Public Business. - Courts of Justice Bill, 1934—Recommittal (Resumed).
Contributions 133–271 of 271. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 50 of 1934 ›
Yes. When I practised in the Petty Sessions Court. I remember that rates to any amount were sued for.
Comment on this
At the same time, this was not inside the competence of the District Court, because this is an amendment to enlarge the powers. The recommendation is in regard to empowering county councils, urban district councils and town commissioners to sue for rates. The Bill as introduced stopped at that. The new matter in this clause is boards of conservators of fisheries or drainage boards, so that we have advanced beyond the Committee Stage. The original Bill confined this recovery of rates to county councils, urban district councils and town commissioners. There is now an addition made and that was done on the evidence given by District Justice Walsh and a Mr. Cobb. They were the only two people who mentioned this matter. There was one other person who mentioned it, but when examined, I think, the phrase used is not shown to have a relationship to this matter at all. There was certainly confusion in the Committee and the two witnesses who gave evidence did not help to clear it up. Reading the report, I think that is true. They simply threw out the suggestion. On that we have this brought in and we have suddenly, in regard to rates, the District Court jurisdiction enlarged, no limitation by way of money value at all.
The Attorney-General defends that by saying the amount is not really going to be in question; it is only a point in law. There are many other matters in which the amount is not so much the subject-matter in dispute as the point in law and yet there is a monetary limitation. Here, in regard to rates, suddenly we find no limitation. I suggest there should be some limitation. If it is thought fit in ordinary matters to have a monetary limitation as well as a provision for a point in law, I think you should have also the same monetary limitation in regard to rates. That seems to be logical.
Comment on this
I think the Deputy does not realise that it has frequently been provided that in cases of this kind where a person's liability is determined by reference to some well-settled scheme of things, the person entitled to recover has been allowed to sue in a court which ordinarily would not have jurisdiction to deal with the claim. If my recollection serves me right, in the old County Court the jurisdiction was £50, but rent could be sued for up to £100. Here, in this case, the rates are determined by reference to the rateable valuation of each hereditament. A question is asked as to how that rate is arrived at, how it is decided for the whole rateable area by the authority striking the rate. If a question arises as to the basis of the rate, whether it was properly arrived at and so on, that can be and should be challenged in a proceeding in the High Court. It may be challenged on a proceeding to quash the rates and the whole proceedings may ultimately be brought to the Supreme Court.
If any question, such as Deputy Dillon mentioned in connection with the Suck drainage, arises it can be tested in either of the ways I mentioned: by an appeal to the Supreme Court or a case stated to the High Court. If it is a question which goes to the root of the whole jurisdiction to strike the rate, it can be brought in other ways before the High Court. It is recognised that in the vast majority of cases no question will arise of such difficulty on fact as would make the District Court an unsuitable tribunal in which to try the cases. For that reason they are taken out of the general rule which limits the jurisdiction of the District Court.
Comment on this
Why retain the paragraph, as it will be in the Act, immediately before that, limiting proceedings at the suit of the State or a Ministry to £25? The State can only sue for £25, whether it is penalty or debt or otherwise, but a county council or a drainage board can sue for anything.
Comment on this
I would like to draw the attention of the Attorney-General to the report of the Dublin County Council in to-day's or yesterday's paper, where it is indicated there are £50,000 of arrears of the current rate. I cannot remember the exact number of ratepayers that that is spread over, but it is a very restricted number; it would mean over the £200 or £300 figure for each ratepayer Assume that I as a rate collector, issue a civil bill against each of the ratepayers and assume the amount is £301. I go to the Circuit Court with it and I am non-suited because it is £301. But if I go to the District Court with any sum, I am not non-suited and I am entitled to get a degree. Does not that seem anomalous and illogical? I think you need to amend the Circuit Court jurisdiction also if you are going to amend this.
Comment on this
Do I understand from the Attorney-General that he takes the view that the suing party, in such proceedings as might arise under this section, would be always a thoroughly responsible body and one that might be depended on to act with prudence and discretion? If that is his belief, he ought to examine the existing constitution of many of the drainage boards in the country. These old drainage boards have fallen into practical desuetude in many places and they consist of the secretary, who is also the rate collector and practically the board himself. They are very frequently bodies of an extremely ephemeral character upon whom one would place no great dependence at all.
Comment on this
That may possibly apply to an odd drainage board, but it would not apply to any other local body.
Comment on this
If they are of that ephemeral character, the amount they would be likely to seek to recover would hardly exceed the District Court jurisdiction. It is unlikely that they would have many claims over the District Court jurisdiction as it at present stands.
Comment on this
They are here entitled to sue for arrears without regard to the amount. I am putting a completely hypothetical case. Suppose you have a man whose drainage board has fallen into practical desuetude, who is not collecting the rate zealously. He takes it into his head to go for somebody and get a substantial sum of money from him on foot of the drainage rate. It might be that he would sue him in the District Court under this section. It is clearly a case that should go before the Circuit Court if it is in excess of, say, £25.
Comment on this
Is the Deputy suggesting that that sub-section should be amended by taking out the drainage boards?
Comment on this
It certainly would make it more acceptable to me, but I am not in a position to say whether it would make it as acceptable to Deputy McGilligan.
Comment on this
I do not think there is anything in the Deputy's point, but we will look into the matter.
Comment on this
There are two or three amendments which really run together. I put down an amendment to delete the only sub-section which Deputy MacEoin has failed to delete, and to call attention to the whole section. The old provision of the Courts of Justice Act is that in the District Court the question of the particular district is determined by the defendants. In civil cases it is the district where the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides and carries on any business or occupation. The committee reporting on the Courts of Justice Bill—for what reason I do not know, because there was not a great deal of evidence on this matter— seemed to want to put this question of the residence or business area of the defendant in the second place, because they put forward a series of recommendations. In contract cases they wanted the Act to be amended so as to provide that it would be exercised by the justice for the district where the contract was made, or where the defendant resided, and there are some other provisions. When you come to tort they wanted it referred to the justice for the district where the tort was committed, and then followed the provision in regard to the defendant. In ejectment cases it was to be decided by where the particular premises are situated. In each case they wanted apparently to reverse the old procedure and put the defendant's position in the secondary place. This does not do that; this leaves it to the election of the plaintiff. There may be a great deal to be said for it, but the old principle with regard to the District Court was that it was the defendant had to be protected in the main against harassing small cases, and, therefore, at any rate, it was made easier for him in this way that all cases in the District Court had to come to where the defendant ordinarily resided; in other words, the burden of travelling, if there had to be any movement from one place to another, was thrown upon the person who was plaintiff. This section is turned entirely in favour of the plaintiff. Why?
Comment on this
The only reason I can see is that the plaintiff is the aggrieved party, at least in the sense that he has something to complain about at the outset as a cause of action. In the case of motor accidents, you might find the plaintiff or the prospective plaintiff in rather poor circumstances, and he has got to follow somebody to Dublin or Cork or the West of Ireland or Donegal.
Comment on this
The defendant is a man who can move out of the way. As far as I can see, he would not be in a similar position. He has been in a certain place and has moved away from it. It is only in running-down cases that there would be much reference to it. Moneylending is another sort of case in which it might arise.
Comment on this
Surely, Sir, this is a departure from the fundamental principles of common law. Surely it is true to say that the damages awarded in any litigation are the penalty for breach of duty? Somebody has failed in his duty to his neighbour, and in so far as he has failed he must pay the penalty in the form of damages. It is also a fundamental principle of law that every man is innocent until he is proved guilty. If you accept the principle that damages are a penalty you must go on to say that every man is innocent until he is proved guilty. If that be true, you cannot say that prima facie the plaintiff is aggrieved, because prima facie the plaintiff is not aggrieved. He has to prove the guilt of the defendant before he can establish the fact that he has been aggrieved. If, on the general principle, the case should lie in the defendant's area, we can say that from the point of view of expediency the case should also lie in the defendant's area, because if six plaintiffs can each sue area one can imagine an unfortunate defendant having to buy an aeroplane and dash frantically around the country to meet his accusers in six different centres. That would be admittedly a very great hardship indeed. Unless the Minister can make a case that it is indeed true that in this country every man who accuses his neighbour automatically raises a presumption of guilt, there does not seem to be any justification at all for reversing the old system and substituting the one proposed in this Bill.
Comment on this
It is not a reversal of the old system. I do not know whether the Deputy has misunderstood the position. With regard to tort, it allows the suit to be brought where the tort is committed. It does not go the length that the Deputy says.
Comment on this
It is at the plaintiff's election, but Deputy Dillon seems to think it provides that I may bring a man into my own area in the sense of the area in which I reside. It does not go that far, but it does go a certain distance because it allows, at the election of the plaintiff, actions for tort to be brought either where the defendant resides or where the tort has been committed. With regard to contract, it allows the action to be brought, at the election of the plaintiff, in the district where the contract is alleged to have been made. That is not contrary to any principles governing the venue of trials for breach of contract. I think that is accepted in the High Court as a proper test of the area in which the action should be taken.
Comment on this
It is a matter I have heard discussed frequently. It has been put forward as a grievance by persons who were, say, run down by a motor-car travelling through the County Mayo, that they find if they want to sue the defendant they have got to follow him to Dublin. Apparently they impressed the committee so much by their type of grievance that this new jurisdiction was given.
