Committee on Finance. - Air Navigation and Transport Bill, 1936—Committee.
Contributions 158–305 of 305. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 25 of 1936 ›
It gives the right to each contracting State to make conditional on its prior authorisation the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or without landing on its territory.
Comment on this
It allowed the Minister to make as a condition precedent the granting of a permit with certain things in it?
Comment on this
Is it a fact that the letters which were written to people who wanted to establish services were framed in such a way as if compliance with that particular Air Navigation Convention made a permit necessary? It was not put forward to those people that he was enabled to do it, but that he must do it in order to comply with the Convention? Is that so?
Comment on this
I think that that would not be the case. The Minister may have stated that it was his policy to restrict those services as far as possible to this national company which he had in mind and the subsidiary company.
Comment on this
And it was possible to do that under the 1920 Act, which was merely implementing the International Navigation Convention?
Comment on this
The necessity for this Bill was to take powers to enable the Government to set up this national company, and also to embody all the existing legislation as far as possible under one statute.
Comment on this
May I suggest a different reason—that the Minister operated, and operated after being advised that he was wrong in attempting so to operate, on the basis of that International Convention enjoining on him those permits in order to comply with the international navigation code; that in fact he was not so authorised either under the code itself or under the 1920 Act, and that this is to clear up the mistake?
Comment on this
I think the Minister was authorised. If the Deputy contends that the Minister said it was mandatory on him, or that he was bound to do it, I should like if he would produce the letters to the Dáil.
Comment on this
Some of those sub-sections are rather important. What is the particular purpose of sub-section (a)—the authority by which powers are to be exercised? Why is that picked out as a special provision after the general powers that are taken previously?
Comment on this
Under some sections of the present Bill the Minister for Industry and Commerce is the authority. Under other sections the Executive Council is the authority.
Comment on this
But this is the Executive Council here. Sections 10 and 11 give what, to the mind of the ordinary lay person, would seem to be the widest powers possible, and it is the Executive Council that takes them. What is the necessity for picking out special matters in Section 12?
Comment on this
Section 11 seems to me to be confined to the Paris Convention. I cannot say definitely that Section 12 is confined to the provisions of the Convention.
Comment on this
I am to take it then that sub-section (b) of Section 12 is to give the Executive Council power in regard to aerodromes, whether governed by the Paris Convention or any other convention?
Comment on this
In any case, in connection with those conventions minor modifications have often to be made to suit the circumstances of particular countries.
Comment on this
Section 13 establishes offences by way of breach of Orders made under the special powers of Section 12, about which the Minister cannot tell us anything.
Comment on this
I am not speaking of Section 13. Section 13 compels compliance. With what? With orders made under Section 12. I have asked the Minister what are those special orders under Section 12. He cannot tell us, but we are establishing a series of offences for breach of them.
Comment on this
Regulations are necessary in connection with the national or domestic aircraft which may not be covered by any of the Conventions.
Comment on this
Can we not get some information as to the necessity for Section 13 in relation to the undisclosed objectives of Section 12?
Comment on this
There is a well-known provision by which Governments are empowered to prevent aircraft from flying in certain areas for military or other reasons. Section 13 enables us to compel compliance when aircraft disobeys signals.
Comment on this
Paragraph (c) surely goes beyond anything that this country has yet seen. The whole of the section, as a matter of fact will have to be considered. It says: "If any aircraft flies or attempts to fly over any area appointed as a prohibited area under or by virtue of an order made under this Part of this Act"—that is, an area that is scheduled as a prohibited area under the general powers of previous sections —"or enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order, the following provisions shall have effect." Among the provisions set out are that it shall be lawful for any officer designated for the purpose by such order to cause such signal as may be prescribed by such order to be given, and if, after such signal has been given, the aircraft fails to respond to the signal by complying with the provisions of such order prescribing the action to be taken on such signal being given, it shall be lawful for such officer to fire at or into such aircraft and to use any and every other means at his disposal to compel compliance. The next provision, paragraph (c), goes on to say that no action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court in Saorstát Eireann in respect of the doing of anything authorised to be done by any such officer under this section, whether such thing is done personally or by a person acting in aid of or under the direction of such officer.
