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Dáil

Bunreacht na hEireann (Dréacht)—Dara Céim.

Contributions 1–145 of 293. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Tairgim go léighfear an Dréacht an dara huair. Tá Dréacht den Bhunreacht seo idir lámhaibh ag na Dálairí le deich lá no níos mó, agus tá sé léighte agus ath-léighte aca. Rinne siad scrúdú agus mion-scrúdú air agus, mar gheall air sin, ní gá é do mhíníú ach go gearr. Nuair a théigheann tú isteach i gceist mar seo, is éigin a lán rudaí do chur síos nach saoilfeá go mba ghá nuair a chromann tú ar an obair. Mar gheall air sin, tá níos mó san Dréacht ná mar a shaoil mé a bheadh. Mar is eol don Tigh, tá an Bunreacht rointe i gcuideanna áirithe. An chéad chuid, baineann sí leis an Náisiún agus deimhníonn sí gur ceart an chomhacht a bheith ag an Náisiún, cibé cineál Rialtais is rogha leo féin do bhunú, agus a saol féin do riaradh mar is maith leo. Deimhníonn sé freisin gurab é oileán na hEireann go hiomlán, na hinsí agus a chríoch-fhairrge an chríoch náisiúnta. Is eol dúinn nach féidir linn na dlighthe a ritheann tríd an Dáil do chur i bhfeidhm ar fud na tíre uile, go bhfuil cuid den tír deighilte uainn. Os rud é go bhfuil an scéal mar sin, tá sé ráidhte sa mBunreacht go mbeidh an límistéar céanna agus an chomhacht chéanna ag na dlighthe a ritheann tríd an Oireachtas fén mBunreacht seo agus a bhí ag na dlighthe a ritheadh tríd an Dáil fé Shaorstát Eireann. Deirmíd go mbeidh an scéal mar sin go dtí go ndéantar athchomhlánú ar an gcrích náisiúnta agus gan dochar do cheart na Páirliminte dlighthe do cheapadh le haghaidh an Náisiúin uile.

Baineann an dara cuid den Bhunreacht le Stát na hEireann. 'Sé an t-ainm atá ar an Stát ná Eire—seanainm na tíre seo, ainm a bhfuil grádh ag gach Eireannach cli cibé áird den domhan ina bhfuil sé 'na chomhnaí. Is fíor é nach mbeidh comhacht an Stáit i bhfeidhm, mar adubhras, san oileán ar fad ach ní fáth é sin gan an t-ainm Eire do thabhairt ar an Stát. Nuair baineadh cúige, no cuid, den Fhrainnc, leanadar leis an tseanainm agus beidh sé mar sin againn-ne go dtí go mbeidh an tír ar fad fén ár smacht. Suaitheantas na hEireann an bhratach trí ndath go bhfuilimíd go léir dílis dó, bratach na Poblachta, uaine, bán agus flann-bhuidhe. Sí teanga na h-Eireann an phríomhtheanga oifigiúil, mar is ceart. Ach os rud é go bhfuil a lán daoine sa tír ná fuil an teanga sin aca, ní folaire cuimhneamh, ar sin agus sin é an fáth go bhfuil an Beurla againn mar dara teanga. Ní gá níos mó a rá i dtaobh na coda seo den roinn seo. Gach adhbhar maoine nádúrtha agus gach adhbhar fuinnimh do bhí ag Saorstát Eireann, beidh siad ag an Stát Nua— Eire. Tá an t-alt sin scrúduithe go beacht ag na dligheadóirí agus táimíd cinnte go bhfuil gach rud mar is ceart é do bheith san méid sin.

Baineann an chéad chuid eile leis an Uachtarán. Beidh Uachtarán na h-Eireann ann, an duine a toghfar ag an bpobal ar fad, siad na daoine féin a thoghfaidh an fear san, agus na comhachtaí a bheidh aige, tá siad léirithe go beacht agus go cruinn sa gcuid sin a bhaineann leis an Uachtarán. Na daoine atá ag fáil locht ar an mBunreacht seo, deireann siad go bhfuilimíd ag tabhairt an iomarca comhachta don Uachtarán. Na daoine adeir sin, is léir nár léigh siad féin an Bunreacht chor ar bith, nó má léigh siad é, is cinnte nar thuig siad é, nó má thuig siad é, is dearbhtha nar mhian leo an fhírinne d'innsint do na daoine. Deir siad go bhfuil an iomad comhachta tugtha don Uachtarán—go mbeidh se ina dheachtóir aige. Ní fíor é sin chor ar bith. Léightear an Bunreacht agus tuigfear an méid comhachta a bheidh ag an bfear seo. E sin a cheapas an Taoiseach nó ceann an Rialtais, ach mar sin féin, ní bheidh air ach páipéar do shighniú, nó có-gháirdeachas do dhéanamh leis an bhfear atá toghtha mar Thaoiseach, mar a rinneadh im' chás féin nuair a toghadh mé mar Uachtarán den Ard-Chomhairle. Déanfidh an t-Uachtarán có-gháirdeachas leis an Taoiseach nó cuirfidh sé a ainm le páipéar éigin, ach ní hé an tUachtarán a chinnfeas an fear a bheidh in a Thaoiseach. 'Sé an Dáil a bheidh toghtha ag na daoine a thoghfaidh an fear a bheidh ina Thaoiseach. Mar gheall ar sin, ní ceart a rá go bhfuil an iomad comhachta á thabhairt don Uachtarán, nuair do bheirimíd comhacht dó ceann an Rialtais do cheapadh. Ní bheidh aige le déanamh ach a ainm do chur le páipéar nó a rá leis an Taoiseach "Deinim có-gháirdeachas leat, mar gheall ar gur toghadh thú."

Sa tslí chéanna, ceapfar an Tanaiste, nó fear ionad an Taoisigh, ach díreach mar i gcás an Taoisigh, ní hé an tUachtarán a chinnfeas an Tanaiste. 'Sé an Taoiseach a chinnean é. Toghfaidh an Taoiseach an fear is mian leis bheith in ionad mar Thaoiseach agus sé an Taoiseach a thoghfaidh na baill eile den Rialtas. Caithfidh an Taoiseach dul os chomhair na Dála agus iarraidh orra glacadh leis na daoine a bheidh ainmnighthe aige mar bhaill den Rialtas. Má bhíonn an Dáil sásta leis na daoine seo, rachaidh an Taoiseach go dtí an tUachtarán agus deirfidh sé leis go bhfuil an Dáil sásta leis na daoine seo bheith ina nAirí. Cuirfidh an tUachtarán a ainm le paipéar éigin nó abróchaidh sé leis an Taoiseach: "Abair le n-a daoine atá toghtha go ndeinim comhghair deachas leo." Sin a meid a dheanfaidh an tuachtara, agus ní dóigh liom gur mór an méid é sin.

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Ní mór.

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Do réir an Bhunreachta, is féidir leis an Uachtarán an Dáil do lánscur nó thabhairt le chéile. Is féidir; ach cé déarfas leis é sin do dhéanamh? Má bhíonn furmór na Dála ar thaoibh an Taoisigh, tig leis dul go dtí an tUachtarán agus a rá leis go mba mhaith leis an Dáil do lánscur agus níl aon chead nó comhacht ag an Uachtarán é do dhiúltiú. Caithfidh sé é do dhéanamh. I geás amháin tig leis an Uachtarán iarratas an Taoisigh do dhiúltiú. Mara mbeidh furmhór na Dála ar thaoibh an Taoisigh, is féidir leis an Uachtarán a rá leis: "Níl furmhór lucht na Dála ar do thaobh, agus b'fhéidir go mba mhaith leis an Dáil duine eile do thoghadh mar Thaoiseach. Mar gheall ar sin, is ceart faill do thabhairt don Dáil fear eile do thoghadh agus nílim sásta lánscur do thabhairt duit." Nó má cheapann an tUachtarán go mba cheart faill do thabhairt do mhuintir na hEireann a mbreith do thabhairt ar an sceál, tig leis a rá "Bíodh sé mar sin; cuirfimíd an Dáil ar lánscur." Níl an iomad comhachta annsin ach an oiread.

Do réir an Bhunreachta tá árd-cheannas ag an Uachtarán ar an Arm Cosanta, ach mar sin féin, is do réir dlí a rialuítear an módh ar a n-oibrítear é. Is féidir linne sa Dáil fheiceál go n-oibreoidh an chomhacht sin tríd an Rialtas. Sin mar atá anois agus táim cinnte gurab amhlaidh a bheidh sé feasta. Cad iad na comhachtaí eile atá aige? Tá comhacht aige na breitheamhain do cheapadh.

Daoine nach bhfuil eolas aca ar an tslí in a ndeintear sin, b'fhéidir go mbeidh siad ag ceapadh go bhfuilmíd ag tabhairt a lán comhachta don Uachtarán, ach má léigheann siad an Bunreacht go beacht agus go cruinn, cífidh siad go bhfuil sé soléir gurab é an Rialtas a chinneas na daoine a bheidh in a mbreitheamhain. 'Sé an Rialtas a dheinfeas an obair, ach níl ar an Uachtarán ach a ainm do chur leis an mbarántas nó le cibé páipéar a dheimhníonn go bhfuil na daoine seo toghtha agus ceapaithe i gceart. Ceapfaidh an tUachtarán na hoifigigh gairme san Airm, ach is do réir dlí a dhéanfa sé é. Ní dóigh liom gur gá dul tríd na comhachta eile ina gceann is ina gceann. Duine ar bith a léighfeas an Bunreacht, cífidh sé nach é an tUachtarán a thoghann na daoine seo ach dream eile ar fad. Mar sin, seafóid a rá gur deachtóir an tUachtarán.

