Workmen's Compensation Bill, 1933—Committee. - Debate Resumed on Amendment 2.
Contributions 200–402 of 402. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 44 of 1933 ›
The Minister is missing the whole point. Special exemption is made for agricultural workers from the general rule of law.
Comment on this
I do not think the Minister knows. It is not clear why. The Minister is taking the section holus-bolus from the British Act, and he has no more idea of why he is doing it than he has as to why pigs do not fly. At the moment I cannot see the reason for this exception, and everybody in this Chamber knows that the Minister has not himself the vaguest reason or the vaguest idea of why it is so.
Comment on this
That sort of abuse will get us nowhere. When the Deputy is driven into a corner he spits out abuse. That is not argument. I explained the reason for this to the Deputy. The exception in this case is for the reason that the farmer himself does not own a threshing machine and he has to hire a threshing machine to get his work done.
Comment on this
Are there not a number of men who use tractors for the purpose of ploughing? If that is the reason for the exclusion of agricultural labourers under this sub-section then this is an entirely erroneous exemption, and I propose to raise the question further on Report Stage.
Comment on this
I move amendment 5:—
In paragraph (c), before the word "employer," line 37, to insert the words "employment of the."
This is only a drafting amendment.
Comment on this
I move amendment 6:—
To delete sub-section (2).
This section has apparently been brought into this Bill consequent upon the passage of the Unemployment Assistance Bill. As this stands I believe it is reproduced in the 1923 Acts in Great Britain. What I apprehended when I read this sub-section was this, that if you had a man who suffered injury and was awarded, say, 25/- a week workmen's compensation, the time might arrive at which he would become eligible for unemployment benefit or unemployment assistance. In order to become eligible for unemployment assistance, it was made very clear in the original Bill that he had to be fit and well and ready for work. A man might be fit and well and ready for work but still be suffering sufficiently from the result of his accident as not to be fitted for the work which he was accustomed to do. I felt that a situation might arise in which you would have an ordinary workman falling between two stools— first, his rights, under the Unemployment Assistance Bill and on the other side his rights under the Workmen's Compensation Bill. It seemed to me that this sub-section was unnecessary because it is here for the purpose of preventing a workman getting both benefits. But the moment a workman gets benefit under the Unemployment Assistance Bill or under the Unemployment Assistance Code, that opens the door for the employer to go into court and say: "This man on his own admission is fit for work; therefore my liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act ceased on the moment that he was fitted for work." And, immediately, the court would declare the man cured and suspend his claim against the employer.
Most people who are paying this unemployment benefit are large insurance companies with legal staffs continually on the qui vive, or else, individual employers who are carrying a burden they are anxious to get rid of at the first opportunity. The very first opportunity these people get—that is, the moment the man gets unemployment benefit—comes with the proof that he is fitted for work. They can come into court with that proof in their hands and ask to be discharged from the obligation to pay benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act. But if you put in a sub-section such as this in the Statute it seems to me that a case might arise where you would find a workman getting neither one benefit nor the other. It is not a likely contingency but it is a possible contingency. It is quite impossible to have any insurance company or any big employer going on paying insurance for one day longer than the law demands. Therefore, if the Minister wishes it brought to an end he should leave to the employer to bring it to an end by some procedure such as I have indicated rather than bring in the Statute which we have here which might operate to deprive the workman of both benefits at the same time.
Comment on this
I do not know if the Deputy succeeded in making the point clear to himself. But he did not make it clear to me. The whole Section 24 is designed to provide this:—If a workman has been injured and recovers sufficiently from his injury so as to be able to undertake light work and he tries to get that light work and does not succeed, he can then go into court and if he satisfies the court that he has failed to obtain that light work, the court may make an order entitling him to receive compensation for the period as if he were totally incapacitated. Sub-section (2) provides that the order of the court becomes discharged if the worker receives unemployment insurance benefit. It is not possible that the worker can lose both. The position, in fact is, that if the worker has a claim to unemployment insurance benefit it may well happen, and perhaps would happen in a number of cases, that receiving the partial compensation which he is entitled to in any event, plus unemployment insurance benefit, he will be in receipt of more than what he was earning before the accident occurred. This section does not prevent that and it is not intended to prevent it, but it is intended to provide that where he is drawing unemployment insurance benefit he will only get the partial compensation to which he is entitled and not the special compensation under an order of the court which he could get if he proved that he was unable to obtain work which he was capable of performing. Ordinarily the position will be, I presume, that the order of the court will persist until the worker obtains light work. The worker may lose that light work again and become entitled to unemployment insurance benefit which cannot be withheld from him if he is available for work of any kind, is seeking it and is unable to obtain it. If he has the necessary credit in the Unemployment Insurance Fund, then he is entitled to unemployment insurance benefit. If his right to benefit became exhausted, or if he is unable to obtain any light work, he can go back to the court and again ask for an order under sub-section (1), but there is no possibility of his falling between the two stools. On the contrary, that sub-section is obviously fair. Even under that sub-section the position may well be that the worker will get more than he was earning before the accident occurred so long as the compensation claim lasts and he is entitled to draw unemployment insurance benefit.
Take the case of a man earning 40/- a week. If he becomes incapacitated he is entitled, on the basis of total incapacity, to receive 30/- a week. If he recovers sufficiently to be able to take up light work and, in fact, succeeds in getting a job, say, as a night watchman at 10/- a week, the difference between his earnings pre-accident and post-accident is 30/- and he is entitled to get 75 per cent. of the 30/-, that is, 22/6 or thereabouts. His position while he has the light work is that he is getting 10/-, plus 22/6. If he loses the light work and becomes unemployed he will be getting in Unemployment Insurance Benefit a minimum of 15/- and may be getting 25/-, which, added to the 22/6, will give him a total remuneration above that which he was earning before the accident occurred. This sub-section provides, therefore, if he is getting unemployment insurance benefit, that he does not get, in addition to the compensation he is entitled to, the additional compensation which is provided for in sub-section (1). That additional compensation is only payable if the workman is unable to obtain light work and is not entitled to unemployment insurance benefit.
Comment on this
If he has 35 stamps to his credit he gets 35 days' unemployment insurance benefit at the 15/- rate, and when that is exhausted he goes on to the Unemployment Assistance Bill.
Comment on this
No, the Unemployment Assistance Bill does not come into this at all. In the case of that Bill there is a means test, and what the workman was receiving, and was entitled to receive from other sources, would be taken into account. In the case of unemployment insurance benefit there is no means test. Irrespective of what his resources are he is entitled to unemployment insurance benefit in respect of the stamps he has to his credit.
Comment on this
What will happen to our friend under sub-section (2) when the benefit to which his 35 stamps entitle him is run out? Can he go back to the court and get his full incapacity restored to him?
Comment on this
I want to get this matter made clear. I am not at all satisfied that a person who is even partially incapacitated can go and draw unemployment insurance benefit. I take it that a person applying for unemployment insurance benefit is called upon to declare that he is available for, and able to take up work. Let us take the case of a man who works, say, on the roads. He is signing on for what? For employment. Supposing he is offered employment which is similar to that which he had been accustomed to do before the accident and he tells the manager of the local labour exchange that he is considered fit only for light work, is he going to get his unemployment insurance benefit? I am very doubtful, and I would like the Minister to look carefully into this matter.
Comment on this
If totally incapacitated he could not draw unemployment insurance benefit at all. If he is partially incapacitated and capable of performing light work and makes a claim for unemployment insurance benefit, he is entitled to get it if he has credit in the fund.
Comment on this
I would be glad if the Minister would look into this matter between now and the Report Stage. What the Minister has stated is news to me. A man goes in and lodges a claim for unemployment insurance benefit. In order to get that claim recorded he has to declare that he is available for, and able to work. When work is offered to him, work that he has been doing all his life-time, and he says: "I am unable to take up that particular job because the doctor says I am only able to do light work," what becomes of his claim? I know what becomes of it if the Minister does not. I know that he does not get benefit, and in saying that I am sure every member on the Labour Benches who has practical knowledge of the matter will agree with me.
Comment on this
The strict interpretation which the Deputy has given means that nobody who is not fit in physical health can get unemployment insurance benefit.
Comment on this
The Minister says that there is no means test for unemployment insurance benefit. Deputies, I am sure, will be glad to hear that. The matter has been raised many times in this House, and questions have been addressed to the Minister's Department about a means test being applied to those seeking unemployment insurance benefit. It seems to me that there is no possible chance of a workman drawing in unemployment insurance benefit and in an award from the court more than he would get through an ordinary maximum award from the court.
Comment on this
I do not think the Minister was right in the example he gave. It seems to me that if the Minister is going to persist in his present attitude cases will certainly arise where men will be victimised.
Comment on this
In any event there is no case for the amendment because if he does get unemployment insurance benefit, then he is all right. The Deputy's argument is that he may not get it.
Comment on this
I want to get the Minister clear on the point. I am afraid that he has not been properly advised, that a man can go to the local labour exchange, a man who is not able to take up the work that he ordinarily does, and having refused that work because of his inability to do the particular job offered, be allowed to draw unemployment insurance benefit. If the Minister argues that such a man will be able to draw unemployment insurance benefit, then I am afraid he has very little practical knowledge of what goes on.
