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Dáil

Courts of Justice Bill, 1934—Second Stage (resumed).

Contributions 1–95 of 195. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Bill Courts of Justice Bill, 1934
Enacted

No. 50 of 1934 ›

Before the adjournment of this debate last evening I was about to allude to some of the observations that had been made, suggesting that the Constitution (Special Powers) Tribunal or the Military Tribunal, as it is called, has in recent times so far attracted business, that would ordinarily go to the Criminal Courts, as to diminish the volume of business in these courts. I think that an examination of the returns of trials before the Military Tribunal will not bear out that assertion. I cannot recall a single instance of a case that has, in the last year, been tried by the Constitution (Special Powers) Tribunal which was not a case of a very abnormal nature, but however that may be, the Constitution (Special Powers) Tribunal is set up by an amendment of the Constitution itself. It is embedded in the Constitution, and there it must remain until such time as that Constitution may be amended again. If it were really relevant to the subject of this Bill one might perhaps suggest that this Courts of Justice Bill might be availed of for the creation of a special jury panel that would take the place of a tribunal such as the Military Tribunal in times of very great excitement and times of political passion, and enable the ordinary Criminal Courts to dispose of extraordinary criminal charges.

I referred yesterday evening to the need for some provision being made in this country to aid poor persons in carrying on litigation. I was speaking about civil cases. I think we should not lose sight of the even more pressing and crying problem here—the problem of the poor person charged with an offence which may entail capital punishment or a long period of penal servitude, for whom there is no adequate financial aid to help him in his defence. Where the charge is murder, there still remains some ancient procedure by which a trivial fee is provided by the Attorney-General for counsel defending a person charged with that very grave crime. I think that any member of this House who is a barrister or a solicitor will agree with me when I say that the inadequate remuneration that old procedure makes available has led to the practice of prisoners accused of murder being defended by young and inexperienced advocates. I put it to the House that that is scarcely right.

If citizens are suffering from sickness or disease, the community places the very best aid in the way of a physician or surgeon at their disposal, and I think the time has come when a citizen charged with a crime like that should have aid of a similar kind placed at his disposal by the State. As I have said, the only form of help that exists at all is where a person is charged with murder. He may be charged with manslaughter or with any other crime that one cares to mention and there is no power to give him any help. Possibly the House might see its way to entrust to the Attorney-General a discretion whereby, on his certificate, any person, whatever the charge against him may be, and who the Attorney-General considers cannot reasonably bear the expense of employing a solicitor or counsel, will receive reasonable aid from the State.

Another matter that I should have liked to see dealt with in this Bill is a branch of the jurisdiction of the District Court the operation of which one living in the country immediately comes across. That is the jurisdiction to order persons to enter into recognisances to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour. I think—I hope I will be corrected if I am wrong—that in such a case no right of appeal exists, and I should have liked to have seen a provision in the Bill whereby any person who is ordered to find sureties to keep the peace or be of good behaviour would have the same right of appeal as if he had been fined a couple of pounds or had got a month in jail. Very often such an order, although it seems in form quite innocuous, is a very great blemish on a person's reputation amongst his friends and acquaintances, and he should, I think, be given the opportunity of having such an order reviewed by a Circuit Court Judge on appeal.

There has been a good deal of criticism directed to the sections of this Bill which deal with complaints regarding the conduct of district justices and the tribunal that would deal with circumstances that might arise making the transfer of a district justice desirable, even though he did not in any way misconduct himself. Hearing that criticism, I felt rather puzzled because, as the law stands at present, a district justice, on an accusation being made against him, can be brought before a tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General. The tribunal that is set up by this Bill consists of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General, with the addition of the President of the High Court. I would have thought that that change is, from the point of view of the District Justice, in principle a change for the better, and that instead of in any way imperilling his independence or security, it affords, by the addition of the President of the High Court for the time being, a very substantial addition to the security that public opinion ensures him in any case.

Something has been said here about the stenographers who have been employed in the Circuit Court taking notes of evidence for the purpose of the hearing of appeals under the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. It is now proposed by this Bill to displace that system and to introduce rehearing. I should like to pay a tribute to the work of those stenographers. My experience of them is that they have done their work extraordinarily well in very difficult circumstances, and I trust that some means will be found, either in this Bill or in some other measure to provide that they will not be turned out of the public service on the enactment of this Bill. I think it was Deputy Costello who criticised the clause in this Bill which provides for the hearing of an appeal from a circuit judge and a jury on the judge's notes. There seems to me to be a good deal of substance in many of those criticisms. And possibly employment could be found for the court stenographers by having them employed as clerks in the court, clerks to the judges, making them available, when a case was being heard by a circuit judge and a jury and having their notes of the evidence, thereby avoiding the practical difficulties that frequently arise when an appeal is being heard on the judge's notes. There are not very many stenographers. There are only eight circuits altogether. These stenographers have now acquired a great deal of facility in dealing with subjects involving technical expressions and procedure. On their employment some years ago they were already skilled shorthand writers. They are now much more highly skilled still. I think it would be highly regrettable if the State were to lose the services of this body of men. If it is not found feasible to employ them in the way I suggest in the Circuit Court in taking notes in jury cases, then they might be attached to the High Court. It might be that the number of cases to be tried in the Circuit Court by a judge and jury are so few that it would not be worth while or economical to continue them in circuit courts. If that is so, there would be abundant scope for them in the High Court. The judges who are paid on a much more liberal scale than the stenographers: why should the time of the judge be wasted in taking longhand notes? Their time is occupied a good deal in taking these longhand notes, and possibly it would lead in the end to economy of public moneys if the stenographers were, on the enactment of this Bill, attached to the High Court and made available to take official shorthand notes of the evidence in all cases tried in the High Court.

There is nothing else that occurs to me in regard to this Bill, so far as principle is concerned, though there may be a good deal to be said as the sections come before Committee for consideration one by one.

Comment on this

In the main, this Bill is a machinery Bill designed to do certain things to improve the machinery of the courts. The ordinary citizen of the country will not be very much concerned with the main principles of the Bill. What he is concerned with is not what is in the Bill but what is left out of it. This Bill is described as a Courts of Justice Bill. But in dealing with the whole question of the administration of justice in this country and the price at which justice can be obtained in this State, one could well extend a qualifying title to this Bill. In fact, everybody knows that the courts of justice in this country are open, not to all the citizens of the country, but to such citizens as are fortified with sufficient money to enable them to obtain justice in the courts.

Dealing with the benefits which the courts confer upon poor people in the country, I must say they confer none at all. The ordinary poor citizen knows perfectly well that it is quite impossible for him to obtain any justice whatever in the courts. I know we are told that the courts are open to all; that every aggrieved citizen can go to the court and secure justice through its administration of justice. But there seems to be about as much truth in a statement of that kind as in telling the people of Gloucester Street that the Gresham Hotel is open to everybody. If the ordinary person presented himself in the court and asked for justice he would get justice short and sweet, just what the person from Gloucester Street would get if he presented himself at the Gresham Hotel and asked for admission for a week.

What I am concerned with in this whole matter is the fact that there is no provision in the Bill and no proposals from the Government to remedy a condition of affairs which deprives the ordinary poor citizen of the protection of the courts or a measure of justice which he is unable to obtain to-day. Everybody knows that poor people are frequently involved in motor car accidents. Everybody knows that when travelling through the streets poor people are knocked down by motor cars. The owner of the car is insured with a powerful and strong insurance company. The stronger the case the victim has against the owner of the car the greater the resources the company mobilises in order to ensure that the victim will not get the compensation which the Acts of Parliament of the country provide for in these circumstances.

Let us take the case of an unemployed poor man with a wife and four or five children. That man meets with an accident in O'Connell Street, Dublin. He is knocked down and seriously injured. Where is that man to get justice? Can he go to the courts and say he is a poor citizen with no money whatever and can he ask there to secure justice or to obtain compensation for the injury he has suffered? If that citizen so acted, I can only say that his faith in the capacity of the courts to administer justice to him would meet with a very rude shock. The most that man can do is to raise some money and give it to legal folk for the purpose of getting their assistance to plead for justice in the courts. Again, the measure of legal assistance he will get will depend upon the amount of money he can raise. If he can manage to secure a goodly sum of money he may get the cream of the Bar to plead his case. But if he is a poor man and cannot raise the money, then he must be content with somebody to plead his case, somebody to whom an ordinary citizen would not dream of going unless he was similarly impecunious. There is no provision in the Bill to remedy defects of that and of a similar kind.

Then there is the case of the tenants of slum houses in the towns of the country. The landlord may let certain accommodation being conscious of the tenant's acute need of some kind of house accommodation. That landlord charges the tenant an enormous rent. The tenant finds it extremely difficult to pay that rent. He might go to the court and ask for a reduction, but since he is unfortunately unable to provide the necessaries of life in the form of foodstuffs for himself and his family, he is clearly unable to provide any money to meet the law costs. The result is that the slum landlord gets away with charging an exorbitant rent. Again, there is no provision to deal with cases of that kind or to provide cheap justice for citizens in such cases.

At an earlier stage this evening the Minister for Industry and Commerce replying to Question 6 on the Order Paper told Deputy Seán MacEoin that if policy holders had a grievance against insurance companies because of the way in which their policies had prematurely lapsed, that was a kind of dispute to be determined in the courts of justice. Imagine the unfortunate man unable to continue to pay his premiums on these policies of insurance because of unemployment, going into the courts of justice as advised by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. Imagine that man asking justice from the court in a matter of that kind, when he is not able, by his sheer inability to pay, to engage counsel to argue his case. That man would lose his case by default. That is because the insurance company can be relied upon to brief the cream of the Bar in order to get legal sanction for an immoral and illegal thing done against the policy holder.

My attention was drawn to a case a short time ago where a workman met with an accident in the course of his employment. He made a claim for compensation on his employer. The employer had the risk covered with a wealthy cross-Channel insurance company and after considerable delay and when this man had been out of work for at least ten weeks the company offered him £25. The man showed me the offer which was made to him and he said he thought it was inadequate, seeing that he had been seriously injured and had lost the sight of one eye. He said to me: "What can I do? I cannot hold out for ever and I think I will be forced to accept this £25." The man was penniless and I wrote to the insurance company on his behalf expressing the view that the sum offered was utterly inadequate and bore no relation to the injuries which the man had suffered, nor did it compensate him for his diminished earning power. Following that, the company consented to increase the offer to £50, but even that amount seemed to be inadequate. Eventually, seeing that the man was badly handicapped for want of money to fight the insurance combine, I recommended him to go to a certain solicitor, to whom I spoke on his behalf. As a result of the solicitor taking the case to court and pleading for the man, the judge awarded him £200 compensation and costs. Contrast that with the original offer of £25 which the man was almost compelled to take because he had no means of compelling the insurance company to pay a higher sum.

That is a classical example of the way the poor are legally robbed because of their inability to obtain legal assistance in cases of difficulty. I think if the Government introduced a Bill to provide legal assistance for poor people, instituting, as Deputy Geoghegan almost suggested, a kind of legal hospital for people who are legally sick, they would be doing a good day's work from the point of view of many poor and deserving sections of the community. I strongly urge the Government, if it is not possible to do it in this Bill, to find some opportunity in the near future of taking steps so that legal assistance will be available for people unable to provide for it through want of the wherewithal. Quite apart from the necessity for providing legal assistance for poor people, there is a strong volume of opinion in the country—and Deputies know it exists —that the whole question of justice is bound up with the amount which you can offer for the justice you want to get. The whole machinery of law is costly and, quite apart from the poorer sections who are unable to pay any money to obtain legal assistance, a large number of other sections of the community, who may be in regular employment, find it difficult to engage in litigation because of the expense involved in briefing the best counsel available. It is a notorious fact, and virtually every Deputy has experience of it directly or indirectly, that you cannot engage in litigation and you cannot use the machinery of justice unless you have a cheque book in your pocket and a substantial sum in the bank to meet the costs of the litigation. I want to say that much with reference to the absence of provision in this Bill of assistance for needy persons who may be seeking justice through the machinery of the courts, machinery which this Bill aims at improving.