Tá baint ag an Uachtarán le reachtaíocht agus leis na rudaí a bhaineas leis. Beidh dhá Thigh ann—an Dáil agus an Seanad. Níl an oiread comhachta ag an Tigh nua agus a bhi ag an sean-tSeanad ar chor ar bith. Ní féidir leis an Seanad nua níos mó moille do chur ar Bhillí ná 90 lá ar an gcuid is mó dhe. Caithfidh siad an Bille do chur ar ais chun na Dála, agus muna mbíonn an Dáil sásta leis na leasuithe do chur an Seanad ann, is féidir leis an Dáil rún do chur i bhfeidhm i dtreo go mbeidh an Bille sin ina dhlí. Ní dóigh liom gur cheart chomhacht beith ag an Dáil breith a thabhairt ar an gcuna san ar cheist mhóir nach raibh breith tugtha ag na daoine uirthi. Más mar sin atá an scéal, b'fhéidir go mbeadh ar an Uachtarán de thuairim seans do thabhairt do na daoine a mbreith do thabhairt ar Bhille táchtach mar sin; ach ní bheidh aon tseans ag an Uachtarán a lámh do chur san obair má bhíonn an Seanad agus an Dáil sásta leis an mBille. I gcás mar sin, ní bheidh ar an Uachtarán ach a ainm do chur leis an mBille. Ach má bhíonn easaontas ann—má bhíonn furmhór an tSeanaid agus trian den Dáil mí-shásta—tig leo impí do chur chun an Uachtaráin á iarraidh air an cheist do chur os comhair an phobail. Annsin, déarfaidh an tUachtarán leis an Rialtas "Is ceart tuairim na ndaoine d'fháil ar an scéal seo agus is oraibh atá a rá an t-olltoghchán nó referendum do chur ar bun." Caithfear sin do dhéanamh laistigh de 1½ bliain. Beidh rogha ag an Rialtas idir an dá rud seo. Na daoine atá ag fáil locht ar an mír sin, 'siad na daoine céanna a bhí ag clamhsán toisc gan srian a bheith le comhacht na Dála. Bhí siad ag tathaint orainn gach lá go raibh an iomarca comhachta ag an Rialtas agus ag na Teachtai sna suidheacháin seo. Dubhairt siad go raibh an dream ba mhó sa Tigh i ndon dlí do chur i bhfeidhm agus gan níos mó ná guth amháin sa mbreis aca. Dubhairt siad go dtiocfadh leo a lán díobhála do dhéanamh don tír, agus anois nuair atáimíd ag cur deire leis sin, níl siad sásta ach oiread. Cuireann siad i gcuimhne dhom "Cáit an Cheoil"—níl siad sásta leis an luch ann nó as. Ní dóigh liom go bhfuil aon tslí níos fearr chun cosc do chur le furmhór na Dála más mian leo rud do dhéanamh nach dteastuíonn o n-a daoine.

I dtrí nó ceithre cásanna eile beidh comhacht ag an Uachtarán feasta. Maidir leis na Billí Airgid, níl comhacht moille thar 21 lá ag an Seanad. Má dhearbhuíonn an Ceann Comhairle gur Bille Airgid Bille áirithe, níl ach an t-am sin ag an Seanad chun é do bhreithniú. Más mian le furmhór an tSeanaid é, is féidir leo a rá. "Nílimíd sásta leis an mbreithiúnas a thug an Ceann Comhairle. Tá dearmad déanta aige." Is féidir leo impí do chur chun an Uachtaráin á iarraidh air Coiste ar Phríbhléidí do chur ar bun chun an scéal do scrúdú. Tá comhacht ag an Uachtarán é sin do dhéanamh má bhíonn sé sásta. Ní dóigh liom go bhfuil an iomarca comhachta ag ar Uachtarán maidir leis sin. Tugtai Billí eile isteach go mbíonn práinn leo I gcás mar sin, más mian leis an Dáil an Bille do chur tríd an Oireachtas laistigh de chúpla uair an chluig, caithfear sin do dhéanamh, ach is ceart gan comhacht do thabhairt chun é sin do dhéanamh de ghnáth, agus má cheapann an tUachtarán nach bhfuil práinn leis an mBille, is féidir leis a rá nach bhfuil sé sásta go bhfuil práinn leis. Is féidir leis an Rialtas dul go dtí an Seanad feasta, mar a bhí sé ar a gcumas do dhéanamh san am atá thart, agus a iarraidh ar lucht an tSeanaid an Bille do thabhairt don Rialtas ar an bpointe toisc práinn a bheith leis. Má bhíonn siad sásta, déanfaidh siad sin, agus muna mbíonn, ní dhéanfaidh siad rud ortha. Má bhíonn an Seanad agus an Dáil ar aon aigne ní féidir leis an Uachtarán cosc nó bac do chur ar an Rialtas. Ní dóigh liom gur gá dom dul níos doimhne sa scéal.

Tá rud eile go mba mhaith liom tagairt do dhéanamh dó. Tá Comhairle Stáit ann chun comhairle a leasa do thabhairt don Uachtarán. Uair ar bith is mian leis breithiúnas do thabhairt ar cheist ar bith, tiocfaidh na daoine seo ina thimpeall agus beidh cead cainte ag gach duine acu ar an gceist. Tar éis iad do chloisint, tabharfaidh sé a bhreithiúnas. Daoine ciallmhara a bhéas ar an gcomhairle seo—an Príomh-Bhreitheamh, Uachtarán na hÁrd-Chúirte, an Taoiseach agus an Tánaiste, an tÁrd-Aighne, Cathaoirleach na Dála agus Cathaoirleach an tSeanaid. Beidh na daoine seo ar an gComhairle de bhuadh a n-oifigí. I dteanta na ndaoine seo, beidh cead ag duine a bhí ina Uachtarán nó ina Thaoiseach nó ina PhrímhBhreitheamh dul ar an gComhairle agus beidh comhacht ag an Uachtarán mór-sheisear eile do thoghadh. Ní bheidh aon chomhacht ag an gComhairle. Comhairleoirí amháin a bheidh ionta agus ní gá morán a rá ina dtaobh, ach gurab é mo thuairim go ndéanfa sé a lán maitheasa don stát Comhairle mar sin a bheith ann.

Rinne mé tagairt don Pháirlimint agus don Uachtarán, agus b'fhéidir nach gá a thuille a rá mar gheall orra. Is ag an Rialtas a bheidh an chomhacht is mó san Stát. Beidh an Rialtas freagarthach don Dáil ó lá go lá. Ach marach furmhór na Dála, ní bheadh an Rialtas i réim chor ar bith, agus os rud é go dtoghtar an Dáil ag an bpobal, agus an Rialtas ag ionadóirí an phobail, is ceart do réir mo thuairime an chomhacht sin a bheith ag an dream sin. Más mian le duine ar bith fháil amach cén áit ina bhfuil comhacht an Stáit, gheobhaidh sé é san Rialtas. Tá comhacht ag an Rialtas—an méid comhachta a bhí aca go dtí seo. Ni feidir leis an Rialtas a ngnó do dhéanamh gan an chomhacht sin.

Tá na cúirteanna le bheith mar a bhíodar, beagnach. Beidh an chomhacht chéanna acu agus a bhí, ach tá leasuithe déanta in áiteanna ina raibh sé riachtanach san do dhéanamh. Bhí ceist ann i dtaobh na gcomhacht atá ag Coimisiún na Talmhan agus a leithéid, agus ba cheart an cheist do shocrú sa mBunreacht. Tá comhacht ag an Rialtas feidhmiú tríd an Uachtarán, agus chó fada is bhíonn aon cheangal eadrainn féin agus náisiúin eile, is féidir leis an Rialtas úsáid do bhaint as aon duine nó as aon oifigeach atá ag na náisiúin go bhfuil ceangal againn leo.

San méid sin den Bhunreacht isiad na hoifigígh agus comhacht na n-oifigeach na rudaí préamhacha den Stát. Sa roinn eile, tá cur síos ar cheist ana-tháctach—na cirt bhunúsaigh atá ag na daoine—cirt nach féidir a bhaint díobh. Sa roinn seo den Bhunreacht tá trácht ar chirt phearsannta, an teaghlach, creideamh agus maoin phríobháideach. Tá foráiltí a bhaineas leis an am a mbeidh an Bunreacht i bhfeidhm agus ón uair sin go dtí go dtoghfar an tUachtarán agus go mbeidh an Seanad curtha ar bun agus an Stát fé lán-tseol. Ní dóigh liom gur gá cur síos ar na ceisteanna seo. Ceisteanna seadh iad gur féidir a chur fé mhion-scrúdú nuair a bheidh an Bunreacht seo fé mhion-scrúdu i gCoiste na Dála.

