Courts of Justice Bill, 1934—Second Stage (resumed).
Contributions 96–195 of 195. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 50 of 1934 ›
Otherwise, I should be compelled to conclude that Deputy Dillon's opposition to this measure is not sincere and whole-hearted. I should not like to rank the Deputy so low in my good opinion as that.
Comment on this
In the circumstances of the present time, I do. I voted against this proposal originally, but I was coerced into doing that by the fact that insufficient time was given to the House in 1929 to consider the Jurors' Protection Bill. That measure was passed here under closure, and only certain amendments were allowed to be debated in this House. I did speak in favour of an amendment requiring a unanimous verdict on the capital charge for in a case where human life is at stake. I still think, and I hope that the House will be given an opportunity of expressing a similar opinion, that is, that a unanimous verdict should be required in these cases, but, in the majority of civil cases and in the majority of criminal cases, too, I think that if nine men agree in the conviction of a prisoner, they are in position to return a perfectly good verdict.
Comment on this
This is a point on which there may be a difference of opinion, not a difference in regard to principle, but as to the most effective course. I do say that, in the circumstances of the time, when it is so difficult to secure convictions in criminal cases and when it is not the desire to have recourse to special tribunals, we should be satisfied with a verdict of nine men out of 12. Deputy McGilligan asked if there were any instances of intimidation. Deputy Corry, speaking on this Bill last night, cited cases in which there must have been the most barefaced intimidation of jurors in court—instances in which employers and their employees were brought up on the same charges, and in which the employers were found not guilty and the men coerced by them were found guilty. Nobody is going to tell me that the juries in that case were not interfered with.
Comment on this
It was remarkable— so remarkable that the judge commented on it and said that only the labourers had been found guilty and that the prisoners who were farmers were allowed to go scot free. Nobody is going to tell me that, where the charge was based on alleged interference with the sheriffs in the enforcement of decrees for land annuities or rates, farm labourers were willing to go out and take such action unless their employers forced and compelled them to do so. It is against all reason and against all commonsense. The reason that I am prepared to stand for the majority verdict in this case is not because I am fond of coercion, but because I feel that the law must run, that the law must be enforced, and that if the jury system is to be continued in this country we must, so far as we possibly can, render the jurors free from intimidation.
Comment on this
I agree, and I may say that my views in that regard have been changed by experience.
Comment on this
We are not enamoured of coercion. We had hoped that all these special measures might be dispensed with, but in any event, whether in my case or in the case of anybody speaking from these benches, we did not carry coercion to the same lengths as it was carried by the Opposition. We did not endeavour to compel our whilom leader to make the speeches we wanted him to make. General O'Duffy was so coerced that you would not give him freedom of speech and he had to leave the Party in order to be able to give free expression to his opinions.
Comment on this
Was the Minister for Finance never restrained by his colleagues from expressing himself?
Comment on this
This Bill has been criticised because we are dispensing— or, at least, it proposes to dispense in its present form—with the stenographers' notes. That is a matter that can be argued one way or the other. But after all, justice was dispensed in this country, as far as my knowledge as a layman goes, fairly substantially as between man and man up to 1923, and I do not think that the judges had the benefit of stenographers' notes up to that time. I do not think either that the country had any ill-reputation for perjury up to that time, and I do not think that, even if the stenographers' notes are dispensed with under this Bill, there will be such a recrudescence of perjury, if there was ever much of it or such widespread perjury as will interfere with the true course of justice. Again, it is a matter for argument as to which is the best method. The Bill, as brought before the House, proposes to deal with appeals in this way, but I am sure that the Minister for Justice has a more or less open mind in that regard. Is it not desirable, in cases of this sort, that changes be proposed for the purpose of eliciting another point of view? No one will say that the Act of 1924, under which we have been operating for the last ten or 11 years, received too prolonged consideration before it was passed. I could not feel that, in the circumstances of the time, it would have received that consideration which it might have deserved. We have reverted in the Bill to what was, roughly, the procedure prevailing before that Act, but adapted to our present circumstances. If it can be shown that there is a case for the notes, I am sure that the Minister for Justice will be prepared to give it his fullest consideration.
The Bill was attacked wholeheartedly by Deputy Costello who seemed to lead the Opposition in this matter. Deputy Costello proclaimed that he was in favour of what is, after all, the main provision in the Bill, and that is the provision for strengthening the Supreme Court. He said, however, that the time is not propitious. I should have thought that, in the view of the Opposition, there could not be a need more pressing than that of strengthening the Supreme Court. They have kept that court and other courts sitting overtime listening to arguments which, on their side, were neither dignified nor consistent nor seriously intended. We are told—we have been told here time after time in the House—that the Opposition want justice; that they want it, they say, in the ordinary courts; and of course, as the aggrieved parties, that they want it speedily. One would have thought, therefore, that they would all have been in favour of strengthening the Supreme Court. But, once again Deputy Costello and Deputy McGilligan and other Deputies say that they would be in favour of strengthening the Supreme Court only that the times are not propitious. And then, we are told that these are lean times—lean times at the Bar and lean times in the legal profession. Well I, as a layman ask myself, reviewing the proceedings in the courts for the last 18 months, how could it be otherwise? The general public during that period have had an excellent opportunity of seeing lawyers on the opposite side at work. They have seen case after case in the paper. Lawyer after lawyer, leader of the Bar after leader of the Bar—all in the wake of the ex-Attorney-General— have got up in the courts calling black to-day what yesterday they were breast-high in advocacy of. The public have seen that what was constitutional yesterday is unconstitutional to-day, according to these men. They have seen these men contesting the validity of laws which they themselves drafted, passed, and enforced. What confidence would any business man have in any advice given to him by the legal profession after the exhibition we have witnessed in the courts during the past 12 or 15 months? Who is going to risk his cause on the opinion of men like these? Who is going to venture a shilling on a cause which such men would have to argue? If there is a lean time in the legal profession at this moment, there is no one but the legal profession themselves to blame for it.
Comment on this
Certain of them set themselves, by this process of sapping and mining of the judiciary, to wearing down the judiciary, to breaking down the Constitution, and to overthrowing this Government. Now they are suffering for that themselves, and now they come along and tell us that it is not propitious to do what the Bill proposes in these lean times. It would have been very propitious, however, I have no doubt, in Deputy Costello's opinion, at any rate, to strengthen the Supreme Court in July and August of 1932 if Deputy Costello happened to be Attorney-General. A Bill was actually in draft to strengthen the Supreme Court at that time. It has become a more urgent matter since then, because appeals to the Privy Council have been abolished.
Comment on this
Does the Minister suggest that there were appeals to the Privy Council in 1932?
Comment on this
Not in 1932, but in the years before it. At any rate, since we have taken a definite step to amend the Constitution so that there should be no doubt whatever as to what is the final court of appeal in this country, it is incumbent upon the Government to secure that that court of appeal will be strong enough to give confidence to all sections of citizens whose cause may come before it.
Comment on this
There has been great complaint about delays in the Supreme Court. It is only natural, with the additional work there is, that that complaint should become more widespread as times goes on. It is not an easy matter for a judge—looking at it from a layman's point of view —to give a decision in many of these cases. They require, many of them, long consideration. I am not one of those who would impel any member of the judiciary to a hasty decision. Therefore, I take the view when it is recognised that there should be at least three judges in one case, that the membership of the court must be further increased, so that those who have to sit will, from time to time, secure relief. I am perfectly certain that if we allowed the present position to continue much longer the general public, knowing the demand upon the judges, knowing the demand upon the Supreme Court, would lose faith in the judiciary, because they would feel that they were overworked and were not getting a fair chance of discharging their proper functions.
Comment on this
Not nearly so laborious as some of those we have listened to in the last day and a half.
Comment on this
We had a fierce attack made by Deputy Costello on one of the provisions of the Bill relating to district justices. Deputy McGilligan criticised that position, also, but I think that there was a certain difference of attitude between the two. Deputy McGilligan admitted that some sort of body was necessary; that there should be some method of making certain that the large number of people appointed—often at a very early age, and some of them comparatively inexperienced— act discreetly; that there should be some person who could on occasion remonstrate with them as to their public conduct, who could consider it in relation to their responsibilities to the people or the causes they had to try, and who would be able to make a recommendation for dealing with any breach of propriety of conduct of which they might be guilty. I think our predecessors recognised the need for that. In any event, in the Act of 1924 they brought in this Section 73, and Deputy Costello, speaking last night, showed how he had availed himself of Section 73. The difficulty about that section, so far as I can see, is that the people who constituted the original Committee, that is, the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General, can only do one thing, and that is certify for the dismissal of a district justice. The consequences which such a course of action would entail are so drastic that many things that might properly be questioned and challenged are allowed to go unquestioned and unchallenged, because of that fact. It was the old case of hanging a man for sheep stealing. Therefore, some procedure is necessary if public scandals are to be avoided. District justices are not in the same position—and we must all realise they are not—as judges of the High Court or the Supreme Court. They live and move among the people. They have intimate contact with people who are potential litigants and they ought to be more circumspect, but, unfortunately, some of them are not.
Comment on this
Some of them are not, and therefore it is necessary that there should be some machinery for the control and regulation of their public conduct. Deputy McGilligan said, in his speech, he did not believe if our proposal in the Bill was adopted that it was going to be abused. No one believed that Section 73 was going to be abused. But I think Deputy Costello, when speaking last night, indicated that when he was Attorney-General he adopted a course of procedure which was a very questionable one. He, the Attorney-General, charged with the prosecution of prisoners and the conduct of State cases in the courts, had ventured to advise the district justices as to their line of conduct. I think an admission of that sort is much more likely to shake public confidence in the administration by the district justices of the laws which apply to the people in their districts than anything else that could be said. I am perfectly certain it came as a shock to most people this morning to read that he, as Attorney-General, charged with the prosecution of prisoners, had been advising district justices as to their conduct.
Comment on this
To shut up, he said, in certain instances. That is not general advice as to conduct.
Comment on this
What is the proposal here? Already we have the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice as a committee of two who can sit and who can decide whether they can give a certificate in certain cases. That committee is going to be strengthened by the inclusion of the President of the High Court. Deputy McGilligan, in criticising the proposal, said that if any man wanted to get control of the judges he would proceed by strengthening, if you please, the committee, which is already in existence under Section 73 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. Does any person believe that there is going to be in this country, at one and the same time, a Chief Justice, a President of the High Court and an Attorney-General who are going to allow their actions and their decisions and their advice in matters of this sort to be swayed by any politician, no matter how powerful he may be?
If there were, and if that time comes, there is an end to true justice and the proper administration of the law in this country. We would have no legislative assembly. I am perfectly certain of that. We would have, I think, no impartial public service, as we know it. We would have, in short, what our friends on the other side have been working for since General O'Duffy launched his movement, the Corporative State. We would have Party government and Party justice and Party administration and Party police, and, of course, it may be as against a contingency of that sort that Deputy McGilligan wants us to take precautions. But if under his leadership and the leadership of his colleagues, this country decides to go Fascist, nothing that this Dáil will do will prevent us having on that day a partisan Chief Justice and a partisan President of the High Court and a partisan Attorney-General and partisan justice, and, therefore, it is only futile and a waste of time to consider Deputy McGilligan's argument as having any validity or weight in this matter at all.