There is a section of this Bill which, in my view, is the most serious and the most important section in the whole Bill. I refer to Section 73 which provides that a verdict of nine members of a jury can provide for punishment in all cases in future in a murder or manslaughter case, or even the kind of case which is probably worse than manslaughter or murder. A verdict of nine members of a jury is now going to be sufficient to secure the condemnation of an accused person. Why that section should have got into a Bill described as a Courts of Justice Bill, I do not know. This section should not be found in such a Bill as this. The section is entirely foreign to a Bill which purports to improve the machinery of justice. Why, this is sheer expediency; it is getting quite close to gangster law, not to justice, and I cannot understand on what grounds a section of this kind has been introduced into the Bill. Certainly the Attorney-General is not in favour of it, if one can judge by his declarations yesterday, and the ex-Minister for Justice did not seem to be terribly enamoured of this particular section. Neither the Attorney-General nor the Minister for Justice has been able to produce a single lawyer on their benches to say a word in favour of Section 73. It is a highly dangerous section; it is an attempt to trample on the rights—and he has rights—of an accused person. It would be better that 100 guilty people should escape scot free from the penalties imposed by the law, rather than that one innocent person should be convicted.

Comment on this

Would you not like a man to get free if nine jurymen were in favour of acquittal?

Comment on this

I am in favour of the restoration of the previous practice which, in my opinion, more adequately safeguards the citizen than the system of a majority verdict.

Comment on this

Would you refuse to acquit if nine jurymen were in favour of acquittal?

Comment on this

Deputy Cosgrave is troubled with the provisions of the Protection of Juries Act, and he does not know on which foot to stand.

Comment on this

If nine jurymen are for acquittal would you be in favour of it? Will you answer that question?

Comment on this

I am in favour of the restoration of the previous practice. Does the Deputy understand that? I am in favour of the previous practice trampled on by Deputy Cosgrave's Protection of Juries Act, a few years ago. The Deputy's conscience is so guilty on the matter that he does not know where he stands in relation to this Bill.

Comment on this

The Deputy's answers to my questions show that his conscience is uneasy.

Comment on this

I shall have a very easy conscience and will have a less muddled conscience than Deputy Cosgrave when he votes against this measure, because he has already trampled on the principle himself. This section to which I have referred has no relation to justice at all; it is pure expediency. Under this particular section it is possible for excitement, passions, and all kinds of hysteria to operate in such a way as to get a verdict of nine people out of twelve in favour of the condemnation of the prisoner. I suggest to the Attorney-General that since no case whatever has been made for this section, it should be deleted completely. Let us get back to the system which has stood for a long time and in which no faults have been found in normal circumstances, irrespective of what might be said in times of special excitement or special commotion or in a state of special emergency. This is a Courts of Justice Bill and it is going to govern a peaceful situation as well as a war situation until it is superseded by some war-time measure. In our permanent legislation we ought to make sure that this kind of expediency does not find a place. I hope, therefore, that the Attorney-General, who is in charge of the Bill for the Government, will undertake to reconsider the matter and to restore the previous practice which, in my opinion, more adequately safeguards the liberty of the citizen than it is possible to do by the maintenance of Section 73.

Comment on this

Let me start the few observations which I wish to make on the Bill by stating that I am in entire agreement with Deputy Geoghegan about an appeal from an order of a district justice binding a person to be of good behaviour and to keep the peace. An order of that kind is really a slur on the person subjected to it and it is only right that he should have an opportunity of having it reviewed by the Circuit Court. I am also in agreement with Deputy Geoghegan with regard to the stenographers. They have done their duty very well and they are entitled to the most favourable consideration from the Government. It would be a pity if they were now thrown out of employment after having done really good work in the execution of the duties entrusted to them. I also think that provision should be made for poor people who are unable to procure an advocate to lay their case before the courts in certain matters and I am also largely in sympathy with practically all that Deputy Norton has said.

The main object of the principal Act of 1924 was to cheapen litigation and to bring the courts of justice, more or less, to everybody's door. I am sorry to say, however, that it did not achieve that object. It certainly did not cheapen the law and, in many cases, it made the administration of the law far more inconvenient for those who had to have recourse to the courts. I am sorry that, owing to illness, the Minister for Justice is not here this evening, because there is one specific case, with the details of which he is perfectly conversant, and in regard to which I may say he is quite sympathetic. I will take now the West Cork area. The town of Bandon, in the old days, was a centre for the County Courts, and sittings were held there three times a year. As a matter of fact, on one occasion the Assizes were held there. Bandon is about 19 miles to the west of Cork and its area extends to some places which are nearly 40 or 50 miles west of Cork. Bandon, while it has every convenience in the way of courthouses, excellent hotels, and railway and transport facilities of every kind, has been neglected in the appointment of the places where Circuit Courts were to be held. The Bandon area extends many miles westward to Clonakilty, Rosscarbery and Dunmanway and beyond them, and the result is that the people have to pass Bandon and go to Cork, 19 miles beyond the natural place where the sittings ought to be. It is a great hardship on poor people, in fact on every class of people, that they have to pass Bandon, where there is every facility and every accommodation, and to go 19 miles beyond it to Cork for the purpose of getting justice. That is a matter that ought to be remedied under the present Bill.

With regard to the section that has been debated so much in public and in the Dáil which refers to the nine-member verdict, I assume from the remarks made by the Attorney-General and the ex-Minister for Justice last evening that the Government will proceed no further with that obnoxious section. I am sure that they will drop it at once because they know that the good sense and the feeling of the whole community is against it. There may be occasions of great civil commotion or times of special stress and national conflict when there might be some excuse for such a provision; but at the present time such a provision, in my humble opinion, is entirely and absolutely uncalled for and one that will be condemned by the whole electorate.

There is one section on which I wish to say just a few words and that is Section 49, dealing with the district justices. Let me start by saying that the district justices have done very good service to the State. I do not think there is anybody in this House or outside it who can reasonably contradict that statement. They live in the area where they function and I think there is no class of people entrusted with the administration of the law entitled to more ample protection and security of tenure than the district justices. I do not care what the law has been up to this, it is my firm opinion that the district justice should have the very same rights and be entitled to the very same privileges as every judge of the Supreme Court, High Court or Circuit Court. There is no reason why he should not get the same rights. When there is hanging over a justice a provision of this kind he is, more or less, in the position of the old tyrant Damocles—I do not use that word in any opprobrious sense—over whose head the sword was always hanging.

Up to this there were certain provisions by which a district justice might be removed from office in certain circumstances. Let us see what the new section provides. First of all, it sets up what I call a vigilance committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, and the Attorney-General. I am sure that they are very able, independent and impartial gentlemen, and that not one of them has any anxiety whatever to act on a committee of this description. This committee having been set up, the section goes on to say: "The Minister for Justice may at any time, on his own motion or in consequence of complaints or representations made to him, refer to the said advisory committee the question of the fitness of any particular justice of the District Court to continue to hold his office..." In other words, if the Minister for Justice gets a mandamus from a Fianna Fáil Club, if he wants to hold his position, he must immediately act upon it and have the unfortunate district justice, who may have happened to give offence to somebody brought before his court, before this advisory committee. I presume it will be a kind of star chamber holding its sittings in private and examining witnesses, if any, in private. The section then goes on to state that they may inquire "into the question of the fitness of any particular justice of the District Court to continue to hold his office having regard to his mental or physical health, or his conduct (whether in the execution of his office or otherwise) generally or on a particular occasion, or any other relevant matter." That means they will have a roving commission to inquire into all his private life; to discover whether at the last dance at the Gresham Hotel or the opening of a beet factory in the country he danced the Walls of Limerick or the Tango or the Turkey-Trot, or to discover whether he goes to Leopardostown or a "penny gaff" along the quays. Surely that does not commend itself to the good sense and prudence of any member of this House? I do not believe the Attorney-General has the slightest sympathy with such a drastic and comprehensive section as this is. I think that the Government would be very well advised to reconsider the section, and, if they do not delete it, to amend it, because, as I have said before, and as I repeat, the district justices, instead of being turned into—as this section contemplates—the old Removables, whose history is so well known in this country, should get more protection and a larger measure of security than they have got here. I really think that if the right thing is done in the interests of the people they will be accorded the very same independence as has been given to the judges of the High Court and to the judges of the Circuit Court. It is not because they are at the bottom of the ladder and are underdogs that they should be kicked around, while others who are no more infallible or no more impeccable should be given a guarantee of security.

Comment on this

So far as this Bill is concerned generally, I oppose it on the ground that this is not the time for the introduction of such a Bill. We are all aware of the present financial position of this country, and why February of the year 1935, above all other times, should be chosen for the introduction of a Bill such as this is beyond me to imagine. So far as the chief contents of the Bill are concerned, it is very difficult usefully to add anything to what has already been said by Deputy Costello from this side of the House, but there are one or two general features of the Bill on which I think comment will not be out of place. I should like to support what Deputy Burke has already said with regard to Section 49. That is the section which deals with the removal of district justices. When the Attorney-General was opening this debate he gave us very little information on what was contemplated by this section, or what position had arisen which justified the existence of this section in the Bill. We are all aware, of course, of certain utterances of district justices throughout the country which would be contrary to the views of large sections of the community, but surely that is no justification for a section such as this. Under the provisions of this section the Minister has power to refer a number of matters in connection with district justices to an advisory committee. The terms of reference are such that that committee can inquire into the conduct of the district justice, not only in the execution of his office but, as the Bill itself says, "otherwise." In other words, the conduct of the district justice in every sphere, no matter how private, is to be inquired into and made the possible ground for removal from office.

For myself, I cannot see any possible reason for differentiating between the position of a district justice and that of any other judge on the Bench. Why should not a district justice be entitled to his little indiscretions just as much as a Circuit Court judge or a High Court judge or a Supreme Court judge? Why must a district justice be put in this penny-boy position—completely in the stranglehold of the Executive Council? Certainly, this provision of the Bill will not do any good to the administration of justice in this country. Terms such as these would not be accepted by a scullerymaid going into employment. A district justice can be transferred from one district to another. And why? Presumably, because he will not do what a district justice here was told to do a short time ago—namely, to impose higher fines. That is the type of thing that is going to go on when this Bill becomes operative. We are all aware of that case in which a district justice received a circular from the Department of Justice telling him that the fines he was imposing were not high enough. In other words, we are now getting another source of revenue by the control which is being given to the Minister and the Executive Council over district justices throughout the country.

There was another important aspect of this Bill which was dealt with by a number of speakers to-day, notably by Deputy Norton, and that is that so far as the viewpoint of the ordinary litigant throughout the country is concerned absolutely no provision whatsoever has been made for it. So far as that is concerned Section 61, I think, is the only section of the Bill which deals with it, and the Attorney-General in dealing with that section yesterday, told us it was the intention of the Minister for Finance to raise the fees of the court officers. In other words, the only thing that this Bill is doing for the ordinary litigant throughout the country is to increase the cost of litigation. We are all aware, and it has been commented on several times in the course of this debate, of the present high cost of litigation. There is no getting away from the fact that the cost of litigation at the moment does make it impossible for a number of people to seek the protection of the courts. In dealing with this aspect of the Bill, or rather with this aspect of omissions from the Bill, I should like to support what has already been said by Deputy Geoghegan in connection with the establishment of a fund out of which poor prisoners would be able to get free legal assistance. The position in that regard at the moment is a scandalous one. I think I am not exaggerating the position when I say that this is the only civilised country in which there is not some such support for poor prisoners. We have this position, apart from poverty altogether for the moment, where a man is charged with a crime; he is put into the dock and he is kept in custody, say, for a week, six days or two weeks. He is put to the cost of defending himself. Assume for the moment that he is innocent and that at the end of his trial his innocence is established by the jury bringing in a verdict of not guilty. He is out of pocket hundreds of pounds, perhaps, in defending his honour and in establishing his innocence. That man cannot recover one penny of that money from the State. That is something that should be provided for in the Bill. If a man is put to the cost of defending himself in a criminal court, if he expends money in defending his honour and establishing his innocence, and if he does that successfully, I suggest there should be some provision in the Bill for recouping such person his costs.