There have been any number of very sacred decisions taken by courts from time to time on the power of the military, even in times of veiled riot, to act, and there have been many cases in the courts which have laid down what is the duty of the soldier acting on orders and whether or not he can shelter himself entirely behind the authority or order of an officer, or whether or not he is bound to use any discretion in such cases. This section makes it clear that nobody need use any discretion, and, whether the order is to be justified or not, no proceedings lie in the courts.
Comment on this
This is already in the 1920 Act also. The Deputy has read certain sub-sections but he has failed to point out to the House that it shall be lawful for an officer specially designated for the purpose, causing such signals as may be prescribed to be given to these aircraft, to fire at such aircraft if, after the signal has been given, the aircraft fails to respond to the signal. Obviously, the circumstances will determine whether the officer should fire at the aircraft or not. At any rate, I think it is obvious that it is essential in connection with aircraft that there should be rather stringent powers for dealing with aircraft which refuse to comply with signals. In any case, the provision is already in the 1920 Act.
Comment on this
The 1920 Act was a British Act and only carried into the laws of this country by Article 73 of the Constitution.
Comment on this
It was, of course, and the whole Act is subject to it. That does not help me in the point I am making. But of course the whole Act is entirely subject to it. Here, however, for the first time, we are asking the House to face up to legislation of a permanent type. This is not a carry-over type of legislation. After all, there is such a thing as the rights of the ordinary civilian population.
Comment on this
Apart from the ordinary people on the ground, there is the right also of the person in the air who may be a member of the civilian population. This is not aimed against military aircraft but against every type of aircraft. Suppose there is something of a barrage put up against hostile aircraft, or so-called hostile aircraft, or something designated for the purpose to be hostile aircraft, and that people on the ground— not in the air at all—are hurt, the Minister precludes anybody inquiring in a court of law as to whether the orders to fire were properly given or whether the persons to whom the orders were given found themselves in such circumstances that they were bound to obey the orders. My point is that this cuts across the whole of the ordinary law as it has been carried over in this country and as it has been practised on behalf of the people of this country. If it is desired to have these provisions in, I suggest that it should be limited to, say, a time of war or threatened war or civil commotion. The idea, however, of somebody, simply because the Minister says he is an officer designated for the purpose, giving an order and that order resulting in somebody either firing at or using some other lethal weapon to prevent aircraft entering the Saorstát, as a result of which damage is done to people in the Saorstát—not in the air at all, but on the ground—and that that procedure cannot be questioned, is absurd. Surely it would be right for the courts to follow the ordinary procedure in matters like this. Of course, I am not very alert at turning this type of case against people in authority. I think it will be found, generally, that courts acting in a responsible fashion and carrying out the law in the usual way will get the help of the ordinary people; but here, according to this, proceedings may not be instituted even to question whether or not such an order was properly given or whether the person who carried out the order in such circumstances was bound to obey it. This, if it is carried into effect, will mean in the future that nobody will ever think of disobeying an order because there is no question of the matter ever being considered in court and they can be sure that their conduct will never be questioned. I say that it is a very grave power to take for no reason given.
Comment on this
The Deputy has become terribly legal since he went into opposition. I have here a copy of the Air Navigation Rules for which he was responsible in 1930, and all I can say is that, if they were suitable in 1930, why should they be unsuitable now? The Deputy, in any event, Sir, is wasting his eloquence, because this Bill simply re-enacts in very large measure the provisions of the 1920 Act as adapted to this country, and also provides that certain action will be taken by the Government in regard to international conventions. There are then certain financial provisions in the Bill. The Deputy has already wasted a large portion of the time of the House telling us of the terrible things we are bringing into this Bill, although this is the second occasion on which I have shown the Deputy and the House that we are simply re-enacting measures that the Deputy himself introduced when he was Minister for Industry and Commerce. The Deputy has not told the House that this provision with regard to firing at aircraft is confined to prohibited areas and that there is only one such area at present in the country.
Comment on this
To start with, it is not confined to prohibited areas in the Bill. However, as far as the 1920 Act is concerned, we will get that cleared up first. The difference between the 1920 Act and this Bill is that the 1920 Act was a piece of carry-over legislation.
Comment on this
Would the Deputy show us where the provision is that is applicable to areas other than prohibited areas?
Comment on this
Does it not mention any aircraft entering or attempting to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order?