In the course of this debate, many people—I think one of them, a layman, and some others of them, lawyers— pleaded for cheap justice for the poor. Deputy Moore, I think, said that the poor man, when he had the misfortune to meet with a motor accident or an accident in the course of his employment, found it very difficult to get a lawyer to take up his case. Unfortunately, that has not been my experience, at any rate. I think that one of the evils which has followed upon the introduction of disability insurance and of motor insurance has been the growth of the speculative legal action, taken up by a solicitor and pressed, on the prospect of getting, not damages for the aggrieved person, but costs for himself.
Comment on this
I do not know. Some of them seem to be very astute lawyers and very successful ones, judging by the verdicts they get.
Comment on this
In any event, if we want cheap justice for the poor, there is a way to provide it. Let the lawyers reduce their fees. I have heard it said here that if a man falls sick, the State provides doctors and so on. So they do. But they do not, except in very special circumstances, employ the leaders of the profession. They provide competent medical attendance for the sick, and I think that most people who have to have recourse to legal assistance could get legal assistance, and competent legal assistance, on perfectly fair terms, if the lawyers reduced their fees. That is one way in which it could be done. I am not averse to saying that possibly there are certain cases in which the State might contribute, as in the case of the capital charge, and does contribute. Some of the defences I have seen put up in capital charges have been put up by these young, inexperienced men, as they have been called, but they have been defences which have received the encomiums of the court and of the people. We are not justified in assuming that because a young man does not command a high fee, he is not in a position to give sound advice to any poor litigant who may have recourse to him.
On the other question of the fees under this Bill, the fact of the matter is that at the present moment the fees only defray 22 per cent. of the cost of the courts. The figure I had in my mind originally was 18 or 19 per cent., and it turns out to be 19.3 per cent. 19.3 per cent. of the costs of the courts is at present covered by fees in this country, but fees in this country in many cases have not been increased since 1851. I do not think Deputy McGilligan or Deputy Costello could say that solicitors' or barristers' fees have not increased since 1851, and while it is necessary that there should be cheap justice for the poor man, at the same time I think that, if it is to be secured in this country, there are two parties who will have to contribute to it, one, the State, and the other, the practitioners before the courts.
Comment on this
Does the Minister think that all this burden of the upkeep of the courts should be placed on litigants and not on the general public?
Comment on this
The litigants are the people who use the machinery. If a man rides in a tram, he pays for it.
Comment on this
Surely the Minister will accept as a right principle that the burden of the upkeep of the courts should be on the community and not on the actual litigants? It should be placed on all potential litigants, who are the whole community.
Comment on this
The two parties to the case ought to bear a fair proportion of it, and that is all we ask.
Comment on this
Sir, on listening to the various references made in the course of this debate to Section 73 of this Bill—the section which provides that a majority verdict of nine to three should be sufficient to convict in criminal cases and sufficient to arrive at a decision in civil cases—I began to think that I was going to be a voice crying in the wilderness seeing that prior to Deputy McGilligan's speech, nobody on either side of the House seemed to have a word to say in its favour. I quite agree that under normal conditions in a normal country, so long as the jury system exists at all, it would be desirable in criminal cases to have a unanimous verdict in order to convict. But conditions here are not normal. We have got to be realists. We have got to face the fact that intimidation is liable to occur in this country in certain cases, and I think there is value in the suggestion that by making a majority verdict suffice for conviction you introduce an element of uncertainty as to who in the jury voted such a way—an element that may save the jury from being as exposed to intimidation as they otherwise would be. Consequently, I support this idea of a majority verdict. I would support it even in cases where human life was at stake. It is provided in Section 73 (2) of this Bill that
Whenever a jury finds a person to be guilty of a crime for which the penalty provided by law is death, the judge shall inquire of the foreman of the jury, and the foreman of the jury shall notify to the judge privately in writing, whether the verdict was or was not unanimous, and the number of the dissentients (if any), and the judge shall report to the Minister for Justice the information so obtained.
Now I take that as indicating that where a verdict was not unanimous the Minister for Justice would normally grant a reprieve except in the sort of case where an element of intimidation came in. I do not know whether the Attorney-General is in a position to confirm me in my reading of what the intention of the Bill is, but that is what at once occurs to me. There can be no particular motive in making this notification to the Minister for Justice unless it is intended that in general he should intervene where no question of intimidation could arise and where the verdict has not been unanimous.
The Minister for Finance, smarting under the jibes of Deputy McGilligan as to the changed attitude of himself and some of his colleagues on this subject, has explained it by "experience." What experience? Experience of the fact that there is such a thing as intimidation in this country. Did he really require to become a Minister in order to become awake to that fact? I venture to suggest that so long as the Minister for Finance had remained out of office no amount of experience would have brought him to the conclusion that the mere fact of being in office has brought him to. In the days when the Party opposite was in opposition anything of this nature was the rankest coercion. The country was told that the proper way to deal with people who were guilty of intimidation and of various brutalities was to show patience and brotherly love to them. I have not the least doubt that the Party opposite would have continued in that line of argument so long as they were not in office.
Now that they are in office they are embarrassed by a phenonemon which when they were out of office appeared rather to please them than otherwise by assisting them in their great general aim of getting into office. Consequently they have introduced a measure such as this. They have, as we all know, introduced other much more drastic measures to deal with the situation which they understood perfectly well when they were out of office but which they did not then deem it appropriate or necessary to deal adequately with at all. That is the explanation of the conversion of certain Fianna Fáil Ministers. They had as much time—they had in fact more time—to think out the subject when out of office than when in office. They were not so childish or so lacking in the power of appreciation of things around them that they could not have arrived at the knowledge of what dangers they would have to guard against before they became the Ministers responsible for guarding against them.
The trouble is that there is a certain class of crime in this country which is labelled "political" and which has absolutely no right to be labelled "political." But once it is labelled "political" the person who commits it has a fair chance of being regarded as patriotic by a certain number of his deluded fellow-countrymen. If for example the murderer of Mr. More-O'Ferrall were apprehended to-morrow and put on trial before a jury, I am not so optimistic as to believe that if a unanimous verdict was required for his conviction he would be convicted no matter what the evidence was. I think that in crimes of that nature even when conviction involves the penalty of death, it is desirable that a majority verdict of nine to three should suffice. I am not of course, overlooking the probability that at the present moment the person charged with such a crime would be brought before the Military Tribunal. But the Military Tribunal may not be always there. It may be that after the Military Tribunal has disappeared, the same dangers of intimidation in this country will to some extent continue. That is a very old and long-rooted mischief here and we cannot be so lighthearted as to think that it is likely to disappear soon. Consequently I think it is reasonable and proper that Section 73 of this Bill should be passed by this House.
The introduction of this Bill as a whole—passing away from that special provision—strikes me as a characteristic piece of shamelessness on the part of this Government. The picture was made quite complete by the speech to which we have just been listening from the Minister for Finance. Really political life has its compensations when one is able to appreciate and enjoy the humour of the situation of the Minister for Finance getting up here and recommending this Bill. One can enjoy comparing the speech he made on this occasion with the numerous speeches he made to us not so long ago on the Temporary Economies Bill. A similar comparison has been made between the attitude of the Government on this Bill and their attitude to very similar proposals a few years ago. They objected then to these proposals on the grounds that the country could not bear the expense. Is the country better able to bear the expense to-day? Is there a single person opposite who would venture to say so?
They objected to these proposals at a time when there was a heavy burden of work being discharged by the courts of this country. They are now recommending them to us at a time when it certainly would not be true to say that the courts are overworked, at a time when they have been able to spare a judge, Mr. Justice Meredith, to go gallivanting off to the Saar for six months or so, at a time when many of his colleagues in Dublin and many of the Circuit Court judges around the country are doing considerably less work, sitting fewer days and sitting shorter hours than they used to do not many years ago.
I listened with amusement to the explanation of the Minister for Finance as to why there had been this falling off in the volume of business at the Four Courts. It was the greatest pity that the Attorney-General was not here to listen to his explanation. His explanation was that the country as a whole had completely lost confidence in the competence of the Irish Bar. I wonder what bearing that has on this Bill? Who are going to be the judges appointed as the result of this Bill? Are they not to be taken from this incompetent body, the Irish Bar? If not, where are they going to be got? Has the record of the particular barristers most closely associated with the activities of the Fianna Fáil Party been so much more irreproachable than that of their colleagues that they would be available as satisfactory judges? Supposing they are made available, supposing the few just, capable men, the few Fianna Fáil lawyers, the few men who can be regarded as competent at the Irish Bar, are taken out and appointed as judges, what effect will that have on the volume of business at the Four Courts? Will it not diminish still further the number of capable advocates who are available for the general public? I have the greatest difficulty in linking up that ingenious explanation by the Minister for Finance of the paucity of business in the Four Courts with the actual proposals of this Bill.
I say that on the ground of expense this Bill ought to be opposed. The country is ever so much poorer than it was at the time when the proposal to create new judgeships was first made. Furthermore, it is ever so much more heavily taxed. The burden of taxation has greatly increased and, added to that, the volume of law business is very much smaller than it then was. Consequently, I think this Bill ought to be opposed.
The leader of the Labour Party made a speech on this Bill. I did not hear all of it, but I understand that he sat down without indicating whether the Labour Party was going to support the Bill or not. It appears to me that if the Labour Party support this Bill they, in particular, will be guilty of an act of shamelessness and an act inconsistent with the general principles for which they are supposed to stand. I regard it as not an exaggeration to say that one of the main purposes of this Bill is to provide unnecessary jobs for Government supporters. The Government could do much to improve the administration of justice in this State, and they could do it without the expenditure of money, merely with the expenditure of a little more honesty and a little more courage, and that would be of far greater value to this country than the Bill which they are introducing and no legislation would be required for the purpose.
I have only one other word to say. It is really hardly worth saying but, for some reason or other, the Minister for Finance thought it relevant or humorous to make several references to the Corporative State in connection with this Party. The Corporative State is not, never has been, the policy of this Party, nor during the time when he was associated with this Party was it ever declared by him to be the policy of General O'Duffy.
Comment on this
I regret that the whole debate on this Bill took its complexion from the speech which was made by Deputy Costello last night. I think this is one of the measures which ought to be considered by both sides of the House dispassionately and on its merits. There is nobody here who is not aware of the fact that a Committee was set up as long ago as 1929, and we have a report from that Joint Committee dating back to November, 1930. Anyone who looks at the recommendations in that report and who examines this Bill will see that in the main the Bill follows the recommendations then made.
