Imposition of Duties (Confirmation of Order) Bill, 1936—Second Stage (Resumed).
Contributions 1–199 of 407. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 10 of 1936 ›
Last night I suggested it would be well for the House to face the realities in this question and not to be dealing with pretences. Deputies who have spoken on the Opposition side have all been labouring to pretend to themselves, to the House and to the country that the real difficulty in this issue between Britain and ourselves is the waywardness or the wilfulness of the present Government, and particularly my waywardness and my wilfulness. Let us go back a little and see the origin of this dispute, and get the whole thing in its proper perspective. For years before we were returned as a Government we held that the payments, in particular the land annuity payments to Britain, were not due to Britain either legally or morally. We made that case in the country, we made that case here. The case was met by the then Government in the country, and the case was met here and we argued it for something like six years. During all that time the basis of the arguments on the other side was that by the Land Acts, etc., these moneys were due to Britain. Never once in the whole of that time was it suggested that these payments were being handed over to Britain in virtue of an agreement which had been arrived at by the then President of the Executive Council and a British Secretary of the Treasury, Major Hills.
There was, as you will remember, before the election of 1932, an electioneering pamphlet issued at the public expense by the then Government for their side, in which the opinions of eminent counsel were cited as to the liability of the State to pay these moneys over to Britain. But not in the whole of that argument on their side was it once stated that the reason that the moneys should be paid over was because a contract to pay them over had been entered into by the then President of this State. There was reference, undoubtedly, to the Ultimate Financial Settlement, but that was pushed aside. As I have repeatedly stated—I am not going to quote the exact words here—the effect of the brushing aside was that the Ultimate Financial Settlement had nothing to do with the paying over of the moneys, that it was not the basis or the authority for the payment, that the liability, in other words, did not rest on that document at all. All the time the argument was that the liabilities depend on other things—the Land Acts, etc.
That was the position when we took office. We were prepared to meet the British case from that standpoint. We told them in advance by public statements that it was our intention, when we got into office, believing that these moneys were not due, to do what any private individual in similar circumstances would do and that is retain these moneys until it was proved definitely that these moneys were due. We expected that the British, as they afterwards did, would come along with their statement of the case. Mr. Thomas, the then Secretary for the Dominions, noticed that statement of mine and sent us a despatch in which he stated that these moneys were due on the basis of a formal agreement as binding—I think he said as binding as the Treaty of 1921 was, a formal agreement binding in honour and in law on the two Governments. That surprised me somewhat; I did not know what he was driving at, and I sent a despatch asking him if he would be good enough to point out to us what was this formal undertaking or agreement which until that time we had not heard about. To our amazement he sent us back a statement that a certain document was signed in February, 1923, by the then President, agreeing to hand over these moneys, and this was further confirmed by the Ultimate Financial Settlement of a later period.
I asked the Minister for Finance, the Department of Finance and the officers of the Department of External Affairs if they had any record of this famous agreement, and to let me have it so that I might know what its terms were. I got a tattered and torn document which I exhibited on one occasion here to the House, but which has been strapped up with ribbon and tape and wax since in order to try to put it in something like a condition in which it would last. It should have been kept in its original form as an exhibit for all time. It was such a remarkable document that it even aroused the curiosity of Deputy Belton, who wanted to come over and have a good look at it. I called it a thing of shreds and patches and that is what it was. I found it was on the basis of this document, which contained only a single signature, quite unlike any document or treaty or undertaking between Governments that I have ever seen, that it was held by the British that these payments were due to Britain. We had to face then a completely new situation. To what extent were we bound by this document which had been kept secret during all these years from the Irish people? We had been aware of the Ultimate Financial Settlement which had been kept secret for nine months, but this was a case of a document nine years hidden away. Was this respect for treaties? As I mention that, I would say that my regard for treaties and contracts is much higher, to put it at its worst, than the regard for them that the Deputies on the opposite benches, in certain statements that they made, have shown.
I remember the Treaty debates well, and I remember that one of the things I used to contend against on that occasion was the suggestion, which was very common, that this country could enter into a treaty, but that on the day it was signed it could be forgotten, that it was imposed on us, and that therefore it need not be regarded. I admit it was imposed, but I recognised then, and I recognise now that even under that threat, the dire threat of force, when documents like that are signed they are constantly used as an excuse by the opposite party to persist in the threat and to persist in the exploitation, if it is a question of exploitation, to which it seemed to give sanction. I know full well that treaties between nations when they are entered into, even under duress, are very difficult things to get out of. I admit I have always held that there is no moral binding force in a treaty imposed by force. I have given an example here in this House before and I believe it is sound. If somebody or other comes along and takes from me by threat of force something that is mine, let us say my watch, and in order to try to legalise his title to it, compels me to resign my title to that watch, I say if ever I can get a chance by force to come back on that robber, to compel him by similar means to give me back my watch, and also to compel him to relinquish the document he has taken, and to hand me a document by which he surrenders any right that might have been given to him by means of the first document, I shall use that force.
It is obvious, in the case of force, that there is no finality about it. There is no moral right secured by treaties got under threat of force. All of us remember the Treaty of Versailles and the circumstances under which it was signed. I ask all of you who were of age to think at that time, did you not know when that treaty was signed that in it there were the seeds of future wars? So it shall always be, but that does not take away from the fact that when you have documents signed like that, they will always be held up by the party which secured your signature to the treaty by the use of a threat, as a barrier if you ever make an effort to get out of the position into which you have signed yourself. I say, then, I have as high a regard for contracts as our opponents at least. I believe that in everything I have said in public in regard to treaties and all the rest of it, I have tried to set as high, if not a higher, standard. It is precisely because I do not want to see any representatives of this country signing an agreement under circumstances like that again, that I have said if we make an agreement with the British it ought to be an agreement which would correspond to realities as regards the consent of our people.
Then, on every occasion when there was a question of a treaty between ourselves and Britain, I have stipulated as a condition that the treaty should be submitted to our people for their ratification, under conditions which would remove the possibility of threats. I have made the case that it is only under such conditions you can have agreements which will be loyally accepted and loyally fulfilled. If there is any element of waywardness shown in the Bill, it is in our adherence to, and not in any departure from, the letter and the spirit of the idea that contracts which are voluntarily entered into should be carried out honestly and fairly. This document was signed in 1923. Was it a document which was, as Mr. Thomas held, binding in law and in honour on our people? I hold it was not, and I held all the time it was not. It was a document the full terms of which were never revealed to our people. They were not revealed to this House. On the occasions on which there was any reference to such an agreement having been signed or made, there was always evasion on the part of the Ministers who were then in office. When there was a question of its publication for certain purposes in Britain, the Government then in office here refused to agree to have it published.
There was a document, the terms of which were such that it would not be politically convenient for the Executive then in office to have that document published in extenso. Suggestions are made that there was some sort of implied ratification of its contents by means of Appropriation Acts and so on. There again there is a departure from a well-known principle, a principle which was argued in the British House of Commons on one occasion by Mr. Healy, and his arguments were accepted by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith. His argument was that appropriations should not be used except to pass moneys that were already granted by previous legislation. The whole idea that Parliament here is supreme over the Executive, and that it is only by their representatives in Parliament the people of the country can be bound in financial matters, was departed from. That was a well understood principle, but it was set aside.
Accordingly, I say that our people, either through their Parliament or their votes, were never parties to that agreement. I repudiate the agreement and I have always repudiated it on that basis. I say it is not binding. Is it a trifle? Was this matter over which we are talking a mere trifle? Was it something that we could lightly set aside and forget about? What was it? Up to 1931 about five and one-third million pounds a year were paid over to Britain and we got nothing in return for it. It had to be paid by means of produce, of course. We would have to pay it by sending over cattle, sheep or other produce. It had to be paid in that way for a long period of years or else by the way Deputy Cosgrave deplores, by the depletion of our foreign credits. It had to be paid anyhow. What relation does this sum bear to our resources? I have frequently quoted the estimate of the British Treasury, given, I think, by Mr. Baldwin when he was Chancellor—66 to 1.
Comment on this
The gentlemen opposite, of course, are so clever that they do not want any officials. They can go over like Deputy Cosgrave and make agreements overnight. They do not want any help from experts of any kind. Deputy Brennan will sneer at the estimate of the British Treasury officials on the matter when it was to their advantage to put it the other way. The estimate of the taxable capacity of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as compared with this State was 66 to 1. That was the ratio—66 to 1. Taking it at these figures, our payments to Britain of five and one-third million pounds would correspond to a payment of £330,000,000 from a country with the resources of Britain itself. There you have an amount which is ten times the sum that the British Government have stated they could not pay in war debts to America without being swamped. Our payment to Britain was ten times the amount, on the ratio I have given, of the £33,000,000 a year that they were paying to America when they stopped. On the 66 to 1 basis, again, an amount of only £500,000 from this country would be equal to a burden of £33,000,000 due from Britain to the United States. Britain could not afford to pay that amount; yet this country was supposed to pay on a ratio of ten times that sum.
It was the contention of Deputies opposite that we should agree, and continue to pay this debt, and forget that it was ten times as heavy a burden upon us as Great Britain was called upon to pay, and which she found she could not continue to pay, to the United States. We talk about the tax upon our cattle. I remember Deputy O'Sullivan going down to instruct the farmers of Kildare, on one occasion, in the early stages of the annuities question. And he threatened the Kildare farmers that if they refused to pay these annuities the British would put a tax of £1 per head on their cattle. I pointed out to the people of Kildare that they were paying very much more than £1 on their cattle and handing it over as a luck-penny to Great Britain.
In 1932 when we came into office we were paying five and one-third million pounds; and the whole of our fat cattle trade did not realise that much. So that in paying the land annuities we were making a complete present of all our fat cattle to Great Britain with something to spare. For the whole of our fat cattle we were getting nothing per head. In that year our total cattle trade amounted to something over £12,000,000. It works out that the payment was equivalent to a tax on the whole of the cattle trade of nearly £7 per head. We were doing at that time—what was kept hidden from the Irish people— we were making a continued payment of a tax equivalent to £6 19s. 2d. or nearly £7 per head. That was the payment agreed to. According to Deputy Cosgrave, we entered into that contract to pay and agreed it was due. If we agree, according to Deputy Cosgrave, that it is morally and legally due, then we may expect some little mitigation. If we go over to the British Treasury, admit that this secret compact and agreement was binding upon our nation, then we commit ourselves to the position which we had in 1931—a position in which, if the trade was to amount to what it did in that year, we would be handing over more than the whole of our fat cattle to Great Britain without getting anything in return. I think, if you put together all the live pigs, bacon and butter, you could, if you were prepared to pay it in that way rather than by means of cattle, get possibly some little mitigation in the conditions. That was the position the nation found itself in. It was not from our waywardness. It is not by contracts made by the present Government that we find ourselves in our present position. If there is to be blame for the present situation, it must be laid upon the shoulders of the people who entered into that contract without any legal necessity whatever.
Now, last night we had a suggestion to the effect that we destroyed some bridge that had been made. We have heard that kind of statement made over and over again. I tried to trace it, and tried to find out how it originated. I associated it with the statement made by Deputy Mulcahy.
Comment on this
I said I associated it with the statement made by Deputy Mulcahy here. Did the Deputy make that statement?
Comment on this
I said I associated the Deputy with those rumours, but I was astonished last night to find it quoted by Deputy Dillon. We have been trying to get at the basis of this thing that has been talked about so long, but up to the present we have not succeeded. We find now that the Independent quoted from its Ottawa correspondent. My recollection was that the Irish Press sent over a special correspondent. I do not believe the Independent did, but that is by the way. We have got an interview here, and just imagine the interview which was made the basis of the statement that we were going to have an immediate settlement. I do not know anything about it. I cannot believe that there was anything of the kind. The Minister for Agriculture was one of the deputation over there; he did not know it was made. The Vice-President himself could not remember anything about it. He was in Ottawa, of course, and the Irish Independent was here. This is one of the things one has always to be very careful about. When a person goes elsewhere he is generally pestered with a number of newspaper men who want a story home. Every one who has been at any conference knows that immediately he comes out these newspaper men come round and ask “Any news; anything we can say?” I have had more than once to deal with matters of that particular sort. I have had many a time to refuse even to say a single word. If you said a word it was magnified into an article.