Comment on this
I am reading from the preamble to Section 13, which mentions prohibited areas, and it says that "if any aircraft flies or attempts to fly over any area appointed as a prohibited area or enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order, the following provision shall have effect," and then it goes on to state the provisions. Surely Saorstát Eireann is not a prohibited area?
Comment on this
Well, while that is sinking in, I can refer again to the 1920 Act. As I have said, the 1920 Act is a carry-over piece of legislation, and this Bill is put up for consideration so that it may be passed as a permanent measure.
Comment on this
It is only in the event of any area being appointed as a prohibited area by an order made under this part of the Act that these provisions would come into effect.
Comment on this
Listen to this:—
"If any aircraft flies or attempts to fly over any area appointed as a prohibited area under or by virtue of an order made under this part of this Act——"
The order is not an order making a place a prohibited area; it is an order under this part of the Act.
"—or enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order——"
I am going to interpret that as I read this part of it as "in contravention of an order made under this part of the Act." Is that right?
Comment on this
The grapes are sour, Deputy, I suppose. Is that the correct interpretation? I think the plain meaning of the English there is:—
"If any aircraft enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of an order made under this part of this Act."
I think that is right. It is then lawful to fire on it. It is not confined to prohibited areas.
Comment on this
It is? The Bill says that orders may be made under this part of this Act under Sections 10, 11 and 12. Section 10 is in regard to such orders as appear necessary for carrying out the Paris Convention. Does the Paris Convention relate only to prohibited areas? If not, orders made under this part of this Act may go beyond prohibited areas. Section 11 sets out:—
"The Executive Council may from time to time direct that the provisions of the Paris Convention ... shall apply to or in relation to any aircraft in or over Saorstát Eireann...."
Unless the Paris Convention is confined to prohibited areas, that again is extensive. Look at the series of things in Section 12. We get down to the letter (n) a series of special powers about which orders may be made, and, in relation to any of these if there is any of them which have an effect on an entry into Saorstát Eireann, there may be an entry, or attempted entry, contrary to the provisions of an order made under this part of the Act. For that, an officer designated may cause whatever signals are prescribed to be given, and if the aircraft fails to respond to the signals, it may be fired on. Not merely may it be fired on but the officer may use any other means at his disposal to compel compliance. If any such firing is attempted, or any other method of enforcing the authority of the officer is brought about, no proceedings may be instituted to question it.
The 1920 Act, if I may return to it, was a piece of carry-over legislation. The House never thought about it and the Executive Council hardly thought about it. It was a piece of legislation designed as a temporary expedient and, under it, certain regulations were made. These regulations—and one knows the fate of these regulations— were laid on the Table of the House. They were not intended to meet a permanent situation. They were made, like the Minister's 1935 Order, to meet an emergency as an emergency arose. They were, in fact, made in order to comply with the navigation code to which we had become a consenting party, and about which trouble was being raised, because certain regulations implementing the code had not been brought in. So far as operating the regulations was concerned, I was never guilty of operating any part of them—certainly not any part about firing on people—and I never would have thought of proposing them to this House as permanent legislation. There may be a necessity, and quite certainly is in regard to specialised areas, to forbid the aircraft of a foreign place, or even our own aircraft, from flying over them, but to say that if and when an officer uses force by firing to get an aircraft to comply with his signals, his conduct should not be challengeable in the courts, is going too far.
Remember that that legislation is founded almost entirely on the Continental situation in the post-war period and about the time when although people were pretending to turn their thoughts towards disarmament, it was seen that the clear way out of disarmament was the provision of the equivalent of a mercantile marine—a civil aviation service, easily changed into military aircraft more or less at a moment's notice. It also was recognised that the easiest method on the Continent, with its fortified areas, of getting spying done as to the latest development of the fortification of large areas was through the medium of aircraft flying overhead, and by the special progress that had been made in certain photographic methods. There was what amounted to a panic on the Continent amongst all the warring powers as to these matters. There is a tradition with regard to espionage in respect of the fortified areas on the Continent which this country knows nothing about, and does not require to know anything about, and against which it certainly does not require regulations to the same extent. In those circumstances that code was passed. Why should we now attempt to set up such a piece of legislation for permanent lodgment on the Statute Book? Why should we copy what has been done in a panic way on the Continent under circumstances which do not hold here at all?