There is another omission in the Bill to which I should like to draw attention. In actions in which the State is a party, at the present moment, the authorities are able to avail themselves of all kinds of defences which are not open to ordinary private litigants. I think it is right to say—I can be corrected by those more learned in law if I am wrong—that, in the absence of any express legislative stipulation to the contrary, the party opposed to the State cannot raise, for instance, the Statute of Limitations as a defence. I think that is correct. Numerous examples can be added to that but my general contention is this—and I can see no argument against the proposition—that the State should be in exactly the same position as any other party when it is engaged in litigation. There is another branch of the law in which the State gets a clear immunity and that is in ordinary actions of tort, except in a case such as that which has been provided for by the latest Road Traffic Act. Generally speaking, it is true to say that an action of tort cannot be brought against the State. That is a most ridiculous position. A private individual is for example libelled by some Government circular. No matter how outrageous or how defamatory that statement may be, there is no remedy on the part of the citizen against the State. Surely these are things that should obviously be corrected, and this is the time to correct them. This Bill makes no provision of any kind for that real kind of grievance.

The only object of the Bill, as far as I can see, is to create two new judgeships. Everything else in the Bill is nothing but mere trimmings, and, as I have said before, this is not the time to bring in a measure of this kind. There would be some justification for it if some real genuine grievances, such as I have spoken of, were remedied in the Bill, but nothing in that way is done by the Bill. We hear a lot of talk about a reversion to the old appeal system— the rehearing system. The net result of that will be that we shall have exactly the same position as before the courts were reorganised. When the change from the rehearing system to the note system was coming about, it was welcomed by 95 per cent. of the legal profession. Everyone condemned the rehearing system on the grounds that it led to wholesale perjury. So far as this Bill is concerned it brings about no real constructive change.

With regard to the position of the official stenographer, I should like to add something to what has been said by other speakers. These official stenographers, doing their work in the Circuit Courts throughout the country, as Deputy Geoghegan pointed out, acquired what may be called a really specialised knowledge of their work. There are terms used in law to which they have become accustomed. Their experience in the courts does fit them for this type of work in a way in which no other shorthand writers are fitted. It does seem extraordinary that after 11 years' service these men are now going to be thrown out on the roadside. That condition of affairs would not be so bad if it were not a fact that there is alternative employment which could be offered to these men, and this Bill should make provision for the utilisation of the services of these stenographers.

There is one provision in the Bill providing for an appeal from a jury action in a Circuit Court on the judge's note. Without any experience at all of that type of appeal, it seems to me on the face of it that this is precisely the type of action in which there should be a full stenographer's note. Surely when an action is heard by a jury, and an appeal is taken from their findings, and from the general results of the action, that is no reason why a full transcript of what happened in the court below should not be placed before the superior court. I understand from what Deputy Costello said yesterday, and from what I have heard from several of my colleagues, that this judge's note system is one that has already proved itself unsuccessful. What does the judge do? As Deputy Costello pointed out yesterday, he is there in the court; he has to control counsel in the court; he has to observe the demeanour of the witnesses, and to look after the general conduct of the trial of the case, and his notes are always necessarily scanty. That is what the higher court has to depend upon when the action comes before it—these scanty hurried notes. The notes, in most cases, will depend on the type of judge. He may be a very quick-minded man who will be able to take a quick note of what is going on, but without going into these matters at all, it must be obvious to everyone that on such an appeal, there should be as full an account as possible of what happened in the court below. If we are going to have a rehearing system, and if that rehearing system is being given official recognition in this Bill, I do not understand why it is not being applied to jury trials as much as to trials without a jury. I do not know why the differentiation exists, and I should like to have that more fully explained by the Attorney-General when he comes to reply.

With regard to the majority verdicts, it seems to me absolutely certain that in order to convict a man, if 12 men are put there to try him, everyone of these 12 men should agree to the verdict of "guilty." I can see no answer to that argument. I do not care about the other side of the question as to whether or not I would be in favour of nine men acquitting a man. The main thing is that in order to convict a man you should have agreement amongst the 12 members of the jury. If you like, you can provide that in order to acquit a man nine shall be sufficient, but we should face up to the proposition that no man can be found guilty of a crime of which he is charged without a unanimous verdict. There must be the unanimous verdict of the 12 presumably reasonable men who were put there to try him.

There is just one thing with regard to appeals that I should like to say before I sit down. I do not think it is true, as Deputy Geoghegan suggested yesterday, that by going back to the old rehearing system we are going to go back to cheap litigation and cheap appeals. The present scale of costs in the Circuit Courts is absolutely different from the scale that existed in the old County Courts, and so far as counsels' fees are concerned on the hearing and rehearing of these appeals, I do not think they will be any different from that which exist at present on the hearing of appeals on notes, because you will have exactly the same scale of costs in the Circuit Courts as you will have under this Bill. Take a case in which a junior counsel is engaged. He gets three guineas on the hearing of the case. He spends a day in court and when the case is finished there is an appeal. Surely, junior counsel is not going to go back to the old County Court scale on the hearing of the appeal. The least that a junior will get on the hearing of the appeal will be three guineas. You will never get back to the old scale, unless you want to revert to the whole scale of costs, when two guineas was given to senior counsel and one guinea to the junior counsel. I do not think it was fair of Deputy Geoghegan to compare a case within his knowledge, in which an unsuccessful party had to pay about £100 and costs on an appeal, while in the next breath he spoke of the costs of appeal in the case he mentioned were £19 under the old system. You will never get back to that unless the whole scale of costs is changed. As a matter of fact, as far as the cost of litigation is concerned, the rehearing system will not make any difference, because all the party pays with notes will, in the general run, have to be paid for bringing witnesses together in the local venue for rehearing.

I should like to reiterate what I said with regard to official stenographers, and to impress upon the Attorney-General that the position of these men is one that should certainly receive his most careful consideration. I have heard that several men who entered into these contracts with the State 11 years ago will, when this Bill becomes operative, be without a job or a chance of getting a job. In view of that fact, I urge on the Attorney-General that their services might be useful, even under the operation of this Bill. They could be used, for example, on the hearing of every Circuit case, if only for the purpose of stopping what was carried on, on such a wholesale scale—perjury. That is an aspect of the new system that should receive the careful consideration of the Attorney-General. He is well aware of the amount of perjury that went on by way of rehearing when appeals were heard under the old system. For that reason I urge that there is a real necessity for retaining the services of the present official stenographers.

Comment on this

It is very difficult to make a speech on this Bill on account of all the nonsense we heard about it. I never heard so many silly things said about any Bill as were said this evening, and particularly by Deputy Norton. I do not want to use slang, but I never heard more "tripe" talked than from Deputy Norton: first, in the general case he made against law, and against both branches of the profession, and then in the particular case he referred to. The Deputy said that the only hope of getting justice depended on the size of one's purse or money bag. He then drew a comparison between Gloucester Street and the Gresham Hotel. The Deputy is apparently keeping an eye on the voters in Gloucester Street. They will be talking about the matter this evening when they read what he said in the Evening Herald and the Evening Mail. They will say: “What a great man Deputy Norton is for the poor.” I do not know if the Gresham Hotel is open to the people of Gloucester Street, but I challenge contradiction of the statement that the Irish courts are open to every citizen who wants justice, irrespective of whether he has money or not.

I think the best thing I can do is to give examples to disprove the charges made against the profession. I grant that the profession has to get fees and to get money. In the first place, they have to be trained and solicitors have to keep offices and to pay big staffs of skilled persons. Money is required on Saturdays for these staffs. I wonder would Deputy Norton not want money on Saturday nights to pay workmen. I had two cases recently which disprove the charges made by Deputy Norton. In one case the Minister for Industry and Commerce attempted, without notice, to take a small farm from a man in Donegal. My client had not a penny. The Minister, after being defeated in the lower courts, went to the Supreme Courts where my client won. We set aside rules made by the Minister under the Mines and Minerals Act. Take the other case made by the Deputy, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where a man met with a serious injury, lost the sight of an eye, and was being bullied by an insurance society to take some trivial sum of money, about £25 until Deputy Norton got busy. I wonder did it ever occur to the Deputy that he was breaking the law, and that the insurance society, as well as the man concerned, was breaking the law in taking £25, because they were all usurping the rights of the courts to arbitrate in a case where an accident took place. The Deputy struts in here and attacks the profession, when he knows that the position does not depend upon the size of a person's money bag. Classes of poor people were referred to by Deputy Geoghegan and by other Deputies—criminal classes—where the charges varied from charity to murder. They are a huge class and it is only reasonable that something should be done for them. The reason why no one troubles about that class is usually because when a man is charged with committing a crime, the moment the Guards arrest him it is said he is guilty. That class is no one's child; they are outcasts. There are many cases almost as serious as murder, where men are charged, and I do not see that any logical case can be made on behalf of the State for keeping a defence from murder cases to the most elementary cases in the District Courts. Take all these various crimes—crimes less than murder—where the consequences may be almost as serious as in a murder case, why should not provision be made by the State for the defence of the accused? They are the only class of people who, in practice, are deserted so far as receiving assistance for their defence in the court is concerned.

Over a period of 20 years, during which I was connected with poor litigants and with a poor county, I cannot recall one case where people, because they had not the money, did not get justice. I think if the position were otherwise that the honourable profession I belong to would not have the right to exist. It would certainly be a terrible reproach to my profession, and I should be sorry to be a member of it, if a person whose rights were being encroached upon could not get legal assistance simply because he or she happened to be poor.

Deputy Norton referred to another case. He talked about poor people being knocked down by motor cars and of millionaires going around in those motor cars. He said that these poor people could not get justice. The Deputy's speech was simply all nonsense. I had a case a fortnight ago where a poor woman, who had been working daily for 35 years, met with an accident. I am simply mentioning this to disprove the sort of stuff that we had from Deputy Norton. It is necessary to give a concrete case because otherwise Deputy Norton might deny this and say it was all untrue. On the 20th March of last year this poor woman, when going home from her daily work, was knocked down by a motor cyclist. She sustained a double fracture of the thigh. She was left for 12 months without a penny. She had, as I said, been out working daily for 35 years. The people for whom she had been working discharged her. She was living alone. She has since been an invalid. She received every attention from the doctors and a solicitor. The solicitor not only employed two senior counsel but a junior to look after the interests of that poor woman, giving, of course, his own services as well. In spite of that, Deputy Norton comes in here to impeach the legal profession. I quote that case for the purpose of brushing aside that sort of stuff from the Deputy.

With regard to the Bill itself, there is only one aspect of it that concerns me. There is one reform that I want to see carried out, and that is an alteration in the form of appeals. Deputy McGuire has been very severe on Deputy Geoghegan for the speech he made here last evening. I suppose that both Deputy Geoghegan and myself are older than Deputy McGuire. We went through the mill and had a rather extensive knowledge of both systems. I think that I can speak with more authority on this matter than Deputy McGuire. The facts were accurately stated last evening by Deputy Geoghegan. I remember that some 18 or 20 years ago I was asked to defend a farmer's son down the country at an assizes. I did so. The jury found him not guilty and I got a guinea. Take the civil side. Some members of the House will remember that the first Lord Chief Justice in Northern Ireland was the late Sir Denis Henry, who had been a leader of the North-West Circuit, of which Deputy Geoghegan and myself were members. Deputy Geoghegan remembers as well as I do going to assize towns and of solicitors going to Sir Denis Henry, then the leader of our profession, and handing a brief in an appeal case marked a guinea or two guineas. He went into court on that appeal and the case was disposed of.

That was the system in those days, and then we had a reform under the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. The point of view taken then was that all these British institutions were wrong; that there could be nothing good in them, and the thing to do was to brush them and sweep them out. I know of nothing more stupid than the change that was made under that Act in regard to the hearing of appeals. It really did away with justice. Take, first, the question of costs and expenses. Imagine a small case down the country. We all know that people in the country are fond of law. At an original hearing the whole countryside attended. Train loads of people came along, and in some instances bus loads accompanied the parties concerned. All these witnesses had to be examined. A transcript of the stenographer's notes of the evidence cost anything from £10 to £14. Deputy Geoghegan has told the House, and I agree with him, that a case such as that would be heard in the old days in the County Court, and decided on appeal, for the sum of £9. Under the system in operation for some years the transcript of the notes for the appeal cost at least £10. That shows the terrible mistake that was made when that reform was brought about.

What I am most concerned with in this Bill is the change in the form of appeal. Deputy McGuire said that the provision dealing with appeals will in practice be as expensive as the present system because, he said, the witnesses will have to be brought again to the trial town. Take the present system where the whole countryside is taken up to the original hearing. If they do not come by train they are brought up in bus loads. They are all examined. Their evidence is taken down by the stenographer and I have told the House what the transcript of the notes cost for the appeal. Under the system proposed in the Bill what will happen? The witnesses will be taken up in a motor car for the rehearing. The hire of the car may cost £2 10s. and that will dispose of the whole thing. The thing is to give the people the feeling that they are getting justice. Whether they are getting it or not, give them the idea that they are. That will satisfy them. Let them swear, and let them have their kick and their fling. It satisfies them.