Comment on this
I do not think I could make that estimate on the basis of the figures on which the other was compiled. They were always magnified. I looked through the report of this particular interview and I find here in the Irish Press a denial of Reuter's report. I find in the Irish Independent“an exclusive interview,” if you please. The Vice-President of the Executive Council, with a representative of the Irish Press on the other side, chose to give an exclusive interview to the Irish Independent. I do not think there is anything in this that gives any basis whatever for the statement or for the rumours that there was any bridge made there; that there was any agreement to agree, as Reuter puts it, made there. There was none whatever, and I can say to the House that the British attitude as regards the determination of this dispute has always been based on these two positions: “Either you negotiate on the basis of accepting that document as binding, in which case we will hold out to you a hope that there may be some mitigation,” or, “if you dispute that, you must put the matter for trial before a Commonwealth tribunal.” That has been the invariable position taken up by the British Government——
Comment on this
——"either you accept the 1923 document as binding the nation, and negotiate on the basis of that acceptance, or you take up the other position—that the two Governments cannot agree on that matter— and then you submit the matter to a Commonwealth tribunal." There has been no change whatever in the British attitude in that matter as regards the determination of the dispute. Now what about this Commonwealth tribunal? It is suggested: "Why not leave it to the Commonwealth tribunal?" The British Government took up the position that it was a matter of principle with them. We took up the position—and I think we are equally entitled to take up the position—that it was no less a matter of principle with us that it would not be so. We never bound ourselves to do that; neither did our predecessors. The 1930 conference contained no such provision as that—that disputes between member States of the Commonwealth should be so submitted. That was resisted, so far as I know, by my predecessor in the Ministry of External Affairs. All that was done at that conference in relation to a tribunal was to indicate the manner in which it should be composed if and when it was agreed by the parties that they were going to submit any particular dispute to such tribunal. We are not breaking any contract that was entered into. This State, through its then representatives, signed the optional clause, the agreement with regard to submitting disputes to the permanent court. The attitude of this State at that time was clear about the matter. It was possible, of course, to submit disputes to a Commonwealth tribunal, but I do not think that anybody here in this country would have the hardihood, with the memory of the Feetham Commission constantly in their minds, to suggest that a matter of life and death, as it would be in a sense to our people—the matter of whether we should bear that burden— should be submitted in that way. If the others maintain that in principle it must be so, we in principle and as a result of the unfortunate experience which this country has had are not prepared to recommend to our people, or to take responsibility for the submitting of that matter to a court constituted in that precise way.
We have had a deadlock, therefore, on these two points which the British have made vital; first, as I have said, that if we negotiate with regard to the amount it must be on the prior acceptance of that contract as binding; and secondly, if we do not accept that contract as binding then we must submit the matter to a Commonwealth tribunal. Will Deputies on the opposite benches tell us what we should do under those circumstances? Of course those on the opposite benches who hold that contracts are honourably binding on the parties will find it very difficult indeed, having been parties to the contract, to say that they could not negotiate on the basis of that contract being binding. We, however, do not think that that contract is binding. We cannot negotiate on that basis, and if there is to be a consideration of amounts it must not be on that basis, but on some other basis altogether. It has never been proposed by the British or accepted by them that there should be negotiations on any other basis. Do Deputies opposite want the matter to be referred to a Commonwealth tribunal? We would be glad to hear their responsible spokesman telling us what they want to have done with it. They have suggested mitigation. They have suggested that the payment of those sums now is a heavier burden than it was some years ago; that more agricultural produce would have to be given in order to pay it; all of which is quite true. But they seem to suggest that if they had the handling of it they would admit that this money was due—morally and legally due— and that they would then ask the British to reduce the amount. I say that is not possible for us. "Mitigation" is a very dangerous word when used by the British Chancellor in regard to amount. It does not suggest reduction such as Deputies on the opposite benches told the country people they would get if they had the doing of it.
"Go over," they tell us, "and make a settlement." We have gone over. We have been there more than once. The British Ministers have been here. We have met British Ministers here. I have met British Ministers in Downing Street. Whole delegations from here have met British Ministers, and the results of all the conversations have been all the time the same thing: "You accept the amount; you accept the contract as binding. After you have done that, after you have given up completely the right of the people to keep those moneys as a matter of right, after you have abandoned that position and given away the Irish case for the legal and moral retention of those moneys, then we are quite willing to consider some mitigation." The other position they have taken up is: "If you do not do that, then we are prepared to submit the legal question, leaving aside altogether of course the general equity, to a Commonwealth Tribunal." There are two disputes going on at the present time between ourselves and the British. One is a financial dispute, which has led to this attempt to compel us, by tariffs, to pay moneys which we hold are not due. There is another dispute of a political and constitutional character. We have never mixed up these two disputes. We have never tried to make the solution of one dependent on the other, but the British have. I think most Deputies will have seen the statements made by the former Secretary for the Dominions which show that very clearly. When we went over as a delegation I had some difficulty in trying to get it understood that we were there dealing with the financial issue only, but as no result came from it, it did not matter very much. However, I want Deputies and the country and anybody else who is interested to know that we have never at any time attempted to make the settling of one of these disputes dependent on the settling of the other.
If I might refer to that political dispute, we took up a certain position when we came into office. We came here pledged to do certain things. We said that when we were elected we would do these things, and we got the approval of the people for the doing of them. When we came into office we set about doing them. We held that we had a legal and a constitutional right no less than a fundamental and a moral right to do them. Who have been proved to be wrong in their contention in this dispute? Is it we who said we could remove these things and that we had a right to do it and frame our Constitution, or is it the gentlemen on the opposite benches who tried to argue that we had not the right? Who has been proved by our own courts and even by a foreign court, the British Privy Council, to be right in this matter? Judgment has been given by the British Privy Council against the British contention and it has been held there that we were within our legal rights and constitutional rights even in doing the things we have done here.
Comment on this
Making the constitutional changes that we have made. If the Deputy does not remember them he can look them up. As I say, there have been two disputes. There has been a constitutional dispute in which we have been proved even by the British Privy Council to have been legally right. There has been the financial dispute in which we still hold that an impartial tribunal will prove us to be right. I have no reason to mix these two up — no reason to try and make the settlement of one of the disputes dependent upon the settlement of the other. It is the British who have all the time been trying to make one of these dependent on the other.
I do hope that when people talk about this economic dispute they will take it in its proper perspective and realise how it has begun and what the Government have been trying to do. We have been trying to save this country from payments which mean a burden which this country could not continue to bear without suffering severe hardships. It has been said that we have not been able to prevent it. That is true. We have not been able to prevent our people suffering tremendously from the effects of the bargain which Deputy Cosgrave made. We have been trying to lighten it for the future. We have been trying to get into a position in which these payments, which are unjustified, will not become the lot of this country for decades of years. On account of the position to which this country had been reduced by past policy, as we had been brought to depend on the British market almost exclusively for our agricultural produce, the British used the position to which we had been brought to extract them from us against our will. Deputies opposite, of course, will say that if your watch is taken it does not matter whether you give it willingly or whether you submit to force—it is taken from you anyway. I hold that there is a very big difference. I hold that there is a very big difference between the position in which the British are forced to take these moneys from us against our will by imposing discriminatory tariffs upon our products and the position we would be in if we handed over the moneys voluntarily as if they were due. There is a tremendous moral difference between the two positions.
I believe that right will ultimately triumph in the matter. I may be wrong in that belief, but it is a belief I have held to fairly firmly all my life. I believe that right in this case will triumph ultimately too. I believe these moneys are rightfully ours and that every cent that is extracted from us by using the position to which past British policy has largely brought this country is a wrong done to this country and that that wrong will ultimately have to stop. If we accept the position that Deputies opposite take up then there is no wrong being done. There is a question of an acknowledgment of something that is due to the British.
Perhaps before I pass away from the subject it may not be any harm for our people to remember some of the contentions on which we base our right to the land annuities, even from the British legal point of view. I think we have proved in the past that what we have done has been more in accord with the British legal point of view than what their own Ministers were doing. I am not dealing now with the fundamental question of the national right or anything of that kind. I am keeping it on the narrower plane. On the basis of equity, I think we have an unanswerable case. On the basis of national right, I think we have an unanswerable case. But let us take the case from the British legal point of view in regard to land annuities. When the 1920 Act was passed the Exchequers of the two parts into which it was proposed to divide this country were given, as it was boasted, a free gift. We smiled at the free gift part, because we remembered that sums very much more than that were due to our country on the basis of over taxation. Sums two and three times the total amount of the land annuities had been extracted from this country as was held by British Commissions and by British officials. This free gift, however, was boasted of. Mr. Lloyd George spoke of "a free gift" to enable us to set up housekeeping—the free gift that was going to be given to the two parts of Ireland, North and South. They were to be allowed to collect from the farmers the debt which was due to the then State, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The two Governments were to be given the right to collect these annuities from the farmers and to retain these moneys in their respective Treasuries.
That was the position when the Treaty was negotiated: that the two parts of Ireland—Ireland as a whole, if you like—were entitled to collect or the Governments of Ireland were entitled to collect from the farmers the annuities which were due to the State and to retain these in their own Exchequers for general purposes. That was the position in regard to the land annuities when the Treaty was negotiated. The Treaty, from the British legal point of view, was afterwards grafted, so to speak, on to the 1920 Act. There is not a line or particle or syllable in the Treaty that could not be regarded as a step forward from that Act. Mr. Lloyd George's sole purpose was to try to get two Parliaments functioning in this country. That was his aim. But the Parliament here did not function by reason of the fact that the elected representatives did not go to it. Because it did not function he had to improve his offer. His offer was something in advance of the 1920 Act to be given to the people in this part of the country. Was it consistent with the idea of making it a more attractive advance from his point of view that "the free gift" was to be taken back? Of course it was not. There was no retraction of that free gift. I am calling it by the term they called it themselves. There was no retraction of the free gift. It was left there.
There was only one clause in the Treaty dealing with finance. What had that to deal with? Had it to deal with the retraction of the land annuities? It had not. Under the 1920 Act the British Imperial Parliament was still to be responsible for what were called Imperial services. They said: "We want to be paid for these services; we want to be paid an Imperial contribution." That was what was in the 1920 Act in this regard. The two parts of Ireland were to pay for certain services which were to be regarded as Imperial services. They were called on to make Imperial contributions. That was altered by the financial clause of the Treaty. That is the particular way in which this so-called Imperial contribution was to be made. We were to be held responsible for whatever proportion of the public debt of the United Kingdom might be held to be fair and just when off-sets and counter-claims were taken into account. It was obvious that that change would have to be made, because the British were no longer performing the services for us that they had intended to perform by the Act of 1920. It would be ridiculous for us to be performing the services ourselves and at the same time paying the British for them. They thought we would have sense enough to realise that and to object to it. Consequently, one particular clause of the 1920 Act, the one relating to Imperial contributions, was changed in the Treaty. Any payments that were due or would have been due under the 1920 Act were commuted into a different payment, namely, whatever sum would be found to be fair and equitable after the counter-claims were taken into account.
We know that there was a certain Boundary Agreement in 1925 and we know that the then President of the Executive Council shouted out that they had made a good bargain, that they had got off with a big nought. This big nought meant that the Article Five was ended. The British, therefore, had themselves agreed that whatever liability was on this State as a result of the financial clauses of the Treaty was assessed at zero from that date.
Therefore, there has been no taking back of "the free gift." I am repeating the word "gift." You can put it in quotation marks in your mind. There was no retraction of that "gift" in the Treaty. The retraction is not to be found anywhere in the Treaty. The question of the Imperial contribution which was provided for in the 1920 Act was changed for obvious reasons into another commitment which was ultimately resolved into no liability. Why then should these moneys be paid over to Britain? How are they due to Britain? Under what head are they due to Britain? On no basis that the British could show except on the basis that the then President of the Executive Council went over and signed an agreement under which it was agreed that these payments should be made. That was such a thing to trumpet to the country, that was such a wonderful bargain, that in modesty it was kept secret for nine years. Do the Deputies who are going to support the view that is put forward by the leaders of the Opposition stand for handing over these £5,000,000 yearly, agreeing that they are due when they know they are not due?
I remember when we were arguing on these lines throughout the country it used to be said, "Oh, he wants to take portion of the 1920 Act and not the rest of it; he wants one portion of the financial clause and not the rest. What about the Imperial contribution? It is true that the 1920 Act made a `free gift' of the land annuities, but what about the Imperial contribution? We did not hear what he is going to do about the Imperial contribution." I have told you into what the Imperial contribution was turned. It turned into a financial clause in the Treaty, which by the Boundary Agreement was turned into no payment as far as this country was concerned. Even if we had functioned under the 1920 Act it would be interesting for us to know how we would stand financially under it as compared with our present position. That is a very interesting thing to examine. The 1920 Act is in operation in Northern Ireland and it is in operation there in full in all its parts. There has been no Treaty to supersede it there. There has been no financial clause and no Boundary Agreement to end it. It is interesting to see how it has worked out there. Those who have studied the 1920 Act understand, and some who have not studied that Act would understand their country's rights in this matter somewhat better if they did study the Act. This 1920 Act provided, on the one hand, for "a free gift" and, on the other hand, for an Imperial contribution from the two portions of Ireland. At the time the Imperial contribution on the whole of Ireland was assessed at £18,000,000 for the initial period. After that initial period of a year or two a Joint Exchequer Board was to be set up which was to examine the details of the expenditure from year to year on the basis of taxable capacity—comparing our capacity with the capacity of Great Britain, that is, comparing the capacity of the two parts of Ireland to pay with the capacity of Great Britain. On that basis the contributions were to be estimated. The estimate for the first year was £18,000,000, and that was to be divided in the ration of 44 to 56. Northern Ireland was to be assessed at 44 per cent. and this portion of Ireland at 56. That is to say, the North would pay 44 per cent. of the whole and this part here 56 per cent. of the whole.