Comment on this
That does not matter for the purpose of this amendment because sub-section (2) only deals with the case of a man who succeeds in getting benefit. If he has succeeded in getting benefit there is no case for continuing the additional compensation which sub-section (1) makes provision for.
Comment on this
Not as long as it is additional. Suppose one is substituted for the other. Let us take a man who is injured and judged to be partially incapacitated—who is declared to be fit for odd jobs—an odd-job man. He proposes to satisfy the judge and the arbitrator that he has made attempts to get light work. This section says the judge shall deem him to be totally incapacitated and says that the provision will not apply if he draws unemployment benefit. If he draws unemployment benefit he should not be allowed to get it at all. But suppose we have power to make him elect to decide as between two funds. The choice as between the two is a most reasonable one. Surely the employer, in whose service he met the accident that led to his incapacity, should bear the burden. That is one step in many courses. It is quite true that if a person is so incapacitated as to be drawing health benefit, then it is not the same case for unemployment benefit at all. But I do not think it matters because of the opposite extreme. I think you can have people not so badly incapacitated, or who for some reason are drawing health benefit and it would be a moot point as to whether that person is able to work. The criteria for unemployment benefit are: willingness to work, available for work and fitted for work. That may be 100 per cent. ability reduced down to total incapacity. Suppose a workman applied for unemployment benefit and on being questioned he admitted that he had made application and had got the court to declare for the reason given, total incapacity. In these circumstances, and drawing this compensation, does anyone think that the officers of the Department or the umpire or the referee, would give that unemployment benefit? I doubt if they would. There are certain cases that might slip through. There are other cases where you would get a slipshod position. But in the main a man totally incapacitated, and who is drawing money upon that basis, would be ruled out. If we had the chance of putting him on the one fund, as against the other, should we not put him back upon the man in whose employment he suffered the incapacity rather than upon the other section of the community? Guarding always against the double drawing, if there is to be a choice to be made it would be more logical to bring him in under the Workmen's Compensation Act rather than to put him upon the Unemployment Fund.
Comment on this
The matter is not so simple as the Deputy thinks. He has pictured a sick man as distinct from an injured man who, perhaps, has lost his foot. There is nothing to prevent a man who has lost a foot from taking an insurable occupation carrying insurance benefits.
Comment on this
He should get it. Take the case of a man who went into insurable employment, with a wooden leg, or with one arm, or some other physical incapacity of that kind. He enters an insurable employment for a year or two. Then the job closes down and he makes his claim for insurance benefit in respect of that period of employment. He must get it and, at the same time, he may be drawing under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Let me give an example. A man earning 40/- a week loses his right foot. He goes to the hospital and gets cured up to the point where he is capable of obtaining light work. He comes out to seek work and does not succeed in finding it. He can, under sub-section (1), come into court on the ground that he is not able to find work—not on the ground that he could not perform work, but that he could not find it. The court may make an order entitling him to receive compensation on the basis that he would be paid if totally incapacitated. Now if that person could perform light work and is seeking it he can draw benefit, and he will seek it and draw it. It will be in his interest to draw it.
Comment on this
There is no means test in unemployment insurance. Let me complicate the matter a little further. The person I have indicated, having got an order from the court, is drawing his full compensation. Then he gets a job as night watchman and he takes it. The order of the court is discharged. But he gets out of that the partial compensation that he was awarded originally. He gets wages for his work and he gets his partial compensation. He then loses the job of light work but, having accumulated a number of unemployment insurance stamps, of course he gets benefit.
Comment on this
There are sufficient decided cases to put it beyond doubt. I went to the fountain head of authority to make sure I was not misinterpreting the position. He is entitled to get his unemployment insurance benefit, and to draw the compensation that was awarded to him and which, subject to commutation, might be continued for life. Again, this insurance benefit goes on if he cannot find light work and makes an effort to find it, and another order can be made entitling him to full compensation on the basis that he would get it if totally incapacitated. The effect of the amendment is, on the one hand, to make it impossible for that person, if entitled, to draw unemployment insurance benefit. If carried, in the form proposed, the effect on a person to whom the court awarded full compensation would be that he could draw unemployment insurance as well and get the same order. That is the effect of the amendment.
Comment on this
No, no. Surely one of the qualifications for receiving unemployment insurance benefit is that the person should be able and ready for work. The ground under which he gets compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is that he has neither got, nor is fit for work. The moment he becomes capable he is no longer entitled to benefit.
Comment on this
The only persons covered by this section are people capable of certain light classes of work.
Comment on this
That person is entitled to draw unemployment benefit if he is in credit. The effect of the amendment would be to enable him to draw that unemployment benefit while, at the same time, getting full compensation under the court order under sub-section (1). That is obviously undesirable. Even on the basis of the lower compensation, if he has unemployment benefit, there will be a payment, which in respect of the worker with 40/- or thereabouts will probably be higher than his pre-accident earnings. The amount will vary from case to case, and will depend on the amount of compensation awarded. It is impossible to fix a general rule in that respect. In any event, it is in the interest of the worker, apart from the interest of the unemployment benefit fund, that he should be allowed to draw against it, even sacrificing for that right the small additional compensation which the court would award him, because it means more money for him so long as his right to benefit lasts. That is why I think the amendment does not quite achieve the purpose which the Deputy has in mind, nor is it in the interest of the worker.
Comment on this
Two points fall for consideration on this amendment arising out of the attitude adopted by the Minister. One is: Can a man who has lost a leg in an accident, who has recovered from the subsequent hospital treatment and secured light work, get unemployment benefit in the event of his losing his light work? Will the umpire, under the Unemployment Insurance Act, judge him to be capable of and available for work within the meaning of the Act? The second point is: Can a man, who does succeed in getting unemployment insurance benefit, exhaust his benefit, and is still unable to go into the open labour market as a result of his accident, go back to the court after his unemployment benefit is exhausted and get another order from the court under Section 24 (1)? That is a very important point. The Minister said that supposing a man suffers a partial disablement, becomes available for light work and gets it, and then loses the light work and gets unemployment insurance benefit, when he has exhausted his unemployment insurance benefit he may go back to the court and get another order under sub-section (1) and get put back on the insurance company as a totally disabled man. I should like to be perfectly sure of that. It is by no means unknown, when an insurance company has a man who is partially disabled on their hands for a long time, getting the compensation of a totally disabled man, that they give him a light job, keep him in it for a certain spell of time, and then sack him.
Comment on this
That may be so. In any event, I should imagine that a person who had succeeded in getting a light job, even a temporary one, would have difficulty in convincing a court that he could not obtain another light job, if he again claims.
Comment on this
I do not want to snatch any advantage of the Minister, but he will bear in mind that five minutes ago he said that a man in that condition could go back to the court and get put back on the original order made under sub-section (1). I think the Minister was mistaken in that detail. I do not think he can.
Comment on this
The Deputy is probably right. If he succeeded in obtaining work once, he is probably knocked out.
Comment on this
Not sub-section (2). The wording of sub-section (1) is "that he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain and has failed to obtain such employment." It would be the interpretation of these words which would rule it, if he had in fact succeeded in obtaining employment, though only for a short period.
Comment on this
I would invite the Minister, in view of the points raised as a result of the introduction of the amendment, to consider the section in the light of the discussion that has taken place and see if steps cannot be taken on the Report Stage to redraft this so as to meet the kind of case which I had in mind when I proposed to delete sub-section (2). I think probably the best way to do it would be to submit the discussion to the experts of the Department and allow proposals to be formulated for the Minister's consideration. I might add that that work could have been done in a peculiarly effective way in special committee.
Comment on this
The Minister made reference to a point which I do not think very definitely arises, that is, if a workman goes to court and proves that he has taken steps to obtain and has got employment, or if it can be proved against him, that that ousts him. I think the ordinary practice is to reduce the award to a nominal amount but to keep the claim alive. I think Deputy Dillon was going on a different point. Look at sub-section (2): "Every order made shall cease to be in force if the workman receives unemployment benefit." That is intended to mean, I know, while he is in receipt of benefit, but that is not what the section says. It appears to me that the reading of that sub-section would mean that if a man got unemployment benefit his award ceases to be effective not merely during the time he gets unemployment benefit, but that if he once got it the award goes. I am sure that is not what is meant. Do the words "if the workman receives" mean while the workman is in receipt of benefit?
Comment on this
The workman need not claim unemployment benefit unless he has worked it out to be in his interest.
Comment on this
Supposing he has claimed once, then he has received benefit. Does the award then cease, or cease only for such time as he is in receipt of benefit?
Comment on this
Although the Minister believes that, in fact, if he went to the court he might not get it?
Comment on this
Not in the particular case mentioned by Deputy McGilligan. I am referring to a case where a man got work. He is referring to a case where a man got benefit.
Comment on this
That is the purpose of the amendment. I am prepared to leave the whole thing over and have it considered in the light of the discussion and let us reopen the section on the Report Stage.
Comment on this
I am not quite clear as to what is to be considered. I should like to look up and see if any peculiar legal decisions have been given arising out of this section and its operation in Great Britain. I have not heard of any peculiarities arising, but there may be some.
Comment on this
Supposing the Minister is satisfied that a practice has grown up, whereby insured persons have deliberately given light work to partially disabled employees for the purpose of knocking them out of an order made under sub-section (1), will he consider amending the section so as to prevent the practice in future?