Comment on this
As reported at question 5319, page 370 of the Committee's report, Mr. O'Connor, solicitor, Swinford, was asked:
"Do you not think that the additional jurisdiction would possibly require a more experienced staff in the District Court?—Not for the matters I mention—contract and tort. We are also strongly of opinion that the District Court should have jurisdiction as regards torts committed within its area, no matter where the defendant resides."
"5320. Your suggestion is that if a Dublin man beats a Ballina man in Ballina, the Ballina man should be able to bring him to Ballina?"
Comment on this
The answer is:
"Yes. I would say, in a case such as you have mentioned, that the Civil Bill should be served a month before the case is heard so as to give the Dublin man a full opportunity of preparing his case. I have come across cases myself where, say, a Dublin lorry or a Dublin motor-car knocked down and killed a calf belonging to a man down the country. It is very hard lines on a small farmer in the West of Ireland if, in order to get proper redress for the loss he has sustained, he has to come to Dublin to sue the party responsible for killing the animal. It usually turns out that it is an insurance company that is concerned, and the man has to accept an ex gratia payment."
"5321. Do you not think that the opposite — that is, bringing the Dublin man down to Ballina—might also cause hardship?—I do not think so. I think that the man who wants to get legal redress should be able to obtain it."——
Comment on this
He concluded his reply by saying:
"In the case that I mentioned, a small farmer in the West of Ireland, I think it is almost impossible for him to get redress if he has to come to Dublin."
Comment on this
I do not know that there is very much more evidence about this. It is very hard to find evidence about it.
Comment on this
Nos. 91 and 92 are not moved; amendment No. 93 is withdrawn and amendments Nos. 94 and 95 are not moved; they depend on amendment No. 89. Amendment No. 96 is not moved.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 97:
In page 23, line 47, Section 62 (1), after the word "refuses" to insert the words "to receive informations in relation to such charge or"
Comment on this
This is a section to enable the Attorney-General to send forward a case for trial even though informations have been refused.
Comment on this
Would the Attorney-General be good enough to explain the exact significance of amendment No. 97 which amends the original proposal in the Bill?
Comment on this
Is there a difference between refusing informations and refusing to send forward the case? What is the difference between refusing informations and refusing to send forward a case, if there is any difference?
Comment on this
No, except that "refusing informations" is the technical and proper term to use. Before a case is sent forward for trial we receive informations. One act is divided into two.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 98:
In page 23 to add at the end of Section 62 two new sub-sections as follows:—
(3) When a direction by the Attorney-General under this section has been communicated to the District Court clerk in pursuance of the next preceding sub-section of this section, such District Court clerk shall cause to be served on the person to whose trial such direction relates notice in writing stating that the Attorney-General has directed under this section that such person shall be sent forward for trial to a particular court (which shall be specified in such notice) on a particular charge (which shall be similarly specified) and that such person is required to attend before the said court at a specified time and place and there to stand his trial on the said charge.
(4) If a person on whom a notice has been served under the next preceding sub-section of this section fails to attend before the court at the time and place specified in such notice, it shall be lawful for such court, on proof of the service of such notice on such person not less than seven clear days before the day on which he is thereby required to attend before the said court and of the service on such person of copies of the relevant depositions and particulars of all additional evidence intended to be adduced by the prosecution on the trial of such person, to issue a bench warrant for the arrest of such person and the bringing of such person before the said court in custody.
Section 62 is introduced at my instance. This is to place beyond doubt the right of the Attorney-General to send forward or have brought for trial before the appropriate court persons who are charged with indictable offences where the district justice has declined to receive informations. The whole practice, as most Deputies are aware, arises in this way: Prior to the Courts of Justice Act the position was that the Attorney-General could, notwithstanding the fact that the magistrates had refused informations, send up a bill to the grand jury and, if they found a true bill, have the accused sent forward for trial and tried before the court. Since the Courts of Justice Act and the changes consequent upon it in this country a difficulty has been introduced, although I have discovered in point of fact where a number of cases had been sent forward and the prisoners sent for trial notwithstanding the refusal of informations by the district justice. Prisoners who were sent forward in this way by the Attorney-General have been tried and dealt with. They were tried in the Circuit Courts and in, I think, the Central Criminal Court without question. Recently I had occasion to endeavour to have tried a prisoner in whose case the district justice had refused informations. The case came before Judge Shannon, and he decided after a lengthy argument and, I think, with some hesitation, that in view of the disappearance of the grand jury the case could not be sent for trial. Deputy Lavery was in the case and he argued it successfully. The circuit judge decided it mainly on the ground that the channel of the old grand jury had disappeared and that it was not now open to the Attorney-General to send forward a person for trial or have a bill sent against a person in respect of a charge in which the district justice declined to receive informations. It can be well understood that it is very rarely that the Law Adviser has a complaint to make as to the refusal of the district justices to receive informations. Speaking personally, during my own tenure of office there have not been more than a dozen cases in which I felt that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused where the district justice had declined to receive informations. But there have been cases. I do not say that the case in which Deputy Lavery was concerned is a particularly strong one; the facts are roughly this: A man was alleged to have been knocked down in O'Connell Street. There was some confusion and difficulty about obtaining evidence and it was some time after the occurrence that an eye-witness to it gave a statement to the Gárda in which she alleged that she witnessed the occurrence, and she described how she saw this particular man being knocked down by a tram.
I considered on that evidence that there was a prima facie case to go before a jury to say whether this tram conductor was guilty of criminal negligence in knocking down a man in the middle of O'Connell Street. First of all, the district justice was asked to receive informations. When evidence was given, the tram conductor's case, I think, was that he did not strike the man at all, that his tram was not responsible for the injuries from which the man subsequently died. However, I thought it was a case in which a jury ought to be asked to investigate the occurrence and see whether, in their opinion, the girl's story could be accepted and, if so accepted, whether the evidence would justify a finding of criminal negligence.
There have been similar cases in other parts of the country in which I thought the evidence tendered before the district justice was sufficient, if inquired into by a jury, to warrant a finding of criminal negligence. There have been other cases of a different nature in which I took a similar view and in which I felt that the district justice had gone beyond his proper province and had, in effect, tried out the issue and come to the conclusion, using his own judgment, and acting as a juror in the case, that there was no justification for the charge against the accused. It is in consequence of that position of affairs that I ask that jurisdiction should be given to the Attorney-General in charge of prosecutions so as to enable him, when he is satisfied that there is evidence to be investigated before a jury, to see that the case be tried before a jury.
I do not see that there can be any reasonable complaint against that. I know that the Bar Council, when dealing with this proposal, have recommended against it. The Bar Council seem to be very favourable to anything involving accused persons. I do not understand why they took such a view, because it only means that this power will be exercised in cases where, upon evidence in the hands of the Guards, the Attorney-General is satisfied that there is a case to be investigated before a jury and evidence available which, if accepted by a jury, would justify a conviction. The cases will probably be rare and, as it only means sending a man before a jury for his trial, it cannot be complained that an injustice will be done, unless one considers that the ordeal of being tried is a gross injustice. It is the practice which was in vogue under the old régime before the date of the Courts of Justice Act. As I have said, the Attorney-General was in a position to send up a bill to the grand jury for consideration. Since the Courts of Justice Act, on a number of occasions, prisoners have been tried in a similar way and it was not until a recent case that the jurisdiction to have this procedure followed was challenged.
The objection which will probably be raised to the proposal is that formerly there was the channel of the grand jury; that there is nothing now to take its place, and that it is in the hands of the Attorney-General of the day to say whether in his view a district justice had wrongly refused to hold that there was a prima facie case on the informations before him. It is a power which probably will be very seldom exercised. It is a necessary and a useful power, and I think the Dáil ought to grant it.
Comment on this
I think that this amendment, harmless though it may appear when read by those who do not appreciate its true inwardness, raises one of the most important questions which arise under the Courts of Justice Bill at present before the House. The proposal is that the Attorney-General, whose functions under the Constitution and under the Acts are very difficult to define, should be not only the prosecutor in courts of criminal jurisdiction, but should also be the person to determine whether a prima facie case has been made.
I think that there is an important question that goes far beyond anything in this Bill which this House might have to consider at some future time and that is, that the position of the Attorney-General under the Constitution should be defined. At present he is the reflection, if I might say so without offence to the present occupant of the post, of His Majesty's Attorney-General as he existed under the Constitution before the Irish Free State was established. He is the King's Officer with all the functions of the King in everything appertaining to legal procedure. That gives him very many different functions. But one which it never has given him is the right to determine whether a person should stand in the dock upon a criminal charge or not. He is charged with the duty of presenting the case for the prosecution. In fact, now that the Crown has disappeared from the title and from the substance of criminal prosecutions, he is the prosecutor, and it does seem to be something of an anomaly that not only should he be prosecutor, but he should also be judge.
The section now before the House asks that the Attorney-General should be put in the position, after a citizen of the State has been put on trial before a court, and after a judicial person, specially qualified and specially trained, has decided that there is no justification for placing that man in the dock, of over-ruling that decision and placing him in the dock for his trial. I know that in recent years, and I do not confine that period of time to the period of the office of the present Attorney-General, some arbitrary rule has been adopted that if a death has been caused by what may be described as an accident—the commonest case, of course, is upon roads where a mechanically propelled vehicle, a motor car or tram car, is involved— there should be a criminal trial of the person who is alleged to have caused that death. I have always thought, and I am sure the House will think too, that that is a wrong distinction to draw. There may have been cases in the Circuit Court and in the Central Criminal Court where persons have been tried on a charge of manslaughter merely because there has been a death, where if there had not been a death, but merely a bodily injury, no matter how serious, no one would be placed on an alleged criminal trial. That is not a distinction that can be founded upon law or upon commonsense. I think the rigidity of that rule is felt there. I do not think it is now the practice to place a person on trial because death has followed some road accident. If it is I think it should be discontinued. However that may be, and having regard to the case the Attorney-General mentioned, whether we agree or not, under the law in this State, as it at present stands, the Attorney-General has no such power or jurisdiction which this section seeks to give him.
