Imposition of Duties (Confirmation of Order) Bill, 1936—Second Stage (Resumed).
Contributions 200–407 of 407. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 10 of 1936 ›
The pastoral goes on to say:
"It is surely, then, not in accordance with charity to be indifferent to the condition of such an important section of the community, nor in accordance with justice to misrepresent its gravity or its cause. And yet this is done and for no other reason apparently than that the exigencies of party politics so demand."
It is a pity the Minister for Agriculture did not read that before he accused the Opposition of endeavouring to spread disaffection amongst the farmers by having them complain of the condition brought on them by the economic war. Would Deputy Donnelly like to hear another pastoral?
Comment on this
Let us have the other one. I have a few of them myself, but they are of a more ancient date.
Comment on this
Speaking of the farmers, the Most Reverend Dr. Kinane, of Waterford—there is nothing wrong with him, I hope; Deputy Donnelly apparently agrees he is all right, and I am sure Deputy Corry will agree that he is a trustworthy, decent man who knows his job—says:
"It is with feelings of the greatest pain and the gravest concern, then, that we see them reduced to their present parlous condition."
I need not read any more; that is quite enough.
Comment on this
What I have read is quite enough. We have the Minister here accusing the Opposition of endeavouring to spread disaffection amongst the farmers by having them complain of their condition. We had the President, Deputy O'Reilly and Deputy Norton telling us to-night of the dwindling British market. I have here before me a very important document which I am sure Deputy Donnelly has seen before. It is one of the documents issued by the Fianna Fáil Party for the 1934 Local Government Election. It is a great document. It deals with the British market and the number of cattle it could not take, but which we are making arrangements to-day to put into it. It winds up with the glorious phrase: "What price the British market now?" Is not that a most appropriate phrase to-day?
Comment on this
Plus British coal, British cement, British iron and British steel. That is the price of the British market to-day. Has it not become enhanced in value since that was printed? Furthermore, it shows the constantly shifting values of Fianna Fáil. The peculiar thing about it is that they do not appear to notice those shifting values, but they are constantly shifting. We have on the face of this document the statement: "The English farmers, faced with a huge increase in stocks, a decrease in killings and a collapse in the prices of farm produce, are utterly impoverished." Mind you, at the same time as that was being circulated amongst the farmers of Ireland we were paying £6,000,000 to endeavour to get into that British market. It cost us £6,000,000 for that year and the year before. Turn over to the back of the document and you will find a few gems. No. 1 is: "The Fianna Fáil policy ensures prosperity to farmers." We have evidence of that all over the country to-day— farmers laying aside dowries for their daughters, educating their sons and daughters and building houses. They are all paying their annuities and rates punctually. There are no complaints and we have nobody on the dole. The Fianna Fáil policy ensures prosperity to the farmers!
Here is another gem: "The Government by refusing to pay tribute to England will have saved £14,514,435 for the Irish people by the end of the year." Is that not very good? What really happened that year? I agree that at the end of that year the withheld moneys amounted to the sum stated, but, on the other hand, the amount received by us for live stock exported in the same period dropped from £18,000,000 to £6,000,000, a loss of £12,212,207. During the same period the British collected in duties on our exports £11,757,000, whilst we paid in bounties £6,322,000, and our levies in respect of butter and bacon amounted to £1,200,000. That left us with a total loss on our side of £32,191,207 in our effort to save £14,514,000. That is what Fianna Fáil thinks good business. That is the same type of business we have in the pact before the House to-day. In our efforts to save £14,000,000 we lost £12,000,000 on our livestock exports alone within that period, Britain collected from us over £11,000,000 in duties; we paid bounties totalling over £6,000,000 and we levied over £1,000,000. If that is the type of business Fianna Fáil wants to carry on for this country, then I for one shall not urge them to do any business or to make any settlement.
We have another item here in this statement. "Under the calf slaughtering scheme and the new Bill to give compensation for diseased cows, the cattle industry will be placed on a sounder footing with a view to increasing quality rather than quantity." How are we placed in that respect? How has that plan succeeded in the cattle industry? The Minister for Agriculture and the Minister for Industry and Commerce boasted here some time before Christmas, as evidence of the prosperity of agriculture in this country, that we had 100,000 more cows in this country than we had in 1931 and, mind you, they were right. We have over 100,000 more cows. Why had we 100,000 more cows than in the year 1931? Because we cannot get rid of the old cows. You cannot give them away. You cannot do anything with them. There is no farm in the country with five or six cows amongst which there is not an old stag or two which the farmer cannot get rid of. If you want proof of that, here it is from the statistical abstract published by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. In 1935 we had 101,694 more cows than we had in 1932, when Fianna Fáil came into power, but in 1935, as against 1932, with that number of extra old cows, we had 346,072 less cattle under one year. Notwithstanding the fact that we had over 100,000 more cows in 1935, we had practically 350,000 less young cattle. Part of that is due to the slaughter of calves and part of it to the sterility of the old cows. That is the evidence of the prosperity which this leaflet promised to the farmers of Ireland if they elected Fianna Fáil—"Vote Fianna Fáil and continue the national advance." The national advance was that we lost £32,000,000 in endeavouring to save £14,000,000.
Comment on this
And the people voted Fianna Fáil. Of course, mind you, I do not blame the people. I remember hearing members of the Fianna Fáil Party speaking down my country before they came into power and they promised the people: "If we get into power, we are going to retain the annuities." They did not tell the people the real thing. They did not say: "We will make you pay them and we will retain them." All they said was: "We will retain them," and the people went away with the impression that they were never going to be asked to pay them at all. The people were told: "We will retain them and we will derate the land for you." How did these two things come off? Was it any wonder the people voted Fianna Fáil? Mind you, if Fianna Fáil could redeem the promises they made, they would be one of the greatest political parties in the world. They said: "When we get into office we are going to reduce taxation by £2,000,000." They got office, increased taxation by £6,000,000, and there is not a budge about it. If the Government could retain the annuities, if they could derate land, and if they could, at the same time, reduce taxation by £2,000,000 without impairing the social services, they would be worthy of support. They are on their trial for long enough now.
Comment on this
No, they will never last so long as that. The Minister for Agriculture told us that the quota will not be taken into account any more. That is not in the pact. We heard murmurs and talk about that, but it is not in the pact. Is it not a rather strange commentary on the whole situation as presented by Fianna Fáil for the last two years? We were told by the Minister that the British market was chock-full and that there was no room for another beast. Deputy Corry quoted from a speech made by the Minister for Agriculture in England to that effect. We were told that not only were we being restricted, so far as quotas were concerned, but every other Dominion was also restricted. Speeches to that effect were delivered up and down the country by Deputies opposite. I think I heard Deputy Donnelly refer to that matter at the Galway by-election. I like to hear Deputy Donnelly. He is a very good open-air speaker, and Deputy Donnelly told us that there was no room for Irish cattle in the British market. He told us that the market was not there for New Zealand, South Africa or any of the other 100 per cent. loyal States and, consequently, it was not there for us.
We had published the other day some figures that show what happened in the period when the restrictions were against us. Take the period 1931-1935. The Irish Free State supplies to the British market dropped from 4.28 to 2.47; Canada supplies went up from 3.81 to 7.40; Australia from 5.30 to 7.17; New Zealand from 4.38 to 5.04, and South Africa from 1.51 to 1.81.
Comment on this
I am quoting from the table supplied to the Irish Independent and published on 26th February, 1935.
Comment on this
On the one hand we have a document which tells us that the British purchasing power has gone down. If you take it in money it is more in my favour; if you take it in animals it is entirely against you. So no matter which way you take it it is against you; but it is immaterial. There is one thing, in any case, about this particular pact. The British farmers are quite delighted with it. I am sure they are much more delighted with it than the Irish farmers are.
Deputy Norton said this is a great pact, much better than the coal-cattle pact, and that he could not see, for the life of him, why the farmer element in the Opposition were opposing it. We are not opposing the settlement as it stands. We want a better and a more comprehensive settlement. To my mind, what is presented to the House to-night is another milestone, and a very sinister milestone, on the Fianna Fáil road to failure. I do not know what hope there is to be found in the President's speech for a settlement of the economic war. If we are to take the President's attitude, as he delivered his speech to-night, we must feel that in our time or, at any rate, in the time of the present Government, there is absolutely no hope whatever of a settlement of the economic war. Deputy Norton bore that out also. The farmers throughout the country, the men among whom the Minister for Agriculture said dissatisfaction is being caused, will have to continue to pay all this money, the burden of which is equated in the price the British put upon our live stock, no matter where sold. That is the prospect before the Irish farmers. No hope of settlement; no release from the obligation that the Fianna Fáil Party has placed upon them, and nobody else.
The President also told us that the price of agricultural produce has dropped considerably all over the world in the last few years. It did no such thing. The index figure of agricultural produce prices in this country was 113.7 in 1932, and that dropped to 83.6 in 1935. In England the figure was 122 in 1932; 107 in 1933, and 117 in 1935. Yet the President tells us that if agriculture is depressed in this country —and this will be a great consolation to the farmers—it is depressed everywhere else as well. That is very poor consolation.
There is one other thing I should like to know: The Minister for Finance, speaking here recently on the question of the coal drawback, informed the House and the country that the reason the coal tax was removed was because he found he could balance his Budget without it. That is important. I hope it is true, because it is to everybody's interest that the Budget should balance, and moneys that ordinarily flow into the Exchequer ought to be welcomed by everybody. It would mean a certain relief in taxation; it would possibly mean more employment and money for other things. Questions were asked yesterday if the Minister withdrew the bounties, which he said he has withdrawn on live stock, was he going to devote this money in any other way towards relieving agriculture, which has to bear the brunt of all these payments—payments which they were never asked to bear before. Agriculture was never asked to pay police pensions and local loans. Now agriculture has to do all that. The reply from the Minister for Finance indicated that he was not going to devote any of those moneys for that purpose. It will be interesting, when we come to consider the matter, to know whether or not the Minister has balanced his Budget without having recourse to those economies as far as bounties are concerned. I think that, having regard to the condition in which agriculture finds itself to-day, a condition to which it has been forced by the present Government, it is only right that some relief, either by way of rates or otherwise, should be given to the agricultural community from the undue load that has been placed upon them by the present Government.
In conclusion, let me say that what I regard as the most sinister aspect of the present debate is the utter hopelessness of any definite settlement of the outstanding matters. Some of us had hoped that the President would say something which we might hang on to, and in view of which we might tell the farmers down the country that there was some hope left in the offing; that this year, next year or the year after they would be relieved from the burdens which are placed upon them. But no hope whatever has been held out. Is it any wonder that we are dissatisfied with a settlement of that type? Is it any wonder that we ask, and is it not time we should ask, that the whole outstanding matter should be settled? Does Deputy Donnelly think that a more favourable opportunity is coming next year, the year after or five years hence or ten years hence?