Comment on this

That is good law.

Comment on this

It is good human nature, anyhow.

Comment on this

That is the report of the Committee.

Comment on this

That has been my experience of people in litigation. Deputy McGuire said that the real purpose of the Bill was to appoint two judges. Of course, that is in keeping with a Government that entered office with a programme of economy. The appointment of two new judges is in keeping with its doctrine that it would practise economy. Deputies can visualise Deputy Donnelly going down for the week-end to his constituency in Offaly and saying "we stand for economy. We told the people that we were going to reduce taxation by £2,000,000. We are reducing it by putting two additional judges in the Supreme Court—not the High Court— but in the Supreme Court where they will get the salaries of Supreme Court judges." That is economy.

There are some other features of the Bill that I desire to refer to. There is this thing of not giving more costs than damages in certain cases. I have considered that, and I think it is an unwise provision. Take the case of a man and a woman who are the guardians of a minor. The minor meets with an accident. At first it looks quite serious and is, in fact, serious, but by good treatment and good attention, and the fact that certain people have greater powers of recuperation than others—in other words, because they are better stickers and better fighters—the minor makes a good recovery. Before there can be conclusive evidence as to its recovery, proceedings have to be instituted. Where are they to be instituted? How is a guardian to discharge his obligations and determine whether or not the damage is not more than is represented by the sum of £300? On the other hand, perhaps the minor is permanently injured. In order to protect himself and to be faithful to his trust, the guardian has to commence proceedings in the High Court. High Court costs cannot be got if the verdict is for less than £300 unless a certificate is obtained from the judge. Why should solicitor or counsel have to go into court and beg for costs when it is an old maxim of the law that costs follow the result? If, in the discharge of his duty, a guardian takes a case in the High Court he should obtain his costs irrespective of the amount of the verdict. In all these cases, one is subject to the whim of juries. Nobody knows what they are going to do until they come in with their paper. Sometimes, when you are expecting a favourable verdict they bring in a verdict against you. I think that, where an action is reasonably taken in the High Court, costs should follow the result and there should be no necessity to apply for a certificate from the judge. Judges are like other members of the community. Some of them have their whims. Some of them are very conservative and cheese-paring, and may refuse to give a certificate. To go back to the case of a guardian of a minor, he may institute an action in the High Court which will involve him in £300 or £400 costs. The minor may, in the meantime, have made a good recovery and, when the case comes on, it may be necessary to make provision for little more than hospital, medical and nursing expenses. The costs have, however, been incurred. I think that the Attorney-General should look into that type of case and remove the restraint provided by the certificate.

Another section of the Bill deals with actions remitted from the High Court to the Circuit Court. In these remitted actions the Circuit Court gets an enlarged jurisdiction. In other words, in a remitted action a Circuit Court judge can give more than £300 damages. I do not like the provision as regards costs. It may look very well on paper, but, in practice, if an action is of such a character that a Circuit Court judge may give more than £300 damages, it is, on its face, an action of a very important character. That being so, senior counsel will be brought down on both sides from Dublin and will have to receive a special fee. The fee varies from 20 guineas to 25 guineas. Would it not be much better to have that action tried in Dublin, where senior counsel would not get that special fee at all? It is because they have to go to the country that these big fees are paid. If there is a prospect of more than £300 being awarded, a case should be retained in the High Court. It may seem strange that counsel should get a fee of 25 guineas for going down the country, but it must be remembered that he may have to leave the day before the hearing, stay a night at the court venue, while the hearing may last all day. It may be next evening before he gets back to town, and he will have lost two and a half days. I think that that section should be amended.

I now come to Section 49, about which so much has been said. It is useless to whip a dead horse, and this section has been pretty well whipped already. I have yet to hear a case made for the courtmartialling of district justices for which this section provides. Are not the district justices barristers or solicitors, just as members of the High Court are? Why, by the condescension of some high directing power, should any special inspiration descend upon, say, me or Deputy Geoghegan, because we happen to go into the High Court or Circuit Court over and above, say, Deputy Costello or Deputy McGilligan, who are made district justices?

Comment on this

I do not think that there is any chance of that.

Comment on this

What is the logic of the case for this court of inquiry? I quite appreciate that, in one or two instances, district justices have been very indiscreet, but High Court judges have been indiscreet, too. Is the whole system to be condemned, and is the whole security of the public, due to the independence of these men, to be undermined because one man happens to make a silly statement? That is the issue. Section 49 provides a series of sweat-boxes through which a district justice is to be forced because one man happens to make a silly statement. Men have made silly statements from the beginning of time and will do so to the end of time. What logical case is there for this court-martial of district justices? They are trained men. They have had seven or ten years' experience of their profession before being placed on the bench. Many of them have had much longer service—service equal in length of time to the service of judges of the High Court. If that be so, why a court of inquiry? The mistake, if made, was made by those who appointed the justices.

These mistakes have been made and will be made. They cannot be prevented. You will get men who, in their ordinary work and in dealing with the man in the street, act quite sensibly, but when put into this position they seem to think that they have attained such a degree of importance that they have a right to dictate and pontificate about everything. Are you going to undermine the entire structure simply because a couple of men once in their lives make a silly statement from the Bench? Then, we have this tribunal, consisting of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General to determine, if you please, the mental capacity of district justices. It might be more fitting if a similar tribunal were appointed to inquire into their own mental state. Why should that not be done? I wonder what metaphysical and psychological operation proceeded in the rambling mind of the man who produced this section. I agree that it should apply to all branches of the profession, to the entire judiciary from top to bottom, but there is no case for applying it to men who are drawn from the same profession as the judges of the High Court themselves. The district justices were put into this position of independence to do away with the old, accursed system represented by the removable magistrate. Eleven years afterwards, when the new system had given great satisfaction to the community, we are going to do away with the independence of district justices. Why?

Deputy McGuire referred to a case where circulars were sent to a district justice because he was not imposing sufficiently heavy fines. I think that Deputy McGuire is slightly inaccurate in that. My information is that what happened was that, whether consciously or unconsciously, the Minister for Finance is attempting to use the district justice as a tax collector for himself, and that a circular was sent out to the official of the Circuit Court —not to the district justice but to the clerk of the court—to tell the district justice: "Oh, your fines are not heavy enough." Did anybody ever hear of such a way—such a clumsy way—of doing it, if it was done? I am informed that it was done.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It was done under Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's administration.

Comment on this

Well, the first time that I ever heard of it was in the last six months.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It was done under Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's administration.

Comment on this

At any rate, I know that it was sent out during the last six months. The Attorney-General need not be shaking his head. It is so, because I know it is so. However, whether it was done under the administration of Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney or by the present Minister, that does not justify it. Two wrongs do not make a right. I say that this provision is now put in deliberately in this Bill in order to give these district justices a removable flavour, so that when an order of this kind is sent out to them to increase their fines, and they do not comply, they may be removed. Very well; you are going to remove them, but where are you going to remove them to? Is it to the museum? Because, if you remove them from one place, you have got to send them to another place. Will the next man who is sent to take the place of the removed justice be willing to oblige the Government? Will he leave, say, Donegal, and go to Cork at the behest of the Minister for Justice or of this committee, because the displaced man has given displeasure to this committee, or this courtmartial, as I call it, consisting of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, and the Attorney-General? That is the snag, and there is no provision here for dealing with it. Where will you find a place for that man, if the man whom you want to take his place will not oblige? When this courtmartial, as I call it, consisting of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General determine that a certain justice should be removed for one reason or another —say, because he is mentally incompetent, although, as I suggest, they are probably pretty well mentally incompetent themselves—what are you going to do with that man? There is no provision here in this section or in this Bill for dealing with that. I think that this thing wants a lot of looking into.

Then there is the question of the section with regard to juries. I am very glad to know that from no side of this House has any defence of this provision been made. One can recall a very limited number of instances of criminal cases where, in defending a prisoner, one was pretty well convinced that the man one was defending was guilty who still managed to be acquitted. I think I can recall the very first prisoner I defended. Certainly, I thought him guilty, but the jury found him not guilty, owing to the fact, I think, that the judge—who is now dead—charged so ferociously against the man that the jury felt it incumbent upon themselves to find him "Not guilty." Now, there is a very old maxim of the law which is admitted, I think, by everybody, or at least accepted by everybody. That maxim is to the effect that it would be better that nine guilty men should go free than one innocent person should be convicted. I think it is a very wise maxim. It has stood the test of time. It has stood the test not alone of theory but of practice. I think it has operated well, and that the number of cases in which a criminal, who was clearly guilty, was found not guilty, are very few. In the memory of the oldest Deputy in this House or of the oldest man outside it, I think it will be found that the number of cases in which, on the evidence, men charged with serious crimes were found not guilty, where the evidence proved them to be guilty, were very few, and that was done under provisions whereby 12 of his fellow-citizens were sworn to go by the evidence. It may be said, as against that, that it is English law, but there are a lot of things English that are not bad—even the coal on a winter's day. That system has stood the test of time. It is not necessarily bad because it is English. It has been proved by time to be good both in theory and in practice, and more in practice than in theory. I ask that that provision should be rejected on the Committee Stage. This whole Bill wants a good deal of hammering out on the Committee Stage, especially with regard to Section 49, and I think I would ask the Attorney-General to take that particular section and recast it. It must be remembered that this District Court is the people's court. We heard Deputy Norton here spouting about the poor. If we are going to give them security, let it be by the independence of the court. That is the important, and the most important thing that should be in the Bill.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Does the Deputy object to the present system?

Comment on this

No, but I object to your undermining the independence of the judges of that court. You are undermining it. I am referring to the District Court. That is the people's court. I say that you should make it as independent as the Supreme Court, and, if you do, the poor man can get justice, notwithstanding all the spluttering by Deputy Norton and others about the poor man's court. Make the man who can hear the poor man's case independent. Make him more independent than the Chief Justice if necessary, and if it is possible. That is why I would ask Deputies of both sides of this House to apply themselves to that section. Perhaps the principle in this Bill is to make two judges. I have no great objection to that, particularly in view of the fact that it is suggested by a Government which alleges that it wants economy.

Comment on this

We have been accused of spluttering from those benches. Being a non-legal man, I do not wish to deal with the legal points of this Bill, but there is one point with which I wish to deal, and that is a point of omission. What I have in mind, in my opinion, would be making for the protection of prisoners to an extent that I believe is necessary. At the present time it is customary to have the publication of evidence on preliminary trials or hearings to establish a prima facie case, and whether or not counsel are supposed to produce evidence at that stage, in practice, I think, it is very rare that counsel do introduce evidence at this particular stage. The result is that a broadcast message is sent to the people of this country to try and establish the guilt of the person who is charged before he is ever tried. I think that where certain opinion is brought before people who may be potential jurymen, and who have the right to discuss these things at the fireside, and when they have only one side of the case before them, there is, willy-nilly, a feeling created in their minds of the guilt of the person charged.

I consider that in the interests of justice, now that an attempt is being made to alter, and to some extent to improve, the administration of the law, this point is one worthy of the very serious consideration of the Government, and one that a very considerable volume of public opinion could be mobilised to stand for. I speak purely as a layman, but I am expressing a view widely discussed by people not of the legal profession, but people who feel as I do upon this matter. They feel that in this respect in the present administration there is a weakness, and that steps ought to be taken to prevent the publication of details at the preliminary hearing, and until the case reaches the stage that both sides can be put so that a jury can approach the matter with open minds and without any preconceived ideas with regard to the person charged. I think this is a matter worthy of the consideration of the Government and of the Attorney-General, and I hope they will give it attention.

