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Dáil

Public Business. - Courts of Justice Bill, 1934—Recommittal (Resumed).

Contributions 1–132 of 271. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Bill Courts of Justice Bill, 1934
Enacted

No. 50 of 1934 ›

Mr. Burke

When this amendment was before the House on the last occasion I said that I proposed to challenge the whole section. Let me say, before I make any further remarks, that there are a few tactless district justices who at times are very fond of delivering moral homilies censuring the Government and making extra-judicial statements instead of administering the law as they find it. In fact, they sometimes go so far as to censure the Legislature itself. That, I believe, is entirely wrong, because their business is to administer the law as they find it. I do say that no officers of the State are entitled to greater security of tenure than district justices. They live within their respective bailiwicks. They are in touch with all the people, and are at the mercy of every disgruntled blackguard who has any grievance, or fancies he has a grievance, against them. Under these circumstances, I submit that they are entitled to the same security as the Circuit Court judges and the High Court judges.

What is the meaning, and what is the object precisely of this section? Is it to degrade district justices to a position of servility, to deprive them of all independence, and, as it were, to make them the subservient tools of any Government that may be in power? I ask Deputies to go carefully into Section 51. It provides that

"The Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General shall constitute an advisory committee for the purposes of this section, and when acting as such committee shall have full power to inquire into and investigate in such manner as they think proper, whether by examination of witnesses or otherwise."

In other words, the advisory committee may hold an inquiry, or some Star Chamber proceedings, and act on some unofficial report from some disgruntled person in the country. That, in my humble opinion, is against every principle of justice. The section goes on to say:

"The Minister for Justice or any member of the said advisory committee may at any time bring to the notice of the said advisory committee either of the following matters in relation to any particular justice of a District Court, that is to say

(a) the fitness of such justice to continue to hold his office having regard to his mental or physical health or

(b) the conduct of such justice (whether in the execution of his office or otherwise) either generally or on a particular occasion."

These provisions place a district justice in a very unenviable position. In other words, the advisory committee can inquire into all his acts, either inside or outside the court; for instance, where he has spent the evening, what he has been doing during the night, has he been playing cards or attending a dance that perhaps has not been sanctioned by the court of the land; has he been doing something that does not meet with the approval of this advisory committee? Suppose he goes down the country and puts a bit on a horse, as I am sure the Minister for Justice sometimes does, is that to be brought against him? It may be against the law.

Comment on this

Only if he loses.

Comment on this
Mr. Burke

It may be brought against some particular district justice who has been doing his duty but who, perhaps, has been doing it in a manner not satisfactory to whatever Government may be in power. The section goes on to say that these matters may be brought before the advisory committee and investigated by it. It does not say that the district justice is entitled to be represented by counsel. to call witnesses or to cross-examine those who may be produced against him. That, in my opinion, again is contrary to natural justice, because we always heard that it was laid down not only under the moral law but under the law of the land that to hear every side is essential to a proper decision.

There is a further sub-section which provides that the proceedings of this advisory committee shall not be questioned in any court of law in the land. I put it to the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice, who are more conversant with these matters than I am, is that a fair provision to put into the section? Is it fair to put any man who is in the dock at the mercy of a tribunal consisting of three people, I do not care how impartial and fair and how desirous they may be to act bona fide—is it fair to entrust his future existence, his career, to such a tribunal without giving him any opportunity of appearing either by counsel or in person?

Then there is a provision here that a district justice may be transferred from one district to another. The transfer of a district justice from one area to another is, in my opinion, the most manifest fault in the section. Whatever be the decision of the advisory committee that it is proposed to set up, if a man is transferred from one district to another he goes there with a blot on his title; he goes there, as it were, a man under a cloud, and he will be an object of scorn and attack for every Fianna Fáil or other political club in the district to which he is sent. Under the circumstances I think this section is a grave blot on the whole Bill. In all sincerity I appeal to the Minister for Justice and to the Attorney-General to consider it carefully before they attempt to put it on the Statute Book.

There is no reason why district justices should not get the very same rights as the judges of the Circuit Courts and the higher courts. They are men, most of whom have done their duty fairly conscientiously and with advantage to the public. By this measure you are more or less passing a vote of censure on the whole of them. You are exposing them to an inquiry of a most searching character, an inquiry which, I believe, is not sanctioned by any code of law in any part of the world. I suggest that the district justices, in view of the responsibility of their position, should hold office by the same tenure as the judges of the Circuit Court. I hope the House will give serious consideration to the suggestions I have put forward.

Comment on this

There was a good deal of criticism passed on this particular section on the Second Reading and at a subsequent period and I think I have gone a fair distance, at any rate, to try to meet that criticism. The provision that complaint should be made on a motion of the Minister for Justice has been altered so that a complaint may be made by any member of the committee as well as the Minister for Justice. Further, if the committee decide that a person in respect of whom the complaint is made is deserving of censure—that provision has been amended and it now provides that that should be conveyed, not by the Minister for Justice, but by the secretary to the advisory committee. It is also provided that the Registrar should act as secretary.

The Deputy has referred to the transfer of district justices. Transfer as a punishment has definitely been dropped. What it does mean, if the Deputy sees any cause for complaint in it, is this, that where, owing to the personal circumstances of a justice, the committee are satisfied it would be difficult for him to exercise his functions in an area, they may recommend his transfer. I am sure the members of the last Administration are aware of the fact, as we are aware of it, that certain justices did find considerable difficulty in areas to which they had been allocated. I know the cases of two or three district justices who have from time to time made representations to my Department that it is very difficult for them to adjudicate in a particular area, and that arises from personal circumstances in that area. It does not mean any reflection on the justices concerned. It means that through having become related to certain people in the district they feel their decisions are sometimes subject to criticism. That is the only reason I have for keeping that part of the section there, that the transfer might be dealt with by the committee for that purpose.

There has been a good deal of watering down, if I might so call it, between what appeared on the Second Stage and what appears in the Bill now. There was one point made by Deputy Burke and I can see the force of it. It has relation to the words "or otherwise." I am quite satisfied with the wording that is in the 1924 Act and I am prepared to leave it at that. On the next stage of the Bill I will meet the Deputy to that extent. There is no desire to inquire into a man's personal activities, whether on the dancing floor or on the racecourse or anything like that. There is no desire to interfere and there is no intention to interfere in any way and the words "or otherwise" may be taken out. Indeed, the whole phrase can be taken out and the words of the 1924 Act substituted.

Exception is taken by Deputy Burke that the decision of the advisory committee cannot be tested in a court of law. A similar provision is in the 1924 Act and I think it is very desirable that such a provision should be here. I do not think it desirable that a committee constituted such as this committee would be should have its recommendations tested and bandied about afterwards in a court of law. To get to the main feature, when the Constitution was being drafted a line was drawn between High Court judges and Circuit Court judges as against district justices.

Comment on this

In the Constitution the Circuit Court judges were left out; they are not protected by the Constitution; they are only protected by the Courts of Justice Act but not by the Constitution.

Comment on this

Yes, that is right, but I know it had been contended by Circuit Court judges, for what reason I do not know, that they were really High Court judges. That contention was made then, and I think that contention is still being maintained.

Comment on this

They are judges.

Comment on this

The contention is that they are High Court judges. However, the provision was made that the tenure of office of certain justices was to be provided by law. The Courts of Justice Act was passed in 1924 and that provided the tenure of district justices. I see very little difference between the provisions in this particular section and the provisions as they obtained in the 1924 Act, except that I would suggest that there is a greater safeguard for the district justices under the present Bill than there is under the 1924 Act. In addition to the two persons, who, under the 1924 Act constituted the committee, we are now having the President of the High Court. In that way, you are leaving the district justices in the hands of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General, as against leaving them as previously in the hands of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General. I think that must surely take away any real criticism that could be directed against it. Whether we like it or not, it has been the experience of our predecessors and it has been the experience of ourselves —very rare experience I admit—that reason for complaint does arise. Such a provision was considered necessary in 1924. With the experience we have had since such a provision is considered necessary still.

Comment on this

The Minister has gone into points which I felt would be better discussed under the next amendment. I think amendment No. 79 was aimed mainly at the constitutional position, or at least at the constitutional position as verified by law, and I just want to know what is the difference that is now made. The amendment is in a form borrowed from the 1924 Act where this phrase is there applicable to the judges of the Circuit Court, the position being that under the Constitution judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court are not to be removed except for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, and then only on a vote or resolution passed by both the Dáil and Seanad. There has been a change, and I think they are now at the mercy of an ordinary majority in the House. It is believed that they are not. At any rate, there was a constitutional provision with regard to the safe keeping of judges in their position as far as they were members of the Supreme Court or the High Court, and in 1924 the Oireachtas decided to give the judges of the Circuit Court the same protection. Now, as long as the 1924 Act remains in its present form they have the same protection as the Constitution gives to the other judges. Of course, they are subject to the disadvantage that that Act can be repealed by an ordinary majority and, therefore, the Circuit Court judges may be put again in an inferior position. They are not, however, cut out of the Constitution, and I think it is the argument of members of the Circuit Court that Article 69 indicates that all judges—without mentioning whether they are Supreme Court or High Court or Circuit Court judges—are to be independent in the exercise of their functions and subject only to the Constitution and the law. I think an attempt is made so to construe that as to carry judges of the Circuit Court via Article 69 into 68. Possibly a not very successful attempt has been made so far. There has been no strength in the argument, because there was no strength needed in the argument; Circuit Court judges have been given protection under Section 73 of the Principal Act.

The movement here is, at any rate, to give to the justices of the District Court that protection via the Act to the Constitution that is at the moment given to judges of the Circuit Court, and I have never been able to understand why any discrimination is made between the position of justices of the District Court and judges of the Circuit Court. It was the bone of contention at the time the 1924 Act was going through. It was the point upon which there was the biggest conflict, and I think the position of the district justices before this Principal Act reached the Seanad was weaker than it is in the Principal Act as it remains at the moment. As I say, the big struggle that there was with regard to the 1924 Act was in relation to the position of the justices of the District Court, but although the Act was passed in that form I do not understand why the justices of the District Court are to be put in an inferior position; why they should not be given, through the law, the protection which, through the Constitution, is given to the higher judges, namely, that they are only removable for incapacity or misconduct and on resolutions by both Houses, or whatever is the substitute protection that there is at the moment. I am not regarding it as much, because I do not think it is going to last long. There is still the idea of preserving the independence of the judiciary, and I want to include in the judiciary the district justices.

