this

I cannot agree to the principle if I do not see any way by which it could be done. I should be only causing misunderstanding and raising hopes that cannot be satisfied. I do not want to raise hopes about a moratorium at the present time or about the dole.

Now as to the time this may last and Deputy Gorey's point about our suggestion of holding stock, I believe that anything I said did not convey what Deputy Gorey attempted to convey. I hope it did not. When I spoke last on this, my attitude was, and I hope my words expressed it, that we should keep as near as possible to our ordinary, national life; that the farmer who has stock to sell, if he gets a fair price, should sell. If there is an attempt on the part of traders to utilise the present situation to defraud the farmer, to give ridiculous prices, so that if he sold he would have to sell at such sacrifices as would entail such loss he should not sell, particularly if there is a chance of his holding out as there is a chance. But it is not going to relieve the situation if as much stock as possible is held hoping for better markets, while there is no attempt on the part of traders to misuse the situation or to fleece the farmer. The question is very difficult. Individual choice in this matter will work better than any concerted action on our part. The farmer is a fair judge of his own affairs. In one case it may be better to hold out in particular circumstances; in another to sell. My advice, at any rate, would be instead of holding out, owing to the critical situation that may arise later, if there are reasonable prices there would be great danger in holding out rather than in selling. I should not like to be understood as giving advice to the farmer to hold out and wait until October.

There was another piece of advice mentioned by Deputy Gorey or somebody else, that I would not like to take. It was suggested this might be a short fight and could be easily settled in a week or a month, and that some persons are holding their stock because there might be an early settlement. I would like them to dismiss that opinion because, willing as we are to negotiate and to try to get a settlement, there are always two sides. No amount of willingness, on our part, will guarantee that the other side is willing to settle. The only safe thing for us to do is to do what I told Deputy Mulcahy at one time, when he was Chief of Staff, during the old negotiations, his duty was. I told him his duty was to get the Army up to the highest pitch of efficiency to defend themselves.

Comment on this

You declined to tell me what our duty was.

Comment on this

I remember it as distinctly as if it was yesterday.

Comment on this

What date was it?

Comment on this

It was at Blackrock when you came down on a famous occasion.

Comment on this

I would like to correct that misconception. I asked the President in debate, as Chief of Staff, what would be our duty, should we get back to a war situation, and he absolutely declined to give me any information as to what the duty of the Volunteers would be.

Comment on this

In public, was it not?

Comment on this

It was not in public.

Comment on this

The Dáil session that was supposed to be secret was the most public that was ever held—public in the worst sense. However, we had better not go back to that.

Comment on this

Stick to this Estimate anyhow. That is what I want.

Comment on this

As it was a parallel situation, I only wanted to use the parallel.

Comment on this

I should like to say a few words, as the President is dealing with the question of the negotiations again. Sir Thomas Inskip states that the negotiations broke down because, so far as I remember Sir Thomas's words, the President took the view that the negotiations could not be profitably conducted while the tariffs were imposed. The British reply was that they could not withdraw the tariffs so long as the annuities were being withheld. What I should like to know is, was there any alternative held out such as that the annuities would be given over to be held in trust by a third and independent party?

Comment on this

My attitude was that the credit of our country is good; that the money is there in a Suspense Account for everybody to see, and that, as far as we were concerned, I would do as I had promised the electorate, when speaking for the Party at the time we were seeking election, that the money would not be sent out of the country until Britain had proved her case. I am keeping exactly to the promise that was given. As long as the money is there in a Suspense Account for the whole world to see, it is a sufficient guarantee, at any rate, of our good faith, and any further point would be only making unnecessary difficulties, as far as I can see.

Comment on this

It would not be worth making an economic war for.

Comment on this

There are two parties to the matter. If we are told that there is only a shadow of difference between us, then why should not the others surrender instead of us? I have no doubt that the people on the other side say the same thing. We have got to put up with that, but I cannot understand why, when there is a difference of this sort, it is we who should always surrender. That is the same sort of mentality that we had expressed a short while ago in the quotation "whom God hath joined to gether let no man put asunder."

Comment on this

I am not suggesting that you should hand it over to England. Far from it.