Comment on this
When is it coming? Are the farmers of this country to continue to pay the annuities twice over? As Deputy Belton said, and rightly said, has not the whole principle of the thing been abandoned as far as retention of the annuities is concerned? Once you make a bargain, saying: "We will remit so-and-so if you remit so-and-so" you are admitting the principle of the collection of the annuities, no matter what the President may say. If you say: "I will take off so-and-so, if you will take off a certain amount and collect the rest," is not that an understanding? You say: "You are collecting £6 off our two-year-old cattle; instead of that, collect £4 5s." To my mind, Sir, the pact and the motion before the House ought to be rejected. It ought to be rejected until the Government can give us some idea of what they are going to do in this matter; until the Government tells the people of this country, whom they have fooled, what they are going to do in this matter. When the last election came on they asked the people: "Return us, so that we may settle the economic war." Now their mouthpiece, Deputy Norton, tells us it is a matter of one man bullying another, and if there is going to be a settlement it is going to be on the terms of the bully. When are we going to get away from that, and come to equal terms with Britain? There is certainly something due to the people of this country. There is certainly something due to the farming community of this country, and until the President and the Government tell the people when they are going to settle this matter, when they expect a more favourable opportunity of settling it and what the terms are, I say this ought to be rejected.
Comment on this
A Chinn Comhairle, in putting before the House the reasons which prompted them to put down this amendment one would expect from the Opposition if not a definite logical case in support of the amendment, at any rate, a certain amount of consistency and coherence. But one listened in vain to Deputy Brennan's speech, in its survey of very many matters, for any indication that the Deputy was speaking to this particular amendment which we find on the Order Paper. The amendment reads:
That viewing with the greatest concern the continuing losses to the people, occasioned by the dispute with the British Government, the Dáil declines to give a Second Reading to the Imposition of Duties (Confirmation of Order) Bill, 1936, until the Executive Council has given the Dáil an assurance that the Executive Council will now take steps to negotiate forthwith a comprehensive settlement of the matters at issue between the Irish and British Governments.
Not alone has no case been made in support of that amendment, but the Opposition speakers have not even spoken in such a way as to lead one to believe that they had even considered in advance what policy they were going to put before the House and before the country in this debate. We have just heard Deputy Brennan telling us that this pact is a sinister milestone on the pathway of the Fianna Fáil Government to failure; while earlier, we had another speaker, a representative of the agricultural industry, Deputy Bennett, telling us that this pact is better than the pact we agreed to last year. Which of the two Deputies are we to believe? Is Deputy Bennett not being a little too straightforward and too manly for his colleagues when he tells us that this pact is better than the pact we had last year and to which the chief Opposition Party gave their unanimous support? Yes, A Chinn Comhairle, the very fact that the Opposition have neglected to make any case against this pact shows that they realise it has advantages for this country.
Comment on this
And the fact that they have avoided telling the country what their alternative is, or even what they mean by the term "to negotiate forthwith a comprehensive settlement of the matters at issue between the Irish and British Governments" shows that they have no policy to offer as an alternative. Last year undoubtedly there was quite a different atmosphere in the House. There was an attitude of relief amongst the Opposition Deputies that a trade agreement had been concluded. This year a trade agreement, which is at any rate substantially in advance of the agreement of last year, is received with thunderous opposition—opposition which consists largely in descriptions of the present state of the agricultural industry, but which really has no bearing whatever and has not been related to the pact at all.
Comment on this
Deputy Brennan seems disappointed that Deputy Cosgrave was not permitted to make a second speech to explain to the House that the agreement which he made and which he signed in 1923 was not a secret agreement. Deputies on the opposite side were told that if Deputy Cosgrave felt he had a case, and wanted to make a second speech to justify his position or to explain matters more clearly to the country, he had very many able lieutenants on that side of the House to explain the position, but I notice that Deputy Brennan in dealing with the matter confined himself simply to stating that Deputy Cosgrave had introduced this matter and brought it to the notice of the Dáil in a very proper manner in 1923.
Comment on this
What was the proper manner? If the Deputy looks at Volume 3 of the Official Reports of the 26th June, 1923, column 2498, he will find that the particular Estimate in respect of which it is claimed by the Opposition leader that this question of the agreement and the financial transactions which it involves, the transfer of those large sums of money yearly to the British Land Purchase Fund, that brought the whole matter before the Dáil, occupies a very short space in the Official Reports— about two and a half or three columns. What were the circumstances in which this matter was brought to the notice of the Dáil? The circumstances were that an Estimate, in regard to which it was admitted that proper notice had not been given, was brought into the Dáil rather suddenly and this is what the then President said as reported in column 2498:—
"I am asking the Dáil to-day to take up a particular Estimate, the Land Purchase Annuities Estimate, and if I have permission to explain shortly the reason for taking this, I think that Deputies will agree that it is necessary, and that any fault that there is in the matter of not having brought it on before is my own. It was understood in the Ministry of Finance that the Dáil was not adjourning this evening, that it would be continued during the week, and that it would be possible to introduce this Estimate after due notice, this Estimate is one which is concerned solely with accounting transactions as to which no controversy can arise, and I hope that the Deputies will accept the Estimate and enable us to make the payment. The Estimate deals with purchase annuities payable under the existing Land Acts. ... The law provides that these annuities are to be collected henceforth by the Government of Saorstát Eireann, and that the proper amounts should, in due course, be paid into either of the funds out of which dividends and sinking fund payments in connection with the various land stocks are paid. These stocks would continue to be managed by the British Government, but it is part of the present arrangement for the adjustment of past land purchase transactions that we should pay over the annuities and leave it to the British Government to pay the interest to the stockholders. Then, annuities when collected are paid direct into our Exchequer as part of the miscellaneous revenue, and this Estimate, when passed, will enable us to make the necessary issues out of our Exchequer to the British Government."
Comment on this
Will the Minister read a little further—what Deputy Wilson said and what the President said afterwards? This is the matter which was kept secret.
Comment on this
Then Deputy Wilson said:—
"Are we to understand from the Minister that this money is the payment made by the tenants for their land, and that there is nothing out of the Central Fund? I would like the Dáil to understand that. This is the money collected as annuities from the farmers which we are now paying over."
Then the President said:—
"The actual sum due to pay the annuities is much greater than the sum which comes in. At the recent negotiations which took place in England we came to a provisional arrangement which binds us, or in which we accepted liability for the payment of a certain sum pending a settlement regarding the major question."
Comment on this
Perhaps the Deputy, or somebody else, will explain why it was that when it was suggested by the representatives of the British Treasury that this agreement should be published the representatives of the Irish Department said, in reply, that Mr. Blythe did not wish, for political reasons, that this agreement should be made public. Furthermore, when the British Treasury pressed to have the agreement published, so as to avoid, or to meet in advance, any question that might have been raised in the British Parliament—at least that was the reason they gave—they were told that one particular part, the most important part of the agreement, so far as the Irish people were concerned, should be pasted over. That is, naturally, one of the reasons why people consider that this agreement is properly called a secret agreement, having regard to the manner in which the question was brought before the Dáil, having regard to the fact that the formal sanction of the Dáil was never sought, having regard to the fact that our representatives told the British that they did not wish to have the agreement published, and having regard to the fact that they actually discussed pasting over that portion of the agreement, lest it should be made public in Great Britain when it came up in connection with some law case.
Comment on this
The portion relating to the land annuities. I shall let the Minister for Finance go into that matter more closely. According to Deputy Brennan the British are going to lose nothing by this pact; the reasons they had in mind for making this pact were that they found that, even under the altered conditions and the readjustments which have taken place in regard to the duties on cattle and the quotas, they will get more money than they require to meet the deficiencies in the British National Exchequer, while Deputy Cosgrave, on the other hand, in his statement to the Press, contended that we were handing over a large part of our industry, a large part of our iron and steel trade and other trades, to the British; that we were handing over, as it were, part of our industrial power to the British. The Deputies cannot have it both ways.
I suggest that this pact should be regarded in another way and that it can legitimately be looked upon as a payment which the British Government are making to get again that footing in the Irish market which they lost, and that the British Government, on their side, are quite anxious to get back into the Irish market and to recover some portion, at any rate, of the trade they have lost during recent years. Deputies are so busy crediting this Government with ideas of selling their country and of making bargains the idea for which, apparently, originated with the British themselves, which are of no real advantage to this country, but which are simply dictated by the British Exchequer experts, that they take very good care not to point out that we on our part have got very substantial considerations, and that the British, for their part, have got what they consider the advantage of getting some kind of footing again in the Irish market for coal, cement, and possibly other articles.
Deputy Brennan stressed the fact that there has been an improvement in the British market and in the British agricultural position since 1935. Can he possibly deny the statement of the President that not alone since the Fianna Fáil Party came into office, but long before, the British market had been a declining quantity, and that that position was greatly accentuated about 1929, 1930 and 1931? The Deputy, if he does try to make the point that the British farmer has achieved some measure of relief and that his position, according to the agricultural index figures, is somewhat better this year and last year than it has been in preceding years, and that it is better comparatively than the agricultural index figure for the Free State would indicate the Irish farmer's position to be, should have regard to those other loyal countries which, according to the Deputy and his colleagues, secured enormous advantages in Ottawa, advantages which, apparently, the Irish Free State, had it been under the control of a wise and statesmanlike Government, would have also enjoyed. If the Deputy looks up the Economic Journal for December, 1935, page 628, he will see there a table showing the position as far as the Dominion of New Zealand is concerned. I will just take two figures from that table: The index number of export prices in 1926 was 100, while the index number of export prices for 1933 was 58. That is an indication of what the position was in New Zealand, and that is an indication of what happened in a country which had particular advantages in regard to climate, in regard to the organisation of its agriculture, and last, and by no means least, having regard to the special link of friendship that exists between New Zealand and Great Britain. I suppose New Zealand is one of the best organised agricultural communities in the world.
Comment on this
Can the Minister say whether there has been any improvement in that figure since 1933?
Comment on this
I cannot. An extract from the New Zealand Government publications points out that between 1928 and 1932 the index figures indicated that the volume of exports increased by 18 per cent. in respect of the greater quantity of exports. After making provision for payment of interest and other fixed claims, they received in 1932 34 per cent. less for their exports as compared with 1928. For an export trade of 18 per cent. more, they got in 1932 34 per cent. less. Still Deputy Brennan will tell us that we are not being fair to the country. We are fooling the farmers when we tell them that the conditions of agricultural depression had touched the Irish Free State even before the present Government came into office, and that this depression had extended to a great many other agricultural countries, including some of the British Dominions which have been held up to us as examples of what can be achieved by paying particular attention to keeping your place in the British market.
If the Opposition were a little more frank and if they told the country the circumstances that they have in mind as to the conditions under which they think a comprehensive settlement of the matters at issue between the two Governments can be effected; if they gave some clue at least during the course of this debate as to what line of advance they have in mind or what policy they intend to pursue, it would be a great stroke of business for them. It would make the country feel that, instead of finding fault with the Government for everything it does, the Opposition had some constructive criticism to offer. Even, as Deputies on the opposite benches admit, the Government has done somewhat better this year than last year. But finding fault with the Government and saying that they cannot possibly agree that anything good can come from this side of the House, is not of much help. If the Opposition were to concentrate on putting before the country the alternative they have to offer, then I think they would rally to themselves some support. Because, after all, if the Party which they represent is to continue to hold the important place in the life of the country which it held in the past, it is necessary it should have some policy. It is just because people—even those of them who are dissatisfied with the present Government and feel they do not agree with it—do feel that no policy is being offered to them by the Opposition that the Opposition are not receiving support. On everything else the Opposition have declared that they are at one with the present Government. The very items of policy that they condemned here day after day, and month after month, they have now come to accept. There is no difference between us only this matter of the economic dispute. In regard to that we are as wise now as at the start of this debate. If the Opposition would show the country that they have some policy to put before the people, besides, as a general rule, a mere policy of destructive criticism, I venture to say it might be good political tactics and a good thing for the country.