I do not see any point of principle in discriminating in this way. The whole object of this immunity from rather summary removal is in order that people may have confidence in the courts. Why should they not be allowed to have the same confidence in the integrity of the lower branch of the justiciary as they have in the higher branches? Why should they not be subject to removal only on obvious grounds of misconduct or incapacity, on resolutions of the Dáil and the Seanad or whatever be the substitute protection at present applicable? Why should not the same protection be applied to the district justices? They do very much the same work. One wants to have the same independence for them. One desires to have the same judgment, unbiased by the thought that their salaries or their positions may be interfered with by an Executive that does not like them. Why should we be less suspicious of interference with regard to the judges of the lower courts than with regard to the others? I think we should try to ward off all interference with them, and allow those men to carry out their duties in the same independent way and with the same fortification under the law and the Constitution as is given to the other people. If one were to take only, say, the number of hours they sit, the congestion of their courts, and the variety of matters they get down to, it will be found that they do a very big amount of work. Multiply their work by the number of them through the country, and it will be clear that the work of the District Court, while not being so important, covers a greater variety of cases inside a limited sphere than there is in any other branch of the courts. The justices of the District Court are nearer to the people. They are meeting them on a more definite footing. There is less of the pageantry of the law creating a barrier between the district justices and the people. They are closer to them; they are living amongst them. Why should we not have it accepted in regard to those people that no Executive will interfere with them? Why should we not have it accepted with regard to them as much as we have it accepted with regard to the judges, who are far more removed from the people? I think those men whose jurisdiction takes them so close to the people ought to be allowed to act according to their own consciences and their own ideas of duty. I know the argument will be made that there are not the same exceptional qualifications required from the members of the District Court as are required elsewhere. That is so with regard to, say, experience of legal matters, but we surely expect the same character. In those people we want the same integrity in passing judgment as we do in the case of the others. There is no point of principle that I can see in this matter of urging discrimination. The principle leans the other way. We should fortify those people as much as possible.

I do not like to open up another matter, but still it must be spoken of. I do not think there has been any unhappy experience with regard to the District Court. The District Court has now been in existence some 12 14 years. There are more district justices, and therefore, as far as that implication goes, there is a bigger possibility of error having occurred or of indiscretion having occurred in regard to this branch of the courts than any other. I do not want this matter introduced and discussed and examples given one way or the other, but I should like to ask the Minister to make up his mind whether there has been any such unhappy experience of the justices of the District Court as would warrant him in the making of discriminations of this sort. Is there any reason for having a toghter rein on the judges of the District Court than on the others? I think there is not.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

There is a good deal of force in what the Deputy says with regard to the difficulty of drawing a distinction between the various branches of the judiciary, and I quite agree with him that we must expect and that it is essential that we should have from the district justices the same independence and integrity that are expected from the judges of the other courts. But the Deputy will realise that there has been a distinction drawn between courts which are of the status of the District Courts and courts of the status of the High Court and the Circuit Court. Now, the Circuit Court is linked up with the High Court in getting the same protection which the Constitution gives to the High Court judges.

We find the district justices provided for in the manner in which the Courts of Justice Act of 1924 provided. We do not find that the Committee investigating this matter made any recommendation in regard to such a change as is suggested by Deputy McGilligan. As regards the district justices themselves, I know that they have contended for a status which certain Departments have not been ready to grant. But as regards their tenure secured to them by Section 73 of the old Act, I do not think there is any complaint or any dissatisfaction amongst the justices themselves. I was in contact with them over this Bill, and while they resented some of the provisions in the section as it originally stood, they did not press for the tenure which Deputy McGilligan says they should have—that is, a tenure exactly similar to that conferred upon the High Court and Circuit Court judges. Some district justices, in fact, said to me that they would prefer the tribunal before which they would be brought to having to go before the two Houses of the Oireachtas. I do think that this matter was considered very carefully. The whole position of the district justices under that section was most carefully considered at the time the section was drafted.

Naturally, having been one of the members of the tribunal set up under the 1924 Act, I was very much concerned with the discussions as to whether amendments were required in the law and what particular amendments were required. The Minister may be familiar from his contact with the district justices throughout the country, with the manner in which they discharged their duties. But by virtue of my position on the tribunal I am in a position to say how far the conduct of the district justices has been brought before us by way of complaint. I think I am right in saying that since I took office I have had only to deal with three complaints against district justices. The tribunal as it stood I think was quite satisfactory to the district justices. They realised that these considerations which were referred to by Deputy J.M. Burke, and on which he relied to justify a change in the section, were present to the mind in particular of the Chief Justice, whatever may be said of the Attorney-General. The Chief Justice occupies an independent position. He is alive to the necessity for preserving the independence of all persons who exercise judicial functions. I can assure the Deputy that it would startle the Chief Justice or the President of the High Court to be told that in a matter of such moment as the case of complaints against a district justice which might lead to his losing his office that he might not be heard. Now, it is a cardinal principle of all justice that you must hear both sides. I doubt if any Deputy would suggest that it is necessary to put anything like that into the section. There was nothing in the earlier section. This jurisdiction was entrusted to the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice with full confidence that in trusting to their experience and their realisation of the necessity of preserving above all things the independence of the district justices, the district justices would get a fair hearing from the tribunal. That tribunal has now been added to. I am sure that everybody in the House will approve of the addition to the tribunal of the President of the High Court. In that tribunal we have now two judges, the Chief Justice who presides over the Supreme Court and the President of the High Court. They rank in that order of precedence under the Courts of Justice Act. They are the highest rank amongst the judges of the courts, and to them is now committed the task of investigating complaints against district justices. The machinery of the tribunal as set up in the earlier Act is unsatisfactory because it has no registrar. That is being remedied in the Bill here. The objection which Deputy Burke made against the section as regards the grounds upon which the scope of the investigation into the district justices' conduct might take has been met by the Minister. He agrees that in (3) (b) the words which are in the old Act shall be incorporated and that a district justice shall only be removed upon the same grounds upon which he could be removed hitherto. That, I think, should meet that objection.

One difficulty which the committee has had is this: that sometimes the committee had brought to its notice complaints about the conduct of district justices which impressed the committee to the extent that they would wish to reprimand a district justice. Sometimes the district justice exceeds what the committee think is his province. He does things or says things which the committee think he ought not to have said. At the same time the committee would hesitate to take the strong course of suggesting that he should be removed from office. That has been met in the section by conferring on the committee power to censure the district justice. That point has come out in every criticism here, and while the criticism I have had of the committee suggested to me that it was a proper provision to put in, I can quite see that there is the other point of view, as I think the Minister for Home Affairs said at the time when the Act was going through or when the conduct of a district justice was brought up here in the House. He said you have got to accept the position when you put in a man into a judicial office that you have got to take the chance as to how he behaves himself, and that if you were wrong in your judgement as to the type of man you had appointed, and if he did things of which you did not approve, that you must put up with that and that it was better to allow a district justice here and there to say or do things which were not becoming his post than to take power to censure or punish him for indiscretion. I think that while there is weight in that objection, the House ought to be satisfied to entrust to the committee which is here set up the jurisdiction of dealing with district justices, confident in the belief that the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court, who will be in the majority on the committee, will not recommend that a district justice should be censured unless he has done something which, while not going the length of being misconduct, is unbecoming to his office and likely, if allowed to go uncensured, to do public injury.

Most Deputies will agree that it is against the public interest that a district justice should traverse the bounds of what we should expect of persons in a judicial capacity and venture indiscreet remarks about things which are not proper to his province. Some Deputies may say that once you allow that to be done it is difficult to draw the line. The only answer I make to that is that you must entrust to such a committee as this the task of finding where the line is to be drawn. It is undoubtedly true of the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court that they would be both alive to the necessity for preserving the independence of district justices, and that they would not recommend even that a man should be censured unless his conduct was such that any reasonable person would agree that he ought to be told that it was unwise for him to be guilty of the particular conduct complained of and that he ought not to repeat it.

Those are the considerations which weighed with me in connection with the framing of this section. The Constitution draws a distinction, I think, between the Supreme Court, the High Court and courts of local and limited jurisdiction. Whether that distinction should be given effect to by putting the district justices on a different level from the other persons who exercise judicial functions is a matter of opinion. It is one, I think, of no practical concern in connection with this matter because, whether there were two Houses who had to pass a resolution, or one House with a certain defined majority, my own experience of the district justices who came to discuss the section is that only one district justice has expressed the view that this tribunal is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with complaints against district justices.

There are many other matters in connection with this section which I suppose we will have to deal with on other amendments. Deputy Burke has taken advantage of this wide amendment to travel over the whole area of the section. The Minister has already dealt with his objection to the transfer of justices. But, again, while theoretically it may be possible to complain that sub-section (8) vests in this committee the power to interfere with district justices and that the fear of such interference may operate to make a district justice less independent than he was previously, I suggest that the Committee, consisting of the highest judges in the land, is the bulwark and safety against an unfair operation of the section against a district justice. I see doubt upon Deputy O'Sullivan's face, and he possibly does not agree with me on that. But there have been drawn to my attention, as the Minister said there have been drawn to his, cases in which that procedure would be eminently desirable in the public interest. I suppose in these matters it is the public interest which counts. It is in the public interest that we have the independence of judges, and anything that interferes with it has naturally to be considered very cautiously and should not be adopted without very serious consideration. It is to the committee, which is charged with this task, the Minister must go if there is any suggestion about a district justice owing to his personal circumstances in relation to the district to which he is assigned. If it is found that the due discharge by him of his duties would be rendered difficult in that particular district, action may be taken if the committee think that such a complaint is justified. It is unlikely that the committee, consisting as it does of judges of the standing I have mentioned, will ever act except in a case in which any reasonable person, having regard to the particular circumstances, would consider it was in the public interest that action of that kind should be taken.

Comment on this

I suggest that the Attorney-General should read over his speech and see whether he brought forward even one reason for discriminating between the tenure of the other judges and the district justices. I listened to him very carefully and I do not think there was a single reason adduced in his speech for discriminating between the tenure of office of these people.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

What I intended to convey was that we found it so and no reason was given to us to change it. We have built upon the old structure.

Comment on this

You kept to the old structure. Merely because it was there in 1924, it is being kept on now. The Attorney-General's sole argument was that when the original Courts of Justice Act was being put through the House in 1924 that distinction was made.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

There seems to be a distinction in the Constitution.

Comment on this

Not with regard to the district justices.

