Land Bill, 1933—Committee (Resumed—Amendment 14).
Contributions 1–176 of 352. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 33 of 1933 ›
Some points were raised yesterday in reference to a ruling given by the Chair on amendments dealing with the arrears. That ruling was not given lightly or arbitrarily. I had given the matter very serious consideration, with the best expert advice available. I have since further considered the matter and am confirmed in my view. I am satisfied that those amendments, and others which I indicated to the Deputies concerned, cannot be moved. The cumulative effect of the amendments would be to increase the charge. The amendments in this series are inextricably inter-related, and it would not be possible to segregate specific amendments from the series. For instance, examination of amendment 32, which technically might be in order if taken alone, will show the absurdity of so segregating them. The effect of that amendment if carried would, as I understand it, be to give tenants no remission of payments until the cessation of the economic war—the date is defined in amendment 3 as one month thereafter. I am, therefore, ruling out of order the following amendments:— 24 to 30, inclusive, and 32, 33, which I mentioned yesterday, and the following:—36, 38, 40 to 49 inclusive, 51 to 56 inclusive, 58, 59, 60, 62 to 69 inclusive, 71 to 78 inclusive, 81, 83, 86, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 107; 125 (for slightly different reasons) and 156. 97 and 100 seem to be consequential on 95. I am prepared to allow Deputy Vincent Rice to put his case on amendment 59, regarding which I have some doubt.
Comment on this
I think the Chair decided that we were to discuss Nos. 13, 14 and some others together.
Comment on this
It has been suggested that the terms of amendment 13 would result in excluding the existing Land Commissioners from eligibility for appointment. As far as I am aware, there is a decision of our Supreme Court that service in the Land Court set up under Dáil Eireann prior to the Treaty of 1921 is service for all purposes such as this amendment implies, and, therefore, so far as I am aware, those Land Commissioners who had service under those courts would not be excluded from eligibility for appointment as lay commissioners. If my reading of the relevant judgment is not correct I want to make it perfectly clear that the term "12 years" mentioned in my amendment should be withdrawn and the term "five years" substituted therefor.
Comment on this
Even if the Deputy substituted the word "five" for "12" I would not accept his amendment.
Comment on this
I take it amendments 1 and 2 are withdrawn? Nos. 1, 2, 13, 14, 15, 17 and 19 might be debated together, as was suggested yesterday, on No. 14.
Comment on this
The Minister's attitude is rather peculiar. He says he will not accept any qualification which will indicate, or ensure, that the particular officer had experience, in spite of the fact that when he spoke here yesterday—and the Attorney-General adopted the same point—he said that the object of the Government was to have officers of experience. I cannot understand the frame of mind which refuses to enshrine that in the Act. If he desires to have experienced officers, and not ad hoc officers, why not put it into the Bill? Our amendment is somewhat different from the amendment of Deputy Dillon. It does not confine the officer to a man of 12 years' standing, but says the lay commissioner must be a man of two years' standing or another officer of the Land Commission who has had 13 years' service, and reached a certain status by way of promotion before he is appointed to the position of commissioner. I think Deputy Dillon proposes to change the term from five to 12 years, but that would not cover one of the existing commissioners. There is one who came into the Land Commission, in recent years, who was transferred from another Department of State, where he occupied a very high office, before being removed to the Land Commission. Our amendment would cover that case. Our amendment deals with a lay commissioner in the Land Commission of two years' standing. That would cover the commissioner I have in mind. I cannot understand the mentality of the Minister in this matter. He professes that he wants officers of experience and yet he refuses to accept that amendment.
Comment on this
Yes, subject to amendments. It would be agreed if the lay commissioners are to be men of two years' standing.
Comment on this
Whether the House agrees to amendment 14 or not Deputies might consider how far amendment 14 meets them. The Chair would allow amendments to be moved on the Report Stage as we cannot now go back to amendments 1 and 2.
Comment on this
Arising out of the explanation given by the Chair may I ask is amendment No. 127 in order, and will it be moved?
Comment on this
Is there any objection to deciding the principle either on amendment 13 or 15, as to whether the lay commissioner should have experience?
Comment on this
The principle could be tried out on amendment 13 or amendment 15. Could we divide on amendment 15?
Comment on this
I take it that if we divide on amendment 13 or 15 we would there and then decide the principle.
Comment on this
If a decision is come to on the matter, and the question is decided, on the Committee Stage, it cannot again be raised on amendment on Report Stage. That is why I suggest that the Deputies might take time to consider the matter and submit their amendments on Report Stage.
Comment on this
Amendment 13, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment 14:—
In sub-section (1), page 6, to delete all words from the word "any," line 39, to the word "behalf," line 42, and substitute the words "two lay commissioners nominated for the purpose by the Executive Council."—Aire Tailte agus Iascaigh.
Comment on this
With regard to amendment 16 which is as follows:—
Before sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
The members of the appeal tribunal shall hold office as members of the appeal tribunal on the same terms and conditions of tenure, save as in regard to remuneration, as the judicial commissioner.
The Minister accepts the spirit of that amendment, I understand, and will introduce an amendment of his own on Report Stage.
Comment on this
I shall introduce an amendment on Report Stage giving the lay commissioner fixity of tenure so that instead of being removable by the Executive he shall be removable only by the Dáil.
Comment on this
My amendment is, of course, that a lay commissioner shall hold office on the same terms and tenure as other commissioners. Is there anything in that that the Minister would not accept?
Comment on this
I think the amendment will be acceptable. I have not the exact terms by me of the amendment that I will introduce. If Deputy Dillon withdraws his amendment he can put it in again on Report Stage and move it if my amendment is not acceptable to him.
Comment on this
I move amendment 17:—
In sub-section (3) to delete all words from the word "with" in line 51 to the word "tribunal" in line 52.
This amendment raises an entirely different point. When the question of the tribunal was first debated, in the House, the Attorney-General referred to the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1888. He said that there a similar tribunal had been set up, and he explained that under the terms of the Railways and Canals Traffic Act a Commission was appointed consisting of three persons. Two of the persons so appointed were lay persons. Of these one had to be a man of railway experience and as the third person an ex-officio commissioner was appointed by, I think, the Lord Chancellor, who was to be a judge of the High Court in England. The constitution of the tribunal he said provided that the judicial person decided points of law, and there was an appeal from the tribunal on points of law and questions of fact were decided by the Commissioners. I do not think that there is any provision in the Railways and Canals Traffic Act referring to the description of procedure to be adopted where the issue arises as to whether any given point is a point of law or of fact. But by implication it is suggested in the statute that any aggrieved party, coming to the tribunal set up under the Act of 1888, should have the right of appeal from the tribunal to the High Courts on the particular question as to whether a matter is a point of law or a point of fact. I am not clear, after the most careful study of the terms of the Bill, as to whether an aggrieved party would have a right of appeal to the High Court on a point which the tribunal had decided was a point of fact. Sub-section (3) of Section 7 says "every question before the appeal tribunal shall be determined by a majority of the members of the tribunal save that, on any question which, in the opinion of the judicial commissioner with the concurrence of one or both of the other members of the tribunal, is a question of law, the opinion of the judicial commissioner shall prevail."