We are definitely breaking down one of the best known standards. One of the most rigid regulations which the people trusted to serve the community under arms have to obey is that which ordains that if they seem to outstep the bounds of their duty, from the officer giving the commands to the men obeying them, they can be brought before a court and have their conduct inquired into. It is a safeguard not merely to the community, but to the serving-soldier. For instance, I am sure the House would be horror-stricken if a regulation of that type were brought in with regard to the Army generally— that, no matter what the command of an officer was, so long as he was an officer designated, that is to say, an officer properly in the service, it must be obeyed and, no matter what the result of it, his conduct could not be inquired into. The House should not be asked by any Government to pass any such clause in a Bill. Why say it with regard to aviation? And certainly not until a case has been made for it.
I suggest that if you allow the ordinary law to prevail, if you wipe out that clause, you have a situation which is as much a safeguard to the serving man, the man in the ranks, as it is to the community, because it at any rate puts him up against this position that, from time to time, he has to use his mind and his humanity in deciding whether a command given by an open maniac of an officer ought to be obeyed or not. That was the safeguard which certain people tried to shelter behind in a very definite tragedy that occurred in this country. You do strengthen the soldier in his attempt to be humane towards the ordinary population if that type of thing is not there. Once that particular regulation is there, no soldier for the future will ever think of questioning anything except one thing: Is this man an officer and is he designated for this purpose? If he is, anything he says goes; it cannot be questioned.
Comment on this
The Deputy has not explained to the House why he found it necessary to embody this provision in these regulations made in 1930. I cannot find his explanation that the panicky condition of the Continental Powers, the war condition, has lasted until 1930, and was so effective that it compelled the Minister of that day to put this provision into his regulations. At first, when the Deputy criticised this provision, he was anxious to safeguard the civil population, the gentlemen who refused to obey the signals given; now he wants to protect the soldier. Surely we can rely on the Government to have regard to the general circumstances of aircraft when they are making orders designating these signals and laying down the circumstances under which officers may fire upon such aircraft. I cannot call to mind a particular circumstance in which it would be dangerous for aircraft to refuse to obey signals. I know that we have had examples recently of aircraft flying over prohibited areas in defiance of international regulations. Are we to take it that, under regulations properly laid down, it would be improper for officers properly designated, and knowing their duty, to fire upon such aircraft if they considered it necessary to do so? The Deputy assumes that officers designated in the section are mere robots, and will fire at every aircraft that comes along. I think we can assume that officers of the Army are reasonable and sensible individuals and that they will have full regard to all the circumstances, and consider such a serious action as firing on aircraft before they do it.
Comment on this
I only want to deal with the last argument, which means that the Ministry can justify the bringing of a clause into the Army Act, under which an officer can give a signal to a man to halt, and if he afterwards orders anyone to fire, anything arising out of that is precluded from inquiry by the courts. The same argument will hold, that you can rely upon the officer being a good fellow; that he will not do it. Why have other countries decided, as far as ordinary defence and land forces are concerned, that it is proper to allow the courts to inquire into the activities of officers and men serving under them when it seems to the courts that there is reason for such inquiry? If other countries had the same view as to the giving of orders to men, as the Minister pretends to have to justify this clause, there would be no necessity for any such intervention by the courts. We are to pass this and to rely on the intelligence, humanity and good nature of the officer and the men under him. The Minister can say if he likes that countries that have even the human viewpoint that I spoke of in regard to land forces generally are not in the majority in that view as regards aircraft. Will the majority of them have it? Are we so definitely stabilised in our institutions with regard to defence that we think it proper to protect an officer, no matter what type of order he gives, as long as it is something permitted by the paragraph, from any inquiry by the courts?