Comment on this

I am extremely sorry that Deputy Geoghegan should have left the House because at this moment it would be ungracious for anyone following him not to congratulate him upon his coming back into voice in the House, particularly since the vociferous incoherencies of Deputy Corry in relation to economies have ceased. We had the spectacle up to to-day of a man like Deputy Geoghegan coming into the House and wending his way through the Division Lobbies voting for cuts on civil servants, Local Government employees, dispensary doctors and on everyone upon whom the cut could fall. At any rate he had the decency to-day to stand up and say he welcomed this Bill even if he had to make the peculiar statement that it was a judicial reform forced by outside opinion. I always used to think it was something of a scandal that men of a professional type, educated men, should have gone so far back upon their tradition as to allow those scandalous posters, often referred to, to be promulgated and votes to be got on them. I also think there is another good thing in Deputy Geoghegan's appearance here on this Bill. We will have to discuss the cost of this. I am pleased that from this side of the House there has not been found anyone to say that when a Supreme Court judge is appointed £3,000 a year is too much to give him. We have, at least, kept off that, but not all people can say the same. I must say I used to regard with a certain amount of cynicism statements made by people who did attach themselves to this economist Party, which seemed to indicate that they were not wholly of the opinion that moved the majority of the Party. Deputy Geoghegan had none of that in mind. He announced at one time, at a meeting in Dundalk, that although he had some doubt about the policy once he saw that vast outpouring of Republican sympathy he would see this thing through to the bitter end. The Attorney General told us on one occasion that he could not serve the Irish Free State. The intervention of both those Deputies in this debate means that they are going to remain Daniels still in the lion's den, not Daniels come to judgment.

We should have heard something about the cost of this measure. The Committee met and reported upon the state of things they found at a particular time. Two representatives of the Fianna Fáil Party, as mentioned by Deputy Costello in his speech yesterday, reported against any increase in the system of the High Court judges until two things came about, one that the economic situation in the country was better, and secondly until there was an increase in the urgent public business which had accumulated in the courts. Yesterday the Attorney-General, deputed to this task by the exigencies of the situation created by the illness of his colleague, the Minister for Justice, read what were presumably his colleague's notes of his speech. It was a very remarkable utterance. There was no argument in it from beginning to end. There was a statement of what was in the Bill, but that was all. The Attorney-General informed us two or three times that in this and that particular we are not agreeing to the recommendations of the Joint Committee but why that was so we have not heard. One would have thought that from a Party which stood so much for economy people would know what they were voting for. One would have thought that we would be told what the cost was going to be here and how it was to be borne as between the taxpayer and the litigant.

There is one other matter and it is the gist of the whole thing, so far as the Committee that reported on the Court of Justice Bill is concerned, on which we get no information. We were told that the system of hearing on stenographer's notes was bad, that it caused delay, that there was a vast number of appeals waiting to be heard. I asked a series of questions yesterday as to when the four appendices to these reports would be brought up to date. I thought the Committee considering the Bill would have information on the point as to the cost and secondly on the question of the volume of Circuit Court appeals waiting for hearing. I asked how many of these represented cases originating in particular years—and how many represented cases that originated this year. I was told that the statistical abstract contained information bringing it up to the years 1932 and 1933 and that the Government had not got the other information. So generally it would seem that the Government had not considered the position and those introducing this Bill had not the necessary information. So far as I am concerned I had not got any; but the Government considered the position and decided taking a decision without knowing what is the state of the work in the court at the moment and without knowing what is the condition as regards appeals and what is the extent of the arrears. Those are two big points—the cost and the urgency, and the arrears of business. I have said the Attorney-General mainly devoted himself yesterday to telling us what was being done but he never once drifted into telling us why anything was being done. He did say this; that the Government were keeping to the report of the Commission— he hurriedly answered in principle but not in detail.

There are, say, five big things in this measure: there is the increase in the number of the judges; there is the question of the new system, which is phrased inaccurately as a going-back to the old system, with regard to the rehearing of Circuit Court cases; there is the complete abolition of the stenographer in regard to certain business; there is the attempt and the tendency to increase the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court; and there is this matter that has been so much referred to and which ought to be referred to oftener—the attempt to close down the official fist upon the district justices. Let us take one thing. The judges are going to be increased. What judges? As far as appointment goes, Supreme Court judges. What was the Committee's recommendation? They recommended that the Supreme Court should consist of more than three people. They recommended further that a sufficient number of judges be appointed to clear off the arrears and to have appealed cases, as they came along, dealt with speedily.

There was more than that said. From time to time, we have had discussions as to the difference between a Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court type and a High Court. It was referred to long ago when the original Courts of Justice Bill was going through and the present Chief Justice, then Attorney-General, spoke on the matter. He said:

"It is desired that this Court of Appeal, which is to be the final Court of Appeal and which is to be, unlike the existing Court of Appeal, constituted as a separate court, should stand apart and should be constituted by men specially chosen for their fitness for that particular court, and that it should not be possible to rush in High Court judges in order to give a day's golf or a day's holiday to judges of the Supreme Court. It is the opinion of the Bar that in the present existing régime, judges of the High Court have been unduly called into the Court of Appeal, and it is a constant complaint of the Bar."

He finished by saying:

"... with a long way the majority of the Bar, that judges of the High Court should not be called into the Court of Appeal and that the Court of Appeal should be made a stable institution to which people can look with respect and which should not be simply a scrap collection of judges got together to hear cases from time to time."

Twice the matter was referred to. When evidence was being taken before the Commission, the Chief Justice himself was examined. He said:

"My view is that the Court of Appeal ought to be kept separate and distinct. In the old days we had the other experience .... and it was never satisfactory. You have great difficulty if a judge in the Court of Appeal has to try a case in which there is an appeal from himself. You will then have to borrow another judge, so that it leads to great confusion. I am strongly of opinion that the Court of Appeal should be something separate and distinct."

The President of the High Court said the same thing. He said that, giving a personal opinion, he had the view that the Court of Appeal ought to be a Court of Appeal and that judges should not go elsewhere. What is the proposal here? What are these judges going to be? What is the reason for adding to the Supreme Court people who are clearly under this Bill going to be given High Court duty to do and only High Court duty in the main? Even the difficulty of nomenclature comes in. The Bill talks of the ordinary judges of the Supreme Court, presumably meaning those other than the Chief Justice, and then goes on to make a distinction between those members of the Supreme Court who are appointed at the date of the passing of this. Are we going to have a Supreme Court divided into Chief Justices, ordinary justices and very ordinary justices of the Supreme Court, or, using church language, are they going to be Supreme Court judges in partibus? When they go hiking around the country is the Supreme Court to be held up if there are important cases that require five judges? Are we to have a Supreme Court of five at all? Is it ever intended really that this Supreme Court of five should function?

Is this not only a pretence? The economy Party cannot face up to bringing in two High Court judges because there is no real reason for it, but having to join two sets of argument, one set relating to the Supreme Court—if it is proper in a country like this that your final court should consist of more than three minds—and that part of the argument swings in then to buttress up the rather weak case that can be made—a very weak case, indeed—with regard to extra appointments in the High Court. So we have this mixture—this business of the people who will not know from day to day whether they are High Court or Supreme Court judges, as far as their duties are concerned, people who will not know when they will be sitting on an appeal from a court which possibly they might have composed themselves, sitting in the other way, and with all the confusion which the Chief Justice specially referred to, the confusion which finally led the Committee to report that the Supreme Court ought to be kept apart and ought to consist of men who were brought up as lawyers, men trained to give decisions on points of law and not men who are having their attention and energies dissipated by travelling around the country and keeping their attention riveted on this matter of review of witnesses and demeanour and the taking of notes in these cases that will be heard down the country.

At any rate, there is a recommendation with regard to the Supreme Court. There is another recommendation with regard to the High Court and with regard to both these recommendations with that economy mind we are told that it was wrong to have appointments made notwithstanding that there was great weight of argument in their favour. It was wrong that these men should be appointed until the increased prosperity of the country warranted it, and until the volume of business in the Superior Courts urgently required it.

Deputy Little was the mover of that. Is Deputy Little impressed now with the increased prosperity of the country, and has he the figures which show that the volume of business in the Superior Courts urgently requires this change? When he has become satisfied on that, what about the latter part of this recommendation, which says: "If there are any changes to be made, they should be accompanied by a revision of salaries in the light of a comparative study of the salaries paid to judges of equal rank in other European countries, for instance, in France..."? That, incidentally, came from Deputy Little, who had sat, and, I hope, had listened to all the evidence that was given. So far as it was given in relation to French judges, it did not paint a very attractive picture. At any rate, there is the first big point. The Committee recommend a certain increase. Fianna Fáil objected to it and they now tell us they want it. They will not tell us what the cost is going to be but they apparently do not object to it. They do not tell us whether there is increased prosperity or anything about the volume of business or whether it urgently requires this change. They do not even tell us what business these new judges are going to deal with. That is the first point.

Secondly, we have this big matter of the rehearing. I interrupted Deputy Moore last night when he was speaking and when he indicated that his point of view in this matter was that only lawyers should think and speak about it. I have no experience as a lawyer sufficient to warrant me to speak on this, and I am speaking, more or less, with the point of view I formed as a layman about three years ago when I read all this voluminous evidence and read the opinions expressed by the Committee. I heard arguments about this for years and it is impossible to say what is the weight of opinion one way or the other. I do not suppose that really, in the end, one system is going to give any better satisfaction than the other, but I think that, at any rate, the situation should be made a little bit clearer than it is at the moment. The Committee recommend the rehearing. Did they recommend that simply? They recommended the rehearing by two judges going on assize and they recommended, or at least, they brought into the atmosphere of their recommendations one other very important matter.

Pretty nearly every witness who came before this Committee against rehearing used phrases something like this: that the system of taking these cases down the country and getting them heard with the witnesses paraded was an invitation to perjury. That phrase was used by the people who object to the rehearing. In the end, Deputy Wolfe who was, if I might say so without disrespect to the other members of the Joint Committee, the driving force so far as that Committee went, suggested, when the Chief Justice was giving his reasons to the Committee, that there was one way of preventing perjury, and that was that the stenographer's notes should be available for the second hearing, and the Chief Justice admitted that the notes of the stenographer would be helpful, and he added that that might hamper a man at the rehearing from telling a different story from that which he told on the first hearing.

There was the possibility that on the rehearing a man might tell a totally different story from that which he told on the first occasion, or there was the possibility that in the changed atmosphere he would tell more than he had told on the first hearing. The opinion of the High Court was that under such circumstances the notes of the stenographer, though available, would not prevent an increase in perjury and that what the Bill now proposes was definitely and clearly an invitation to perjury by witnesses on the rehearing. There is more than that to be said on this matter. This whole question of the rehearing has been talked of here as if the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, abstracted from the people of this country some right that they had from time immemorial—a right almost common to mankind.

Let us be clear about that. First of all, note the change. When the Courts of Justice Bill, 1924, was introduced, I understand from what I have read this afternoon that there was a system under which the County Court jurisdiction was, in the main, a £50 jurisdiction. This was increased to £300. There was some system of rehearing in relation to the £50 downwards. We are now insisting, for the first time in the history of this country, on a rehearing of all cases from £300 down to £50. That question was brought out before the Joint Committee, and it was stated that in relation to the £50 and downwards, no country in the world had such a rehearing and that this country was unique in that respect. How did that come about?

The Chief Justice was asked a question on that point and on page 317 of the Report of the Joint Committee on the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, he said that there were peculiar historical circumstances about it, that it had an historical basis which no longer exists. In the case of the £50 and downwards cases we used not to have a judicial hearing at all. The work was done under what was known as the system of the assistant barrister. These assistant barristers were sent across the country hearing these cases. The barrister was not a judge. Then it became clear that the people who suffered from the defects of that system had not had a judicial hearing at all. That matter of the rehearing arose so as to give them a judicial hearing because the rehearing that we have been talking about was the first judicial hearing.

The fact is, therefore, that in the circumstances, these £50 and downwards cases were put into a category apart from what obtained in any country in the world. They had no relation to that type of case of a judicial rehearing at all. We now say with regard to the £300 and downward cases that we are going to have a rehearing. I want to let the people who know the human beings who live around them realise what is going to happen on this rehearing of the £300 and downward cases. Everybody who faces up to the situation knows the litigant will appreciate that he has his right of appeal. He knows under the provisions of this Bill that that appeal is to take place in the local area with all the witnesses again paraded. Now, does anybody not believe, knowing the people amongst whom we live, that that appeal is not going to be followed by an increase in perjury? The witnesses and the people in the case are going to compare their own first story with the story that was put up against them by the other side. Undoubtedly, on rehearing there is going to be a change in the story told at the first hearing. The witness at the second hearing will be in a position, after comparing the evidence given at the first hearing, to add to his evidence. The Joint Committee recommended that the stenographer's notes should be made available. If these notes are available the witness will find that if he changes his evidence too much he will be caught out. In this Bill we are introducing two things, first, a sort of duplicity which will mean that the case was not fully presented the first time; that the main witness was withdrawn or that there was something kept up the sleeve; or that there was something not revealed, but kept over for the second hearing. The alternative plan to that may be to put your case best at first, but to do yourself up better for the rehearing. That rehearing with all the historical circumstances ought to be considered.