Comment on this
I shall have to consider that very carefully, because there is no obligation on the employee. If the employee has got the order from the court, then there might be something in that. But the employee does not get the full compensation until he has got the order from the court.
Comment on this
Suppose the employee says that he is fit for a certain type of light work, and goes to the court and says he cannot get that kind of light work, and the court says, "We hold you to be totally disabled until you are able to get that type of light work." Then he is met by a man on the door-step who says, "I will give you a job of that kind." Immediately he must go and take it, and his compensation is reduced by the amount of the wages he gets for that light job. He holds the light job for a couple of months, and he is then sacked out of it. He is then in the position that he has his reduced compensation and no job.
Comment on this
He would have his unemployment benefit, but that is exhausted in a very short time if the man has been at work only eight or nine weeks. If the Minister is satisfied, as I think he will be if he inquires into it, that fictitious jobs are given just for the purpose of defeating the concession under this section, will he consider redrafting the section in order to meet that possibility?
Comment on this
We should have been discussing the amendment, but the section has been covered as well.
Comment on this
On the section, I just want to point out to the Minister that he has in this instance let go of his sheet-anchor—the British legislation. The Minister, in answer to various amendments which we put forward, advocated the retention of his draft by reference to the British legislation. In respect of this particular section the Minister has, whether advisedly or not I do not know, overlooked the fact that the section which he has put in here has been amended very considerably in England, by the Act of 1931, so that in this section this legislation will lag slightly behind the British legislation. I should like to know what is the point in preferring this particular section to the later section in the British Act of 1931. I should also like to draw attention to one outstanding feature of the present section which has been altered in the British legislation of 1931. Under the section as it stands the onus of proving his inability to get light work is on the workman. Under the amending Act of 1931, it would seem that that onus has been shifted from the workman. If it has not been actually shifted to the employer, the burden on the workman has at least been lightened, because instead of using the words which are used in this section and which I think were used in the Act of 1925, Section 9, sub-section (4)—"If a workman who has so far recovered from the injury as to be fit for employment of a certain kind, proves to the satisfaction of the court that he has taken all reasonable steps to get light work. ..."—the section of the 1931 Act says, "If it appears to the county court judge that the man has taken reasonable steps ..."; in other words the burden is either shifted or lightened. We are proposing to keep the burden on the workman, and I should like to know why it is that the later Act of 1931 has not been adopted here instead of the provisions that are contained in sub-section (1) of this section.
In the Act of 1931 there is an additional right or a safeguard put in for the workman, which does not appear in this section. In addition to enabling the court to give compensation as for total incapacity on the failure of the workman to obtain employment, there is a provision that "if the court considers that having regard to all the circumstances it is probable that the workman would but for the continuing effects of the injury be able to obtain work in the same grade and in the same class of employment as before the accident..." I should like to know why that provision was left out in this section. I should also like to know the justification for it. It would seem that the amending Act of 1931 has desirable elements in it which should commend themselves to this House, and that those desirable elements should appear in this section. I would have put down an amendment, but before doing so I wanted to know why they are left out, so as to be able to see what case has to be met. I should like the Attorney-General, who has now taken the Minister's place, when considering the section as a whole, to look into this matter and let us know what the policy is, and why the British legislation—which is, as I have already said, the sheet anchor of the Minister —has been loosened in this particular instance.
The last point I wish to call attention to is the retention of this very vague phrase "employment of a certain kind." I do not know what that means. The British judges have refused to tell the British people what it means. I suppose we will have to wait until some courageous Irish judge tells the Irish people what it means, and in the meantime the legislature is going to tell no one what they meant when they put it in. I should like the Attorney-General to consider whether, having regard to such decisions as there have been on those words "employment of a certain kind," it would be possible to get appropriate words which would enable people to know where they stand. Fortunately again the British House of Lords has stepped in in favour of the workmen, and has given those particular words an extended meaning, although some of the judges were of the opinion that the extended meaning they proposed to give to those words was not intended by the Act. I do not know whether the Minister will go back to his second sheet anchor, the original intention of the legislature, and give a less extended right to the workmen because of the original intention of the legislature, cutting down the rights which have been given to the workmen by the British judges. Those are matters which should be enquired into before this section is again considered on the Report Stage.
Comment on this
The Minister is prepared to meet Deputy Costello's point. I am afraid the amendment made in the English Act has been overlooked. There is no intention of lagging behind the British section in regard to dealing with this matter. On an earlier section the Deputy stressed the fact that decisions in England have shown that the courts have been faced with certain difficulties and have had trouble in discovering what was the intention of the legislature. It would be much better, I would suggest, that the Minister should, on the Report Stage, endeavour to amend the section so as to get rid of the difficulties as discovered by the cases which have been before the courts. On the earlier section the Deputy suggested the radical cure of going back to the old section of the 1906 Act. With regard to this section and that earlier section. I imagine a much more sensible thing would be to put in amendments embodying words which would avoid raising the difficulties that have been discovered by the English courts. We ought to be able to arrive at some agreed amendment which would prevent, if possible, the same state of affairs arising as has occurred in England. I will undertake to have the matter looked into.
Comment on this
I do not know if I properly understood what the Attorney-General said. Certainly I am not paid for drafting amendments of a difficult character. The Attorney-General has an expert staff at his disposal. I think it was described in the Seanad as the most expert staff of draftsmen in the world. They can put it into shape. I have drawn the attention of the House to the fact, and I understood the Attorney-General to say that the Act of 1931 was overlooked. How could I know that the Attorney-General and the Minister overlooked the Act of 1931? Was I to put down the Act of 1931 as an amendment on the assumption that they had overlooked it? Before I put down an amendment I want to know the policy behind this section. Now that I understand it is really a mistake, it is a matter for the Attorney-General, the Minister and the draftsman. Certainly I am not going to do the job for them, if that is the suggestion.
Comment on this
I quite accept that. All I suggested was that if the Deputy wishes I will let him have a draft of the amendment.
Comment on this
Certainly. I thought the Attorney-General was suggesting that I should formulate the words.
Comment on this
No. I suggested that if the Deputy wished we could discuss it on the Report Stage when I will submit an amendment.
Comment on this
I move the following amendments:—
7. In sub-section (3), page 12, line 44, to delete the word "workmen" and substitute the word "workman."
8. In sub-section (5) (a), page 13, lines 24 and 25, to delete the words "the references contained in paragraph (a) of sub-section (2)" and substitute the words "the reference in sub-section (3)."
9. In sub-section (5) (b), page 13, lines 30 and 31, to delete the words "contained in the said paragraph (c) of sub-section (2) of this section and in sub-section (3)" and substitute the words "in sub-sections (3) and (4)."
These are drafting amendments.
Comment on this
In amendment 7 it is proposed to substitute a word which means nothing for a word that means something.
Comment on this
Clearly it is taken from the wording at the side of Section 34. These are the exact words it is now proposed to put in.
Comment on this
I do not suppose the Deputy is making any case there.
Comment on this
What is to be done? Is the amendment to be withdrawn, or corrected if there is power to do so now? No one raises any objection to a verbal alteration if it is permissible.
Comment on this
The substituted words will be correct.
Comment on this
It is a misprint. There are references to several paragraphs but not to the paragraph mentioned in the amendment. The amendment proposes to eliminate words not in the Bill.
Comment on this
On the section the medical certificate takes effect unless before the expiration of ten days the workman sends to the employer a report from a duly qualified medical practitioner disagreeing with the certificate served by the employer. While it appears to be reasonable to allow ten days for the workman to arrange to have himself examined and counter evidence put in against the employer's medical adviser, very often ten days would be inadequate. In many cases, members of trades unions look to the headquarters of their organisation to protect them in cases of this kind. In practically all cases members of trades unions can get legal and medical advice when a difficulty arises relating to workmen's compensation. If an employer's medical adviser's decision becomes operative in respect of the termination of or the diminution of compensation within ten days it may seriously inconvenience the employee. A workman may be employed in Connemara or in Donegal but he may be attached to a trades union in Galway. He will have to communicate with the local secretary, who will have to communicate with headquarters, and then the union medical adviser will have to examine the man and the information will have to be conveyed perhaps to another area. It would be a hardship to fix ten days in a case like that. I suggest that there will be disagreement between the workman's and the employer's medical advisers, and that in order to avoid hardship, there is a good case for extending the period to 21 days.
Comment on this
I think that is a reasonable point. I agree that when a stipulation with regard to time is put into an Act it is sometimes discovered that it works a hardship. Had this been a matter of rule it would be open to the courts to extend the time. There is the difficulty that if this is embodied in the section it might be difficult for the courts to extend the time. I will suggest to the Minister to extend the period to 21 days or that some way of allowing a workman to escape from the strictness of the section may be discovered.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 10:—
In sub-section (1), lines 39 and 40, to delete the words "and before he has attained the age of 50 years."
Section 27 prevents a workman from commuting his liability after he has attained the age of 50 years. I do not think it can be argued that a workman of fifty years of age has not got all the faculties he will ever possess and I do not see why that provision should be put in. It may possibly increase the difficulties in the way of such a workman obtaining employment. Certainly it will not diminish them and I would ask the Minister's consideration for the amendment.