Comment on this

There is some distinction in the Constitution so far as Circuit Court judges are concerned. Why the discrimination? I am glad to see that the Government are so extraordinarily conservative that merely because the thing is so, or has been so, or that the Act was passed by us, that is sufficient reason for not changing it. I suggest that there is a certain amount of experience to go back upon in the last year. Why should the House put these district justices on a lower level from the point of view of their judicial capacity—not as to the type of case they are to try, but as regards their judicial value? Why degrade them? It may have been done in 1924 but is there any excuse for continuing it? I think on the whole district justices have given as much satisfaction in the conduct of their business as any other branch of the profession, whether it be the Circuit Court, the High Court or the Supreme Court. I think the Attorney-General will agree with me in that, if he reads over his speech, if that is not putting too great a penance upon him. I think he will agree that the arguments he brought forward tell as much against every other branch of the judicial system as that of the district justices. He has brought forward no argument at all for continuing this matter. Why then keep it?

The great bulk of cases in this country come before the district justices. The ordinary citizen is more in touch with the district justice's court than most of the other courts. I think the aim ought to be to elevate that particular court in the eyes of the people. Whatever is done in respect to District Court cases concerns the individual more than any other class of case. It is precisely in the case of district justices that there ought to be the feeling that they are above any kind of influence from the Government or anybody else.

I listened carefully to the Attorney-General to see what justification would be given for this provision in the Bill, and all he did was to assert that he is continuing it from the Act of 1924. I take particular objection to the point which he made in his speech when he said that undoubtedly district justices sometimes forget themselves. Am I to understand that the ordinary individual does not feel that judges sometimes forget themselves? They are human; nevertheless it is felt that the whole of the public interests benefits from the fact that they should feel they are independent. Why not give the same independence and the same tenure to district justices as is given to the judges of the Circuit Court who have, in the Constitution, not one whit better standing than the district justices have? The Constitution cannot be put forward as any objection. Now you propose to bring district justices before what is a court and try them. The public have the greatest confidence in their courts; still you are going to try them. It is very easy to bring them before a court no matter what the court decides. The Minister for Justice has power to bring them before a court. That is the position, and it is the very reason why you should put district justices on the same level as other judicial personages in this country.

This is not a question in which there is any Party principle, one way or the other, involved. That is quite clear. There may be, and always will be, in the Department of Justice, and in every other Department, a tendency to extend control more and more. The Department of Justice has a certain control over district justices that it has not over others. It will be anxious to keep that; every Department is anxious to keep its control, but that is not a reason for keeping it. A stronger case could be made, from the practical point of view, for the independence of district justices, than even for the independence of the Supreme Court; because you are dealing with a greater mass of people who are interested, some of them fairly ignorant so far as judicial independence is concerned. I know the Attorney-General, when dealing with matters of this kind, in this House, seems to show that he never meets any people in the country except saints. He never heard of perjury being committed in this country except on very very rare occasions. The ordinary person believes that justices or judges can be interfered with. I do not believe they can. God help the person who tries to interfere with them. But, then, if there is this idea that they can be controlled by Government, even to the extent of being brought before a court—because that is what, it amounts to—you are going to weaken and not to strengthen the system and practice. That is why I think this ought to be changed.

What the Attorney-General should do is to bring forward some justification for putting district justices on a different plane. That is precisely what he failed to do. Not a single argument has he brought forward in favour of that course, and I suggest that is what he should have turned his mind to. He deems that the Government is justified in taking a certain course merely because it was done in 1923 or 1924. If the Government uniformly adopted that policy I do not think they could go on any sounder lines; they would be more often right than wrong. But that is not what they do. They pick and choose. Sometimes they put forward the plea that they are only doing something that was done in 1923 or 1924. They say "that is what we are doing now," and they ask "are we not justified seeing that it was done in 1923 or 1924?" But that is what the House is here to determine.

There have been three complaints against district justices. How many complaints, let me ask, would there be against any judge, in any country, if complaints were encouraged? Probably we would be overwhelmed with them. The Attorney-General must know perfectly well—it may be through weakness on our part—that the people of the country are not prepared to believe that the justices always act as a kind of automaton on purely judicial lines. That view does not prevail. It could not prevail here or in any other country. Naturally you hear criticism of district justices. Naturally you hear criticism of the other judges. But why are they alone capable of being called to account? Why not a court for the other judges?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Is not this a court? Cannot they be brought here?

Comment on this

I am sorry if that is the Attorney-General's idea of a court. This House a court!

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Cannot the judges be brought here on resolution?

Comment on this

Precisely. I was going to deal with that. They could be brought here for a very serious matter, for complete removal, but not for censure. There is that difference. What are you going to do? You are going to have the power of nagging at these people, making them subservient. Even if you have confidence in the court the fact that they may be rashly brought before the court is bad. What is the Attorney-General's objection to letting them be brought before the Oireachtas for removal? What is the objection to them any more than to the other judges? Why does he put the other judges so to speak on a higher level from that point of view? My contention is that if anyone was to be put on a higher level it is precisely the judges who come so much into contact with the ordinary litigants. Before the Minister for Justice asks the House to consent to this he really should try to justify different treatment. After 11 years' experience even the present Government could learn something, and the mere fact that a Parliament, just coming into being, which had begun to function normally, took certain steps then, is no justification for not reconsidering the whole question.

Comment on this

I want to make one net point in this business in favour of giving district justices the same tenure of office as that of Circuit Court judges. To my mind the attitude of the judges as between two litigants is pretty safe. We have no reason to apprehend that any serious miscarriage of justice could arise even if the Government had power to interfere. The principal reason we give constitutional protection to judges is to provide a bulwark between a tyrannical government and the citizens. You find constant reference all through history to the rights of individual citizens being vindicated by judges, as against a government that tries to take these rights away. The Attorney-General will agree that that is the real source and origin of the elaborate safeguards that are provided for the judiciary. As a matter of fact, a very large number of State prosecutions come before district justices.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Practically all.

Comment on this

Quite so. One sees very frequently Revenue cases in which district justices feel it incumbent upon them to take a very independent attitude. They frequently criticise very adversely the Revenue Commissioners and differ very trenchantly from the interpretation which the Commissioners wish to give to the law. We see cases under the Trade Boards Act and a variety of minor prosecutions of that kind coming before district justices where it is of importance to the individual citizen that his rights should be vindicated. It frequently happens that the case from the point of view of the Government is quite a small one, and they think that it should be disposed of with dispatch, and without very serious consideration, as a minor offence, although giving rise to a very heavy penalty, whereas the individual citizen feels that it is not the penalty that is at stake, but the question of whether he has broken the law or not. He is anxious to vindicate in a court of law that he has not transgressed. In order to do that he may seek to make the case that the Government or bureaucracy is trying to interfere unduly. To that extent unquestionably the independence of the minor judges is of minor avail. If he feels that the district justice might be hauled before a court, such as is envisaged in the 1924 Act and in this Bill, it might reasonably be felt that the district justice would be reluctant to vindicate what appeared to be a very trivial claim. That district justice might say that instead of coming into collision with a Government Department, and possibly having a row at which he would have to appear before the Chief Justice and the High Court, he would fine this person, even if he did not think he had been guilty of anything other than a technical breach of the law.

Instead of the unpleasant consequence of taking a strong attitude against a resolute Government Department, a district justice might be induced by the threat of being called before a committee for censure to scamp justice by branding a person as one who had broken the law when, in fact, he felt that a very strong case might be made for him, the Government Department condemned and the citizen vindicated. I make that net point because I am painfully conscious of how difficult it is for men, in the face of Cabinet Ministers and permanent officials who are concerned with getting a job done, to remember the legitimate feelings of individual citizens. It is extremely hard for the Attorney-General, who is handling hundreds of prosecutions in the year, and who is frequently called upon to make grave decisions involving enormous penalties, and who has to decide whether prosecutions are to be proceeded with or abandoned from want of evidence, to remember that a fine of 1/- on a man who has never been convicted in a court of law may be a very grave consideration. It may give rise in such persons to uncertainty and uneasiness, if they feel that the independence of the judges before whom they will be brought is any way sapped or interfered with. As Deputy O'Sullivan stated, it does not appear that the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice in their research have discovered any very serious case against giving the district justices the same tenure of office as Circuit Court judges. It has seemed to them that they are proposing to leave things as they were unless a strong argument is adduced for changing. I submit that the argument has now been adduced sufficiently to push the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice off that position and saying that the only justification for this distinction between district justices and circuit judges is that distinction which existed heretofore. Unless the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice feel that it is going to do some serious harm, they ought to eliminate any distinction that exists in this Bill. If the Minister for Justice thinks that such a course would do serious harm, then I think he ought to tell us the nature of the serious harm that he apprehends.

Comment on this

It is quite obvious that the heart of the Minister for Justice is not in this Bill. I say that because of the speech which we heard from him now, and which was chiefly devoted to telling Deputy Burke that he agreed with most of what he had said. I think he undertook to remove that section of the Bill providing that an inquiry should be made into the conduct of a district justice "whether in the execution of his office or otherwise." I think he has undertaken to remove that vicious word "otherwise."

On the other hand, it is equally clear that the real push behind this section of the Bill comes from the Attorney-General. I must, however, agree with Deputy O'Sullivan, who remarked that there was really only one argument advanced by the Attorney-General in support of setting up this Committee, and that argument was that when he came into office there was a practice in force of distinguishing between district justices and judges of the other courts. That may be so, but what we want to hear from the Attorney-General, who wants us to put this section in, is what good there is in that practice. The contention from this side of the House is that it is a rotten practice and should be got rid of. It is not enough to stand up and tell us that the practice is there.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It is not enough to say that it is a rotten practice unless you show that it is so.

Comment on this

I intended to show that it is so. The Attorney-General told us that it was in the Constitution, that the practice was supported by words in certain Articles of the Constitution. But we had a Seanad in the Constitution; there was an oath in the Constitution; there was University representation in the Constitution; there were a number of other things in the Constitution; and that remark that this practice with regard to the tenure of district justices is supported by the Constitution bears absolutely no weight coming from that side of the House.

The Attorney-General has also told us that so far as he has been able to ascertain from a few district justices scattered here and there throughout the country, they are in favour of this committee. Among 33 justices of the District Court—I think there are 33 permanent district justices in the country—one is bound, of course, to find weak-minded men, men who are not independent in their natures, and men who could not be made independent by any legislation. We have to face up to that, but it is not what district justices want that we are going to provide. It is no argument to say that the district justices are satisfied. It is our duty to see that we have an independent Judiciary, whether the members of that Judiciary want to be independent or not. That is what the Attorney-General seems to fail to realise altogether—that it is our duty to put the Judiciary in its proper place, that is, to make it independent. Article 69 of our Constitution tells us that all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their functions. There is no distinction whatever made between district justices and other judges of the courts.