Comment on this

To get back to what I was speaking about. I was pointing out that the advice I would give the farmers was the advice I gave to Deputy Mulcahy on the occasion when there were negotiations taking place. The one safe thing for us to do is, as far as ever we can, to take measures to defend ourselves. There is no other course. If negotiations take place and are successful, well and good. We will have lost nothing by this step. I do not think the Executive Council ought to take steps which it will have to retrace. I would not have us pledged to something that would have to be sacrificed if there were to be negotiations. I believe that the steps we should take are steps which the nation would take in any case. By working along that line, and as quickly as we can, we will be taking the sensible line to protect ourselves. We will have taken the only step we could take to defend ourselves. You can take your choice. You can take the money out. You can have peace on these terms—there is no doubt whatever about it—but if you are serious in your belief that these moneys belong to this country and that we must assert our right to them by every possible means, as we believe, then there is no line of action you can take except the line which we are taking. We are criticised for taking what any person who goes into the matter would see are the only steps that any people would take who are really in earnest. We are in earnest. We believe that we have a right to these moneys and that even if they were legally due it would be nearly impossible for us to pay them. That is not the issue at the moment, however. The issue is that we are entitled to keep them because they are not due, legally or morally. Because that is a fact, we are taking the action which we are taking at present, and I will put it to the Deputies on the opposite benches, if they have a sense of fair play, if they do believe that the Irish people are entitled to this, to point out in what particular we have done anything except what would have been done by people who are serious about the retention of these annuities.

I did not wish for this fight. Probably, I visualised the damage that could be done by this fight——

Comment on this

And no one behind you?

Comment on this

——I probably visualised the damage that might accrue just as much as the Deputies on the opposite benches. But you cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs.

Comment on this

And we are the eggs!

Comment on this

Bad eggs—gluggers!

Comment on this

The casualties.

Comment on this

Occasionally we will have casualties. I notice a representative of the Labour Party talking about casualties, but on that subject, how have Labour organisations, how has trades unionism defended the rights of the individual worker, when the rights of the workers were threatened, except by risking casualties? It is unfortunate—I am very sorry for it, and I have often pitied, during strikes, the men who were suffering—but why is the strike carried on? Would a Labour men like to be told that the strike was carried on because there was some political agitator amongst them making his living by stirring them up? Is not that the usual plea when men are fighting for their rights—that those who lead them are simply living by this form of activity?

Comment on this

Russian money!

Comment on this

Did the President ever hear of arbitration in Labour disputes?

Comment on this

There is arbitration in Labour disputes just as in other disputes, but if the employers were to limit the arbitrators to the employers themselves, say, would the Labour men be satisfied? There are quite a large number of employers in the world, but if you had a labour dispute, would the Labour representative think that his people were unreasonable if in looking for arbitration—and particularly if they had already had experience of a similar case in which they had given way—they said, "We will not accept arbitration if we have to choose our nominees on the board of arbitration from amongst the employers."

Comment on this

There is no analogy.

Comment on this
A Deputy

It is analogous.

Comment on this

It is very interesting to see Mr. Thomas advocating and standing up for that policy at one time and pretending not to understand it now, if you please.

Comment on this

Deputy Davin followed that policy for a good number of years.

Comment on this

I only say this——

Comment on this

On a point of personal explanation, I am entitled to deny absolutely the statements made by Deputy Morrissey that I had any connection, at any time, with Mr. Thomas's organisation, but I helped to persuade a number of his people to chuck him out when the right time came.

Comment on this

I hope the Deputy did not chuck out Deputy Morrissey.

Comment on this

They chucked the Deputy out first in 1921.

Comment on this

I can imagine how Mr. Thomas would reply to Sir Thomas Inskip, if Sir Thomas Inskip were an employer, and Sir Thomas Inskip said to him that he would not agree to the wide choice offered within our world wide class, the employer class. Suppose Sir Thomas Inskip said——

Comment on this

Oh, oh!

Comment on this

Get down to realities.

Comment on this

It is a reality.

Comment on this

It is not.

Comment on this

Of course, it is a reality.

Comment on this

It is not a fair analogy.

Comment on this

It is not a fair analogy at all.

Comment on this

You are up against it.

Comment on this

I know as much about Trade Unionism as Deputy Davin or any member of the Labour Party.

Comment on this

Let us say, then, that it is an unfair analogy——

Comment on this

Take a French Canadian.

Comment on this

It is not a question of area. The President does not know anything at all about the subject, with all respect to him.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The President is entitled to make the analogy and Deputies are entitled to their opinions but not to interrupt.

Comment on this

We are entitled to say that it is not a fair analogy.