Comment on this
The limitation suggested is designed to prevent injustice arising. I must say that I do not feel very strongly on this but it seems to me that the balance of argument is in favour of the limitation suggested in the Bill. The lump sum which the employer must pay in order to release himself from liability to make a weekly payment is the sum which if invested on the date of the application in the purchase of an immediate life annuity would purchase an annuity for such a workman equal to 75 per cent. of the annual value of the weekly payment. Obviously, the lump sum which would purchase that annuity becomes much smaller as the age of the workman advances and if he is over 50 years of age the employer could release himself from liability by the payment of perhaps a comparatively small sum which would not be adequate compensation to the workman for loss of the weekly payment. Whether the fifty year figure is the proper point it seems to me that there should be some point at which we could say that the right to commute the weekly payment should not be operative and that the weekly payment should continue. Fifty seems to be a reasonable age having regard to all the circumstances but if the Deputy will suggest another age we can consider it.
Comment on this
I suggest that we are on two really different aspects of the proposition. I am suggesting that it is undesirable to prevent a workman commuting his payment after fifty years and that it may operate harshly against him. If the Minister wishes to take up the attitude that his only objection to this is that an employer will get out of his liability for a very small sum compared with that payable in the case of a younger man there is no reason why the Minister should not look into that question between now and the Report Stage.
Comment on this
There is another point in connection with this section. I think that Deputy Norton is rising to make it so I will forestall him by referring to it myself. It is the question of whether we should put into the section words which will give the workman the right to get a weekly payment transformed into a lump sum payment at the end of six months. As the section stands it gives an employer the right to apply to the court for an order authorising him to cease the weekly payment and to make a lump sum payment. The Bill says that if such an application is made the court shall make the order. The question is whether we should give the workman the same right to apply to the court for an order requiring an employer to make a lump sum payment in substitution for weekly payments. The practice, as I understand it, is that employers rarely avail of this power to terminate the weekly payments and representations were made to the Committee in 1925 by trade union representatives that the workman should have the right which I suggest. The suggestion was renewed to me by the Irish Trade Union Congress and the Labour Party and I am having the matter considered, but I should like Deputies also to consider it so that we could have a satisfactory discussion on it on the next stages of the Bill.
Comment on this
I would urge the Minister not to accept the amendment moved by Deputy Dockrell because——
Comment on this
On the section, I want to urge the Minister not to be in any way generous towards the amendment moved by Deputy Dockrell when he comes to consider it because Deputy Dockrell says that he does not want to see the workman penalised. If his amendment is carried, quite conceivably it may result not only in penalisation but in thriftlessness on the part of many workmen. I think there is a very strong case, and especially in the case of a man of advancing years, for not permitting an employer or the insurance company to commute his payments by purchasing even an annuity. I would prefer the 50 years to be reduced rather than extended and I would suggest to the Minister that when he comes to consider the amendment, he ought to bear in mind that if he accepts the amendment it will be possible for a man of 55 or 60 years of age to have his weekly payment commuted by the purchase of an annuity which will yield him only 75 per cent. of his weekly compensation and that, at that age, in existing circumstances, it would be extremely difficult for him to obtain any other kind of employment, however light. There is a very strong case for making it impossible for an employer or the insurance company to say: "We will go into the court; commute the weekly payments and pay this man the equivalent of 75 per cent. of his weekly compensation." What you really are doing in the case of that man is reducing his weekly sustenance by 25 per cent. and while a man young in years could probably take that kind of risk a man of 55 or 60 years of age in existing industrial circumstances, ought not to be permitted to expose himself to that kind of risk. I hope that the Minister will stand at least for the 50 years figure. If there is any case, it is for reducing it to a lower figure.
Comment on this
I would draw the Deputy's attention to the fact that the evidence is that the employer rarely uses this right.
Comment on this
In sub-section (4) words were introduced by the 1923 Act which had not been in the Workmen's Compensation code before. Sub-section (4) provides for the giving of notice and says:
A notice of accident may be given to the employer or, if there is more than one employer, to one of such employers or
and the following words were brought in by the 1923 Act:
to any foreman or other official under whose supervision the workman is employed.
There end the words introduced by the 1923 Act, and the remainder of the old section follows:
or to any person designated for the purpose by the employer.
It occurs to me that it is not a very satisfactory arrangement, that where you have a large factory and several hundred workmen working under different foremen, it ought to be sufficient notice for the purpose of this Act for a man to inform one of the foremen that he has met with an accident, particularly when you remember that it is quite legitimate to send your employer a letter telling him that you have suffered an injury, and all that anybody need do who meets with an accident in a factory is to send a registered letter to the registered address of the company informing them that he had met with an accident. They can also tell any person who is designated for the purpose by the company, or they can communicate the fact to any director or, I should think, to the secretary. The question is whether "employer" will include "manager," which I doubt. However, sub-section (5) provides that notice of the accident may be given by delivering the same at, or sending it by post in a registered letter addressed to, the residence or place of business of the person to whom it is being given. So long as a person has the right to do that and all the other things, I do not think he should be discharged from all further responsibility for notifying any firm with whom he may have been working. I did not put down an amendment on the matter, but I suggest to the Minister that he should consider that between now and the Report Stage, and if it is open to any abuse, or if it is creating any inconvenience he should consider seriously dropping it and reverting to the old form.
Comment on this
I should like to know from the Minister if he has definitely considered the absolute necessity for imposing upon a workman who is injured the obligation of giving notice in writing. In this instance, as in the section I referred to a few moments ago, the Minister has departed from his sheet anchor, the British legislation, because the British legislation provides that notice of an accident may be given verbally or in writing. It appears to me personally—and I am merely expressing an individual view— that a workman who is injured will not be very desirous of sitting down and writing a letter. In addition, he may not have twopence for a stamp, and fourpence for registering the letter, or he may not have the sealing wax to seal up the envelope. It occurs to me that it may impose undue hardship on a workman who is injured, to ask him or his wife to sit down and write a letter giving notice of the accident. I do not know why the requirement of notice in writing is put into the Bill. I know the Departmental Committee recommended it. I know it is desirable for the purpose of facilitating an inquiry into the accident. I know it is desirable for the purpose of enabling an employer to be in a position to inquire into the accident. I am also aware of the provision enabling the court to dispense with the notice in writing if the justice of the case requires it. At the same time it does impose what appears to me personally to be a rather unnecessary obligation on the workman to have to write a letter, get a stamp and where he is sending the letter by registered post, to get sealing wax and all the other paraphernalia necessary to the sending of a registered letter.
Comment on this
I cannot see that it is such a serious burden to ask the workman to give notice in writing of the accident within six months. It does not necessarily require a registered letter or a stamp. If he can get somebody to deliver it, he can have it sent by hand. Taking all the circumstances that may possibly arise into account, I think it is desirable in the interests of the employer that he should get formal notification of the name and address of the person injured, and the circumstances in which he was injured. That is what the employer gets, the name and address of the person injured, a statement of the cause of the injury, and the date at which the accident happened. It is I think accepted that it is hardly a burden on the workman to require him to give a brief statement of these particulars—the statement can be in a very rough form indeed—while it would be unfair to the employer to amend the section so as to delete this provision and the employer should have that information in any event. The section is clearly enough drafted to prevent any injustice arising because of this obligation. The fact is that we have the existing law, the recommendation of the Committee, and the sheet anchor to fall back upon.
Comment on this
The sheet anchor, the British legislation, I would again remind the Minister only requires verbal notice. I may point out that it is departed from in the sheet anchor legislation followed in many instances here. As a matter of fact the way the matter works out in practice is that no workman ever gives notice in writing or very seldom gives notice and the judge, taking a very human point of view, says to the employer: "You are not prejudiced in any way because you knew all about it."
Comment on this
If the employer can be proved to have known all about it, there is no necessity for notice.
Comment on this
When the Act says that you must serve notice in writing, it rather strengthens the employer in the case and enables him to go to court and say he has been prejudiced by reason of the absence of the notice in writing of such particulars as are required by Statute. Although personally I would prefer to see an amendment down to the effect that this notice should be verbal or in writing, I think that in practice the courts will probably ignore the necessity for a notice in writing. In effect, the workman will not be prejudiced because in 90 per cent. of the cases notice in writing will not be given.
Comment on this
In the Report of the Departmental Committee set up in 1925 it was recommended that in any legislation to be introdced here the provisions of the British Workmen's Compensation Act——
Comment on this
Paragraph 16, page 22. It was recommended that the provisions of the British Workmen's Comsation Act in respect of the installation in every factory of a first-aid outfit in charge of a responsible person, should be embodied in legislation here. Referring to the advantages to be gained from the installation of a first-aid outfit in every factory, the Committee stated that they understood that "under an arrangement with the British Home Office the insurance companies are keeping a classified record of all investigated accidents in order that appropriate measures for safety and prevention may be devised in the light of experience." The Committee goes on to say:—
"Too much importance cannot be attached to this subject and from the evidence it is clear that the value of prompt treatment, even of minor accidents, is appreciated. We consider that the adoption in the Saorstát of statutory provisions similar to those covered by the recent British Workmen's Compensation Act would be of advantage here and we recommend accordingly."