The only point that has been made is the question of whether this is an appropriate time. It might perhaps be said that we have lasted in the present condition over a period of four or five years and that we could continue in the same condition for a further period. But I would put it to Deputies that it is most unwise to set up a Committee of this sort to examine into a matter of such general importance to the community as the administration of justice and to allow the recommendations of that Committee to be pigeonholed indefinitely. I say, therefore, that if any fault has to be found with us, it is that we did not immediately, on assuming office, give effect to the recommendations of that Committee. I quite confess that more than once I expressed the opinion that this Bill should have been brought forward sooner, and the only reason that it was not was that we have, as everybody knows, in this House Bills constantly coming in with regard to matters of industry and commerce and other matters of that sort and we had to give precedence to those things. Therefore, I think we would be more justly blamed by the Opposition if it had been said to us that we allowed this report to remain for an unconscionable time and did not give effect to it. In my opinion we are giving effect to it not too soon; if anything, rather too late.
The next question that has been raised is the question of expense. It is said we are creating two new judges. The very people who complained about this expense admit that it is desirable that the Supreme Court should be strengthened, that, as it is our Supreme Court, it is desirable that it should have the confidence of every citizen. For instance, not very long ago there was a case in which we had a unanimous decision on a very fundamental and important matter, a unanimous decision by the High Court. That went to the Supreme Court and we had a majority decision there. If the majority decision had been in the other direction, as it might have been, we would have had a rather curious result in that two judges of the Supreme Court would be reversing a unanimous decision by the High Court. I think that that would be an undesirable situation and that in cases of importance of that particular kind it should be possible to have a court in which, if there was a reversal of a decision, the majority would at least be greater than or as great as the number which gave the decision in the High Court. Nobody has attempted, in fact, to make a case against strengthening the Supreme Court which will have to be done sooner or later, and I suggest that the sooner it is done the better. We cannot have it both ways. If we want judges, if we think it desirable, we must be prepared to face the expense. There is no use in suggesting that we can have judges without that expense. That, at any rate, was the recommendation of the Committee and we have implemented that recommendation to that extent.
Another recommendation of the Committee was that we should have a rehearing on appeal instead of the present system of appeal by notes. There again, the Bill follows the recommendation of the Committee. Deputy McGilligan, I think it was, made a case against this rehearing, but, at any rate, a layman looking at it can say that this change has been recommended by a Joint Committee after seeing both systems in practice. The only question is whether there should be a rehearing by two judges or by one. I confess that there considerations of economy decided the question. Probably it would be held that two judges in such a case would be better than one. It would certainly mean, however, that twice the time would have to be taken over the cases, because under the Bill two judges can go on circuit hearing appeals, both of them going to the one town and sitting in separate courts hearing simultaneously the different cases. It is quite obvious that if the two judges were sitting together in the one court they would not do half the business; because the two together would probably be very much slower about each particular case than a single judge would be. I think that the extra expense that would be incurred in having two judges would have to be justified more completely than it has been by any views put before us. Consequently, the Government took the view that the principle of rehearing in appeals which was suggested by the Joint Committee should be accepted and that considerations of economy should be kept in mind by having one judge instead of two. I simply say on that, that probably if expense had not to be taken into account the Government would have agreed to two judges. The expense, however, would be considerable and we do not think that there has been a sufficient case made to make it appear that there was such a necessity as would justify the expense.
The third point raised was the question of stenographers. I must confess that the case made for the retention of the stenographers taking notes has affected me considerably. Personally, I think that a very good case has been made for a re-examination of that. I have no doubt whatever that if the Minister for Justice were here he would take the views expressed very carefully into consideration. Certainly if I were acting as Minister for Justice, I would be very much inclined to meet the points raised in that matter and to provide for note-taking. I have been in court a few times myself and I have always considered it an extraordinary thing that the business should be held up while the judge took a lengthy note in longhand. Consequently, I think that I can say that in Committee the suggestion about stenographers will probably be before the Dáil again—it may be by way of amendment by us. I cannot go any farther at the moment because, unfortunately, the Minister for Justice, who has had the whole charge of this Bill, is unwell. I will promise, however, that the matter will be most carefully considered.
The next point is the advisory committee which is to be set up to deal with complaints against the conduct of district justices. The moment you keep in mind the constitution of this committee, when you remember that it is to consist of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, and the Attorney-General, you will see at once that, even if you were to regard the Attorney-General as purely partisan in the matter, you have a tribunal, at any rate, in which the majority will take the point of view of the need for the independence of the judiciary. Most Deputies are aware that the Attorney-General occupies a relatively independent position under our Constitution and in our Acts. It is altogether a mistaken idea that people have that the Attorney-General is a member of the Executive Council and is more or less compelled to take action in accordance with the majority, or something of that sort. He is not. He is in a comparatively independent position and he does act independently. He takes account, naturally, of the need for the safety of the community as a whole and matters of that sort, but, generally speaking, and particularly in relation to matters of this sort, the Attorney-General occupies an independent position.
The position would be this: that if the Minister for Justice thought that a particular district justice was acting in an improper manner, he would bring the matter to the attention of the Attorney-General of the day and ask him to have the conduct of this particular justice reviewed. I stand very firmly over the independence of the judiciary. I think it is a very important principle. I think it would be a great mistake on the part of any Government to do anything which would make it appear that the judiciary was in any way subject to the Executive of the day. It has to stand in an independent position and that position ought to be one of safeguarding the interests of the individual citizen against any unjustified aggression on the part of the Executive. At the same time, the courts ought to bear in mind that an Executive has responsible duties to the community; that it has to perform its duty.
Whilst protecting the citizen against any undue aggression by the Executive Council a justice should at the same time have in mind the interests of the community as a whole, and remember that there is such a thing in a matter of that sort as unjustifiably leaning backwards. I think I have heard it from the other side of the House, and therefore it will not be regarded as a Party attack if I say that I have been scandalised on more than one occasion, not alone since I came to those benches but even when I was on the other benches, by statements that have been made unnecessarily by justices, apart from their functions or their duties, and I take it that no member of this House wants that. Justices are in a protected position. They are given positions of great responsibility and great honour, so they ought to be most careful that in the exercise of their duties they keep within their own proper limit. In cases where that is departed from, I think the Minister for Justice of the day—if he thinks remarks made by a justices are calculated to impair the administration of justice or the preservation of order—would be entitled to bring the conduct of such a justice to the attention of the Attorney-General. Is there anybody here who thinks for a moment that if a case of that kind were referred to the Committee which is provided for in this Bill—the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General—there would be a decision against the district justice unless it were well justified? It is no harm for anybody to have constantly before him the idea that he is not irresponsible—that there are some people at any rate to whom he is responsible. Judges for instance are themselves responsible to the Dáil, in the sense that if they were to act in a manner which was obviously irregular and generally harmful—I forget the exact words of the Constitution at the moment—the Dáil could, by the majority that is provided for, remove a judge, and I think that the community does need some protection in that case.
Comment on this
Because of the fact that the alternative would be to have the same rule for them here; there are judges to look after judges. The Deputy will admit that the judges of the High Court are on a higher scale. At any rate, they are so regarded, and are paid higher. They are in a position of greater responsibility than district justices. We put the higher judges, so to speak, or a committee of them, as guardians over the other judges. The guardian over the higher judges is ultimately this House, as representing the community as a whole. I think that there is an understandable gradation there. I want to point out also to the Deputy, who seems to be quite unaware of it, the fact that there is a distinction at the moment. Under the existing law, the present position is that if the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice—there are only two on the committee at the moment—were to agree, they could remove a district justice for misconduct. The only thing we are really doing is changing it from being a tribunal or a committee of two to a committee of three, and we are weighting it on the side of the independence of the judiciary by putting a majority of the judges on the committee. I do not think that any reasonable person can suggest that there is, in that, anything which can fairly be described as an attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary. I am perfectly certain that the majority of our people will understand that it is necessary to have some tribunal to which a complaint can be made when justices act in an irresponsible manner, exceed their functions, or take advantage of the position they are in to say and do things which they ought not to say or do.
The next point which has been referred to is this question of a majority verdict. I must confess that personally I do not share Deputy MacDermot's views. I am more or less of the view which I held when I was in Opposition. The Attorney-General—I do not think he was properly reported last night when speaking on this matter on the Second Reading—made it quite clear that the Government was not wedded to that system. It may then be asked why we do not put the other system into the Bill. The reason is that we have made inquiries from various sources, and got the opinions of district justices, Circuit Court judges and others on the matter, and the reports we have got would seem to indicate that the fears which I had when I was in Opposition were not justified, and that the system as a whole is not working badly. Consequently, holding the view which I held when I was in Opposition, when I said that a matter of this sort should not be changed immediately at the will of any particular Executive, I think personally it was much better to bring the present position before the Dáil and hear the views that would be expressed. There is admittedly a difference of opinion on those benches and a difference of opinion on these benches in regard to this particular matter. You can hardly pick out half-a-dozen people who will not have different opinions about it. As this was, therefore, a matter on which there was admittedly a difference of opinion, before finally going back on the old system—I must say that personally I very strongly inclined to the unanimous jury, certainly in capital cases —I think it was better that we should first of all hear the opinions of the Dáil, and see whether the Opposition, now that they have left these benches and gone to the others, have changed their minds. It seems to me that if we are charged with changing our minds the same charge can equally be levelled against members of the opposite benches, who also appear to have changed their minds in the opposite direction. I do not know whether we can fairly say that that is proof of what was said by a Minister who was accused of changing his mind when he went from Opposition into office. What he said was:
"Well, when I was in Opposition I was in a position of far greater liberty and less responsibility."
Whether that may justly be said to account for the change of attitude on the part of those who were on the went to the opposite benches, and on the part of those who were on the opposite benches and came here, I am not going to say at the moment. I can say that, as far as I am concerned, I feel that in capital cases, before a man's life is taken by the State, we should have it determined as far as we can by unanimity that he is guilty. I am only a layman, and the difference of opinion on this matter is perhaps as much amongst lawyers as amongst laymen.
My view of it is this: suppose a mistake has been made in a case where imprisonment occurred, it is always possible for the State to give a certain amount of compensation. They can release the prisoner and they can give certain compensation for the time he has spent in prison. But if the State has taken a life it can make no compensation; it cannot restore or bring back that life. The case may be made by lawyers—"Well, if you accept the principle of unanimity at all you must make it range over the whole line of criminal cases." I say I do not agree. I think there is very definitely a distinction between a case where a man's life is taken, which cannot be restored by the courts, and a case where the State has put a man in prison. It is a very serious loss, no doubt, if a man is deprived of his liberty unjustly, but it is possible for the State to make some amends and it is possible to undo the wrong to a certain extent. On the other hand, if a man has been wrongly executed, there is no chance of making restoration. Therefore, if it were left to my judgment alone, I confess to the House—I would probably be guided by others on the question of a majority verdict in other cases—that in capital cases I would make unanimity necessary.