On that ratio of 14 to 11, you can easily see that the payment which would be due by the North would be something less than £8,000,000, and that the amount here would be a little over £10,000,000. For the first period, both the North and the South were to get the annuities as a free gift, but we would have to pay towards Imperial services, the national debt, and other services, something like £10,000,000 here, while the people in the North would have to pay something like £7,920,000. That was only for the initial year or, at most, two years. A Joint Exchequer Board was to be set up which was to determine afterwards whether these were equitable sums or not, and in proportion it was to allocate the amounts that were to be paid by the North and the South. The Joint Exchequer Board has been working in the North. There was a provision by which, if more was paid in a particular year than was justified in the circumstances, then it could be reduced, the circumstances being the services rendered and the wealth of the community to meet them. What happened? This sum of nearly £8,000,000 was scaled down to £6,800,000. It was scaled down still more rapidly in succeeding years.
I have some figures here which I think may prove interesting to the Deputies opposite. They will be able to see from them how this part of the country has been treated by the financial changes—from the financial provisions of the 1920 Act to the financial payments that have been made by the preceding Government. These payments, as I have told the House, were scaled down rapidly. A liability of £7,920,000 became actually only £6,685,000. If we take the period from 1926-27 to 1931-32, a period of six years, the total sum of money which we handed over to Britain amounted to £32,812,308. In the same period the net payments in the case of the Six Counties amounted to £4,000,000 odd, while gross amount of the Imperial contribution proper was £5,623,000. In other words, during that period, instead of a ratio of 44 to 56 the ratio has been 1 to 8, so that a ratio of comparative equality has been turned into a ratio of 1 to 8. I am not taking in these figures the amount of the annuities which the North retained, so that this great bargain, financially, which has been made, compared with the position, financially, that we would have been in if we were treated on the same basis as the North, which retains the annuities, works out in this way: that over that period a ratio of 44 to 56—a ratio, as you can see, of comparative equality—has been turned into 1 to 8. During the ten years 1922 to 1931 the total amount that we paid over in land annuities was £54,611,000. That includes the £3,000,000 odd which was paid over before the Land Commission was finally transferred.
As I have said, these payments in the North were scaled down very considerably. In the year 1932-33 the net payments in the way of Imperial contributions made by the North amounted to £75,000. The estimated amount for the year 1933-34 was £29,000. If the 1920 Act had been in force here in the year 1932-33 the amount that we would pay on that head—the payment that would correspond to the original payment of £10,000,000, and if we were to retain the ratio of 44 to 56—would be something like £95,455. That is the position. I think, therefore, that the gentlemen on the opposite benches will not in future be very anxious to tell us all about the £10,000,000.
Comment on this
Undoubtedly. I would advise the Deputy to talk in that spirit to the gentlemen in the Party to which he once belonged. To take up where I began: that is, the basis on which you have to consider this whole question with the British. All we claim under this coal-cattle pact is that there has been, in fact, some mitigation of the hardship—no more. We are not trumpeting it in any particular way. We say that we did not enter into any agreement that this other part of the money is due. We recognise the fact that it is being taken against our will. All we say about the present pact or agreement is that it is, in fact, some mitigation, but does not interfere in any way with our rights to claim that these payments, or the exaction of this money, be stopped. The British are using the position in which they find themselves to extract payments which we hold are not legally due. We have not been able to do better than we have done in this pact. It is somewhat of an improvement of the position in the past, but it is made without any renunciation of our claim. It is made without any kind of prejudice to our claim, and I think that the British would hold on their side that the matter is being dealt with without any prejudice on their side. It is an agreement without prejudice to the existing dispute, which still remains to be settled. We heard talk about the British market and that we had thanked God that it was gone. I do not think anyone thanked God that it was gone.
Comment on this
If Deputies gave the whole of Senator Connolly's speech, and not a single phrase, the sense in which he thanked God would be clearly understood. He was speaking of the condition in which this country had been placed on account of the policy of having ranches and bullocks for export side by side with the export of human beings, and he said that if the policy of exporting human beings stopped side by side with the export of cattle, and if that meant that the British market was gone, then he would thank God. From 1917 to 1921 when we spoke to the Irish people we said that that was precisely what we wanted to stop; that we wanted to build up here, as far as we could, a country which would be able to support its own people. We pointed out that the land was fertile, and that the people were strong enough and intelligent enough to work out their own destiny and could provide a livelihood for themselves in this land. We said that there was no need to continue the policy of exporting cattle and to be dependent on the British market if by carrying on that policy we should have in consequence the devastation of our countryside. We all thanked God that such a thing should stop, and we set out when we came into office to try to remedy that position. To a considerable extent we have remedied it. It is true that we cannot change it overnight. No one suggested that we could change overnight from the position in which the British was the market for our exports and that we took British goods in return. We set out to manufacture our own requirements, and having done that, we have for the present to try to get a market for our surplus. The obvious thing to do was to try, as far as possible, to change from a system of producing goods for a market which was obviously glutted. I was quoted as having thanked God that the British market was going. I did not do anything of the kind. In so far as it could be secured for years past, I have had every speech examined to see if there was any place in which I could reasonably have been accused of thanking Heaven for the passing of the British market.
Comment on this
If Deputies go through my speech as a whole, or through reasonable extracts, I am perfectly certain the House will see that I explained my remarks.
Comment on this
That is a pitiful interruption. It is absolute stupidity. I say that there are two contexts in which I might have made use of that expression. One was the context that I have explained, in which I might have said that it was a good thing that the British market had gone if it meant turning our countryside into ranches, and having a man and a dog on them instead of homesteads. If I said that that was the extent of the British market, then I might have thanked God. Another thing I might have said, not thanking God for it, was that I was accustomed when in opposition to try to get the Minister for Agriculture and the Executive to realise that the British market was, in fact, diminishing; that the value of agricultural produce everywhere was going down and that it was going to cease to be as valuable as it was in the past. I pointed out that as a fact the British market was going.
Comment on this
The British market is going compared with the past. The reasons are obvious, because you have the competition of the Argentine and elsewhere.
Comment on this
In fact it cannot be questioned that the British market as it was in the past and in the years of the war has disappeared practically. We told Deputies on the opposite side who were talking yesterday, and who talked about the drop that has taken place since we came into office, that there has been a fall in the value of agricultural produce.
Comment on this
It is not in our time the change has come about. It is a mistake for anybody to calculate on the British market being in the future what it was in the past for Irish produce. Even then it brought with it a reduction of our population and a number of other disasters.
Comment on this
We believe that, and we are prepared to argue it with the Deputy at any time. The fact is that every other country has doubled its population, while in this country of rich land the population was halved, although we were during the whole of that time a prolific people. While there may be other causes, that one is pretty obvious. It is pretty obvious that if we have to compete with prairies this country must become a prairie. If we have to compete with lands carrying only six or seven people to the square mile, we must get into a position to compete with them. That warning was given by British Ministers and by experts to British agriculturists. We quoted the statement several times. Agriculturists were warned that that day was coming. I stated, time after time, that it was a mistaken policy to build on the idea that the British market would come back. Opposition Deputies have been going around the country trying to suggest that if their Party got back into office the British market would be miraculously restored. The British have a right, as we have a right, to put on tariffs. We have the right to protect our industries. We only say to the British that it is to the discriminatory tariffs we object— tariffs deliberately put on to extract moneys which are in dispute and which we hold are not due. If we start, or if we continued, to pay this burden of £5,000,000 a year, I think it is not unlikely we would find ourselves, if we tried to build up industries, with a demand from the British to allow their goods in and not to put tariffs against them, or that they would put tariffs against us. There are certain things we cannot stand for if the British do. They have a right to do certain things. We have a right to protect our industries. If they want to protect their industries we can claim an equal right. All we claim is that tariffs should not be put deliberately on our products, to extract payments which we hold are not due.
Comment on this
The pact does not recognise anything of the kind. The pact is a pact by virtue of which we conceded certain things to the British in return for certain concessions from the position they had established.
Comment on this
Our fundamental case is not prejudiced by that pact. That pact, or agreement, in so far as it has been agreed to—it has not been signed—is an agreement which is being implemented, in so far as it can be, by the legislation that is necessary on both sides. That agreement, or pact, or whatever you like to call it, is not a recognition on our side that any of these moneys in dispute are due to the British, or that the British have any right to collect them from us. What we do say is this: that, in return for the—British taking more cattle from us and levying a lesser tax on our cattle——
Comment on this
We know that they were levying a tax, but there is a difference between recognising an actual fact and admitting that it is legitimate. There is, and has been, no recognition on our part of the right of the British to levy these tariffs.
Comment on this
I repeat that there is no recognition in this pact of the right of the British to levy these tariffs. There is cognisance taken of the fact that heretofore the British were levying certain sums on our cattle, rightly or wrongly—rightly from their point of view, but wrongly from ours. There is cognisance taken of that fact. That is admitted, and the British have bargained to reduce these tariffs in certain cases and to take larger quantities of certain commodities of ours in other cases in return for our taking coal, cement and so on from them.
Comment on this
There are some people, evidently, who cannot see the difference between recognising the right to do something and taking cognisance of the fact that something is being done. If some people cannot recognise the difference between acknowledging the fact that a thing is being done, and appreciating whether it is right to do so or not, I am afraid I cannot say anything more on the matter. If such people think that that is too small a point to be proceeded with, then there is nothing more to be said. However, the position we take in this pact is that certain conditions, which are bearing heavily upon the agricultural community of this country, are recognised, and well recognised, to be bearing heavily on our agricultural community. We believe that these conditions should not obtain and that our people have been brought, very wrongfully, to the point of being compelled to bear a burden which they ought not to be compelled to bear. We believe that we have secured a mitigation of that burden, without any prejudice to our original case or without any question as to the right of the British to levy these tariffs. For that reason we are asking the House to implement that agreement or pact, or whatever you like to call it, in that sense and in no other sense. We believe that this pact is an improvement on the position of last year. We believe, furthermore, that it is an improvement which has been obtained without any sacrifice on our part of the position we have taken up. I am quite willing to admit that, if I were a negotiator with the British, and—I do not mind saying it here to everybody— if we were in a stronger position than we are at the moment, I would not make that agreement.
Comment on this
The flag had to go down to that extent, yes; but not in the sense that we do not still retain our right, or that we do not hope that right will yet triumph.
Comment on this
We are asking the House to implement that understanding, or pact, or agreement, in that sense and in that sense only. We claim to-day, as we claimed when we came into office, that these moneys are not due. We are prepared now, as we were prepared then, to submit the whole question to a tribunal in which there will be no restriction; and that is a big thing for a small country to do.
Comment on this
Might I ask the President is he prepared to submit this question to the Permanent Court of International Justice of The Hague?
Comment on this
The question as to which court this matter might be submitted to would have to be carefully examined. I have said in the past that, if there is a court on the impartiality of which we can depend, we are willing to submit the question to such a court; but, as I was going to say, when Deputy MacDermot interrupted, that is a very big thing for a small nation to do. It is a very big thing for a small nation to submit such a question in such circumstances—a nation that, in the nature of things, cannot have the influence or cannot have knowledge of the ways of presenting the facts—to the judgment of a tribunal of that sort, biassing them, if you like, unconsciously.
Comment on this
Yes, unconsciously, and sometimes consciously. I am sure that Deputy MacDermot has read of some of the past cases in which there were tribunals of that sort and in which he knows that influence was used.
Comment on this
Yes, only dishonest minds; but history should make us a bit cautious in that respect.
Comment on this
I suggest that there is hardly a country in Europe that would not be biassed in our favour as against England on this question.
Comment on this
When Deputy MacDermot makes such a remark, he must be as innocent in this matter as when he said that all we had to do was to go over to settle with the British agree with their contention, tell them that we wanted so-and-so, and that we would get all we wanted.
Comment on this
Well, that is what Deputies opposite said. Their attitude to us was: "Do not say boldly that you believe that this secret agreement was not binding on our people; do not take a firm stand on a position like that; just go over and say to the British that you will accept their contention in that regard—say that we are a small country and that there are many reasons why they should be generous towards us and so on—and everything will be all right." I remember the Deputy's speeches here.