There is no doubt that under the previous Acts, to which reference is here made, there was an appeal from the judicial commissioner to the High Court on any point of law. I find it difficult to ascertain, from as careful a study of the relevant statutes as I am in a position to make, whether there would be under the Land Code, when it incorporates this Bill, an appeal from this tribunal to the High Courts on the question of whether a point is a point of law or a point of fact. Unless that appeal lies, there is no analogy whatever between this tribunal and the tribunal set up under the Railwayc and Canals Act of 1888. In my opinion, if it is perfectly clear that there is an appeal to the High Court from a majority decision of the appeal tribunal on whether a question is a point of law or a point of fact, a great deal of my objection is disposed of. In the absence of that right of appeal, I am of opinion that the provision contained in sub-section (3) is thoroughly bad. It is as well, at this stage, to recapitulate the exact significance of what that sub-section contains. Sub-section (3) provides that where an aggrieved party appears before the tribunal on appeal from the Land Commission the two lay commissioners can overrule the judicial commissioner on the question of whether the point raised is a point of law or not and, if the two lay commissioners take the view that the point raised is a point of fact, the judicial commissioner is immediately put to one side; he simply exercises the functions of an ordinary lay commissioner and no more.
My submission is that the very question of whether any point is a point of law or a point of fact is itself a point of law and that it requires a person trained in the law, and essentially judicially minded, to decide that question. I submit that the consensus of opinion in legal circles is that it is frequently exceedingly difficult to draw a sharp dividing line between what is a question of law and what is a question of fact and that there are occasions when the best authorities will say that a point raised is a mixed point of law and of fact. The matter is not easy of solution and it seems to me to be one pre-eminently suitable for consideration by a High Court judge. I submit to the Attorney-General that if there is no right of appeal to the High Court from the appeal tribunal on such a question as I have mentioned here, the decision at the appeal tribunal sitting should be reserved to the judicial commissioner and the judicial commissioner should be the only person to declare whether any point made is one of law or of fact. In the event of the judicial commissioner deciding that it is a point of fact, it may be decided by the majority vote of the commissioners sitting, but in the event of the judicial commissioner deciding it is a point of law, then it shall be decided in accordance with the terms of the Bill by the judicial commissioner, with a right of appeal to the High Court.
Comment on this
I am obliged to Deputy Corry for the suggestion that Deputy Holohan and myself might in some way be appointed to these vacant positions. Perhaps it would be an advance on the somewhat vague terms of the Bill if Deputy Holohan and I were appointed commissioners. Anyhow, members of the House would know where they are. With all respect to Deputy Corry, I am not at all sure that Deputy Holohan or myself would fill the Bill as efficiently as we would like it to be filled. I have no hesitation in saying that I would completely fail to be of any help in the matter of intelligently deciding what would or would not be a law point. I do not know if we are taking the three amendments together —1, 2 and 17.
Comment on this
Then we are taking amendment 17 by itself. On different occasions I spoke at length on this section, and it has been amply debated by others. It seems to me indefensible that the rights and liberties of the tenants as regards their land are to lie in the hands of the two lay commissioners, the appointment of whom is undefined. There was an attempt made to regularise that matter. Amendments were proposed to limit their appointment to certain classes of land commissioners. As the section stands unamended, it means that on a question of law the two lay commissioners are to have the determination of matters, and the judicial commissioner is merely a figurehead. The Attorney-General rather implies, without speaking, that I am talking bosh, but he may find it necessary to get up subsequently to defend the position. It has been argued, and there has not been an intelligent refutation, that the final say on a question of law will lie with these two gentlemen, whoever they may be. Up to the present that has not been disputed; there has not been any honest case made against it. Our contention is that points of law will be finally determined by the lay commissioners and the judicial com missioner will be a mere figurehead.
Comment on this
I think we can meet Deputy Dillon's point. The Minister is satisfied, I think, to make it clear that there may be an appeal on a ruling as to whether a question is a question of law or of fact. That meets the Deputy's difficulty, I think, and it also meets Deputy Bennett.
Comment on this
Perhaps the Attorney. General would be good enough to say that, in the event of that not being implicit in the Bill, his analogy between this tribunal and the Tribunal set up under the Railways and Canals Traffic Act is not as good as he thought it was?
Comment on this
I do not want to enter on a further discussion of that matter. Deputy Dillon argued it without having read or studied it.
Comment on this
I think I made it clear last night that it was left to the Commissioners to say whether a question was a question of law or of fact, and there is no appeal on the question.
Comment on this
I read the section to the Deputy last night. Is there any point in discussing that now?
Comment on this
The experience of ordinary tenants in the country in the past has been that they had to meet the law costs that hung around their necks once they attempted to look for any justice in this country.
Comment on this
On a point of order, I propose, with the permission of the House, to withdraw my amendment.
Comment on this
The question of appeal does not arise. When it arises, I presume an amendment will be brought forward to give effect to the Attorney-General's promise.
Comment on this
I do not know what the Deputy means by the expression "a half," but personalities should be omitted from the debate.
Comment on this
On a point of order, sir, is the amendment withdrawn or is it not? If it is withdrawn, I respectfully submit that the Deputy has no right to speak on it.
Comment on this
Yes. Is it legitimate to draw the attention of the Deputy to what has actually happened? He seems to be oblivious to what has happened.
Comment on this
Deputy Bennett seemed to be very anxious about facts. Is he satisfied that the judicial commissioner can say that the price of an estate——
Comment on this
The Deputy seems to be very troubled lest any light should be cast on this thing. Deputy Bennett is anxious about the point of law. Is he satisfied that the judicial commissioner could say that the price of an estate was a question of law, and rule out the two lay commissioners on it? That might very readily happen. There is no Deputy on any side of this House, who has had any experience for the last five years, who is satisfied to leave the judicial commissioner with any kind of control.
Comment on this
There is no special judicial commissioner in question here. As to the existing judicial commissioner his actions should not be discussed here.