When we come to the question of majority verdicts, there is also the question of what is to be the majority. Is it to be nine out of 12, or 12 out of 16, as, I think, is the Scottish system? The larger the number, in one sense, the better the chance of satisfactory results. I think that is fairly sound, but we have had a system of 12 jurors and it is, apparently, considered that that is a sufficiently large number. The question is whether nine out of 12 is a sufficient majority. However, it would be possible, if a mistake were made, for the State to make amends of some sort in any case, except a capital case. Undoubtedly, I would clearly distinguish between capital cases and other types of cases. As against the submission of Deputy MacDermot, I would say that the object of punishment in these cases is not so much that of exacting penalties from people or from the individual concerned. It is mainly with a view to preventing similar occurrences; it is a deterrent.
Comment on this
Looking at it from that point of view, I think the Deputy will admit that the very fact that a man knows that if he commits murder, and if he is caught, he will be tried, and that if the facts are sufficient to convince 12 men that he is guilty, he can be convicted—that from the point of view of a deterrent is sufficient.
Comment on this
He is not likely to play on the chance that he may have one or two jurors who may not agree or who may not be convinced. It is a question in the long run of securing the necessary evidence, I would say, and from the point of view of its being a deterrent, I think we would lose nothing if the verdict in capital cases had to be unanimous.
Comment on this
Might I intervene for one moment? The weakness of the point the President is making is that where there is an element of intimidation expected, it is not true that the man who contemplates committing a crime believes that if 12 men are convinced of his guilt he will be found guilty. He believes, on the contrary, that some of those who are convinced of his guilt will be intimidated from finding a verdict to that effect.
Comment on this
If he feels so strongly about that, he will believe that he can get not merely four, but six jurors who will not vote for finding him guilty. If the intimidation is to be so effective as the Deputy imagines it will be carried much further than that. However, I admit, and I admitted it at the start, that this is a matter on which people, looking at it from different angles, will hold different opinions. We are not infallible, and we have, each one of us, only to think for ourselves what is the best thing to do. Both systems have been tried, and both systems, according to the reports given to me, seem to work. We put it to the Dáil in this way—I think it is no secret, and I think I can tell it to you— that unless very strong pressure is put forward for the retention of this provision as it appears, it will be changed in Committee, at least to exempt cases where capital punishment is involved. That is the position as it stands at the moment. We are quite frank to the Dáil about it. We wanted to have this matter discussed, and we felt that it would be better to leave it in the form in which it is at the moment, on its first introduction, and get it dealt with in that way rather than to take the other view and commit ourselves absolutely to it at the start. I admit again that there can very well be a difference of opinion about this, and that we are not wedded to this proposal. I may say—I think I can speak for the Executive Council—that the view at the moment would be that if it depended on the Executive Council alone, we would favour exemption in capital cases. What I mean is that we would favour unanimity in capital cases. I think I have covered the main points that have been the subject of criticism by the Dáil.
There is one other matter which was raised by Deputy Norton. To my mind, it is very important but I think it is outside the scope of this particular Bill. This Bill is to provide machinery, in the existing circumstances, to strengthen the Supreme Court and to change the system of appeals. I might say that these are the main provisions in the Bill. There is no attempt in this Bill to make the cost of litigation less or to make recourse to law easier for the very poor. I think that is a question that should very properly engage our attention. I think it is a matter that the Minister for Justice might very well consider as a subject possibly for new legislation. I do not think it reasonably or properly comes into this Bill. If and when legislation is produced to deal with the matter, we shall probably again have different opinions about it. The Minister for Finance will naturally, whether here in the Dáil or in the Executive Council—certainly in the Executive Council—have very strong views about anything that would lead to an extra burden on the taxpayer, and very properly. When there is a question of making it easier for the poor to have recourse to law, and of getting the defence of the law where their rights are in question, the cost of the availability at the moment of legal services will have to be taken into account and other matters will have to be very carefully examined. I can only say that the question will be examined. I am sure that the Minister for Justice, when he reads the report of this debate, will be inclined to consider whether there are any steps that he can take to make it possible for the poor to have recourse to law and to be protected in the same way that the rich can protect themselves by their wealth at the present moment.
Coming back to the question of expenses in general, except for the expense of the two judges who are apparently necessary—if we admit they are necessary we have to face the expense—the only other expense will be that of certain judges sent out on circuit but our information is that that expense, relative to the total cost, will be slight. It is not going to be very much. What we have to ask ourselves is, whether we have a fairly costly machine, and whether we are to stop making it as effective as we want it to be by considerations of expense in a relatively small way. We think the extra cost there is justifiable; that it means less for litigants, that it means justice is nearer, and in every way is better than the present system by note. In all this matter, while there should be differences of opinion, we should take it from one side of the House, without any suggestion that this is introduced with any motive other than the motive of the general good of the community. If on both sides we were to approach our Bills in that way, I think we would be doing our duty very much better than if we tried to score Party points, or by dealing with measures in the extravagant way that Deputy Costello dealt with this one last night. A heading I saw in one newspaper ran "Unsound in principle. Vicious." I was wondering where was the viciousness and what caused the former Attorney-General to suggest that it was vicious. Vicious is a nasty word when you see a newspaper with such a heading. The heading to the "Irish Times" report was "Proposed changes in the law. Courts of Justice Bill under Fire. Principle utterly unsound and even vicious." I have spoken of the principles. I am waiting to be shown where they are utterly unsound. I have certainly not been shown, in any statement made by anyone who kept to the Bill, where there has been anything vicious in it. I think that in recommending it, as the Attorney-General did, we can stand over the Bill as a piece of legislation which will be in the general interests of the community.
Comment on this
I did not intend to take any part in the debate on the Second Reading, for the reason that I was a member of the Joint Committee of the Courts of Justice Bill, and the views I formed are contained in the report of that Committee. Consequently they are known to everyone who takes an interest in this measure. Having heard the debate there are some matters on which perhaps I should say a few words now, because I intend to speak on them on the Committee Stage and may possibly propose amendments. That will give the Minister for Justice and the Attorney-General an opportunity of considering the points in the meantime, if they think it advisable. The big principle of the Bill is rehearing on appeal. Different views have been expressed upon that question. I was a member of the Committee that heard the evidence on this matter, and it was overwhelming in favour of reverting to the system of appeal by way of rehearing. The evidence given by a number of members of my own profession was not the evidence of individuals, but of barristers who were deputed by the profession to express its views. The same remarks apply to the solicitors who gave evidence in regard to their profession. Evidence was also given on behalf of representative public bodies and Chambers of Commerce, in favour of reverting to the old system of appeal by way of rehearing. Any person who listened to the evidence could not fail to realise that the country wanted a reversion to the old system of appeal. My own view is that even a lawyer who objects to that system, or who does not like it, has to recognise, whether it is good or bad, that the enormous majority of the people want it and are entitled to have it.
I am an advocate of going back to the old system of rehearing of appeals. From my personal experience as a barrister who went on circuit for 15 years, and with ten years' experience of the new system, the old system of appeal was very much cheaper and much more satisfactory to litigants. It is a good thing for people, when they win or lose a case, in the first instance, to have an opportunity of hearing what has happened on the appeal. What happens under the present system is that if a person wins in the local Circuit Court, the case then goes to Dublin, and the next thing he hears is that the decree which was given in his favour has been reversed and that he has to pay the costs. He does not know what has happened, and is full of suspicion of the honestly of the solicitor and counsel that appeared for him. Under the old system of appeal the Senior and the Junior Bar went on circuit. I was a member of the North-East circuit where sometimes a case of trespass would last half a day or a whole day. It might be a case about a gate pass between a couple of small farmers. The fee of the junior barrister for perhaps a half day or a whole day was £1 1s., and if senior counsel was engaged the best man on the circuit would get £2 2s. On that circuit he need not have a junior. That senior counsel would do the case if it lasted a half day or a whole day. If the case was lost the legal expenses including barrister's fees and solicitor's fees would amount to something between £5 and £10. Under the present system no one could consult a junior barrister at less than £4 4s. or £5 5s. and no one would ask senior counsel to act without a proportionately larger fee. The country wants to go back to the old system. In my experience it was a better system and more suited to the needs of the country.
There is one thing I dislike in this Bill. The committee recommended that there should be an appeal to two judges. I think that is the proper system of appeal. I know that some individual members of my profession say that one judge would be enough. A system of appeal to two judges is the proper system, and that was recommended by the committee. I say that for this reason, that 80 per cent. of the appeals are mainly on a question of fact. There is no reason to assume that a High Court judge is a better judge of facts than a Circuit Court judge, so that if you have an appeal from a Circuit judge to one High Court judge, you will simply have one mind against another on a question of fact.
Comment on this
I should like to get the Deputy's views on this matter. It has been represented to us that a second judge knows when he comes to deal with the case what points of view have been expressed already. He has got the advantage of the previous judge's notes. Probably he has the case presented to him in a more complete form. The whole tendency will be to confirm the previous judge's opinion, unless he can point definitely to something that was clearly wrong. Therefore, when the second judge comes along, it is not a case of one man's mind against another man's mind, but the case of a person having a more complete survey of the case than the first man could possibly have.
Comment on this
The answers to the President's point is this, that in a system of rehearing you have in the first instance the hearing, say, on a question of fact, and you have perhaps an incomplete hearing. On the other hand, you may have a complete hearing. The same witnesses will come forward, or there may be additional witnesses on the rehearing. We will assume that it is a question of fact, as to which complete testimony has been given in the first instance before the Circuit judge. Different minds will take different views as to questions of fact. I am referring to the class of case where there is a near balance between the two sides. The Circuit Court judge finds that it is a question of fact and in favour of one of them. The case goes on to appeal. You have a single judge hearing the appeal, just one human mind which there is no reason to assume is better than the other. One simply happens to be a High Court judge and the other a Circuit Court judge. What I suggest as the satisfactory thing would be to have two judges hearing the appeal. You will then have either two judges agreeing with the Circuit Court judge or disagreeing. You may have one agreeing with him and the other disagreeing on the same set of facts. You will have this satisfaction for the litigant that, supposing the Circuit Court judge has given a decision for the plaintiff and that the two appeal judges disagree, it means that you have two minds deciding on one side as against one on the other. If the two judges hearing the appeal disagree, then the order of the Circuit Court judge will stand. In other words, you will have two minds agreeing in favour of one litigant as against one mind.
There is another point on which I wish to criticise the Bill, namely, that I think it is a great mistake to get rid of the stenographers. I think they should be retained. I have not the report of the joint committee before me, but I think the recommendation we made was that the stenographers should be retained and be made whole-time servants. The recommendation was that while the stenographers' notes would not now be the matter on which the Appeal Court would act they should be made available for any litigant who wanted them. Speaking from experience as a barrister, I can say that it is extremely valuable to have a note of what witness said in the court of first instance. I have found it so in the old county courts. In those days I used to take a shorthand note myself, so that if a witness tried to change his evidence on appeal afterwards it had a very salutary effect if you were able to confront him with a note of what he had said in the court of first instance. Of course, the note that a barrister or a solicitor would make in court and the note made by a stenographer would be entirely different. A stenographer's note would be much more authentic, while the other would be only useful for the purposes of cross-examination. I think the Government should reconsider this matter of implementing the recommendation of the joint committee which suggests that the stenographers should be retained and their notes made available for any person willing to pay the prescribed fees.