I can imagine the Minister saying that that is the kind of provision that should be made in a Factories and Workshops Bill but it may be a good while before a Factories and Workshops Bill passes through the House and becomes law. I suppose the same could be urged in Britain at the time it was embodied in legislation there but we have it from the Report that "too much importance cannot be attached to this subject and from the evidence it is clear that the value of prompt treatment even of minor accidents is appreciated." I would suggest to the Minister that even at the risk of its being a little clumsy, from the legislative point of view, there is a good case for the insertion in this Bill of a provision requiring every factory to instal a first-aid outfit so that injuries may be treated promptly and so as to prevent possible loss of employment to the workman and the payment of compensation by the employer.
Comment on this
The sole reason why the recommendation of the Committee is not being carried into effect in this Bill is the determination that the recommendation could be more appropriately dealt with in a Factories and Workshops Bill such as we have in contemplation. I hope shortly to be able to introduce a Bill to amend the Factories and Workshops Act and it was thought that this particular matter could be dealt with more suitably in that Bill rather than in this. I do not think the difference in time will be so substantial as to cause any serious inconvenience to anybody.
Comment on this
May we take it from the Minister that it is definite that he will introduce such a Bill?
Comment on this
I would ask Deputy Dockrell to hold over his amendment to this section. I accept the amendment in principle and am trying to get an amendment drafted for the Report Stage which would meet the Deputy's point and my own.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 12:—
Before Section 52 to insert a new section as follows:—
Every redemption agreement, commutation agreement and agreement by way of compromise shall be submitted to the court for approval before registration, and where it appears that the lump sum is inadequate the court may make an order directing that such agreement shall not be registered.
There are two other amendments on the paper, Nos. 14 and 16, dealing with the matter raised by my amendment, and, perhaps, it might be considered convenient that the three should be discussed together. No. 14 is the amendment put down by the Minister, and No. 16 is Deputy Dillon's amendment, and they all deal with the same matter. I did deal in some detail with the question raised by this amendment during the Second Reading, and, as I do not wish to take up the time of the House, I do not propose to go over that ground again, because the Minister has accepted the principle of the amendment. However, I must say that I prefer either my own amendment or Deputy Dillon's amendment to that of the Minister, for the reason that the protection sought to be given by this amendment to the workman is really an attempt to reenact a provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906. I would like to refer to the words of the provision in the Act of 1906 on that matter. It is in the Second Schedule of the Act and provides that "where it appears to the registrar of the county court, on any information which he considers sufficient, that an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment by a lump sum, or an agreement as to the amount of compensation payable to a person under any legal disability, or to dependants, ought not to be registered by reason of the inadequacy of the sum or amount," the registrar may then refuse to record the memorandum of agreement sent to him for registration, and refer the matter to the court. I prefer that to the wording of the Minister's amendment, and I also prefer Deputy Dillon's amendment, for the reason that his amendment does specifically draw attention, as the Act of 1906 draws attention, specifically, to the question of inadequate amount. Deputy Dillon's amendment raises the same point by the use of somewhat different words. The Minister's amendment says that, where the county registrar has any reason which seems to him sufficient that the agreement should not be registered, he shall refer it to the court. I think it is important that the specific attention of the judge or the registrar should be directed to the adequacy of the sum. Therefore, I suggest to the Minister that he might either accept Deputy Dillon's or my amendment, or else that he might change the wording of his own amendment by bringing in a direct reference to the question of the adequacy of the lump sum to be given.
Another thing to which I should like to refer is that I think that in the case of agreements of this kind, which are to determine the workman's rights finally and which are of so much importance to him, they ought to be brought before the judge in every instance and not merely before the registrar. The position here is different from that which obtains in England. The enormous mass of work that an English court has to get through with regard to compensation claims would render it humanly impossible for the judge to deal with all these matters. That, however, is not the position here, and I do not think that any of our circuit judges would complain if the onus were put on him of going into this question of whether the sum were an adequate sum or not. Accordingly, I submit that the Minister might accept either Deputy Dillon's or my amendment or change his own amendment to bring in a direct reference to the adequacy of the sum. I would also suggest that he should change it so that the reference of this highly important question should go to the judge and not to the county registrar. I am aware, of course, that the county registrars are very competent people, but they have a lot of work to do, and I consider that it is important that this matter should be dealt with by the judge in court himself.
Comment on this
The suggestion I should make is that the amendment, No. 14, standing in my name, should be inserted in the Bill now, and that the question of amending that amendment might be considered between this and the Report Stage. I am not convinced that it would not be better to leave in the words "for any reason that seems to him sufficient" rather than refer to the adequacy of the amount. However, that is a matter we could deal with in relation to that particular point. I make the suggestion that if we insert the Government amendment now we can then have specific proposals in relation to that amendment.
Comment on this
I am satisfied to withdraw my amendment if the Minister, between now and the Report Stage, would inquire from his legal advisers as to whether the words "for any reason which seems to him sufficient" might not be interpreted to imply that the agreement would have to have in it some legal defect before the registrar could refer it to the court. That is just something to think about. It is a danger to safeguard oneself against, because, clearly, what the Minister has in mind and what Deputy Rice and I have in mind is that if the registrar thinks that a "fixer" has been trying to put over a quick one on a disabled workman, his attempt to do so ought to be prevented by the intervention of the court.
Comment on this
I move amendment 13:—
In sub-section (2), page 21, line 5, to delete the word "prescribed" and substitute the word "required".
This is a purely verbal amendment.
Comment on this
I move amendment 14:—
Before Section 55 to insert a new section as follows:—
(1) Where no notice of objection based on a statutory ground of objection to the registration of an agreement the subject of an application for registration under this Act is received by the county registrar within the time limited by the immediately preceding section, but the county registrar is, for any reason which seems to him sufficient, of opinion that such agreement should not be registered except in pursuance of an order of the court, he shall refer the application to the court which shall make such order in the matter as it thinks proper.
(2) Where the county registrar refers an application to the court under this section, he shall notify all notice parties of such reference and the reason therefor.
That is the amendment of which we have just been speaking.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 15:—
In sub-section (1), page 21, line 51, to delete the words "the foregoing section" and substitute the words "this Act", and in line 52 before the word "forthwith" to insert the words "unless he refers such application to the court under the immediately preceding section."
This is a consequential amendment.
Comment on this
I move amendment 17:—
In sub-section (1), page 22, lines 10 and 11, to delete the words "or before such agreement has been actually registered in the register."
This amendment is also consequential on amendment No. 14.
Comment on this
This section deals with the alternative remedies which are open to a workman who has sustained injury, or to his dependants in such circumstances as, in the opinion of his legal advisers, to make it possible to bring a claim under another Act. Let us take the case with which most of us are familiar—a case under the Fatal Injuries Act. A workman may meet with an accident in the course of his employment, which accident results in his death. His relatives are advised that it is possible to sustain an action under the Fatal Injuries Act. They make a claim under the Fatal Injuries Act. The employer responds by lodging the maximum amount he would be liable to pay under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is provided in sub-section (3) that when compensation is sought under the Fatal Injuries Act, and the court decides that the employer is not liable, they may, after dismissing the action, proceed to assess compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is provided that they may deduct therefrom all or part of the costs caused, in their judgment, by the plaintiff bringing the action under the Fatal Injuries Act rather than under the Workmen's Compensation Act. That seems to me to be a most unfair way of garnisheeing the compensation to which the dependent relatives of the workman are entitled under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This deduction is made from compensation which is not the property of the deceased workman, but the property of his dependent relatives, and it is they who have to pay.
Comment on this
I say that that is a most unfair way to reward the legal fraternity for their trouble.
Comment on this
If the Deputy suppresses his impatience I shall try to tell him. I can understand a plaintiff, when he loses his case, having the costs given against him and these being levied against his estate. But the compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act for a wife and dependent children ought not to be garnisheed in this way simply because it is easy for the court so to do. If these people have any other assets, let these assets be made responsible in respect of the costs of the unsuccessful action. But the compensation provided for a widow and children in respect of the loss of their breadwinner ought not to be garnisheed so that the legal people can get their costs.
Comment on this
I do not know whether Deputy Dillon ever heard of the workman who fell down a manhole and who, by the time the legal people had finished making representations on his behalf and recovering damages for his injuries, was moved to inquire: "Was it you or I fell down the manhole?"
Comment on this
Quite clear, but the widow might be advised by one set of lawyers that she had a good case under Lord Campbell's Act while another set of lawyers would be equally convinced that she had no case.
Comment on this
That is the employer's moral. If the employer is likely to be saddled with compensation under the Fatal Injuries Act he would, of course, prefer that the plaintiff should proceed under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Deputy knows that perfectly well. What I want to ensure is that the widow and children, who are awarded compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, will not have portion of the compensation payable in respect of the death of the breadwinner garnisheed for the costs of an unsuccessful action under another Act. If these people have any other assets, these assets can be made liable for the costs, but, in many cases, these people have no other assets. While this Bill is intended to provide a definite scale of workmen's compensation, the person who brings an unsusccessful action under the Fatal Injuries Act will not get the scale of compensation provided under this Bill, but that scale of compensation less the costs incurred by the bringing of the unsuccessful action. I think that the compensation awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be free from any charge for such costs. If they were, there would be fewer people advising dependent relatives to proceed under the Fatal Injuries Act. So long as compensation awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act is available for costs under another Act, then the potential claimant will always be able to get abundant advice from the lawyers to proceed under the Fatal Injuries Act. The worst that can happen is that compensation will be given under the Workmen's Compensation Act and that that will be available for costs.