Comment on this
I bow to your ruling, sir. If Deputy Dillon's amendment were to be accepted we might as well——
Comment on this
——do away with the two lay commissioners altogether. They would have no business there. I see no use in this State wasting money paying men to be there merely as figureheads, and that is what Deputy Dillon's amendment means. His amendment means that the two lay commissioners are to have no voice whatsoever in anything so long as the judicial commissioner, whoever he may be, says: "Oh, that is a question of law". Once he says that, the two other fellows can walk out and he will settle it. As I said, it is a lawyer's amendment brought in to try to make work for lawyers, and, God knows, the lawyers have got enough out of the tenants of this country without getting more.
Comment on this
We are all familiar in this House with Deputy Corry's statements, but people outside the House do not realise the type of man Deputy Corry is and I submit, sir, that the allegation, which Deputy Corry has made, that this is a lawyer's amendment put forward in order to get work for lawyers, is a deliberate charge of corruption. Outside this House Deputy Corry has about him the reputation of being a member of Dáil Eireann and his words, therefore, must carry weight with ignorant and ill-informed people. For that reason, I ask you, sir, to rebuke Deputy Corry for what he has said.
Comment on this
I hope that the Chair is aware that Deputy Dillon last night charged other members of this House, who are not lawyers, with corruption. He charged them with corruption, if not directly at least indirectly.
Comment on this
If Deputies would bear in mind the fact that members in this House act as the representatives of the people who elect them, it would make for better debate.
Comment on this
If my words were reported to Deputy Smith as reflecting any suggestion of corruption on him or on any other member of the House, they were incorrectly reported. What I said was that the Deputy used the expression "we" in connection with the administration of this Land Act and that the Deputy said that it was legitimate for them to use that expression.
Comment on this
I used the expression "we" simply because the people gave us that authority and that right and power. We are, for the time being, representing the majority of the people; and I hold that I am entitled to use that expression. I do not mind, of course, what Deputy Dillon attributes to me. I feel that I am as good a judge as Deputy Dillon of what is or is not correct practice, and I do not want any lectures from him on that point either.
Comment on this
I assure the Deputy that I said exactly what he has repeated now, and not a word more; nor had I a desire to impute anything to him other than what he has now said.
Comment on this
I gather from the Attorney-General that an amendment will be introduced to give an appeal to a superior court, probably the Supreme Court or some other court, that is to judge on the question of whether a question before the tribunal is a question of law or of fact. That is to say, that at some stage a judicial person will decide that question, and the undertaking is that the amendment will be introduced to give effect to that. If that is so, the shortest thing to do is to give the decision on that point to the judicial commissioner. He is a High Court judge, and you are only going to lead to what Deputy Corry and other Deputies are so concerned about. It seems to be a most extraordinary thing, to my mind, to leave the question to, let us say, a High Court judge who is not a judicial commissioner when, in fact, the judicial commissioner, who might be any High Court judge, is there to decide it. Why not give the decision of the question to the judicial commissioner? I do not press that point, I only put it forward because it seems to me that it will be important afterwards administratively. If, of course, the Government are against that point of view, and if the Government would prefer to have the question decided by some other High Court judge by appeal I do not make any objection; but I do suggest that it is a cumbrous method of doing it.
Comment on this
At the present time, there is an appeal to the judicial commissioner on questions of law, so it is not adding to it. We are definitely on the question as to whether, when matters come up from day to day, the first point as to whether it is a question of law or a question of fact, has to be decided by the majority. In the ordinary way the same appeal lies against the decision of the appeal tribunal as lies at the moment against the decision of the judicial commissioner. I think the Attorney-General agrees that even as the section stands when the appeal tribunal adjudicates as to whether it is a question of law or fact that the decision is challengeable in the High Court.
Comment on this
The position is that there is an appeal on law at the moment, and you propose to extend the same appeal to the question as to whether the issue was one on law or on fact.
Comment on this
The Attorney-General has suggested that there might be some doubt—that it might not be right or clear in the statute as it stands. The Minister gives an assurance that he will make it explicit.
Comment on this
But once the Attorney-General is in doubt as to whether it can be read into the Bill as it stands, the safest thing is to make it explicit.
Comment on this
Do I understand that an appeal will lie even when the judicial commissioner has been a party to the decision arrived at—even when the judicial commissioner has agreed with the decision of the majority?
Comment on this
Yes, if the farmer concerned will be able to pay the lawyers on both sides. Why not go straight and give the judicial commissioner power to decide on the spot whether it is a question of law or of fact? I take it that the judicial commissioner is a man of equal probity with his colleague in the High Court to whom you are allowing an appeal. If as you are promising to amend the section so that an appeal will go to the High Court from the decision of the appeal tribunal, why not give the judicial commissioner the status of the High Court judge in the matter of whether it is a question of law or of fact? Why not do that and not be driving a man whose land you are going to take at a scrap price to bring up an array of lawyers at 20 guineas each with 10 guineas a day refresher?
Comment on this
I agree with the point that Deputy Corry has raised, and so will every farmer in the House agree with it. We want land legislation for landed people, for landless people and not for the lawyers. I am not imputing corruption but you are putting too many charges upon the owner of a farm that you want to acquire. You already have a High Court judge there and you will not accept his word as to whether a certain issue to be decided is a question of law or of fact, but if an appeal is made you will accept the opinion of a High Court judge, a colleague of that judge, on these matters. I am not a lawyer, but I know that is all nonsense. I wish this thing would be left to a free vote of the House. If it were I have no doubt as to the result.
Comment on this
I do not think that the Deputy knows what is being discussed. What he is proposing is an amendment of the Constitution to make some court lower than the Supreme Court the final arbiter on a question of law and fact.
Comment on this
That is not the point. It cannot be the final arbiter, an appeal must always lie, but leave that matter in the first instance to the judicial commissioner.
Comment on this
I agree, but if my land were being taken, and a question arose as to a point of law or fact, and the judicial commissioner decided that question, I would hesitate to appeal against his decision to a higher court, whereas I might not hesitate if I knew that laymen had overruled him as to whether it was a question of law or fact. I would be glad if that were left to a free vote of the House. We would vote down the lawyers, anyway.
Comment on this
I am trying to please the Deputies on the opposite benches. One of the criticisms they had against the Bill in the course of the Second Reading debate was the provisions of sub-section 4 of this section. That sub-section provides that no officer of the Land Commission shall sit or act as a member of the appeal tribunal for the determination of any questions relating to an order or thing in the making or doing of which he took part or was concerned.
Comment on this
I move amendment 19:—
In sub-section (5), line 3, to delete the words "an officer of the Land Commission" and substitute the words "a land commissioner having not less than two years' standing as such commissioner."