Táim cinnte go bhfuil furmhór na ndaoine sásta leis na prionsiobail ar a laighead san mBunreacht seo. B'fhéidir go bhfuil mion-rudaí annso is annsiúd ann gur cheart iad do leasú. Má thaisbeánann na Dálairí na rudaí seo dúinn, agus má bhímíd sásta mar gheall orra, déanfaimíd iarracht ar iad do cheartú; ach ní mór ciall a bheith leis na tairisgintí sin. Muna mbeidh ciall leo, ní abróchaidh aon duine go mba cheart glacadh leo.

Cuirim an Dréacht-Bhunreacht seo os comhair na Dála. Molaim é don Dáil agus don tír. Tá áthas orm gur thuit an crann orm a leithéid seo d'obair do dhéanamh. Is iomdha lá a bhí muintir na tíre ag feitheamh le lá mar seo. Beidh deis agus faill againn an obair do leasú agus do chríochnú. Níl aon phráinn orainn. Ní abraimíd gur gá an Bunreacht bheith ina dhlí laistigh de chúig nó sé lá nó laistigh de chúig seachtaine, más gá an oiread sin ama chun an obair do dhéanamh i gceart. Ach táimíd sásta nach gá an seal sin. Nuair a bheidh an obair déanta againn annseo cuirfimíd os comhair——

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An ndubhairt an t-Uachtarán cúig nó sé lá?

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Seachtaine. Dubhradh nár ghá é do bheith ina dhlí laistigh de chúig nó sé lá. Is cuimhin leis an Teachta an ócáid nuair nár tugadh fiú is aon lá amháin.

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Ach ní chun obair mar é seo.

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Tá's agam go maith nach eadh. Tabharfaimíd a sáith aimsire don Dáil chun an obair seo do dhéanamh i gceart. Mar adubhras, nuair a bheidh an obair déanta againn, cuirfimíd an Dréacht os comhair muintir na hEireann. Nuair a bheidh ár gcuid féin den obair déanta, táim cinnte go mbeidh muintir na hEireann beagnach uilig sásta leis an Dréacht. Mar tá daoine annseo nach bhfuil Gaedhilg acu, is dócha go mba chóir dom tosnú ar an mBéarla, agus an míniú a thug mé in nGaedhilg do thabhairt i mBéarla. Nuair a bheidh an Bunreacht á phlé againn, is ceart dúinn é do dhéanamh tríd an nGaedhilg agus iarraim ar na Teachtaí ar an taobh seo den Tigh, agus ar an taobh eile, ag a bhfuil an Ghaedhilg úsáid do bhaint aisti sa díospóireacht. Caithfidh mé cromadh ar an mBéarla anois.

I have said that I suppose it is right to speak now to those who were unable to understand me when I was explaining some of the provisions of this Bunreacht, this draft Constitution, in Irish. As I said, the attempt has been made to make this a clear document, one that would be easily read and easily understood. I think that, largely at any rate, that has been achieved. It does seem to me to be a document which is easily understood by anybody who really takes the trouble to read it carefully, and I am sorry to think that there is a number of people who took it upon themselves to criticise it and who have not read it carefully, because if they had I cannot see how they would have had the audacity to make some of the criticisms which they have made.

If you look through it you will find that it is divided into certain well-defined sections. The first section deals with the nation, and asserts the right of the nation to choose its own form of Government, to choose whatever relations with other States it deems to be best in its own interests, and to live its own life in its own way according to its own genius and tradition. In that section, too, is claimed by the nation the whole of the national territory, but, because at the moment we are not in a position to make the will of the majority of our people effective throughout the whole island, it is clearly laid down that the area of jurisdiction of the Government which is provided by this Constitution shall be of the same extent as that of the State, Saorstát Eireann.

In the second section, dealing with the State, the most important matters dealt with are the name of the State; the fact that under God the power of government comes from the people, the people designating the rulers. It is, therefore, from the people that the rulers get, not their authority for ruling, because that authority comes from a higher source, but their immediate designation as rulers. The flag which is accepted as the national flag is laid down here specifically in the Constitution as the tricolour, and the Irish language is definitely specified to be the first official language, whilst English is accepted as the second official language. Except for the Article which says that the property of the nation which formerly belonged to Saorstát Eireann is taken over, there is nothing further of importance I think in that section.

The next section is that which deals with the President, how he is elected, and the powers he has got. He is to be elected by the people as a whole for a period of seven years. Now, nobody would propose getting the whole people to elect a person unless it was proposed to give him substantial powers, and consequently if those powers are in any way to be exercised in connection with legislation it is only right that a person who had got the authority definitely from the people for doing certain things should exercise it. The President's term of office, seven years, was chosen because in a matter of that sort frequent elections are inadvisable. That has been noted by several States on the Continent, a number of which have also chosen seven years as the period of office of the President. We are following possibly the majority in choosing that period. It is not too long, and at the same time it is sufficiently long, I think, to avoid the inconveniences of frequent elections. With regard to the powers that are given to the President, it might perhaps be well to speak a little bit more at length than on the other parts of the Constitution, because some critics have fastened particularly on the powers that are given to the President and pretended that those powers are of a dictatorial nature.

Now, there is nothing, in my opinion at any rate, to justify any such criticism or any such conclusion. The powers that are given to the President in what I might call definitely the executive domain are relatively small. It is true that it is his signature that will go to a number of appointments, but he has himself nothing to do with the selection of the people who are to be appointed. Now, clearly you have not much power if you have to put your signature to something and to accept something which has really been done by somebody else. So far as the executive powers of the President are concerned, if you examine carefully the Bunreacht you will find that those powers are exercised on advice, or that they are exercised after a decision has been taken by other bodies. In this, you will notice that it is the President who will appoint the head of the Government or the Taoiseach. He appoints him; he does the formal act called appointment, but it is not the President who selects the head of the Government. The head of the Government under this Constitution will be selected by the Dáil in the future, as the head of the Government was selected by the Dáil in the past. There is no change whatever as far as the question of selecting the head of the Government is concerned.

That brings me to another matter. One set of critics say that we are creating a dictatorship, and another set of critics say that we have made no change at all. There is no truth in the statement that we are creating a dictatorship. To a certain extent, there is truth in the statement that we have used, and propose to use in the new Constitution, methods which we have used here and found satisfactory in the past. I think there is wisdom in that. In any case, wishing to get this through the Dáil, and wishing to get it to the people and accepted by the majority of the people, I was anxious, naturally, that the things that we were satisfied with should remain: that we should not have change simply for change's sake.

Now, once you determine upon a democratic form of government, representative government, government responsible to the elected representative of the people, the main lines of your Constitution are set. We here have always made clear that we believed in the fundamental right of our people to choose their own Government, the form of their State even, and, believing in that right, we naturally enshrined it in the Constitution. If there is one thing more than another that is clear and shining through this whole Constitution, it is the fact that the people are the masters. They are the masters at the time of an election, and their mastery is maintained during the period from election to election through the President, who has been chosen definitely to safeguard their interests, to see that nothing that they have not in a general way given approval of is passed by the small majority which used to be threatened here as a danger to the country as a whole. It is extraordinary how people change about.

Comment on this

When we decided to act as we are at present, we found people on the other side of the House criticising us and telling us from day to day that a single vote here in the Dáil might land the whole country into a terrible condition: that this was the most absolute Government in the world, and that the vote of a single member was going, we were told, to upset the whole country. Now, feeling ourselves that there was no danger in that, being indifferent from that point of view, and having no fears about it, we have tried to meet those who have fears, but the moment that we try to meet their fears, lo! we are told we are depriving Parliament of its full powers.

Is not that the criticism? It would be very interesting to go back on the debates that we had here for the last year, to take those debates, and to read, for instance, Deputy Professor O'Sullivan's attacks and Deputy Cosgrave's attacks on the power of the Government to pass any Bill: that we were the most absolute dictators, and that by a single vote we could pass in a moment a Bill which was going to rob everybody in the country overnight. That was the threat that was held out during that period, but now because we say, "Well, if there are people who feel like that, then, just the same as in the case of the Seanad, we will give them certain safeguards," and when we provide the safeguards, they come along and say that we are depriving Parliament of its powers. Of course, there is no such thing as logic in matters of that sort. We cannot find it, and we are not likely to get it. Indeed, we do not look for it from the people on the opposite benches.

I was speaking about the fact that we have used certain parts that we found useful and that have been tried. One of the things that we have no hesitation in re-adopting is that the head of the Government should be selected in the Assembly in which the representatives, directly elected by the people, will have gathered. The head of the Government will then be chosen by the Dáil as before. The President's powers of appointment are confined, as I said when speaking in Irish, to putting his name to a paper, to performing the sort of ceremony that was performed when I was first elected and congratulated on my appointment. Seeing, therefore, that the head of the Government is chosen by the representatives of the people, it is foolish to talk of a dictatorship in connection with the President in that matter anyhow. Similarly, in regard to the appointment of the Tánaiste and the other members of the Government, the President does not select them. They are selected, or will be selected, by the head of the Government. He has to bring the names of his colleagues before the Dáil, and get the Dáil's approval before they can be appointed. When he has got the Dáil's approval, he informs the President of what his choice is. He informs him that the Dáil has approved his choice, and then the President performs the formal act of appointment. But the President does not choose the people who are appointed. Surely, there is nothing dictatorial about his power in that connection.