We will put men serving under him in such a position that they know that an officer's order once given cannot be questioned in the courts, and to that extent there is greater persuasion on them to obey. I think that an outrageous situation to bring about by way of permanent legislation. What is the fear? If we were entirely dependent on some huge arsenal for our entire defence, and if it was easily located and was in such a dangerous place that we could only guard it by having very stringent regulations about people flying over it, and if there was imminence of some attack by aircraft going to destroy it, then, in regard to that type of prohibited area, it might be possible to have officers and other people protected from judicial inquiry. This may have relation to any order issued by the Executive Council under this part of the Act, when some aircraft fails to comply with signals in relation to any matter. As to general matters detailed in Sections 10, 11 and 12, we say that we are not going to have the conduct of the officer who gives the order inquired into. There has been no case made for a breach in the old situation that prevailed as between the civilian community and the serving forces. The Minister appears to regard that as important. We should think of the danger to the civilian community. Surely the Minister's memory has not failed him, and he will remember that quite an amount of the anti-aircraft machinery used during the Great War had an effect, not upon the people at whom it was aimed, but on the unfortunate civil population, upon whom the stuff rained down, inflicting more casualties amongst them than those defending the country against offensive aircraft. It does not need any flight of imagination to see such a situation as that being brought about if orders are so general. I suggest to the Minister that he should think seriously before he makes this very considerable breach in the old system of the courts, a system that has allowed proper action, with the judges always moulding themselves to help the Executive, recognising that the Government must be assisted. Notwithstanding that, the Government appears to be against action being taken before an inquiry into the conduct of officers and men. I think it is a safeguard to the community and to the men and prevents officers getting out of hand, which I think is not likely to happen here.
Comment on this
The first Convention lays it down that for military reasons or military safety the Government shall be empowered to specify certain areas as prohibited areas. In spite of what the Deputy argued, that this section deals with other than prohibited areas, I state definitely that it applies only to prohibited areas specified by order. When aircraft are challenged and refuse to obey signals, then the Government is quite justified in enabling officers to fire on such aircraft. I do not see why, if officers carry out their duty and try to prevent aircraft from disobeying signals in prohibited areas, the Deputy should be so terribly anxious that these officers should be hauled up in court. They will carry out their duties in this matter, presumably as they carry out their other duties, according to the law of the State and according to lawful orders given by superiors.
Comment on this
I intervene in this debate with the desire that neither Fascism nor the Reds should prevail in this land. I feel that the Minister does not understand the terrible powers being given to any officer controlling even what he alleges is a special area. Supposing the courts decided that the area in which something happened was not an area as prescribed by the Minister, a person aggrieved has not even the right of appeal to the courts. The legislation of this country has tended towards the removal of the old theory that the King can do no wrong, and the Road Traffic Act allowed the ordinary civilian to take action against a Minister or a soldier. Previously a civilian, if injured, could not proceed for damages. I thought we had got so far away from that that, at least, the Government would take a wider and a more democratic view or, if you like, would be republican in their outlook, rather than saying that they could do no wrong and that no one could question what they did. That is the position this section sets up. No one can question what they do, even the courts that have been set up in this country. The Minister would be well advised to consider this section, because it goes beyond all the notions we hold concerning the rights of the individual. When I was an officer in the Army, if someone was knocked down while I was being driven by someone else, there was no action against me. An Act of the Oireachtas changed that position. The Minister relied a good deal on the Act of 1920. I wonder does he remember that that Act was really a "take-over" of regulations that were set up during war time? Deputy McGilligan said that it was due to the post-war terror in Europe. I believe, in fact I know, that it was due to what they called D.O.R.A. Some of the provisions of that Act still exist. I had the pleasure of being imprisoned under some of them. I am prepared to give the Minister and the Executive Council all necessary power, but if the House accepts the principle that any officer or anybody with authority can fire at any aeroplane passing, mind you, not over a prohibited area— because I do not agree with the Minister that any spot in this country is prohibited—I feel we are giving a power to such officers that the people of this country do not desire to give to any officer or soldier. I am not suggesting that the Executive Council should not have sufficient powers to deal with occasions of danger, if such danger existed. I think the Minister would be well advised to reconsider the section, especially paragraph (c), and have it withdrawn.
Comment on this
If the Government of the country decide that for the safety of the community it is necessary that aircraft should be prevented from flying over certain areas, and if as a result of failure to obey these regulations—if this provision were not the law of the country—any aircraft flying over such territory caused such damage as would entail loss of life and property, what answer would Deputies on the opposite side make to people who suffered? What alternative safeguard do they consider the community should have against aircraft which flagrantly defy the laws and regulations of the country?