I moved a somewhat similar amendment to this yesterday. This section deals with the setting up of a committee for making rules regulating and prescribing the practice and procedure of the appeal tribunal. I made a point yesterday—that the Minister himself had made several times—that it was necessary to have an official who had experience of Land Commission practice on a committee appointed for the purpose of drawing up rules. It is necessary to have a land commissioner on a committee of this kind, because every land commissioner is familiar with the rules governing the procedure of Land Commission courts, and because the land commissioner is familiar also with the practice relating to Land Commission court work. For that reason, I move my amendment to have the substitution made.
Comment on this
I am prepared to meet the Deputy to the same extent as I met him in the matter of the amendment to the rule-making authority in sub-section 3, that is to substitute for an officer of the Land Commission a land commissioner. I will insert an amendment on the Report Stage.
Comment on this
I would be glad if the Minister would explain Section 8. I did my best in trying to understand its meaning, but I must confess that I failed to do so. I would like to get from the Minister a definition as to what is limited and unlimited.
Comment on this
In any case where at the moment a person has a right of appeal to the judicial commissioner, he will have the right of appeal to the appeal tribunal, and limited rights of appeal under Sections 28, 30, 31 and 33 of the present Bill.
Comment on this
I take it that this is a section expressing the right of a person to appeal, and that the language of the section is involved because the idea is to provide for every sort of appeal.
Comment on this
There are certain sections upon which there is an appeal on certain aspects of a question, and it is provided by this that the word "appeal" shall not be interpreted to exclude a partial appeal. Before we pass from that, is (6) of Section 28 an instance of a limited appeal?
Comment on this
And it is merely to ensure that a limited appeal would not bring in those that are applicable in Section 8.
Comment on this
I propose amendment 20:—
To insert at the end of the section a new sub-section as follows:—
(3) In this section the expression "order of the Land Commission" includes an order of the Land Commission under Section 3 of the Forestry Act, 1928 (No. 34 of 1928), and a decision of the Land Commission under Section 4 of the Mines and Minerals Act, 1931 (No. 54 of 1931).
Comment on this
At the present time under Section 3 of the Forestry Act of 1928 applications are heard by the Land Commissioners with an appeal to the judicial commissioner in the matter of taking land for forestry. In Section 4 of the Mines and Minerals Act of 1931, decisions as to whether minerals are the property of the Land Commission or the State are determined. It is necessary to provide that these appeals be heard by the appeals tribunal in the future.
Comment on this
Will it be necessary to amend Section 10 to implement the undertaking given in respect of the right of appeal?
Comment on this
I move amendment 21:—
To delete lines 47 and 48 and substitute the words "provided that the decision of the appeal tribunal on such application shall not be valid or effective unless the judicial commissioner concurs in such decision.
It is provided in the section that the right which the judicial commissioner hitherto had of granting resumption orders in certain cases shall, when this Act becomes law, be exercised by the appeal tribunal. The amendment provides "provided that the decision of the appeal tribunal on such application shall not be valid or effective unless the judicial commissioner concurs in such decision." The procedure up to the present was that before tenanted land was vested the Land Commission made investigation to find out whether the tenant in whom the land was about to be vested had already had an advance from the Land Commission. If he had an advance of £3,000 then automatically a form was sent out notifying him that it was proposed to retain the additional holding. There were other cases, I admit, where the Land Commission was satisfied that it was necessary to retain the holding for the purpose of improving it, or for the purpose of relieving congestion. The same form was also sent out to the tenant, notifying him that it was proposed to retain the holding. Following the sending out of that notice an inspection took place for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not congestion existed in the neighbourhood of the particular farm, or whether there was any reason why the Land Commission should not resume the holdings. The next step, the Land Commission having satisfied themselves that it was necessary to retain the holding for the purpose of improvement or for the purpose of relieving congestion, was that an application was made to the judicial commissioner for, in Land Commission phraseology, a resumption order. It was customary for the judicial commissioner to grant the resumption order. I have never known a case where it was refused. That power was conferred on the judicial commissioner by the Act of 1923, sub-section (3), Section 29, which reads:—
"On any application by the Land Commission for or in connection with the resumption of a holding, the powers of the Court under section five of the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881, shall be exercised exclusively by the judicial commissioner whose decision shall be final."
It is just as well that Deputies should be familiar with the extent of the authority exercised by the judicial commissioner. Section 5 of the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881, states:—
"During the continuance of a statutory term in a tenancy, save as hereinafter provided, the court may, on the application of the landlord, and upon being satisfied that he is desirous of resuming the holding or part thereof for some reasonable and sufficient purpose having relation to the good of the holding or of the estate, including the use of the ground as building ground, or for the benefit of the labourers in respect of cottages, gardens or allotments, or for the purpose of making grants or leases of sites for churches or other places of religious worship, schools, dispensaries, or clergymen's or schoolmasters' residences, authorise the resumption thereof by the landlord upon such conditions as the court may think fit, and require the tenant to sell his tenancy in the whole or such part to the landlord upon such terms as may be approved by the court, including full compensation to the tenant.
"Provided that the rent of any holding subject to statutory conditions may be increased in respect of capital laid out by the landlord under agreement with the tenant to such an amount as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant."
In any event, that is the machinery chosen for the purpose of dealing with resumption cases. Notwithstanding what has been said about the judicial commissioner, and the way he discharged his duties in the past, I am perfectly certain that the Attorney-General does not agree with any of those remarks, but will agree with what I am about to say, that so far as his authority was concerned in relation to the granting of resumption orders he certainly discharged that duty fairly, justly and equitably. No one can make any charge against him in that connection. As I say, the Land Commission could do nothing more than apply to the judicial commissioner for the necessary resumption order; in other words, for the necessary authority to proceed with the acquisition of the holding in order to distribute it for the relief of congestion.