Similarly with the judges. The President does not choose them. They are chosen, or will be chosen in the future, as they have been chosen in the past, by the Executive Council; and when the choice is made, the President's power merely comes in to give formal expression to the decision that has been taken by the Executive Council or by the Government. The President is head of the Army. The supreme command of the Army is vested in him, but it is clearly stated that that command will be exercised in accordance with the law. As the Government are there, with day to day responsibility to Dáil Eireann, and as it is Dáil Eireann that will vote the moneys that are necessary for the upkeep of the Army, it is quite obvious that control will not be permitted to be exercised except by the elected Government which is responsible from day to day to the House of Representatives.

What other powers has he? He appoints the Attorney-General, but the Attorney-General is not selected by him. The Attorney-General is selected by the head of the Government who nominates him. The President has no power to take anybody else but that person. He has no power to appoint anybody else.

Comment on this

Why mark the distinction between the appointment of the Attorney-General and the judges?

Comment on this

Why was it marked before? I am not going to argue questions of detail to-day. I am quite prepared to stand by the present system under which the appointment is made by nomination, which in these cases is carried by the same nomination that selects the members of the Government.

Comment on this

That is not my question.

Comment on this

I am not going to go into questions of detail to-day. This is not the time to go into details.

Comment on this

Why bring up the two matters then?

Comment on this

I ask the Chair to see that I am permitted to continue my speech without interruption. I am prepared at any time when we come to the details to take these points one by one and deal with them. I am simply dealing now with the powers of the President, and I say that, though he has the appointment of the Attorney-General, in fact the Attorney-General is not chosen by him. At this stage that is the only point I want to make. He also appoints the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Comptroller and Auditor-General is not selected by him; the Comptroller and Auditor-General is selected by this House and he cannot do otherwise than appoint the person chosen by this House. So that all these appointments which are to be made by the President are of a formal character and do not suggest, and cannot suggest to anybody who understands how they are done, the idea of dictatorship.

You may say he dismisses these people, too — he terminates their appointment, if you wish. But, again, he only does this on the advice and after the decision of quite different bodies. He would remove judges from office, but if so, it would be only after a resolution passed by the two Houses. The Comptroller and Auditor-General would be removed by him if he had to be removed, but it would be only after a resolution of the two Houses. The Prime Minister or the Taoiseach or the head of the Government is not removable by him; he has to resign unless he has the support of a majority of the Dáil behind him. The President dissolves and summons the Oireachtas, but again he does that on the advice of the head of the Government who has got the support of a majority of the representatives of the people in this House.

There is one difference in this regard between the new position and the old. Under the Constitution which will be repealed by this, a Government which failed to get the support of a majority of the Dáil could not get a dissolution. In this case, it will be possible for a Government that has been defeated to ask for a dissolution and it will be in the discretion of the President to give it or not. That will require careful consideration on his part but, in my opinion, it does lead to the mastery of the people being maintained in a way it could not be maintained under the present system. Again, that is a matter of detail, important no doubt, but a matter that we will be able to discuss in detail when we come to this particular section. I will simply repeat again what I have said when I referred to these appointments—that in this Constitution the President's act with regard to appointments is largely of a formal character and, if you are going to find fault with it, that fault would be that he was given very little power in this particular connection which could justify his election by the people as a whole. If there was not anything in these powers to justify his election, and there were no other powers but the powers given under the heading largely of his executive functions, the proper criticism would be that this man has such little powers that these powers would not justify the expense or the trouble of a popular election to the office.

Let me go on to the other side of his functions—his functions in the legislative domain. Here his responsibility is greater, and his powers in a certain sense are greater, too. I have referred to one very fundamental power given here, and that is the power of acceding to the request of a Government which has failed to secure the support of a majority in the Dáil. I just refer to that and emphasise that it is an important power, and that the wise exercise of it by the President may mean that he is maintaining the supremacy of the people at a time when it is vital that the people's supremacy should be maintained.

With regard to legislation generally, in the ordinary course we will take it that the Dáil by a majority will pass a measure. That measure will go to the Seanad. The Seanad will consider it and may amend it. Generally, I would take it, if the Second House does its duty as mainly a House of revision, because its powers of delay are very limited under this Constitution, we will get between the two Houses a certain amount of agreement, and the measures will pass in future as we have been able to get the ordinary measures in the past. But, if there is a difference of opinion between the two Houses on a matter which is considered by the Seanad to be one of fundamental importance, and if a substantial minority—not less than one-third of the lower House— combine with the majority of the Seanad, and they request the President not to put his signature to that Bill and let it become law until the people have had an opportunity of expressing their will upon it, then that becomes a matter in which the President will carry a serious responsibility. But, according to this Constitution, if the two Houses agree, he has no function but to sign the Bills as brought to him. His function is to see, in fact, that a measure upon which the people have not expressed an opinion is not passed through in circumstances such as the leader of the Opposition here was wont to describe to us some time ago—by a single vote.

Suppose you had a situation where there was a fundamental matter of national importance and that it was passed in this House by a single vote and rejected almost unanimously in the Seanad; that the President was satisfied, and it was obvious from the expressions of public opinion that he noticed that this was a matter on which there was a considerable difference of opinion in the country, then the President would weigh up the situation and say to himself: "Does my duty compel me to send it to the people? Do the differences which exist warrant that the people should be put to the expense either of an election or a referendum?" If he comes to the conclusion that the people's will should be obtained upon it, he tells that to the head of the Government who has presented the Bill to him, having listened, before he made up his mind, to the advice of important people in the State, namely, those who are in the Council of State and who sit in camera.

I want to remind you that this Council of State consists of certain officers of State ex-officio and that it will ordinarily contain the leaders of the big Parties in the Dáil; two members or so from the Government. Ordinarily there will be in it people who had held office as head of the Government formerly. They will, therefore, be in a position to explain or try to make clear any point of view that they may have on it before the President makes up his mind. So that he certainly is provided with a body competent to advise and warn him of any dangers and of all the facts of the situation. He is supposed then to judge for himself, having heard that advice. If the conditions are such as to warrant it, he is in a position to tell the head of the Government: “I am not prepared to sign that Bill until the people's will has been obtained on the matter in question.” Then the Government have a choice. If the Bill is not immediately necessary for their policy, they can let it lie there for any time up to one and a half years. Within that time they can either have an election, and it is sufficient to have an election, because with a matter of that sort held up it will clearly be before the public mind, and the people, when they are electing their representatives, will clearly know and have envisaged the result of the election in regard to that particular measure, so that the matter will be clearly before the public mind if an election is held; or the Government may choose to proceed by way of a referendum. In that way the matter would be submitted to the people directly without an election. In order to weigh the presumption that the Bills which would be passed by the people's representatives in the Dáil are accepted by the people you make sure that the people must definitely veto the measure by a majority of what you may call the effective register. The number 35 per cent. is put down there, because roughly 70 per cent. of the register polls at a well-contested election. The idea was that if you had a well-contested election and the measure was distasteful to the people or they were against the measure for one reason or another that the responsibility should be put on them to turn up and oppose the measure by at least half of what one might call the effective register. The responsibility is on the people who are opposed to the measure. The whole balance is in favour of the people's representatives and the measure is passed unless the people themselves come out and veto it. Consequently, it would be largely a wise measure of power that would be held in reserve to meet very special occasions. It would be a measure that would not be used without very grave necessity but it is useful as a reserve of power.

That is the position. I repeat that as far as an ordinary Bill is concerned the President cannot touch it. He has no veto in the case of an ordinary Bill. His power only comes in when there is a big difference between the two Houses, when there is a matter of fundamental national importance involved and when he is requested by a majority of the Seanad and at least one-third of the Dáil to see that the measure is put to the people, and their will taken upon it.

With regard to other measures, the President has a certain power also. With regard to Constitutional measures, or powers to amend the Constitution, the President has no function. There is a period of three years in which an opportunity is given to make any minor amendments in the Constitution, for, despite all care that may be given to this measure by the Dáil, it is possible that some things might slip through. For that reason there is a period of three years in which an opportunity will be given, if they are small matters of drafting and not Constitutional principles, to change them if the President agrees. But the idea is that this Constitution is to be enacted by the people themselves, and being enacted by the people themselves it would not be right that you should change that by mere legislation. Consequently any measure that is intended to change the Constitution has to go to the people. But the President has no function in connection with it. It might happen that a Bill may be brought in here which, though not expressed to be an amendment of the Constitution, might, in fact, be an amendment to the Constitution. Unless it was assumed that the Constitution might be amended by a Bill, the Bill if passed could not amend the Constitution. That is ruled out. Therefore it would be contrary to the Constitution if such a Bill were passed.