I do not want to refer to the circumstances of this particular case. But the House ought to approach this matter with the knowledge that the courts have decided that as the law stands the Attorney-General has no power, and ought not to have power, which this section would give him. The Attorney-General referred, and properly referred, to the history of the office of Attorney-General and to the history of criminal prosecutions in this country. It always was the law that no man should be placed upon trial until a grand jury—that is a jury of citizens—had determined that he should be put on trial, and that there was a prima facie case for a petty jury to enquire into; that is to say, that he should not stand in the dock upon trial on a criminal charge.
Now the grand jury has gone. At the same time that the grand jury disappeared there was set up in this country a system of District Courts in which paid judges—men with legal qualifications—were established to investigate the preliminary basis of criminal charges; and these district justices were given jurisdiction to receive or to refuse informations. I use the technical term, which means that they were to determine whether a person should stand his trial or not. I do not see any reason why these district justices, who have had their status already so fully discussed tonight, should be further degraded into the position of having their decision —come to after they have heard at length the evidence of material witnesses given before them on both, and having come to a judicial termination whether there is a prima facie case or not—reviewed by the Attorney-General or why he should have power to overrule their decision. The Attorney-General mentioned that I was concerned as counsel in a case where this principle was established. I want to get away from any discussion whatever with regard to that case. But some observations in regard to it were made by the Attorney-General—I do not say intentionally but incidentally—to which exception might be taken. It would be wrong for me to deal with this—I regard that as a matter of principle—but I think this was established, that no citizen should stand in the dock unless a body of citizens, whether a coroner's jury or a grand jury, had determined that he should stand his trial.
It is now sought to do away with the alternative provided by our Constitution and laws—inquiry by a district justice, a trained lawyer who hears the case—and place the Attorney-General in what should be an embarrassing position for him, to revoke that decision, and to say that although a judicial officer of the State who heard the evidence has decided that there is no case, the Attorney-General who is charged with the prosecution, and whose duty it is to present the case from the point of view of the State, fairly no doubt, but nevertheless bound to bring into the case everything that can come in to show the guilt of the prisoner, should be empowered to review that decision and to reverse it. I say I do not know why that case should be made by the Attorney-General, and I think the principle involved is a very important one.
After all it is a serious thing for any one, whether highly placed or lowly placed, whether rich or poor, that he should stand in the dock in Green Street or any other criminal court in this country, charged unless a justice has determined there is a substantial case. I mentioned the case of death. We all know that frequently people have gone to Green Street, and stood in the dock on a charge where anybody who gave a moment's attention to their case would realise that only one verdict, a verdict of acquittal, was possible. Yet, they have to face that trial and incur the expenses, and suffer the indignity, and a serious indignity I consider it to be in such instances. It is one thing to go to the District Court where an inquiry is held, and where there is nothing in the nature of a criminal prosecution involved. If a man could go there and establish to the satisfaction of a trained judicial person that his case is not a criminal one, I do not see why that decision should be reviewed especially by the chief officer of the Executive in legal matters.
I have said that the Attorney-General's position is one which at the present moment is very anomalous. We have had examples of that in the courts in recent days. We know that the Attorney-General is not only, under the Criminal Jurisdiction Acts, and the Ministers and Secretaries Act, principal adviser to the Departments of State, but that he is also the officer who has the right to give or withhold the fiat necessary to bring an action against Ministers of State. The office has certain judicial qualities. It is administrative and executive, and now it seeks to become judicial as well. I think this should be considered on a broader plane than the present amendment.
I think it will be a very serious thing if the Attorney-General sets himself up as a court of appeal from district justices who, under our Constitution, have taken the place of the old grand juries. There are multitudes of people outside to whom these things will mean a great deal and who may find themselves involved in accidents or something of that kind. This section is not confined to these because there are officers of companies, or officers of local authorities, who may have got into some difficulty, or have been guilty of some inaccuracy in their administration, and I think it would be a dreadful thing if after their case was investigated by a district justice who decided that there was no case upon which a jury could justifiably convict, that the Attorney-General, who is the officer perhaps of the Department of State, alleged to be defrauded, should be able to review that decision and send that man to his trial. What I am pleading for here is in effect, that a man whose case was tried once and whom the judicial system has acquited, should not be put on his trial again by an executive officer of the State who, in many cases, must be concerned with very different considerations. I urge the House, and I urge the Attorney-General, carefully to consider this particular section before he forces it to a vote. I think there are very grave issues involved that go far beyond the implications of the section, serious though it is in itself.
Comment on this
I agree entirely with what Deputy Lavery has just said. I think that there are involved in this amendment very serious issues involving the liberty of the subject and the rights of the people who may be involved in the criminal machine. I can say without undue presumption that I am entitled to speak on this proposal with some authority, because I can see the question from both points of view. For some years I occupied the position which my friend the Attorney-General now occupies, and I used the power which he seeks to become entitled to use under this Bill on two occasions. He used it actually on one occasion. I got away with my few occasions but he did not get away. On the two occasions that I used this power the jury in fact convicted the prisoner who when before the district justice was acquitted or informations were refused. That does not affect the principle. In the particular circumstances of the cases I was involved in at that time it was quite clear that a miscarriage of justice was likely to arise, unless the power, which was exercised in exceptional circumstances, was in fact then exercised. I suppose during the six years I was Attorney-General I dealt with 10,000 or 12,000 criminal cases altogether. Other cases came before me which never went for trial. I suppose 20,000 cases would be the minimum number of criminal cases I dealt with in those six years, not to speak of cases I dealt with during the four previous years as assistant, when, as Deputy Lavery says, this alleged power was never made use of.
I think I can approach this, sympathising with the point of view of the Attorney-General who wishes to have this power. But I also had the other experience since I left office, the power in the particular case to which Deputy Lavery referred, in a motor accident where the police appeared to have the view that in every case involving serious accident, or particularly in the case of death there must be a prosecution automatically. My experience as Attorney-General directing and conducting prosecutions is precisely the same as I have had since that time in ordinary practice. That is that district justices in my experience are far more prone to receive informations than to refuse them in criminal cases. They are far more desirous of sending people for trial than refusing informations. It is the line of least resistance with district justices. If there is a prima facie case they just sit there and an unfortunate clerk writes whatever he can get down as the witness goes along. The district justice just sits there and says: “I think there is something to be tried.” It should be realised by Deputies that when indictable offences as they are called in popular language, triable by jury are being investigated before a district justice, the accused has no chance of giving evidence on his own behalf or of producing witnesses. No matter how cogent the evidence he may be in a position to produce to show that he must be acquitted if the case goes to a jury he cannot produce that evidence or bring it before the notice of the district justice if the police can produce some witness—although the district justice may not believe him—who might say something which somebody might think a jury would believe if he got before a jury.
Actually I had that case. There was no evidence whatever in that particular case which I defended subsequently in Green Street, to show that a motor driver was guilty in the slightest degree of negligence, except evidence from one talkative and voluble gentleman who appeared from nowhere. At the last moment he came up and volunteered evidence in the District Court. The whole weight of the evidence of that particular gentleman was in favour of the accused, but, because of his appearance on the scene the case went for trial. The jury stopped the trial and laughed that particular gentleman out of court by acquitting the prisoner in the middle of the case for the prosecution. My client had to pay out of his own pocket the fees for his defence before the district justice and had to pay my fee and the fee of junior counsel to appear for him in Green Street. The State did not indemnify him against costs, even though the jury stopped the case. That is a typical instance of the attitude of district justices towards the investigation of criminal offences. In 99.9 of the cases presented by the police they simply say that there is something in them and that they must go for trial, even though they do not believe that a jury would convict. The district justices are too prone in my experience as Attorney-General and as an ordinary practitioner to accept informations and to send cases forward for trial. Speaking for my experience of reading depositions before they were sent for trial by district justices, in cases which would come up in the ordinary way to the Attorney-General's offices for his fiat, many a time I wished that district justices had not sent forward a large number of cases, because if I entered a nolle prosequi, or if the Attorney-General entered a nolle prosequi in similar cases, district justices feel it as a personal affront, and incidentally the Attorney-General might be the subject of criticism in the Dáil for doing so. What is proposed in this section is that in the few cases where the district justice refused informations, it enabled the Attorney-General to override that view, and to send them up on his own behalf. I have convinced myself after some thought and with deep appreciation of the point of view of the Attorney-General that it is a wrong principle. In the old days there were roughly speaking three protections for the accused, the magistrates before whom indictable offences were investigated, the provisions of the Vexatious Indictments Act, and finally, there was the barrier of the Grand Jury. Those three things were interposed between the Crown and the prisoner. To all intents and purposes, having regard to the procedure of criminal administration at the moment, the Vexatious Indictments Act is dead, the Grand Jury is gone and there is nothing between the prisoner and the State now except the district justice.