Quite recently we read the criticism made by the Lord Chief Justice of England of the system under which judges have to make notes. I am sure the Attorney-General will agree with me in this, that no judge can make a proper note of a case that he is trying and try the case properly at the same time. It cannot be done. While the judge should be watching the witness, he is trying to get down on paper a note of what the witness is saying. There is only one High Court judge, so far as I know, who takes a shorthand note of the evidence, but I think that even doing that must distract a judge from his real, vital business, which is that of watching the case, listening to every phrase and every turn of phrase and studying the expressions of witnesses. A case cannot be properly tried by a judge who has to make notes, and who has to take into account that his notes will be before the Court of Appeal that is going to decide the question as to whether he was right or wrong in his decision. Again I would strongly urge on the Government to reconsider that and to implement that portion of the committee's account. I do not make any appeal to the Government on the grounds that they are putting out of employment a number of very deserving people, because every Government is obdurate and unsympathetic to those considerations.
On the question of nine jurors I do not agree with some of the speakers who have gone before me. I had three or four years' experience prosecuting in Green Street. I have discussed this matter with some of my colleagues, some of the most experienced members of the Bar, within the last few days, and I have expressed my own opinion in this way: that if I were, say, an Englishman living in England, I would be against the idea of having to accept the verdict of only nine jurors in a criminal case. I put my ground for that in this way: that I think an English jury will convict on a great deal less evidence than an Irish jury. I am speaking now from personal experience. I never saw a conviction by a jury of the City of Dublin—I think, on the whole, that they are perhaps harder than jurors through the country—in a case in which there was any suspicion that the person convicted was innocent. I do not think that you will ever get nine jurors—pick them as you like at random—in this country to agree that a person is guilty unless the evidence is what you might call overwhelming against them. I think there is a good deal in the distinction that the President has drawn between the case of a death sentence and other kinds of crime because if a man is wrongly convicted on the capital offence——
Comment on this
It is extremely unlikely to happen in this country. I do not know whether Deputy MacDermot understood what I said or not. I said that I did not believe, picking any jury in this country, that you will find nine people to agree that a person is guilty if he is not in fact guilty. It would be a most extraordinary concatenation of circumstances that would bring such a situation around.
Comment on this
I think there is a good deal to be said for the point of view as regards capital punishment. As an additional safeguard there is something to be said for the point of view that if a man is wrongly convicted then you can make no restitution if you have hanged him.
Comment on this
I do not agree with the point of view that you should have a unanimous verdict in ordinary criminal cases. I think it is safe enough in this country to have a verdict of nine jurors. I say that you will never get a conviction by nine people out of twelve unless the evidence is really overwhelming. There is this to be said about the case in which capital punishment is involved —that the jurors will be more cautious than ever when a man's life is at stake. With some other statements of the President, I find myself in agreement. He said that he was scandalised on occasions by pronouncements made from the bench not only when he was in opposition but when in office. I was glad to hear the President say that. I have always thought that sufficient notice was not taken of persons in judicial positions—minor or otherwise—pontificating from the bench. That is not their job. I regret to say that it has happened in a very scandalous way since the President took office and that no notice, so far as I know, has been taken of it. I welcome the statement from the President that he condemns it, and I hope that he will take steps to see that it does not recur.
I should like to draw the attention of the Attorney-General to another matter arising out of Section 77. This is really a point which I should raise on Committee Stage. I am putting it forward now so that it may receive consideration in the meantime. This is the section which deals with what is known to lawyers as Lord Campbell's Act—that is, the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846. That was an Act which gave a new right and a new cause of action to dependants where persons were killed by negligence. Those dependants are entitled to bring an action claiming damages for the loss. The Act provided that a jury should try the action and that a jury should also deal with the apportionment of the damages amongst the different dependants. I confess that, as Section 77 is framed, I do not really understand what is intended. It is so obscure that I should like to have the matter cleared up. The section says:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, any action under that Act may be heard and determined by a judge without a jury."
The word used is "may." The section goes on to say:
"...when any such action is so heard, Section 2 of the said Act shall be construed and have effect as if the word `judge' were substituted therein for the word `jury' where-ever that word occurs."
I suggest, for the consideration of the Attorney-General, that the Act of 1846 being an Act which gives a new cause of action, when you substitute here the word "judge" for the word "jury," it is open to the construction that you are taking away the right of trial by jury. I could understand the section if it provided that, on consent of the parties, the action might be tried by a judge without a jury, but having regard to the fact that the Act of 1846 gave a new cause of action, when you make this substitution, it may be construed by a judge as imposing upon him the obligation to try the action himself without a jury. There are two limbs in that section of the Act of 1846. One of these limbs provides that the jury are to determine the question of negligence.
Comment on this
It is not intended to take away that right.
Comment on this
I accept the statement of the Attorney-General. The section as it stands is, however, open to the construction—I have consulted some of my most experienced colleagues on this matter and they agree with my view—I have mentioned. One limb of that section in the Act of 1846 says that the question of negligence must be tried by a jury. The second limb provides that the jury are to apportion the damages amongst the dependants. There is a great deal to be said for the view that the judge should apportion the damages amongst the dependants but I do not think that there is anything to be said for the suggestion that the judge should determine the question of negligence. We know that the right to a jury was limited in effect by Section 94 of the Courts of Justice Act of 1924 to cases of tort. This is really a case of tort and I should not like that a section of this Bill would be even ambiguous as to the right of the litigant to have a jury in cases of this kind. I hope that the Attorney-General will consider the amendment of that section of the Bill so as to clarify the position. Let us take the case of a man who is killed and who leaves a widow and a number of young children. In that case the judge would probably be the better tribunal to determine the apportionment of the damages amongst the dependants but I did not think that the question of negligence in an action of this kind should ever be tried, except by consent, by a judge alone. Those are the main points that occurred to me. I put forward the last point, the question of the stenographers and the question of two judges, in the hope that the Government will give them consideration between now and the Committee Stage.
Comment on this
I hesitate to speak on this Bill but, having had occasion during the last four or five years to find fault with the present Minister for Justice and with his predecessor, owing to the non-functioning of the Circuit Courts, I think I should say that, in my opinion, the provision made by this Bill is very similar to what we have at the moment. On the last occasion on which I put a question to the Minister—a little over 12 months ago—he informed me that there were 262 cases awaiting trial in the Circuit Court and that over 60 of those cases had been for seven months on the list of the court. I stressed the unfairness of that to the commercial community, because before these cases reached the Circuit Court the plaintiffs were possibly from four to five months endeavouring to get payment of their accounts. As a last resort they tried to get the court to interfere on their behalf. In most of those cases, which were listed after the parties had been three or four months endeavouring to get payment, 12 months elapsed before they got a verdict. In many cases there was an appeal, and business was so congested in the appeals court that that involved a further delay of six months. Well, now, it was a most unfair thing that the business community should have to lie out of their money for such a long time, and I am not surprised at all at what Deputy Costello said yesterday about the state of legal business in view of this fact. In the Circuit Court at the moment the Minister informed me that there were two judges dealing with these cases that came before the Court, and still this state of congestion has been getting, if anything, worse for the last four to five years, notwithstanding the two judges. In this Bill, I find that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is the same.
There is one small matter that I would like to refer to, and that is the winding up of companies that is taken away from the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and put into the High Court. That is only a small matter, and otherwise the jurisdiction is much the same. Consequently, if this congestion occurred under the existing system, and there is no alteration in the existing system or in the number of judges that preside over the Circuit Court, we may expect the same congestion under this scheme. That, to my mind, is most unfair, and I intervene at this stage to point that out to the Minister for Justice and to the Attorney-General.
There is one other matter with regard to the Appeal Court to which I should like to refer before I leave that point. The appeal is from the Circuit Court, and there it is very much the same under this Bill as it is at present. One judge will be allocated to hear the appeals. If there has been congestion and if it is found that that system has produced congestion in the past, there is no guarantee that the same kind of thing will not occur under the new system. I should like the Attorney-General to look into that. We have been suffering in the City of Dublin for at least five years owing to the delays, and it is the view of all commercial men—and I see a number of them—that the system is tedious, costly and unsatisfactory. Those are the views, generally, on the Circuit Court at the moment.
There is just one other point to which I should like to refer. Under this Bill, the judges are to go on circuit at two periods each year. It is necessary that some judge should remain here to hear cases such as the winding-up of companies and other matters that may come before the courts in connection with bankruptcy and things of that nature. It is necessary that one judge should always be available in Dublin.
Comment on this
That may be so, but I should like to be sure that one judge would be available under the new system.
Comment on this
I would like to have an assurance from the Attorney-General that it is not intended to send them all out and that there would be one man available always.
Comment on this
I hesitate to enter into a discussion on matters of law, but, from a layman's point of view, I think that the Bill is all to the good in that it proposes to bring back to the country the rehearing of cases. I think that it is a very good thing to have established in the minds of the people of our country that there is a means, and a ready means, of redress for their grievances, let them be supposed grievances, or otherwise—the courts will determine that—and I think that in that respect the Bill commends itself to us. Another thing that I would like to say is that I was impressed by the President's statement on the question of majority verdicts. I say that, because I think it is well that the country should know the Government's attitude towards the preservation of life. Perhaps, circumstances, into which we need not go in detail, have helped the country to look less seriously on the taking of life than in former times, and perhaps the rising generation does not look upon it in the same way as the people of long ago. However, I think that even the State should err on the side of caution. I think it is a right principle, as the President has put it, that before the State intervenes to take a person's life, the verdict should be a unanimous one so as to put the matter beyond all doubt; and whilst it is necessary that the State should do everything in its power to deter crime, it should not, on the other hand, give any facility towards the lessening of its responsibility in regard to the preservation of life. Perhaps there are people who might enter into a long debate on the question of whether life should be taken at all or not. I am not going to enter into that, but I think that, as a Government and as the elected representatives of the people, we cannot be too careful in this matter, and I think it would be a wise thing, as the President pointed out, to have an amendment inserted on the Committee Stage that would put that matter beyond all doubt in such cases and that there should be a unanimous verdict instead of a majority verdict.
I am also inclined to agree with Deputy Rice when he says that there should be an additional judge for rehearing. I am not competent, and I do not wish, to enter into the question of the competence of a single judge on rehearing, but I think that it would establish more confidence in the law among the people of the country and among the litigants themselves if an additional judge were present at the rehearing on appeal. I was impressed with the point of view expressed by Deputy Rice, and I think that if we have rehearing on appeal in the country it would be well-spent money. It would mean extra expense, probably, but it would be well worth it to have a second judge on appeal. After all, the more we establish in the minds of our people the absolute fairness and absolute impartiality of our courts, the more our people will respect the courts and the more they will respect the majesty of the law. I do not wish to enter into any further details and I only rose because I just wanted to express my mind on those few points.