Under this Land Act it is proposed to go very far in the direction of securing additional powers for the relief of congestion. It may be that there will be several holdings on an estate. In the past it was customary for the Land Commission, as a mere formality, to vest those holdings in the tenants. It was practically only in cases where the tenant had already got a Land Commission advance amounting to £3,000 that they retained the additional holding, and that holding was utilised for the purpose of relieving congestion. Under the additional powers which the Minister is asking for under this Bill it is possible for him to retain any holding, no matter what size and no matter what valuation. He may even, as a matter of fact, under the power asked for in Section 1 of this Bill, resume a holding or retain a holding of five acres in area. He can retain any holding of any size or of any area. I want to safeguard the small tenants. I did not put down this amendment for the purpose of giving the judicial commissioner certain powers which the Minister wishes to withhold from him. I put it down for the purpose of safeguarding the small tenants, and for the purpose of giving the judicial commissioner in regard to resumption cases more or less a continuance of the authority which he has enjoyed up to the present, and which he has discharged as I said, justly, fairly and equitably. There is still a very big number of holdings throughout the country to be vested in the tenants. There is a certain number of estates at all events to be dealt with. Even in the cases where those holdings have been vested in the Land Commission, the Land Commission has identically the same authority and the same power with regard to resumption proceedings as they had under the Act of 1923. That power was given to them under the Land Act of 1931. Up to the present that power has been exercised fairly, justly and equitably. If the Minister had given us an undertaking that two of the present Land Commissioners would act along with the judicial commissioner as the lay tribunal under this Act, I would be perfectly satisfied to let the tribunal exercise all the powers relating to the resumption of land. In the absence of any such undertaking from the Minister, I want to retain a certain authority for the judicial commissioner in respect of those resumption cases, because it is only by the retention of that authority by the judicial commissioner that the small tenants whose holdings are still to be vested in them can have their interests safeguarded. For that reason I move this amendment.
Comment on this
What I said on the last amendment applies also to this. You might as well get rid altogether of the two lay commissioners as accept this proposal. The judicial commissioner can sit tight and say: "I do not agree with that", and it is thrown out automatically under this amendment. Under the amendment nothing shall be valid or effective unless the judicial commissioner concurs. I do not agree with Deputy Roddy as to the functions of the judicial commissioner in the past. The small tenant that Deputy Roddy is particularly interested in could be met by the question and answer I quoted in this House on the Second Reading of the Bill—the question as to why 61 acres of land which were applied for for the relief of congestion were refused even though the individual concerned held 5,722 acres. It was decided by the commissioners that this man, with 5,722 acres, should not lose 61 acres; he could not afford to part with 61 acres for the landless men. I suppose that is one of the small tenants for whom Deputy Roddy wants to get the judicial commissioner to exercise such functions as are applied for under this particular heading. I consider that a mistake has been made, and if I can I think I will rectify it. I think I will bring in an amendment on the Report Stage abolishing that judicial commissioner altogether. I think it is the proper course to take. Deputy Roddy and those associated with him seem to have a terrible dread of lay commissioners. I was accused here last night of making an attack on the Land Commission officials. I did not. I had personal experience of the Land Commission Court, and I was agreeably surprised at the fairness with which they met cases brought forward. I cannot say the same about the other court that I went to afterwards; I found that the case was tried before ever it went into it.
Comment on this
The Deputy has already been told that he is not to discuss any decision of that judicial commissioner, on this or any other amendment.
Comment on this
We have been repeatedly challenged, I might say, by Deputy Roddy and others as to the decisions that have been come to. Comments have been made by some Deputies here on their fairness, and if comments on their fairness are right——
Comment on this
The Chair has said that personal comments on and criticism of the judicial commissioner are not to be made, and that ends it.
Comment on this
Well, a Chinn Comhairle, I confine myself to this, that apparently Deputy Roddy and those associated with him have a terrible dread of what the lay commissioners will do. I happen to have an entirely different opinion of lay commissioners, as compared with lawyers of any class, shape, form or description.
Comment on this
Of any class, shape, form or description. Deputy Dillon awhile ago accused me of accusing the three lawyers concerned in the previous amendment with corrupt practice. I did not, and I wish to disassociate myself from that here and now. I said that the amendment had been brought in by three lawyers, and I passed no comment. As for the weight of my opinion, I do not grudge Deputy Dillon or anyone associated with him to test the weight of my opinion in my own constituency any day they like.
Comment on this
This amendment is an endeavour, and a very definite endeavour, to overrule and set aside the changes that we are making in the tribunal. It is a very definite attempt in that direction, and I for one would sooner see the appeal tribunal wiped out altogether, because I do not believe in paying men for nothing, or for acting merely as figureheads who would have to go on their knees to buck-shee lawyers and let them tell them all about it. That is why I consider that Deputy Roddy's amendment should not be considered here.
Comment on this
My view on this amendment has already been expressed in relation to other amendments. I think we are as fully competent to appoint a lay commissioner as either the British Government or the Cumann na nGaedheal Government.
Comment on this
I think perhaps the Minister attaches undue significance to one aspect of this amendment. If he would look at Section 11, to which this amendment is moved, he will see that this is one of the odd cases which marks out this tribunal from the tribunal referred to by the Attorney-General. This is one of the cases in which there is no appeal from the tribunal. Section 11 reads:—
On any application by the Land Commission for or in connection with the resumption of a holding, the powers of the court under Section 5 of the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881, as amended by subsequent enactments (including this Act) shall be exercised by the appeal tribunal, and the decision of the appeal tribunal on such application shall be final.
There is no means of getting that reviewed by a court of law.
Comment on this
Before this, the decision of the judicial commissioner was final. What we are trying to do through this Bill, is, on questions of fact, to substitute the judicial commissioner by the lay commissioners; that is definite. We have given our views on that matter. Deputy Roddy objects to that. He wants the judicial commissioner left as the final word in this matter, simply because he says he cannot get an assurance from us that this tribunal would consist of two lay commissioners of two years' standing in the Land Commission. I said, as far as this concerns appeals, we are not going to listen to it. I believe we are as fully competent to appoint land commissioners as anyone else, either the Cumann na nGaedheal Government or the British Government.
Comment on this
I draw the Minister's attention to one point. I do not profess to be familiar with the whole land code from 1881 down to the present time but I am not clear on this; whether a point of law or the interpretation of a point of law might not arise under the Land Act of 1881. I put that to the Minister.
Comment on this
I believe it could not, because if that was so an appeal would lie from the decision of the judicial commissioner.
Comment on this
Not necessarily, because he is a High Court judge. The terms of the statute would suggest that normally there would be such an appeal, and here we are passing a Bill which deliberately, in this case, provides that there should not be an appeal, which would rather confirm my suspicions that a point of law might arise. If a point of law arises there would be no hope of any appeal here. I do not know whether a point of law can arise or not, but I am suggesting that there is a possible way of dealing with the case whether the tribunal is final, whether the High Court should, by statute, be prevented from functioning in such a case, or whether it should give the judicial commissioner power to invalidate a decision when the decision of the lay commissioners is made on a point of law. Perhaps the Attorney-General would inform the House whether under Section 11 a point of law can arise on appeal?
Comment on this
I do not think that arises, because the mind of the Executive Council is made up that this section must go into the Bill in this shape. They will not yield to making it a subject to appeal.