If a law is enacted which is contrary to the Constitution, and if that law is held by the Supreme Court to be invalid, and if certain actions are taken or certain things done under that law, they might not be revocable. It is therefore advisable at the earliest possible stage to draw attention to the fact that the particular Bill is against the Constitution and to stop it in its course at least before it becomes law. That is the special function of the President. If through attending to the discussions here in the Dáil and the representations that may be made by the Opposition or the arguments brought forward in the Seanad, he is of opinion that the measure, if passed, would be invalid by being contrary to the Constitution, the President has the power of sending that measure or referring that measure for decision to the Supreme Court. He can do that before he signs the measure. The measure would become law at the moment by his signature. But it is not the President who decides whether it is against the Constitution or not. His function is simply one of causing the measure to be referred. It is an important power, and I think some functionary or some institution in the State ought to have the power of such reference and there should be no waiting until the measure becomes law. If the measure did become law acts may be possibly done under it, and then these acts may have consequences which are not always removable.

The President also has a function in regard to Money Bills. For the discussion of Money Bills the Seanad has only 21 days. The Seanad has three months for the discussion of an ordinary measure. To prevent any fraud upon the Seanad by compelling them to discuss within 21 days and practically not to interfere with the Bill which they would have a perfect right to discuss if it came in the guise of an ordinary measure, and to prevent the possibility of mistakes by the Chairman of the Dáil, there is an appeal to the President against a certificate of the Ceann Comhairle. There can be an appeal made by the House affected, that is the Seanad. The Seanad may complain to the President that the Bill was certified a Money Bill in mistake. They may ask the President to set up a Committee of Privileges which would determine the issue as to whether the Bill was or was not a Money Bill. The President then selects an equal number of members from each House and appoints the judge to determine the issue. Again the President himself does not determine the issue. He refers it to the Committee of Privileges. If anybody suggests there is a better method, if any Deputy knows of a better method, or if the Dáil agrees to a better method, I am quite prepared to listen to any arguments that may be put forward. I am quite open to listen if anybody can show a better way of selecting the committee. That is one of the functions of the President if the Seanad thinks that a certain Bill should not be certified as a Money Bill.

There is also in this draft of the Constitution provision for a state of emergency. None of us may be certain that some time or another there may not arise a situation in which it is vital to get legislation passed quickly.

Ordinarily, I think the Seanad could be depended upon to see a national emergency with the Government and to accede to the wishes of the Government to have the Bill passed expeditiously. But we might find that would not be the situation, and therefore the primary House, the House of Representatives, are given under this Constitution a very great power, namely, the power of compelling discussion within a very limited period by the Seanad and of compelling a decision by the Seanad within that period, and, no matter what may be the decision of the Seanad, if the Dáil do not accept their recommendations or amendments, the law is passed over their heads. It is clear that if the Seanad were not to agree in a case like that and if that power were given without some form of check, it might be abused. Remember that you cannot by a law arrange for every possible set of circumstances, and you cannot by this Constitution arrange for every sort of possibility. To diminish the chances of a misuse of that tremendous power, the President is put in the position that his consent would have to be obtained; he would have to concur with the primary House, the House of Representatives, before the powers of the Seanad were curtailed to the extent that is suggested here. It will there be seen that he is put in a very responsible position.

Let us take what will ordinarily happen. He will be kept in touch with the position of affairs generally in the country by the Government or the head of the Government from day to day or from week to week. The Government ought to be able to persuade him, giving him all the inner knowledge that they may have about the situation, while they may not be able to persuade a body like the Seanad. If he concurs, then the power of the Seanad to spend a long time over the discussion of such a measure is limited in accordance with the resolution of the House. There is no question of the President coming in a dictatorial way and saying: "This must be done within a certain time." He has nothing to do with the initiation of this; it must be initiated by a majority of the Dáil. His function is that of an umpire, so to speak, to see that the Lower House acts in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. It would have to be a clear and an obvious abuse of power before the President would interfere. If he were to interfere unnecessarily he would be a very foolish man, indeed.

Even in the legislative domain we may not agree. I am not expecting perfect agreement. Nobody who has ever lived could devise a Constitution on which 140 or 150 people would be of the same mind. We have to settle this question in the same way as all differences of opinion are settled, by a vote. I did not dream when I was drawing this up that we would all agree on points of that kind. We can argue them out and balance the pros and cons, and finally come to what, in our opinion, is the best decision. My own belief is that the powers in the legislative domain are the chief powers and the only powers the President has which would justify an election of him by the people. In exercising these powers he is acting on behalf of the people who have put him there for that special purpose. He is there to guard the people's rights and mainly to guard the Constitution. His functions are not of a dictatorial character; they are functions rather of a judicial nature in connection with legislation. Inevitably, I have had to spend more time than perhaps would be justified on this because of the criticisms levelled particularly at that particular section. I now come to the question of the Seanad, which I have referred to a number of times.

Comment on this

What about Article 13, clause 10?

Comment on this

What has that relation to?

Comment on this

It is the one in which you can give the President any powers you like by law.

Comment on this

The Deputy, I think, is a lawyer, and to say that you can give the President any powers you like under that Article clearly indicates that the Deputy has not read the Article, because it is subject to the Constitution.

Comment on this

Will the President explain it to us? We are anxious to hear it.

Comment on this

It is very difficult to explain anything further than what is contained in this, but what it means is this: There may be a time, a particular set of circumstances may arise, when an appointment has to be made. That appointment may be open to be made by any particular person, the head of the Government, the Attorney-General or the Ceann Comhairle. Perhaps it may be thought that it is more consistent with the general working of the Constitution that that appointment should be made by the President, acting on advice. We put it here that whenever he is acting in such a manner he would have to act either on the advice of the Government or after consultation with the Council of State. If by legislation—and that means that the two Houses must agree—it is agreed that this particular function should be given to the President, he would make the appointments on the advice of the Government. If it is not mentioned that it is a thing that he may do at his own discretion, it will have to be done on the advice of the Government. If it is done at his own discretion, it will only be capable of being done after consultation with the Council of State.

Comment on this

One supposes such legislation will be introduced to deal with, say, the appointment of a chief warble fly inspector.

Comment on this

Or a Blueshirt leader, maybe.

Comment on this

This is simply to give an enabling power to Parliament to deal with matters that may be of a routine character. There may be, for instance, the question of the appointment of visitors to a university. It may be appointments of that kind, but they must be subject to this Constitution. The Constitution very clearly defines the area of power of the President and whatever is done cannot be contrary to the Constitution. Therefore, they cannot give him powers that are given to the Government or to Parliament. Suppose there was in contemplation a new university and a settling by law that the appointment of these visitors should be made by the President, you have power to do that under this Constitution. Whether you would have power without it, I do not know. At any rate, it is a sort of omnibus clause to enable certain things to be done. Of course, you cannot arrange for everything in a Constitution of this kind. The intention is to let the lawyers point out if matters are carried out accurately or not, or if certain powers are capable of being used beyond the extent that it is contemplated to use them. I would be glad to hear arguments in that direction.

Comment on this

Surely this Article adds nothing to the powers of Parliament?

Comment on this

We will argue that in detail at another time and the Deputy will have every opportunity of submitting his points. All I am concerned with is to meet the Deputy's point. We have heard a lot of talk about the dictatorial powers of the President and I am simply referring to the matter in passing because my attention has been directed to it. If anybody argues in committee that any power is unnecessary and gives good reasons in support of his argument, we can wipe it out. If anybody suggests that the wording is such that it could be used to give to the President powers not contemplated by us, then we can narrow them down. So far, I do not see anything in the Article, any danger to apprehend. If I am wrong I shall be glad to have my error pointed out to me. That is one of the advantages of having a body like this to discuss such matters in detail. This is a case where the lawyers, if they sat down to help from the professional point of view and did not allow the lawyer to be swamped in the politician, could do good work.

Comment on this

—Sweetly conciliatory!

Comment on this

I am sorry—that is, if I have said anything that is hurtful; but it does genuinely express my view. This matter of the Constitution is going to be interpreted, ultimately, by the Courts. The Supreme Court is going to be the body to decide on its interpretation. I know that a number of people would prefer to get some other body to be the judge in such matters, and I do not want to say, for one moment, that, if I could get another body to deal with the interpretation of the Constitution, and which could decide such matters just as well as the Supreme Court, I would not be in favour of having some body other than the ordinary courts. I know that in other countries, courts are set up, known, roughly, as constitutional courts, to deal with such matters, which take a broader view— again, I do not wish to be hurtful— which take a broader view, or not so narrow a view, as the ordinary courts which, strictly interpreting the ordinary law from day to day, have to take. If I could get from anybody any suggestion of some court to deal with such matters, other than the Supreme Court, then I would be willing to consider it, and, if it were feasible, to adopt the suggestion. I confess, however, that, as I confessed on another occasion with regard to the Senate, I could not get any other body that would be satisfactory. At that time, I could not get a satisfactory Seanad, and so I confess now that I have not been able to get anything better than the Supreme Court to fulfil this function. However, if it were possible to find a better body to deal with these matters, and if the lawyers would help me to put into this an indication whereby it could be suggested to the court that, in constitutional matters, the court should not take a narrow, or, what might be called, a strictly legalistic view, then I would do that; but again that is a course that I found too difficult to put down here and to reduce to practice.