Comment on this

It is as good a one as occurs to me at the moment. It is a principle and it is as good as most analogies are. Analogies, perhaps, are always imperfect in the sense that they cannot be carried out to their fullest extent but they are illustrations.

Comment on this

Might I suggest to the President that it is not fair, as there has not been a strike by the farmers, that they should be made casualties?

Comment on this

What about the ranchers?

Comment on this

Well, we had better get down to the issues, perhaps. The issues, then, are arbitration, on the one hand. We are ready, quite ready, for arbitration, but we are not going to give way on the principle that we must choose, from wherever they like, our nominees on the Board.

Comment on this

Then, only on the basis of a British surrender will we have arbitration.

Comment on this

We are not going to be dictated to, or restricted in choice, by the opposite party.

Comment on this

It is only on the basis of a British surrender that the President will have arbitration.

Comment on this

And I have said that I would hold that position, if I were as loyal a member of the British Commonwealth as any member of the Party opposite.

Comment on this

Then, that settles that.

Comment on this

Yes, that settles that, finally.

Comment on this

That is good.

Comment on this

The next question is the question of negotiation. We are quite prepared to negotiate, provided that the initial conditions which may give any hope for success are there. We cannot be negotiating at the same time as we are taking measures in this country to defend ourselves. These defensive measures, in one way or another, are going to react on, and do a certain amount of damage to Britain.

Comment on this

And to Ireland.

Comment on this

No matter whether we make that our purpose or not, the very defensive measures that we take, of necessity, will be doing damage, and it would be a rather peculiar position to have negotiations continued at a time when we were taking active steps which the British would say are going to damage them, and, if we do not take the steps, we are going to put ourselves into a position in which we will be getting weaker from day to day because of the lack of time to take measures to defend ourselves. I will not take the responsibility for committing the country to negotiations under those terms. If the British want negotiations, they can have them. The money is there, clearly, in a Reserve Fund, where it will be retained for a reasonable time, and that reasonable time may flow away fairly quickly. I was asked where this two million pounds was going to come from. We will have to see, first of all, what the bill is and how much of it will be spent before we can take measures to get it, but if it is necessary, at a later stage, and if the British have not taken advantage of our offer of negotiations, then we will be compelled to use it, because we cannot put that further burden on our people, when their money is there and when the British are, on their own admission, paying themselves otherwise.

Now, that is the position. I do not want to be aggressive in this thing at all. As a matter of fact, I do not want to be repeating it, because, if I repeated it sufficiently often, instead of being believed, I would be disbelieved, and it is the truth. From the very first day on which I had anything to do with Irish politics, the greatest hope I had was to see a time come when the peoples of these two islands would live, side by side, as friendly neighbours, and I believed in the policy of independence, because I held the view that they would be brought closer in their relations, and in a more permanent manner, by mutual advantage than they would ever be by force from one on the other. I do honestly wish to see friendly relations between the two peoples. I do not wish for this fight at all, but I do not want to see money, which the Irish people can ill afford, given wrongfully away. We are defending, so far as we here are concerned, their interests in that. That is the sum total. So far as the British Empire is concerned, I have indicated what the policy of this Government is, and I have tried to speak as frankly as I could, both to the people here and to anybody else who may be listening. Apparently, now, we are going to talk to each other across the water. Very good, let it be taken that way. That is our attitude here—a perfectly friendly one. We may speak about the spirit of Ottawa. I do not know what the spirit of Ottawa is, but I know it is the same spirit exactly as the spirit in which we met the British representatives here and the same spirit in which we met them in England. It is quite the same—no difference whatever. There has not been any of the acerbity that some people try to pretend there was. There was nothing of the kind.

With regard to contact, I am supposed not to have kept in contact. I kept in contact so far as it was possible or of any value. It is suggested here that I asked Mr. MacDonald to discuss the matter. I did not, as a matter of fact. I am not making any point on it but, as a matter of historical truth, I did not. Deputy Norton knows that he rang me up in the middle of the night, one night, and said, in the presence of four or five witnesses, that it was suggested that Mr. MacDonald would like to see me about this. I pointed out the hour of the night and that it was impossible to see my colleagues. I gave a number of reasons why I could not go but, as the Prime Minister of England was ill, and was going on a rest holiday, I said, "All right, I will go." I did not go to the meeting for half an hour after the scheduled time, because there was some doubt as to the conditions under which the meeting should be held. I do not want to make any point on it, but there are no punctilios like that keeping me away. I am quite prepared to deal with these matters in a friendly way.