Comment on this
I want to make this statement to the House. The Attorney-General is a member of the Executive or of the Government. We have all a warm regard for him personally. His courtesy is invariable but I have not yet heard a precedent for a statement that because the Government is determined to ram something down the throats of the House, and because of that, the law officer of the Government declines to explain the section. I asked him as a responsible officer of the Government, and of this House and one who advises the Government, whether an appeal on a point of law might lie from this tribunal under Section 11, and his answer is that because the Government is determined to ram it down the throats of the House he will not concede an explanation here. Surely the Attorney-General will agree that that is an impossible position. If Deputies cannot turn to the law officer of the Government— and I wish to discharge myself of the least suspicion of being offensive— who is a public servant and the custodian of the legal rights of the people to whom shall they turn for information? That is the position. Nobody else can know as well as he can. We put the question to him, can that position possibly arise, and he must defend it in the light of that possibility if it exists.
Comment on this
It appears to me that Deputies opposite cannot be serious in this amendment. I do not think they would force it to a division. It asks us to declare that the lay commissioners shall have no authority to decide questions of fact. Deputies opposite would not give the lay commissioners any rights at all. What is wrong with the lay commissioners? Are they to be men who will not be allowed to deal with matters of any kind? The case was made by Deputy Roddy that on this amendment he was defending the rights of the small tenants with five or six acre farms. That was a ridiculous suggestion. Deputies do not mean a bit of it. Their argument now is that the lay commissioners will be biased in favour of the small farmer when dealing with the owners of the ranch lands. But they cannot have it both ways. The lay commissioners on questions of fact will be much more experienced in dealing with such matters than the judicial commissioner. They will be men of experience. Surely the Government has no intention of appointing men who have no experience of these matters. I take it that they will have a greater ability and knowledge in matters of this kind than the judicial commissioner himself. Why then try to put these men out of bounds? I am going on the argument of Cumann na nGaedheal Deputies now who seem to say that if there is anyone biased in favour of the small farmer here it will be the lay commissioners. That is what Deputy Roddy now wants to say. It is absolute nonsense, and he is talking just for the sake of putting up a position of some kind.
Comment on this
I did not intend to suggest that we should ram this down the throats of the House, as Deputy Dillon suggests. I merely want to make clear that we do not see any point in discussing this amendment. The amendment is not what Deputy Dillon has been striving to prove it is. We have already agreed that where a question comes before the appeal tribunal as to whether it is a question of fact or not the decision may be appealed against. This question before the appeal tribunal will be in the same position. I am informed that there is never or hardly ever any question of law in these cases. I do not know whether there is any suggestion to the contrary but that is my information from officials of the Land Commission. If there is a question of law the decision will be exactly the same as in other cases.
Comment on this
That is quite all right, but it is important that it should be put on record that the Attorney-General says that there is an appeal on a point of law. Arising out of Section 11 there will be an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Comment on this
Under the new section there is clearly an appeal on questions of law, and as to whether the question is one of law or of fact. But there is a very wide question dealt with here. The whole scheme of the Bill is to give the tribunal power to resume land. Deputy Roddy's amendment would confine that power, so far as the acquisition of tenanted land was concerned, to the judicial commissioner. I think that is the real purpose of his amendment apart altogether from the legal questions arising out of the Land Act of 1881. The effect of the amendment would be this, that when it is a question of the resumption of tenanted land the last word shall be left to the judicial functionary. That is a point we want to press on this amendment as well as the other point that will be dealt with on the amendment promised by the Attorney-General. I do not think the House should pass by this without realising the significance of what is going to happen if none of the safeguards is left. What is really happening is that all the safeguards under the Land Act of 1923 are being wiped out. The House will have to remember that it is possible here under this Bill to take land, not only for the relief of congestion but for any purpose at all. The House must remember also that not only can land be acquired for any purpose at all but that any class of land can be acquired for any purpose at all.
Under the Land Act of 1923 land could only be acquired compulsorily for the relief of congestion and certain other purposes, and could not be acquired at all if other lands suitable for these purposes could be acquired. Both these safeguards are wiped out. There is absolutely no safeguard at all left to the landowner whether he is a tenant, lessee or an owner in fee simple. He has no safeguard whatever, good, bad or indifferent. There were ample safeguards under the Land Act of 1923. There were safeguards with regard to the taking of public land or preventing the Land Commission from acquiring land absolutely except for the relief of congestion. There were safeguards that prevented the taking of residential holdings and other holdings. Under the Land Act of 1923 these could not be taken if untenanted lands suitable for the purposes for which they were required were available in the neighbourhood. All these safeguards have been completely swept away.
The position now is that the Land Commission may take any land of any kind and for any purpose. The purposes for which these lands may be taken are absolutely unlimited; that is the purposes defined by appealing to the section, which says that land may be taken for the relief of congestion or for suitable persons. There is absolutely no safeguard of any kind, good, bad or indifferent, given to the owner of land and there is no safeguard that any one portion of the land may not be taken for any of these purposes. Therefore, Deputies who think that the provisions of this Bill are about to establish a pleasant state of affairs have not really realised what the position is. I think that when it is fully realised what the position really is people will wonder why any Government should propose that such vast powers should be given over to the tribunal in question. I could understand this point of view if the Government said we must do this and take these powers, and we propose to do it and to ram it down the throats of the people if they left even this one safeguard which applies not only to the question of acquisition but also the question of price and a hundred and one cases which arise, and which are bound to arise, although not specifically pointed out in the Act, that the owner of land—a man, say, who might own £1,000 of real property which he earned hard by the sweat of his brow —was allowed this safeguard, that he would have the benefit of having a judicial personage to say the last word. Whether you remove all the considerations which I have mentioned in the Land Act or not, if there is any sense of justice left in the tribunal they must consider some such considerations.
When an issue comes before the appeal tribunal as to whether certain lands are to be taken, what will they have to consider? They will have to consider the circumstances of the owner, whether he is an ordinary farmer, whether he is married and has children, whether he is farming his land properly, whether he employs labour, whether he has other land and whether there is other land in the neighbourhood more suitable for acquisition. If a case comes before the tribunal for the acquisition of 100 acres from a man who has only 200 acres, the members of the tribunal should ask themselves why such a proposal was made and whether it was a fact that there were 1,000 acres in the neighbourhood available which it was not proposed to take. Considerations of this sort are vital. More genuine injustice can be done by treating any one of these issues lightly or inefficiently than can be done by 100 civil bill prosecutions. Lawyers will realise what feeling there is in a Circuit or High Court as between citizen and citizen on an ordinary unimportant issue, a comparatively unimportant issue. If a man does not get fair play on some small point it poisons him all his life. Hundreds of these issues involve very material and social considerations for the family owning the land. Why, in such circumstances, should not the tribunal be judicial? Give all these powers if you like, but at least let them be exercised by a judicial personage. It is absolutely the negation of all law to give these immense judicial powers to non-judicial persons.