The country has not been given any alternative whatever. In this debate there has been no attempt at any real criticism of the terms of the pact. We have heard nothing beyond the argument that the Ministers should have gone over. If the Ministers do go over, I do hope that they will never make the same blunders that their predecessors made and that they will not hurriedly put their names to any documents affecting the welfare of the community for a long period of years without very serious consideration. As the Minister for Industry and Commerce pointed out last night, if this Government reached a position in which they felt that they could enter on equal terms into an arrangement with the British Government, the Ministers here will not be too shy to do so, and they will not display the least sign of that cowardice attributed to them by warriors like Deputy Brennan. When this matter reached an acute stage in October, 1932, a strong delegation representing the Irish Government went over to London. The occasion has not arisen since for any such delegation to go over. It was well understood by the Opposition and by the country for many months past that negotiations would likely be in progress for the continuance or the determination of the coal-cattle pact. That matter has been handled, and handled very successfully, by officials representing the Irish Government.
Comment on this
I think that a special debt of gratitude is due to the officials. They are the men behind the scenes who very often give valuable advice and carry out practically to the point of conclusion agreements of this kind. We have been very well served indeed and we are very well pleased with the work that our officials have done for us in any negotiations of this kind. If the occasion should arise that the Ministers themselves felt that this comprehensive settlement could be brought about, they would not allow any personal or other considerations to withhold them for a single moment from taking the steps that would be necessary to bring about such an arrangement. The position has been very fully and clearly stated by the President of the Executive Council to-day. He has brought Deputies back to a realisation of the position that we need not deceive ourselves into believing in any other policy except the policy of continuing steadfastly onward with our own policy, developing our own resources and industries and maintaining our population, as far as we can, in reasonable comfort and security. Any other policy but that policy of proceeding steadfastly ahead, building up our own country economically, so that we can face the future with confidence, would have very fatal results for the nation. If those concerned in this dispute realise that we are going ahead with our policy and that we are not to be shaken from it; that the country that elected us supports us in that view, and that the country realises that our case is a just one, then the sooner will the other party to the dispute come to see that they will have to get down to brass tacks. They will have to take some serious steps if they have in mind the opening of negotiations leading to such a substantial settlement, as the Opposition seem to think is possible.
Deputy MacDermot referred to the fact that the making of this agreement, at any rate, has shown that the British have abandoned a certain position that they had taken up; that they have not, as our opponents would have led us to believe in the years that have passed, harped back to this or that point of constitutional change nor tried to bring past history into the dispute. They have realised, as the decisions referred to to-day by the President have shown clearly, that we were fully within our legal and constitutional rights in any action of that kind that we have taken. But it is to the good, as Deputy MacDermot has pointed out, that we have an agreement of this kind. If it helps on the way towards a fuller agreement nobody will be more pleased than the present Government. We want it made quite clear, however, that so far as we are concerned, we shall not barter any national rights either now or in the future for any economic advantage. If we were to do so, there is not the slightest doubt but that the criticism that we have heard in the Dáil to-day and yesterday would be multiplied a thousand-fold throughout the whole country, and rightly so. The Irish people, no matter what the difficulties of the situation may be, or the burdens that may be placed upon them, and particularly on the agricultural community, would not be prepared, I venture to say, to accept a settlement that would in any way take from our national rights or that would not be a full recompense for the sacrifices that have been made in this struggle up to the present, nor do I think that any Deputy will get up and say that the people would be prepared to accept such a settlement.
Mr. Morrissey rose.
Comment on this
Before the Deputy speaks, I want to announce that I have been informed that it is agreed that the Minister for Finance be called upon to conclude at 9.30 p.m. I, therefore, ask Deputies to bear that understanding in mind and express themselves with brevity.
Comment on this
It is rather a pity, Sir, that you were not in a position to convey that to the House at 3.20 this afternoon before the President started on his marathon.
Comment on this
Surely, Sir, I will be allowed to make at least one speech without the offensive interruptions of the Minister for Finance. The Minister for Education told us that there should be more frankness. He reproved Deputies on this side because, he said, they had not faced up to the motion or the Bill before the House; that nobody on this side had attempted to explain what the motion in the name of Deputy Cosgrave meant. I have been waiting for the last two days for some speaker on the Government side to tell us what this so-called pact means. I waited for an hour and 40 minutes to-day, when the President was speaking, to hear from him what was meant by this Bill. Remember that this, the Second Reading, is the most important stage of this Bill; that it is a Bill to implement the pact, and that the Minister for Finance is not in the position to inform Deputies as to what the pact means or to give information regarding the tariffs on the articles comprised in the pact.
The President, to-day, gave a most amazing performance. If I may say so, we have had many strange speeches from the President, both inside and outside this House, but I do not think that any Deputy, whether he sits on the Government side of the House or this side, has ever listened to such a speech from him as that which we had for an hour and 40 minutes to-day. It was an appalling performance. Anybody who looked across at the Government front bench could see that even the President's Ministers were appalled. They were terribly disappointed, obviously, every one of them. They were so depressed that at least three of them hid their faces behind their hands.
Comment on this
It is no harm to notice things in this House. I would ask, Sir, if it is possible to control the Minister for Finance.
Comment on this
I noticed that, during the President's speech, Deputy Morrissey was engaged in conversation and I presume the Deputy does not think that we ought to sit in silence wrapped in wonder at the words of wisdom that fall from his lips.
Comment on this
So long as the Minister does not get enmeshed in his own wisdom I do not mind. The President, as I was saying, took us back a long way in his speech. As one of my colleagues remarked, you could get the greater part of it in the files of the daily newspapers of 13 years ago. It consisted not of an explanation of the Bill before the House, but of the benefits which, he maintained, this country had lost by refusing to accept the Act of 1920. The President proceeded at length to explain to the House how much better off financially we would be to-day under the terms of the 1920 Act than we are under the Treaty. I agree that, financially, it would be hard to devise any measure which would put the country in a worse position financially than it is in to-day. The President, Deputy Davin, Deputy Norton, the Minister for Education and the Minister for Industry and Commerce told us that we were getting valuable considerations under this particular Bill, but not one of them has given any indication of what the considerations are.
I want to issue a challenge, and I hope Deputy Donnelly will be in the position to take it up because I am confident that he is the only one on the benches opposite who could deal with it. Is not this the position under this pact, that we get nothing whatever except the right to sell more of our cattle, with the tax attached? The difference between our position to-day and our position two years ago is this, and this is the pact in a nutshell—that two years the British were collecting the amount of the withheld money. I do not think anyone disputes that. The British were collecting their money and our total coal trade was not put in pawn. They were not given a monopoly of the coal market, as well as one third of our cement trade, and our Government was not forced to surrender one half of the special duties which were imposed in retaliation for British tariffs on Irish exports. That is the position.
In his speech the President admitted that the British drove a hard bargain with the civil servants who were sent over to represent the interests of this country. The position to-day is this, and no Minister or Deputy on the opposite benches can deny it, that the British get not only the full amount of the withheld moneys, but a complete monopoly of the coal trade, representing over 3,000,000 tons a year; and one third of our cement trade, while the special duties here are halved upon steel, iron and electrical goods, sugar and sugar products. Any victory in this pact is a victory for the British and a retreat for us. I do not care about the figures. I do not care if it is said that we are going to export double the number of cattle exported last year, or whether the tax on them is to be £4 5s. 0d. or £5 5s. 0d. What really matters is that the British are going to get the full amount of the annuities, plus the ex-R.I.C. pensions, plus local loans and other withheld moneys. No one can deny that. Our position is considerably worse to-day, as the British are not only getting the full amount of money they claimed but they are getting our coal trade and other things.
When introducing the Bill the Minister for Finance said that the British Exchequer would lose £800,000 and the Irish Exchequer about £200,000. He explained that the figures were to be taken with the greatest reserve. In the name of goodness, what is the use of making a statement like that on such an important matter? The figures are either accurate or not. If they are accurate they need not be taken with any reserve; if not accurate then they ought not to be mentioned in this House. Whatever the British Exchequer may lose, or whatever the Irish Exchequer may lose, or whatever doubt there may be about the amount that will be lost, there can be no doubt about this, that Irish farmers are going to continue to pay the full amount of the annuities to Britain, plus the ex-R.I.C. pensions, plus local loans and other charges, as well as £1,500,000 pounds to President de Valera on top of these charges, whereas their total direct payments, prior to Fianna Fáil coming into office, were less than £3,000,000, so far as the land annuities are concerned. To-day the farmers are forced to pay— where they are able to pay—indirectly to Great Britain, and directly to our own Government, roughly, £6,000,000 odd. I do not think these facts will be contested. Deputy MacDermot said that this was not a one-sided agreement; that we are getting substantial consideration for anything we gave. The Deputy carefully refrained from giving us any idea of what these substantial considerations are. There were no substantial considerations and I venture to say that Deputy MacDermot knows that as well as any other Deputy.
We had the Minister for Industry and Commerce in his usual form. Everybody can admire the Minister for Industry and Commerce as a fighter. He does his best to put a face upon a very bad case. If he has a very bad case he does his best to sustain a simulated sense of the indignation to which he is roused by the destructive criticism of the Opposition. I do not think there is any man in Irish public life who has so completely divorced himself from any contact with truth in debate in the House as much as that particular Minister. I am sorry owing to your suggestion, Sir, that I am prevented from going into many other matters with which I would like to deal. We had a typical speech from Deputy Davin. In his usual whirlwind fashion he made charges all round and got himself into a huge question mark, by hurling queries of all sorts at the Opposition. Of course, there was no question to the President, upon whom responsibility rests for having a policy to settle this matter; who is in his position to-day because he, by whatever means you like, convinced the people of this country that his policy and that of his Party were infinitely superior to the policy of their predecessors, and that they could therefore make a much better settlement. Now, they are so far reduced by the challenge from this side of the House that they want us to lift not only the country but the Fianna Fáil Party out of the mess they are in. Deputy Davin stated that if Deputies were to discuss this matter in a fair and impartial way they should be provided with proper information in the official way. Deputy Davin, not having been provided with proper information in the official way that would enable him to discuss the matter in a fair and impartial way, immediately proceeded to say that he was 100 per cent. in favour of the Bill. Speaking in the full depth of his ignorance, he told us that it was a much better settlement than the coal-cattle pact of last year.
I can only come to the charitable conclusion that it was lack of essential information was responsible for Deputy Norton's display in the House to-night. Knowing nothing about the Bill, nothing about the pact, and having no proper information or official facts before them, yet these Deputies are prepared to swallow everything. So much for the consideration that was given to the Bill in this House.
Comment on this
I would like to approach this matter from a different point of view to other Deputies. I followed the debate very closely and, naturally, was very much interested in Deputy Cosgrave's speech when moving the amendment. What struck me as remarkable and as peculiar was the phraseology of the amendment, particularly the last two or three lines of it.
...Until the Executive Council has given the Dáil an assurance that the Executive Council will now take steps to negotiate forthwith a comprehensive settlement of the matters at issue between the Irish and British Governments.