There is another thing about this talk to which I should like to refer. Conversations that were supposed to be confidential have been published piece-meal. I only want to say that that is not my wish and I want to say, in as mild a way as I can, in respect of this, my first experience of this sort of thing, that I was astonished, to say the least of it, at the fact that there was an ex-parte statement given by Mr. Thomas of conversations which were supposed to be private. I do not want to make anything about it, but, if private conversations are to be held, I am quite willing to keep them absolutely secret and to give nothing to anybody. I do not want to make anything about it. If private conversations are to be held I am quite willing to keep them secret, and to give nothing to anyone, except that which has been agreed upon as a public document by both sides. I have no complaint if there is rigidity in the matter. I admit that giving to the public piece meal information by one side or the other is harmful. I have not given to the Dáil the information which it is my duty to give. I have given it about conversations only when the example was set by another party to the negotiations. I have nothing to fear about that. I do not care whether they are published or not, because the conversations I would have in private are precisely the same conversations I am prepared to have in public. I have nothing to fear from them. I want to say that I am not in favour of giving unauthorised publicity to conversations. It does not help negotiation when misrepresentation takes place. Piecemeal publicity is not helpful. Everyone recognises that it is not helpful. I have got used to it for a pretty long time.

A variety of things was referred to. I have attempted to indicate the position of the Executive Council in asking for this grant, and to defend them in a way which Deputies ought to be able to understand against these attacks. I ask Deputies on the opposite benches, as long as we are the Government, to give us just the assistance which we are entitled to get. As they know full well it is a difficult task.

That reminds me of certain questions about threats. As far as this Executive Council is concerned it wants no threats given to anyone. It can conceive of no greater damage to the country than threats of that kind— no greater damage.

Comment on this

From the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs.

Comment on this

It depends exactly on how people are anxious to interpret a statement of fact like that. I was not here and I do not know. What I say is that no matter who says it, threats are bad, are damaging, and the worst possible thing that could happen is that they should be indulged in.

Comment on this

I do not want to interrupt the President, but I want to ask for a statement from him, that the Government of the day will not countenance any threats issued by anyone towards any member of this House or the public who gives free expression to any views.

Comment on this

Or to the Press.

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As far as I am concerned, and can manage it, this Government is going to give protection to every individual to express his views as he likes.

Comment on this

No Foxey-Foley about it.

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For instance, we all know that the British would have agents through the country trying to find out public opinion. That is only natural. Deputies yonder should know full well that they could interpret public opinion as no British agents could. The only thing at present about their statements that I am anxious about is that the British might regard them as interpreters of public opinion greater than they are. That is the danger, that in fact they might be taken to interpret public opinion when, in fact, by their attitude, they do not represent the temper of our people at the moment, because of a particular defeat—I hate the word, but I cannot find a better one to express what I mean. The defeatist note in these speeches is not in our people but the British might be trying to take advantage of it. The danger of the situation is that the expressions of public opinion by Deputies opposite might be taken by the British as expressing public opinion accurately when in fact they do not. Mr. Thomas, who has been accustomed to win fights of a particular kind, or to lose them, as the case may be, owing to the breakdown of the morale of our people, might hope that he is going to break down that morale here. In my opinion, he is not going to have any breakdown of morale here. What I am afraid of is that unnecessary damage would be done through the British counting upon a public spirit such as would be in the country if the Deputies on the opposite benches really reflected public opinion, when they do not.

Comment on this

Question.

Comment on this

Supposing they did accurately represent public opinion, is it not clear that they would be hampering us in trying to secure victory? Everyone knows that. That is why in times of crisis there is a restriction on the expression of public opinion.

Comment on this

In every country.

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I do not propose that we should do that. I am opposed to any attempt whatever to intimidate any Deputy on this side or on the other side.

Comment on this

Certain members of the Press consider that they received an indication from quarters very close to the President which they interpret as a threat. I would like if the President could give the Press an assurance that they are free to publish what they like, and that they would have the President's protection against any possible action that might be taken against them.

Comment on this

Wait a moment. There is such a thing as sedition, as Deputies opposite know.

Comment on this

I referred to news published in newspapers in other countries.

Comment on this

The type which is more entitled to be called sedition than a statement. When there is a deliberate attempt made to pull down the Government—the only Government that, at the moment, can protect the interests of the country—and when there is an attempt to stir up unwanted feeling by misrepresentation against that Government, and by slander, that is something in which the Government will not tie its hands.