I did not follow Deputy Corry or Deputy Cleary or, indeed, the Minister. They talked what appeared to me to be nonsense when they said that Fianna Fáil was as well able to appoint a land commissioner as Cumann na nGaedheal. That is admitted. Cumann na nGaedheal would have no right to send these issues before anybody except a judicial personage. A land commissioner is a civil servant, a very honourable and useful profession. Why is the judicial function hedged around with safeguards, not only in this but in other countries, where there is any conception of law? The answer is because it is realised—and this is no charge of corruption or inefficiency in respect of civil servants—that in these matters if you want impartial justice you must have a functionary who has a certain very special type of tenure. The experience of this and other countries has been that where you have not that functionary you will not get the justice you expect to get. That is no reflection on civil servants. I assume that Deputy Corry and Deputy Cleary are incapable of realising that distinction, but educated and civilised people have always understood it. People with any moderate sense understand that sort of thing. It is accepted by the ordinary man in the street in every country in the world and it ought to be accepted here. It is accepted almost as a universal principle that these considerations should be decided by a judicial personage. That has been the experience of generations of people in this and other countries. You are departing from it here and I consider it is a shocking departure.
What happens? Let us say I have a dispute about £25 worth of property and I get a judge, with all the independence and prestige of a judge, to decide that dispute. If I have a dispute in connection with £300 worth of property I go to the Circuit Court. These are comparatively small issues for an individual. They may be material to him, but they affect only one aspect of his life. In the case of land one's whole livelihood is at stake. It may be £1,000 worth or £500 worth of property, but to the man who has only £500 or £1,000 worth the issue is all-important. You will have 101 different issues arising. It makes all the difference in the world whether you take one end of a man's farm or the other, whether you leave him a certain right of way or take it away from him. It will affect his life and the lives of his family for generations afterwards. It makes all the difference in the world whether you leave a man to maintain the buildings which he has placed on his lands out of the overdraft on which he is now maybe paying 6 per cent. All these questions are to come, not before a judicial tribunal, but before a tribunal the members of which must be the servants of whatever Government be in power. I think that is a shocking state of affairs.
It would be wrong to say that I would not mind what provisions you put in the Bill. Of course I would. But if there is any conception of law amongst Deputies on the opposite benches they would recognise that though a definitely written law may be drastic it has advantages—you know where you are. You do not know where you are now. You cannot get the benefit of the law as you should get it if you have a tribunal like this.
Comment on this
Is the Deputy not overlooking the fixity of tenure the Government are now proposing to give?
Comment on this
The Deputy's speech is certainly on that line.
Comment on this
I understand they are to have fixity of tenure, but the same as civil servants.
Comment on this
The same as judges— irremovable except by the Oireachtas? Are they to have a legal training?
Comment on this
With fixity of tenure the same as judges have and they can only be removed by vote of the two Houses? I admit that goes a long way to meet my point.
Comment on this
When Deputy Hogan talks about the safeguards of the 1923 Act, surely he has realised by now that the safeguards he mentions were the greatest evils so far as the congests are concerned, and it was for them that Act was supposed to cater. If anything is done under this Bill which goes back to what he calls safeguards, but what I call evils, it will defeat the whole intentions of the Bill. What the Deputy calls safeguards were played fast and loose with by the people from whom it was intended to acquire land and it defeated the intentions of the 1923 Act. When the Deputy speaks of safeguards he must close his eyes to the fact that the 1923 Act, so far as dealing with congests was concerned, was an absolute failure.
It must be remembered that congests have rights, too. For the last two days we have been listening to the rights of people in possession of large tracts of land. The people who are in need of land have rights too. They are entitled to be catered for. The Deputy should remember that there are other people for whom there should be safeguards—the small congest farmers living on the verge of starvation for a number of years. I have as much respect for the rights of property as Deputy Hogan, but I have greater respect for the lives of human beings. You will be conflicting those two rights if you have safeguards for the man with the large tracts of land and take no interest in the man who wants a little land.
Comment on this
Question proposed: "That the lines proposed to be deleted stand."
Do you agree with this result?
I move amendment 22:
At the end of sub-section (1) (c), line 20, to add the words "and the defendant in such proceedings requires the proceedings to be heard and determined."
Section 12 deals with the question of arrears and the revision of annuities payable to the Land Commission. Sub-section (1) says: (Sub-section quoted) Of course, I cannot imagine that, in the case of default, the Land Commission would be very anxious to continue the proceedings. For that reason, I have added the words: “and the defendant in such proceedings requires the proceedings to be heard and determined.” The object of the amendment is that such proceedings shall not be continued unless it is the express desire of the defendant in the case that they should be continued.
Comment on this
In the ordinary way, the defendant can withdraw his case. In that way, we could accept the amendment, but it amounts to nothing. At the present time, if the defendant has entered a defence he can withdraw it.
Comment on this
This is a case where he does not want to withdraw it. He thinks he has a good defence.
Comment on this
If he thinks he has a good case, let him go ahead and fight it. If he thinks he has not a good case, he can withdraw it. There is nothing here to prevent him from fighting his case and, if he wants to withdraw the case, he can do so. Deputy Hogan should read the section.
Comment on this
I have read it. Supposing the defendant has a good defence. He wants his costs. He goes before the court and enters a defence in the ordinary way. He wants the case to be heard and to get it dismissed with costs, which he is entitled to do. If the section remains as it stands, can he do so?
Comment on this
The last lines in paragraph (c) say:—
shall be further prosecuted or proceeded with... unless a defence was filed or entered in such proceeding before such passing.
Surely, the Minister does not suggest that the defendant in such a case would be anxious to continue the proceedings. Why not withdraw the proceedings unreservedly?
Comment on this
The Land Commission have withdrawn proceedings unreservedly except where the case has been entered, and they will withdraw unreservedly if the case has been withdrawn. Suppose I am before a court and I have filed a defence against the Land Commission assessment, I can withdraw the case.
Comment on this
I move amendment 23:—
To delete sub-section (2).