I do not think the discussion on this amendment should be allowed to come to an end without making some reference to the opinions of the Minister for Justice when he was Deputy Ruttledge. In 1931, speaking on the Department of Justice Estimate, the present Minister for Justice, as reported in volume 38, column 350 of the Official Reports, said:

"We have heard a good deal in this Dáil about the independence of the Judiciary, and about the independence of the courts. We have heard it from the platforms throughout the country, from election hustings, and so on, that the Judiciary stood between the people and the Executive, and that the Judiciary was independent of the Government. We recognise, and everybody must recognise, that the only protection for the people of the country is the independence of its Judiciary, and I think it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find in the records of any other Government where a Judiciary has been interfered with."

Then if I skip certain portions, which the Attorney-General might afterwards read with some advantage, I go on to another passage:

"When the Courts of Justice Bill comes before the House"—

That was the Courts of Justice Bill then pending, which was under the control, I understand, of Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, then Minister for Justice—

"one provision, I hope, will be that the district justices will be on an independent footing the same as the Circuit and High Court judges."

That statement of opinion by Deputy Ruttledge, as he then was, is probably his opinion to-day, because then he was in the happy position that he could argue on principle, and there is really no principle that can be put forward upon which a distinction between district justices and other judges of the courts can be based. District justices do, of course, come in contact with the poorer people of the country, but it is a fact that for every one case tried by High Court judges, there are 40 tried by District Court justices, that is to say, for every one time a High Court judge adjudicates on the rights of parties who come before him, a district justice adjudicates 40 times, and the rights upon which the district justice is adjudicating are just as important to the poor people who come before him throughout the country as are the rights of large insurance companies who come before the High Courts and are able to indulge in the luxury of counsel, and, if necessary, an appeal to the Supreme Court. I should like the Attorney-General to give us some really concrete reason why district justices, judges as they are called in our Constitution, should be placed in any different position from that of any other judge.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

First of all, they are not described as judges in the Constitution.

Comment on this

Article 69.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Secondly, the Deputy seems to have worked himself into a heat about this matter. I think he raised this on Second Reading and he seems to think that there is some sinister purpose behind the sections of the Bill which deal with the position of district justices. I thought it was quite a reasonable answer to give to Deputy O'Sullivan that I found—I did not say it was a practice that I found when I came into office—that district justices held office by virtue of provisions in the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, and that I found nothing in the report of the Judiciary Committee dealing with this matter suggesting that the changes which are now put forward here should be made. I thought that ought to be a fair enough reason for the Government's accepting the position of the district justices as described in the 1924 Act and building upon that.

I have further to draw the attention of the Deputy who has just spoken to the fact that this arrangement as embodied in the 1924 Act was the result of the report of an earlier Judiciary Committee, so that we have at least a tradition, about which we have heard so much in recent debates, crystallised in the report of the Judiciary Committee of May, 1923, the Act of 1924, and the last report of the Judiciary Committee. We have at least that to start with, and yet we are charged from the opposite benches with refusing to do something which all reasonable men ought to have thought about and introduced as a radical change in the status of the various sections of the Judiciary. If the Deputy who has just spoken had proved the word he used about it—that here was something rotten which we ought to change—if he had given any evidence whatever to suggest that there was something so rotten that it could not have escaped the attention of the Judiciary Committee or could not have escaped the eyes of the Minister in examining the position, one might have some patience with the argument.

Comment on this

But it did not escape the Minister. I showed that it did not escape him and quoted his opinion.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I think that from what was stated here to-day and what I said five minutes ago, we both agree that the district justices should be independent. What is argued for here, however, is that we should change them into judges, alter their description, and style them judges and treat them in a precisely similar way to that in which High Court judges and Supreme Court judges are treated. If it were shown to the House that the district justices have suffered from the provisions of the 1924 Act, that their independence has been encroached upon, or that any of the dangers which Deputy Dillon visualised in hypothetical cases had occurred, one might have some reason for offering to consider the whole matter with a view to altering the whole status of district justices. But, as I said, speaking a short time ago, I have had no complaint from district justices, and the Judiciary Committee apparently got no complaints from district justices as a whole to the effect that the position they held and the manner in which their removal might be carried out affected their position or rendered them subject to the control and direction of the Government or of the Minister.

Until a case is made that the existing position puts the district justices in some position where their independence is affected, I do not see why the Government should be expected to make this rather radical alteration, because there seems to me to be quite good reason for regarding the persons who occupy the position of district justices as not on the same level as the High Court and Supreme Court judges. I do see a reason why they should be independent and I do think that these provisions of the 1924 Act secured their independence. As a matter of fact, one district justice said to me that he would prefer the machinery of the 1924 Act to the machinery which was available in the case of High Court and Supreme Court judges. The independence of the district justices is safeguarded and the interests of the public, as regards the independence of the Judiciary, are therefore being had regard to, and why all this fuss and pother should be made about their position, why this belated, eleventh-hour idea, as regards the status of district justices and the alteration of the whole structure of the Courts of Justice Act, should occur to the Deputies opposite, I am at a loss to understand. I did understand the Deputy's criticism of the original sections as actually in the Bill. The Deputy let himself go on the Second Reading in that regard and I think he will agree that all the objections that he then advanced have been met, and he has not made any complaint in that regard. He now, however, has clung on to an amendment introduced by another Deputy, the effect of which would be to alter the whole position and remove points supposed to be regarded as a stigma under which the district justices have been suffering. Certainly, if they have been suffering under such a stigma, they have not made themselves vocal about their position in the matter, and those who went to the Judiciary Committee made no complaint, nor has any suggestion come from the Judiciary Committee that would justify the Government in making this alteration.

Comment on this

The Attorney-General made one or two points that I should like to refer to. The reason the matter was not brought before the Judiciary Committee was that it was considered that the situation had become stereotyped, so to speak, and that there was no way of getting away from a bad position. I know myself, however, that it was a very sore point at the time of the passage of the 1924 Act—perhaps not immediately after the passing of the Act, because the situation was in a state of flux at the time and people had not yet come to realise what it meant to the substantial independence of the district justices—but once it was realised, I think it was a cause of complaint amongst them generally that they had been demeaned in their office, that their title had been demeaned and they held that the change of title was specifically with a view to putting them not in the position of judges and not guaranteeing their independence. I know myself that for years a number of them had that complaint and, as one individual who had very little to do with the 1924 Act and who never could understand why the decision was made, I was hoping that, when the Courts of Justice Bill was being considered, an opportunity would be given at any rate to discuss this matter and get some reasoned attitude in regard to it. I do not know yet whether it is right or proper to put the district justices into the position of judges and give them all the security and tenure the judges have, but I think the onus in that matter rests on the people who seek to put them in a different position. Prima facie, if, as a start, district justices are judges, as such, they should have as much right to independence as other classes of judges and, for the security of the country, they ought to have the same security and independence as other classes of judges.

What I think was a mistake happened in 1924, and I do not think that, because that mistake has gone on for a certain number of years, we should simply leave it alone, and this is the opportunity I have been seeking in order to try to rectify what I consider to have been a mistake. I think the Attorney-General would have some cause to adopt a slightly querulous tone if it was interfering with Section 73 of the Act of 1924, but there is now being brought in a completely new proviso with regard to district justices. Up to date, all that could happen was that they could be removed from office and nothing else. Nothing more could happen. That was the solitary right given and, of course, it would have to be a very bad indiscretion or a continual series of events that would cause a Chief Justice or an Attorney-General to bring up a district justice with a view even to questioning his removal, but that was the only power given. There is now power to censure. Let us take the new situation and this glorious tribunal of which the Attorney-General is so proud. I think it is good, although I do not think it is so glorious as the Attorney-General seems to think, but if it is so good, why not apply this glorious tribunal and the new system to circuit judges? Are they so immune from error where the district justices are not immune?

It is because the Minister for Justice and the Attorney-General seek to impose a new type of penalty on the district justices that I think we should get the opportunity to reconsider the whole matter and find out why the district justices should be put on a lower level altogether. Nobody has yet faced up to this point of the distinction that is made and I think that, incidentally, if the Minister for Justice re-reads his remarks in 1931, on the occasion of the Budget, he may find another argument to the one used by the Attorney-General, but I am afraid he will not find it to be any good to him because he opened that particular attack on the Budget that year with the question of the independence of the Judiciary. On that occasion, the present Minister for Justice asked: "Why all this tripe talk about the independence of the Judiciary?" The Minister at that time stood very strongly indeed for putting the district justices on a footing of independence with every other judge in the country. That was the argument of the Minister for Justice at the time. He was not at all pretending at that time that it was a mere question of independence and that the independence is not being interfered with by reason of this tribunal. The Minister went full tilt at it. The Minister was in the mood then to ask that district justices should be made judges, and that Section 73 of the 1924 Act should be given constitutional construction.

Is there any reason now, knowing the important matter it is to have the judges independent, knowing the duties that the district justices have to carry out and knowing their behaviour over the last 11 or 12 years, why they should not, at any rate, be put on the same footing as the circuit judges at the moment? If they are put on the same footing as the circuit judges they are carried by the circuit judges and by Section 78, more or less, into the Constitution. The district justices and the circuit judges can be more easily removed from the Constitution than the Supreme Court judges or the High Court judges. Why should not the district justices be put on the same level as the circuit judges? I cannot see any point at all arising either from argument in the abstract or from practical experience as to why they should not be put on the same level. I think they should be given exactly the same position.

Alternatively, if we are so enamoured of this new tribunal that the Minister for Justice is setting up in this, why not test it in relation to the circuit judges and get the reactions of the Executive Council to a proposal to have the circuit judges open to censure and not as they are at the moment? At the moment the only penalty that can be inflicted on a circuit judge is his removal from office: a very harsh penalty requiring a very serious state of affairs before one moves to impose it. Why not test out the reactions of individual members of the Executive Council to such a proposal? Let us accept the point of principle that we have a good tribunal, and put the proposal before them that we think it is right and proper that district justices should be subject to a nagging sort of procedure and the possibility of censure: to something less serious than removal. Let us put that on the circuit judges, and if it were put I think there would be an outcry from the generality of citizens in regard to it. I do not think that the people who would object would be at all swayed to like the proposal because of the Attorney-General's argument that, after all, the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court—judges in very superior positions—would never move without there being good reason. If the tribunal is so good, it is good enough for the circuit judges and why not apply it to them? That will not be done because it would be regarded as an absolute scandal.