Comment on this
The course of this debate has been rather curious, and, to me, somewhat of a surprise both in the tone in which it opened and the tone in which it closed. In opening the discussion on it and in moving the Bill, I made a very simple statement outlining the main proposals in the Bill, referring to the Joint Committee's Report, drawing attention to the part of that Report that was being implemented in the Bill, making clear to the House the recommendations in the Report which were not being adopted, and giving some reasons as to why the Committee's Report was being departed from in these respects. That course was adopted because here we were introducing a Bill which has been in the air for a number of years. It is many years ago since the pressure upon the then Government was so great with regard to the position of the administration of justice through the courts that they yielded to that pressure and set up this Joint Committee. Prima facie there must have been some dissatisfaction, something that the Government of the day felt called upon to investigate. There must have been something that after a period of five years was thought to be a sufficiently important question to investigate, namely, the question whether the courts were working satisfactorily under a system established in 1924. That was considered a sufficiently important question to find out how the courts had been functioning, and to find out how the system had been working, and they set up a formal Committee of the House to investigate the matter and make recommendations.
The Joint Committee sat. It began in 1929 and sat on throughout 1930. I was one of the witnesses who went before it. I went there as the representative of the Bar Council. I had no axe to grind. At that time I had been eight years a junior barrister. I was out in the cold so far as the Government of the day was concerned, but I went before that Committee to give my impression as to how the system then working compared with the system in operation up to 1924. That Committee had before them judges, district justices and everybody who took an interest in the working of the courts. All these people attended and gave their evidence. They went there to help the Committee. They were put through long and searching examination as to the working of the particular system in the courts, and they made any suggestions that they thought would help to improve the conditions. That appeared to me to be a perfectly reasonable and rational way for the Dáil or Oireachtas to approach the question whether the system in their courts ought or ought not to be remodelled. That was the system adopted in framing the Courts of Justice Act in 1924. It obviously is the only practical way in which a system like that can be approached with so many technical and difficult questions to solve, problems in connection with which the ordinary layman is so remote that he is unable to form a judgment upon them unless he can get the experience from those who possess it. Those who are in a position to do so offered their help in every way so far as they could to perfect the measure. Again, I say that appears to me the only rational way in which to approach that particular type of question. After investigation, such as I have detailed, that Joint Committee made unanimous recommendations along certain lines, and it has been in the air, ever since that time, that there was going to be a change of the present system and that certain recommendations of that Committee were going to be fulfilled.
I make bold to say that in 1931, if the Government then in office had remained in office, having that Joint Committee's report before them, one of the first things they would do would have been to introduce a Bill to implement the recommendations of that Joint Committee. It is all nonsense to pretend that the recommendations were not reached after full consideration of all aspects of the problem, or to pretend that they had not the backing of the opinion of men who had made most searching investigations into the matter, or that they did not represent what Deputy Rice said, namely, what the people really wanted with regard to the administration of justice. In that state of things, when this Government came into office if, instead of doing what it reasonably might be expected to do, namely, bringing in a Bill founded on those recommendations, it proceeded with more important pieces of legislation to enable it to complete its programme, it might reasonably be complained that there had been much delay rather than overhaste in bringing forward this measure.
I was astonished to hear the onslaught made on the Bill by Deputy Costello. I have the highest respect for Deputy Costello. I do not impugn any of the Deputy's motives and I accept quite sincerely what he says, but I find it very difficult to see how he can justify the language he used in reference to this particular Bill. The President referred to two or three adjectives that Deputy Costello flung out and proceeded in a half-hearted way to justify. For an hour and a half he was obviously endeavouring to make as much political capital as he possibly could out of the introduction of this measure by the present Government. That was followed by a similar kind of attack by other Deputies opposite. As I said, I was astonished at the tone in which Deputy Costello opened his speech but I was equally surprised at the speeches of some other Deputies and at the statements made that this measure was introduced at an inopportune moment and that it contained an unsound principle. I would have expected an attitude of praise from the Opposition, who were themselves responsible for this Committee and who invited this report and who, I should have thought, if they were in office in the ordinary way, would have brought in a similar type of measure.
We welcome the type of criticism on this measure that we got from Deputy Rice. I am glad to see that he has had the courage to stand up for this report. I feel the tone and temper of his speech was wholly admirable. When he asked us to look into certain points that he made, and certain criticisms that he offered, I have no hesitation in giving an undertaking that the two or three matters that he mentioned will be looked into. He was the only Deputy opposite who referred to Clause 77. As I indicated on a former occasion, it is not intended to deprive the plaintiff in fatal accident cases of the right of trial before a jury. All that is intended is rightly to interpret a consent, and to enable a judge without a jury to hear Lord Campbell cases on the question of the apportionment of damages. It was merely intended to do that and to allow the trial before a jury to be availed of in the ordinary way. We had from Deputy Good the answer to some of the fulminations we heard in this debate, and the unfounded suggestions that such is the state of things in the courts that there is no necessity for any attempt to improve the machinery. He has given the instance of the position with regard to the Dublin Circuit Court. He holds an opinion as a business man and I am sure he has no motive inspiring him when he suggests that there should be further expenditure in connection with it. He merely wants what business men have always been asking for— swift dispatch of business. It is almost more important, in my opinion, that justice should be speedy than that decisions of the judges should be correct. Unfortunately, the complaint has been made against more than one branch of the Judiciary in this country that one of the evils is that justice is not speedy or is not as speedy as it should be.
In answer to Deputy Good, if I may, now that I have mentioned his complaint—I do not know whether he was here when I introduced the Bill—I did point out that it was intended to assign two permanent judges to Dublin. He may reply, of course, that there are at present two judges, because Judge Davitt and Judge Shannon are, practically speaking, permanently assigned. Judge Shannon has been there since he was appointed, but it is the intention to enable business in Dublin to be dealt with with more dispatch by lightening the outside circuits so as to have a judge available to come in and assist the Dublin judges. Hitherto, it was not possible, by reason of the wording of the Act, to transfer a Circuit judge from one area to another to assist temporarily in clearing up business. Whether that will be adequate or not, I am not in a position to say, but we hope it will help, and it ought to help considerably, the speeding up of business in the Dublin Circuit Courts.
Comment on this
It is very late, and this Bill has been thrashed out at great length, and although I have a number of points raised by Deputies noted here, I do not know that it is necessary for me to go into them in detail. The criticism of the Bill, and of what one might call the principles of it, which are the only matters which should be relevant on Second Reading, falls under certain main heads. Some have already been dealt with adequately, and some of them have not perhaps been dealt with so fully. Deputy Costello selected four or five matters of major importance and applied the adjectives "vicious" and "unsound" to certain of the provisions, and with those I think I shall be justified in dealing.
The first principle which he attacked and suggested was "vicious" and "unsound" was this provision that Supreme Court judges should be available to deal with High Court work, and he enlarged upon the view, which we all hold and which nobody can doubt is correct, that it would be an ideal thing if one could have a Supreme Court completely aloof and away from the ordinary business of the courts, and which would be regarded with greater awe and respect than any other branch of the courts. That, on paper, anyhow, looks to be the ideal thing. I wonder if that is so in practice? I wonder if experienced lawyers would not say that it might be a very good thing that judges sitting in the Supreme Court should from time to time deal with the ordinary work of the courts, sit as High Court judges, go on circuit, see the conditions in the country and have the experience of actually seeing and hearing witnesses who appear before them and be brought more closely into touch with the realities of life throughout the country? I think there is a good deal to be said for that view. I certainly do not see why the adjective "vicious" should be applied to it.
You have certain instances and the President illustrated it very admirably in the instance he gave—it is agreed on by the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court and all those who gave evidence before the Joint Committee—in which cases are heard by a court of three in the High Court, where they go on appeal to the Supreme Court and where by two to one in the Supreme Court a decision of the three judges in the High Court may be reversed. There you have four against two, and yet the verdict of the two stands. It may be said that the two are Supreme Court judges whose opinion is entitled to greater weight than a decision of the High Courts. I think Deputy Costello himself has suggested that very often you cannot see the difference between High Court and Circuit Court judges; in some instances, you have Circuit judges who in standing and ability and so on may not rank as high as High Court judges and the same applies in connection with the distinction between High Court judges and Supreme Court judges.
You have also the position which has not been mentioned at all that in several important cases that have been heard during the last ten years the High Court Bench has been drawn upon, but perhaps I am going on to another point now. Deputy Costello, as I say, first of all criticised the provision which enabled the Supreme Court to be drawn upon for the purpose of enabling the business of the High Court to be dealt with more expeditiously. As I said in introducing the Bill, that is a compromise. It is admitted, I think, that the High Court needs additional judges and it is admitted that the Supreme Court needs strengthening. The ideal system might be to give the Supreme Court their extra judges and to give the High Court some extra judges, but the compromise which we suggest here seems to me to have about it the recommendation that, if it can work in practice, it achieves in a much simpler and more economical way the two ends of enabling one to have a Supreme Court of five to hear important cases and to prevent anomalies arising, such as arose in the particular case already referred to, and, at the same time, to enable them, when less important cases have to be dealt with, to be drawn upon to deal with these cases. With all due respect to Deputy Costello, there are less important cases. There are degrees of importance in cases which go to the Supreme Court and I challenge his statement that all cases that go to the Supreme Court are all of equal importance. Does he suggest for one moment that a motion for a new trial in a running-down case is of equal importance with a case involving the validity of a particular Act of the Oireachtas or some other constitutional question?
It is absurd and ridiculous to say that you cannot have a workable system under which when a case of importance or a case which has been heard by a full court of the High Court comes up for review, five judges can be called on, and at other times, when the pressure on the High Court requires extra judges, either for the hearing of appeals or for the dispatch of the ordinary business of the High Court, a court of three cannot be left available to deal with the ordinary less important cases in the Supreme Court. One of the excuses given for the use of the word "vicious" is that that particular condition of affairs should prevail. I submit that there was no basis whatever for it. The other aspect of it which is also relied on to justify the charge of "vicious," namely, that you would have the colleagues of one man sitting in judgment upon him, that if he functions as a High Court judge he might have his colleagues in the Supreme Court reviewing his decisions. That is possibly not absolutely the thing that one would desire if it were possible to avoid it, but the thing has been happening during the last ten years and we have not heard a word about it from the opposite benches.
Frequently cases have been decided by members of the High Court drawn to sit in the Supreme Court, and you had the particular position which arose in one case in which a Supreme Court judge was unable to sit, owing to very good personal reasons, on a case which lasted three weeks, and a High Court judge was called upon to sit in the Supreme Court and while the court was sitting, the Supreme Court judge owing to the position that prevailed up to the introduction of this Bill, could not be asked to do any other work, and for three weeks he went about without a thing to do. In the Court of Criminal Appeal you have the exact position. When I mentioned this to Deputy Costello, when he was speaking, he said it had nothing to do with it and that it was quite irrelevant. I suggest that it is not irrelevant.