Amendment No. 23 is cognate with a number of other amendments standing in my name. It is cognate with amendments 31, 34, 37 and a number of other amendments of that character. Now, sir, when a private Deputy puts his hand to the amendment of legislation of this kind, it is sometimes difficult to draft an amendment which will produce the exact effect desired. Accordingly, it is not uncommon for an amendment to be put down in order to raise the issue of a particular principle, and, in the event of the Government accepting the principle, to withdraw the amendment and allow the Government to redraft it in the best and most effective way. The purpose of these amendments is to draw the attention of the House to the injustice of requiring arrears of Land Commission annuities that have accrued during the last two years, while arrears that accrued in the previous years are being remitted. It seems to me that whatever excuse there was for a man falling into arrears in the years prior to 1930, there was a far better excuse for a man who fell into arrears in 1931 or 1932.
As I understand the Bill at present, the purpose is to forgive arrears which were fallen into prior to 1930, and to collect arrears into which tenants fell in the years 1930, 1931 and 1932. Now, the tenants who fell into arrears in 1932 are people, many of whom were doing their best to keep the ship afloat and pay their rent and who found their means of livelihood swept away by reason of the economic war and were driven back to a very hard tussle to keep themselves and their families in food and clothes. They were forced by the circumstances of the time to fall into arrears—many of them falling into arrears under the belief that they had paid their land annuities two or three times over at the fairs which they attended. There are many men in the West of Ireland whose land annuity is £1 or 30/-. They went to a fair and on the sale of one beast they lost——
Comment on this
Surely, the Deputy does not intend to enter into a discussion of the economic war once more?
Comment on this
I deem it a privilege to be instructed by the Ceann Comhairle but I resent being instructed by the Deputies behind me.
Comment on this
I do not really think that I can deal with the problem that this amendment raises unless I dwell briefly on the circumstances under which these people fell into arrears with their annuities.
Comment on this
Is the Deputy aware that the effect of this amendment is to prevent any arrears being funded or that the effect is to prevent people who are paying purchase annuities to the Land Commission getting the benefit of the 50 per cent. reduction? That is the effect of his amendment, however. I do not mind if the Chair allows him to talk on anything he likes but the effect of the amendment is to prevent people taking advantage of this section which will entitle the Land Commission to give a 50 per cent. reduction on land annuities.
Comment on this
I should be surprised if that were the effect because I went through this section with meticulous care with a view to avoiding any such contingency as that. Amendment 23 proposes to delete sub-section (2) of Section 12 and that section reads:
(2) As soon as may be after the passing of this Act, the Land Commission shall ascertain the amount of the arrears of every purchase annuity to which this section applies which were due and owing on the 15th day of July, 1933, and the amount of the costs and expenses (if any) incurred by the Land Commission before the passing of this Act in proceedings for the recovery of such arrears, and immediately upon such ascertainment—
(a) where the amount so ascertained of such arrears does not exceed the aggregate amount of such purchase annuity payable during the three years ending on the first gale day in the year 1933, such arrears together with the amount so ascertained of the said costs and expenses shall (if not otherwise paid before the passing of this Act) be payable by means of a funding annuity and not otherwise; and
(b) in every other case the amount so ascertained of the said costs and expenses together with so much of such arrears as is equal to the said aggregate amount shall (if not otherwise paid before the passing of this Act) be payable by means of a funding annuity and the residue of such arrears shall not be payable.
Comment on this
I am sorry. The amendment proposes to delete a section which deals with the arrears and not halving the land annuities.
Comment on this
I was more careful than the Minister thought. I was trying to raise this matter on an amendment which would not be ruled out of order, as some other amendments were, very properly, ruled out. The suggestion I make is this: That if the principle of the remission of arrears is to stand, and if it be just to remit arrears of persons who fell into arrears prior to 1930, then all the more is it just and equitable that persons who fell into arrears during the continuance of the economic war should have their arrears remitted too. I and every Deputy in this House know of individual cases in which people were literally unable to raise the requisite money to pay the land annuities and for no other reason than this that the cattle they had laid by for that express purpose did not realise a tithe of what they expected. Many people in the country run their economy on the basis that they buy a couple of beasts. They carry these beasts over for a certain period and feed them and they rely on paying their shop debts, their land annuities and other such commitments as they have to meet on the difference between what those beasts cost them and what they afterwards realise at the fairs. Now, during certain years to which this proviso about arrears applies, these people put in a pair of beasts, fed them for a certain period, and when they brought them to the market they discovered they were going to get less for them than what they cost. As a result they discovered that the provision which they had made for the payment of the land annuities had evaporated. When such a man is asked afterwards to pay his land annuities he is bound to say what the reason was; the answer was bound to be this: "I am not able to pay these land annuities because the cattle dealer at the fair collected, not only my land annuities but the land annuities of two of my neighbours out of the money he paid me for my cattle. Having paid, not only my own land annuities, but the land annuities of two of my neighbours as well, how can I be expected to pay again?"
When people ask me what they should do about the payment of these land annuities I say to them: "In my opinion, so long as the law is made by an Irish Government in our own Parliament, it is the duty of every man and woman in this State to obey it. The proper method of procedure, if you deem the law to be unjust, is to join a political organisation and put that Government out of office at the earliest possible opportunity; but so long as any Government is the Government of this country that Government should be obeyed by the citizens of this State. If you do not like the kind of Government you have it is your duty to do all you can to turn it out and put in a Government that you consider a just Government." Where a person came to me and told me that he was unable to pay his land annuities owing to his inability to get a proper price for his farm produce I said to him: "take a pen and paper and write to the Land Commission and tell them that with your best endeavour you cannot pay this money; explain the reason for your inability, and place the full facts before them."
Now is the time when that apparent injustice can be rectified by the Government. They have been told by a farmer that he made his very best endeavours to comply with the law and that, being unable to do so, the Government should come to his relief and remit his arrears. Even at the eleventh hour the Government should remit these arrears. I trust they will and thus give effect to the proposal we made in this House some time ago. That was to suspend the payment of the land annuities until the conclusion of the economic war. If the Government, even at the eleventh hour, do that it will not be the first time that it has implemented its intentions and acted on second thoughts. This Government has shown no reluctance on other occasions to do what they wanted to do by retrospective legislation. Indeed on some occasions I have had grave fault to find with them on that account. But this is one of the rare cases where the Government should realise that second thoughts are best and that if they have not accepted and implemented the resolution suspending the collection of the land annuities during the economic war here is a means now of doing it. Let them announce that those people who fell into arrears during the period of the economic war will have these arrears remitted. Let them take steps to deal equitably and fairly with everybody. By the Bill as it stands we are only considering the case here of persons who have actually fallen into arrears before 1930. We are not considering the case of those who have fallen into arrears in the last year and a half. It is only the case of annuitants who fell into arrears more than three years ago that this Bill is now dealing with.