The Deputy, by getting me into another line of thought, has been taking me away from the line which was more or less a synopsis of the measure before us. However, with regard to the Supreme Court, one of its principal functions will be the function of determining whether Acts passed by the Legislature are, in fact, repugnant to the Constitution or not. Now, I was just beginning to deal with the question of the Seanad when the Deputy put me back to the question of the powers of the President. With regard to the Seanad, I think I have already anticipated something I was going to say. In dealing with the question of the old Seanad. I expressed a number of opinions, and one of these opinions was that people who think of an ideal Seanad cannot reduce that ideal to practice—in other words, they cannot get a form of Seanad which even comes near the ideal towards which they are aiming. I challenged the Opposition, two years ago, to produce such an ideal Seanad. I pointed out that it is all very well to say: "Oh, the people's representatives may run amok, and we want to have another body to prevent them from running amok"; but the moment you get another body, so to speak, to guard the guardians, or to watch the watchers, you find that that other body's difficulties are just as great, and that they are just as likely to run amok as the other.

Consequently, I am all the more convinced that such a thing as an ideal Seanad is not possible. At the time, I challenged the Opposition to produce their ideal Seanad. There is, I know, a complaint from the Opposition because of the abolition of the former Seanad and the fact that a Seanad is now proposed in this new Constitution. It must be remembered, however, that I asked the Opposition to come in on the deliberations of the committee that was set up to deal with that matter. They were very anxious that there should be a Seanad, but yet they shirked coming in on that committee. They thought, evidently, that it would be very much better for them to be in the position in which they are to-day— a position of being able to sit back and criticise whatever was being done. Nobody could say that they put forward any constructive suggestions, but they wanted to be able to say: "It is your business to put forward constructive suggestions," and then sit back and criticise whatever suggestions were made.

Comment on this

They would be accused of a breach of secrecy.

Comment on this

There would be no accusations where they were not deserved.

Comment on this

What about Glasgow?

Comment on this

At any rate, we set up a committee to deal with this question of a Seanad, and on that committee there were a number of people who were interested in this particular matter. As far as I could manage it, I got representatives on that committee from all the different Parties. They sat down and considered the question, and the result of their deliberations—I think it is not unfair to say—was, in the main, to prove the thesis that it is not possible to get a satisfactory Seanad; and the only thing that made me put a proposition for a Seanad into this measure at all is this: that there were members on the benches opposite, as I remember, who, during the Seanad debate, said: "Very well, even a bad Seanad would be better than no Seanad at all." It is precisely on that basis—that some Seanad, the best Seanad we can get, even though it may be adjudged a bad Seanad, is still better than no Seanad at all—that this proposal is now included. My attitude is that, even though some of us may be largely indifferent to the question of whether or not there is a Seanad, if a large section of the people of the country think that there is something important in having a Seanad, then, even if we ourselves are indifferent to it, we should give way to the people who are anxious for it.

Comment on this
A Deputy

That is very nice.

Comment on this

Yes, very nice and agreeable. However, we asked the Seanad Committee to sit, and I, personally, was pleased to find—because it was a line I tried to explore a few times, and it did give you that idea of something that would not be a mere reproduction of the other House—that the recommendation was that we should get a Second Chamber that, at least, would be of a character in which there would be represented men who would have special knowledge and experience of certain activities in our national life, and that, though we are not organised in a way that would make such a Seanad immediately practicable, nevertheless there was a germ of a suggestion which we tried to work up and to make practicable. It is quite possible, of course, that those who put forward those schemes would prefer their own scheme unchanged instead of the scheme which is suggested here, but I think we will be able, when we come to the details of that, to convince those who are here at the moment, and those who took part in the deliberations of that committee and who suggested this particular line of development, that what we propose to do here is about as good as can be done in the present circumstances. If anybody can suggest to me that there are objections to what is proposed here, and that these objections can be reasonably maintained, and if anybody can suggest that there are good grounds for improvement, we have open minds on the matter. In fact, in regard to all these questions, our attitude is that, even though we might be largely indifferent as to whether there should be a Seanad or not, if the majority of the people want it, we want to get the best arrangement that can be got.

This proposed Seanad is based on the idea that a number of panels, corresponding to our main activities in life, should form the Seanad; that we should have a panel dealing with national culture and education—the learned professions as they are called —that we should have a panel for farmers, including the fishing industry; that we should have a panel for workers, organised and unorganised, rural and agricultural; and that we should have an industrial panel dealing with the question of public administration, and a panel for industry and commerce. Now, with these panels formed, and with, I think, the 43 members that will be selected from these panels, they will be put before an electorate, which will consist of all persons who had been candidates for the Dáil and who had received more than five hundred first preference votes or been returned unopposed. That electorate shall choose from these panels the numbers that are going to be specified. We have not specified in this measure as it stands before us the details of this proposal. It is not that we cannot offer you a proposal for doing it. We can, but there was no point in enshrining detailed proposals in the measure, when conditions might possibly change and if there were to be here any development of functional organisation or vocational organisation, it would obviously provide a better method for the selection of the Seanad than the methods that are herein proposed. Hence, in this Constitution itself, we are not stereotyping the numbers from each panel or the means of election to each panel. We are leaving that to an Act which can be changed from time to time. In addition, you will notice that a certain number of members are left for nomination. There is, first of all, the question of the number of these members. The number is smaller than has been suggested in any of the commission's reports. There is a smaller proportion relatively, and I think a smaller number absolutely.

Comment on this

We suggested ten out of 50.

Comment on this

It is a smaller proportion, at any rate. I am glad to be corrected, but my impression was that it was a smaller number absolutely and relatively, than in any of the reports of the commission. If ten, as the Deputy suggests, was the number recommended in one of the reports, there is not a very great difference between it and the number mentioned here and relatively the number mentioned in the measure is a smaller proportion. There will be a difference of opinion as to whether that number is too large or too little. There is also a provision in the draft which differs from the provisions and the suggestions made by the commission. That is that the universities should get a representation which they had formerly in the Dáil. My own attitude towards that was determined by the fact that there was a case made here or there had been some suggestion that we had not completely implemented our word in some particular way.

I did not believe that that was well-founded. I do not think now it was well founded but it occurred to me that we ought to meet a suggestion of that sort by giving the universities —we shall have to determine the electorate by law—the power of choosing for the Seanad three members each. That was the number they were entitled to under the old electorate to return to the Dáil. That is a substantial proportion, and consequently there will be placed on the universities the responsibility not merely, as was the case in the educational and cultural panel, to send to the Seanad people who had a special knowledge of education but people who could fairly represent them on the first panel. The numbers we propose for this new panel are diminished, so to speak, or are smaller than they would otherwise be were it not for giving to the universities this power of choosing three members each.

You will then have 11 to be nominated. I gave this matter careful consideration but, after all was said and done, I came to the conclusion that if the President is to fulfil and exercise the serious responsibilities placed upon him by the Constitution, it is better that he should keep away from what I might call the composition of the House and, therefore, the possibility of a suggestion that he is influencing the voting in this House. In considering it there was a desire to give functions to take him away from active participation of any kind in politics—I should not perhaps say politics, but unfortunately we give that term a meaning which it ought not to have—to take him away from party politics. He has to be interested in the broad politics as far as the State as a whole is concerned, but he should not be involved in what you might call party politics or in matters where there are differences of party view. That would give us 17 members with 43 to be elected afterwards. At a later stage when we come to discuss the measure I shall be prepared to give the Dáil an indication as to the numbers which I would propose, if it were left to me, to be allotted to these various panels under the law as I would propose it. That law will have to be passed. Whilst we could indicate at some time in the Committee Stage what would be the terms of that law, I do not think the law itself should be put into effect until the people have passed the Constitution because it would be implementing something which should not be passed until the people had given expression to their opinions on the draft itself. We have therefore got the Seanad. I repeat what I have said before about it, that it is far, as I know quite well, from coming up to the ideal of the perfect Seanad. Their powers are roughly powers that were indicated by the greater number in the commission and you will notice that they are very limited powers. Of course, they have to be limited unless you are to face a clash between the two Houses, which would be most unfortunate.

The next portion of importance in the Constitution is that which deals with the question of international relations. With regard to international relations generally, it does not make a change. It is not intended to make a change, except this change, that it puts the question of our international relations in their proper place—and that is outside the Constitution. It is clearly to the interests of our people that there should be in regard to the fundamental law the greatest possible amount of unanimity, the greatest possible amount of agreement. These are the rules under which all our political institutions are to work. We shall have advanced a great distance indeed if we can get the rules under which we are to work, the things that prescribe all our institutions and the manner of their operation. If we can get substantial agreement on these, a great deal will have been done. The idea of this Constitution is to put this matter of our external relations in its proper position relatively to the Constitution, and that is outside it, as a matter of foreign policy, to be determined from time to time, according as the people's interests suggest to them that they should put this Government or that Government into office with powers to implement their will. That is what is done here. It is done by giving to the executive authority, namely, the Government, which is the fundamental executive authority, power to use any organ, instrument or method of procedure which may be used for similar purposes by other nations with whom we may be associated, no matter what it is. Although it is giving a power which has been clearly and obviously suggested by the exact circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment, nevertheless if we were a completely isolated State in the world, looking around us, and if we thought there was going to be instituted a league which was going to hold itself together by an agreement amongst its members to operate in a certain way, we should have power, if we wanted to, to join such a league. I am not saying that that idea—although I think it is a perfect one in the Constitution, and ought to be there —would have been suggested to me or anybody else except in the context of the existing situation, but there is nothing in it that is derogatory to the powers of the people, of the people's Parliament, of the Government, to do that. Consequently, dealing with our external relations, it enables the Executive Government of the day to make use of it, provided that there is a law passed by the national Parliament which would make that possible. Now, the law can exactly prescribe the conditions. In our case the law has already been passed, and this Constitution takes over that law. Therefore, when this Constitution is passed, as far as our external relations are concerned, no change is made, but the external relations are kept in a position in which they can be dealt with and handled as a matter of public policy, without bringing them across the fundamental rights which govern the working of our institutions.