Remember this, that if a district justice refuses information, that does not end the matter. That is not a judicial determination of the question to the point of saying that it can never be heard again by the same district justice; in other words, to put it technically, autre fois qui cannot be pleaded if the Attorney-General again brings the case before the district justice, so that he still has the power, if a district justice does what he thinks he ought not to have done—refuses information—to bring the same case on the same evidence before the same district justice and to ask him: “Will you change your mind?” If he gets fresh evidence, the district justice has not merely the excuse, but possibly the duty, of changing his mind.
That is the position at the moment. If a district justice refuses informations, the prosecutor, whether he be a private prosecutor, the police or the Attorney-General, can bring that same case again before the same district justice, even on the same evidence, and ask him to reconsider the matter. Consequently, I think that, taking all things into consideration, the balance is entirely in favour of not proceeding with this proposed amendment. There is only an infinitesimal number of cases in which the power will be required. I think it is not right to impose the duty of doing this on the Attorney-General. In his own interest, in the interest of the present occupant, and sympathising with the task he has to perform, knowing from my own personal experience what it is, I think it is right and proper that this duty should not be imposed upon him, because it will mean that a very serious duty will be case upon him and upon his office.
In effect it will mean that in every single case in which informations are refused the police feel aggrieved— everybody will admit that, and it is only natural; their prey has slipped from them—and they will write up, knowing that this power exists, to the State Solicitor concerned, who will write to the Chief State Solicitor in the Castle, who will in turn send the special circumstances of that case to the Attorney-General. The result will be that every case in the entire Irish Free State in respect of which informations are refused will descend ultimately and inevitably upon the Attorney-General's office and he will be asked to review every single case. I think it is not right that that duty should be imposed upon him. I think it is an impossible task. The taxpayer is paying a trained man and a man of experience. The district justices who now occupy their offices have had very considerable experience of this class of cases. If they decide that there is not a prima facie case, in practically every case it may be taken that there is not, because their normal tendency is to decide in favour of the police. Their normal practice is to decide in favour of the police, and, in addition, their normal laziness, if I might put it that way, will lead them to decide in favour of the police, because it is the line of least resistance.
Everything tends against the accused and to close up this last loophole of escape to the unfortunate accused person amounts, I think, almost to a denial of justice. I think on the question of principle, so ably adumbrated by Deputy Lavery, the Attorney-General should not press this. Again, I say, as I said on a previous amendment here to-night, we can discuss this, and I am sure that both the Attorney-General and the Minister will discuss this question as a question of principle, neither side endeavouring to score off the other or to make political capital out of it. I have the greatest sympathy with the point of view which the Attorney-General urged on this matter, but I have given the matter considerable thought and I have come to the conclusion that it is not a power which, in the interests of the accused person, in the interests of the liberty of the subject, or of the Attorney-General himself, should be conferred upon the Attorney-General.
Comment on this
I must, of course, be impressed by the view put forward by the last speaker. He has had the advantage of holding my position, and, after the experience in that office, of being in a position to look now at the other side of the picture. I had, of course, the experience of being a defender of prisoners and have now the experience of being a prosecutor, but he has had considerably more experience than I have had, and I appreciate that what he has said is only after much consideration and is the expression of a view which he thinks on the balance is the correct one. I agree with him that to ask that such a power should be given to the Attorney-General means imposing upon him an extra burden and adding to his duties. It would not, I think, go to the length suggested by Deputy Costello of requiring him to investigate every case in which the police failed to get their man. After all, he must remember that there was a time when the power to send these bills forward did exist, and apparently they acted during his term of office on the basis that the power did still exist, and I do not think it is reasonable to say that the police felt so aggrieved by refusal of informations in those cases in which informations were refused that they pestered either the Chief State Solicitor or his office with demands that a bill should be sent forward.
However, undoubtedly it would add considerably to the duties of the Attorney-General, but I suggest this provision only in an interest which has not been mentioned here at all. We have heard a lot about the liberty of the subject and the interests of the accused person. Deputy Lavery said that he pleaded for the liberty of the subject in this matter. I introduce this only in the interest of justice and had in mind only the situation created when an accused person wrongly escapes the ordeal of a trial before a jury. Deputy Lavery says that I want to constitute the Attorney-General a court of appeal from the district justice, but, as Deputy Costello has just pointed out, the district justice in this case does not adjudicate at all. He investigates the evidence before him and his duty, as I construe it—and this is where I quarrel with the district justices who have led me to introduce this amendment—is to say whether there is evidence which would justify a jury in convicting and whether there is a prima facie case.
When he has discharged that duty, I do not see anything shocking or anything that interferes with the liberty of the subject, not being an arbitrary interference—and liberty is defined as freedom from arbitrary interference— in this proposal, unless it is to be contended that this power which the Attorney-General is to have is to be an authority arbitrarily to interfere with the freedom of the subject, and I do not think it can be attacked upon that ground. I only ask that where an opinion is formed, on evidence at the disposal of the Attorney-General, that an offence has been committed, If, notwithstanding his plain interpretation of that evidence, a district justice declines arbitrarily to send a prisoner forward, he shall have the opportunity of considering the case again, taking on himself the burden of saying that there is a prima facie case, and asking the jury to investigate it. I see the force of what Deputy Costello says: that, while that is merely putting a man before a jury, who may not convict him, that may be a very heavy punishment in the way of the costs and expenses involved.
Deputy Lavery has suggested that there are hardships inflicted upon persons, who clearly are innocent, by reason of the procedure still followed of putting on trial for murder or manslaughter all persons at whose hands it can be shown a death occurred. I do not know whether the Deputy wishes to convey that he thinks that that practice has been in existence for some time or is still in existence. I think I may inform him that, very far from that being the case, almost the reverse is the case, and that numbers of files pass through my hands every day where, if that rigid rule were applied, the persons would be sent forward for trial. I think, however, following Deputy Costello's practice in the matter, I may say that in my office we do not allow a case to go even before the district justice unless it is thought that, on the evidence, there is a prima facie case to be made. That practice has reduced the number of cases enormously. I should say it has reduced the number by 50 per cent. of the cases. Well, perhaps, that is too big a percentage and I should not rely on my memory, but I can say that the rule or practice now is—and I think has been for a number of years here— to treat cases of that kind on the same basis as other cases and not to put a person on trial or send him before a district justice unless there appears, on the statements, to be a case for them to answer.
Now, as I say, I appreciate the force of the arguments advanced by Deputy Costello and I realise that his views upon this matter are of considerable value; but I still feel with regard to the two cases he instanced himself, where a miscarriage of justice might have occurred and a prisoner have escaped trial, that that ought to weigh very seriously with the House. Even isolated cases of that kind in which justice is defeated ought to weigh very seriously with the House and they also weigh with me. It is merely for that reason that I bring this forward here, because it is no pleasure for me to have to investigate again cases I have already passed on to the district justices for investigation or which have been passed on to them by the Guards and in which, in a great many cases, the district justices were competent to decide themselves. I have no wish to encourage a district justice to act either casually or lazily in dealing with these cases because, as Deputy Costello said, I very often have felt that district justices could have dealt with the cases before them and need not have sent them on to the Circuit Court at all. However, as I say, I still feel that, in the interests of justice, this section is required, but in view of the way the matter has been put before me and the plea advanced by the two Deputies who have spoken, I think it would be better for me to reconsider the matter so as to see whether, on the balance of the argument, when the Report Stage comes along, it will be necessary to insist upon the section.
Comment on this
Is it agreed that we take Section 62 and the amendment is agreed to on an undertaking?
Comment on this
Before Section 63 is passed, perhaps the Minister or the Attorney-General would make it clear that no very extended power is given to a district justice in civil cases to procure the attendance of witnesses. The district justice has very arbitrary powers of issuing bench warrants and things of that sort to procure the attendance of witnesses in criminal cases, but I think it would be quite unwise to allow the district justice to procure the attendance of witnesses in civil cases, in ways in which the High Court cannot procure the attendance of witnesses. I merely want an assurance that the door is not opened very wide in that section.
Comment on this
The intention is to give the district justice in civil cases the same power as he has already in criminal cases.
Comment on this
But that is merely paraphrasing the section and, if I might be permitted to say so, I could see that for myself. My point is that in criminal cases the district justice can issue bench warrants and dark matters of that kind. Now, in a civil case the High Court cannot even procure the attendance of a witness by a process of that kind. I think that, in the High Court, if you subpoena a witness, it is very doubtful if the court can commit the witness for contempt if he fails to appear. Some of the judges exercise the power and think that they have that power but, as a matter of fact, I think the only power is an action for damages. Certainly, if you have, for a £5 or £1 claim, power to procure the attendance of a witness, who may not want to interfere in private litigation between two parties, I think it is not right that power should be given to have him brought along by, say, a stalwart Civic Guard.
Comment on this
There are four amendments, Nos. 99, 101, 103 and 107, all of which provide for a majority decision by the rule-making committee. I think that a decision on amendment No. 99 might govern the lot.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 99:—
In page 25, Section 65 (1), to insert after the word "justice", line 1, the words "with the concurrence of the rule-making authority exercising power in respect of the court to which the matter relates."—(Patrick McGilligan).
I should like to know if the Minister has made up his mind as to whether he will accept the principle of Mr. McGilligan's amendment.