It is not irrelevant to point this fact out—the President of the High Court goes down to Green Street and presides in the Central Criminal Court. Appeals from his decisions come before the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeal is constituted of a judge of the Supreme Court and two High Court judges. The two High Court judges are to sit in review of the action of their colleague in refusing a certificate or on his conduct of the case. That is not a practice that one would desire, but I do not see anything in it which justifies its being characterised as vicious or unsound.
I think it was unreasonable to open this debate on the note on which it was opened. Charges were made upon the slightest justification. That, I suggest, is the case in the reasons given by Deputy Costello. The Deputy advanced to the second charge. The second charge was a wholesale attack upon the return to the system of appeals which obtained under the British. Again, we had Deputy Vincent Rice speaking at the very end of the debate, with the responsibility attaching to a member of the Joint Committee which heard this thing at length. The Deputy is, perhaps, in the best position of any of us here— together with the other members of the Committee who sat with him—to judge as to how far a genuine feeling prevails in the country against the system of appeals introduced in 1924.
Deputy McGilligan does not seem to realise any fault at all in the system introduced in 1924 however unreasonable it is. However, one may argue that the system at present is a better and a more perfect one, but the real answer to that is that the people of the country—and there cannot be any reasonable doubt about it—want a return to the Assize Circuit. Deputy Costello himself says he is a voice crying in the wilderness. His only reason for opposing this provision in the Bill is, as he tells us, that he was always opposed to it. He says it is, in his judgment, a bad system.
The Deputy overlooks altogether the report of the Joint Committee which recommended this provision. I gave evidence before that Committee. I repeat now what I said that time. The fact is that I gave evidence before the Committee with no intention or motive whatsoever save as a representative of the members of the Bar Council. I put before the Committee my views as regards the working of the two systems. I suggested how the system ought to be altered so as to meet the needs of the people and to give better practical results to the man in the street.
My experience as a solicitor for five years—an experience which covered the period immediately before the attack upon the system of the British courts— was put before the Joint Committee. I was one of the leading lights myself in breaking up the Assize system in Mayo. I was able to bring to the notice of the Committee my experience of the Sinn Fein courts which I was responsible for organising in the West of Ireland. I subsequently organised the Sinn Fein Land Courts, of which I was one of the judges. I was one of those who drafted the constitution of the Republican courts. I want to point out now that the provisions in this Bill are a much nearer approach to the constitution of the Sinn Fein courts than the system which some people imagine is approximating to that. It approximates more closely in this way that it took some of the names which I envisaged for our courts and applied them to the system introduced in 1924.
Our system was that of a judge going down from Dublin to the county towns and dealing with appeals from the district courts. That is the system which is embodied in this Bill. At the time I gave evidence I had eight years' experience at the Bar, and I had a practice which enabled me to bid goodbye to the county courts. I said to the Committee that I did not view with any pleasure, nor does Deputy Rice nor any other member of the Bar view with any pleasure, the prospect of having to go down to the county towns; we do not view it with any more pleasure than do the judges. I told the Joint Committee that I did not like the prospect of having to go down there twice a year on circuit. At the same time I said that the appeal system though opposed was very popular. It was very popular for the reason which I gave for the success of the district courts.
One of the reasons given by one of the biggest solicitors in the country for the success of the district courts is that it has an appeal by way of rehearing to the Circuit judge. One of the reasons given for the success of the old Assize system—and in the words of the Chief Justice it was not an English system at all, it was really unique—was the rehearing of cases. I was speaking as a solicitor who practised for five years and who had County Court and Assize experience. I take it after all that the system of the appeal to the Assize judges was quite popular with the country people for the reason that they were able to get a quick decision. The Assize came round at regular intervals. As is intended here, a rehearing took place. They had the benefit of having the case tried by one of the High Court judges from Dublin.
I think anybody who reflects on it will agree with me that if you are to have, as Deputies Good and Haslett said, increased respect for the Administration, nothing will help to do it more than sending out High Court judges through the country. I was quite sincere in the evidence I gave to the Committee. I know it causes discomfort to most of the members of the Bar having to go round on circuit. I have been talking to solicitors who were unanimous in their expression of opinion that this Bill is wanted and that this is the proper way in which a system of appeals should be arranged. Taking it all in all, this Bill is considered, by those who are competent to judge, as a quite good and excellent Bill. So much for what a Deputy has called "the vicious and unsound principle" behind the Bill.
When we had to adopt the recommendations of the Committee, we decided to abandon the recommendation that there should be two judges in the rehearing of appeals. I know that there are a good many people who favour two judges as a court of appeal. Deputy Vincent Rice has put forward very strong arguments in favour of two judges. I think I may give my own views about that. I am quite against having two judges hearing appeals. I hold that an appeal to a single High Court judge is quite sufficient. I have none of the recollections that some members of the Bar seem to have about the ill-treatment which cases got from the single High Court judges hearing appeals at Assizes. I recollect that they went faster, that they did their work more quickly. The net issues were raised on appeal. Very often it was quite simple and easy for counsel who appeared to know what were the points to be dealt with. The case was presented in a simpler way to the single judge of the High Court.
During my time these judges were very competent. There were one or two exceptions who were great cranks and less competent to give a proper judgment than the County Court judge. But, taking it all in all, it would be much better for everybody to have a single judge going down to the county towns than to have two judges dispatching the business. The single judge on Assize is as likely to give satisfaction and be as acceptable to the great body of litigants as two judges.
From my own experience I think the two-judge tribunal is a bad one, despite the reasons given, which do, undoubtedly, carry a good deal of weight in its favour. A High Court judge in Dublin is allowed to sit as a judge of fact in a case involving any amount—it may be £250,000; there have been cases in the High Court involving that sum. As regards the decision of a single High Court judge hearing on fact, it is almost impossible to reverse it and, unless some extraordinary circumstances in connection with some unusual and gross mistake are submitted, his judgment on a question of fact is final. Does it seem reasonable to say that he is not a better judge of fact than, or that he might at least be given the position of reviewing a finding of fact of a Circuit Court judge? I think in practice it will be found that the single judge is a satisfactory tribunal. I agree with Deputy Haslett that the presence of two judges is a more impressive tribunal, but it is a much more difficult one to plead before; it is a much less expeditious one, because it will take more than double the time a single judge will take. I do not think there is so much in the objection to the single-judge tribunal as some Deputies seem to think. In fact, I may say that if I were to be left free to choose between one and two judges, with the question of economy out of it altogether, I would unhesitatingly plump for the single-judge tribunal.
There was another thing with which Deputy Costello dealt, the transfer of minors and lunatics from the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice. I do not know whether he included that in his wide sweep of vicious and unsound principles. If he were aware of the circumstances, he might not be so whole-hearted and sweeping in his denunciation. I made the matter clear before that was embodied in this Bill. The Chief Justice was approached and the matter was discussed with him and the Chief Justice expressed his willingness, provided certain safeguards were given, such as that there should be one judge delegated to deal with lunatics and minors. I have no hesitation in agreeing with what Deputy Costello said about the experience of persons concerned with lunacy and minors during the last ten years—that the Chief Justice has shown the most extraordinary care and interest in the wellfare and the well-being of every minor and person of unsound mind coming under his care. The system at present has the virtue that there is continuity, that there is a certain judge in charge of these matters, and I have certain doubts as to whether it is advisable to make this change. But I want Deputy Costello to understand that this change is not being made in any sense whatsoever as criticism or by reason of any suggestion that the Chief Justice has not carried out his functions with regard to the administration of lunacy and minors to the utmost satisfaction of everybody who has had any contact with his court. He himself was aware of the suggestion that this change was to be made and he offered none of the violent objections that were made by Deputy Costello.
Another matter which was trotted out here as an exhibition of the mentality of the Government, showing them up in a bad light and revealing their anxiety to deal a blow at the independence of the judiciary, was the position with regard to district justices. I felt amazed when I heard some of the statements that have been made. Surely there cannot be any question as to the fairness and reasonableness of this proposal. The President has explained and defended it in detail, and I do not know that any words of mine are needed to convince any Deputy open to conviction in the matter that the proposal, far from trenching on the independence of the district justices, as a matter of fact commits the control of them to two judges, one judge of the Supreme Court and one judge of the High Court—the President of the High Court and the Chief Justice. They are two members of an advisory committee. Deputy McMenamin talked at length and I do not know whether he was really aware of what the present position is. Some other Deputies do not seem to have realised that a distinction has always been drawn between the district justices and other judges. In the 1924 Act the district justices were singled out for separate treatment. A certificate from the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice was all that was required to remove a district justice, provided the removal was for misbehaviour, misconduct or incapacity, or the usual grounds upon which a judicial personage could be removed.
Giving my own experience, that particular provision is a most unsatisfactory and unworkable provision. The section is lacking in any clear indication as to what is to happen when the certificate is given. We have had a little experience of the working of it and, speaking personally, I found the onus thrown upon me as executive officer of the Government placed me as Attorney-General in a most difficult and awkward position, and I am to some extent responsible for transferring the burden and the responsibility to two judges of the courts. And yet the thing is attacked here in a most thoughtless, unreasonable and unfair manner as indicating a willingness and an anxiety on the part of the Government to get control simply because, in the course of my opening remarks I said, and I think I was quoted by Deputy Costello as saying, that the Government wanted a middle course in dealing with district justices.
An examination of the provision will show that, first of all, a complaint has to be made. A committee then investigates it and no step can be taken by the Minister for Justice unless on the recommendation of the advisory committee. The burden of Deputy Dillon's argument was that the provision which enabled something less than removal to be inflicted as a punishment on a district justice was trenching on a principle, and once the principle was trenched upon there was danger. Now, I suggest that is not so. I suggest that while the control of the district justices is ultimately vested in two independent members of the judiciary, it cannot be suggested that the Executive has any way of getting rid of an undesirable district justice unless he desires to go, that it has no means of punishing him by transferring him or reprimanding him unless the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court or either of them joins with the Attorney-General in agreeing upon a definite course of action. Some of the Deputies suggested that they were waiting with interest to hear what I had to say about it. But I think myself that the provisions of the new section are admirable.
Comment on this
Does not the Attorney-General think it gives abundant power to the Minister for Justice to persecute a district justice by continually reporting him to this advisory committee?
Comment on this
I heard the Deputy say that, but he can do that at the moment. Can he not complain every day if he wishes to the Chief Justice and to me and let us consider whether or not we shall issue a certificate? He can, as I interpret the position. There have been very few instances, in fact I think only one instance, since we came into office, in which a district justice was dealt with under that provision. The way in which the tribunal is worked is that a complaint is made by the Minister, and if the complaint prima facie reveals a justifiable ground for calling upon a district justice to explain his conduct in a particular matter, he is called upon to explain his conduct.