Comment on this
Why is that the worst that can happen? Cannot the action under Lord Campbell's Act be thrown out?
Comment on this
A person may lose under Lord Campbell's Act, but he will get compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Comment on this
The fact that compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is available for costs will result in many people getting advice to proceed under the Fatal Injuries Act. I suggest that the Minister should give consideration to the question of making workmen's compensation available only for the purpose intended—to provide sustenance for the widow and dependent children instead of being responsible for the costs of an action which possibly was the result of foolish advice.
Comment on this
I do not spring to my feet to defend the right of my professional brethren to get paid for the work they have done. Deputy Norton seems to have some "down" on the legal profession. I do not know why. Now that his colleague, the Leas-Cheann Comhairle, proposes to join us in that profession, I trust he will reconsider his opinion. I think that Deputy Norton can have no complaint against the judiciary or against either branch of the legal profession for the manner in which they look after the interests of the working people. They do not go out to make costs for themselves and they are not going to make costs for themselves by, as the Deputy seems to suggest, wrongfully advising the widow of a deceased workman to take an action under Lord Campbell's Act in order that they may be able to collar the costs that may be got out of compensation that subsequently would be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
I would like to point out to Deputy Norton a matter which he appears to have overlooked. Perhaps he has not read the section. I would like to point out that it is all in the hands of the widow. These costs cannot be given unless the widow puts herself in the power of the court to award costs. If the widow takes an action under Lord Campbell's Act, and if then it appears that she is going to fail in that, she may ask the court to assess compensation. She there and then says to the tribunal: "You assess my compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and at the same time in your discretion deduct the costs out of that."
Comment on this
The widow of a workman can with great ease take an action under Lord Campbell's Act and, if she loses, the defendant has a judgment for costs against her, but that judgment for costs is of absolutely no practical use in 99 cases out of 100 or in 999 cases out of 1,000. She will not have any assets. Under this section she can only be made liable for the costs if she walks into the lion's mouth, hands herself to the tribunal and says: "You assess the amount and take the costs of my abortive proceedings out of my compensation." Even in that case the word in the section is "may." The judges have a discretion as to whether they will or will not give it, and again, in 99 cases out of 100, the judges will not give costs. I might even go so far as to say in 100 cases out of every 100 the employer will never get the costs. That is the invariable experience of anyone appearing in these cases. The courts will not give you costs in those circumstances.
There is a more fundamental difficulty in this section than that raised by Deputy Norton, a very much greater difficulty from the point of view of the dependant of the workman and that is at what period, at what stage, is he deemed to have made his election. It is a matter of doubt under the existing law. It is a matter of doubt whether, when the widow of a man who is killed in the course of his employment issues a summons under Lord Campbell's Act, the mere institution of proceedings under that summons is an election which, having exercised, she must go on with and abide by the result. It is a matter of doubt when she issues a writ whether she then and there debars herself from proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act is barred once judgment is given. That is not clear under this section and I think Deputy Norton would be better advised to direct his attention to that aspect of the section than to be bothering his head about the costs of the legal fraternity when the legal fraternity do not get the costs.
Comment on this
As regards the matter raised by Deputy Norton, I have nothing to add to what Deputy Costello has said. It is quite clear that the representative of the workman cannot have it both ways. If he elects to take proceedings against the employer under the Act to which the Deputy referred and loses his case, he has to take the chance of costs being awarded against him and being deducted from the compensation awarded under this Act. Deputy Costello has told us that the practice nearly always is that the court will not award costs against the workman. Whatever the practice may be, if we put anything like that in the Statute we would be practically inviting every workman who thinks he has any case at all at least to have a try out. In a fatal case a workman's dependants can do so with the knowledge that no matter what the outcome may be they are not going to lose money. That would lead to an impossible state of affairs.
Comment on this
If Deputy Costello is prepared to leave over consideration of amendment 18 until the Report Stage, perhaps that would be the more advisable course. I am prepared to accept the amendment in principle.
Comment on this
There is a difficulty, where a person is bringing proceedings against the State, in deciding who his employer is. His employer may be the Minister for Defence or the Commissioners for Public Works. It was for the purpose of drawing attention to that, that I submitted this amendment.
Comment on this
I am having an amendment prepared. Personally I do not think this is the same as in the case of the Traffic Act. I think the workman as a rule knows what Department he is employed under.
Comment on this
Yes, but legally he might not know who his employer is. Take the case of a man employed by the Department of Defence. It would be difficult for him to say his employer is the Minister for Defence, because the Minister for Finance pays him. It is to get over that difficulty and to have something rigid that I have put down the amendment. It struck me that the Minister for Finance, being the person who pays, would be the appropriate respondent.
Comment on this
What is the significance of sub-section (2) of Section 63? Does it mean that the Minister may approve schemes for friendly societies outside the operation of the ordinary terms of the Act?
Comment on this
It empowers the Minister to modify by warrant any annual allowance or gratuity granted under the Superannuation Act of 1887, so as to bring such allowance or gratuity into line with the amounts awardable as workmen's compensation under this measure. The section is, in fact, the same as the section in the 1906 Act. It does not effect a change in the law except as regards the terms. We have the terms "Minister for Finance" and "Oireachtas" instead of the terms in the original Act.
Comment on this
By what authority does the Minister for Finance issue a warrant? I understood that was a Royal prerogative.
Comment on this
I am not sure that this is not a function that ought to be reserved for President de Valera, and then let the man who reads the warrant make up his mind what he was president of at the relevant date. It is a different business bringing in the Minister for Finance. I think the Minister for Industry and Commerce ought to look up as to whether and why the Royal Prerogative is exercised and where it is exercised. If the President would sign it, we would know at a particular date whether he was King or whether he was President of an Irish Republic, but it is very awkward to find the Minister for Finance acting as King Seán MacEntee.
Comment on this
I move amendment 19:—
In sub-section (1) (c), line 39, after the word "death" to insert the words "by accident".
This is only a comparatively insignificant point to which I wish to direct attention by this amendment, but it may have important effects. The effect of this amendment would be that proceedings can be brought by the relatives of a seaman within six months after they have received notice of the death by accident of the seaman. As the section stands at the moment proceedings must be commenced within six months after the news of the death has been received by the claimant. Supposing an Irish seaman is abroad somewhere, say, Valparaiso, or some distant part of the world, supposing he meets with an accident, dies as a result of the accident and the shipping company writes a formal notice to the widow to say they regretted that on a certain day the husband died. The widow may not know for months afterwards that the circumstances were such as to constitute an accident. I do not want to have the dependants of a seaman jeopardised by this particular provision. The widow will have notice of the death of the husband, but she will not have notice of death by accident. The section as it stands would enable a shipping company if they were unscrupulous enough to inform the widow that the husband had died on such and such a date, without informing her that he had died by accident. The limitation should be six months from the date on which the widow gets notice of the death by accident. That is the purpose of my amendment.
Comment on this
I move amendment 20:—
To delete sub-section (2).
I move this amendment in order to raise a general question of fishermen rather than to secure the passing of the amendment. The British Act provided that fishermen who were remunerated by shares in the profits of a boat were excluded from the operations of the Act. That has been re-enacted here. Under Section 67 power is given to the Minister so that he may "by Order under this section declare that this Act, subject to such modifications as may be specified in such Order, shall apply to such members of the crew of a fishing boat as are remunerated wholly or mainly by shares in the profits of the gross earnings of the workings of such boat, and whenever such an Order is made and has come into force this Act shall, with such modifications as are specified in such Order, apply to such members." I was not satisfied that the English form was suitable to the conditions obtaining in this country. I do not know what type of fishermen in England are remunerated on the share system, but I do know that a great many fishermen in Donegal are altogether remunerated on that basis everywhere. I am not at all sure what the merits of the case are, whether it is wise to exclude those men from the benefits of this Bill or not. In the County Donegal it might mean that you made the skipper of one of these comparatively small boats liable for the workmen's compensation, and this might operate to stop fishing altogether or to wipe out somebody altogether. A claim might be made on one of the shareholders in the boat. I am not at all sure, taking into consideration the type of title under which these boats are held, whether it would always be easy to establish the individual against whom the action would be taken. For that reason, I thought it right to draw the Minister's attention to the matter. Probably if he has considered it he may have something to tell us as to what influenced him in the decision he has come to in drafting the section as it is.
Comment on this
The decision has been come to in order to avoid the holding up of this Bill until the difficulties associated with its application to share fishermen have been solved. We have taken powers of bringing up this question afterwards. Section 67 gives the Minister power to apply the Bill to such fishermen with or without such modifications as the circumstances arise. I am afraid I cannot give the Deputy much more information since this section is simply for the avoidance of the problem until this particular matter has ben solved.
Comment on this
Would the Minister take steps to consult interested parties and secure a memorandum after these parties have been consulted and at the same time to bear in mind that he is by statute withdrawing any possible claim they might have? He is taking something definite from them.
Comment on this
That would be a matter for the court to decide, as to whether they are workmen or whether they are engaged as workmen. The statute here defines that they are not. Therefore, we ought not to lose any time in setting about the collection of the information which we may require so that we may make an order at the earliest possible moment to secure the inclusion of these fishermen.