Comment on this
The answer is very simple. Nobody wants to prevent the Government of this country taking power or having power to prevent hostile aircraft flying over part, or the whole, of this country if necessary, but we think that coincident with that power there should be power given to the courts to prevent officers running amok, to prevent officers losing their heads, to prevent them acting under the influence of drink. These things happen. I am not saying that they happen in the Free State Army but they could happen. Are we going to prevent a man losing his head by having him conscious that he may be hauled before the court to answer for his conduct, if aircraft have failed to respond to a signal in a particular way, or is he more likely to lose his head if he feels that no matter how irresponsibly he acts he will not be brought before any court? It is futile to think that an answer has been given to the matters discussed here by pretending that if we take away paragraph (c) the Government would be left powerless either to prevent aircraft entering the country or passing over a prohibited area. Everybody will agree that the Government should have that power if they want to make any part of the country a prohibited area, but that must be done regularly. The prohibition must be effected with some degree of reason. Is there not a greater likelihood of unreason prevailing if an officer knows that he must only put himself in either of these positions to escape liability in the courts: (1) he must be an officer designated for the purpose, (2) he must give a signal and (3) the aircraft getting the signal must fail to respond to such signal by not complying with the provisions of the order prescribing the action to be taken on such signal being given. Once these three things happen, that man can fire at oncoming aircraft and no matter how irresponsible his action is, nobody can question it.
I say that if his action is irresponsible it should be open to question. When I say that that irresponsible action should be open to question, I am not suggesting that the Government should not have full powers to prevent hostile aircraft from passing over the country. There is a great difference, however, between saying that you must have power to prevent hostile aircraft passing over the country and telling a man who runs amok that his action cannot be challenged in the courts. By all means give these men all the protection they require but if they are irresponsible and if the courts find that they have acted irresponsibly then they should be liable to punishment, and there is no punishment laid down here. You preclude any proceedings of a civil or a criminal type against a man who has caused loss of life through irresponsibly giving an order on the nonobservance of some small point of the provisions for replying to a signal. In addition to that you prevent this. Some officer may lose his head on a certain occasion and decide to fire upon aircraft. A civilian member of the public, miles away from the scene, is injured, yet that person cannot take a civil action for damages if this section is passed in its present form. Surely we ought not to be asked to agree to that.
Comment on this
Army officers are subject to Army discipline and to the Army Act, which, I hope, will soon be in operation. The Deputy desires that provision should be made in this Bill to drag military officers, who do certain things in the execution of their duty, before the civil courts when as everybody knows they are subject to military regulations and military discipline if they do anything irregular. I think the Deputy ought to assume that officers who have laid upon them the duty of signalling aircraft, to prevent their flying over areas which are prohibited for national reasons or for the safety of the community, will carry out their duties lawfully according to the orders which are given to them, and that any cases in which they may act illegally will be dealt with in the same way as any other wrongful act for which an Army officer may be called upon to account.
Comment on this
Does the Minister think that Army officers in regard to certain crimes are subject only to Army discipline?
Comment on this
They are subject to Army control for any failure or neglect in the carrying out of their duties.
Comment on this
Does the Minister think that if an officer carrying out his duties commits some illegal act or some crime the civil courts are powerless? If the Minister thinks that, he is a long way from realities.
Comment on this
If the Minister attempts to bring in an Army Act to prohibit the courts from dealing with officers——
Comment on this
How can we discuss it on the Army Act if we find that this clause has been passed into law to debar the courts from dealing with an officer who has been guilty of some illegal act in connection with this Bill?
Comment on this
The Minister is really very far away from the ordinary realities of the code under which he lives. Does the Minister believe that if a member of the Defence Forces— I am leaving the question of aircraft out of it for the moment—runs amok and kills somebody, he should be dealt with under the Army code only?