Comment on this
I should like the Attorney-General to explain sub-section (2). Is not that sub-section going beyond the functions of the district justice in his official capacity?
Comment on this
A great deal of this debate has been what one might call a Committee Stage debate.
Comment on this
"Whether in the execution of his duty or otherwise"— whether in his office or outside his office.
Comment on this
I do not want to enter into a discussion with the Deputy on this matter. It is more appropriate really to the Committee Stage. We are only now on the principle behind the thing. I make this remark, however. It is not suggested that a judge of the High Court, for instance, would not be put on the carpet here by a resolution introduced about him if he conducted himself in some manner ill-befitting a judge outside his office. Surely it is perfectly proper, if you admit the principle of control, at all, that you should not confine yourself to behaviour while sitting on the Bench, and that you must have jurisdiction to deal with him for conduct outside that? I am sure that on reflection Deputy McMenamin will see that that is an absurd objection. I do not think I need deal with what has been treated as a very important question, namely the majority verdict. Apparently, I was so vague in introducing this that I was unsatisfactory to Deputy McGilligan. However, he has had his say upon it and he has had his usual pleasure of ransacking the volumes of the Dáil Debates and producing the statements of Deputies here to confuse them and I suppose he has gone away to bed happy.
There are some things which Deputy Costello suggested with which I am possibly in agreement. They are not in the Bill. He suggested that we might consider that under the Judgments Extension Act a judgment given in England can be executed here, but that there are difficulties as regards the execution of an Irish Free State judgment either there or in the Six-County area. It is not perhaps appropriate to this particular Bill but it is a matter that should perhaps be considered. I also agree with him about the question of enabling arbitrators to give costs. That had already been mentioned to me. I do not know whether it is appropriate to deal with it in this Bill. I am told that it would take five or six sections to do it properly and it might possibly more properly be the subject of another Bill.
One matter he criticised very severely was the distinction drawn between the appeal in jury cases and the appeal in non-jury cases in the Circuit Court. We had some words as to what the present position was. He seemed not to be aware of the fact that there is a section in the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, which does draw a distinction between the appeal in a jury case and the appeal in other cases heard by the judge alone. The present system requires an appellant or a person who seeks to vary the finding of the jury in the Circuit Court to move by way of notice of motion for a new trial, and the grounds upon which he may move are set out in the section— I think it is Section 96. It is a section the existence of which a good many people are not aware of. Apparently Deputy Costello does not appear to be aware of the distinction between the two forms of appeal. As I said to him across the House when he was discussing the matter, the section in the Bill is really a reproduction of the provisions of the 1924 Act with regard to appeals in jury cases. There is a difference in it, I admit, on examination, and perhaps he may have been referring to that. It allows the judges on an appeal at present from the verdict of a jury in a Circuit Court case not alone the ordinary power which the court has, on a motion for a new trial, of sending the case back for a new trial, if they think the verdict is against the weight of evidence, or if any of the other grounds prevail which can be relied upon, but it also enables the court to set aside the verdict altogether and enter judgment for the appellant on the notes.
I do not know if Deputy Costello's suggestion is that that should be embodied in the section, but when we come to deal with the section in Committee that can be appropriately discussed if it merits consideration, and possibly the position of juries in the Circuit Court, as we are told by some judges, that possibly juries could be dispensed with in the Circuit Court in civil cases. This may not be welcome to a good many Deputies, but the view is taken that owing to the fact that we are now giving a second hearing to litigants in the Circuit Court the desirability of having a jury available is not as great as it was. I am sure Deputy Good will have present to his mind that on certain occasions there is great danger that the work in the Circuit Court in Dublin will be held up by notice being served requiring juries to hear cases. A case that might be disposed of by a judge in an hour or two takes one or two days before a jury and this leads to the congestion which the Deputy complains of. That is a matter which can be more appropriately dealt with when we come to deal with the section in Committee.
Comment on this
What about Section 21? Has the Attorney-General anything to say about giving more than £300 damages in remitted actions? That will have a tendency to increase the congestion.
Comment on this
I have noted what the Deputy said. I do not know whether it is reasonable to expect me, at this stage, to deal with all the points raised on the different sections. I think that was dealt with by some other speaker. The suggestion is that while the section does not explicitly suggest that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts is to be increased the trend and the effect of it is to increase the jurisdiction. I do not think that is so. If you examine the section as it stands and read it in the light of the judgment on which motions to remit are now heard—the Hosie versus Lawless decision—there is nothing to indicate that a person moving to remit an action to the Circuit Court must not bring himself within the terms of that decision. If it happens that the person who is moving to remit satisfies the court that the case is a proper one to be tried in the Circuit Court, and it turns out on the hearing in the Circuit Court that in truth and in fact more than £300 damages should be reasonably awarded, the section is to enable the Circuit Court to award these damages.
It is reasonable to imagine a case in which while a judge listening to the motion in the High Court is satisfied that the case is proper to be tried in the Circuit Court, using his judgment on the amount of damages that would probably be recovered and so on, it may turn out, in fact, when the evidence comes to be given that £300 is an unreasonable amount, and that damages of £400 or even £500 should be awarded. If I recollect the section correctly, it is to enable judgment to be given in the Circuit Court for a sum in excess of £300 in such cases.
Comment on this
Because the High Court judge has made a mistake you are opening the door and increasing the congestion in the Circuit Court.
Comment on this
Does not the Deputy agree with me that if a High Court judge has exercised his judgment on the application to remit a case, and he turns out to be wrong, it is a very severe punishment on the litigant that he cannot get the extra damages to which he is entitled simply because the High Court has underestimated the liability which would be incurred?
Comment on this
It is a matter for the Committee Stage, and I will discuss it with the Deputy when it comes up on Committee. Deputy McGuire dealt with the question of district justices. I think I have already dealt with that matter, and I do not think I need say any more in regard to it at the moment. He also complained of the absence of any provision for an action against the State. Some other Deputies also referred to the desirability of making the State provide for costs in aid of poor prisoners. As a member of the legal profession I have not the slightest objection to seeing the State providing more money for litigation, but I think the Minister for Finance would receive that proposal very doubtfully. In any case it is one which appeals to a good many. I think the President also referred to it when speaking. It is largely a question of ways and means. In any case I do not think it is appropriate to this Bill. If it is to be considered, it should be made the subject of a separate Bill.
Deputy Burke and, I think, Deputy Geoghegan touched on a matter on which nobody else touched. They asked that we should provide in the Bill for an appeal from an order binding to the peace. That has been a sore subject for a number of years, but it is not a very big matter. It has been a cause of complaint, but the reasons why an appeal from an order binding to the peace has not been granted flow from the particular nature of the jurisdiction which enabled a justice of the peace formerly—a district justice at present—to order a person to give security. As judges or justices it came within their jurisdiction to ensure that order should be maintained in the particular area from which they were drawn. If it is thought by the Dáil that there should be an appeal, it may possibly be considered by the Minister, but at the moment I do not think it is quite appropriate to this Bill, which really is supposed to deal with the machinery of the courts, and that particular type of legislation is more appropriate to a Bill dealing with summary jurisdiction or criminal administration generally.
I think I have already referred to one or two of the matters dealt with by Deputy Dillon. His complaint about the provision in regard to district justices is that the judiciary should be above reprimand. I do not see eye to eye with him. I think that the penalty of removal is a very serious one. While the fact that a penalty is extremely severe makes a person who wields the power hesitate to execute it, you very often might have quite a different situation, when a man offends to such an extent that the person who wields the power considers that he should be dealt with in some way, and, if that is the only way to deal with him, removed. I think it is preferable that there should be a minor form of punishment—that transfers should be available, or that the minor punishment of reprimand should be available.
As I pointed out already, in dealing with that particular section, their removal, transfer, or reprimand can only be administered after the Advisory Committee—which, although it is described as an Advisory Committee, really wields the power, and the Minister is merely an executive—has recommended it. The Minister's jurisdiction, as Deputy McMenamin pointed out—I do not know whether by way of criticism or otherwise—is confined to exercising the prerogative of mercy. He cannot inflict a greater punishment than the Advisory Committee recommended; he may inflict a lesser one. The difficulty which the Deputy pointed out does, of course, arise; you cannot transfer a man if there is nowhere to transfer him to. The Deputy worked himself into a great state of excitement about where a man was to be transferred to. If he only reads the section he will see that the very provision to which I have just referred, enabling the Minister to substitute one form of punishment for another, meets the case. That is one reason for giving the Minister discretionary power, even after the Advisory Committee has made a recommendation that a justice be transferred.
Comment on this
The Attorney-General does not propose to deal with the question of costs in general?
Comment on this
I do not know what the Deputy means by dealing with the question of costs in general. I should have said this in dealing with the appeals, that, as Deputy Vincent Rice said, my own experience was that the system of appeals formerly was infinitely cheaper than the present system. I believe—I may be wrong in this—that when this new system of appeals is in working order there will be a reduction of at least 50 per cent. of the amount appeals will cost the litigants involved, and in particular cases the decrease will be much greater. I do not know if that is the aspect to which the Deputy refers.
Comment on this
The Circuit Court costs were fixed by rule. I am aware that one of the solicitors commenting on this Bill drew attention to the fact that the costs in the Circuit Court are unduly high. From what I have heard that would appear to be so. The costs are high, but it is a matter for the Rule-making authorities. The stenographers' note is a matter with which, I think, I need not deal. It has already been promised that the question will be considered. I do not know if anything else that was said is of such importance that it calls for comment at this stage. I think almost any other provision in the Bill which was touched on by speakers would be more appropriately dealt with on Committee. I have referred to what I think are the principles which are behind the Bill. As Deputy McGilligan said, I think, in the course of his speech, it may be that when you balance one system against the other it will be found that you will not get better results from one than from the other, or that it is difficult to see which will give better results. I think, as I said in the earlier part of my speech, it is also of very great importance that before this Joint Committee—which went into the matter at great length, and heard the evidence of witnesses drawn from all parts of the country— there seemed to be hardly a dissenting voice amongst those who spoke for the ordinary litigants throughout the country against the request that the system of appeals then prevailing should be altered.
As far as I know—and I have had some discussions about this matter since the time the Bill was first mooted, we have had questions in the House, we have had Deputy Anthony, time after time, asking when were the recommendations of the Joint Committee to be given effect to—I certainly know of no change of attitude in any part of the country in regard to the matter. I believe that solicitors throughout the country, members of the Bar and the public generally have been waiting for this change to be brought about. It had to be brought about some way and it is better to have the thing done now, as the President said, if it is going to be done at all. The two main changes made by the Bill—that in regard to the Supreme Court and the alteration in regard to appeals—have been justified by the arguments advanced. There has been a state of uncertainty about this matter for a long time. People have been expecting this Bill, and I think that we may as well make up our minds that under any Government the proposals with regard to these outstanding matters would be precisely similar to the provisions which are contained in the Bill.
Comment on this
Question put.
Do you agree with this result?