Until that assurance was given the Deputy asked that the Bill should not be given a Second Reading. The Minister for Industry and Commerce put some queries to Deputy Cosgrave, as to what might be construed as proper matters to be included in a wide comprehensive settlement. Amongst other things the Minister asked Deputy Cosgrave if Partition might be included and the reply was: "Yes, Partition as well." That is reported in the newspapers to-day. In a sense I was glad to hear Deputy Cosgrave saying that in any wide comprehensive settlement that hereafter might be made with the English, the fatal work done as regards Partition might, to some extent, be undone, and that he was willing to include Partition. I do not know how far political assurance can go, or how far political audacity can go. I have often heard people making speeches which they repudiated the following day, and in a matter of this kind, with a history such as Deputy Cosgrave has, when he comes along in the year 1936 and says to the Minister for Industry and Commerce that he was prepared now to put in Partition as one of the issues that could be included in that wide comprehensive settlement, one must regard it as a similar repudiation. Unfortunately for Deputy Cosgrave, the English always had—I believe it is a trait in their character—an extraordinary way of dealing with people with whom they had negotiations. Particularly, they had this peculiarity; that, if they happened to "best" an Irishman in negotiations, whether it was due to their cleverness or his own stupidity, they always published the fact as a proof of their cleverness. Whether it was due to their cleverness or to our stupidity I cannot say. But I find that, according to the Belfast Telegraph of November 30th, 1934, there are extracts given from the Daily Telegraph, dealing with the life of the late Lord Birkenhead, written by his son. There it is said that, in December, 1925, Mr. Baldwin had to make a compromise with Mr. Cosgrave, under which, in return for monetary concessions, the Free State accepted the existing boundary as final. Deputy Cosgrave now wants that to be included in a comprehensive scheme for adjusting our differences as between Ireland and England. However, that is not the worst of it. Deputy Cosgrave went a little bit further than that, and this is why I am so amazed that he should advert to this aspect of the question at all. In December, 1934——
Comment on this
The remark made by the Leader of the Opposition was in reply to a query put to him across the House. That remark comprised just one sentence. The Deputy, having dealt with that matter, should proceed to the question before the House. The question of Partition, per se, is not under consideration.
Comment on this
The comprehensiveness of this amendment, Sir, was dealt with last night by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and, in reply, Deputy Cosgrave said that the question of Partition was to be included. It is in connection with Deputy Cosgrave's record as regards Partition and in connection with what he did in the past that I am giving these quotations.
Comment on this
On a point of order, Sir. While I cannot understand some of Deputy Donnelly's references, surely the reference to what some people said some years ago cannot be germane to this discussion?
Comment on this
I wish to say, Sir, that if the President of an Executive Council, before this Government came into office, went to another Government—the Government of another country—with an agreement that he said should be regarded as final, surely I am entitled to ask why that question should be re-opened now by the very people who then said it was a final settlement? Surely I am entitled to refer to the occasion on which that question was re-opened by the gentleman to whom I refer?
Comment on this
I am referring to the settlement which Deputy Cosgrave made where Lord Birkenhead said that "if the Dáil was to be persuaded to acquiesce in the Boundary——"
Comment on this
The Chair has told the Deputy that a debate on Partition is not in order; neither is the history of the attitude of the Leader of the Opposition towards Partition. A passing reference was made to it; the Deputy has replied and must get away from that subject.
Comment on this
Well, Sir, I think that last Sunday week, in the town of Fermoy, Deputy Cosgrave said that if this was all that could be done the present Government should get out. He obviously thinks that, if the present Government should get out, or should be put out, he could make a better settlement than the one that has been made by this Government. I suggest that, after all his efforts in the past, he has been driven into a different sense and a different mentality than that which he used to hold when he believes that, in the comprehensiveness of this amendment, he can get back again on the political issues. The President said to-day that the British always wanted to differentiate between the political and economic issues. One of the speeches delivered by Mr. Chamberlain in a debate on the land annuities in the English House of Commons was as follows:—
"Opposition speeches had not made any distinction between one kind of debt and another, because they thought the default of the Irish Free State was exactly the same as the default of Germany or the technical default on war debts of this country to America."
The words I am quoting are taken from the Daily Telegraph of 19th June, 1934. Mr. Chamberlain continues:
"As a matter of fact, this dispute between the Irish Free State and ourselves, although in its present acute form it arose on account of the withholding of the annuities, was really an incident in a political dispute. It must not be supposed that a political dispute could be settled by turning the other check and saying: `Do anything you like; we shall always give way to you.' If we were prepared to concede that the Irish Free State should become a republic, and that certain other breaches of the Treaties between the two countries might take place, then that might settle the dispute."
That was published in the Press, and, I believe, published in the public records of this House, and still we are told by Deputy O'Higgins that the President has blasted the bridge over which a breach could be made, and still the pretence is made that the President introduced political issues into the matter when the delegates came home from Ottawa.
There is another matter to which I should like to refer. Deputy Brennan spoke here this afternoon. He is a Deputy for whom I have a very great regard. I am sorry, however, that he should have done one thing that he did this afternoon. I have been here since the last general election, and this is the first time—and I hope I will be here as long again before I see such a thing happen—that I have known of Deputies to make political propaganda out of pastorals issued by the Bishops. I sincerely hope that, in documents of that kind, the propaganda department of the Party opposite will not in future have Deputies like Deputy Brennan reading out Bishops' pastorals in support of the kind of thing Deputy Brennan said to-day.
Comment on this
Another statement made by Deputy Cosgrave in his introductory speech was that this Government, since it came into office, had destroyed a system of agricultural economy which took a long, long time to build up. I admit it took a long time to build up, but the people who were responsible for building up this system of agricultural economy that was in operation when we came into office made a good job of building it up, because, when they started it, about 90 years ago, there were 9,000,000 people in this country, and when they had established that system of economy of which Deputy Cosgrave is so proud, there were 4,250,000. The population of quadrupeds in Ireland to-day amounts to something around 4,818,000. The human population used to be double the animal population but it is the reverse now.
Comment on this
In what condition was the unfortunate human population when there were 9,000,000 here?
Comment on this
Deputy MacDermot can get an answer which he will not, I am sure, dispute. I went to considerable trouble to inform myself on that aspect. There was a commission appointed by the British Government to go into the question of agriculture here at one time. It was called the Devon Commission and Deputy MacDermot can get its report. In order that they might destroy the system of economy that existed and blot out the small farmer, that Commission came to the conclusion that farming in Ireland was carried on too small a scale and that the best thing to do was to amalgamate the small farms and blot out the human population. That was done and the small farms were put together. They are the ranches of to-day and that is what Deputy Cosgrave deplores is going out of existence. Deputy MacDermot can verify my statement. He has only to ask for the report in the Library, and, if I am wrong, I will publicly apologise.
Comment on this
What the Deputy says has no bearing on the question I put to him, which is: Is he aware of the misery and appalling poverty that was spread throughout the country when that large population was here?
Comment on this
I am aware of this, that the greatest export of food, while the population were starving, which took place in the past took place in 1847, the year in which something like 1,000,000 people died of hunger. What is the use of Deputy MacDermot trying to convey that the system of economy in operation when we came into office was the best that could have applied to this country? It was the best that could have applied at the moment. This has caused sudden inconvenience to a number of people. It has come as a sharp jolt or shock to certain sections of the population and I am not such a fool as to get up and say that there have not been inconveniences as a result of what is taking place. We are trying to make things easier for the farming community.
Comment on this
Will the Deputy allow me to interrupt once more? I am not defending any particular system of economy. I am merely suggesting that the time has come when we should stop referring to the period when there were 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 people in the country as if it was a sort of Golden Age.
Comment on this
I think it was the bitter knowledge of the fact that half of the population in this country were blotted out of existence that brought Parnell into public life. I have seen in some of the papers recently—and I think Deputy MacDermot must have felt a little proud—where Deputy MacDermot was referred to as the Parnell of 1935. I do not think, judging from his remarks to-night, that the same spirit actuated Deputy MacDermot in entering Irish politics as actuated Parnell when he came in to rescue the people from a system of agricultural economy that made them serfs and paupers.
Comment on this
Not at all; that is where the Deputy is wrong. Deputy O'Leary, I understand, missed his train home to Cork the last time he was going home, and he will always miss his train if he gets these ideas.
Comment on this
I suggest that the Deputy should come down and tell us about the advantages or disadvantages of the Coal-Cattle pact.
Comment on this
We have tried in making this pact, to make things easier for the ordinary farmer. I can quite understand the Opposition attitude to it. It will be much more difficult now for the Opposition to go down the country and to say "The country is down-and-out". The more pacts that are made by the present Government, the more difficult it will be for them to say to the people "No effort is being made for you; you are going to starve and you are down-and-out." The most extraordinary remedy I ever heard for the position of farmers who are in a bad way—and it is possible that many of them are—is to say to such a man "There is no hope for you." That is no good and it is no palliative. What a farmer, or any person in a tight corner at any time, wants is encouragement. He wants some type of redress and some effort by people in a position to make it to make his lot in life a little less hard than it otherwise might be.
Comment on this
If Deputy Belton draws me on to that track about sheriffs and bailiffs, I might have to go back and reply to him. I do not want to go outside the terms of this amendment.
Comment on this
I can quite understand Deputy Belton's interruptions. There is a wonderful similarity in the phraseology of Deputy Cosgrave's amendment and his. Deputy Cosgrave wants a wide comprehensive settlement and Deputy Belton, in clause (c) of his amendment, wants the Bill rejected because it does not provide a comprehensive settlement of the dispute. There must have been some kind of collusion in the drafting of these two amendments judging from Deputy Belton's interruptions, and I think Deputy Cosgrave and he must have consulted each other before they were tabled.
Comment on this
It is not a bit difficult for me to tackle them. I give this advice to Deputy Belton—he has often taken my advice—the pages of this country's history are studded with instances of this type.
Comment on this
That is true. There have been defeats as well as victories on the pages of this country's history.
Comment on this
But all those items have been moulded together to form the history of the country and the long-drawn out struggle that has taken place between the two countries is composed of items and incidents of this kind.
Comment on this
Not at all. It is a better face than Deputy Cosgrave put on the question of Partition. I would say to Deputy Belton that he is treading on very dangerous ground, because if he keeps going on and once more falls in behind the leadership of Deputy Cosgrave he might be selected to go across and make one of these comprehensive settlements, and come back, as Deputy Cosgrave did, with an honorary degree from Cambridge University, and he might also get the freedom of the City of Manchester beside the monument to Allen, Larkin and O'Brien. Is that not a happy future? Anything at all is possible with Deputy Belton in the mood he is in at the moment. If anybody had come out of this House last night and had told me that Deputy Belton, one of the most famous politicians in the country, a good Irishman, a man who took part in the Rebellion of 1916 and who served his country well—I give him all that credit—had referred, in his speech proposing his amendment, to the dictum of Fintan Lalor, that the land of this country belonged to the people of this country, as so much rigmarole, I would laugh at the man who told me. I defy Deputy Belton to go to a meeting anywhere in North City and tell his constituents that the words of Fintan Lalor upon which the land movement, the Land League and practically every other national organisation were founded are so much rigmarole.
Comment on this
On a point of correction. I asked where the gospel of Fintan Lalor was enshrined in this coal-cattle pact.
Comment on this
I was surprised when I heard that. Deputy Belton referred to an interview given by the President to the Daily Telegraph, in which he mentioned the unity of Ireland, which might come within a comprehensive scheme, as so much tomfoolery. Is the unity of Ireland tomfoolery? I put that to Deputy Belton.
Comment on this
If such a state of affairs is brought about as will enable us to regain the lost province, will it be tomfoolery?