Comment on this
All right. I do not ask the Deputy to accept the paraphrase. All I say is that the impression that his speeches made on me, as well as the speeches of other Deputies, was that if we went over and asked the British to look at our conditions and to realise that, by past policy, their six votes to one resulted in certain things happening in our country, they would generously consider the whole position and say whether there should not be what would be regarded as, if not a generous, at least a reasonable settlement. It must be remembered that there are two sides to this, and that, when the British come to meet us, they will not come, as Deputy Cosgrave would like us to go over, unsupported. They will have all their officials, everyone of whom will be like a general in an army—determined to win at all costs and to extract every penny that it is possible to get. When questions like that are brought up, there is no question of generosity. That is the British attitude. Their attitude is to extract every penny they can get. We cannot blame them. That is the way things are done and it is only foolishness on the part of our people to think we can go over like that, and, with palavering words, make a good bargain. You are not going to do it that way and the Deputy has shown himself completely and absolutely misinformed when he imagines that, so far as bias is concerned, in the countries of Europe, the bias would be in our favour. The bias would not be in our favour. The countries of Europe, at the present time, are, every one of them, working and bidding for British friendship.
Comment on this
For British friendship, for political reasons. Markets do not come into this particular case.
Comment on this
No. The President's friendship, unfortunately, in this case, is only accounted by the amount of our resources to put behind the friendship. It counts for nothing more. I am not such a fool as to think that it would count for anything else. These are the hard facts of reality in the light of which all these things have to be examined. I say it is a very big thing for a small country to agree to arbitration by the representatives of other countries, but it is absurd for anybody to think that we should be compelled to accept, as a principle, that we are not to choose, as people generally do in cases of arbitration, our own representatives from whatever source we like.
However, our position is stated. I hope that the background I have given of this whole dispute will give an air of reality to this entire matter, and that we are not going to have people talking here in the sort of way in which Deputy O'Higgins and others talked, as if it was only because of the impossibility, to use another word, made use of in this connection, of the President and of the members of the Executive Council that this matter has not been settled long ago. You can settle if you give in; you can settle if you accept this burden; you can settle if you accept the burden which, as I have said, meant the giving of all your fat cattle in 1931 or £6 19s. 2d. a head on all your cattle in that year to meet that payment. If you are prepared to do that, very good. We are not prepared to do it. We think it would be most unfair to our people, and, in recommending this agreement, we are not abating one jot the claim we put forward in regard to these payments. We say they are not due, and we say that even if you were to accept the 1920 position, with all the Imperial contributions, and reckoning our position on the basis of the position in the North, we would be paying only a very small fraction of the sum we would be compelled to pay under the 1923 agreement, if we were to accept it. That is the position from which the House should examine this pact. It is put forward without any detraction of principle, or any departure from principle, or from the position which we adopted, and I think the House ought to accept it.
Comment on this
In the course of his observations, the President said that a certain agreement was kept from the House for nine years. I have here a volume of the Dáil debates, Vol. 3, dated 12th July——
Comment on this
Deputies have no right to make a second speech. The Leader of the Opposition has already spoken. Other Deputies on the same side will have an opportunity to reply to points raised. If every speech made and every argument objected to were to be answered by Deputies who have already spoken, debate would never end.
Comment on this
There was an allegation made that a document was kept secret for nine years. That statement is untrue. It is untrue in substance and in fact.
Comment on this
I have documentary proof of it in this volume. Is the Dáil to be prevented from hearing it?
Comment on this
May I submit, Sir, that the President of the Executive Council makes a personal charge against a Deputy that he withheld from this House an agreement which he personally signed in London, purporting to act on behalf of the Executive Council? While it could not be regarded as the right of Deputies to answer observations made when they themselves have already spoken, it is surely an exceptional case when an allegation is made that an individual Deputy, acting as President of the Executive Council, withheld from the House a document which he signed on behalf of the Government.
Comment on this
I will submit, as against that, that if a Deputy makes explanations which will suggest that I have wrongly informed the House, I also should be allowed to reply and the thing can be kept going ad infinitum.
Comment on this
The President always takes the precaution of speaking after me in dealing with this matter. I have closed up his newspaper on the transaction.
Comment on this
No personal charge was made; the arguments were political. There are, I presume, to be other speakers who can give any quotations which the Leader of the Opposition wishes to cite in rebuttal.
Comment on this
I can deal with any of you boys anyway. That is one thing certain. I have already dealt with your newspaper. You got into office by false means and you will get out by honest means.
Comment on this
This country, at the present time, is suffering great distress and great losses. There are quite a number of people who have acted in such a way as to inflict grave injury on this country, politically and economically. The economic effects of these actions are pressing very heavily on the country at the present time. The people who have injured this country in that way are Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, Kevin O'Higgins, William Cosgrave and the MacEoins, the O'Sullivans and the Mulcahys. Ireland was deserted by them; her interests were neglected; they had responsibilities which they did not live up to: they had work to do which they did not do. So the country turned and it put Eamon de Valera at the head of an Irish Government. Some of the people who did the country wrong are dead and gone and can interfere with him or interrupt him no longer in his work; the others, if he consults the Minister for Industry and Commerce, he will find, are reduced to such insignificance in the matter of importance or influence in this country that they cannot impede him in his work. They have been handed back before the country by his Minister for Finance and labelled Judas, Castlereagh, Carey and Leonard McNally. They have been stamped from the public platform by the mob called into existence by the Minister for Justice, when he called upon his mob to clear the accursed crowd out of the way.
At any rate, they sinned and they are gone; now Eamon de Valera is head of an Irish Government; our people are suffering and an Irish Parliament asks him what he is going to do about it. That is what matters. The Dáil is asked to pass to-day a Bill reducing certain tariffs on English goods coming into the country as part of a new agreement by which we will take certain goods from Great Britain and she will take certain goods from us, while, at the same time, she takes the moneys that are at present in dispute. Will the President and will the members of his Party accept it that they have been called in by this country to remedy the wrongs done by the Griffiths, the Collinses, the Cosgraves and the O'Higginses and will they stand up to the work there in front of them? We have no political reputations to bother about here on this side. The man who gets into his dungarees and does the work, dirtying his hands and dirtying his face, does not matter; he has no dignity to think about. But he goes about his work. We do not care what may be said with regard to anything in the past, but we do care, and the individual members of the Fianna Fáil Party, I am sure, care, about what happens to this country in the future. It is because the present agreement indicates that the President is going to do nothing to help this country and that the passing of it would be simply throwing dust in our eyes and allowing him to throw dust in his own that we are opposed to the passing of this measure, and that we ask him what he is going to do to get the people out of their present economic difficulties. The President wishes to confine the discussion with Great Britain to the land annuities. He is prepared to discuss that matter to a definite conclusion, but he does not indicate to us what that conclusion is to be. He tells Deputy MacDermot that he is not sure what kind of tribunal he would go before. If the President is to be assisted in any way by the people or the Parliament, he ought to be clear in his own mind on this question, and he ought to let us know what he is clear about. I suggest that he is clear in his own mind that he would not put this case before an international tribunal in preference to a tribunal set up within the British Commonwealth of Nations and that he would not put it before a tribunal within the British Commonwealth of Nations before he would discuss it with the British face to face. He knows he would get a better settlement from a Commonwealth tribunal than he would get from an international tribunal. He believes that in his own heart. He knows that he would get a more satisfactory settlement by discussing this matter face to face with the British, as a business or a national matter, than he would get from any tribunal, whether looking at the matter from the equity or the legal point of view. We look at the President carrying on his antics with this conviction—that he is going to get nowhere with them, because he believes in his heart that he would get a better settlement with the British by meeting them face to face than he would get in any other way. The longer he keeps from facing the British in that way, the greater are going to be the losses of our people.
The President confided to us to-day that the British will not discuss the land annuities with him unless he discusses the constitutional position of this country and its relations with the British Commonwealth of Nations. The President has lectured us about taking cognisance of facts. Does the President propose to take cognisance of the fact that the British refuse to discuss an economic or financial settlement without, at the same time, discussing whatever kind of settlement requires to be made in respect of the political disputes that exist between us and the British Government? His attitude to-day is all the more amazing when he tells us that the British have said that if he admits the legal position with regard to the land annuities, so that they can discuss it without loss or principle from that point of view, they will consider a mitigation of the burden of the land annuities. The indication is that if he settled with the British the political or constitutional difficulties outstanding, the mitigation might be much more considerable than it would otherwise be. If that is the position between the British and the President, then we should not hear it by mere suggestion or implication. We ought to have a clear statement of what the position is and a clear indication of what the British offer is.
Comment on this
The President has told us that he could get off some of the land annuities if he admitted they were legally due. He has told us that he would not be allowed to bring even that to a conclusion without settling some constitutional difficulties, and that if he settled those with the British, he would get off more. He tells us to-day that he is not going to do anything about it. The President has seen this country destroyed by Griffith and Collins. He has seen this country plundered and robbed by Cosgrave and his colleagues. He came in here in 1932 to remedy these things. The situation has not got better. What is the President going to do, now that the responsibility is on his shoulders? The present proposal is a finicky proposal. I asked the Minister for Finance, in relation to the Bill before the House, what were the items in respect of which Customs duties are going to be reduced, what were the original Customs duties on these items before the 19th February, what were the additional duties borne by British goods before 19th February, what would be the ordinary Customs duties on these goods and the additional duties on British goods after 19th February? What did the Minister for Finance tell me? He told me that it had not been possible in the period since the questions were received to extract the information sought. The questions were put in on Friday last and the answer was required yesterday. One would imagine the information would be already in the Minister's hands as to what duties were going to be charged in future in respect of the items dealt with in this Bill and what duties were charged previously. The President and the Minister for Finance are in such a hurry that they want all stages of this Bill passed to-day, and we cannot be told what the amount of the duty on each of the items involved in the measure is going to be.
The President talked about secret agreements. This is a secret agreement. Nobody knows whether it was signed or not. If it was signed, nobody knows who signed it. Nobody knows how many cattle, or how many horses are to go across. We have been told that bacon is equated to cement. We do not know what is to happen our bacon if cement factories are established here. Cattle, we are told, are equated to coal. If coal development takes place here, we do not know what is to happen our cattle. We do not know what duties are to be charged on the sugar and electrical goods which may be imported. We do not know what the farmer is to get out of the agreement and what the Revenue is to get out of it. We are told in a leading article in the Irish Press that the import of British coal was 1,000,000 tons greater in 1935 than in 1934, and that it is anticipated there will be a further increase this year. The article then says:—
"That is a factor that will help to determine the amount of the quotas of cattle, horses, sheep and so forth. These quotas will be fixed from time to time in accordance with the extent of the trade between the two countries."
What has happened is that civil servants have been asked to go across and meet civil servants in Great Britain and, no doubt, say: "The pact that was made last year was a rotten pact. It gave the British more money from this country than had actually been withheld from them. We cannot continue that." We cannot continue that. We want to make a new pact, and when the British, who are concerned, as I stated, only with getting what they claim was wrongly withheld from them, mark out on the dotted line the things that could be done in order to allow them to retain the amount of moneys that they consider to be due to them, and the Executive Council here send civil servants across to do a business transaction, to sign on the dotted line where the British Treasury indicated they could sign, and leave the British the amount of money that the President and the Executive Council, were, in their opinion, withholding from them wrongly. The President says it is not a departure from principle, that it is a recognition of a fact and that, recognising certain facts, they made this agreement. It is, we are told, without prejudice to anything that may be done either in regard to the general financial dispute with Great Britain or our political dispute. But when is anything going to be done in regard to that?
If the President can recognise a fact in connection with certain relations between himself and Great Britain, when is he, or any member of his Party, going to recognise the facts that stare them in the face from every county in this country? When the Executive Council introduced their Emergency (Imposition of Duties) Act in 1932 what did they tell the people? Deputy Hugo Flinn told them that when they put on these duties here they were arming themselves against the British attack, and that when the Act was operated here, poor unfortunate Thomas was going to be put in this extraordinary position: that because the Irish Free State would not pay him the annuities, he was going to collect those annuities from the English consumer. The Minister for Finance told us of certain overriding facts that made it desirable and important and necessary that the Dáil would pass that Bill so that the British themselves would pay the tariffs. The economic war having been opened by the President, as he indicated, and having been answered by the British tariffs, the House was told here by the Minister for Finance and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance that it was the British people who would pay the tariffs that were being imposed on our cattle and agricultural goods going in there.
Deputy O'Reilly stated that a day's dislocation, perhaps, had been created, nothing more; that prices for agricultural produce to-day may be lower, but they were not very high hitherto, and there was not the slightest reason within a week or two why prices would not go back again to what they were before the stunt policy was adopted. On the 14th July, 1932, when the foundation for this policy that is being pursued under the Emergency (Imposition of Duties) Act was laid, Deputy O'Reilly said there would be a day's dislocation and in a week or two, at the most, prices of agricultural produce would go back to what they were. Is Deputy O'Reilly prepared to face the facts that now stick out of the situation?