Personally, I would like to see an amendment to the Constitution that would put the circuit judges as such into Article 68 and with them the district justices. The only thing that makes me halt in coming definitely to a conclusion on that is that I know the present Chief Justice, when he was Attorney-General, regarded this matter of the district justices as an important one. Whether it was a point of view obtained after reflection, whether it was his own point of view or a departmental point of view I cannot say, but the Bill was passed about the 10th April, 1924. I have no knowledge of what were the considerations that prompted the Dáil to accept that position about the district justices. There was not a great deal of argument about it in the Dáil. The argument occurred in the Seanad, and the argument did not take place in the Dáil until the Bill came back from the Seanad. Then definite changes for the betterment of district justices were accepted immediately by the Dáil. That is my recollection of what happened. I cannot see any reason whatever for making any distinction. If there is going to be any change let it be the slightest change. If you put the President of the High Court into 73 as well as the two people who are there, leaving the section as it is, then there is a slightly better tribunal I think because it is more weighted with the judicial mind and has less weight from the political side. We would then have possibly a better tribunal. But leave 73 as it is. It means that the only thing that can be done in the case of a district justice is removal and only for certain things. I think that when making a change you should do it in the proper direction. Even if we cannot give the district justices the full safeguards of the Constitution we can, so to speak, carry them by a side road into the Constitution by equating them with the circuit judges. Incidentally, the Attorney-General said that the Constitution makes a difference even in the terminology of the circuit judges. I do not think that circuit judges are anywhere mentioned in the Constitution.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

They are judges appointed according to law.

Comment on this

The only judges given the title of judges in the Constitution are the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

And other judges appointed according to law.

Comment on this

The only judges to whom the title of judge is specifically applied in the Constitution are the judges of the High Court and of the Supreme Court. If there is any other mention of judges it is by some sort of implication, but there is no phrase relating to circuit judges in the Constitution.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I know.

Comment on this

If there is a discrimination it is as much against the circuit judges as against the district justices.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Look at the last sentence of Article 68. "The terms of appointment of judges of such other courts as may be created shall be prescribed by law."

Comment on this

If that is going to apply to circuit judges it can quite easily be applied to district justices. There is differentiation in the use of the word "judge" which in the Constitution applies only to judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court. It does not apply to circuit judges. If there is a phrase making it applicable to the circuit judges, then that phrase makes it applicable also to the district justices.

Comment on this

It would be very interesting to pursue the matter mentioned by Deputy McGilligan as to whether or not district justices come within the description of judges in the Constitution. I do not propose to follow that particular discussion at all because I think it is entirely futile. I do know that there are a number of people who hold strongly the opinion that district justices are within the provision of the judiciary in the Constitution and that that particular provision in the Act of 1924 is really unconstitutional. I am aware that there is one well-known district justice who holds that view very strongly, and he, I think, put up that view to the Minister's Department. However, that is a matter on which there may be a very wide divergence of opinion. I think it is entirely irrelevant to the present discussion because I think we ought to approach this amendment as a matter of principle. When I came into the House I heard the Attorney-General stating that he had been charged with this and charged with that, but leaving aside all that, I think we ought to approach this entirely as a question of principle, and in the light of the experience that has been gained since 1924 when the new judiciary was established. We ought to forget all about what was in the judiciary report, what the present Chief Justice said when he was Attorney-General, what the present Minister for Justice said when he was a Deputy in Opposition, and all the rest of it.

Let us see if, as a matter of principle and in the best interests of the administration of justice in this country, there ought to be only one integral system of justice in which every branch is united to the other, all resting on the same basis and giving a sense of security in every branch. I regard the fact that I am supporting this amendment as a certificate of my own capacity for looking at the matter from the point of view of principle and not from the point of view of personal prejudice or personal opinions, because I take the view that it would be an excellent thing to remove, transfer or to get rid of altogether certain of the district justices. I entirely sympathise with the point of view which I know to be held, and to be held very strongly for the last ten or 12 years, by the officials of the Department of Justice on the subject of certain district justices. That is the very reason that makes me pause. When I see a district justice, as I unfortunately do occasionally, using his position as a district justice and using the bench as a platform from which to broadcast all sorts of nonsense and pontificate on various matters of morals and public questions as if he were some sort of person in a position to speak ex cathedra, I feel a certain sympathy with the provisions of the section proposed. But I do not think we ought to allow that to interfere with our view of the question of principle and I put the question of principle in this case from the point of view of the public. I know what the point of view of the Department of Justice is. I know what I feel sometimes when I appear before a district justice or when I see in the papers what some of them say about certain matters of public interest; but I do not think we ought to allow that to influence our opinion on this matter.

This system of the district justice, a paid judge, was established in this country as an experiment. It was an entirely novel institution, introduced in 1924, and I think we will all be agreed on this, that it is an institutution which has fully justified the authors of the idea of paid magistrates. It is some compliment to this country that other countries are now adopting that system. They have had the benefit of our experience of this system over the last 12 years and they are copying us. I think we will have in another part of this country, and possibly also in Great Britain, a system based somewhat on the system we established in the Free State. We had been suffering for years here from the old system of removable magistrates. That was supposed to be a very heinous system and a system that one could not possibly stand over in any civilised country. It was a system whereby a person was appointed at the instance of the Executive and removable at the will of the Executive and, consequently, a creature of the Executive. We had the system of Justices of the Peace here which had become an absolute scandal. We have all heard stories of the things the old Justices of the Peace used to do. There was one very famous case where a certain well-known practitioner in the south of Ireland objected to a certain Justice of the Peace who was proceeding to sit on his client's application for a licence or something of that kind. To his horror the client heard his solicitor objecting to this particular Justice of the Peace. Afterwards when he remonstrated with his solicitor outside, his application having been duly refused, the solicitor informed the client that he was keeping the Justice of the Peace for the appeal, which he duly did and he won on the appeal.

That was the system that was swept away, and the result has undoubtedly justified the institution of the district justice, which has, on the whole, been a success. I repeat that the best district justice, the man doing his work best from the point of view of the Government, from the point of view of the public, from the point of view of the litigant and from the point of view of the State, is the person whose name never appears in the newspapers, who never makes a speech from the bench and who is never the subject of certiorari proceedings in the High Courts. Taking them all in all, the district justices have been a success. I was surprised as well as disappointed to hear from the Attorney-General that the district justices as a body have made no protest against the provisions of the Bill as they appeared originally or as they now appear amended.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

They did protest against them originally.

Comment on this

Then I must have misunderstood the Attorney-General.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

They do not object to the section as it now stands.

Comment on this

That is, they have wrapped this particular section around them?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

That is the impression I got. I may be wrong.

Comment on this

Was that merely through relief from the other bad section?

Comment on this

I am relieved to hear that the district justices as a body protested against the original proposals, and it may be safely concluded that they have not made violent protests against the proposals now made, because they are now, as Deputy McGilligan said, relieved at getting something better than that horrible thing that originally appeared in the Bill. These district justices had to concentrate on their own personal positions; they were worried about their pensions, and I am sure the Minister was worried by them about their pensions, their allowances and other matters of that kind. Naturally they concentrated on matters affecting themselves personally and forgot the question of principle when they found something that was considerably improved from the original position. It is a relief to me to know that they protested against the original proposals, because my opinion of the district justices as a body would have gone down very considerably if they had not made a strong protest against the original provisions of the Bill.

Let us look at the matter from the point of view of the public. There is undoubtedly a tendency observable in the legislation of this country for some years past—I will not put it on the period since the present Government came into power; I am prepared to say it goes back beyond the period when the present Government took up office—to increase the jurisdiction of the district justice on criminal matters. District justices have very wide powers under various Acts, emanating from various Departments of State. They have power to put people in prison or fine people very large sums. The original idea of the District Court as an inferior court has been considerably eaten into, on the criminal side at all events.

The Attorney-General said there is quite a good reason to regard the district justice as not being on the same level as judges of the Circuit Court, the High Court or the Supreme Court. I would like to hear him give the reason. He said there was quite a good reason, but he did not give it. I take it the work to be done by a district justice does not require the same knowledge, experience or capacity as is required for the position of a High Court or Supreme Court judge, or even that of a Circuit Court judge. But, subject to that observation, I do not see, at the moment at all events, why there is a good reason to regard them as not being on the same level from the point of view of principle and the provisions of the Constitution as regards the Judiciary. They deal with small cases on the civil side of the court, but even on that side it must be recognised that a £5 process before a district justice is every bit as important to the person suing or being sued on the process as the biggest High Court action involving the biggest legal principles in the High Court is to the parties who would be involved there. Every case is a case of importance to the person involved, whether the amount is small or large. Very often a small case in the District Court is of more importance relatively to the parties concerned than a big High Court action. So I think there cannot be justification on that basis for saying there is a reason to regard these courts as not being on the same level as the higher courts.

Concentrating on the criminal side of the court, I think the public must be considered in this matter. This House will remember—or if the Deputies in the House do not remember they can see it from a perusal of the Official Debates—the efforts that have been made from time to time by Departments—and I am not confining my observations to things that have occurred since the present Government came into office in 1932 —to impose on district justices the duty of imposing minimum fines and minimum penalties in certain cases, demonstrating clearly the lack of confidence and trust that exists in the minds of Government Departments in connection with the administration of the various statutes by district justices. There are numerous instances on record of cases where the present Government, and the last Government —I will include them in order to put this matter on a proper footing— wanted to have it put into an Act of Parliament that district justices were bound to impose minimum penalties. That was something in the nature of a public scandal. It could not be stood over, and should not be stood over by any Government. It was put into some of the Acts of the last Government, and was found to be quite unworkable. But there is that tendency in Departments—whether it is a Bill about cattle or about sheep or about eggs, or whether it is a Bill from the Department of Justice about public safety or criminal justice of any kind— to think that district justices will not see the point of view of the Department, and will not act in accordance with what the Department wishes them to do.

In my submission to the House it is that tendency which reveals itself in this Bill in connection with district justices. They are put on a par with civil servants. They have to retire at the age of 65 years. Their pensions are modelled on provisions of Pensions Acts similar to those dealing with civil servants. Those provisions for removal and transfer, now appearing I very strongly suspect at the instance of some Government Department or another, reveal, as I say, the official attitude that district justices cannot be trusted to carry out what is the wish of any particular Government. When members of the Government are carrying out a policy they cannot see that there is anything to be said against that policy, any more than a person who is appearing in court for a particular party, plaintiff or defendant, can see that the other side has any case at all. He cannot understand why the judge will not decide in his favour no matter what sort of case he puts up. These provisions reveal an effort on the part of officialdom—let us put it as widely as that—to interfere with the Judiciary, and show in my view and in my experience the official attitude of wanting to get their grips on the Judiciary. I do not mind repeating here what I have already repeated in this House that the official attitude of certain Departments of State towards the Judiciary and the legal profession is little short of a scandal.