Comment on this
Deputy Cosgrave says that it is in his comprehensive scheme, and, if you were talking to him, he must have informed you.
Comment on this
Let us suppose that the economic war was settled overnight and that no pacts were necessary. I put this to people who thought like Deputy Cosgrave and still think like him. I remember referring in this House, when talking about the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland, to a report by Michael Collins that from the time of the Union to the outbreak of the Great War Great Britain had robbed this country of something like £400,000,000. During the last 14 years, as a result of what the British Government have done to us, the people with whom we are negotiating——
Comment on this
Deputy Belton is good at figures, and Deputy O'Higgins said last night that he thought, above all things, we should have some mathematics with regard to this pact. While Deputy Belton is shouting about this £4 15s. per beast——
Comment on this
I am assuming that the economic war has disappeared overnight and that no pacts are necessary.
Comment on this
The Chair is assuming that the debate on all stages of this Bill will conclude to-night.
Comment on this
If these gentlemen would cease interrupting, I should not be very long. I should like to hear Deputy Belton apply himself to this problem. During the last 14 years, the 26 counties of Southern Ireland have paid £360,000,000 in taxation. The figure for Northern Ireland was £11,000,000 per year which, for 14 years, amounts to £154,000,000. In the last 14 years, as the result of negotiations by weaklings, as a result of negotiations by people who had not the courage to stand up at all times as President de Valera has done, £518,000,000 was collected and spent in taxation in this little island of ours. And Deputy Belton is talking about this £4 5s. per bullock, which seems to have got on his brain.
Comment on this
Do not make any mistake about this: I appreciate the difficulties of the Executive Council. I appreciated the difficulties of Deputy Cosgrave in 1925. I was one of those members of the Republican Party at that time who did. President de Valera at that time did not go around the country stabbing Deputy Cosgrave in the back. We made an offer—I was one of the members responsible—that if Deputy Cosgrave at that time stood for whatever rights this country had under the Treaty, we would stand with him. We had the first pact welcomed. The second pact, according to Deputy Belton, is no good. According to Deputy Cosgrave, it does not go far enough. I wonder what the President could do which would satisfy mentalities like those? When I got up to speak to-night, I made one resolve— that I would avoid recrimination. I trust that recrimination will be eradicated from our discussions. We want everybody's help in this matter. If the scheme for further settlement is to be comprehensive or successful, not only on economic issues but on major political issues, recrimination is one of the things that we must avoid. I do not intend to indulge in anything of the sort and never did to any extent. I know that Deputy Belton now regrets to a great extent his reference to the Fintan Lalor dictum and to the President's interview with the Daily Telegraph. Perhaps they were hastily-spoken words.
Comment on this
Still it is something. Would Deputy Belton undertake to go across to London and get anything better?
Comment on this
Deputy Belton says that this pact does not provide a comprehensive settlement of the dispute between this country and Great Britain. I am asking a natural question. What is a comprehensive settlement? Deputy Cosgrave did not tell us.
Comment on this
You hauled down the flag. Settle the economic war. You hauled down the flag and rolled it in the gutter.
Comment on this
"Settle the economic war." Settle it on the best terms you can get. Go back to the old system of agricultural economy. Go back to the ranches and to the bullocks.
Comment on this
That is the settlement, boiled down. There are no farmers in this country complaining about this pact or the previous pact. When I use the word "farmer" I do so advisedly. A number of cattle dealers are kicking up a row, but no farmers. Deputy Belton is one of the wise men of the agricultural community who got out of cattle and went into tillage farming beside a big city.
Comment on this
If all that we hear regarding the state of affairs under the régime of the last Government be true, I wonder why the Agricultural Credit Corporation was set up. Perhaps Deputy Roddy or Deputy McMenamin could inform us as to that. It was set up to provide money on easy terms so as to tide farmers over their difficulties during the régime of the late Government. I do not think I have much more to say on this subject. Perhaps I have gone on a bit longer than I had intended. I do not want to monopolise the time too much. I will say, in conclusion, that I am voting for the pact, and I will also say that I still have confidence in the Executive Council. I differ from Deputy Belton in this respect, that when I give my loyalty and allegiance to a leader I do not allow myself to be turned into a battledore and shuttlecock, shifting from Party to Party as the spirit moves me.
Comment on this
Order! There is one motion before the House, and to that motion there are two amendments. Deputy Roddy.
Comment on this
The Minister for Education charged the Opposition with making no case for the amendment on the Order Paper in the name of Deputy Cosgrave. Speakers on the Opposition side advanced very strong and cogent arguments in support of that amendment, but the most convincing and the most overwhelming argument that could be advanced in support of it is the condition to which this Government has reduced the farmers. The amendment speaks for itself. There is nobody who is acquainted with the agricultural conditions in this country who does not realise that the policy of this Government in so far as it affects agricultural conditions, is the strongest and most convincing argument that could be advanced in support of the amendment.
The President wandered over his favourite hunting ground to-day. He gave us the history of the last ten years and he dealt with all sorts of matters that have absolutely no bearing on the Bill before the House or on either of the amendments. I think the President of the Executive Council ought to be in a position to know what is happening in the country and to know the conditions existing amongst the agricultural community. I thought that he would have held out some hope to our agriculturists or at least that he would have made some reference to the terrible plight in which his policy has placed them. But, no. The impression one gleaned from his speech is this, that so long as he is head of the Government in this country there will be no settlement with Great Britain and the case either for or against the payment of the land annuities will never be settled because, so far as I could infer, President de Valera will not be satisfied with any tribunal that might be appointed by people living on earth, or by anybody in heaven either.
We have to face realities. The members of the Government who have spoken on this Bill have steered clear of the main issues implied by this pact or arrangement recently entered into. They have made practically no references to the nature of the pact or what it really implies. They have dealt with all sorts of side issues and, so far as I can understand from the tactics pursued by them, their object was to keep the discussion completely away from the arrangement we are supposed to be dealing with. It is obvious to me that no Minister on the Government Benches is satisfied with that pact. It is perfectly clear from the half-hearted manner in which the Minister for Agriculture and the Minister for Industry and Commerce spoke in support of it yesterday afternoon that they are thoroughly disgusted with it. I believe there is not a member of the Government Party who is not disgusted with it. They certainly gave the country, by implication, clearly and definitely to understand that they would on this occasion secure a much better settlement, a much better pact than that which is before the House.
I will try to some extent to bring this discussion back to realities. I will remind the President and every member of the Government Party that what the agriculturist in this country wants at the moment is the removal of all barriers against the export of his live stock. No expedients, no pacts, no arrangements, no subsidies, and no bounties devised or entered into by the Government can ever ensure to the agriculturist a chance of making any sort of a decent livelihood until he has the right to export freely his live stock to the English market. This agreement apparently has been hammered out with such hard bargaining that the motto of quid pro quo, as one newspaper termed it, can very well be applied to it. The British Treasury officials apparently saw to it that when the terms of the pact were being arranged it was ensured that the moneys withheld by our Government would be paid in full to the British Government.
I agree with the case made by Deputy Belton yesterday. We have before us a Bill for the purpose of implementing the terms of the pact. The pact arrangement itself provides that this country shall continue to pay duties on the export of live stock to the British market. When the terms of the pact were being arranged it was clearly and definitely understood by the civil servants who acted on behalf of the British Government that when these duties were collected the moneys realised by the collection would be applied to the one specific purpose of paying the annuities withheld by the present Government, and paying other moneys due to the British Government. No matter what the President may say or what the Minister for Industry and Commerce or the Minister for Finance may say, the annuities are being paid and they know they are being paid. If the annuities have to be paid, why not pay them straightforwardly instead of by duties in this fashion.
The fact that the bounties on cattle and horses are withdrawn under this pact means that the practical value of the British concessions have either been completely nullified or very seriously reduced. In the case of old cattle, classed as mincers, the withdrawal of the bounty actually offsets the reduction in Customs duty and thus the actual position remains very much the same as before. There are many small farmers, not merely in the West, but in other parts of the country who are not able to finish off cattle at the age of two years so as to make them suitable for the British market. They are forced by virtue of circumstances to hold the cattle until they are practically four years old. These farmers are forced to bring their cattle around from fair to fair. In the past, the big inducement to a jobber to buy the cattle was the fact that he was able to get a bounty of £1 on each beast. That bounty has now been withdrawn, with the result that these unfortunate farmers have been placed under a considerable handicap. In many cases they may be forced to dispose of their beasts at a ridiculously low price. In many instances at fairs at the present time you can get as good a price for a year-old beast as for the class of beast I mentioned.
The real and practical advantages of the new arrangements in this pact really go to the British miners. The Minister for Finance withdrew the duty of 5/- per ton on English coal. The withdrawal of that duty primarily benefits the people of the City of Dublin and other Irish towns. The amount of that duty was practically £500,000. As against that, the Government now proposes to withdraw bounties amounting to approximately £450,000 so that one amount balances the other, and the unfortunate farmers of the country, as a whole, are made to pay very substantially for the coal requirements of the country. I agree that the Minister in withdrawing the duty on coal did the proper thing, but the point I want to make is that because of the withdrawal of the bounties in respect of the export of cattle, 75 per cent. at least of the farmers of this country to-day who are dependent upon the production of live stock and live-stock products, are forced, by virtue of the arrangement, to bear the full brunt of the economic war without any prospect or hope of any remission whatever.
I would ask the Minister to bear this further fact in mind. There are many small farmers who are living on very small holdings in many parts of the country in the South and West who must cut and depend largely on turf for both fuel and income, whose land is of very poor quality, and who are particularly hard hit by this arrangement. They are forced not alone to pay whatever taxation may be involved in the new arrangement made by the Minister, but they are also forced to contribute a certain amount towards the purchase of coal by their better-off neighbours. Professor Joseph Johnston some time ago pointed out that the purchasing power of the farming community in this country had been reduced by £20,000,000. If the Government persist in their present policy of gradually reducing the farmer's income, I ask you to what extent will the farmer's income be reduced in the course of another 12 months or another two years? Surely to goodness the President and the Minister for Finance must realise if there is to be any chance at all of the farming industry surviving, if there is to be any chance at all of the people engaged in the industry making a decent livelihood, the conditions under which the industry is carried on must be placed in such a secure position that the farmers will be able to estimate the profits that they are likely to make out of it, in the hope of arranging for its fuller and better development.
Unless the position of agriculture— and the success of the whole State depends upon the position in which the farmers find themselves—is placed on such a secure foundation as will ensure for them at least a chance of making a reasonably comfortable livelihood, then it is inevitable that the efforts the Government are making in other directions to industrialise the country will fail. If the farmer's income, under the policy pursued by the Government up to the present, has depreciated to the extent of £20,000,000 in a period of three years, how much, I ask, will the purchasing power of the farming community depreciate if the Government persist indefinitely in that policy? Surely it is time for the Government to face up to realities. I submit that this pact, while it does confer certain slight advantages in two or three different directions, is of no practical value to the people engaged in the main industry of this country at all. If it is the policy of the Government whilst it is in office to continue year after year to make pacts of this description, then I submit they cannot hope to make any impression on the unfortunate condition in which agriculturists find themselves at the moment.