Comment on this
This, of course, is back again to what we were at earlier on about the matter of finance. Here it is taking away from the rule-making authority the right to veto fees. We had this out in another way on the former stage and on the Second Stage. Deputy McGilligan takes a strong view with regard to the right of interference by the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Justice in the fixing of fees. I tried to defend it and Deputy McGilligan seemed to have the impression that the views I expressed were put into my mouth by the Department of Finance; and that fees would go up to such an extent that they would seriously affect litigation and so on. I do not think that a position such as that is likely to arise. On that occasion I used the words that they were a mere bagatelle, and I think these are the only words that properly describe them when you relate them to the ordinary costs that are incurred. They can never rise to such an extent, or would not, I think, be permitted by any Department of Justice to rise to such an extent, as to create injustice in the way of preventing people from seeking their rights in the courts.
Comment on this
The Minister has had close on four years' experience of the Department of Finance, and he does not know the lengths to which it is prepared to go if it is let go those lengths. I think that the provisions of this section, with reference to increasing fees, will ultimately go very much further than the Minister anticipates, or even intends himself. Just as, in connection with the debate on the last amendment with the Attorney-General, I put as one of the grounds on which I was appealing to him not to press his amendment that I was doing so in order to save him from himself, so to speak, I support this amendment also in the interests of the Minister for Justice himself, because I know that he will uphold the interests not merely of the profession but of the private litigant seeking to exercise his constitutional right of going into the public courts of the country. But he will involve himself inevitably in a wrangle, which will never end, with the Department of Finance because I think he will have realised by this that the Department of Finance, very naturally because that is what it is there for, from its point of view wishes to get as much revenue as it can from the public. It has long since seen, or thought it saw, a method of partially financing the courts of justice at the expense of litigants, and the point of view of the Department of Finance is that courts of an elaborate nature, with judges, staffs and all the rest of it, are being provided for litigants at the expense of what the Department of Finance considers the Department of Finance, and it cannot see why it is that litigants should not pay more than they do for litigation. The Minister says that the amount of stamp duties and fees, compared with the cost of litigation, are a mere bagatelle. The Minister, of course, is speaking in reference to the fees that he charged as a solicitor.
Comment on this
Speaking from the point of view of those who belong to my profession, the relation between the stamp duties and the fees that we get are not a mere bagatelle, but in relation to the costs the solicitors get perhaps they are. This is only opening the door, and I think that ultimately, if this is given in to, the Department of Finance will very nearly have achieved its end of financing the Courts of Justice out of the litigant's purse. The Department of Finance likes to see the financing of the General Post Office paid for by the people who send telegrams and post letters, run as a business concern, and not at the expense of the taxpayer, and just as it makes the people pay who send telegrams and post letters for a State service like the Post Office, the object here clearly is to make the litigants who use the courts pay a very good proportion of the expenses of the upkeep of the courts. I think it would be at least some measure of protection against the natural predatory tendency of the Department of Finance that the rule-making authority should be interposed in order to help the Minister for Justice in his fight against the Department of Finance.
Comment on this
The Minister for Justice will find it very hard to disagree with his colleague, the Minister for Finance.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 100:
In page 25, to add at the end of Section 65 (1) the words "provided, however, that the said fees, or any of them, shall not be raised so as to increase the same, or any of them, by an amount of more than five per centum over the fees chargeable immediately before the introduction of this Act unless and until there shall have been obtained from the rule-making authority exercising power in respect of the court to which the matter relates, and laid before Dáil Eireann, a report on the proposed revisions and the said revisions shall have thereafter been approved by resolution of Dáil Eireann."
The object of the amendment is simple, and, in my opinion, a laudable one. Its purpose is to prevent the Minister for Justice and the Minister for Finance from raising the fees chargeable at the Court offices by any sums greater than 5 per cent. on the rate existing at the date of the coming into operation of the Act. During the Second Reading Debate on the Bill, a lot was said on the question of the expense of litigation in the country. The object of the amendment is to keep that expense down as much as possible. We all read constantly of the complaints which are made by the ordinary people of the country who have to avail themselves at times of the Courts in order to assert their rights of the excessive cost of litigation. This is an amendment which, I think, the Minister should accept. As I have said the cost of litigation is enormous at the moment. It seems an extraordinary thing that a poor man's Government above all should add to that cost.
Comment on this
I cannot accept the amendment. I could not say what my views on the subject would be in a particular set of circumstances, but I cannot bind myself as to what increase, if any, may arise in the fees. At this stage I could not give the Deputy any assurance on that. The fees will have to be considered generally, and I am not prepared to state at the moment whether there will be any increase or not.
Comment on this
Is not the Minister satisfied that at the moment they are too high? The amendment contemplates a rise of 5 per cent. on the present rate of fees. Surely, the Minister is able to state whether or not he is of the opinion that at the moment the fees are high enough and should not be increased. Does the taking off of the 5/- duty on coal represent his views on that?
Comment on this
Before the House passes the section, I desire to draw particular attention to sub-section (3) paragraph (e) and to suggest to the Minister for Justice that it is somewhat inappropriate, and, perhaps, undesirable that the registrar of a court should be a member of a committee of which one of the judges of the court is also a member, and that possibly he might see his way on a later stage to amend paragraph (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 67 by deleting the word "who" and thereby making the registrar of the Supreme Court merely the secretary of the committee instead of having him, as he would be if this Bill were enacted, a member of the committee and also the secretary of the committee.
If that suggestion were to commend itself to the Minister for Justice, I would like to add a further suggestion and it is this, that the sub-section should have additional words that would enable the assistant registrar of the Supreme Court to act as secretary of the committee if, by reason of illness or for any other cause, the registrar himself was unable to be there. It is obvious that occasions may arise when, for one of many substantial reasons, it would not be possible or convenient for the registrar of the Supreme Court to be available as secretary. It would be regrettable if the proceedings of the committee were to be retarded through an accident of that sort. I will merely repeat that the Minister for Justice might, perhaps, consider the suggestion of dropping the registrar of the Supreme Court as a member of the committee and leaving him in his other capacity of secretary and providing also for a substitute in the event of his being unable to act as secretary.
Comment on this
Representations have been made in relation to that matter and I will give it consideration between now and the Report Stage. I hope to be able to get a suitable amendment for what the Deputy has in mind.
Comment on this
As far as I see, these amendments deal merely with a question of drafting. I think our view is that it is not necessary to put in "a majority of". However, I will have that matter looked into. I think Deputy McGilligan's amendments are trying to make it more clear, but our view is that it is not necessary to put in the words.
Comment on this
There is one matter that I think I may appropriately refer to on Section 70. It does not in strictness arise, but I merely wish to make the point. It is in connection with the power of the rule-making authority to make rules for the Circuit Court. There is a practice existing in the Circuit Court by which, at the conclusion of a case, the solicitors on both sides get up and apply for expenses and have a wrangle about them. I have been requested to bring to the Minister's notice that that practice should cease and that the matter should be dealt with by the rule-making authority just as the ordinary costs of the action, in the same way as matters of that kind, expenses, are dealt with in the High Court. I shall be glad if the Minister will look into that matter. It will tend to stop the somewhat unseemly wrangles that take place.
Comment on this
I have received from some county registrars recommendations that the costs might be taxed by the county registrars in Circuit Court actions. I will see if that can be met. The matter will be considered.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 105:—
In page 27, before Section 71, to insert a new section as follows:— Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 66 of the Principal Act sittings of the Circuit Court (for the disposal of other than criminal cases returned for trial before the said court) for the Bandon division of the County Cork circuit area shall be held twice each year in Bandon and twice each year in Clonakilty and sittings of the Circuit Court for the said division (except in the cases referred to hereinbefore) shall be no longer held in Cork.
I am sure this amendment will be accepted by the Minister. I want to explain why I put it down.
Comment on this
Before he proceeds, might I explain to the Deputy the difficulty—it might shorten the discussion. The position is that the sittings are fixed by the rule-making authority. I shall have to resist the amendment, because I think it would be undesirable to incorporate in the Bill an amendment of this sort. It is purely a matter for the rule-making authority to fix the sittings.
Comment on this
I think in this matter the people of Bandon have a distinct grievance. There is certainly no reference to Bandon in the Schedule. I think the Minister should consent to the inclusion of Bandon as a centre in which to hold the Circuit Court. Bandon is a very important town in the County Cork.
Comment on this
It is, like every other place in the County Cork. As you all know, it was a long time ago a great stronghold of Orangeism and I am sure everybody remembers the famous lines:
"Turk, Jew or Atheist
May enter here,
But not a Papist."
Then, someone came along and wrote under that:
"Whoever wrote these lines
Wrote them well.
The same are written
On the gates of Hell."
But things are very much changed since that time. Bandon is now the fortress of Irish nationality. Bandon is about 18 miles west of Cork City and all the litigants who, in the ordinary course, would go to Bandon if there was a Circuit Court held there, are now compelled, at least some of them, to travel 40 and even 50 miles to get to Cork. In my opinion, that is a shocking state of affairs and it means putting needless expense on people who are either compelled or who wish to go to law in order to have their cases decided.