That is one aspect of the matter, but there is another aspect. There is the case of a person who is brought before the district justice on a criminal charge. The district justices have power to give terms of imprisonment and impose large fines which may seriously prejudice the character and the future of the person involved in those charges. The tendency, as revealed in the Courts of Justice Act, 1924—and as wrongly revealed in that Act—was to discourage appeals from the district justices in certain cases. There was a limitation put upon the right of a person who was charged with a criminal offence to appeal from the decision of the district justice. That limitation, fortunately, was removed by subsequent statutes. I am glad to say that I had some considerable voice in the matter myself. I think, at the moment, the only decisions that are not capable of being appealed from are in regard to certain matters under recent Bills, and also with regard to binding to the peace. There is some doubt about sending to a reformatory. I think I tried to cover that under some of the latest statutes. I intended to do so, at all events, whether it is covered or not. That tendency again shows the official mind as revealed in those sections. and that is why I have such a strong objection to the proposals as they are outlined here in this Bill. I do think that from the point of view of principle, whatever our personal prejudices in certain cases might be, it would be far better that the judicial system from top to bottom should be one integral whole, that it should be bound together by the same links, and put upon the same basis.

Comment on this
Division

Amendment put.

Tá 36
·
Níl 63
Result _

Do you agree with this result?

I move amendment No. 80:—

In page 20 to delete Section 51 (1) to Section 51 (9), inclusive, and substitute therefor the following sub-section:—

Section 73 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by inserting the words "the President of the High Court" after the words "the Attorney-General" where the latter words twice occur in the said section, and the said section shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Several amendments hang on amendment No. 80.

Comment on this

No; amendment No. 80 is entirely different. I do not think there will be very much debate on any of them because we have gone over the ground already, but I look upon amendment No. 80 as separate in itself. If there is going to be any change let it be the minimum change, adding to the tribunal that is going to adjudicate on offences of the district justices. Abolish all those series of clauses which undoubtedly tend to create the impression that the district justices are to be under a microscope all the time and that they are to be harassed and censured. To this matter that they are to be censured I am entirely opposed. If you are going to create the impression on the public that you are going to censure them it will undoubtedly mean that a great many more complaints will be coming forward. Some other amendments have relation to this. I have an amendment to take out the Minister for Justice as the person who can send forward complaints. As long as the Minister is in there and there is the possibility of having the district justice censured all these busybodies who have axes to grind and find these axes blunted will all be writing to the Minister for Justice. There may be Ministers who will send forward complaints to this committee and have matters brought before them that should not be brought at all. If we are not going to let them have the tenure of certain courts of justice, let us not fling open the door too widely to frivolous objections and complaints against them. I know that the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court will not entertain many complaints. But the Minister can send them forward. The result will be that a lot of people will take pleasure in even getting so far as having the complaints sent forward.

Comment on this

That is the argument I was going to make and in which the Deputy has anticipated me that the committee will regulate its own procedure as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 51. This advisory committee are not going to be hauling up before them a district justice on some trivial or vexatious complaint put before them. They have power to examine the matter and, if they think there is very little in it, or at least nothing that deserves the formality or otherwise of an inquiry, they are not going to harass the district justice. I can also say that if there were complaints going to flow in in that way, knowing that only in very rare cases could such a complaint be justified, knowing that that would be the normal and is the normal position, the committee would not regard them seriously and would, in their own procedure, take such steps as they considered necessary to prevent a continual recurrence of that kind of thing. I do not think there is any danger along the lines that the Deputy has in mind.

As regards the question of censure, it is a pretty desperate decision, if I may use the word, to deprive a man of his position in that way, or remove him. I have always felt that it is very useful to have some sort of minor or middle course. Whether it has continued as the practice or not, we do know that it might have been related to the argument on the previous amendment. A number of these district justices are young men when they are appointed. At any rate, they have not the mature experience or the legal experience of barristers who are appointed as Supreme Court or High Court judges. It is often useful that some censure or warning could be given where a district justice has been indiscreet or something like that, instead of having to take the very extreme course of depriving him of his position. I think, therefore, that the middle course is a very useful one and that, far from being a source of danger, it is going to be a source of safety for the people who might be involved.

Comment on this

I am against this general principle of imposing what I call this humiliation on district justices and having it paraded in an Act that they are to be open to censure when the Circuit Court judges are not. The qualification for appointment as a Circuit Court judge is ten years as a barrister, and for a district justice six years as a barrister or solicitor. The Minister, I am sure, is not demeaning his own profession by thinking that people from the ranks of that profession will be guilty of this. I do not think that four years will make a great difference. If the Minister gets his colleagues into consultation I do not think he will find it is the young men who have to be lectured when discipline has to be enforced. It is not in the early years that there is any great prospect of anything going wrong; it is rather when a man gets hardened a little in his office.

We have refused the proposal to put district justices on the same footing as Circuit Court judges. Very good. They are now subject to the control of the tribunal under Section 73. It may be changed by adding the President of the High Court, but why add all this long list of matters making it clear to anybody who likes to read the Act that the district justices alone of all people on the Bench may be censured? If there is this intermediate matter set out about censuring it is going to be made clear to people that there are lesser matters which can be urged in objection against the district justice than may be urged against the Circuit Court judge or High Court judge. I do not think that is for the good of the courts.

Comment on this

I agree with Deputy McGilligan that the very fact that these provisions are put in a Bill dealing with the courts of justice is a censure on our own judicial system. I do not care in the least about particular individuals who are to form the body of district justices, but the fact that these elaborate provisions have had to be put in 12 years after the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, came into operation is in itself a censure on our own judicial system to anybody reading the Bill, or the Act, if it becomes an Act with these provisions. People who are studying our Constitution inevitably deal with our judicial system. Books have been written on our Constitution and incorporated in these books have been articles dealing with our judicial system and the judiciary and a number of those articles, which have dealt with the judicial system set up in 1924, have commented favourably upon this new system of district justices. It looks as if we ourselves, with 12 years' experience, have come to the conclusion that there is required statutory authority to keep members of that portion of our judicial system, known as district justices, under some sort of disciplinary control; in other words, that we believe, and put it upon record in a statutory and permanent form, that experience renders it necessary to keep the whip over district justices. That is a bad thing and it ought not to be put into the Bill, even if the conduct of district justices during the 12 years had called for such a provision, unless there was very grave abuse that required to be curbed or cradicated.

I think the Minister has an open mind on this subject. I think he is carrying out the official view and acting the part of an advocate, and that the Attorney-General is doing the same. I am not acting the part now of a politician in pressing that the Minister should accept this amendment. We do not hope to secure anything by this. The very fact that there are not a dozen people in the House and that the Press, when they are reporting this debate in the morning, will say that there was another long and tedious instalment of the Courts of Justice Bill, shows the very great interest taken in this Bill, important as it is to every citizen; so that we get nothing out of pressing this point, but rather the contrary. I think that the Minister ought to accept the amendment and that he can accept it without sacrificing any principle. Not merely will he not be sacrificing any principle, but he can show himself to be open to argument by dropping the very objectionable provisions that appear in the Bill and accepting this amendment, which will put the position back again to what it was in 1924 with, perhaps, a little strengthening of it.

I remember the late Professor Swift MacNeill, when lecturing us on constitutional law and the independence of the judiciary, referring to an instance of a rebuke being addressed to a judge by a Home Secretary. Notwithstanding the fact that the principle of the independence of the judiciary is so well ground into the British Constitution and such an integral part of the Constitution, there is on record an instance of a British Minister addressing a rebuke to a High Court judge and getting away with it.

We have control in the Dáil over the judiciary. We will have complete control over them when the Seanad is gone. Why then put on record, in a Bill of this kind, that in the view of the Legislature of this country, after an experience of 14 years, after working a judicial system which has at least, commanded some admiration, in respect of the district justices portion of the system, and that has commanded considerable respect in other portions of the Commonwealth of Nations, that we want such a provision? Why, with all that experience, should we want this degrading provision to keep our justices within bounds? I think it is a blot upon the Bill. In practice I think it will be no use at all, because I do not think the President of the High Court and the Chief Justice will ever be got to give a majority opinion censuring a district justice. No matter how serious the charge I think a body of that kind would hesitate to censure a district justice. I think the removal of a district justice must inevitably follow from a censure of this kind.

If this committee is to be of any use whatever, censure of a district justice would be only a preliminary to his removal. I think, therefore, that because of the fact that a person occupying the position of Chief Justice or the President of the High Court will be prevented from acting against one whom he regards as a colleague, although in a different scale of the judicial hierarchy, and will hesitate so to act, this will be, more or less, a dead letter. It will never work in practice; it will never be put into practical execution; and it will be a blot upon the legislature and will give permanent from to what would be regarded as the opinion of the Government that district justices require something to keep them in order.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Some Deputies will probably find this a very tedious discussion. We lawyers do not. I think Deputy Costello has wasted no time in making the point, on this section, that he has made, and I think he has made a very effective argument in favour of his point of view. While there is a great deal to be said for what he urges I differ from him in his view as regards the practical value of this provision. I may say, as I said in answer to Deputy O'Sullivan earlier. I can see a number of arguments directed against the section on the ground that it contains this provision. It may be looked upon as a blot, on the section, that it is necessary to state in black and white that the committee will have power to censure a district justice. I can see the force of the argument that it might invite persons to file vexations and ridiculous complaints, or to bring to the attention of the Minister matters which without this provision in the section would not be brought to his attention, and that it might become a medium for both harassing the Minister and the district justices. At the same time, experience convinces me that it is a reasonable thing to have provision there to enable a tribunal to administer a rebuke where the conduct of a district justice has been such as to merit disapproval by the members of the committee, but where they would hesitate to recommend that the district justice should be removed. That weighed with me in agreeing with the Minister in introducing this provision.

I think the Minister has an open mind upon this matter, and that there is a great deal of force in what Deputy Costello has said. But the Deputy has not shaken me away completely from the view I have, that, having regard to the constitution of the committee, and the preponderance of members on that committee, entirely removed from any Governmental control, that anyone who is dealing with this will recognise at once that there must be a genuine cause of complaint to be recognised by it, even if it gets through the Minister's hands at all, and that there must be something very serious to merit censure, not to talk of removal.

All this will counteract the dangers the Deputy fears as following from the system. I do not think that commentators will regard it as any serious reflection on the working of the system as hitherto in existence. That consideration is not of serious moment. It must be remembered that the type of work district justices have to do is different from the work of the other courts. I think there is justification for this and it is not altogether fair to say that this provision is the work of officials of the Ministry of Justice. It was considered very carefully. I do not know whether the Minister is prepared to think over the points the Deputy has made between this and the Committee Stage.