I am told and told in the most emphatic way that the people down the country want this rehearing. That is what we are told. I do not know that they know why they are asking for it. Neither do I know that the people who are voting for it realise that we are not going back to the old system. But we are going back to the £50 downwards system, and we are making a complete change and a break as far as other cases are concerned. That is to be viewed in the general tendency of this Bill, which is towards decentralisation —more work for the Circuit Courts.

The Chief Justice was asked about this and in reply to the question:

"Where else did a rehearing take place?"

replied:—

"So far as I know, practically nowhere does an appeal on the credibility of witnesses exist. Take, for instance, the County Court in England which has a jurisdiction of £100. There is no appeal on fact there. There is only appeal on law."

Let us take the English system. It is amazing that the English never tried out the system of rehearing on their own people. It was tried out here. They did not like it afterwards and they never applied it to themselves. They have this compulsory jurisdiction up to £100. They have, by consent, of course, a vastly bigger jurisdiction and there are figures in the possession of the Government Departments which show the amazing use that is made of the Circuit Court jurisdiction in England, in which men of reputed standing in the commercial and business world bring cases far beyond that amount into the County Courts; and they do that with the knowledge that they have no appeal except in point of law. There you have a big community with a better commercial aptitude than we have and they go into their own courts with compulsory jurisdiction of £100, and they do that with the knowledge that the only appeal against the decision arrived at is an appeal, not on a question of fact but on a question of law. And yet we must have here this appeal on all cases now within the Circuit Court jurisdiction.

There is one on the point to which the Chief Justice referred. Talking of the rehearing, he said at one point—I cannot get the quotation at the moment—that the verdicts of the judges of assize were of very little importance in this country. He says at one point in the evidence that the verdict of a judge of assize, a judge going out on this old type of rehearing, was regarded as of so little value that nobody ventured to quote it as an authority. That, apparently, is what was thought of the system of rehearing. What has been the experience of the men who lived through that work? The President of the High Court gave any amount of evidence in the matter, and his view was that you had these men going out from the High Court in Dublin, that they were pervaded by a spirit of restlessness from the moment they went out until they got back, that they knew the High Court business was getting into arrear and their whole attention was riveted on the days they had to be out and keeping their programme scheduled so that they did not spend one extra hour in a country town. Their attention was riveted on what they had scheduled themselves to when they started. The President of the High Court went to the point of saying this. He asserted that it could be said of the Munster Circuit that the only town in which there was even a proper hearing while on assize was the last town of the circuit, because there the judge knew he was then up to his programme; he had so many days before he would have to go back to Dublin and, in the main, he was able to fit in cases. But in every other town there was always the fear of a day added on which would have to be taken off somewhere else; there was always the fear that days would have to be added on and the period he had allocated for himself would not be sufficient. Apart from the way a man's mentality was affected by the thing, the spirit of restlessness pervaded and there was definitely an unsatisfactory system with regard to this rehearing.

On page 355 of the evidence given before the Committee the President of the High Court says:

"My view of the hearing of appeals that went under the old system is certainly not such as would make me recommend that system for the hearing of appeals to any tribunal at present. If I may say so, there is a certain amount of halo cast about the old system of appeals. My own experience was nearly always a sense of dissatisfaction with the hearing of appeals on circuit. I think there was a tendency in all towns except the last town of the circuit, where the judge had unlimited time, to rush through cases and cases were rushed through in all the towns except the last town of the circuit."

Then he talks about whether the work was generally done from the angle of the pleader. The President, who had experience on circuit, condemned this system that the Government are deciding to go back to. Why the Executive Council have taken this decision, I do not know. It has not been explained here.

Let us assume that the decision has been taken to get back and we are going to go out on circuit and the old assize business is to restart. What type of assize hearing is there going to be? The attitude of the Committee was in the direction of two judges. Reading through their evidence, the way in which they thought that the tendency to perjury could be stopped was by having the notes as well as by having the witnesses again. We are doing away with the notes so far as this type of case is concerned; we are just going to have the witnesses. The invitation to perjury is now open. If one reads the evidence given here, as far as efficiency is concerned, there was very little contradiction of the point of view of the Chief Justice and the President. There was plenty of contradiction from the aspect that people wanted the other system, that people were dissatisfied with getting a verdict in their absence. The procedure was that the appeal came to town, and 18 months afterwards the parties were simply told by the solicitor "We have lost" or "We have won." We are told that is unsatisfactory, yet there is any amount of evidence that the people down the country want this. But why do they want it?

Let us go a bit deeper into that. It was said they wanted it because it was going to make for speedier justice; you were going to get to the end of a case more quickly, and they were told on the Committee that the whole system was going to be cheaper. Let me take the point about cheapness first. There is a peculiarity observed sometimes in the case of commissions. It is asserted that a comment made by an early witness colours everything. An early witness came before this Commission and made a statement that then, as a layman, I thought was peculiar. When I heard the comments of some people at the law I realised it was not merely peculiar but ludicrous. The statement was made before this Committee that you would get senior counsel travelling on assize who now demand 20 and 25 guineas for a special case down the country, going out again and accepting two or three guineas on a brief. I remember when the Chief Justice heard of it in evidence afterwards he said: "Who said that?" and he was told a counsel said it. His next astonished and perplexed remark was: "Was it a senior counsel?" and when he was told it was, he stopped talking. But a senior counsel did say that.

I wonder if anybody who has any experience of the present system as opposed to the old, believes that counsel are going to go out again? There is no doubt the man who gets a special fee for an individual case, if he goes out on assize, will take something less, but anything like the idea of five or eight guineas on cases at assizes, and getting the best man for that, the man now rated at the other point, is ludicrous, and yet that is in the background, in the atmosphere, of this whole recommendation.

With regard to speed, I take this report and I find that in the year 1932-33 a certain number of appeals were heard in the High Court. What number of appeals, so to speak, originated in that year. I cannot say; the information is not here, but I am sure it must be available somewhere. But if what was the rule at the time the Committee met was still the situation with regard to those appeals in 1932-33, then this emerges, that the High Court in that year heard a number of cases which not merely included all the cases that originated in that year, but one hundred more. It, therefore, appears that in 1932-33 the High Court had got to the point of knocking off all the appeals that originated in a particular year. They had heard over three hundred cases. At the time the Committee met, according to the Vice-Chairman of it, the appeals were accumulating, were rolling in at the rate of 200 a year. Suppose the High Court had got to the point where they were dealing with a number of cases sufficient to include all that originated in a particular year, and 100 arrears, if the 1932-33 rate of progress was kept up in 1933-34 the arrears would have been wiped out. The High Court was in a position to hear and determine within the year every appeal that originated within the year. If that is the case, the argument of urgency has very little in it.

Surely in this small community we have to balance these considerations of speed against considerations of cost. Again, we are baulked by the fact that no figures have been given by the Government, and we do not know what the cost of this will be. We can simply see that there are two new judges to be appointed. We know what that is going to cost; but I take it that that is a very small part indeed of the cost that the new Bill will entail on the community. There will be judges going out on circuit and there are judges' servants still to be appointed; judges' travelling expenses will have to be met, as well as the travelling expenses of the servants of the judges. The £6,000 that will go in salary is going to be a very small part indeed of the extra cost of this to the community. We ought to have some idea of the cost to balance against whatever is the consideration of urgency with regard to the appeals.

Somebody has referred to the matter already and I want to say this briefly. In 1923 a Commission was set up to consider the whole question of courts of justice in the country. They were asked to approach the matters referred to them untrammeled by any regard to any of the existing systems of judicature in the country, to examine the nature and classification of the legal business, both contentious and non-contentious, for the due discharge of which in the interests of justice, machinery and establishment should be provided by the State and to consider and report upon the requirements of the litigants and other persons interested, and especially as to accessibility, efficiency, expedition and cost. That was the finale of a letter written by the then President who first of all directed attention to the fact that nothing had impressed itself more on the minds of our people as a standing monument of alien government than the system, the machinery, and the administration of law and justice, which we got over. That Committee was composed of 12 people, two of whom could be regarded as belonging to the old regime and who were judges. There were also six persons who are now judges—the present Chief Justice; the present President of the High Court, three judges of the High Court, a Senior Circuit Court judge in Dublin and a district justice. There were also two members of the legal profession and a representative of the commercial community. Unanimously they brought in a recommendation in favour of a new Circuit Court system and in favour of a rehearing on stenographer's notes. It cannot be said that that group of six had any enthusiasm for the old system. Three of them were chosen because they had been associated with the Dáil courts. The majority of them were in sympathy with the movement that allowed for the establishment of the Dáil courts. Unanimously they recommended against the old £50 civil bill appeal and rehearing and unanimously reported in favour of the system of stenographer's notes.

We are now going back upon that and we are going back upon it pretending to found ourselves on the report of a Committee which recommended that we should go back to a rehearing on appeal by two judges and an appeal apparently on the notes. We are going back simply to one judge and we are wiping out the notes. We are told we are going to have a cheaper system. So that whenever the question of cheapness entered into the consideration of these people it was founded upon what would be regarded as the mistaken idea that apparently counsel's costs were thought to be the big item in this matter and that these costs were certainly going to go down. We have the ominous warning to the people in a particular section that court fees are going to be increased. If the consideration of cheapness has gone, it seems to me, and I do not approach this from the professional angle at all, that if there is no great question of urgency arising, no case has yet been made for departing from that unanimous recommendation and taking up something midway between the recommendation of the Committee of 1929 and something else that has emerged from the brains of the Government.

The third point, an amazing point to have raised in a measure like this, is this whole question of stenographer's notes. That was referred to often before. Again, I go back to the time when the Courts of Justice Act was going through the Dáil in 1923. The present Chief Justice, who was then Attorney-General, speaking definitely on this matter of stenographer's notes, as reported in columns 458 and 459, Volume 5, of the Official Reports, talked about Civil Bill appeals and the ordinary County Court cases up to £50, and then said:

"The other cases, the cases which are now heard by the High Court, between the limits of £50 and £300 in value, which are commonly called Records, formerly were tried in a great hurry by the judge of Assize, or tried in Dublin. In these cases the existing manner of appeal is an appeal on judges' notes, not an appeal by a rehearing of the witnesses, and every member of the Bar in this country has been greatly impressed by the great drawbacks that attend a hearing on judges' notes."

I stress this because in this Bill we are going back in certain cases to a rehearing on judges' notes. Here is the Chief Justice's attitude on that:

"Either the judge takes very elaborate notes, lengthy notes, which prevent him having that acute observation of witnesses of which Deputy Bryan Cooper speaks, or he takes inadequate notes, and the result has been that there has been for years a demand in all the courts here to have a stenographic report of the evidence as they have had in England for a very considerable time."

Several times later that was raised. That was in October, 1923. I get a peculiar verification from England of what the then Attorney-General said in 1923. I find a report in the English press of 14th February in which the Lord Chief Justice of England opening certain courts said this:

"Those who know anything of the work of the Court of Criminal Appeal are well aware that it simply could not exist without the help of a competent shorthand-writer in every trial or indictment; those who know the work of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division do not need to be told that the shorthand note is quite indispensable; and those who, at Nisi Prius, spend their lives writing down to dictation the copious evidence of a cloud of witnesses are unable to understand why their time and their attention cannot be saved by recourse to the same simple expedient. It is not merely a question of time. Nobody, I am satisfied, can attend adequately to the progress and development of a case if he is laboriously occupied in taking in longhand a full note of what is being said in the witness box. In my humble opinion, the thing is ludicrous."

This shows the difference:—

"A judge is able, without much difficulty, to record briefly, for the purpose of his judgment or his summing-up, the handful of dates and documents, of figures and phrases, which really count in a case. But, as the matter stands, a judge finds it to be his duty to take a full note of a mass of chatter in 20 cases because one of them might, conceivably, go to appeal. In other words, he wastes time, energy and, therefore, public money in discharging the mere task of a capable amanuensis."