Comment on this
We have had a lot of figures given here to-day in connection with farmers' production and agricultural prices. Deputy Roddy just now alluded to the position of the small farmers, and we had some references to the "comprehensive settlement" that is going to be made. I should just like, in the short time at my disposal, to give a few figures in relation to the position of the small farmers of whom the Deputy spoke. In 1928 the small farmer got for butter exported the sum of £4,495,885, and in 1931, three years later, he got only £2,071,291. Although he sent more butter in 1931 than he sent in 1929, he got £2,500,000 less for his butter in 1931. In 1928 he received for bacon exported to the British market £4,362,112, and in 1931 £2,200,000 for the same bacon.
Comment on this
Follow it up. It was probably like your rhubarb—sour. In 1928, in respect of eggs exported, the farmer received £2,902,000, and in 1931, £2,030,000, showing a reduction of £872,000 in the price of his eggs in that market. The price received in respect of the total exports of beef, butter, eggs, bacon, etc., in 1928 was £14,948,255, while in 1931 the price received in respect of similar exports totalled only £8,858,320. That shows a reduction in the price of our agricultural exports of £6,085,935 in a period of four years—a reduction of 40 per cent., although there was then no economic war. Deputy Cosgrave knew all that when he was President of the Executive Council in 1931. In addition to the price which the farmers were getting, showing a reduction amounting to £6,000,000 within four years on their agricultural produce, they were paying the full annuities to Britain, for whom Deputy Cosgrave was collecting them. With the full knowledge of these facts—and I want you to realise the nature of the "comprehensive settlement"—Deputy Cosgrave went over to England in 1931 as President, and appealed to the Government there for Heaven's sake to give him a moratorium on £250,000 of the annuities. They told him to go back and pay it. This is the man who is going to make a "comprehensive settlement."
Comment on this
It will be as comprehensive as your pact, at any rate. We got a majority of the people of the country in 1932 to support us in withholding the annuities. We went before them again in 1933, when there was a 40 per cent. tariff on cattle exported, and we got a bigger majority still. We went before them again, on a selected franchise, if you like, in 1934, and got another majority. That is the position. Knowing that, what is the attitude of Deputies opposite?
Comment on this
Let the Deputy shut up. On the very night that Deputy Norton, leader of the Labour Party, endeavoured to pave the way for negotiations on this matter, Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, as reported in the Official Debates, 14th July, 1932, column 1034, Volume 43, said:
"I suggest that the Executive Council should take the course of saying to the British Government: We will hand you over this half-year's annuities. We will hand them over to you, reserving the status quo, but we will hand over without prejudice, and if the results of the arbitration are such that you are entitled to retain them, you will retain them; but if the results of the arbitration are such that we are entitled to get them back, we will get them back.”
That was the contribution by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney towards a settlement. President de Valera went over the following day, and what did Lord Hailsham say to him? He said: "Hand over the year's annuities before there can be any negotiations." Those who were out shouting about tariffs on cattle in the 1932 Elections were, also, the very people trying to make bullets for the British Government to use in the fight. If the representatives of the people here in this Dáil stood together in this economic war it would not have lasted two months. How could anyone expect, if I had a quarrel with Deputy Donnelly in the morning, and if he had a fisticuff match, and I saw his colleague coming behind and giving him a dig in the back that he would win. That is our present position. That is the position which we have had to face up to for the past four years while we have in Opposition people worse than the carrion crows. There is only one cure for all this, and that is to take these people out before the country and let the people finish them. Let them send them back, fewer in number and more miserable than they are at present, if that could be possible.
Then we are asked why not make a comprehensive settlement. That is the contribution made up to the present by people who are endeavouring to prevent the payment of the annuities, to upset local authorities and to render the working of every arm of government impossible. That is the position Deputies opposite take up, and then they ask why not make a comprehensive settlement. We will settle this question, and we will settle it without the Opposition. It will be a settlement in which no principle will be given away.
Comment on this
We will do the job which the people of this country, in three successive elections, ordered us to do, namely, to hold on to the annuities and to prevent the robbery of the people. Now just one other word. We heard a lot about the cattle pact. Unfortunately owing to the agricultural policy of our predecessors we have a surplus of cattle which was proved even to-day in the Dublin Cattle Market. The prices proved there was a surplus.
Comment on this
Every jack-in-the-box holding for the last four months, is rushing in with his cattle. The only way we can secure a proper cattle population basis is that everything must be rationalised.
Comment on this
It was an awful pity they did not shoot you off, too. I do not want to say any more, and shall make way for other Deputies who are anxious to speak.
Comment on this
I would not merely like, but I would thoroughly enjoy, answering Deputy Corry's alleged points which he has just put to the House; but, in view of the fact that there are some other speakers better entitled to speak in this debate than I am, and that there are only about 30 minutes left, I must deny myself the luxury of replying to the Deputy. I should like to tell him, in passing, that we were very glad to hear what he said, that he and his Party will settle this matter. That is what we are asking them to do.
Comment on this
I should like also to follow Deputy Donnelly, especially in his panegyric of Parnell and others who established the rights of the tenant farmers to the land. I should like to tell him of the way Parnell and his successors pledged the credit of the country that the Irish farmers would pay their annuities, and to remind him that it remained for the first Irish Fianna Fáil Party to teach them to default in their payments. Time does not permit me to go further into this matter, but I have a duty to perform before I sit down.
A serious charge was made by the President of the Executive Council against the Leader of the Opposition. The charge in itself is so ridiculous as to be nonsensical, were it not that it was given further currency by the Leader of the Executive Council, who repeated and reiterated his charge about the so-called secret agreement. The President repeated the charge that when Deputy Cosgrave was President of the Executive Council he kept from the Irish people and their representatives the fact that the agreement of 1923, dealing with the annuities, had been made. At the conclusion of the President's speech Deputy Cosgrave repudiated that allegation, but under the ruling of the Ceann Comhairle he was unable further to develop that repudiation. On Deputy Cosgrave's behalf, I wish to do so to-night in the few moments that remain to me. The charge, repeated, not for the first time, by the President, is that Deputy Cosgrave made some sort of shameful agreement in 1923, so shameful that he and his colleagues were unable to tell the Irish people what it was all about. So far from being shameful, so far from being apologetic for that agreement, Deputy Cosgrave and his colleagues have shown over and over again that that agreement was entered into for the benefit of the Irish people. There was nothing shameful about it, nor was it in any way a secret agreement.
Comment on this
The Deputy will not draw me. I have ten minutes in which to do a job, and I am going to do it. The allegation by the President is that it is a secret agreement, kept secret deliberately by the present Leader of the Opposition when he was President of the Executive Council. I have dealt with two points. Let me deal with the third point. Implicit in the President's charge is the allegation that the liability of the Irish farmer tenant purchasers to pay their annuities to the stockholders who advanced that money for the purchase of their land rests upon this secret agreement. It does not rest upon this secret agreement, nor upon any other agreement, whether made by the President of the Executive Council or anybody else. I hope to be able to deal with that before I sit down. Let me deal with the question as to whether this agreement was ever brought before the notice of the Dáil, or before the notice of the people of this country. On 26th June, 1923, Deputy Cosgrave, who was then President, introduced into the Dáil— from which the present Government were absent at that time waging war on the elected representatives of the people, and that is why this agreement was secret—an Estimate for the sum of £3,133,575. For what purpose? To pay the land annuities. I have not time to read it all; you can read it at column 2409, Volume 3 of the Dáil Debates of 1923. When introducing that Estimate Deputy Cosgrave, then President of the Executive Council, explained that the land annuities which were being collected from the tenant farmers were being sent over for the purpose of being distributed, through the machinery of the British National Debt Commissioners, to the people who had lent the tenant farmers the money. He told the House it was being done, and explained it in answer to Mr. O'Connell and Mr. Wilson, then Leader of the Farmers' Party.
At column 2498, Deputy Cosgrave, then President, said:—
"The Estimate deals with purchase annuities payable under the existing Land Acts."
Is not that clear? He goes on:
"The law provides that these annuities are to be collected henceforth by the Government of Saorstát Eireann, and that the proper amounts should, in due course, be paid into either of the funds out of which dividends and sinking fund payments in connection with the various land stocks are paid."
Is there any secrecy about that? He continues:
"These stocks will continue to be managed by the British Government."
Is there any secrecy about that statement? Is there any secrecy about saying that to the Dáil, from which at that time the members of the present Government were absent, waging war on the elected representatives of the people? Deputy Cosgrave continued:
"But it is part of the present arrangement"
—that secret agreement which we hear so much about—
"for the adjustment of past land purchase transactions that we should pay over the annuities and leave it to the British Government to pay the interest to the stockholders."
You can finish the rest there if you are honest enough to read what Deputy Cosgrave said then to the people's representatives who were here at that time. At column 2499, Deputy Cosgrave went on to deal with "the recent negotiations which took place in England." He said:
"The actual sum due to pay the annuities is much greater than the sum which comes in. At the recent negotiations which took place in England we came to a provisional arrangement which binds us. ..."
There is your secret agreement for you; there is the secrecy connected with that transaction.
In July of the following year Deputy Cosgrave again referred to the matter. If you are honest enough and decent enough to read it—it has been referred to often enough by Deputy Cosgrave in his public speeches, but that does not satisfy even the President of the Executive Council—you will find it at column 1143, Volume 4, of the Dáil Debates; there he again refers to the matter, draws attention to this fact— a fact which Deputies will have to know and which the people of the country will have to realise—that, under this alleged secret agreement, so far from there being any liability imposed on the tenant farmers or on the Irish taxpayer which did not exist before, there was a liability of nearly £1,000,000 per annum placed on the British taxpayer under that so-called secret agreement, which they would not have had to pay if that so-called secret agreement had not been made. So much for the shameful part of that agreement.
I have just told the House that an Estimate was introduced for the payment of the annuities. That Estimate, in accordance with the procedure of the House, had to be made law. It was made law. It was made law by the Appropriation Act of 1923, and that Appropriation Act came four times before the Dáil and four times before the Seanad; so that nine times here in public, in the absence of the Fianna Fáil Party, they were told about those arrangements which had been made by Deputy Cosgrave; nine times they were told that the annuities were going to be paid to England, and we are told here by the President of the Executive Council that Deputy Cosgrave kept that agreement secret. If you are honest, read item 8 of the Schedule to that Act; read item 15 of the Schedule to that Act and read item 25 of the Schedule to that Act. If you are not honest you will not read it, but if you do read it you will find there set out specifically every item of money that had to be paid under that so-called secret agreement. And that was not enough. The Land Act of 1933 was passed in this House, and four times—not counting the First Stage—that Act went through the House, and in four stages it went through the Seanad. Section 12 of that Act, which was so much canvassed subsequently, was passed by this House; it was canvassed four times here on four stages, and four times in the Seanad. So much for the lack of publicity given to those arrangements, so much for the liability to pay.
I want to make a last point on the question as to whether this agreement imposes our liability to pay or not. Deputy Cosgrave, in answer to articles in the Irish Press over Christmas, has completely repudiated and refuted every such argument. Article 42 of the heads of working agreement made by General Michael Collins in 1922 recognises the liability of the Irish tenant farmers to pay those annuities, and agreed pending capitalisation——
Comment on this
Article 42 of the heads of working agreement which was made by General Michael Collins in 1922 provided for no liability, because the liability existed apart from that, but for the recognition of the liability of this country to transfer the annuities for payment of dividend and sinking fund on guaranteed land stock, pending capitalisation and pending agreement, if such agreement could be come to, for settlement of a lump sum in discharge of the liability to pay those annuities. That is what General Collins agreed to in 1922. He did not agree to the liability to pay the dividends and sinking fund. That existed in accordance with the law of the Irish Free State—an Irish law, not a British or any other law. There was imposed on us by law—and by international law, not by British law—the liability to continue to transfer the annuities, when they were collected, to their proper source, to discharge the dividend and sinking fund. It is not under Article 42 of the heads of working agreement that the liability exists. It is not under this so-called secret agreement; it is under the Irish Land Purchase Acts that the liability is imposed on the tenant farmer for his annuity. That annuity is appropriated in discharge of sinking fund and interest on guaranteed land stock. That is where the liability arises.