Comment on this

The case I have in mind is not newspapers published here but newspapers published in another country.

Comment on this

As to the I.R.A. and that there is some secret pact between ourselves and the I.R.A., there is not. Our attitude is that we set out deliberately on a policy which we gave the country in order to have unified direction. That policy we engaged in at the time the civil war ended. We made it quite clear that, in our opinion, there was only one way to unity of direction for the country, and that was by the acceptance of majority rule, and by acceptance by the elected representatives of the people, as determined by the majority, what national policy should be. We stated that it was clear to every section of the people that they could freely elect their representatives and that their representative, could come to the national assembly. There was no excuse for rejecting majority rule, and there should be no possible excuse for anybody refusing to accept the assembly of the representatives of the people as being the governing body. That principle we have worked for from the time the civil war ended. Day in and day out we built the Fianna Fáil organisation upon it. That principle is the principle we are going to work upon, and we believe it will have the effect of unifying the country. It is on the unified principle we depend for the future welfare, unity and peace of this country. We are anxious naturally during the period that the oath is still here, that nothing should happen which would make it more difficult for that principle to be fully accepted. And our actions are justified on that basis. There is nothing we have done which would for one moment subordinate the elected representatives of the people to any body other than the representatives of the people. We are here independent, responsible only to this Dáil and responsible to the people of the country, responsible for the policy that we openly proclaimed and responsible for none other; responsible in the position which we occupy to see that peace is maintained and that every citizen in the country is entitled to express his views. We intend to act in that way as long as we are in that position. As far as public meetings are concerned, there has been a suggestion that there has been interference. As far as we can give protection at public meetings protection will be given; interruption will be prevented in the same way as it would be at our own meetings. We cannot, of course, get people to come to listen to Deputies on the opposite side. That is something we cannot do.

Comment on this

That is Deputy Gorey's complaint.

Comment on this

Not at all. You have done a little too much that way. You sent us Foxey Foley last Sunday.

Comment on this

May I ask the President, before we get on to lighter subjects, to make clear the position he has been speaking about. Do we understand that in the meantime the I.R.A. may organise, drill and arm? That is an important matter and deserves an answer.

Comment on this

The position is this— provided that there is no attempt to get arms in, we are not going, as far as we can prevent it, to allow arms to come in. As long as there is no attempt to get arms, or as long as there is no attempt to publicly parade with arms, we are not going to get out after the arms that are in the hands of individuals at the present time.

Comment on this

For this reason, that it is not in the public interest that it should be done. Why should people object if there is peace? Is not our purpose to secure peace? There were other methods tried from these benches, and they did not succeed. They crushed them for a time.

Comment on this

Why should people want arms if there is peace?

Comment on this

If Deputy Morrissey had a longer acquaintance with Irish movements he would know why.

Comment on this

I was born in Tipperary and my father and mother before me.

Comment on this

Yes, but then you should understand why arms have come into the hands that they have come into.

Comment on this

Arms have come in in the last six weeks.

Comment on this

They have not.

Comment on this

They have, Sir. Produce the Minister for Justice here. That is the man. He has information. I say it is a lie to say they have not. The Minister for Justice has reports which can prove they have come in.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

I must ask the Deputy to withdraw that.

Comment on this

Well, I withdraw.

Comment on this

Will Deputy Gorey give the Executive Council the information as to where they have come in?

Comment on this

They have been coming in. Has not the Minister for Justice reports from the Gárda Officers which prove that they are coming in?

Comment on this

We have reports from our police officers—documents to say, as far as they know, no arms have come in.

Comment on this

I hope that will be published in the Press so that the police officers can read that statement.

Comment on this

That is another hare.

Comment on this

As one who never carried arms of any description, I want to ask the President will he state why certain people in this State are allowed to have arms?

Comment on this

Certain people in this State have arms for a couple of reasons. One is, I think, sufficient— that is that the arms could not be got from them by anybody.

Comment on this

That is an answer.

Comment on this

And the State, when it could not get them, would be acting stupidly and foolishly in attempting to get them.

Comment on this

That is an answer.

Comment on this

That is a true answer.

Comment on this

Might I ask——

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The President might be allowed to conclude, but any Deputy wishing to ask a question should not be shouted down.