That is a man who is complaining that they have not in England a system which we got here in 1924. In 1935 we propose to go back, for certain cases, to the system which the Chief Justice in England describes as ludicrous, and which our Chief Justice, when Attorney-General in 1923, described as making the hearing of cases completely impossible. Why is it being done? It is not on the report of the Committee, because the Committee recommended, not merely the keeping of the notes but recommended that even on a rehearing the notes should be there as an additional point on which to lean. Evidently swayed by the evidence of the Chief Justice when he spoke before them they accepted his contention and put in a recommendation that shorthand note-takers should be supplied, even to the Supreme Court, so that the judgments might be taken down properly and made available at once for members of the Bar and for the public. We are simply told by the Attorney-General that this is happening and we have not been told why. We propose to depart from the present situation in this matter—a good situation brought about by the 1924 Act. We propose to depart from it in the hearing of Circuit Court actions tried with a jury. We are going to go, in those cases, on what the Chief Justice in England described as inadequate notes, and what the Chief Justice of our country described as being, probably, inadequate notes, or if they were not inadequate notes they were notes whose adequacy had been gained at the expense of the energy and time of the judge on the first hearing. When he should have been keeping a watch on the demeanour of witnesses and other matters he had to be occupied with his notes. There is no reason given to us why this should take place.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

That system obtains in the High Court at the moment, with the exception of the two Chancery judges.

Comment on this

Why not extend it?

Comment on this

What system?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The system of the judges taking notes.

Comment on this

But the system of the stenographer taking notes is also in the Chancery Courts.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I am merely drawing the Deputy's attention to the fact that it was never extended to the other judges of the High Court.

Comment on this

What was not extended?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The system which allowed High Court judges to take notes has continued in the High Court despite all that has been said against it.

Comment on this

I do not know what is meant by talk of allowing High Court judges to take notes.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

For ten years there has been no change made with regard to the obligation on the High Court judges to record evidence by taking notes themselves, unless there is an agreement between the parties to supply a stenographer.

Comment on this

This is the time to do it.

Comment on this

One of the valuable things which the present Chief Justice referred to when talking of the courts system, and the change which had been brought in, was this: he said:

"We will not merely have a complete record of what witnesses say but a complete record of the judge's charge."

How are you to get the judge's charge if there is no stenographer, and if the judge is giving the charge in relation to his own notes?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I am merely drawing the Deputy's attention to the fact that that system has existed for ten years in the High Court.

Comment on this

But what are we doing? We are now going back and making this business in relation to the judge's notes the rule. We had gone away from that. We had achieved, with everybody's consent in 1924, a big change—a change which the Chief Justice in England wants at the present moment.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Only in the Circuit Court.

Comment on this

When there is apparently everywhere a tendency towards the development of stenographers' notes we go back on it in regard to Circuit Court appeals where there is a jury in the case. Why is it done? It is not because the Committee recommended it, because the Committee did not recommend it. They recommended quite the reverse. That is entirely without regard to this other sympathetic matter of the fact that having trained up certain people and having had them occupied at this work, we now propose to put them out, making no allowance for their services up to date, and without any question of compensation for them.

A matter which has not yet been stressed, and which I think is worth stressing at this point, is that there is in one section of this Bill a definite signpost, and in the Bill generally there is a tendency towards an increase of Circuit Court jurisdiction. There is a section here—I will be told it is an old practice—which says that on remitted cases an award can be made above the ordinary Circuit Court limit. I am wondering what the repercussion of that is going to be on the remitting of cases generally. Deputy McMenamin has referred to the standard which judges have at the moment when an application is made to remit an action. I do not think he stressed that standard in a sufficient way. As I understand the test it is this: the application of the judge's mind is simply to one point, namely, "Would a verdict for more than £300 be set aside as unreasonable and excessive"? Unless he can say that that is so the action is retained in the High Court. Now that test certainly goes, to a big extent. It may be said that notionally you still have the idea that £300 is the Circuit Court limit, but on a remitted action you are empowering the Circuit Court to deal with a matter which goes well beyond that amount.

I do not know if for the future the old test will apply, but I take what the Attorney-General said in relation to the phrase in the report as meaning that for the future consideration is to be not whether the matter is proper to be tried in the High Court but whether the matter should not be tried in the Circuit Court. Where does that come from? Any number of people were questioned about the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Any number of people were asked whether they liked the change which had taken place between £50 and £300. Some people said they liked it. The majority of them said that had they been asked to give evidence on it before it had been accomplished they would have thought that £300 was too high. Nobody who read the evidence given before that Commission could say that there was the slightest tendency observable on the part of the majority of the witnesses to increase Circuit Court jurisdiction. Yet I think—I may be wrong in my opinion—that it emerges from this Bill that there is a definite urge towards driving more business to the Circuit Court. Surely some argument should be used to the House when asking people to accept a Bill which has in it that tendency.

District justices come into one section of this Bill. Apparently the Attorney-General is of the opinion that, as between what is proposed in the Bill and what is the present situation, the proposal in the Bill is preferable. In this country we have a written constitution, and in that written constitution we establish the judges as a whole in a definitely independent position, and we give the higher courts control of constitutional matters. Right down through the whole list of the judges in 1924 there was a big argument on this matter of independence. I think the biggest argument which took place on the whole 1924 Act was in relation to what was regarded as an attempt by the then Government to break in on the independence of the judiciary. That arose through this matter of the rules. With regard to the rules for the District Court the Minister was going to be the authority, assisted by, but not with the concurrence of, a particular group of people. That caused a flare. There was another point about the judges' salaries and where they were to be charged, but in the main the attention of the Dáil and Seanad was then directed to this question of the independence of the judiciary, and the main argument arose in relation to the district justices.

We have a provision at the moment that no district justice can be removed save for incapacity, physical or mental infirmity, misbehaviour in office or misconduct. These are the only reasons for which a district justice can be removed. He is removed, then, from office, but any of these things—incapacity, physical or mental infirmity, misbehaviour in office or misconduct— has to be certified under the hands of the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice. Section 49 is to replace this. Section 49 opens briefly. It has what Deputy Costello called a speciousness about it which attracts, because instead of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General you have a committee—the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General. But immediately your suspicions are aroused, because they are described as an advisory committee and you begin to wonder who has the power and then the meaning of the section begins to develop. First of all who calls the advisory committee into action? The Minister for Justice. The Minister for Justice may at any time, and he may on his own motion, or he may in consequence of complaints made to him, refer to the advisory committee "the question of the fitness of any particular justice of the District Court to continue to hold his office having regard to his mental or physical health or his conduct (whether in the execution of his office or otherwise) generally or on a particular occasion or any other relevant matter."

Now let us take that as the beginnings of the exercise of executive authority over a judge. Section 73 of the Act allows removal, but it is only for incapacity, for physical or mental infirmity, for misbehaviour in office or for misconduct and, for any of these things, there must be a certificate of both the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General. Take the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 49 alone. The Minister refers. He can do it as often as he likes. He can do it on his own motion; he can do it on foot of complaints, or for any reason that strikes him. He can persecute a district justice if he wants to. I am not speaking of what is likely to happen but of the possibility. He can persecute a district justice by getting his conduct always brought forward for investigation and he can have different reasons, or a variety of reasons over a number of times, or at the same time. "His mental or physical health." We had that before. "His conduct, whether in the execution of his office or otherwise." Then "His conduct generally or on a particular occasion." Finally, as if that were not sufficient, the Minister can refer the question of the removal of a district justice to this advisory committee for "any other matter." Surely there should be an explanation of what is intended to be encompassed by that particular phrase. Have cases occurred which were not of misconduct or misbehaviour, and does the Government think—I take the phrase of the Attorney-General—that "the Government should have another course open to it"?

Supposing the advisory committee is properly asked to advise the Government, they may report in a variety of ways according to sub-section (3)—that no action be taken, that the justice be censured, that the justice be transferred, that the justice be removed from office on account of mental or physical infirmity or that he be removed on account of misconduct. As far as I can make out, reading this, the only recommendation of the committee which the Minister for Justice shall carry out is that in regard to censure. Sub-section (5) states that when the advisory committee recommends that a justice of the District Court should be censured "the Minister for Justice shall communicate such censure in writing to such justice." On no other recommendation of the advisory committee need the Minister for Justice or the Executive Council—because they vary up and down through the section— take action. They may do whatever they please. They can do more than the committee recommends or they need not do what the committee recommends.

This has got to be viewed from two angles—first of all, the persecution of a district justice who is doing things— let us take politics immediately—that are displeasing to the Government, who view his actions through political spectacles. Or let us take the case of a district justice who is doing things which are displeasing to the community as a whole, but about which the Government do not bother because his actions are in accordance with their political views. As we have it in Section 73 of the Act, two people come down on him—the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General. As we have it in the proposal in the Bill, there is an advisory committee to which a reference is made, and then the Government can do whatever they like in the sense that they need not accept any of the recommendations of the advisory committee, save that in regard to censure, and the censure may be sent in writing. There is no public notice that the district justice is to be censured. Is it to be considered that that section, analysed as it has been, is a good and proper substitute for Section 73 of the Act in the minds of people who want to see the justices independent?

There has been too much attention entirely applied to the persecution of a district justice for things he is doing which the Government dislikes, but I want the other case considered — the case of the man who should be censured and who should be removed, and who is going to let off, or left alone, because what he is doing is in accordance with the particular political views of a Government at a particular time. Take one standard only. If there is going to be independence of the judiciary, would it not be far better to have a single movement of the advisory committee—the findings of the advisory committee and the carrying out of these findings reposed entirely in the hands of a body completely independent of the Government? If there has to be some link-up with this House, as the House that, in the end, governs judges as well as everything else, let it be through a report, to be made by the Minister, of what the committee has recommended and achieved in relation to a particular justice. If there is to be any modification made in Section 73, it should be by the replacement of the Attorney-General by the President of the High Court, so as to leave it entirely in the hands of the Chief of the Courts, and the man who is, so to speak, second in control of the courts, that they should keep an eye on the conduct of those people who are themselves in the inferior courts, and that they alone should have the power to censure, remove from office, or transfer a district justice.

It is clear that there must be some hold finally over district justices as well as over all other judges. In that matter we used to have it that a vote of both Houses, for stated reasons— and only for stated reasons—meant removal from office. Unless there has been something happening more than the public is aware of, which makes it necessary for the Government to take this middle line, which was the Attorney-General's phrase—that the Government must have some middle line—unless there is a better case to be made than merely a vague reference to district justices and indiscreet talk, I think this section ought to be completely abolished, not that Section 73 should be left as it is. If there is any change in Section 73, it ought to remove any touch by the Attorney-General in the matter, or if thought necessary, leave him there and add the President of the High Court or a committee of three, or a majority completely divorced from the Executive Government. It may be said that district justices are first of all more numerous and do not require the same experience in the way of legal training as judges in the other courts. It may be said that they are more in contact with the people, and if I may say so with respect, are more vulgarised, that they are subject to more temptation in the way of indiscretion. Their conduct for ten or 11 years is the answer to that. There can be nothing said about them as a body.

Supposing that this is the thin end of the wedge, to be slipped in here, why should not there be something else later? Is there not a good reason for some one later saying: "We want the middle course with regard to the Circuit judges." Are we eventually to have the position that we will want a hold over all the judges in the way of asking committees to report upon their conduct? Remember it is in relation to their office they are to report finally as to their conduct and on any other relevant matter. I do not say that this is the reason for this being put in. But supposing someone wanted to get complete control over the judges and the courts, could he ask for anything better than to get power to make this frequent reference in relation to the conduct of any judge? It is the small things that count at the beginning. I do not suppose, if this is passed, that it is going to operate immediately to the detriment of any district justice. But it is a bad thing to have this breach made. The appetite grows by what it feeds on. Someone may consider that there has been an indiscretion and immediately the middle course is there, to get some advisory body. The mere fact of being able to make frequent reference to it with the knowledge of what it is going to lead to is certainly going to harm him in his work, and is not going to aid him in the eyes of the people or the litigants who go to the courts. We have had no reason given for this, except the veiled phrase used about some small indiscretion supposed to have been committed or that was hinted at by the Attorney-General.