The Minister for Agriculture endeavoured to persuade the House last night that certain arguments that were being put up with regard to the situation were entirely wrong. He wanted to persuade the House that there was, in fact, no restriction in the number of cattle going out, and he implied that there was going to be no restriction. With a certain amount of pride he stated that between 1926 and 1932 the average cattle export was 724,904 head and that Great Britain alone took 670,000 cattle in 1935. Great Britain last year was taking 670,000 cattle, whereas her previous average was about 724,000, that is, in the years before the economic war began. What our farmers are con cerned with, and what, I am sure, the Fianna Fáil Deputies who accept the President's leadership in this matter are concerned with, is what the farmers got for the cattle that were taken off their hands. What did they get? In the years that the Minister for Agriculture was speaking about the farmers got over £13,000,000 for the average export of 724,000 cattle. What did they get for the 670,000 cattle that were sent to Great Britain in 1935? They got £5,375,000. The Minister is claiming that we sent out of this country nearly the same amount of cattle as we previously sent out, but we got only £5,375,000 as against £13,000,000.
When will the President take cognisance of that fact? The position is even worse than it seems, because the people, including the farmers, had to be taxed to provide bounties to force these cattle out, not only over the tariff walls in Britain, but to grease their way into the hands of the Germans or whatever other foreigners were taking the extra cattle exported. When is the President going to face that fact and the other facts that flow from it—the impoverished condition of our farmers and agricultural labourers and the growing impoverished condition of our towns? Is the President going to sit still and say: "I am not going to accept the principle of saying that we owe the land annuities. I am not going to accept this, that or the other thing that the British want"? Is he going to stick inside his wall of glass in Merrion Street, free from any of the domestic cares, any of the economic cares of the farmers throughout the country, free from the growing economic cares of many commercial and business people in the country, and is he going to allow that situation to drag on?
The President says it is right for him to hold these annuities, it is right for him to take up the attitude he has taken on constitutional matters and that these things will adjust themselves in time. How did circumstances adjust themselves in time in the past except by men who had responsibilities facing up to them, going into wherever the battle-ground was, whether around a council table in Great Britain or a police barrack in the country here, and fighting the fight that had to be fought there? How long does the President think that he can sit calmly and quietly where he is and do nothing to improve the situation outside? How long must he sit there to bring the situation to a point at which it will be impossible for him or anyone else to deal with it? Does he not know that every day that passes greater difficulties arise, not only for himself but even for the British? Does he not know that every day that passes creates greater difficulties in this country for any class of society or any people in any class of business who want to do their business honestly and straightforwardly? The growing amount of unemployment, the growing amount of taxation that is being put on the people for relief are indices of a problem that is growing, not only for the President and his Government, but for everybody, whether in agricultural, commercial or manufacturing life, who is endeavouring to carry on the business of the country.
Coincident with the beginning of this economic war with Britain, the theory was started that what was killing this country was the cattle trade and that live stock and live-stock products were going to be replaced by the growing of cereals. We ask the President to tell us clearly what he thinks about these matters, too. We ask Deputies of the Fianna Fáil Party to understand what has happened politically, financially and economically in this country for the past 20 years. We ask them are they going to speak their true minds or are they going to sit back in their benches ignoring the facts that are crying out to them from every county in Ireland?
As reported in the Irish Press of March 26th, 1934, Deputy O'Reilly said that to his mind the cattle trade was the curse of the country and that it had ruined more families in the last 20 years than any other business. I want seriously to ask everyone of the members of the Fianna Fáil Party, from the President down to the humblest back bencher, does he not know that the industry of agriculture is going to be the foundation of the life of our people here, that we cannot have industrial development or commercial success if our agricultural industry is injured? Do these Deputies not know that live stock and live-stock products are going to be the life and the foundation of that industry? Do they not know that their tillage policy cannot be pursued without an increase in live stock and live-stock products? Do they not know that their tillage policy cannot be pursued unless we have external markets and that these Irish Press headlines, this dope that is given to the people periodically, suggesting that there is going to be tillage development in this country and that that tillage development is going to compensate for all we are losing in outside markets on our live stock and live-stock products, are just one right-down big public lie? What else are they? I would ask Deputy Donnelly is there any farmer in his constituency who believes that tillage development can go on without our having external markets for live stock and live-stock products? Deputy Donnelly is prone to too much honesty, if not here in this House, at least during the time he spends outside it, to say anything else but that the farmers of Leix and Offaly do not believe that they can develop their tillage without external markets.
Comment on this
How does he think that the farmers can be helped out of the difficulties in which they find themselves if these plain things which everyone believes, and which are believed by Deputies themselves when they are outside the House, are going to be denied by the Fianna Fáil members when they come in here? Will the President look at the conditions of agricultural employment which exist to-day? The Minister for Industry and Commerce was patting himself on the back last night on the fact that somebody could be got to admit in this House that, there was an increase in the number of persons employed in agriculture throughout the country. Goodness knows there ought to be an increase in the number of persons employed in the agricultural industry if there was any particle of truth in any single line of all that has been written with regard to the tillage policy which the Executive Council are doing so much to help by way of subsidies and by way of advertising and propaganda generally.
The total increase in the area under crops in the country is said to be 166,495 acres. I suppose 160,000 would represent the acreage under wheat and about 50,000 acres the acreage under beet, both of which crops are heavily subsidised. What is the position in agriculture as regards employment as a result of all that? Would Deputy Donnelly say how many additional permanent agricultural labourers were employed during 1935 as compared with 1931, taking into consideration the increase in wheat-growing and the increase in beet-growing in the country? There were only 419 more men employed as permanent agricultural labourers in June, 1935, than there were in June, 1931. With all our subsidised crops under the wheat scheme, the beet scheme and the tobacco scheme, there were only 419 more persons employed as permanent agricultural labourers in June of last year than in June, 1931. There were several counties where there were less permanent agricultural labourers employed last year than in 1931. One of these counties was Wexford, the most subsidised of our counties. There was a fall there of 78 permanent agricultural labourers. In Carlow there was a decrease of 105, in Kilkenny a decrease of 237, in Tipperary a decrease of 301, in Limerick a decrease of 246, and in Kerry a decrease of 203. There were 78 less in Sligo, 76 less in Longford, 188 less in Cavan and 84 less in Monaghan. These figures show the reduction in the number of permanent adult agricultural labourers employed on the land in June, 1935, as against June, 1931.
Another remarkable feature of the situation is that when you take farmers, temporary and permanent agricultural labourers, and persons above 18 years of age and below 18 years of age, there were 5,878 less persons employed in agriculture last year than there were the year before, in spite of all we are told about the great development of tillage.
Comment on this
Deputy Donnelly should concentrate upon what is being done for agriculture to enable the people to get out of the difficulties in which they find themselves. If there is anything in what the President argued —he did not argue it to-day, but he and his Ministers argued it at various times—that the tillage policy of his Party is going to provide a market for our agriculturists that is going to compensate for the loss of the British market, we should like Deputies to address themselves to the signs of the times existing at present which would show that there is nothing in their contention. There were 5,878 less persons employed in agriculture in June, 1935, than there were in the year before in spite of the increase in acreage, the subsidies, bounties and everything else that could be done like that. Not only is employment in agriculture in that peculiar position from the point of view of numbers, but the amount of money that is circulating amongst agricultural labourers has decreased in an enormous way.
The total number of permanent agricultural labourers employed in June last year was 89,000. To take them at their face value, the figures published by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, as to the value of agricultural wages, and to assume that they are not more than that, means that the agricultural labourers employed permanently throughout the country lost £711,000 last year compared with their earnings in 1931. I do not know how many months in the year a person described as a temporary agricultural labourer gets work in the country. But if he gets three months' work, then, on the figures quoted by the Minister for Industry and Commerce as to the value of agricultural labourers in temporary employment, agricultural labourers have, in addition, lost £128,000, so that £840,000 less was paid to agricultural labourers last year than in 1931.
Deputies on the other side of the House, as well as on this side, know what this country has gone through. They know that this country had difficulties to face before 1913. They know the type of difficulties that were placed by the British Government, and by British interests in this country, in the path of the movement that tried to get the Home Rule Bill passed in 1912 and 1913, and they know that the general spirit in the country at that time was able to raise up and to support whomsover were the leaders and to counter those difficulties. They were able to find new leaders when the occasion arose. They found new leaders who faced up to their responsibilities in the circumstances of 1916. They were prepared to lay down their lives in order to bind the people more closely together by stimulating their feelings, by the genuineness of their action, pointing out to the people the way they should go in making their demand for the freedom and liberty of the country. They pointed the way to the Peace Conference that was to take place after the war. They did not succeed in getting our people into that conference, but the feeling inspired in the people by the leaders of that time brought the people over the difficulties that stood in their way until the Peace Conference was open to them and until they did find themselves admitted to the Council of Nations. They did find their way there, with the leaders of South Africa, with the leaders of Canada, with the leaders of Australia, and with the leaders of New Zealand— all standing as representatives of their people and asserting that they were sovereign in all matters affecting their own States, and that their people were in a similar position as the people of Great Britain.
The President boasted here to-day that he had taken action that the British had denied he had a right to take, and which the British Privy Council by a judgment had upheld. He declined to say what that was. But there is nothing that the President has done affecting our constitutional relations and rights with Great Britain that was not done before he came in here. He speaks of the wiping out of the Privy Council When a Privy Council Bill was put up here and when Lord Hailsham said we had no right to pass it, will the President deny that Deputy Cosgrave stood on a platform in Donegal and told Lord Hailsham what the position was and fully outlined that position?
Comment on this
Because we killed the Privy Council without any pyrotechnics or sword display, or heroics or waltzing about amongst mobs.
Comment on this
It was dead. So that when the President boasted that he wiped the Privy Council out of the position of having an effective influence in Irish affairs the fact is that it was gone long before he ever put pen to paper about it. When will the President wake up to the responsibilities that are on him in respect to the internal problems of this country, or the international position of this country, and take his place like a manly representative of this country, the type of representative that this country is entitled to have because of the fact that everybody knows the difficulties that this country stood up against during the present generation? Everybody knows the position that was hewn out for this country in the League of Nations, and the British Commonwealth of Nations, not only by the physical struggle and courage of our people as a whole but by the manliness, the integrity and the intelligence of the people who bore responsibility for leadership.
The President talks about the land annuities as a war debt. What was his position with regard to war debts? Did he not, in his position as leader of this State, practically appeal to the American people not to have any mercy on, or to give any consideration to, the British appeal to be allowed off war debts then owing to America, by reason of the fact that they were unable to pay off those debts because they had forgiven the war debts of other countries? Would it not have been much better for the President of this State, who was put into the highest position of the League of Nations by the work of the leaders of this State who had gone before him, if he had realised what the effect of the international war situation was, and if he had spoken with greater judgment than he spoke of England's debts to the United States of America? Could he not have given some thought to a line of appeal that war debts should be mitigated in some such way as would lead not only to better international relationship but would provide him with a very strong argument for the mitigation of this country's debts to Great Britain.
Comment on this
We could get it I am sure. But the President did go out, and, practically, did appeal to the American people not to have any sympathy with the British people and not to leave them off their war debts.
Comment on this
Not like that, but by contrast when the British refused to consider the burden placed upon us in this State.
Comment on this
Yes. Instead of standing in his international position in the way in which the President ought to have been standing, considering the position he held or was going to hold in the League of Nations, and taking time by the forelock, pre-judging the situation and having his mind made up, he allowed himself by action of the British against this country if you like to be dragged into the position of throwing oil on fire, and dealing in a most irresponsible way—even when we take the interest of this country alone into consideration— with a matter that must be settled at some time internationally, and when that settlement comes, it is bound to have a better effect on economic relations and international relations throughout the world.
Comment on this
The Deputy would oblige us by telling us about this matter at some appropriate time.
Comment on this
I shall be very happy to give the President any information I have about it, and I shall be very glad to see the President develop a mind in regard to what should be done in connection with the debts that exist internationally, and that are crippling political harmony and economic well-being. The President, again as President of this State, goes to Geneva and takes a line of action with regard to sanctions against Italy that is in full harmony with the British line of action. He sees that the British line of action is a logical and sound line of action internationally, and is in accordance with what he considers the best international policy to pursue. But when he comes home, where at times he plays the part of journalist to the leading articles in the Irish Press, he has nothing but criticism of and sneers at the British for pursuing an armament policy in a world in which he knows that a country which is not prepared to protect itself in arms might very easily get short shrift with regard to its interests in a few years. Why cannot the President pursue a sound, decent line in general international politics, and it might have a better effect on our own internal situation here?
The President seems not to have made up his mind either as to how he is going to treat the international situation outside or the national situation here, but our concern is that he should open his eyes to what is happening our farmers, our agricultural labourers and our townspeople here; that he should realise the losses that are being occasioned; that he should shoulder his responsibilities in those matters, and face in the direction in which the fight has to be made, if a fight has to be made; that some members of his Party, knowing something of what the people have gone through, knowing something of what they are likely to go through, should face up to the situation and should get clear that they must establish, in some way or another, harmonious political relations with Great Britain; that we do demand in the British market rights and facilities above any people in Europe; that, if we do not get them, our national life is going to be prejudiced here; we are going to be poorer; we are going to have less luxury, less gaiety, less of that spirit in the country without which you cannot have progress, you cannot have social harmony and you cannot have any kind of decent national culture. Just as our people are being injured economically to-day, they are being injured morally to-day. Our people are being set back in their ideals with regard to culture, and in so far as the Irish language is concerned there is no progress of any kind being made to save for the country the national language while there is a chance of its being saved. The futility that is indulged in by the President, in his approach to every political and economic problem creates divisions of all kinds from one end of the country to the other; brings make-believe and deception into everything that is touched in a public way; and until the President makes up his mind that something must be done, until he sets out the alternatives and gets clear on what he is going to try to do, all those losses are going to continue and all those bitternesses and futilities are going to exist in every walk of life.