Comment on this
I support the amendment and I do so for this reason, that in the Sea Fisheries Association these men are paying for shares. The insurance would come to a very small amount. It would cost very little to have them insured. At present in a small town when a death takes place the local people have to subscribe. I would appeal to the Minister to include all these in the workmen's compensation because it will only come out of the boats. I ask him to have them included.
Comment on this
If it could be done in that way it would be quite satisfactory. This Bill does not require insurance against risk at all. The owners of the boats may not have insured against risks. In the case of share fishermen it would be hard to determine against whom the injured men would proceed. The Deputy said that share fishermen did get compensation. It is a question of fact whether they come within that definition or not. The existing law says: "This Act shall not apply to such members of a crew of a fishing vessel as are remunerated by shares earned in the profits or the gross earnings of such vessel." We are not changing the law in respect of them. We are, however, taking power to apply the Workmen's Compensation Act to such people with such modification as circumstances may necessitate, it being provided that the order under the Act shall not come into force until it has been before the Dáil for 21 days.
Comment on this
The provision in the Bill is an improvement on the present position. The provision that the Minister has just read out has been interpreted, strange to say, in an extremely strict way. It has been interpreted to mean that a man who has had even the very smallest share in the profits, or in the gross earnings, of a boat is excluded from the Act. There have been judicial decisions to that effect. The leading case is that of Costello v. Kelsoe Brothers. In that particular case the applicant was only in receipt of a very small amount of the profits of the boat in comparison with his ordinary remuneration. He was in receipt of a substantial wage of, I think, £1 a week, plus his keep and bunk on board. He received something small, which amounted only to about £1 in the month or more, by way of poundage or share in the profits. Yet he was held to be outside the operations of the Workmen's Compensation Act. A case such as that could not occur under the provisions in this Bill, which speaks of "wholly or mainly paid out of profits." Therefore the position of a fisherman working on a share system is improved to that extent. If he is only receiving a small portion as remuneration in the way of shares he now comes within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In our circumstances there are many of those persons who are running a boat, more or less, on equal shares, and undoubtedly while the owner of the boat gets what is called the "boat's share," there are two or three men who depend entirely for their remuneration on shares in the boat. They are co-adventurers—that, I think, is the term applied—with the owner in the work of running the boat.
Comment on this
There is what is called the "boat's share." That is a technical term. The boat's share is probably one-half of the total earnings of the boat, and that would go to the owner of the boat. Then the other half is divided in diffrent ratios amongst the crew. In the case of a small proprietor of a boat, and where the members of the boat are remunerated entirely on the earnings, I fear that if you made the owner liable for workmen's compensation it would involve him in the cost of insuring his crew—of the men working on shares. I am afraid that would put him out of business. I do not see how you can improve on the present provision in the Bill. The same provision was made in the British Act of 1923, and it was put into that Act because of the decision in the case to which I have referred. That decision excluded persons from the Workmen's Compensation Act if they were getting even the smallest share in the turnover of the boat. I consider this a considerable improvement on the present position.
Comment on this
On the section I want to refer to sub-section (2), which provides: "The Minister may by order under this section declare that this Act, subject to such modifications as may be specified in such order, shall apply to such members of the crew of a fishing boat as are remunerated wholly or mainly by shares in the profits or the gross earnings of the workings of such boat, and whenever such an order is made and has come into force this Act shall with such modifications as are specified in such order, apply to such members." Does that mean that the Minister can make an order that the Workmen's Compensation Act shall apply to one particular boat?
Comment on this
Does it not look very like it? It seems to me that the Minister cannot apply this Act to one crew.
Comment on this
If the Deputy will look back at Section 65 he will see that it does not mean that the Minister can only apply the Act to one ship. I take no responsibility for the drafting, but that is the interpretation.
Comment on this
It is a fairly important thing. None of us wants to give the Minister power to apply the Workmen's Compensation Act to the boat of his worst enemy, or, again, to the boat of his best friend, so that clearly that is not the purpose the Minister has in mind. Perhaps he would look into the drafting of the section.
Comment on this
I want to ask the Minister a question with reference to sub-section (3). It reads: "The Minister may from time to time by order under this section extend the provisions of this section to other diseases and other processes and to injuries due to the nature of any employment specified in such order not being injuries by accident, either without modifications or subject to such modifications as he may think fit." I think that is a very wide power to give the Minister. Is it wise to give the Minister power to extend the benefit of this Act to diseases that are not contained in the Schedule?
Comment on this
The Deputy is aware that this is not new. It is a re-enactment of a section already in the 1906 Act.
Comment on this
I did not know that it was in the 1906 Act. The Schedule of industrial diseases that have already been defined as diseases which might properly be dealt with under this Act is pretty long. Perhaps the Minister will tell us what procedure he goes through before defining an industrial disease for the purposes of the Act.
Comment on this
I move amendment 21:—
"In sub-section (1), to delete the word "Fifth", line 27, and substitute the word "Sixth".
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 22:—
To delete Rule 3 and substitute the following Rule—
3 (1) Where a workman leaves a child or children and such child was or all such children were wholly dependent on his earnings, the following provisions shall, subject to Rule 5 of this Schedule, have effect in relation to the children's lump sum, that is to say:—
(a) the children's lump sum shall not in any case exceed £600;
(b) where the compensation consists of both the children's lump sum and the adults' lump sum, and there is one child only, the children's lump sum shall be a sum equal to the amount arrived at by multiplying £2 1s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date of the death of the workman and the date on which such child will attain the age of 15 years;
(c) where the compensation consists of both the children's lump sum and the adults' lump sum and there are two or more children, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—
(i) in case there are two children only, the children's lump sum shall be a sum equal to the total of the following amounts, that is to say:—
I. The amount arrived at by multiplying £3 6s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date of the death of the workman and the date on which the elder of such children will attain the age of 15 years, and
II. the amount arrived at by multiplying £2 1s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the elder of such children will attain the age of 15 years, and the date on which the younger of such children will attain that age;
(ii) in case there are three children only, the children's lump sum shall be a sum equal to the total of the following amounts, that is to say:—
I. the amount arrived at by multiplying £3 15s. 0d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date of the death of the workman and the date on which the eldest of such children will attain the age of 15 years, and
II. the amount arrived at by multiplying £3 6s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the eldest of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the second of such children will attain that age, and
III. the amount arrived at by multiplying £2 1s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the second of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the youngest of such children will attain that age;
(iii) in case there are four children only, the children's lump sum shall be a sum equal to the total of the following amounts, that is to say:—
I. the amount arrived at by multiplying £4 3s. 4d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date of the death of the workman and the date on which the eldest of such children will attain the age of 15 years, and
II. the amount arrived at by multiplying £3 15s. 0d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the eldest of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the second of such children will attain that age, and
III. the amount arrived at by multiplying £3 6s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the second of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the third of such children will attain that age, and
IV. the amount arrived at by multiplying £2 1s 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the third of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the youngest of such children will attain that age;
(iv) in case there are five or more children, the children's lump sum shall be a sum equal to the total of the following amounts, that is to say:—
I. the amount arrived at by multiplying £4 3s. 4d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date of the death of the workman and the date on which the eldest of the four youngest of such children will attain the age of 15 years, and
II. the amount arrived at by multiplying £3 15s. 0d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the eldest of the four youngest of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the second of the four youngest of such children will attain that age, and
III. the amount arrived at by multiplying £3 6s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the second of the four youngest of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the third in order of seniority of birth of the four youngest of such children will attain that age, and
IV. the amount arrived at by multiplying £2 1s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date on which the third of the four youngest of such children will attain the age of 15 years and the date on which the youngest of such children will attain that age;
(d) where the compensation consists of the children's lump sum only, and there is one child only, the children's lump sum shall be whichever is the greater of the following amounts, that is to say:—
(i) the amount arrived at by multiplying £2 1s. 8d. by a number equal to the number of complete calendar months between the date of the death of the workman and the date on which such child will attain the age of 15 years, or
(ii) the amount of the adults' lump sum calculated under Rule 1 of this Schedule, if the compensation has been or included the adults' lump sum;
(e) where the compensation consists of the children's lump sum only, and there are two or more children, the children's lump sum shall be whichever is the greater of the following amounts, that is to say:—
(i) the amount of the children's lump sum calculated under sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, if the compensation had consisted of the adults' lump sum and the children's lump sum, or
(ii) the amount of the adults' lump sum calculated under Rule 1 of this Schedule, if the compensation had been or included the adults' lump sum.
(2) References in this rule to the date on which a child will attain the age of 15 years shall be construed as references to the date on which such child will, unless he previously dies, attain that age.
The purpose of this amendment is to correct a mistake in Rule III in the Second Schedule in the form in which it appeared in the Bill, and to secure that where there are children and a lump sum is awarded that the following will be the effect: If there are, say, four children, and periodical payments are based upon the amounts that would be payable in respect to four children, and one of those children passes the age in respect of which compensation is to be paid, namely 15 years, then the amount in respect of the three children is automatically increased to the point which it would be if it had been three children, and so on when the third child passes the age of 15 the average for the remaining number is increased. In the form in which it originally appeared that was not adequately provided for, and, in fact, worked out on a particular specimen case it was possible that the amount of compensation payable might be less as the family got larger, provided the family were older in age. It is to provide against that that this amendment has been drafted. It has been tested out in all possible cases that may arise, and seems to achieve our purpose, which is that the amount of the compensation shall be fairly provided on the basis set out there.