Comment on this
Does the Minister think it proper to produce a Bill to prevent the courts from dealing with such an officer or does the Minister think that that should have application only in regard to aircraft? If that is intended it should be dealt with in a certain way. The Minister evidently will allow a man to be irresponsible in the discharge of his duty in regard to aircraft but will not allow him to be irresponsible in regard to any other of the activities of the Defence Forces of the Saorstát. That is rubbish. The Minister obviously does not know what the situation here is with regard to the interaction of the civil code on the Army code. We are passing this as permanent legislation—as permanent as statutes can be—and the Minister is blindly following what the Continental people did round about the time when espionage from the air and attack from the air were present to the minds of the people, as it is not present to our minds. If it is present to our minds, we have failed to make any provision against it. In this Bill we are telling officers to do as they please and that they will not be hauled before the courts no matter what they do. This is not a defence provision; it is a lunacy provision and it is breaking across the ordinary law. Owing to the Minister's view as to what the provisions of the ordinary law are in connection with military affairs, I suggest that he should take this provision back and have it considered. It is quite clear that it is not being brought forward by anybody who understands what the real position is.
Comment on this
It may be. The terms of the Paris Convention cover a great many things. It was the greatest common measure of what a lot of people desired. Are we to go to the extremity?
Comment on this
If I did, I was wrong. It was never thought of as a permanent provision, and it ought to be abandoned. It establishes a completely new situation with regard to the interaction of the civil code on the penal code which enforces military discipline. It creates a new situation with regard to the supervision by the civil courts of military men who, in the pretended doing of their duty, do something criminal. In such circumstances the ordinary military man could be had up before the civil courts for at least the graver crimes. This provision will prevent any such matter being investigated by the civil courts. That should not happen.
Comment on this
The Deputy suggests that officers should be brought before the courts for carrying out their duty in defending the population?
Comment on this
Suppose the Minister is brought before a military court and is censured for acting irresponsibly. As a result of his action an individual may have suffered a very substantial loss for which he would ordinarily have an action for damages. Is it the Minister's intention to deprive that citizen of the right he would otherwise have? That man may have a family dependent upon him and he may be crippled. In the ordinary course he would get damages which would maintain him in something like the same standard of comfort he enjoyed before. If the military court finds that the officer has acted in a wildly irresponsible way, is that citizen to have no right to recover damages simply because he happens to have been injured by an irresponsible officer and not by an irresponsible civilian?
Comment on this
Does the Minister deny that soldiers have recently been brought before the criminal courts for manslaughter because they knocked down and killed people?
Comment on this
I am not going into the question of any other charges that may be brought against officers. I am dealing with this particular section.
Comment on this
The analogy is perfect. There is no special reason why these people should be put on a special footing. In the case of the ordinary member of the defence forces, if he does what the courts think is murder, even though he has done it in compliance with a military order, the courts will inquire into the matter. They will inquire into the order given, and, even if the man was subject to penal discipline if he did not obey, they will consider whether he was justified under the civil code in obeying the order, in the circumstances. Again, I point out that this matter of orders is not confined to prohibited areas. It is no answer to say that the Paris Convention has some reference to prohibited areas. A variety of orders can be made under Sections 10, 11 and 12. If aircraft operates under these circumstances, all an officer has to be satisfied about is that he is an officer, that he gives a signal, and that the aircraft fails to respond in respect of one matter. Then he can fire and nobody can inquire into his action no matter how irresponsible it be. We should not be asked to pass such a provision. The answer may be that you can rely on your officers. If that be so, why not introduce this principle into the ordinary law? It would be an outrageous provision to introduce into a Defence Forces Act. This House—even with the mechanically propelled legislation to which we are becoming accustomed —would never consent to that. It is absurd to ask the House to agree to it in connection with this Bill.
Comment on this
The Minister does not realise the significance of this provision. The Executive Council found it necessary to suppress a certain ceremony at Bodenstown a few weeks ago. Suppose some people from London, Liverpool or Manchester chartered an aeroplane and came along to Bodenstown. If an officer fired on that aeroplane, he could not be brought into court for injury done to the occupants of the aeroplane or to citizens on the ground. That is going against all the notions of liberty of the individual and democracy and I am sorry that it is a Republican Government makes the proposal. I instanced that case of Bodenstown because the Minister knows of the habeas corpus case in regard to Wolfe Tone. It would indeed be an extraordinary tragedy or perhaps you could describe it as a comedy—it would be a comedy in 1936-'37—if a person or persons going to the Wolfe Tone anniversary were wrongly fired at and that the officer responsible could not be questioned before a court.
Comment on this
The authority will be there without paragraph (c). Take out paragraph (c) and the Minister will have plenty authority.
Comment on this
Because there has to be a prohibited area and there is only one such area in this State.