The President asks us to state what are the problems that have to be settled with Great Britain. Why should he be afraid to put down on a list what are our problems? We have the problem of Partition. We have the problem of our constitutional relations with Great Britain. We have the problem of our economic and financial relations with Great Britain. Does the President want any assistance in dealing with any of those? If he does he will go first to the British, and he will see what exactly are the obstacles that the British are putting in the way of our getting a settlement of Partition that would be agreeable to him; of our getting a settlement of any constitutional difficulty in a way that would be agreeable to him; of our getting an economic settlement or a financial settlement about which he could agree with the British: and he will then come to this Parliament and tell this Parliament what those difficulties are.
Comment on this
I do not like to inter rupt the Deputy, but I have done that several times, and told them again to-day.
Comment on this
What has the President told us to-day? He told us that he could get some of the land annuities taken off if he admitted that they were legally due, but that, in fact, he could not, because the British also tack on the constitutional difficulties.
Comment on this
As this is a matter which we should like to get clear, perhaps I may interrupt the Deputy. I stated that the British Chancellor said that if we accepted the agreement as being binding, and got to a common basis on that, then there might be some mitigation. That is all that was said. That is the only point we have reached in that regard.
Comment on this
The President also said that the British had mixed up the constitutional and financial matters, and implied that he could not get a settlement of the financial matters without a settlement of the constitutional matters.
Comment on this
Surely to goodness when the President sees the condition to which this country is reduced, when he realises that his present attitude is one of sitting inside in his office in Government Buildings and letting the situation go on and those losses continue, he should consider it worth while setting down in greater detail in respect of those matters—partition, the constitution, the economic and financial position—what are the difficulties raised by the British against a settlement between the present Government and the British Government?
Comment on this
With regard to Partition, the British apparently are not going to consider the matter.
Comment on this
But will the President give us the whole position in a more definite and detailed way? Is he going to sit in his office and see the income of our agricultural community dropped from £12,000,000 a year to £5,000,000 a year for what the Minister for Agriculture tells us is practically the same amount of cattle, because the British say: "We are not going to do anything for you about Partition"? Is the President going to sit in his office and do nothing about it?
Comment on this
Bunkum! Will you tell us what exactly you think the President ought to do to change the British will in the matter?
Comment on this
When the President goes to the British for the purpose of settling completely all the difficulties that are outstanding under those heads which I have mentioned, and comes back and tells us what the difficulties in the path of this settlement are, then we will be able to talk to the President and tell him what we think about Partition and every other aspect of it.
Comment on this
White Papers have been distributed already to the Dáil. They were published some years ago regarding such an investigation, and the whole of the arguments on both sides.
Comment on this
In the meantime, the President is going to sit inside and do nothing. Civil servants went across to London at the beginning of this year and signed along the line drawn by the British Treasury making a new agreement that would give the British Treasury only what they considered they were entitled to. Then the attitude of the President here is that he is going to stick where he is and the people are going to suffer losses. To my mind the President is simply a deserter from his responsibilities. The unfortunate people of the country having been promised a great development in this country, the building up of industries, the protection of our agriculture, increased employment for our people, are being left to stew in an economic position that they never thought they would experience or which any of their fathers never thought they would experience and that after being promised a leader to fight for them and to defend them whether they had the institutions of government in their hands or not, whether they had an international position or not.
One of the reasons why we oppose this measure is that it is of no use. So little use is it that the Minister for Finance could not tell us yesterday what the duties were or what the duties are going to be on the items affected by the Bill. There is no use pulling the wool over your eyes or trying to pull it over ours or trying to pretend to the people that prices will be up in a week. There is no use in prices going up. Higher prices could have been got for fat cattle in the Dublin market to-day from English buyers, but the fat cattle were not there to be sold because the condition brought about by the policy of the Minister for Agriculture is that the fat cattle are not there to be sold.
Comment on this
Extinct as the British market is, according to the President and his Ministers, we had not sufficient cattle to fill the quota in the British market last year. To-day, when higher prices could have been obtained for fat cattle they were not there.
Comment on this
The President and the Minister can do nothing to relieve the people of the difficulties in which they find themselves or to safeguard the Irish industrial future until they make up their minds that they are going to do their part as responsible Irish leaders to settle the difficulties that they were put there to settle, and the longer they remain there without attempting to do that the bigger will be the blow they will strike, not only at the happiness of the people to-day, but at their prospects in the future.
Comment on this
In the course of the debate on this Bill a fairly large portion of the ground covered did not seem to be strictly within the realms of the Bill. I do not propose to follow Deputy Mulcahy into that wide realm of matters which he has traversed and will endeavour to confine myself to the Bill, to the amendment, and to the matters which arise out of them. Quite frankly, I regard the agreement which we are asked to approve in this Bill as a settlement which takes the form of exchanging certain commodities, of which we have a surplus, for certain commodities of which the British have a surplus. To the extent that both countries can exchange their respective surpluses, I think the arrangement provided for in the agreement and in the Bill is something which has much to commend it from the point of view of sound common sense and from the point of view of promoting a scheme of distribution of trade and commerce which is inevitable in any system of society where one country produces more goods than it can consume under existing circumstances and where another country requires those commodities because it does not produce them on its own. I think, therefore, that, viewed from that standpoint, the settlement to which legislative effect is being given in this Bill is something which, from the point of view of good economics and sound common sense, has much to commend it to the House.
The attitude of the Opposition to the Bill is a strange one. Last year they were in favour of the coal-cattle pact and actually voted for that pact with the knowledge that the coal when coming into the country was subject to a tax of 5/- per ton. So that in 1935, looking at the matter from the point of view of the agricultural community, on the one hand, and the consumers of coal, on the other hand, they voted for a coal-cattle pact which was not as effective or as advantageous as this agreement is and which, at all events, definitely committed them to the acceptance of a pact which involved payment in the form of taxation by our own people of a sum of 5/- on every ton of British coal imported into the country. The Party opposite not merely spoke in favour of it as a business settlement, but actually went into the Division Lobby and voted for that coal-cattle pact, which, as I say, from the point of view of the agricultural community, is not as beneficial as the agreement which we are asked to ratify by legislation to-day.
To the extent, therefore, that this agreement is an improvement on the 1935 coal-cattle pact, I am in favour of it. I think the House, if its real feelings in the matter were allowed to be revealed without the threat of the operation of the Party Whip, would be found to support the agreement as something which is, from the point of view of the agricultural community, an advance on the position as they previously knew it. At all events, whatever the attitude of the farming community may be within sight of the Whip's lash in this House, the individual viewpoint of representatives of the agricultural community in the country is that this agreement is an advance on the position which has existed up to now. To that extent, this agreement is to be preferred to the coal-cattle pact of 1935. There is no Deputy but knows perfectly well that if he were asked to choose between the coal-cattle pact of 1935 and the agreement of 1936 he would prefer the 1936 agreement.
I regard the Opposition amendment, not as a sincere effort to find a solution of the difficulties which exist between the two countries, but as an attempt to make political capital out of the situation which exists. I regard the amendment as being part and parcel of that squealing and defeatist policy which is being carried on by many members of the Opposition for the past four years on every platform around the country. In the worst days of the economic war, in the worst days when efforts were made to collect the land annuities and when efforts were made to collect the rates, Deputies opposite and persons belonging to the Party opposite who are not in this House, encouraged in every possible way a defeatist mentality throughout the country on the non-payment of rates and on the non-payment of land annuities.
This amendment to-day is part and parcel of the same mentality; it is part and parcel of the same outlook and it is part and parcel of the same campaign to try to weaken the position of this country in the face of an economic war which challenges the economic and national standing of this country. We are told in this amendment that the Bill should not be passed by the House "... until the Executive Council has given the Dáil an assurance that the Executive Council will now take steps to negotiate forthwith a comprehensive settlement of the matters at issue between the Irish and the British Governments." We are told impliedly in this amendment that we can get a comprehensive settlement of the matters in dispute between the two countries. We are told by inference that the only difficulty in the way of securing a comprehensive settlement of the issues in dispute between the two Governments is the unreasonable attitude which is being pursued by the Irish Government. Nowhere in the amendment and nowhere in the speeches which have been made on the opposite benches has there been a single criticism, however mild, of the attitude of the British Government in carrying on an economic war against our people. The whole attitude of the Party opposite has been "our Government is wrong," and not once in the course of any speech from the benches opposite has any attempt been made, no matter how mild the language, to offer one single word of criticism against the British in this matter. Like Deputy MacDermot last night, I dislike the philosophy which is enshrined in the saying: "My country right or wrong," but, as between that philosophy and the philosophy of the Opposition, I prefer that philosophy. I prefer the declaration, at all events, "My own country right or wrong" rather than what the opposite benches have expressed: "The other country right or wrong."
Comment on this
We are told that we can get a comprehensive settlement, and we are told that the only thing that stands in the way is the recalcitrant attitude of the Government. I happened in 1932 to be in London in an effort to settle matters in dispute between the two Governments, and I must say from my experience on that occasion that the President did everything that any man could do to settle the dispute between the two Governments. If the negotiations did not then take place, and if a satisfactory basis of settlement was not then found, that was not due in any way to any difficulty put in the way by the President, nor was it due in any way to his hands being tied by his Executive Council. The then attitude of the British Government is the same as the attitude they are pursuing now. Their attitude in 1932 was: "We do not care what your claim is to retain these moneys; you must pay or the tariffs will go on.""Pay the money" was the attitude of the British Government, "and we will submit the matter to a Commonwealth Tribunal." These were the only alternatives offered to the President then, and, so far as I can judge, these are the only alternatives offered now. In face of that the Opposition Party suggests that we should resume the status quo and continue to pay this disputed money which we have held for four years and then consent to the matter being referred to a Commonwealth tribunal, a Commonwealth tribunal which they themselves refused to accept as a competent tribunal to judge an issue of that kind between various States now comprised in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Opposition tell us “to get a comprehensive settlement.” I have indicated what I believe to have been the British view in 1932. I heard their views with my own ears from their own spokesmen. I should like to know now from some member of the Opposition whether there has been any change since then in the British attitude. If there has been a change we ought to know, on the authority of any person who is competent to make a settlement, that there has been a change. The Party opposite say: “Get a comprehensive settlement.” I do not know on whose authority they make the statement that a comprehensive settlement can be got. Their reluctance to indicate the basis of their belief that such a settlement can be got must be taken as further evidence that this is a humbugging and hypocritical amendment, not designed to assist this nation, but designed to make mean Party capital out of a situation about which they ought to be as gravely concerned as any other Party in the State. But, seeing that they have told us that it is desirable to get a comprehensive settlement and seeing that they have apparently believed that a comprehensive settlement can be got, are we not entitled to know from them on what basis that settlement can be negotiated? Are we not entitled to have from the members of the late Executive Council, the Party which hopes they may be the next Government, some indication as to the way in which they, if they were called upon to do so, would settle the economic war? Are we not entitled to hear from Deputy Cosgrave and from the members of the front bench opposite what their views are in respect of a settlement of the economic war? Should we not be told by them not only their authority for saying that a comprehensive settlement can be got, but also the basis on which it is possible to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the matters in dispute between the two Governments? We have not had in any speeches from the opposite benches, nor in the many speeches which members of the Party opposite make throughout the country, a single indication as to the basis upon which they can get from the British a comprehensive settlement of the economic war. Long before there was any economic war they showed themselves to be incapable and incompetent to get a settlement of the outstanding political differences which existed during their term of office. Now they tell us they can get a comprehensive settlement, and they can do that in more difficult circumstances than those which existed when they were not able to get a partial settlement from 1922 onward—except the kind of settlement that could be got by always surrendering to the British. Now in this amendment they ask the House and the country to believe that they can get a comprehensive settlement to-day. I will concede that if a government or nation is in dire need any settlement could be got in 24 hours, but let us have no mistake as to the kind of settlement it would be. A speedy settlement of this matter can be got by this Government if this nation is prepared to surrender the position which it has taken up——
Comment on this
If we are prepared to haul down the flag and to say to the British that we have lost the war; if we are prepared to continue to contribute to the British Government the sum of £5,250,000 for the benefit of its Exchequer, you can get a settlement by paying that money and by indicating that although you still believe you are entitled to it you are gladly prepared to pay it over to another Government by raking it out of the pockets of your own people who are ill-equipped to make such a contribution to the finances of another country. It is always possible to get a settlement with your adversary. It is always possible for a weak man to make peace with a bully, but make no mistake about it that such a peace is on the bully's terms. We can get a settlement of this economic dispute and of the political dispute with Britain if we are prepared to adopt the attitude of the weak man—the rôle of suppliant seeking from the bully any settlement that the bully is prepared to give. That is the settlement which you can get to-day if you surrender. It is the settlement the Party opposite want this nation to plead for. Speaking for myself and the members of our Party, I want to say that any settlement on the basis of surrender would not give you a settlement of the matters in dispute. There would be found men and women in the country who would accept no such settlement just as, in the 1933 election, when the majority of the electors preferred to carry on the fight rather than accept the offer of the three days' settlement which Deputy Cosgrave made.