Bandon is provided with an excellent courthouse; there are splendid hotel accommodation and admirable transport facilities, and there is no earthly reason why litigants should be compelled to go to Cork City, passing Bandon on their way, and spend their money in Cork. They are put to unnecessary expense. This may appear to be a laughing matter for Deputy McMenamin, but it is a very serious matter for the people who have to attend the courts. I think in all the circumstances the claim of Bandon for a sitting of the Circuit Court twice a year at least is a paramount one, and it should be seriously considered by the Minister. We hear talk now about this being a matter for the rule-making authority. This scandal has gone on for several years and it is about time the position there should be remedied. I think it is about time that the present condition of things in regard to the holding of the Circuit Court should be changed and, so far as I can see, the best way to effect the change is to embody the matter in an Act of the Oireachtas. As I say, it is certainly a drawback to the people, and everybody in West Cork will endorse that view. As I have said already, no effort, has been made so far to remedy this section in the Act. Circuit Court Judge O'Connor, who is now operating in Dublin, told me that if he could do so he would willingly hold courts in Bandon. I think under those circumstances that the only way in which the matter can be remedied is by putting this section into the Act of Parliament. In that way we shall be doing only justice to the people of West Cork.
Comment on this
I understand that Clonakilty has already got a sitting, and if the people of Bandon can bring forward the same convincing arguments that Deputy Burke has urged here they may be able to induce the rule-making authority to have a centre in Bandon.
Comment on this
At the time Clonakilty was mentioned in the schedule there was no suitable courthouse in Bandon. I may say incidentally that the son of a courthouse-keeper in Bandon was one of the Manchester Martyrs.
Comment on this
I am sure the Minister will give it due consideration.
Comment on this
Is there any real difficulty about adding Bandon to that schedule? What Deputy Burke says about the matter is that Bandon is a very important town but the court house happened to be temporarily out of repair and the judge refused to sit there. It cannot be included unless it gets back into the schedule. The rule-making authority cannot include the name of Bandon because it is not in the schedule. Clonakilty and Skibbereen have sittings and there is a good deal of jealousy about Bandon, which is a far more central place. The courthouse has been rebuilt, and there is very fine accommodation there now.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 106:—
In page 27, Section 71 (4), lines 38/39, to delete the words "Minister for Justice" and substitute the words "Justices of the District Court".
The object of this amendment is to allow the district justices themselves to choose their four representatives on the Rules Committee, instead of having, as is provided in this section, that choice in the hands of the Minister for Justice. I wish to insist on this amendment, because it seems to me that this is yet another piece of evidence of the general interference with district justices which so clearly marks the whole of this Bill. The Attorney-General will probably speak on this amendment, because he seems to me for some reason or other which I have not been able to fathom, to have some particular set on the district justices. The Minister for Justice, for some other reason which I also am unable to fathom, will never speak when district justices are mentioned because, I think, of the fact that he has not really changed the views which he held in the year 1931, when he was speaking on the Department of Justice Estimate. I can see no reason at all why the 33 district justices throughout the country should not choose their own four representatives on this Rules Committee. In fact I can see a strong reason for the power of doing so being taken out of the hands of the Minister, because the Minister would be in a rather embarrassed position. if I may put it so, in making the selection. I take it that he would be more or less bound in ordinary courtesy to choose the district justices in their order of precedence, that is, their precedence in office, in accordance with the rank which they hold amongst themselves as district justices. For instance, he would have to take the senior justice of the Dublin Metropolitan District, I take it, as one of the representatives. If the matter is left to the district justices themselves —each of them regards himself as just as important as any other member of the District Court Bench—they will exercise free choice in the matter. It is far more likely that four good members will be chosen by the district justices themselves than that any good choice would be exercised by the Minister, restricted as he would be by the fact I have just mentioned. I have already said that there are several instances in this Bill of a desire to interfere as much as possible with the District Court, and I would ask the Minister, as a mere gesture indicating his bona fides in this matter, to leave the selection to the district justices themselves. I understand that throughout the country—even on this point which, to the Minister, may appear to be a very small one—there is a desire amongst the district justices themselves that the choice of the four members for this Rules Committee should be left in their own hands. I cannot put it any further than that. The Minister may have some special reason for having the matter in his own hands. If he has, I should like to hear it.
Comment on this
This is really a continuance of the position as it is under the 1924 Act. Under Section 90 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, the justices who were members of the rule-making committee were nominated by the Minister for Justice. There has been no complaint from anybody; certainly it was not brought to my knowledge, and I am not aware that it was brought to the notice of the Department of Justice in previous years that there was any dissatisfaction or cause for complaint by the district justices. This system has obtained since 1924. While it is not stated in any Bill or Act, the practice always has been that the district justices are consulted. I do not anticipate that there would be any disagreement with the district justices as to accepting the nominees they would suggest. The Deputy, I am afraid, is misinformed if he has got the impression that there is any dissatisfaction amongst the district justices, or that the practice that obtained has not been quite satisfactory to them. There is nothing sinister about it, I assure the Deputy.
Comment on this
Amendment No. 107 is governed by amendment No. 99, and amendment No. 108 is governed by amendment No. 102.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 109. It is a drafting amendment. It reads:
In page 28, line 4, Section 73 (1), delete the word "Section" and substitute the words "Part of this Act".
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 110:—
In page 28, line 41, Section 75 (1), after the word "court" to add the words "or, in the case of the Local Registration of Title Rules Committee, the practice, procedure, and administration under the Local Registration of Title (Ireland) Act, 1891, and the operation and effect of that Act".
This is a drafting amendment.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 111. This is also a drafting amendment. It reads:—
In page 28, line 49, Section 75 (2), after the word "justice" to add the words "or, in the case of the Local Registration of Title Rules Committee, in the practice, procedure, and administration under the Local Registration of Title (Ireland) Act, 1891, with a view to the improvement of the operation of that Act."
Comment on this
We cannot let this section go by without some well-chosen observations about the Revenue Commissioners. This section appears to be a section which on its face is for the benefit of the unfortunate taxpayer who is to be put into durance vile by the Revenue Commissioners. It provides that where the Revenue Commissioners have clapped a man into jail because of some iniquitous tax due, the Revenue Commissioners are bound to discharge him within six months whether the debt is paid or not. The whole power has been given to the Revenue Commissioners. I wonder why it is that it is the Revenue Commissioners who are to allow the man out. The persons who put in the prisoner are the persons to let him out. Surely there should be a mandatory direction that he shall be released at the end of six months, that forthwith at the expiration of six months, if not sooner, the jail gates shall be opened and the man released.
Comment on this
The section is intended to be for the benefit of the taxpayers, and the question is whether there is anything there on which the Revenue Commissioners can close their teeth.
Comment on this
Would it be possible to give power to somebody other than the Revenue Commissioners to order his release? Is there any reason why the prerogative of mercy should not be exercised in a case where persons are sent to prison for a fixed period? The Revenue Commissioners take up a view with regard to Revenue matters that might seem inhuman to the public at large. Is there any reason why the power of release should not be vested in the Executive Council in the case of these offences as in the case of ordinary offences?
Comment on this
I wonder is the Deputy right in thinking that this is an interference with the exercise of the prerogative? This section is designed to provide that where the Revenue Commissioners imprison a man for the non-payment of taxes that they are authorised and required at the expiration of six months to release him. That is to say, they cannot hold him longer than six months. That is the effect of the section.
Comment on this
They are required to do it. Is not that right? They hold him.
Comment on this
Yes, for non-payment of a Revenue debt.
Comment on this
Why not? The imprisonment is related to a tax or duty under their care and management. Is it not the object of the section to see that notwithstanding the fact that there has not been payment within six months, they in their knowledge of the facts are to release the man. Is it not proper that the Revenue Commissioners should be the people to do that?
Comment on this
The person who fails to pay a tax may at present go to prison and may rot there. It is now provided that after six months the Revenue Commissioners are required to discharge the prisoner. Is not that a roundabout method of providing that imprisonment in default of payment of the debt shall be six months and no more? Would it not be better to take the matter directly rather than in a roundabout way?
Comment on this
I can see the reason. They do not want to let it appear in the order of the district justice that the man is only in for six months. They are in hopes when the man sees the order that he will jump to the conclusion that he will be kept there in sæcula sæculorum or until the debt is paid. They evidently hope that when he sees the order over him in terrorem he may be induced to pay. The Minister should look into that.
Comment on this
It may in fact have the same result. The matter has gone beyond the point contemplated by the section. It has become the subject matter of a court order, and it appears to be contrary to principle that where a matter has become the subject of a court order then the Revenue Commissioners should be supposed to cut down the effect of that order. It is a matter of drafting.
Comment on this
We must take amendment No. 113 before amendment No. 112. I move amendment No. 113.
In page 29, Section 77, line 12, to delete all words after the word "as" down to the end of the section and substitute the words "are prescribed by rates, scales and regulations generally determined by the Minister for Justice with the sanction of the Minister for Finance."
The purpose of this amendment is to get information. Is the Minister for Justice going to determine the details of the expenditure in each individual case or is there going to be a scale laid down and that the Minister will in future see that scale followed? I want the scale and not a sheet sent in by the judges in regard to expenses.
Comment on this
I understand that the finances are going along lines that have been at present working with regard to the Circuit Court judges. There is a scale there which will operate on that basis.
Comment on this
I want to bring in the idea of a scale, and not that each judge, on each piece of travelling, sends in his itemised bill, so to speak, for expenses—that he will have a scale fixed and go according to that.
Comment on this
It does not, but that has been the practice with Circuit Court judges. It is a scale.
Comment on this
Has it always been the practice with Circuit Court judges, or is it a recent practice? I understand that recently the allowances of Circuit Court judges have been very considerably curtailed and even based on an entirely different principle from what they used to be. I think the Circuit Court judges generally are very seriously perturbed.