Comment on this
But paragraph (c) of the section has nothing to do with that. Take out paragraph (c) and you have the rest left.
Comment on this
Then, the person can fly over any area. The paragraph reads:—
(c) no action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court in Saorstát Eireann in respect of the doing of anything authorised to be done by any such officer under this section, whether such thing is done personally or by a person acting in aid of or under the direction of such officer.
Comment on this
The order making the area a prohibited area. No order has been made about Bodenstown.
Comment on this
I mentioned Bodenstown because the real point of this case is that the matter could not be raised in the Civil Courts. As is well known to the House, the most important case decided in the Civil Courts in regard to the military and others was the case of Wolfe Tone.
Comment on this
With regard to the civil liability that would arise in the event of an officer having been found acting in an irresponsible way by a military court, is it the Minister's intention to deprive the civilian of his legal remedy against an officer so convicted by a military court?
Comment on this
I quite willingly admit that it is a hypothetical case. I want to know, in that hypothetical case, is it the Minister's intention to deprive a civilian of his remedy to sue for damages? Let me put it in this way: An officer, acting under Section 13, behaves in an irresponsible way, as a result of which the citizen loses his earning capacity; is it the Minister's intention or desire to deprive that citizen of his right by law to recover damages against that officer?
Comment on this
I do not know what type of court the military regulations provide for a case such as the Deputy has in mind.
Comment on this
Is it a court? If it is, paragraph (c) of Section 13 prevents the civilian from proceeding in any court with any legal proceedings against the officer.
Comment on this
Paragraph (c) applies only if the officer carries out his duties as his duties should be carried out.
Comment on this
I am trying to follow the points put by the Deputy. Some of them are peculiar and others serious. The Bill does not provide protection for an officer who is drunk and starts shooting all round.
Comment on this
It provides that in certain circumstances, say, where an area is a prohibited area and where an aeroplane flies over that area, or attempts to fly over it, the officer shall warn that party, and if the aeroplane, in spite of having got the warning signals, persists in the attempt to fly over the area, the officer is then to fire on it. Whatever method of firing that may be, whether it is shrapnel or some sort of shot, he is empowered to fire. He is only doing it in the course of his duty. The Bill does not specify that a drunken officer shall be on duty; if this drunken officer who may be outside the prohibited area comes into that area and acts, he is not in that event protected by this Bill. As I understand it, that is the case the Deputy is making. The Bill does not provide for that sort of thing.
Comment on this
I cannot imagine the protection of prohibited areas being carried out only through officers serving in the prohibited areas.
Comment on this
There is a Government in the country. That Government is so far responsible that it has an Army such as the Deputies on the Opposition had in their days. It is found to be an efficient Army, and it has done its duty by the people of the country——
Comment on this
There is no use in Deputy Dillon saying "Hear, hear." Deputy Dillon is new to this thing.
Comment on this
This is the position. There is a prohibited area; an officer is on duty in that area. He is an officer of our Army. He is not an officer who, when his duty is finished, puts the cannon on his back and walks home. There is such a thing as order in the country.
Comment on this
I propose to accept the Minister's view that the areas that are prohibited areas are prohibited for the protection of the people of the country. I do not agree with the Deputy's contention in regard to this Bill. On this particular section here, as I understand it—and I have been following it very closely, and following the efforts of the Deputy to make his points—I am satisfied that in voting for this Bill there is no danger to the community. On the contrary, there is protection to the community. There is no danger of the officers of the Army being in the main drunk.
Comment on this
Yes, in the main, or the greater number of them being drunk. It may happen in every army that you may have one man, out of a large number, who may be irresponsible.
Comment on this
The Deputy wants to alter the whole thing; in fact, he wants the whole country to be put into a lunatic asylum because of what might arise through the irresponsibility of one maniac. He wants to put the whole Army into fetters because of that. That officer in the near future might be responsible for Deputy McGilligan's pet scheme, the Shannon scheme. The officer might be in that area, which might be described as a prohibited area, and the Deputy wants to put the officer in charge of the Shannon scheme in the position of saying to himself after an aeroplane has disregarded his signals: "I must not fire on that aeroplane, because somebody afterwards might take an action against me." Consequently the officer may allow the whole works at Ardnacrusha to be blown up.