The next part, as I say, deals with fundamental rights. In the earlier part of the draft Constitution the various institutions are set up, and their powers indicated and defined. In this part, we set down what are the rights which the individual and the family have as against the operation of the otherwise all-powerful Parliament, the Oireachtas, acting on behalf of the community and interested in the common good. These, in order to be accurate, have to be expressed very carefully. You have the natural conflict between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community as a whole. You cannot make those statements in an absolute way. You cannot say: "A person has this right," when the interest of the community as a whole has to be considered in relation to it. Take, for instance, the case of private property. We have clearly said here that the right of private property is a right, as a right, with which the State cannot interfere. But the public good, the public interest, may demand that the exercise of that right may be defined and limited. Therefore, when we are stating that the right, as a right, must be respected and must exist, we also have to note at the same time the fact that the common good, the interest of the community as a whole, may necessitate the delimitation of the use of that right to serve the common good. It is useless then to say: "This is absolute." In matters of that sort it is not absolute. You cannot state those rights in an absolute way. They need to be qualified. Of course the critics will say: "If you qualify them, they are no use at all, because the qualification cannot be limited. There is no use in saying that the right of private property is admitted if you are going to admit to the State the right of delimiting its right absolutely without checking it." You cannot, however, state those things absolutely. All you can do is to give the fundamental principles; to state them clearly and correctly, and leave it to the sense of justice, the goodwill of the community, to work in accordance with the spirit of the declarations.

The same thing is true about liberty. I think it was Deputy Costello in some public statement who suggested that the sanctified phrase. "The liberty of the individual is inviolable," is omitted. It is omitted, because in fact the liberty is not inviolable. Liberty may mean licence, and licence has to be checked and curbed in the common interest. Therefore, instead of stating, as if it were an absolute thing, "The liberty of the individual is inviolable"—which we all knew in fact was not so—it is stated in a way which can be defended and which is accurate; in other words, that if the liberty of the individual is interfered with it will be in accordance with law, for the common good; that that will not be done in an arbitrary way, but that it will be done in accordance with the law. If he has committed a crime, he has done something which is against the interests of the community. I put in the habeas corpus safeguard. I took it word for word from the old Constitution, because I did not want a dispute here. I do not want to pretend for a moment that I think it is ideally expressed, but at any rate it has stood the test over a period, and nobody has suggested to change it. Anxious to save the time of the Dáil, and to concentrate discussion on matters on which there was real difference of opinion, I took that particular part completely as it was, and I make no apologies for doing it. The reasons for doing it are clear and obvious.

Then, we have in this Constitution also the family. We refer to the family, and make it quite clear that in our view the fundamental group of the State—in a sense the most important group of the State—is the family. We pledge the State to protect the family, to protect it in its constitution and in its rights generally. This is not merely a question of religious teaching; even from the purely social side, apart altogether from that, I would propose here that we should not sanction divorce. Therefore no law can be passed providing for divorce. When we come to the details you will find there are further provisions in that connection. I am only just referring to them in passing. There is another Article here which seems to get me into trouble. Deputy Costello apparently thought he was doing a good thing when he offered me as a whole-burnt offering——

Comment on this

I did not offer you; you offered yourself by your draft.

Comment on this

I say no. I say that the Deputy was clever enough to think that that situation would work, and it did apparently.

Comment on this

Well, I am very clever then?

Comment on this

I am not completely burnt out yet.

Comment on this

The fire is being prepared.

Comment on this

Let us consider this whole question of women's rights. I seem to have got a bad reputation. I do not think I deserve it. I myself was not conscious at any time of having deserved all those terrible things that I am told I am where women's rights are concerned. So far as I know, whenever there was a question of working to ensure that women would have equal rights, I have worked for it, and there is nothing in this Constitution which in any way detracts from the rights which women have possessed here. I took out that phrase and I make no apology for this any more than I did for the other phrase about the inviolability of the person. I consider it is a phrase which meant nothing in the context, could not mean anything because it was patently untrue, so I took out that phrase "without distinction of sex." Why? Because I considered it altogether unnecessary. Since we have begun to make laws in any sense for ourselves we have made no distinctions as citizens between men and women, as far as political rights are concerned. There is none suggested here. Citizens are mentioned a number of times, and our citizen law clearly indicates what we understand to be citizens. There is no distinction made in this Constitution, in regard to political rights, between men and women. I took out that phrase "without distinction of sex" because it had no meaning in the context of the Constitution, and in the general atmosphere in which we have been the whole time as far as women's rights politically are concerned.

Somebody wants to put it back. They want to have the reminder that at one time there was a distinction made. If they would take my advice they would let things alone. In Geneva and elsewhere, when women's organisations wanted to make representations to get certain things done, it was to the Irish delegation that they generally came. They came to it when they wanted to have any question moved in regard to their rights. Their attitude all the time was that they did not want to be put in any position other than that of equality, and they have got equality right through this document. There is nothing in it to suggest that they cannot vote for and become members of the Dáil, that they cannot vote for and be Senators, or that they cannot vote for and become President. There is nothing in this Constitution which will debar them from being President of the Supreme Court, from being Chief Justice or from holding any single office in the State. There is no distinction made whatever between men and women as far as the vote, the franchise, office or anything else is concerned. Therefore, I am wondering how it is that they should have been led after that hare which Deputy Costello very nicely started.

Comment on this

The President has not caught it yet.

Comment on this

I would like the Deputy to show it to me.

Comment on this

The President will hear of it shortly.

Comment on this

I am sure the Deputy will be highly amusing when he tries to make me a whole burnt offering, but I assure him that I have not any fears whatever about it. There seems to be something in this that I have not seen, and I would be glad if the Deputy would point it out. Our Citizenship Act, which has been admitted by women's organisations all over the world to be the one which probably of all others most nearly accords with their ideals, remains, and has not been changed. Of course, Deputy Costello says that we are making no special provision for women —that women should have the same rights as men. One can say in answer to that, that we are making no special provision that men should have the same rights as women.

Comment on this

I made no such point.

Comment on this

That is the point, as far as I can see. I read the Deputy's statement because I wanted to make sure about it. I was very anxious about it, and read his statement so that there could be no mistake.

Comment on this

The President got a fright.

Comment on this

Not a bit. The Deputy is making a terrible mistake if he thinks that I am afraid of this particular thing. I am not, because I believe that 99 per cent. of the women of this country will agree with every line of this.

Comment on this

If I convince the President on it, will he put it specifically into the Constitution?

Comment on this

If I am convinced that the Deputy has made a good case, I will have no hesitation, because if there is anything omitted that should have been put in, I am quite ready that it, with anything else, should go in. My anxiety is that we should agree on this fundamental law to the greatest extent possible. That is why it has been introduced in the Dáil for full discussion and for full amendment before it is submitted to the people by way of plebiscite. I would not like to think for a moment that I could not be convinced by truth. I think I can, and if the Deputy makes something that is a real point —and we have a fairly good jury here—and if he is able to make a case that will convince the jury against the case that I make, I am quite willing to let the jury decide.

Comment on this

This is a packed jury.

Comment on this

Oh! What is the Deputy trying to rely on now? That is a very bad beginning for him to make: to declare himself lost before he makes his case. The Deputy tried to frighten us before with threats.

Comment on this

I never did.

Comment on this

If the Deputy will read up some of the debates that we had here he will find instances where he threatened all sorts of terrible things, but his threats did not come right.

Comment on this

Some of them did.

Comment on this

Except when they became a threat to himself—when he went along and tried, as an advocate, to undo what he had done as Attorney-General. That is the only time that I remember that many threats of his were likely to come true, and I forget what was the result in those cases. The Deputy's threats are no longer terrifying, but at one time I was innocent enough to think, when he spoke here, that he was speaking as a lawyer, strictly as such. He has not his wig on here, and therefore I expect that he feels at liberty to make a case that he would not dare to make elsewhere.

With regard to women, they are mentioned in two Articles. But why are they mentioned? They are mentioned to give the protection which, I think, is necessary as part of our social programme, and I am prepared to go with that programme before the country. I do not care what criticism comes from anybody on the basis of it. We state here that mothers in their homes give to the State a support which is essential. Is there anybody who denies it? Is it not a tribute to the work that is done by women in the homes as mothers? Is there any woman who is a mother who will say that it is right that when her husband is idle or otherwise when she has the care of her children that she should be forced by economic necessity—she is not forced by law and is not prevented by law from doing these things—and by our social system to go and earn what is necessary to maintain the household? In regard to labour and in regard to work, our aim ought to be—we may be too slow in arriving at it, but no country has apparently done it yet—that the breadwinner, who is normally and naturally in these cases when he is alive, the father of the family, should be able by his work to bring in enough to maintain the whole household, and that women ought not to be forced by economic necessity to go out and either supplement his wages or become the breadwinners themselves.