Comment on this
If the Deputy will have patience I will talk to him in a minute or so about the sacrifices. I want to say that any attempt by the Government to haul down the flag and to put over a surrender settlement would be bitterly opposed by everybody who realises that a satisfactory termination of this dispute is vital to the economic, fiscal and national development of the country. Even if the President were to haul down the flag and to make an unfavourable settlement with the British, I doubt if, in existing circumstances, it would be possible to commit the majority of our people to accept any such settlement as a permanent settlement of our relations with Britain. We can, of course, if we want a settlement continue to pay the £5,250,000 a year to Britain, to collect the annuities in full from the land annuitants and export them to Britain.
Comment on this
We can continue, of course, to have the most cordial relations with the British, such as the Opposition had from 1922 to 1932, if we are prepared to continue to export to Britain £5,250,000 a year. I would like to ask Deputy MacEoin, who is probably going to speak in this debate, whether the settlement that he envisages involves the continued payment to Britain of £5,250,000 per annum? If the Deputy answers in the affirmative, then we know where the Opposition Party stands. If he answers in the negative, we are entitled to know from him, since we have not so far got it out of the leader of his Party, what grounds there are for saying, or believing, that you can get a settlement with the British without paying the land annuities in the existing circumstances.
Comment on this
Nonsense is probably the right word, but Deputy McGuire said commonsense. If Deputy McGuire believes that you can get a settlement with the British without paying the land annuities, he should be on the front bench and in the first seat on the front bench, because that fertile mind of his should not be obscured on a back bench. From that exalted position, Deputy McGuire might tell us with whom his Party have had discussions which lead them to believe that, with commonsense, they could get a settlement of the dispute without paying the annuities to Britain. Deputy Cosgrave did not say that he was convinced that he could get a settlement without paying the annuities. Deputy MacEoin will not say it when he comes to speak, and Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney will be careful not to say it in this House.
Comment on this
It is left to Deputy McGuire, who sits on the second-last back seat, to discover a recipe for the settlement of the economic war.
Comment on this
Is it possible to find out from the Party opposite whether they honestly believe that you can get a settlement with the British without having to pay the land annuities?
Comment on this
Here is another wizard sitting on a back bench who has discovered that such a settlement can be got. We will test that in a few moments by references to another important point. Although there are three Deputies sitting in the front bench opposite—those sitting on the back benches are apparently prepared to contribute their recipes for the solution of this difficulty—nothing can be screwed out of the occupants of the front bench to indicate their policy for a settlement of the economic dispute. Is not the plain fact of the matter this, that there is no Party in the House and no Deputy who believes that, in existing circumstances you can have a settlement with Britain unless you continue to pay the land annuities? Does not everyone realise that the British attitude from 1922 to 1932 has been to continue to demand the payment of the land annuities, and that the British people were not even prepared to accept a deposit of these disputed moneys outside the jurisdiction of this Government, or to allow the matters in dispute to be decided by some competent tribunal? Does not everyone know perfectly well that the attitude of the British is to collar the annuities as quickly as they possibly can and to keep pouring them into their own Exchequer?
When the Party opposite talk about a comprehensive settlement, do they mean a settlement which involves much more than the annuities? What kind of settlement precisely have they in mind? Have they a settlement in mind, for instance, which will enable us to live in amity and concord with the British by putting back the Oath of Allegiance in the Constitution? Have they a settlement in mind which involves the continued payment of £5,250,000 to Britain? Have they a settlement in mind which would restore the Governor-General to his former dignity? Have they a settlement in mind which involves making the Treaty of 1921 superior to the municipal law of this country? Is that the kind of settlement the Party opposite have in mind when they talk about a comprehensive settlement, involving putting the Oath back in the Constitution, exalting the Governor-General to his former dignity, making the Treaty superior to the municipal law, and continuing to send £5,250,000 of hard-earned Irish money to replenish the coffers of the British Exchequer? If that is not the kind of settlement they mean, will somebody on the first, second or third Opposition Benches tell us what they have in mind, what kind of settlement they believe they could get; and what authority there is for that belief?
Comment on this
I do not think anyone has asked the Deputy to make him an object of charity in this House.
Comment on this
I did not say that. The Deputy has asked for so much help that I suggested we should provide the tickets to London.
Comment on this
The Deputy's Party's performance in this House, on any dispute between this country and England, has distinguished itself not by helping the Irish nation or the Irish people, or any Irish Party. Its actions and its records, in February, 1923, in particular, have shown it to be a Party which is much more concerned with helping Britain than helping any other country. Nobody in either Party who wanted to help Britain would have signed the agreement that Deputy Cosgrave signed. The case that could be made for that agreement is that they did not know what they were doing: that they were inexperienced in office, and of what was involved. While a generous country might make an allowance for incompetency, that agreement could never be justified by any advertence to law, by any advertence to facts or to any canons of justice or equity. In future I advise the Party opposite, even though it might smudge their faces a bit to defend their attitude in connection with that agreement, to say that they did not know what they were doing then. At least, that attitude would be understandable. But to stand up in London, and to stand up here, and to say that these moneys are due to Britain, when every legal authority knows that they are not due, is only to cut a figure in this House which no national Party has ever previously cut. Deputy McGuire told us that, actuated by some inspiration of commonsense, the Opposition Party believe they can get a settlement which will not involve payment of £5,250,000 by this country. May I remind Deputy McGuire that before he became a member of the Party opposite, the Cumann na nGaedheal Government in 1931 asked the British Government, not for a remission of the £5,250,000, not for a moratorium of that amount of land annuities, and not for cancellation of a single halfpenny of the annuities, but for a moratorium merely for one year of £250,000 due in respect of compensation, and that application was contemptuously rejected by the British Government. In 1931, a moratorium could not be got for £250,000. Yet, the Party opposite have the hardihood and the audacity to tell the intelligent men and women of this country that they could secure a cancellation of £5,250,000 in 1936.
Comment on this
Deputies opposite may fool themselves with delusions of that kind, but the intelligent electorate will always remember that when a moratorium for £250,000 could not be got in 1931, they are not likely to get a cancellation of £5,250,000 in 1936.
Comment on this
Because the country has been sold by the Fianna Fáil Government. There is a good case for remission.
Comment on this
The Party opposite does not know when it has a case. In 1923 they gave that case away and also £5,250,000 yearly. In 1931, Senator Blythe, who was Minister for Finance in the then Government, thought the Government has a case. He may have been wrong and Deputy McGuire may have been right. At any rate, the Minister for Finance in the Cumann na nGaedheal Government thought they had a case and he asked for a postponement of the payment of £250,000 for 12 months. The request was contemptuously rejected by the British Government and there was no moratorium. This is the Party and these are the people who are now going to secure cancellation of £5,250,000, which the British contend we owe but which is disputed here. The attitude taken up here is supported by eminent counsel. The Party opposite promises the people nothing less than a comprehensive settlement, yet they could not secure a moratorium in 1931. Having regard to the blundering settlement that they made with the British, I do not think the people of this country will ever entrust them to make a settlement again. However, if the people in a spirit of hardihood were willing to let them make another settlement with Britain, they should make sure that the nation's cheque book is left behind in Dublin, because it is obviously a risky experiment to send people to London ill-equipped to make a settlement, and incompetent from the point of view of not knowing their own case. The only thing generous about them is the cheque book which belongs to this nation. I think the people will be inclined to remember 1923 and 1931 and that the Party opposite will never again be called upon to make a comprehensive settlement.
Comment on this
What did you say when the Labour Party went over to secure the election of Mr. J.H. Thomas? Deputy Davin went over.
Comment on this
Did not members of the Irish Labour Party go over to support the Labour Government in England?
Comment on this
We are not discussing what the Labour Party did at any particular election. I call upon Deputies to discuss the motion and the amendment before the House.
Comment on this
Reference has been made in the debate to the economic war and to its effects upon the agricultural community.
Comment on this
One would imagine from the speeches made with regard to the economic war that there was only one class suffering from the economic war, and that was the agricultural community.
Comment on this
Deputy Belton says that is the only class that is paying for it. I might remind Deputy Belton that there are people in this country, people in the towns and villages and cities of this country—town workers, agricultural workers, artisans and so on, as well as small farmers—who have been experiencing an economic war, not from 1932 to 1936, but, in the battle against adversity and misfortune, from the time they were born until they die.
Comment on this
These people, who know what the real ravages of an economic war are, who have experienced an economic war all their lives, and who have not any capacity to bear it, are entitled to some consideration, and I think that, at least, their view-point is entitled to be heard. Let us realise, at all events, that there are people in this country who are suffering the pangs of an economic war as well as the agricultural community: people who have been suffering an economic war all their lives, who have been enduring adversity and misfortune all their lives. Are their prospects and their interests to be bartered in order that an agreement can be arrived at on any terms—terms of surrender and of hauling down our flag?
Comment on this
I think that Deputy Belton is invincible to any kind of intelligent explanation of anything, and I despair of trying to convert him now. However, as I said at the outset, Sir, and as I want to say now, I regard this amendment of the Opposition as a shallow, humbugging and insincere amendment—an amendment designed for no other purpose than as part of the agreement of squealing which has been carried on by the Party opposite for the whole period of this economic war. They know that this settlement, although it is by no means perfect, is something better than the coal-cattle pact of 1935. They voted for that pact of 1935, and I hold that they are insincere when they say that they do not want this settlement and that they are not prepared to approve of it. So far as this amendment by the Opposition is concerned, I think it bears, on the face of it, all the attributes of insincerity and dishonesty, and I think it will be voted for with considerable regret by the farmer members of the Party opposite.
Comment on this
The Deputy himself voted against the coal-cattle pact of 1935. What has happened since?
Comment on this
Yes. I voted against the coal-cattle pact of 1935 because the coal coming in here at the time was carrying a tax of 5/- per ton.
Comment on this
I just want an understanding of the position. It is a strange political wind that makes political bed-fellows out of Deputy Belton and Deputy Anthony. It must have been a rare storm that made these two Deputies into a kind of political twins in this amendment—Deputy Belton representing the City of Dublin and Deputy Anthony representing Cork—and neither of them wanting the economic war settled unless they can get a comprehensive settlement of it.
Comment on this
Deputy Belton could not tell us on what basis he would get a comprehensive settlement.
Comment on this
And, so far, we have not got any basis for a comprehensive settlement from Deputy Anthony.
Comment on this
Maybe there is a treat in store for me; but I rather imagine that this duet of Deputy Anthony and Deputy Belton on this motion is a kind of a Laurel and Hardy picture with which many people like to entertain themselves outside this House. As I say, Sir, I think that this is an insincere amendment and, furthermore, I think that this is not the time nor the place for wasting time on insincere amendments of this kind. I hold that the settlement that has been made is a better settlement than the one that was made last year. It is not by any means an ideal settlement, I quite admit, but it opens up a chance, perhaps, of settling the whole fundamental dispute; and if there is any prospect of getting a settlement of our dispute with Great Britain on a basis that will do honour to this country and that will recognise our country's essential equality with Great Britain, then I think that any opportunity of getting that settlement should be embraced. On the other hand, I hold that any settlement with the British which would involve a hauling down of the national flag and a surrendering of our position to Great Britain would be a settlement for which it would be impossible to get any approval in this country, and which would cause further strife and disorder in this country instead of the peace and order which we all desire but which some people would lead one to believe can easily be got by such a surrender.
Comment on this
I believe that this pact is a great improvement on the pact of last year, and I have been persuaded largely of that fact by the attitude of the Opposition Party. For some reason or another the Party opposite generally seem to become infuriated when there is any advance made towards better conditions in this country. When any advance is made towards better conditions, the Opposition always seem to become more keen, and the amount of energy they put into their efforts is always very great indeed. At the same time, I should like to remark that I hope this pact is not in any way going to give any degree of permanency to the cattle trade as it hitherto existed in this country. I think that that would be a calamity and, in that connection, I think that most of the talk from the opposite benches is mostly for propaganda purposes. They believe they are deluding a number of people who, at one time perhaps, before the advent of the late Government, got some profit out of that particular industry. People engaged in that industry, mainly in the line of distribution, and perhaps certain sections engaged in the raising of stores, previous to the advent of the late Government and the collapse of cattle prices in 1931, got some profit and undoubtedly had some savings out of the industry, but, at the same time, as an industry, it has been proclaimed for many years by many authorities, and at one time by many members on the opposite benches, that that particular trade was the cause of many of the great misfortunes of this country. One of the greatest misfortunes, they held, was the depopulation which arose from want of employment and, therefore, it is reasonable to connect them and to decide that the cattle trade, population and employment are not bedfellows and are not generally found together.