Comment on this
I do not think that is so. I think the matter has been adjusted satisfactorily to the Circuit Court judges.
Comment on this
I am glad to hear that, because the last time I heard about it they had a very large grievance.
Comment on this
I will look into the matter and let the Deputy know on the next stage. I understand there was a scale and that it will be followed; probably a higher scale than that for the Circuit Court judges.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 112:—
In page 29 to delete Section 77, lines 6 to 13 inclusive.
The amendment does not explain itself, because my objection to the section is not for what is contained in it, but what is left out of it. It discriminates between the judge and the jury. There is a proposal to pay the expenses of the judges and I have no objection to that, but I do object to the discrimination made between the judge and the jury. Each of them performs a necessary function and the function of the jury is no less important than that of the judge. The jury is in a different position from the judges. The jury as a rule are poorer men who are not living by the law. They are compelled under a very severe penalty to do their duty in the interest of justice. I see no reason why in a Bill that proposes to deal with justice such a gross injustice should be done to the poorer section who perform at least as important a function as the judges. When a person is put on trial his life is in the hands of these men. These 12 men, who are generally much poorer than the judges, are taken from their ordinary business. They must attend no matter at what cost, or what they may suffer by the neglect of their business. They have to attend the court and stay there from day to day. Does the Minister think, in the name of justice, that is fair to these men? I do not know what the real objection is to including these jurors and giving them expenses?
Comment on this
Is the Deputy making a case for paying the jurors rather than not paying the judges?
Comment on this
If I were to move an amendment that jurors should be paid it would be ruled out of order, and the only course open to me is to move to have this section cut out until the jurors get the same consideration as the judges. I believe that there is not a decent honest representative in the House who claims to be a representative of the unfortunate downtrodden middle-class people but will support this amendment no matter what side of the House he is on. I am glad Deputy Corry is in the House, as he has always stood up for the farmers against the lawyers, whatever his other faults may be. I hope he will do so this evening. The thing is so obviously just that I hope to have the support of every side of the House.
Comment on this
I kept out of the House this evening for one reason, and that is, that every time I came as far as the door and looked in I saw nobody on any of the benches only lawyers dividing the spoil. It reminds me of a little song I heard long ago which was composed when a certain lawyer died and four comrades were taking out the remains.
Comment on this
I will explain. This is the song:
"Ladies and gentlemen, behold the wonder,
One rogue above and four rogues under.
His body's for the grave but his soul is for a journey;
The devil is at law and he wants an attorney."
That is what the House reminded me of this evening.
Comment on this
The Deputy, in order to get something for the jurors, wants to deprive the judges of their salaries.
Comment on this
Is the Deputy suggesting that some of the salaries of the judges should go to the jurors? If he will, I will support him.
Comment on this
I did not catch what the Minister said. If he does not agree to include the jurors I will have to press it to a division.
Comment on this
This section provides that a majority verdict, both in civil and criminal cases, shall be a verdict of a jury. I think that there is a fundamentally wrong principle involved here. We know the present situation is that in civil cases a majority verdict is permitted and that nine members of a jury can return a verdict. The section provides, not, I think, for the first time, but now by way of alteration of the existing law, that in a criminal case a verdict of nine out of 12 who form a jury shall be the verdict. I said that there is a wrong principle involved here. It goes to the root of the whole justification for the system of trial by jury. If a case is tried by judges, whether one judge, or two or three, or any other number, each of the members of the Bench is a trained mind, determining for himself his opinion upon the facts and the law involved, and it is quite right and proper, in order that a decision may be reached, that if the number on the Bench is more than a single judge, the majority should prevail, because you have persons specially trained applying their minds to the question at issue.
But a trial by jury rests upon an entirely different principle. I am afraid that in this section, as in a good deal of the legislation with which we are afflicted in this country, there is a sort of hand-to-mouth method of procedure, and the failure to go back to fundamental principle and to realise what has been done. I think that attitude towards legislation has been manifested very often under the Constitution and fundamental matters affecting the State. This is also a matter affecting the State and the whole Constitution and the organisation of our civic life. Members of a jury are not specially trained for their task. They are persons selected at random from the community, men of every type of profession and calling. They are brought together as a body of men, and asked to pronounce upon a subject which as ordinary individuals they have to decide in courts all their lives. The justification of the jury system is this, that if 12 such persons, selected at random, can come to a conclusion that there is reasonable moral certainty if not absolute certainty, their verdict is right. In the case of a typical jury you have men of great intelligence, men of average intelligence and men perhaps of less than average intelligence. It is ignoring the fundamental, justification of trial by jury to allow a majority verdict. The only justification of trial by jury is that unanimity gives a reasonable certainty, a moral certainty that justice is being done.
I think if we are to maintain the jury system at all—and I for one hope it will always be maintained, because although juries may return unreasonable verdicts, I think they do not often do that—it is because the community feel that in every case, civil and criminal, you have as a matter of fact, even-handed justice done. You can only get that by requiring unanimity—that the whole 12 coincide in the verdict. I think, however, that to an extent the principle of majority verdict might be justified in civil cases where the aim is to get a verdict, and where it is better that even a wrong verdict should be given quickly, than that there should be no verdict at all. Civil cases differ from criminal cases, and if the jury system is worthy of being maintained at all, no departure from the unanimous verdict should be made, and that verdict should be either for or against acquittal.
Mr. G.K. Chesterton has written an essay on the jury system and its verdicts much on the lines on which I am speaking. He said in a criminal court the judge, counsel, and officers of the court, see only in the dock the usual man in the usual place. They have not been brought in from their offices and their shops and such places to attack the problem. They are there engaged in this kind of thing all their lives and they see only the man in the dock. Mr. Chesterton is a layman, and I am not to be taken as adopting his views, but there is something to be said for his point of view. He says people lose their sense of reality if they do not see the prisoner in his human character and conduct, as outsiders would see it. It is the justification of the jury system that 12 men are called in to determine upon the guilt or innocence of that man, and the only reason for allowing them to determine upon such an important matter is that the unanimous verdict of 12 men is most likely to give the true result. I think there is a great principle involved here, and it should not be departed from lightly. I think it is a matter of the very greatest importance, and it should not be determined without very serious deliberation.
Comment on this
I should like to join in the appeal made to the Minister to drop the provision in this section by which it is provided that a majority verdict in criminal cases should be sufficient. The history of trial by jury in this country is now fairly long. If I understand it aright, except in what are called agrarian cases and political cases, that system has worked rather satisfactorily. The same cannot be said of the civil and other aspects of our common law procedure imposed upon us in the 17th century. The system of jury trial seems to have commended itself to our people except in such exceptional cases as those to which I have referred.
The previous Administration when in power tried a new experiment on the old method of arriving at verdicts in criminal cases. For some years a temporary statute existed enabling nine members of the jury, in criminal trials, to bind their brethren. I do not want to refer to the working of that temporary Act. We had it only for ten years, but I do wish to draw the attention of the House to the fact that an appreciable period of time has elapsed since that statute expired. A great many citizens have been put on trial since then. Possibly the Minister for Justice, or the Attorney-General, can give some indication to the House of the degree of dissatisfaction that has been found with the conduct of juries during that very substantial period of time in which unanimity has been required for the purposes of a conviction. It seems to me that the experiment tried by the previous Administration did not produce such good results as would lead us permanently to introduce into our criminal procedure this method of con viction of prisoners by majority of nine out of 12.
Another matter which I am sure the Minister and Attorney-General have not lost sight of is this: That even assuming that through lack of knowledge or through perverseness of the jurymen disagreements result, that does not mean that the prisoner is acquitted. It merely means that he has to take his trial again and again, perhaps. It may be indeed that it adds to the hardship imposed on a guilty man. However that may be, the point I desire to make is that generally speaking a greater injury may be done to the prisoner than is likely to be done to the public, unless the public, through the Attorney-General may put the prisoner on trial again before a fresh jury generally at a different sitting of the court. In these circumstances, unless the Minister for Justice or the Attorney-General have some information or knowledge in reference to this procedure during the last couple of years, which would influence them in persisting in this alteration, I appeal for at least further reconsideration of the provisions of this section.
Comment on this
I understand that on the Second Reading of the Bill various views were expressed on both sides of the House. It is a very difficult question to decide whether or not it is necessary to have unanimity in verdicts, and if that should continue. If we were satisfied that the jury system was all one would hope it to be, and was in a position to stand any strain that might be put upon it, I do not believe it would be necessary to continue this. Everyone would consider it more desirable to get unanimity.
That was the main reason that actuated us in bringing in, on the other Committee Stage, an amendment by which we asked for unanimous verdicts in murder cases, where persons were liable to the capital penalty. The object behind that, of course, was that if a person's life was taken away there was no remedy if a wrong was done, whereas in the other cases, where a person is imprisoned and suffers some punishment, if it is discovered that there was a miscarriage of justice, the State is in a position to compensate or a remedy could be made. I do not think I could quite agree to having an unanimous verdict in any case except where a prisoner is liable to capital punishment. There are views on both sides of the House which differ on this question. It is not desirable, except to see how justice can be done in the jury system as we have got it.