Comment on this

Before the Minister commits himself one way or another, may I make one observation? I do not want him to commit himself without hearing this last point of view. I do feel strongly upon the section. I think the Attorney-General will agree with me that, whereas there have been some instances where even he would like to administer a rebuke to district justices, yet, there have not been such abuses of their position generally by district justices as would urgently call for this section. This is not the last Courts of Justice Bill that will be introduced by the Legislature of this country. It is not the last Bill we will have dealing with legal reform. I make this offer to the Minister, that if at some future time the facts are such as require the passage of a Bill containing provisions of this kind, I will support a proposition of that kind. I think the facts at the moment do not require it and that this provision can at least be postponed for another Bill.

Comment on this

The position in any case is that something would have to be put into this Bill. It has been pointed out that until now Section 73 of the 1924 Act was there. Even if the committee could certify, it does not state who is going to remove or who has the power to remove. Something of that kind has to be put in to tighten it up, from the experience that has arisen. I did my best to try to bring in various things in view of the criticism that was directed against this and to meet these criticisms as nearly as I could. I fully agree with Deputy Costello that there is not anything like general complaints against district justices. For from it. The contrary is the case. I emphasised all through that it is extremely rare for anybody to have any reason to comment on or to make complaints against district justices. We are all satisfied about that. On the other hand, it has been the experience of the present Attorney-General that there will arise something which does not affect the overwhelming majority of the other district justices, something that cannot be dealt with in a particular way. It has never been the desire that district justices should be hauled up before this committee on every whim or complaint made by someone in the country. It might be possible that at some time such a thing could happen. I could not realise such a thing arising. I am prepared to reconsider the question of censure, but something will have to go in to clear up the position that has obtained. I will consider the suggestion of Deputy Costello before the next stage to see if I can go any further to try to meet him.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 81:—

In page 20, Section 51 (1), line 12, in Section 51 (2), line 20, in Section 51 (3), lines 22 and 23, in Section 51 (4), lines 30, 35, and 41, in Section 51 (5), lines 51 and 53, in Section 51 (6), lines 57 and 59, in page 21 Section 51 (8), line 17, and in Section 51 (9), line 31, to delete the word "advisory".

This concerns a small point dealing with the removal of the word "advisory" wherever it occurs. The section seems to me to set up a committee but to give to the Executive the power of controlling the committee. I realise that a tribunal cannot be given the right to remove; that will have to be done through the Government of the day. It seems to me that the word "advisory" indicates that the Executive Council need not carry out what the committee says. The word "may" is used. That, I think, will surely introduce an element of politics into the whole thing. If you are going to have these people removed the certificate should carry. If a man is reported for grave misconduct he is given an opportunity to resign. If he does not resign the phrase "may be" is used. Take sub-section (6) (b). I want to cut out that it is an advisory committee. If you are to have a committee let its word go. If it certifies physical infirmity or misconduct it gives a man an opportunity to resign. Do not have the Executive Council sitting in judgment further.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

What is behind that is leniency.

Comment on this

We are to have machinery set in motion and the judicial people will consider and report. Suppose that the Chief Justice takes up a case of what he thinks is misconduct or bodily infirmity, or that the Committee find and certify that there is either misconduct or infirmity, why should the Executive Council be allowed to say "no"? Why continue that man in office? I want to get the impression that this is not an advisory committee but a committee that will certify.

Comment on this

It does not matter.

Comment on this

If the certificate operates without any intervention by the Executive Council and gives a man a chance of resigning, that is proper. If he does not go he ought to be made go.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

And the Deputy's point is to meet it by amending (b).

Comment on this

Yes, that would probably do. That is the substantial point there.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

That the Committee's recommendation must be acted upon?

Comment on this

I move amendments Nos. 82 and 83:—

82. In page 20, Section 51 (1), lines 16 and 17, to delete the words "referred to them under this section or".

83. In page 20, Section 51 (3), line 21, to delete the words "The Minister for Justice or".

The only reference that can be made is by the Minister for Justice.

Comment on this

And the Committee.

Comment on this

They would be authorised to take it up. I want to get it that any member of the Committee can take up a matter on his own volition. I think it is unwise to have the Minister for Justice put in the position of being the channel for communicating objections to district justices before this Committee. Let it be done by a specific point being brought before judicial persons or the Attorney-General. I would rather have it done by judicial people. If there is no channel via the Minister I think it will stop foolish complaints.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Would not this provision tend to stop foolish complaints rather than otherwise? They must go through the Minister for Justice.

Comment on this

Surely not. Do you mean to tell me that people will not write more absurd things to any Minister than they would write to the Chief Justice of the High Court?

Comment on this

That is a very different thing when you have no opportunity of knowing what has inspired them. As regards complaints against district justices, surely the Minister for Justice knows something about these people. He cannot be misled to the same extent as he might be about complaints with regard to certain other things. Surely the Executive Minister should be the channel through which some complaints come.

Comment on this

He must know about them in the end. There is not a great deal in it.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It would only mean that the Minister would have to write back to the complaint saying that if he wanted to make a complaint he could make it to the committee.

Comment on this

If the Minister for Justice could act as a barrier against complaints going to the committee he performs a useful function. People who might write to the Chief Justice would not write to the Minister.

Comment on this

In the same way the committee would be relieved to some extent by having a secretary. It is hoped that the secretary will relieve the committee of frivolous complaints.

Comment on this

The feeling about sub-section (2) is that, so to speak, in this Bill we are putting in all the paraphernalia of arranging for registration, and it looks as if there is going to be an inundation of complaints. It is almost a new duty cast on the Registrar of the Supreme Court to act as secretary.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It is merely put in because of the necessity of setting up machinery.

Comment on this

Would it not be regarded as very definite criticism of the whole district justices group if there was more than one complaint a year? Yet, we are to have machinery and a secretary.

Comment on this

It is for the purpose stated.

Comment on this

In reference to amendment No. 84:

In page 20, before Section 51(4) to insert a new sub-section as follows:

A justice of the District Court may at any time make complaint to the said committee about any matter affecting the said justice of the District Court in the discharge of his duties and the said committee shall investigate, consider, and report on such complaint in such manner as they deem expedient.

This was put down to draw attention to absurd cases brought against district justices. I am not going to proceed with the amendment now.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 85:

In page 21 to delete Section 51 (8). What is the purpose of sub-section (8)? It says:

...consider that the personal circumstances of such justice rendered the due discharge of his duties difficult in that particular district...

Comment on this

What I have in mind is—and I think I mentioned it earlier —that there have been at least two district justices asking to be transferred from their areas. There has been no complaint from anybody but themselves, but they say that they find it very difficult when they have relations pleading before them. I do not see that this is going to help us very much because I see a difficulty unless we can get some other district justice to exchange with them. I am merely putting the provision in so that if the opportunity does arise, we can try to meet their wishes. The solicitation has been going on with the Department for a good while. I thought Deputy Costello might be aware of it, but perhaps it did not arise in his time. Since I came into the Department, however, at least two district justices have emphasised that it is not fair to them to keep them in particular areas.

Comment on this

Such personal circumstances as relatives is one thing, but I can throw my mind back to cases, although I was not supposed officially to be the channel of any communication or complaint, of district justices who wanted to get out of a particular district because of the difficulty of educating their children in that district. When you boiled the thing down, it meant that there was rather a drift towards Dublin on the part of the district justices.

Comment on this

That is not the purpose of the provision.

Comment on this

Would not the section empowering the Executive Council or the Minister for Justice to transfer a district justice to another area with their consent meet the situation and look less objectionable than this sub-section appears to be on its face? The expression "personal circumstances" might be interpreted by an evilly-disposed person to mean something very much different from a mere desire to get out of one district into another. I do not want to give any particular instance of what I could visualise certain people as conceiving the personal circumstances to mean.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The provision the Deputy suggests is actually contained in Section 49 (2).

Comment on this

Then the Minister's point is met, and there is no necessity for this sub-section. There is some thing suggestively hasty in the expression "personal circumstances," and I think the sub-section should be left out.

Comment on this

There is this point that while some justices might find themselves embarrassed and bring it to our notice, complaints might arise in regard to a justice who might have been embarrassed but who did not want to leave the area. That would be a matter for the committee to consider.

Comment on this

I think the Minister might reconsider that sub-section altogether in conjunction with the rest of us. "Personal circumstances" is a very objectionable phrase.

Comment on this

We will consider it.

Comment on this

With regard to my amendment No. 86:

In page 21 to delete sub-section (51) (9), I should like to know what is the purpose of the sub-section, about not having these matters questioned or made the subject of proceedings?

Comment on this

It refers to testing it in the courts.

Comment on this

There was no such safeguarding provision in the original measure.

Comment on this

It follows the 1924 Act.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The last sentence of Section 73 was "No such certificate shall be questioned or made the subject of proceedings in any Court."

Comment on this

That is the certificate in relation to removals?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The certificate given by the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General.

Comment on this

Might I draw the Minister's attention to one point which may or may not be of importance? There does not appear to be any power to put witnesses on their oaths. There is power to examine witnesses but there does not appear to be any power to examine on oath.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Does the Deputy suggest that it is necessary?

Comment on this

Even a High Court judge has no power to administer an oath except in relation to proceedings before him. I am not particularly anxious to have it in; I just draw the attention of the Minister to it. In addition to that, I suppose there will be a qualified privilege to anybody who gives evidence before that Committee, but there is no absolute privilege attaching to it. Perhaps it is better that there should not be privilege attaching to it so as to prevent people making false allogations.

Comment on this

It is certainly not a judicial proceeding and not anything to do, say, with the conduct of this House, so where is the privilege?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The fact that a statutory power is conferred on the Committee to investigate complaints protects anybody making any complaints to them.

Comment on this

There would be a qualified privilege, and possibly it is better that it should be that way, because, if there is a complaint made maliciously, it is proper that the person should be dealt with and that the person against whom the complaint was made should have a remedy.

Comment on this

Does the last phrase "no report of this Committee shall be questioned" mean that slander or other actions could not be founded on the report?

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

That would not touch anything that happened in the course of the investigations. It deals only with the report.

Comment on this

They cannot be questioned themselves but they cannot be made the subject even of any proceedings.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I think that could not by any stretch be said to cover any of the proceedings. However, I am sure all this is academic.

Comment on this

I think amendments Nos. 89, 94, and 95 can be taken together.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 89 on behalf of Deputy MacEoin. The principle underlying this is more or less the same as that underlying my own amendment No. 94. I rather anticipated what I would have had to say on these amendments in the remarks I made on the section dealing with district justices. I feel very strongly that, in respect of any order of any kind made by a district justice, there should be an appeal to the circuit judge. There is no appeal, or at least it is believed that there is no appeal, at the moment from the district justice who makes an order binding people to the peace. I can conceive that in certain circumstances the jurisdiction of a district justice to make an order binding to the peace is very advantageous from the point of view of the maintenance of order, but some district justices are rather too apt to use that power. Some who have been district justices have made use of that particular piece of machinery as a method of doing substantial justice in a case in which perhaps they ought to have given another decision. I think quite seriously that there ought to be an appeal from an order binding to the peace.