There are two other matters of minor importance, but both show the tendency. I referred to one of them already. I take it that the system of justice is going to be increased in cost and that fees are going to be raised. Can we have any information as to how much, because calculations were made as to what amount the courts cost the people? What proportion of the cost is borne by the litigants? Can we have any information on the important point, as to how far the increase in court fees is going to go towards meeting the full cost?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I think the figure is 23 per cent.

Comment on this

Borne by fees? What percentage is proposed to be borne in future? That is the important point. I want to know if the fees are going to be up by 50 per cent. Are they going to be doubled or what is going to happen? It must be aggregated. Certainly there should be some indication of what is meant by this section. While we are on that point, can we hear the increased charges that are going to be put on, either on the taxpayers or the litigants, by this measure? In other words, what is going to be the cost, between travelling expenses, and salaries of the Courts of Justice Bill?

Majority verdict has been talked of, the principle of majority verdict, or the verdict of the unanimous jury. Again we have to go elsewhere. What countries have the system of 12 jurors and majority verdict? How many countries have not that system? Is it so widespread a practice that you are elevating it higher, and saying it is a principle of justice? If so, what is the principle? Is it unanimity? If you have a jury of 12, 15, or nine, do you want all the 12, the 15 or the nine to combine in saying "Guilty" or "Not Guilty"? Do you want the weight of opinion, and that it would not matter if the jury was 12 if you got nine, or if the jury was 15 if you got 12? Is objection being taken to having only nine, or having only a certain proportion of the people who heard the case? Is there to be any discrimination inside the jury room in whatever number you have, someone saying "guilty," someone saying "innocent," and someone saying "the case is not proved"? Are you going to insist on this both with regard to innocence and with regard to guilt?

There should be some fraction of the number, up and down, in which majority verdict is clear. Are you going to have any other repercussions when you have a small number not of the opinion that a man is innocent but that there should be a retrial? That gets us to the point of acquittal again. Who in this House is able to say that 12 unanimous people are a good jury and give a good verdict; that 12 out of 15 are not; or that nine unanimous people out of 12 are not? Where is the principle in it? There is only one thing to be said about this proposal. That is the phrase Deputy Costello used, and that Deputy Geoghegan followed on, that this has been introduced into a permanent court of justice measure; that it is not being introduced as a measure for a temporary period dealing with the intimidation of jurors. It is not being introduced after men have been slaughtered and men wounded. It has been introduced without any argument except what the Attorney-General said, that personally he was not wedded to it, and he doubted if the Government was. Yet it is proposed. As far as I am concerned, I take the nine out of the 12, or I will take 12 out of 15. I have little experience in this matter, but people who have experience told us of their experience and of how cases ran. Let it be put in on more than experience and if a change is to be made let a case be made for the change. If the change is to be made permanently, let a case be made for it. I remember that when this was first introduced it was brought in because of the killing of a juryman and the wounding of another, and as far as this particular part was referred to, it was referred to in that context all the time: that if the intimidation of juries was going to become the normal practice in this country then in a permanent court of justice measure a case could be made for having a majority verdict instead of an unanimous verdict. I hope that is not going to be the case. Unless someone here is bold enough to say that he believes and fears that it is going to be the case, then there is not the same excuse as there was for having that majority verdict previously. I remember that when it was introduced before it was regarded as the greatest engine of coercion and oppression that ever was thought of.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Did the Deputy read Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's speech on it?

Comment on this

I read it last night to refresh my memory, and if the Attorney-General has in mind the Deputy's references to the age of Justinian and the rest, I know it all. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's speech was perfectly sound. The proposal at that time was objected to on a point of principle by President de Valera, in a two-hour speech, during which he recited for us every Coercion Act that had been passed in relation to this country since 1800.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

May I read a sentence from Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's speech on that occasion?

Comment on this

Certainly.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

"If nine sensible, ordinary citizens are of opinion that a man is guilty, surely that ought to be sufficient."

Comment on this

If I had not thought it was a general principle, a general rule, I certainly would have accepted it as a way of meeting a situation in which people were going to be shot at, because once a man was found guilty every man in that jury was known to have assisted in finding him guilty. At the time that proposal was regarded as a fearful weapon of oppression. The President recited for the House all the Coercion Acts that had been passed since 1800, winding up with the Juries Protection Act. Now we get a Bill emanating from the Executive Council, of which he is the head, which contains this infamous proposal, and there is no argument with regard to the killing of jurymen or the intimidation of jurors. Therefore, the only thing that we can think of is that the coercion spirit is an infectious matter.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It began with you.

Comment on this

It is alleged to be ours. Where is it gone now? Take all the Coercion Acts from 1800. What did the President do since he came into office with regard to coercion? He re-established one group described by the Minister for Finance as the Executive Council's bloodhounds. In addition, he tried to bring in the vilest coercion measure that ever was attempted in this country, the passage of which was only blocked by the Seanad.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

What Bill?

Comment on this

The Blueshirt Bill.

Comment on this

Not permanently blocked.

Comment on this

Possibly, and coercion will have its day: a bigger day. We know, of course, that the Minister can say that without feeling that there is any lack of principle in his conduct or in his illogicality. The Minister who barked and foamed about the bloodhounds of the Executive Council now has them and operates them, and the Minister still hopes that the coercion measure against the Blueshirts is not permanently blocked. He will probably tell us, referring to his own conduct on the 1929 measure, that he was sound in what he said and that his actions were proper! They would be sound and proper in voting against this proposal. Let us see one member of the Executive Council who is in favour of this proposal? Surely some man must have been found to raise his voice for it in the Executive Council.

Comment on this

The vote was by ballot.

Comment on this

If there is such a tremendous appreciation amongst the Executive Council of two things—trial by jury and unanimity—can they explain their attitude in regard to the Military Tribunal where there is no jury and not necessarily unanimity?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The Military Tribunal does not arise on this Bill.

Comment on this

I submit it does by analogy. Where is the jury?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

We are not discussing the Military Tribunal. The Act under which it was set up has already been passed.

Comment on this

I apologise for mentioning the Military Tribunal. Will the Executive Council think it fair to stand over any body that holds criminal trials without a jury and in which unanimity is not the rule? What would they think of establishing a new body, not the Military Tribunal, and of having people paraded for trial before it without a jury and having the decision of two out of a court of three the rule? If they are in favour of that, why all this nonsense and all the talk in 1929 about trial by jury and of the unanimous verdict of 12 people as being the only real way in which you could properly say that a criminal was brought to justice? It is too much to expect logic and too much to expect principle from some people, but really there are bounds, and when you are considering such a matter as this, which was elevated in 1929 to the region of principle, and it is now proposed to break it, surely some one man, whoever be that timid cowering creature in the Executive Council who thought of this ought to parade himself and tell us why he voted for it, and how he got a reluctant Attorney-General and apparently a defiant Minister for Finance to allow this to make its appearance even in a Bill. Surely that requires an explanation.

The last thing that I want to say of the measure is that it is to take its place in the scheme of things in regard to the judiciary in the country. In 1924 a certain judicial system was set up in the country which was enveloped in the Constitution. It is now proposed without great argument to make considerable changes. We are going to have people appointed to the Supreme Court who, in the main, are not going to be Supreme Court judges. They are going to do High Court work and they are going to be out through the country for the greater part of their period. Are these men going to be appointed without any security, or are they going to be appointed as the old judges were with this security: that, except for incapacity or misconduct and on a vote of the two Houses, they cannot be removed? Are the men who are going to be offered Supreme Court posts going to have it put bluntly to them that a political majority in one House can get them shifted from office the moment that political majority likes to operate that power? That is the position.

Comment on this

Nonsense.

Comment on this

Does the Deputy not believe it?

Comment on this

Does the Deputy believe it?

Comment on this

I am not saying what is likely to happen. I am saying what can happen. If the Deputy does not believe that is the law he can ask the Attorney-General.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It is not the law.

Comment on this

What is the law? I stated the law to be this: that there is a Bill which may become an Act one of these days, and that is a pious resolution in it; that before something happens a particular resolution by a particular majority must be passed, and that a simple majority can repeal that Bill. Is not that the situation?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I disagree with that, as I did at the time the Deputy made the point before. Is it not provided that that particular amendment of the Constitution cannot be amended itself save by the same majority? We will not argue it.

Comment on this

Indeed we will argue it. What is to prevent a simple majority repealing that Bill?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The provision in it.

Comment on this

And if the Bill disappears the provision disappears.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

But it cannot disappear save by that majority.

Comment on this

At any rate, Deputy Donnelly will know where he is now.

Comment on this

What about Deputy McGilligan's Corporative State overthrowing the whole of this system without any voting?

Comment on this

I have no Corporative State as yet.

Comment on this

You almost had.

Comment on this

Not of the nightmare type with which you scared yourself.

Comment on this

The nightmare type of the General.

Comment on this

We have our own views.

Comment on this

Deputy McGilligan was scared about that.

Comment on this

There were more people scared than Deputy Norton. To come back to the Bill, that, I assert, is the situation. We can get it argued relevantly in Committee in relation to the district justices. There is a provision in the Constitution at present by which a simple majority of the House can repeal a particular pious resolution. The moment that is done, the simple majority can deal with the judges.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I disagree.

Comment on this

Will the Attorney-General take office as a judge, with a belief in his security, on the strength of that resolution?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Certainly.

Comment on this

And will he have no complaint to make afterwards if removed by a political majority?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I shall not say that.

Comment on this

That is the position to which we have got. It is appropriate, at any rate, to have that thought around the discussion of this measure. We are changing the courts of justice, to a certain extent. I think that we are changing them for the worse, but that is a personal opinion. I speak for no group. We are going to appoint people to perform duties which are not detailed and thus place them in an impossible position. We are going to mix up the Supreme Court and the High Court and we are going to do away with a system which the Chief Justice and other lawyers of repute insisted upon. We are to go back to a system which was limited to £50 cases and to apply that system to the whole jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. We are going to establish that system, unique amongst the nations of the world, because of little historical circumstances that affected only £50 cases. We are doing that in the teeth of evidence of men learned and experienced in the whole matter to the effect that it will open the way to greater perjury. In this Bill we have omitted the only possible impediment suggested to—not a complete safeguard against—the extension of perjury. We are doing that while at the same time we are reducing the courts, which we built up on an independent basis, giving them power governing the Constitution, to a situation in which a political majority of one can fire out of office not merely the new appointments but every man who sits on the Bench without any reason, because the law states that a judge shall be removable only for incapacity or misconduct and that can be changed by the same political majority of one. That is what the courts are being brought to by the economy Government which now, without any reason, brings in this measure which is going to burthen the country with an undisclosed amount of expenditure. Not a single argument has been put up by the Attorney-General as to why these changes should be made. We have been told what the changes are, but in this Assembly, which is supposed to be a deliberative assembly where reason meets reason, the Attorney-General has used no argument in support of the proposals put forward.

Comment on this
Seán MacEntee Minister for Finance (Mr. MacEntee) Fianna Fáil

Having listened to Deputy McGilligan on the majority verdict, I feel, looking across at him, as a humble Hebrew might have felt when he looked at Moses after he had come down from the Mount with the light of sanctity glorifying his countenance. He reminds me also of the old adage: "When the devil is ill, the devil a saint would be." Deputy McGilligan, when in opposition, feels, like Deputy Cosgrave, that there is something to be said for the unanimous verdict of twelve good men and true, to use the description applied by Deputy Dillon last night. Of course, with Deputy McGilligan this is not a matter of principle. He says that there has been far too much talk about principle in respect of the majority verdict. I thought he was going to argue it as a matter of principle, but he said he "would like to know who in this House was bold enough to say that nine out of twelve jurors could return a good and valid verdict?" Deputy McGilligan said it Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney said it. Deputy Bennett said it. Every member of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party, who was on this side of the House in 1929, said it.

Comment on this

The Minister for Finance misheard Deputy McGilligan. He asked who in this House would be bold enough to say they could not.

Comment on this

I am sorry I misheard the Deputy, but Deputy Dillon is bold enough to say they could not. I remember the peroration of Deputy Dillon's speech last night. He said:

"Sweep away this proposal for majority verdicts and give us back the unanimous verdict of 12 good men and true."

Comment on this

He could only say that because he would be bold enough to say that a verdict of nine men out of twelve would not be a good verdict.

Comment on this

If the Minister would read my speech, he would see what I did say.

Comment on this