Comment on this
During the course of the observations I made on the Second Reading of the Bill I gave expression to my views on the proposals contained in it. Possibly I spoke a little too heatedly and expressed my views too strongly. At all events, on that occasion I produced for the benefit of the Ministry all the things they had stated in favour of unanimity, and I thought it was rather an astonishing thing that these people, from the President down, who are so keen on majority rule were bringing in a Bill and were suddenly becoming sponsors of the very proposals to which they took objection some years ago. I want to get away from that atmosphere, to forget everything said on the Second Reading, and everything that could be hurled at the Minister for Justice, and to consider this question on principle. The fact that Deputy Geoghegan appealed to the Minister not to insist on this provision, and the fact that the Minister has stated that a number of Deputies in his Party are not in favour of it, leaves it free and open to the House to discuss it as a matter of principle. It is a very grave matter of principle indeed. I feel that the decision we now take, if we take a decision, is one that is going to rule very vitally upon the principle involved for many years to come. If we decide to have majority rule, then I think no subsequent Government ought ever interfere with that. I do not think they would. Similarly, if we agree to pass this Bill, and to retain the system of unanimity in criminal trials, I do not think any subsequent Government ought to reverse that policy. The matter is too fundamental and too grave to attempt to chop and change.
Deputy Geoghegan referred to the fact that the last Administration brought in a provision for majority verdict in criminal cases. That provision was brought in in a Bill which was temporary in its life. It was only to operate until a certain year, and in fact has expired. It was experimental as Deputy Geoghegan said. It was something more than experimental, and was merely given a short life. It was not a Bill to interfere with the jury system in the ordinary sense. As the Title of the Bill demonstrated, it was a Juries' Protection Bill. I do not want to go into the very unpleasant circumstances of the time at which the Bill was introduced; one juror had been murdered, several had been wounded and every juror on every panel before that Bill was passed had been intimidated. The Juries' Protection Bill was an effort to stave off what subsequently became the provisions of Article 2A of the Constitution. It was one of the means adopted to deal with the situation that confronted the then Government. It was an effort to retain the jury system, which was crumbling under the attacks of intimidators and murderers. The last Administration was anxious to retain the jury system, and to retain the system of unanimous verdict if at all possible. They were anxious that experimental measures should only be taken in regard to people trying to undermine that system. They tried that device in the Juries' Protection Bill. I might say in parenthesis that they tried every possible device before the provisions of Article 2A were brought in to meet the menace that confronted the State at that time. Deputy Geoghegan referred to the fact that it was an experiment. I agree that it was an experiment. But it was also something more than an experiment. It was brought in under special circumstances which I hope sincerely have passed away forever.
Whatever the future of this country may be, whatever the destiny is in store for the people, I am afraid the jury system will never stand up to political attack. If there is political ferment in the country at any time, if there is agrarian outrage, and if self-styled patriots as in the past make an attack on the personnel of unfortunate people who have to serve on juries, then no jury system will stand that attack. Therefore, I do not think that this project, that nine out of 12 can be a weapon to be used in defence against attacks on the jury system. I think the provisions of the Juries' Protection Act having been tried have proved to have failed. Deputy Geoghegan has pointed out that since that Act expired the system of unanimity has been in existence. We all know, unfortunately, that our courts are overworked with criminal work in recent years. I do not know what is the reason, but practically speaking, throughout the length of the years, Green Street is occupied either by the circuit judge or by the judge of the Central Criminal Court. A very large number of cases have been heard, and taking it all in all, in most cases there have been convictions. The system appears to be working very well now. It is a matter on which many people feel very deeply; this question of the unanimous verdict. It may be that it is one of the old principles taken over from British common law and has become embodied in our conservative legal system. There are numbers of people, lay as well as in the legal profession, who make a shibboleth of the unanimous verdict. Personally, I do not think the system of unanimity is so sacrosanct as a number of people imagine.
Having regard to the general feeling that exists in the public mind, and as far as it is known on this side, and in the mind of the profession, I think there is a strong demand for the retention of the unanimous verdict in criminal trials. I think the Government would be well advised to leave the matter stand as it is at the moment. The Bar Council are certainly very strongly of the view that there should be unanimous verdicts, and, on their behalf—and I think the Attorney-General knows this—I am expressing here the very strong view which the members of our own profession hold on this. They may be accused of being interested in the matter, but that accusation, like most other accusations directed against the legal profession, is entirely without foundation. I think that most lawyers who have practised under the system of law that obtains here have become imbued with the idea that it is in the best interests of the administration of justice and the administration of the law, as well as of the protection of the rights of a prisoner, that there should be a unanimous verdict. While I had something to do with the Juries' Protection Act, and its administration subsequently, I think the general prevailing view of the public and of the legal profession is against this change, and, in all the circumstances, I think the Minister would be well advised not to press it.
Comment on this
Surely this point arises that the purpose of the administration of the criminal law is two-fold. It is designed, firstly, to secure that the innocent shall go free and that the guilty shall be properly punished, but also there is the important element that the community at large shall rest content that substantial justice has been done. The community at large in this country, for as long as the common law has run here, has been accustomed to get that assurance that when a man has been adjudged guilty he is guilty from the unanimity of the jury's verdict. I do not think the Attorney-General or the Minister can doubt that the majority verdict will never carry that same conviction of real justice to the public mind that a unanimous verdict carries.
I further think that those intimately connected with the accused will not have that same profound conviction that substantial justice has been done, and, speaking as a member of the public, rather than as a member of the legal profession. I press very strongly on the practising members of the legal profession here that this is a matter that deserves consideration, not only from the legalistic point of view but from the social point of view as well. It is no small part of the successful and proper administration of the criminal law that justice should be brought home to the criminal, but also that society at large should be convinced that justice has been effectively done. I do not think you can hope to do that by majority verdicts, and I think you are doing it at the present time, and have been doing it for generations, by the unanimous verdict of a jury of 12 men.
Comment on this
Might I press one point which I forgot to mention in connection with this matter and which, I think, will appeal to the Attorney-General in the exercise of his functions as prosecutor. He is aware of the existence of an institution called the Court of Criminal Appeal, and, having landed his catch, he has perhaps discovered that it is taken from his grasp by that august body. I think that while it is right and proper that the Court of Criminal Appeal should exercise a very stringent supervision over the conduct of criminal prosecutions, in every court, and while I think the jurisdiction and supervision which has been exercised by the Court of Criminal Appeal since its establishment has been very salutary and has resulted in a tightening up of criminal administration all over the country, and the exercise of their functions by judges in criminal cases, from the High Court down to the lowest court, has been bettered and improved as a result of the existence of the Court of Criminal Appeal, I think the effect of this section will be to make the Court of Criminal Appeal very much more strict afterwards in their investigation of criminal trials before juries than ever they have been before.
Where they will be under the impression that a majority verdict carried a conviction, they will, I think, be inclined to look at the conduct of the proceedings before the jury in the criminal court with a very much more severe and raking eye than even at present, and I think the Attorney-General may find himself, in the exercise of the functions of his office, presented with still more difficulties if he persists with this particular provision.
Comment on this
I have already on Second Reading explained, or endeavoured to explain, my attitude towards this question and have admitted that, theoretically, I have myself favoured unanimity, and I also was inclined to favour it from the point of view of the practical value of the change, because I do not attach the importance to the magic number 12 that apparently some Deputies think should be attached to it. I do not know why a verdict of 12 jurors should be so sacrosanct and a verdict of nine so little thought of. The history of this section is the history which has been given by Deputy Geoghegan and Deputy Costello. It is the re-embodiment in the law of the section which lapsed with the lapse of the Juries' Protection Act of 1929, except that that Act contained the section without, I think, distinction in respect of a capital case. There was provision in the section that a judge in a capital case should report to the Minister the exact number of persons who voted in favour of conviction, but a nine verdict carried in a capital case just as well as in an ordinary criminal case.
The Act lapsed, I think, in 1931 or 1932—it had, I think, a three years life—and directly it lapsed, and, in fact, before it lapsed, I had the experience of several of the judges and those concerned with the administration of the law making the appeal to me that, whatever was done about the other sections of that Act, a short Bill should be immediately introduced re-enacting this particular section. I resisted that appeal because I said I thought it was not quite as essential as they imagined, because all the judges who had experience of the working of the system of nine verdicts had genuinely come to the conclusion that it was a most salutary change in the law, that no injustice that they had ever seen had been done by it, and that it had the merit of preventing two or three trials caused by one or two troublesome jurors. As I say, I was pressed very strongly as to the merits proved in the working of the section of the 1929 Act.
Deputy Geoghegan has asked me to give some particulars as to how things have worked since the section lapsed and suggested that we should have some statistics with regard to the number of cases in which there have been disagreements. I am assured that, judged by the working of the nine verdict system in the period during which it was in operation, those who were in close contact—excellent judges whose judgment, I think, Deputy Costello or anybody who had contact with them would accept—were satisfied that, in practice, no injustice had been done and that a great deal of help had been given to the speeding up of the machinery of the courts.
The circumstances of the introduction of that Act have been referred to by Deputy Costello. He said, I think, that it was introduced as a section in a general Act designed to protect jurors and he thinks that the circumstances which caused its introduction are not likely to recur, or that, if they do, other methods will have to be adopted to protect jurors, and that in fact jurors cannot be protected by any sort of legislation of this character. That may or may not be. With regard to my views about it, I can only say that I do not think people are justified in making such a shibboleth of the number 12 as Deputy Costello said, or that it is going to work such grave harm to restore this provision to the law.