Comment on this

This arms question is a big question. I know something about it and about the origin of it and about the tradition that insisted on the retention of arms. I have tried to point out on more than one occasion that under present conditions arms could not be of value for prosecuting national purposes. I have tried to point out time after time that under present circumstances arms cannot be used for national purposes except they are to be used first of all in internal warfare in this country. I put this question to anybody who stood for holding arms: "Do you want to use these arms in internal or civil conflict?" The answer I have invariably received was "No." I said then: "What do you want them for?" Now, suppose they are there to be used solely against an outside enemy, is it not as clear as daylight that under present conditions if arms are used to defend the people they can only be used successfully under the leadership of the elected representatives of the people? They can only be successfully used when the elected representatives are leading; and if the Government for the time being is leading, will you not have sufficient arms for everybody who is willing to carry arms and everybody who is willing to bear them for the freedom of the country?

Therefore I have said that, to my thinking, under present conditions if those who are following the old national tradition consider that they are going to try the policy of getting freedom for this country by arms in that way they are living in bygone conditions. A change has taken place. When I tried in Thurles to show that, I told the young men that when they tried to get arms into the country, how stupidly they were leading them along that course, and I said: "Do you realise that if this Treaty is passed if you attempt to use arms the first thing you will have to do is to use them against the Government of the country? The Government will either have to abdicate to you or the Government will have to attack you," and therefore the first step I pointed out at that time was to consider what they were doing.

But the gentlemen on the opposite side instead of trying to get that lesson, instead of wanting to end all the misery, tried to misrepresent me and misrepresent the arguments that I had used. They come along now and try to ascertain my attitude towards arms. The moment the Treaty as such was put through and the State founded upon the Treaty was established, the moment that happened you had a new situation in Ireland, a situation that was quite different from any previous situation, a situation which immediately broke the traditions, so to speak, and broke the foundation for any arguments in favour of arms. What was the proper thing for us to do to realise that situation? Was it to try to work against the traditions of the people? Was it not to put forward a sensible programme by which those who wanted to go further towards national progress could do so? The only way that was left us was to try to get a national assembly which was free; free so that every person who entered into it had not in any sense forsworn his views; and that he could come in here as a representative without forswearing the views he held as a Republican and then work to get a majority here in favour of a republic. That is the whole foundation of the Fianna Fáil political policy as far as it is concerned with internal politics. Therefore it is not necessary to ask me to-day what is our attitude towards arms.

Our attitude is that we hope the good sense of the young people of Ireland will triumph and, when they are allowed to come with their representatives freely into an Assembly like this, without any commitment other than the commitment of accepting majority rule, it seems to me that there is no excuse whatever for refraining. That is our policy. We mean to go ahead with it. We do not believe that any good purpose would be served at the present time by attempting to go after arms or to get arms. We would not succeed if we tried. We would create the same sort of position as was created here when our predecessors were in these seats and we would be handing down to a succeeding Government, whatever it might be, the same problem. We hope that problem will be solved. We hope the moment the Oath is removed everybody will see that the last justification for retaining arms will have gone and that this country will then have to advance and defend itself with the resources put at its disposal and under the direction of those elected as a Government by the majority of the people's representatives.

We are working steadily for that policy and we are not going to be driven from it by any suggestions that we are favouring this or that body, that we are acting illegally in not pursuing those who have guns. We are asked what are the guns wanted for. I have given the explanation that the guns are in their possession as a result of previous efforts here in Irish history to win the freedom of this country by force of arms. There was no Government directly until the Dáil was established—the Republican Parliament. Previous to that, there was a secret organisation which armed itself in order to be able to use the only weapon that was deemed to be effective against an outside enemy. That is the position. Let us face it and realise the facts. Let us forget the antagonisms that were created by the unfortunate divisions that followed the Civil War. Deputy Desmond Fitzgerald talked about the authority of a Government, how it is derived, and the rest of it. He said quite clearly in this House that he was a potential rebel.

Comment on this

No, sir.

Comment on this

The Deputy cannot get away from it. He indicated that in certain circumstances he was prepared to be a rebel.

Comment on this

Never against lawful authority.