I do not know why the idea got abroad that this particular exercise of judicial discretion is something apart, something sacred, and that it should not be touched once the discretion has been exercised. I am sure that the Minister and the Attorney-General know that it has been decided that the exercise of the power to bind to the peace is of a particularly punitive character. According to the Chief Baron, at all events, it is of a very punitive character, and cases where orders binding to the peace were made were often given the benefit of certiorari where otherwise they would not, and I think there are actually decisions to the effect that the evidence in respect of which the order was made, could be reviewed on certiorari in cases where they could not be reviewed in ordinary proceedings by certiorari. I do not know where the idea of selecting orders binding to the peace from the right of appeal grew up, but it became very firmly rooted in some people's minds. Even in the Act of 1928, although I thought I had it covered when pressing my own point that every order should be appealable from a district justice, apparently the point was not covered. I thought I had it covered at the time and I want to have it covered now. I think that to allow district justices to have unlimited discretion tends to make them autocratic, even though their jurisdiction is limited. I hold that it is not right that there should not be an appeal from the district justice. Normally, it is not right that there should not be an appeal from every court, if that were possible. I should like to see an appeal from every court, if that were humanly possible, but of course, that cannot be the case as there must be some final court of appeal. However, although we recognise that there must be one final court of appeal, we always wish there were another higher court to appeal to. Where you have far-reaching powers exercisable by the district justice, powers affecting the pocket and person of the individual, I think that in every case there should be the right of appeal to another independent mind. I think that there should be full liberty to appeal.

On the specific point covered by my own amendment, I feel very strongly also. I do not think that the discretion is very often exercised wrongly by district justices, but at the same time it is exercised occasionally in cases where the facts do not justify a conviction but where the district justice says to himself: "Although I cannot convict this fellow, I do feel he is deserving of some sort of punishment and I will order him to enter into recognisances to keep the peace." And that may happen in cases where the district justice should have actually dismissed the charge, but instead of that an order is made binding to the peace. Sometimes that order is salutary, but very often it leads directly to breach of the peace. Perhaps the Minister has heard of the case of a gentleman being bound to the peace for so many months by his wife, and her method of helping her husband to keep the peace during the period covered by his bail bonds was to dare him to assault her. The husband finally got to the point that he could no longer resist the temptation and assaulted her violently —all the more violently because the accumulated patience of months became strained to the breaking point, and his temper broke out in a particularly violent way. I think that there may be such provisions scattered through the obscure statutes which we took over under Article 73 of the Constitution and I want these swept away and the district justices made subject to appeal. As I say, I do not think there will be many appeals, but the fact that there is an appeal from a court is a very salutary expedient, indeed, for keeping the judicial person on the rails.

Comment on this

I fully sympathise with Deputy Costello's point of view on this matter of binding to the peace. I myself have had experience of cases where people found themselves in the position, as a result of having been bound to the peace, of being afterwards regarded, for purposes of cross-examination and so on in other cases, as criminals, merely because they had been bound to the peace, and they might have been bound to the peace just because the previous justice or magistrate had had in mind something very different.

At the time this was being drafted, I did not advert to it. It was not brought to my notice at the time, I think, as I am sure that otherwise I would certainly have incorporated something in the Bill to meet that case. I agree fully, as I have said, with the Deputy's point of view as regards getting an appeal in this particular kind of case anyway, or where a person is bound to the peace and has no right to appeal. The only difficulty that occurs to me is that there might be cases where it might be desirable that a person should be bound to enter into recognisances to keep the peace pending a hearing before the Circuit Court judge.

Comment on this

I have no objection to that.

Comment on this

And that power should be given to the Circuit Court judge to wipe it out if he was satisfied. I shall try to frame something like that.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 96:—

In page 22, Section 53, lines 20-21, to delete the words "irrespective of the amount thereof" and substitute the words "where the amount due does not exceed £10."

This is an enlarged jurisdiction that has been given to the District Court and I want to put some limitation on it. The section reads:—"In proceedings at the suit of a council, a county or other borough, or an urban district, or the commissioners of a town or a board of conservators of fisheries, or a drainage board, etc., for the recovery of any rates due to such council, commissioners or board, irrespective of the amount thereof." I think that is very wide. Is it thought desirable to give power to go for arrears of rates irrespective of the amount?

Comment on this

The old petty sessions, I understand, had unlimited jurisdiction except in fishery cases, where they were limited to £10.

Comment on this

But this is very enlarged. The whole of this sub-section is new.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

It is recommended by the Joint Committee in paragraph 52.

Comment on this

Possibly, but is it thought desirable to give this with the phrase at the end of it "irrespective of the amount thereof"? In other words, no matter what is the amount of the rates to be recovered, the jurisdiction is to be given to the District Court.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The old Petty Sessions Courts had unlimited jurisdiction in the matter of rates. As there is an appeal from the district justice, I do not think there is any reasonable objection to this.

Comment on this

As far as I remember, the question of these rates was raised by only three witnesses before the committee and it was passed over without any very great question about it and without very much evidence.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

The reason for that is that in most cases there is generally no question about the amount of the rate where it is a matter of the rate recoverable. If there was any challenge, it would be on the basis of the legality of the rate or on some other basis which could be tested on appeal or certiorari. I imagine that this is considered a convenience for everybody, both the person who owes the rate and the officer collecting it, to have it recoverable by summary proceedings.

Comment on this

Does not this amendment apply to the drainage rates that are struck by the old drainage boards which are now gradually being transferred to the local authorities under an Act of the Oireachtas? Does the Attorney-General advert to the fact that, in connection with those drainage boards, when they are being transferred to the local authority in more than one case there has been a protracted discussion carried on between the local authority and the Board of Works subsequent to the making of the charging order? There is one case within my knowledge, in which a very obscure situation has arisen as to who is liable for the maintenance of the drainage scheme in the interval between the entry of the Board of Works and the effective operation of the charging order transferring it to the local body. Now, it may be that in that period which, I think, extends from 1926 down to the present—I am referring to the River Suck Drainage Board—very large arrears may have accrued—I do not know—but may have accrued due by certain landholders within the drainage area. Very substantial sums may be at stake.

Does the Attorney-General think that, where a fairly complex question of law may arise as to liability and where a very substantial sum may be at stake, that it is a desirable thing to widen the jurisdiction of the District Court? If the Attorney-General were to make the case that nothing can arise in these matters relating to drainage rates but a simple question of fact, as to whether the money is due or not, I think there would be force in his contention; but, suppose a large sum is at stake and a complex question of law falls to be decided as to whether the rates have not been clearly determined by any previous decision, or where the decisions are of such a kind as to be very obscure to the ordinary landholder in a drainage area, surely he ought to have the protection of a judge in determining his liability in respect of any arrears that may have accured.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I think the defence for allowing the District Court to deal with this kind of case is this, that only in very rare cases indeed will a difficult point of law arise such as the Deputy has adverted to. A difficult question of law as to the right to recover may arise, but undoubtedly there are other types of cases in which similar difficulties may arise before the District Court. The machinery of the law allows a test to be taken on any question of law arising before the District Court in either of two ways: there is the ordinary appeal. Where that is done the whole matter will come before the circuit judge. It is very unlikely, however, that that will occur in drainage cases, because hardly ever will the amount of the rate sued for be over £300. Suppose a defendant is dissatisfied as regards the amount sued for, or that there is a difficult question of law involved, he can, if he chooses, take the case straight away from the District Court—that probably is the procedure that would be followed in the case mentioned by the Deputy—by asking to have a case stated, and having the net point of law involved decided in the High Court. He can have the issue decided by a Divisonal Court of three judges. I am sure the Deputy has observed that in prosecutions brought on my behalf before district justices the suggestion has sometimes been thrown out that we wanted to have the law decided on the point involved and asked to have a case stated. The district justice decides the case in a particular way, and that leaves it open to either side to ask for a case stated. What we are proposing here will allow district justices to have jurisdiction to decide the vast majority of these cases. That, I think, is a useful thing. It will make the matter easy for those liable for the rates, but it does not prevent a test case being brought to elucidate points such as the Deputy has mentioned.

Comment on this

Surely that is to deny the whole purpose for which we have the Circuit Courts, which are meant to provide a cheap method of determining claims within a certain fixed limit. I think it is no libel on the District Court to say that its monetary discretion is carefully restricted, because it is generally held that the justice obtainable there, while substantial, is somewhat rough and ready. It is felt to be adequate for very small sums. When the sums sued for exceed that, it is quite true, as the Attorney-General says, that one is left with the resource of going to the Divisional Court, but the man who is driven to that resource is the pity of all his neighbours. He is the unfortunate creature under our system of law who settles the law, possibly at fearful cost to himself.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

No. It is a very cheap method of settling it unless the case involves several days' hearing.

Comment on this

In any case, it seems to me that if the Circuit Court is there and is deemed by the Legislature to be the appropriate court for getting a decision in every kind of case involving up to £300, there does not seem to be any good reason why these drainage cases should not go there in the ordinary course of the law if the sum at stake is in excess of the normal jurisdiction of the District Court. I would be interested to hear from the Attorney-General why he wants to make these drainage rate cases an exceptional matter in respect of the District Court any more than he would make any other class of case an exceptional matter.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

Ordinary rates are recoverable up to any amount.

Comment on this

Why did the Committee recommend an amendment of the law to permit it to be done in the District Court?

Comment on this

I submit that for the reasons I have explained these drainage rates are sometimes, owing to their transitional character at the present time, prone to give rise to very obscure questions of law. As a matter of fact, I think the Attorney-General will agree that the tendency of these drainage rates is to disappear altogether, because the policy of the Department of Finance and of the Department of Local Government is to transfer all these drainage boards over to the local authority, when, I suppose, the rates will come under the law applying to ordinary poor rate.

Comment on this
The Attorney-General

I wish to correct the statement I made a moment ago, that ordinary rates are recoverable up to any amount. I wish to correct myself by saying that under the old Petty Sessions Court procedure there was unlimited jurisdiction such as is now sought to be given to the District Court. By an oversight, apparently, in the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, that unlimited jurisdiction in these matters was not then conferred on the District Courts. It is really as a reinstatement of the old position with regard to the Petty Sessions Courts and their jurisdiction in these matters that this amendment is introduced.

Comment on this

The Attorney-General I not proposing to give unlimited jurisdiction to the District Court in the matter of poor rate. You are only proposing under this amendment to give unlimited jurisdiction to the District Court in the matter of the drainage rate.

Comment on this