Children's payments are, as Deputies are aware, made on this basis. It is assumed that periodical payments will be made. There is, of course, discretion in the court, but it is assumed that they will be periodical. Under the existing law a lump sum is paid into court in respect of a child and allowed to accumulate. Under this Bill the payments will be made while the child is getting up to 15 years of age. Payments will be calculated on a certain sum per month, in respect of every month that the child has to live, from the date on which compensation is awarded to the date on which the child reaches 15 years of age. The amounts are set out in the amendment.
I may say that, in respect of the rules dealing with the disposition of compensation in fatal cases, the procedure which is embodied in the rules relating to the adult lump sum departs from the recommendation of the Committee. Deputies are no doubt familiar with the recommendation of the Committee in this regard, which involves the principle of definite payments, and which were inaccurately calculated, so that under various circumstances the maximum prescribed by the Committee could have been exceeded. The amount depends on the earnings of the worker. There is a maximum of £300 and a minimum of £200. Within these limits it is calculated on the earning of the worker being a weekly earning multiplied by 156 on a three years' basis. That part of the proposal follows the existing law in Great Britain. In regard to the children's lump sum, we followed the recommendation of the Committee. It does not depend upon the earning of the worker, but on the children and the ages of the children. It is different from the British law, and it is designed to secure that there will be available periodic payments, if circumstances justify them, for the children, during the period in which they are likely to be most in need of that, that is, while not of the age that it would be possible for them to earn their contribution towards the maintenance of the household. I assume it will be desirable to discuss this at some length, so I shall leave it at the moment.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 23:—
In Rule 2, line 42, after the word "shillings" to add the words "and in any case of partial incapacity shall not exceed twenty shillings."
There is a maximum sum provided which weekly payment shall not exceed. I wish to have another maximum provided for partial disablement. It would be very desirable in computing various injuries, and I hope the Minister can see his way to accept it.
Comment on this
I do not think this amendment would be altogether fair if inserted in the Bill. It might in various circumstances that could be contemplated press injuriously upon the workmen. Again I take the case of a man earning 40/- a week. After an accident he might have recovered sufficiently to do light work, and he might succeed in getting employment which would bring him in 10/- a week. The difference then between pre-accident and post-accident earnings would be 30/- of which he would get 75 per cent., so that under the Bill as it stands he would be entitled to get 22/6. I think, in all the circumstances, 22/6 is not excessive compensation for a loss of earning power of 30/- per week. The insertion of a maximum is, I think, undesirable. There are so many cases in which it would operate unfairly, and the difference is likely to be so small that it should not be allowed to interfere with the recommendations of the Committee. It is possible to get some peculiar results in imaginary circumstances. If you can imagine a worker getting a certain pre-accident and post-accident wage, and calculate what his circumstances might be in various positions, you would get a peculiar result, but, on the whole, the calculation adopted in the Schedule works out remarkably fairly, and in that case the compensation seems to be in proper proportion to the loss in earning which the accident has created. You upset the curve, if I may say so, if you bring in proposals of maximum compensation, so far as to lead to injustice, having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
Comment on this
I move amendment 24:—
In Rule 4 (a), line 56, to delete the word "eighty" and substitute the word "seventy-five", and in Rule 4 (b) line 60 to delete the word "seventy-five" and substitute the word "eighty".
This is really a drafting error. The Bill as it stands makes it 80 per cent. where the difference between the earnings does not exceed £1 and 75 per cent. where the difference between the earnings exceeds £1. Obviously, it should be the reverse. It is not quite easy to see, because, of course, the Bill talks not of earnings, but of difference between earnings, but it is quite clear that a mistake has been made.
Comment on this
On the schedule, I should like to ask the Minister why he has reduced the amount of compensation from 35/- to 30/- per week. Thirty shillings may be a decent sum for an ordinary unskilled labourer, but a man who has had £4 or £5 per week, who is unlucky enough to meet with an accident and is laid up for a considerable time in consequence of it, will find it very difficult to live on 30/- per week. We certainly are opposed to that, and I should like to know what made the Minister come to the conclusion that 30/- was sufficient, and why he reduced it from 35/-.
Comment on this
The Committee recommended that the amount of compensation in non-fatal cases should be calculated on the basis which we have adopted in the Bill, with a maximum payment in any one case of 35/- per week. They made that recommendation in 1926. Since that time there has been a substantial decline in the cost of living, and I think we are entitled to take that decline into account in fixing the maximum amount to be paid under the Bill. On the other hand, there is the fact that in Great Britain, a country which is much more highly developed industrially than this, the maximum amount payable since 1923 has been 30/- per week. The recommendation of the Committee, that the maximum here should be 35/- was, of course, made after the change had been made in the British law. I do not think, however, that that in itself should weigh against all the considerations I have mentioned.
We have adopted the recommendation of the Committee in respect of the manner in which the amount is to be calculated. In that respect we have departed from the existing law and are also acting in a manner different from that provided in the English law, with the result that, subject to the maximum, the amount payable here is in every case, except at one particular point in the scale, higher than it is in Great Britain. The position here is that anyone earning over 40/- per week before the accident gets the maximum compensation of 30/-. It is true that under the existing law, which is of course a temporary law passed in 1919 and continued every year since, these people get 35/- per week. In Great Britain the maximum of 30/- is only paid to persons who before the accident were earning 60/- per week. A person in Great Britain who was earning 40/- per week instead of getting our maximum of 30/- only gets 22/6, and the same difference goes down the scale. Where the weekly wage was 35/-, the payment here will be 26/3 as against 22/-. Where the weekly wage was 30/-, the payment here will be 22/6 as against 20/-. In the case of a person earning 25/-, where you come to the break in the scheme, the payments are the same in each case, 18/9 here and 18/9 in Great Britain. Again, the scale falls less in this country than it does in Great Britain. Where the weekly wage was 20/-, the payment here is 16/-, as against 15/- in Great Britain.
We are thus providing compensation to workers who have been wholly incapacitated on a level higher than in Great Britain, even though it is somewhat below the scale of compensation now in operation. The scale of compensation now in operation here is based on the 1906 Act, plus the 75 per cent. addition in the payments made by the War Addition Act which ceased to operate in Great Britain in 1923. It has continued to operate here. We are now effecting the legislative changes which were effected in Great Britain in 1923. In that year they went back to the 30/- maximum and we are going back to it now. In doing so, we are taking a different method of calculation in respect of the lower-paid worker which works out better than the British Act although in respect of the higher-paid workman it works out the same. The desirability of doing this was, of course, very carefully considered and there are a number of circumstances which seem to justify, in fact to require, that we should not legislate here for the substantially higher maximum which the Committee recommended in 1926. I feel confident that if the Committee had been meeting now, in the circumstances existing now, having regard to the present cost of living, they would not have made the recommendation which they made in 1926 in entirely different circumstances. They would have had regard to the maximum prevailing in Great Britain, just as I feel certain that if the British Committee had been meeting now, instead of in 1923 when they recommended the maximum of 30/-, they would probably recommend a smaller maximum even than the 30/- which is now in operation there and which it is proposed to bring into operation here.
I feel quite happy in my mind that we are not doing any injustice in effecting the change, having regard to the fact that, although it means a lower maximum, it means a much less steep decline in the scale than has been the position here, and is the position in Great Britain. In the majority of cases, of course, the payment made is the maximum payment. It is only in respect of a certain class of workers, workers whose remuneration is under 40/- per week, that any payment other than the maximum is made. It should be noted also that the method of calculating the payment in the case of a partial incapacity provides for a higher percentage, and also works out more favourably to the workman than elsewhere.
One other point I want to make, and that is, that no person who has been injured at a date prior to the passage of this Act is prejudiced by its passage. The Act operates to continue for him compensation at the same rate he has been getting heretofore. A person who has been getting the maximum of 35/- under the existing law has by this Act his 35/- secured for him. There is no reduction being effected in the amount paid.
Third Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Fourth Schedule agreed to.
FIFTH SCHEDULE.
2. In the event of the death of any person (in this and the next following paragraph referred to as a deceased dependant) entitled as dependant to money which is or is part of the adults' lump sum paid into Court under this Act, then, if no order has been theretofore made by the Court as to the disposition thereof for the benefit of other dependants, in the event of the death of such deceased dependant the Court may, subject to the provisions of the next following paragraph, without requiring representation to be raised to the estate of such deceased dependant distribute such sum amongst such persons as appear to the Court, upon such evidence as the Court may deem satisfactory, to be entitled by law to receive the same or if such deceased dependant is illegitimate and dies intestate, amongst the persons who in the opinion of the Court would have been entitled thereto if such deceased dependant had been legitimate, and if there are no such persons the Court shall deal with the sum as the Minister for Finance shall direct.
The following amendment was agreed to:—
In paragraph 2, page 37, to delete all from the word "such" in line 24 to the end of the paragraph and substitute the words "persons who (as the case may be) appear to be so entitled as aforesaid or would have been so entitled as aforesaid, the Court shall pay such sum to the Minister for Finance for payment into or disposal for the benefit of the Exchequer."—(Aire Tionnscail agus Tráchtála.)
Fifth Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Sixth Schedule agreed to.