Deputy Mulcahy gave some quotations from remarks of mine which he possibly got from the Press. Those quotations did not mean exactly what he read into them. They meant just what I have said—that the cattle trade in this country was looked upon by the greater part of the people who had to emigrate as the curse of this country. Great Britain is undoubtedly going to foster here whatever industry is most suitable to her purpose. There was a lot of talk about tariffs and quotas and industry generally, but I am absolutely convinced that Great Britain, if we never had an economic dispute, and even if we paid the £5,000,000 and another £2,000,000 in addition, would retaliate immediately if we set up tariff barriers against her industrial production. Naturally, we could not expect to have it both ways. What was the position we were faced with here as a result of the world collapse of prices, which, incidentally, Deputies on the opposite benches do not believe in? For weal or woe, emigration had ceased, and there is no sign that it is going to be open again for some considerable time, and we were faced with the problem of trying to absorb as many of those people as we could.
Some counties had rather acute problems. Counties in which there were a number of small holdings, thickly populated areas, had a very severe problem. Counties like Meath did not have that severe problem because, owing to its cattle condition, there were not people there, and we were fortunate in that we have a lot of land on which people can be placed. That solves to a large extent the labour problem there and it solves the question of emigration, but I am convinced that the British Government would have retaliated with tariffs, even if there were no such question as the withholding of these annuities. That would have been the one and the only road open to them. We are now purchasing coal in return for cattle. This agreement lasts for one year. We may not need coal next year or we may need only half the quantity. What then? If the people continue to go on the land, there will be fewer cattle produced and we shall want a lesser cattle market, but we shall certainly want more food. It always seems strange that in a country like this the best land was the land which carried the least people, and that land in County Mayo of a poor description for conacre always ran around or about £5 or £6 an acre, whereas land around Tara and the richest parts of County Meath could make little more than £3 or £3 10s. 0d. before the economic dispute.
Comment on this
No. Who informed the Deputy of those things? He should go and find out the truth. My land is both tilled and stocked as good as yours.
Comment on this
That is one of the positions this country has to face up to. It is a position which the Party opposite does not want to face up to. Why? Because they know perfectly well that they will not have the responsibility.
The other question we have to face up to is also a rather serious one. It is the matter of inducing people to hold on to cattle which are every day becoming of less value and asking them to refuse to take on a different form of economy. No matter what our political prejudices may be, force of circumstances will compel us to change whatever economy we had if it is out-of-date and to adopt a new one. Every business man in Dublin has had to do that, and has had to do it in recent years, and perhaps two or three times. With all the talk there is about the cattle trade, the prices of cattle, and this market in England which is so sound, so healthy and so good that we should actually keep a lot more cattle —somebody across the way said that we have not got them because we killed the calves—this is strange information. The position in that market in 1934 for the three months ending November was that Scotch short sides, national mark, the best beef produced in England and produced generally from our stores, were worth 82/3. Last year, during the same months, they were worth 77/3. The English national mark selected in 1934 was worth 65/4; last year it was worth 60/8. Those prices are for 112 lbs. dead. Argentine chilled hindquarters were worth 56/10 during those three months in 1934, and in the same three months of 1935 were worth 60/-. Stranger still, Australian frozen hindquarters were worth 34/11 in 1934, and last year they were worth 37/1. Why is that? Simply and solely because the British farmer has not got a selling organisation or an organisation of any kind. His meat is placed on the market just as his grandfather put it on, and it is not of the quality or the appearance of this chilled meat. He is handicapped in every way. The butcher who sells his meat does not want to sell it because he has no interest in it. His interest is in the Argentine, where his money is sunk, and the result, so far as the British farmer is concerned—and he admits it to-day and these figures prove it—is that he is in a declining market.
Are members on the opposite benches entitled to try to persuade the people that we defrauded them and ruined them? We did not do that. We told the people—I said so here myself and the Minister confirmed it—to keep as few cattle as possible and have them as good as possible, but to go into other things. Can anybody on the opposite side tell me how we are going to progress so long as we have only one commodity here to sell and only one customer? If we have not industries here to maintain our population, where are they to go? And if they do leave the country, what is the use of talking about national tradition or the national language? We cannot have it both ways, and the people do not want it both ways. If we go to an election to-morrow morning we will get better results than we did on the last occasion. We know that well. What, then, is the use of wasting time here? What is the use of creating bad temper by what I may describe as impertinent suggestions and insulting phrases? Why cannot we realise the difficulties we are up against and co-operate in some way or another? Is that how people of one household make a deal or a bargain? Do they carry on the same conduct as the people on the other side? If they did, the house would not stand long. The whole place would collapse. I am convinced that there are men on the other side who would rather that the whole House should collapse than that we should succeed. But succeed we will.
Comment on this
I am sorry that Deputy Norton has left because I wanted to tell the House, in Deputy Norton's presence, what a valuable asset the country has in the Deputy. When President de Valera let down the Republic, Deputy Norton stepped into the breach. In his efforts to-night to make what I considered a most contemptible speech, he forgot what ought to be his duty—that is, what happened to the labouring community since the economic war started. Deputy Norton kept very wide of that mark. In bidding for the Left vote, as against Fianna Fáil, he has not time for these things. Deputy Norton had outbid Fianna Fáil for that vote and that has taken up all his time. He wants to know from the Opposition what their plan is for a comprehensive settlement. When the Government was in Opposition, they did not answer questions like that. They thought it was an impertinence to ask them such questions. They said that it was the job of the Government to provide the answers to such questions and that it was not for them to make suggestions to the Government of the day. Now, when they find themselves in a hole of their own making, as they have definitely admitted, they say: "What is the way out of this, boys?" Deputy Norton also wants to know what is the way out. The President, Deputy Norton and other speakers mentioned that this country could not continue to pay £5,250,000 to Great Britain and exist. Are we not doing that and much more at the present time? How much are we paying at present by way of penal tariffs? We are paying not alone the annuities but £2,000,000, representing pensions and local loans. We are also paying half annuities at home. What are we paying out of? We are paying out of our depleted assets. They are depleted to the extent of the British tariff on every beast we sell, whether for home or foreign consumption. Is not that the position?
Deputy Norton comes in and wants to know what would become of the country if we had to pay £5,250,000 per year. We are paying over £10,000,000, if you allow for tariffs which we have to make up. The Minister for Agriculture admitted last night that the price which the British pay for live stock here is the basic price. Consequently, with that as a basis, it does not matter whether those who buy our cattle are Germans, Spaniards or Belgians, because they are buying them at the price that Britain pays for them, which price is less the annuities. Then, we have people saying that the country could not continue what it was previously doing when it had a market. The President told us to-night that, in 1931, when we were paying £5,000,000 to Britain, we were paying at the rate of £7 per beast exported to Britain. Let us take him at his word. In 1931, the average price we got for cattle exported to Britain was £16 11s. If we did pay £7 per head, we still had £9 11s. left to play with. This year the average price was £8 7s. per head and we are paying Britain the annuities all the time. As President de Valera admitted, both to-day and previously, we are paying them in a manner which is more calculated to injure the people than if we were paying them directly.
The President started his speech to-night by asking us to face up to the realities of the situation and leave out the pretences. I wish the President would leave out all that old history, which is pure nonsense. To my mind, it seems like the old story: "Mary sat down and told me the old story, over and over and over again." We had the Government rehashing the 1923 agreement. When the leader of the Opposition wanted to answer the President he was not very anxious to hear him. He asked permission to make a second speech in reply. The leader of the Opposition merely wanted to quote ten lines to show that the agreement had been properly brought before this House in 1923. One would imagine from the fuss made about this Bill that we were considering some matter of very weighty importance—some weighty decision that the Government had come to and in respect of which this House was asked to decide whether or not the Government was worthy of support. If any decision has been taken by the Government, what is it? In considering the Bill before the House, we must have regard to its implications. Certain advantages are supposed to accrue to us as a result of the remissions which we propose to make in this Bill. What are these advantages? Deputy Norton tells us that this is a much better pact than the coal-cattle pact, but nobody seems to have told us exactly what the pact is.
We have been told that there is a type of exchange in this pact—the giving of one thing for another. We are given coal for cattle. The Minister for Agriculture gave us to understand last night that there was an end of the quota system, so far as we are concerned. That must have been startling news for the Minister for Agriculture, and it must have been very startling news for the Minister for Defence, who said last year that not alone was Britain entitled to inflict this quota, but it was perfectly fair and equitable as far as we were concerned. Deputy Corry, Deputy Donnelly and Deputy O'Reilly told us there was not room in England for another beast of ours at that time. After that we got the coal-cattle pact and now the Minister for Agriculture tells us that there is no quota so far as we are concerned. It is not, so far as we can ascertain, printed into any pact or Bill and we would like to be assured of the fact. Let us see what we have got, and let us see the reasons which prompted the present pact.
It has been alleged from the Government Benches that we have complained that we are getting coal from Britain, that we have complained that we are getting cement and iron and steel from Britain. I am not going to complain of that, and neither did anybody on this side of the House complain of it. My complaint is that if the Government are at war with some nation, no matter what nation, and if there is any truce with regard to certain matters, the Government ought to see that they get their pound of flesh. They have bargained for British coal, British cement, British iron and British steel. Is there anything else Britain wants to get rid of? Is there anything else we have to bargain for? Did we even bargain over those other things? Was there any necessity for that bargain in order to get a reduction of the tariffs? I have here by me, taken from the Irish Independent of September 16th, 1935, an account of evidence given in the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts issued in London as a Blue Book, and it includes the following exchanges at a meeting held on May the 30th, when Sir Richard V. Nind Hopkins, K.C.B., of the Treasury, was examined. The account reads:—
"Mr. Albery, M.P., asked the witness if he could give any idea of the figure up to date, and what was going to happen when the receipts from the Irish Free State special duties had caught up with the expenditure, by reason of the default of the Free State.
Sir Richard Hopkins: The receipts from the duties just caught up with the default, falling directly on the Exchequer, within the limits of the financial year which has just closed, but the balance is so small as to be hardly worth taking account of. During the current year I anticipate, as far as one can see, that there will be a very considerable surplus, and during the year the Government will have to take a decision as to what is to be done on the matter.
Mr. Culverwell, M.P.: The Government are not bound to reduce the duties to bring in the appropriate amount?
Witness: The Act said that the duties were imposed with the object of reimbursing any public fund of the United Kingdom which had suffered loss through the Free State default, and it was said that the whole produce of the duties was to be paid into the Exchequer. The point now is that the receipt of the duties is more than sufficient to balance certain of the Exchequer outgoings."
I maintain that whatever reductions we have got we have not got them as the result of a pact at all. We have got them as a result of the fact that Britain was collecting the amount which was in default, and more, and that the new basis so far as live stock is concerned is going to bring her in all that she requires to meet the deficit.
The Minister for Agriculture told us last night that he felt it would take the Opposition all their time to make the farmers complain. The farmers are well off, he says. They certainly are well off! All we have to do is to go through the country and make a few inquiries in order to find out how well off they are. Let us, as the President says, face the facts, face the realities of the situation and cut out the pretences. What is the position? Are we paying the annuities by way of tariffs? Originally our annuities were £3,000,000. Britain is now collecting £5,000,000 off our live stock, and President de Valera's Government are collecting 50 per cent. more. All that has to be found by the farmers, and yet the Minister for Agriculture tells us that he believes it would take the Opposition all their time to keep the farmers complaining. The Minister last night alleged that the Opposition were endeavouring to spread disaffection amongst the farmers, endeavouring to make the farmers themselves believe that they are badly off when they really are not. I wonder if the Minister for Agriculture thinks that other people in this country might be guilty of endeavouring to spread disaffection amongst the farmers? For instance, some of the Catholic Bishops in their Lenten Pastorals make certain references to the conditions existing amongst the farming community. Will President de Valera pay any heed to what these Bishops say? It surely will not be alleged by the President or the Minister that the Irish Catholic Bishops are endeavouring to spread disaffection amongst the farmers.
Comment on this
In my own time, Deputy, I will quote the Pastorals for you. Do not hurry; you might hear them too soon.
Comment on this
He should have. The Most Reverend Dr. Keane, Bishop of Limerick—is there anything wrong with him, Deputy Donnelly?—in the course of his Lenten Pastoral says:—
"Many questions are still discussed and, as far as may be, decided from the political point of view alone, and many seem to be incapable of taking any other, even when that other may be concerned with the social virtues that regulate the conduct of men towards one another. We have an instance of this in the attitude of many to the sufferings that have come on the agricultural community. Everyone who knows the countryside knows that these sufferings are very real and in certain cases very distressing."