Comment on this

But the Deputy himself is going to be the judge whether it is lawful authority or not. I merely want to make this point, that there are people in the country who justified their action on exactly the same basis. All I ask Deputies over there to do is not to forget completely their past and the motives they had in the past. I ask them to remember that when they were younger men they had certain ideals. There is in this country a large body of young men who are not able to cut things as finely and argue as neatly as Deputies over there. I will ask those Deputies to remember that and to use their commonsense upon it and to be as just to others as they would like justice to be shown to themselves. If they, under certain circumstances, feel they would be justified in rebelling, there might be others who would feel similarly. I could make a case if I wanted to, but I do not want to do it; I do not think it would be good that I should make a case. I could make a case on the premises that have been indicated by Deputy Fitzgerald. I could show why people who have not accepted the authority of this Parliament were entitled to act as they did. The first foot I would stand on would be the fact that they were excluded from representation. That might be a false premise, but from a democratic point of view it is not unsound. It may be, from another point of view, fundamentally wrong, but there are people who think like that and if Deputy Fitzgerald betrayed himself in showing that at the back of his mind he was getting to think like that, why should he not give some consideration to others?

Comment on this

I indicated clearly that I would feel myself bound to be submissive to a Government as long as it acted according to law.

Comment on this

Perhaps I had better not enter into arguments of this nature at this stage. It ought to be clear what the attitude of the Government is both so far as internal and external matters are concerned. I confidently ask Deputies here, regarding the national situation, seeing it as it is, to give us their support. If they give us that support—I wish to Heaven it could be unanimous—they will be doing the right work for the nation at the present time.

Comment on this

Perhaps I will be permitted to ask the President a question. I would have asked it before but——

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Before the Deputy proceeds, I would like to point out that it was understood that, in accordance with convention, the President rose to conclude the debate on the Vote moved by him.

Comment on this

I did not wish to interrupt the President.

Comment on this

You did do so several times.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It is customary in such circumstances to allow, on the conclusion of the debate, brief, relevant questions to be put to the President or other Ministers concerned. But since so many questions have been put to the President and answered by him during the last two and a quarter hours, I purpose putting the question forthwith.

Comment on this

On a point of order. Will the Chair allow me to refer to a personal matter by way of a question to the President?

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Yes.

Comment on this

The President, in attempting to answer a question which I put to him—and I put it in quite an orderly fashion—made a reference which I looked upon more or less as a personal reflection. The President said that if I were closer to national events in this country I would understand certain things better. Perhaps the President will explain what he means by that.

Comment on this

The trouble in this House is that there has been too much innuendo and, when a person speaks plainly, it sometimes happens that there is inferred from what he says a meaning that he never intended to convey. I had no intention of conveying anything more than what I said, and what I said I mean. I said that if Deputy Morrissey had been closer to national events he would have better understood certain things. I mean by that that if he were actively or directly associated with the Volunteers in the past he would better understand the situation. Perhaps he was—I do not know. I believe if he were as closely associated with them as other people I know—people who are following us in this situation—he would understand it quite well. That is all I mean.

Comment on this

I accept the President's statement that he did not mean to convey what I considered his words meant. I think I am entitled to say this, in fairness to myself, that my father and all belonging to me were born and bred in Tipperary. I have been returned here for the last ten years and I think that is sufficient character for me.

Comment on this

Were you in the Volunteers?

Comment on this

I never shot anybody.

Comment on this
Mr. Hayes

The President indicated that it would not be advisable to give any information regarding this Estimate beforehand. Would there be any possibility of making a monthly return with regard to the amounts expended and the objects to which the money was devoted? The information might be given after the event in a fashion similar to what we get under the subheads of an Estimate.

Comment on this

As Deputy Hayes well knows, there is a usual method of accounting.

Comment on this
Mr. Hayes

But that is two years ahead.

Comment on this

Why should we be asked to break in in this case and make a new rule? In so far as it is possible to meet Deputies by giving that information from time to time, unless we feel it is absolutely not in the public interest, we will try to give it. I promise that.

Comment on this

I have a suggestion to make which may possibly smooth matters, especially in view of the appeal the President has made. Perhaps the President would be prepared to add to his present proposal after the word "granted" the following words:

to compensate the people who suffer in proportion to the amount of loss they sustain by reason of the impositions on their produce.

Comment on this

The thing is impossible.

Comment on this

It is a very simple thing. It could be done in this way——

Comment on this

If the Deputy talks to me privately on the matter, I will see what can be done.

Comment on this
Division

Question put.

Tá 58
·
Níl 43
Result Carried The question put was agreed to.

Do you agree with this result?

Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

As ordered on 15th July last, the Dáil stands adjourned until Wednesday, 19th October.

The Dáil adjourned at 7.50 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 19th October, 1932.

Comment on this