How can you find out whether we are liable for annuities or not? The President said to-day that he will not have a Commonwealth court. He will not have a Commonwealth court and he will not have a court of The Hague.
Comment on this
Why will he not have a court of The Hague? Why will he not have an international court? Because he cannot square it. He has not got enough influence to induce the members of the court to decide in his favour. He wants a court that he can square. He has refused a Commonwealth court. He has refused the Permanent Court of International Justice, which the last Government, through Deputy McGilligan, on the part of this country, subscribed to without reservation. He has refused to let this dispute go before that court at The Hague. He has also refused to let the courts of this country decide this question.
Shortly before the election of 1933 a writ was issued against the Minister for Finance and the Attorney-General, and my name was to that writ. The object of that was to let the Irish courts decide the issue as to whether the Government were bound to pay the annuities or not. We never got the fiat of the Attorney-General. What we did get was the section of the No. 2 Act of 1933, the second Act they passed when they came back after the General Election of 1933. The Land Purchase Annuities Fund Act of 1933 was passed for the specific purpose of putting an end to that action which had been instituted. In face of that section and that Act it would be impossible to go on and get a decision of the Irish courts on this question. So that the Government have barred the Irish courts and the Commonwealth court and the international court, and all they want is a court they can square.
Comment on this
I understand there was an understanding arrived at outside the House that the Minister for Finance should be allowed to conclude the the debate at 9.30. Of course, the Chair is governed by Standing Orders and if arrangements made outside the House governing the proceedings here are not observed the Chair has no power to enforce them.
Comment on this
I am sorry that Deputy Costello has left the House. It is unusual for me to congratulate a member of the Opposition upon his speech, but I think we can all admit, however much we may differ in other respects from Deputy Costello, that he has proved himself to-night to be one of the ablest counsel for the defence that any of us have had the pleasure of listening to. It is unfortunate for his case, however, that to those of us who know the facts even such a display of forensic eloquence does not carry conviction. It is regrettable, too, that while we were listening to it we had not the advantage of having Deputy Costello's client in the House also. Of course, skilled lawyers on occasions keep their clients out of court. There is a temptation sometimes to put them in the witness box and when a client on occasion goes into the witness box that is his undoing. It would have been Deputy Cosgrave's undoing if he had been here to-night to answer some questions which I should like to put to him.
This debate was turned on the issue of the 1923 agreement, the circumstances in which it was signed and the justification which there was for it. Deputy Cosgrave has recently endeavoured to justify that action, not only in the public Press, but here in the House, but he has not been candid with the people. This agreement of 1923, I say deliberately, came as a bolt from the blue to his colleagues in the Executive Council. It did not originate in a discussion as to whether we were responsible for the annuities accruing due from time to time in respect to the pre-1923 Land Acts. It did not originate in a discussion as to whether we were liable for the R.I.C. pensions or not, although they are also included in the agreement. It originated in the disavowal by the British Government of their liability to pay to the Irish railways moneys which were due to them under an Act passed by the British Parliament in 1920. In October, 1922, as our people will recollect, the railways here were in a perilous condition. It was feared that owing to the dislocation of traffic they would probably be compelled to close down. The then Provisional Government took the matter up with the British Government and pointed out that, according to their view of the position, large sums—I think £1,500,000—were due from the British Exchequer to the Irish railways and that these sums ought to be paid immediately.
At the same time, there was another issue alive between the Provisional Government and the British Government. I am speaking now from recollection, but that issue, I think, was as to the exact amount for which the Provisional Government was liable in respect of R.I.C. pensions. The Provisional Government, just then, was hard driven for funds. There was a question as to whether £800,000 should be paid to Great Britain in respect of the pensions of the former members of the R.I.C. The Irish Government wanted £1,500,000 from Great Britain to keep the railways going. The British Government said: "We want £800,000 from you in respect of these R.I.C. pensions." The Provisional Government pointed out that they had not the funds and were not likely to be in a position to pay. After some negotiation, the British Government said: "If you pay us £600,000 in respect of local loans and other liabilities we will lend you £800,000 to discharge your liability in respect of the R.I.C. pensions." Again I should like to say that I am speaking from memory and the figures may not be exactly correct, but that is the main trend of what happened at that time.
On 12th December, 1922, when these matters were still at issue, an invitation was received from the British Government to send representatives to London to discuss this and other matters. In a review of financial matters which were then outstanding it was pointed out that possibly this question of the land annuities might arise. I do say this, and I challenge Deputy Cosgrave to deny it, that some of the people who were best competent to advise him told him that there was no urgency about this matter of the land annuities and that no discussion should take place, either with the British Ministers or the British Treasury, until we had fully satisfied ourselves that we had any liability for this £135,000,000 of Irish land stock. That was represented to the then President Cosgrave on the 14th December, 1922. I cannot tell what happened subsequently.
Comment on this
Deputy MacEoin says I am chancing my arm. Deputy Cosgrave has a remedy. Let him put down a motion for a select committee to inquire into these matters. Let him do that and we will see how this 1923 agreement was signed; we will see what investigation took place to satisfy him, though some of his colleagues were sceptical at the time, that we were, in fact, liable for £135,000,000 worth of land stock. That is simple and easy. There is one man who can put the full facts before the people. There is one man in whose power it is to unlock the confidential files. There is one man who can come and ask for a select committee to inquire into this and put the documents before the people, and that man is Deputy Cosgrave. I cannot. In any event to discuss mainly this question as to whether Great Britain was liable to pay us £1,500,000 in respect of obligations to the Irish railways and to ascertain how far the then British Government were prepared to facilitate us in respect of minor commitments under the Treaty a delegation went to London. That delegation on the 12th February signed the "Secret Agreement."
It has been alleged by Deputy Costello now that there was no secrecy about this matter; that Deputy—then President—Cosgrave brought in a Supplementary Estimate which gave the fullest information possible to the House as to what had been done in London. Let us see exactly how this matter was brought to the notice of the Dáil. You will have observed that Deputy Costello adopted very selective tactics when reading from the Dáil Debates. He began at a place selected by himself and then ended at another portion selected by himself. Then he was good enough to say:
"If you want any more you can read it yourself."
Let us see how this matter was brought before the House, because it is a brilliant example of the typical Cosgrave manner of Parliamentary manoeuvre. When we were in opposition there was one thing we did acknowledge about the then President and that was that he was an astute parliamentarian. We said there was no person could manage the Dáil business with the same facility and with the same cleverness as Deputy Cosgrave. But I am afraid that that is Deputy Cosgrave's limitation. He is too clever to be at the same time intelligent, and often he is too astute to be entirely honest with the Dáil and with the people. The House was referred to column 2498. If the House had been referred to column 2494 it would have seen the prelude to this essay in Cosgrave parliamentarianism. In column 2494 there is a report of a debate upon the Finance Act for the year. President Cosgrave has moved an amendment granting exemption of income-tax to certain charities. It is important that we should bear that fact in mind and it is also important to bear in mind that Deputy Gerald Fitzgibbon, as he then was, has just pointed out that part of the amendment which Deputy Cosgrave had moved to introduce into the Finance Bill of the year had been embodied in the current British Finance Bill. Here is the background of this transaction: a perfectly innocuous amendment, one which would be welcomed by all sections of the House—to exempt certain charities from income-tax—is introduced into the Finance Bill. It is adopted unanimously. Nobody is taking any interest in the proceedings as very often happens on the Committee Stage of a Bill. There are three or four members sitting here, some of them possibly more or less somnolent. One, the Minister in charge of the Bill, is, however, wide awake; he has to get the Bill through. The Minister in charge of the Bill that day was President Cosgrave, and without difficulty he persuaded the House that the section ought to be inserted in the Bill. It is done in the following way:—President Cosgrave says:
"I move that the new section be inserted in the Bill.
Mr. Blythe: I second.
Comment on this
Is there anything to be deduced from President Cosgrave's statement except that one was a quid pro quo for the other?
"They have met us fairly in regard to that and now comes our responsibility. I am asking the Dáil to-day to take up a particular Estimate, the Land Purchase Annuities Estimate, and if I have permission to explain shortly the reason for taking this I think that Deputies will agree that it is necessary, and that any fault that there is in the matter of not having brought it on before is my own."
He signed the Agreement on 12th February, 1923, and he delayed in bringing the Estimate before the Dáil until the 26th June, the very last day of the session, and late in the evening of the very last day, and he goes on to say:
"It was understood in the Ministry of Finance that the Dáil was not adjourning this evening, that it would be continued during the week, and that it would be possible to introduce this Estimate after due notice."
Then President Cosgrave went on to say everything that Deputy Costello has just read for us—but he did not read this though the Minister for Education did:
"This Estimate is one which is concerned solely with accounting transactions, as to which no controversy can arise."
This Estimate is now put before the House as a proof that the "Secret Agreement" of 1923 with its terms were fully divulged to the Irish people. And how was it put before the House? It was put before the House merely as an accounting arrangement. What does an accounting arrangement mean? It means that you will keep your accounts and that I will keep my accounts during a provisional arrangement, and that when the whole transaction is to be completed and wound up, then the accounts will be balanced one against the other, and whosoever owes anything will pay it to whomsoever it is due. Is not that the meaning of an accounting transaction?
Comment on this
Would the Minister tell us something of the advantages or disadvantages of this pact?
Comment on this
Later on, in reply to a question by Deputy Wilson, President Cosgrave, as he then was, then said:
"At the recent negotiations which took place in England we came to a provisional arrangement which binds us, or in which we accepted liability for the payment of a certain sum pending a settlement regarding the major question. That sum in all amounts to"——
Not £3,100,000 for which a Supplementary Estimate was introduced. The sum which President Cosgrave led the House to believe under this provisional arrangement he was bound to pay was not £3,100,000, but in his own words it amounted "to about £160,000." We are now told that this agreement of 1923 was fully exposed to the Dáil and fully exposed to the people. I think that I cannot do better, in concluding the reading of these very interesting extracts from the Dáil Debates, than to refer to a little interchange which took place before the Estimate was agreed to Deputy Wilson said:
"In other words... it is deducted by the Minister for Finance from the payments to the local authorities so that we get it both ways."
President Cosgrave replied:—
"I suppose the Deputy will not deny that it is very hard to catch the farmers."
And here is a gem of real bucolic intelligence from Deputy M. Doyle:—
"You are catching them very well in this case, anyhow."
Comment on this
Deputy Doyle had a prophetic instinct. He knew exactly what was happening. Let us see now how far President Cosgrave went in his endeavours to keep the terms of this agreement from the Irish people. I say that the speech which he made on the 12th June, 1923, was carefully phrased so as to lead the Dáil to believe that only a provisional arrangement had been entered into, and that the Supplementary Estimate was only to give validity to a certain accounting transaction. We often bring Estimates before the Dáil merely to keep accounts right, and to satisfy the Comptroller and Auditor-General. There was an occasion upon which we brought in an Estimate for over £3,000,000 and not a penny piece of public money passed. It was merely to regularise a certain book-keeping position, and that is what is meant by an accounting transaction.
People who understood the position, or thought they understood the position, when they heard President Cosgrave say that this was merely an accounting transaction, did not for a moment believe that we were going to pay over £3,100,000. What President Cosgrave did wish them to believe, and did try to make them believe was that the utmost liability even under this provisional arrangement was for £160,000 a year. Now, if he was not concerned to give this impression of the terms of the secret agreement of 1923 to the Irish people, why was he concerned for the succeeding three years to keep from the people the exact text of the agreement? Here it is in black and white. Deputy Costello says that it has nothing to do with the payment of the land annuities. But the first Article of Part 1 states:—
"It is agreed that: The Free State Government undertake to pay at agreed intervals to the appropriate fund the full amount of the annuities accruing due from time to time, making themselves responsible for the actual collection from the tenant-purchaser."
If a man put before the Dáil a Supplementary Estimate on the 12th June, 1923, and said that it was only an accounting transaction and if he had nothing to conceal, why did he hold up the text of that article for over three years? Because the people would plainly see that there was more than an accounting transaction behind that particular Supplementary Estimate, and because the people would plainly see that this provisional arrangement involved them not in the payment, at the worst, of £160,000, but of a sum of £3,100,000. Can anybody deny, in face of the records, that every attempt was made by Deputy Cosgrave and the then Government to keep these facts from the Irish people? If anybody has any doubt about it, here is an extract from a letter which has been published and referred to before. The letter is dated the 17th July, 1925, and in it there is this passage:
"Mr. Blythe sees considerable objection from a political standpoint to publishing in extenso the documents setting forth the financial agreements of the 12th February, 1923.”
Was not that an attempt to keep something secret, and to withhold something from the Irish people? If Deputy MacEoin was a juryman, bound to do justice on oath, and if that document were put before him with the question: "Was there an attempt to keep this matter secret?" what answer could he give except "Yes," on the face of that evidence? And not merely that, but I say if these files are examined—and the man who can have these files examined is Deputy Cosgrave—they will show that there was a suggestion to publish this agreement in a bowdlerised form, and to cut out altogether Part I relating to the land annuities transaction, and to publish Part II as Part I. If that statement is controverted, I am willing to prove it before any tribunal Deputy Cosgrave chooses.
We have been told that this whole transaction was exposed to the Dáil on Wednesday, 3rd February, 1926. Three years after the agreement was signed, Deputy Connor Hogan asked the President
"whether the text of the Financial Agreement of the 12th February, 1923, entered into between the Government of the Saorstát on the one hand and the British Government on the other, and containing, inter alia, provisions as to the collection and disbursement of moneys advanced under the Land Purchase Acts, 1881-1909, will be communicated to the Dáil.”
We have been told that this is not a secret agreement, that the Dáil was aware of everything contained in the agreement. Here was a member of the Dáil—possibly not on 12th June, 1923; I should have to refresh my memory on that, but, at any rate, he was elected in August, 1923—asking the then President of the Executive Council on 3rd February, 1926, when this agreement was going to be presented to the Dáil. If it was not a secret agreement, what objection was there to presenting it to the Dáil? If it was not a secret agreement, and if it was fully exposed to the House in the Supplementary Estimate upon which Deputy Cosgrave relies for his justification, what objection was there from the point of view of the then Government, what breach of confidence could there be, what impropriety could there be in referring the Deputy who put down the question, and who was entitled to the truth, and to all the information a Minister has at his disposal, relating to a matter of public interest—if it was in the public interest to publish it— what objection could there be to President Cosgrave referring Deputy Connor Hogan to this alleged debate on the Supplementary Estimate of 1923 and saying that the terms were fully disclosed there? He could not because such a statement would be obviously untrue.
Comment on this
May I ask a question for the sake of enlightenment? I understood from the President's speech and earlier utterances, that the very existence of that agreement was unknown until the British Government disclosed it. How did Deputy Connor Hogan know about it?
Comment on this
It had been referred to as a provisional arrangement. I am not saying that the existence of the agreement was unknown to some people. I am merely saying that, so far as certain members of the Dáil and the people were concerned, the very existence of such an agreement was unknown. I will tell you why. Because all reference, or practically all reference, to this Supplementary Estimate of 23rd June, 1923, was suppressed in the Irish newspapers. The only reference published at all was Deputy Cosgrave's statement that this was merely an accounting transaction. Deputies can look up the records in the National Library and they will find that what I am saying is true. The report was tucked away in one corner of the Irish Independent so that it was taken to be a cursory transaction. People outside the Dáil were not aware of it. The 3,000,000 souls who had to find the £3,100,000 were not aware of its existence. When the question of the payments was raised in the House and in the country, the existence of this agreement was never once referred to by the then President Cosgrave. Let me come to his answer to Deputy Connor Hogan:
"The Government have recently been considering this question and several kindred matters. A decision has not yet been reached, but I hope to be able to give the Deputy a definite answer before very long."
The poor Deputy never got his answer, and the papers were never published, because the decision come to, after consideration of the question by the then Government, was that they would not publish the secret agreement of 1923.
This Bill which we have been considering to-night and this pact which the Opposition have attempted to criticise——
Comment on this
As the Deputy has reminded me, I will quote one other thing. An attempt has been made to use the name of Michael Collins to justify the secret agreement. I think if the heads of the working agreement are read it will be seen that against Article 42 of that agreement there is an asterisk, which points to a reservation made by General Michael Collins with regard to the land annuities.
Comment on this
It is a discreditable thing to use his name to justify the "Secret Agreement" and those who pretend to be his loyal comrades and attempt to play on his memory to cloak their own misdeeds should be ashamed.
Comment on this
You said at one time that that made no difference; that the English people would have to pay.
Comment on this
That is the policy which the Opposition stand for in this debate. They want a narrower market for Irish live stock and higher tariffs against them. That is their policy. That is what Deputy Fagan and Deputy Finlay are going to vote for. That is the policy Deputy Dillon is gloating over—a narrower market and higher tariffs. That is the practical alternative the Opposition have to advance as against this Bill. The House can decide that, without prejudice to either side, it will accept a reduction of British tariffs against us and will accept enlarged quotas, or it can do, in the alleged interests of the farmers, of course, what the Opposition wants it to do. They are full of solicitude for the farmers. We saw Deputy Dillon weeping about the sad position of the fairs. He wants to make them sadder by having fewer buyers for our cattle. He wants to have fewer licences. He wants higher duties. We must get home to the country the alternative which the Opposition are offering as against this pact—a narrower market and higher tariffs.
Comment on this
That is an extraordinary policy. I can quite see that Deputy Finlay and other Deputies do not want me to finish. I suppose he cannot insure against getting home this to the Irish people, as he did not get home to the other people——
Comment on this
This policy of a higher tariff is an extraordinary one. To ordinary intelligent beings, it would scarcely seem to be a rational policy, but I am not going to do the Opposition the injustice of saying that for these purposes this is an irrational policy that they have adopted. They have no small opinion of themselves. According to this amendment, they think they could bring about forthwith a settlement of all the issues involved, including a settlement of the partition question.
Comment on this
The Minister must be allowed to make his speech, and the Chair is not addressing any particular Deputy.
Comment on this
The Opposition say they can settle these issues with great ease—"forthwith" is their own word for it. I know that the Leader of the Opposition has no small opinion of himself as a statesman, and regards us as being mere amateur Ministers.
Comment on this
When they adopt this extraordinary policy, we ought to ask ourselves why do they adopt it. They adopt it because their purpose is to capitalise the hardship of the people and to trade in misery. They talk about a settlement, but the fact is that they do not want a settlement. They think that this arrangement is an advance towards a settlement. The people outside also think it is. The Irish Times blazoned it across their pages as such; and it is because the Opposition think that this pact represents some advancement—whether it actually does or not—that they oppose it.
Comment on this
They wanted the economic war to start. It was Deputy John Marcus O'Sullivan who talked of the possibility of the British taxing our cattle—wanting them to do it. You will often hear the hurler on the ditch telling you how to strike the ball, and in the same way Deputy O'Sullivan told the British how to strike, and Senator Blythe was also ready with his advice as to what horn a tax should be put on. They wanted the economic war to start, they want it to continue, they want it intensified, because it is only by the defeat of our people that they see any hope of a return to power. I am wondering if any people listening to Deputy Costello grasped the significance of his remark when he said that early in 1933 he wanted the issue, as to whether these annuities were payable to Britain or not, to be tried out here. Does anybody think that Deputy Costello wanted that verdict from an Irish bench in the hope that it would justify us? Is there anybody foolish enough to believe that? Is there anybody who thinks so little of Deputy Costello's intelligence as to think that he thought that if that court were to decide in our favour the British would have any regard for the verdict? Not at all. They would turn around and say, if the court had found in our favour, that they were not concerned with the legalities of the matter, and that they were pinning their faith to the secret agreement of March, 1923. Yet this Irish lawyer, with nothing to gain for his country, was willing to bring this dispute into the Irish courts and to act as an advocate for Great Britain. It was not the first time. The White Paper which was published in 1931 was an attempt to justify the British claim to these annuities, and in June of 1933 the Deputy, whose arguments were rejected by the Irish people, was ready to open it up again, not in the interests of the Irish people, but in the interests of the British Government. I repeat that the Opposition do not want this economic war to end. Their one hope is that it should not end. They do not want a settlement.
Comment on this
They do not want a settlement because their only hope of being returned to power lies in the humiliation of the State and the defeat of the Irish people. They say that they accepted and commended the original coal-cattle pact.
Comment on this
They welcomed the original pact because they thought at that time that it was the beginning of the end, but they were disappointed in their hopes. The moment it became public that negotiations were in progress for a renewal of the pact on more favourable terms, the Opposition went all out to jeopardise the outcome of the negotiations, and secure a breakdown in the negotiations if they could.
Comment on this
The very moment it was announced that, pending the outcome of the negotiations, the old coal-cattle pact would be renewed, we heard an attack on that pact. We had the attacks on British coal— coal of the very same quality, as the Minister for Industry and Commerce showed, as had been imported into this country during the nine years that Cumann na nGaedheal were in office. We had these attacks on British coal and were told how bad the British coal was, and these attacks were made by the very people who, only 12 months before, were describing the Continental coal as unburnable.
Comment on this
The President said that nobody signed that agreement. He was ashamed to stand over it.
Comment on this
In introducing this Bill and describing the effects of the new arrangement, I was studiously moderate. There was no need to exaggerate. It was made, as I pointed out, without prejudice to the issues which have arisen between the two Governments. The people understand that and they realise it fully. They would not wish, and they have no desire, that we should acknowledge the right, as distinct from the power, of the other party to the dispute to collect the annuities. They see that as the background to this pact and they know that, in all the circumstances, on the practical facts, it is one which they can accept. I feel that if that issue were to be put to the country to-morrow, our action in making this pact would be fully vindicated, and the Opposition would be condemned by the people for what they have shown themselves to be in this debate, a mere factious Opposition, seeking not the benefit and welfare of our citizens, but seeking, as I have said before, the defeat and humiliation of our people.
Comment on this
Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."
Do you agree with this result?