This has reference to mothers, and there is no use in bringing into this context young girls and people who are not married. This has reference to mothers whose duties are in the home. By the performance of their duties in the home they give to the State support which is vital and essential. What is wrong in trying to work for a social system in which it will not be necessary for those people, who by the very fact that they are married and have undertaken those duties, and may be assumed to have a preference for performing those home duties, to labour outside? I would like to know from any women's organisation or from any woman what is wrong in saying that we should strive for a social system which will be such as will not compel women to go out and work to supplement either the wages of their husbands or otherwise to maintain the household? It is against the social system that this is directed—to try to remedy it if we can, and to try to work in that direction. We may not succeed, it is true. It is a very difficult thing to bring about. But the present social system, inasmuch as it compels mothers to leave their natural duties as mothers and go out and become breadwinners when their husbands are idle and cannot get work, is a system which we ought to try to reform. One of the reforms should be in the direction of enabling a man, if it is a man, to earn sufficient to cover all his domestic needs; and, if it is a widow who has young children, to enable the State to come to her aid and contribute to such an extent as will not necessitate her leaving her duties as a mother and engaging in outside labour. I do not mind being a whole burnt offering in working for that. I do not care what women's organisations there are or what ex-Attorney-General leads them, I am going, as long as I live, to try and work for that. I do not care a thraneen who says I am reactionary if I work for that, because it is not reactionary. It is very easy for people to use words and, by the use of these words, to try to buttress up a case which, without them, would fall and collapse.

The next place that we have women is in connection with the social directives. With regard to these social directives, some people say: "They cannot be taken cognisance of by the court; why have them there then? They are pious aspirations; they cannot be any more. Why put them there?" My answer to that is that they will be there as a constant headline, something by which the people as a whole can judge of their progress in a certain direction; something by which the representatives of the people can be judged as well as the people judge themselves as a whole. We will judge of our progress in a certain direction by asking ourselves how far we have advanced in this direction. They are intended to be directive to the Legislature. They are not to be determined by the courts for this reason—that it is the Legislature that must determine how far it can go from time to time, in the set of circumstances, in trying to secure these ideals and aims and objectives. It would be clearly absurd that a court should come in and say: "The Dáil has not done this which it might do; it has not gone as far as it could go," and that the determination of that should be left to the court. That determination clearly has to be left to the representatives of the people. The people themselves will have to advance in this direction. They will have to be led by their representatives in this direction; their representatives will have to put up policies to them leading in this direction. If they are to be judged from time to time, it is right that they should be judged by their actions in the Legislature and not that some body like the Supreme Court should become the judge. The people as a whole will have to judge the Legislature in that matter, and the Legislature will have to be its own judge in regard to the set of circumstances and the advances which are to be made.

In that section there is reference to women. From memory I think the reference is that care shall be taken by the State, so far as the State can do it through its laws, that the inadequate strength of women and children shall not be abused. What is wrong about that? Is it not right that we should see that the inadequate strength of women and children should not be abused? Is it not the duty of the State to see that the free exercise of the right of industry shall not be conducted in such a way as is going to make for that? Are we to go back to the beginning of the industrial era? Are we, through our laws, and through the regulations made under these laws, to make certain that the inadequate strength of women shall not be abused? Where is the derogation from the rights of women in that? Is it not a fact that the inadequate strength of women has been abused? Is it not right that the Parliament, on behalf of the people as a whole, in the interests of social order and the good of the community, should see to it that the inadequate strength of women should not be abused or that they should not be exploited in that particular way?

Comment on this

Who said it was not right?

Comment on this

I am speaking of places where women are referred to in this Constitution. This Constitution has been attacked on the ground that it is taking away women's rights. What it is doing where women are concerned is that, where their rights are, they are equal. Therefore, where they are referred to here, they are referred to by way of protection and the protection which the State is bound to give. We say, therefore, that the inadequate strength of women or the tender age of children should not be abused. We also say that women and children ought not to be forced by the necessity of the economic system as it operates, that we ought to try and prevent this economic compulsion driving women into avocations unsuited to their sex or strength or age. What is wrong about that, I should like to know?

Comment on this

Why not put in the Book of Proverbs? We all agree with it.

Comment on this

If you do all agree, is it not a good thing to have it there as a headline?

Comment on this

Why not put in the Book of Proverbs?

Comment on this

The Book of Proverbs is not quite as germane to our work here as social objectives which we should try to reach. The social system at present, as the Deputy must know, is not anything like what it ought to be; it is not like what it ought to be anywhere in the world. It ought to be our constant endeavour to try to remedy it. One of the best ways of remedying it is to set out definitely objectives which you should try to reach.

Comment on this

Pious resolutions.

Comment on this

It is not going to be done by pious resolutions. I am not suggesting that pious resolutions would settle it. The Deputy knows well that I am not suggesting it. I say it is a good thing to have the Dáil and the people as a whole to agree upon and state: "These are the aims towards which we should work." If you have anything against it, do at least with us, who are strongly in favour of it, what I do in regard to matters about which other people are indifferent. You may be indifferent whether this is here or not; we are not. We believe it should be here. I think it should be here as a constant reminder to the Legislature of the direction in which it should work. I will bet that, once it is there, there will be nobody in the House who will make such use of it on the hustings as Deputy Morrissey. We are making him a present there. If he works in that direction he will get my support in trying to make these things effective.

Comment on this

You have not been very successful anyway.

Comment on this

More successful than your Party.

Comment on this

The next thing is this: that women should not be forced by economic necessity to enter into avocations unsuited to their strength or sex or age. Is it going to be suggested that economic necessity does not at this moment force women into avocations unsuited to their sex; occupations they would never dream of entering if they were left to their own choice? There is no suggestion that women should be stopped from entering into avocations for which they have aptitude or will or desire.

Comment on this

Emigration.

Comment on this

I am admitting straight off that the desire to get wages and money is forcing people into employment, if not unsuited to their age or strength, certainly employment that I should prefer given in this country rather than given elsewhere. I am not denying that these economic evils exist. I am not suggesting that putting this here will cure these economic evils at the start. Putting this here will mean that it is like a party programme. It is put there and it is up before the people. It is a national programme this time, not a party one. If this draft Constitution is accepted by the Dáil and the people, it no longer becomes a party programme. It becomes a national people's programme. Just as we, since we came into office, took our declarations and checked them and asked ourselves, "have we done this?" or "have we done that?" so, as we get towards this aim if it is accepted by the people as a whole, the people can examine their aims and see how far their resolution to do these things has been acted up to. I challenge any women's organisation to say that it is wrong to have a declaration in the Constitution that economic necessity shall not be used to force women into avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength.

There is another Article with regard to the equality of all citizens before the law. I am not going into the history of that phrase or its origin, either here or on the Continent. But that phrase is being used for a purpose and interpreted in a sense in which it was not interpreted in the beginning. That phrase is interpreted as meaning that in all our laws there could be no distinction between sections of the community and between individuals in the community. It is quite clear that that interpretation is absurd. The Chief Justice is permitted by law to do things which a bank clerk will not be permitted to do. There is cognisance taken in our law of social functions, and one cannot absolutely state that all citizens, as human beings, are equal before the law. You cannot deduce from that that our laws are not to take cognisance of absolute social or physical capacity. Is a child, for instance, to be held as responsible for certain actions, a child whose will and mind are not developed, as a matured person? Are our laws to insist that he should be held as responsible as a person who was mature? Clearly not. Therefore, if you want to make a statement with regard to the equality of persons before the law, you must modify such a statement by making clear in what sense they are equal before the law. You must put in the modifications to make it clear that it is not intended to state that in your laws you shall not have cognisance of social functions, capacity and so on. A lunatic, a person who loses control of his mind, is not to be held responsible, and we will have laws which will deal with such persons and which will deal with other matters of the same type. Therefore this Article is an attempt to state exactly in what sense the law is going to deal with persons.

I fear I have tired the Dáil somewhat with this statement. We will have an opportunity of dealing with these matters in detail. I want to repeat what my attitude in regard to the Constitution is. It was clear that a Constitution was necessary and urgently necessary. No people more than the Opposition were so insistent in saying that the present position leaves the Government with tremendous powers and without check, and that, in the interests of the community as a whole, it would be better not to leave them these unreasonable powers. Therefore, it is that the Constitution is necessary. It is necessary also from the point of view of bringing to completion that series of step-by-step changes which, taken as a whole, have left the old Constitution a tattered and torn affair. The Draft Constitution is, therefore, necessary. The aim has been, if possible, to present the Dáil with a Draft which would be likely to get the greatest possible amount of support. I would like that we would be unanimous about it because, clearly, unanimity in that case means stability. That was what the old Constitution did not have as a basis. A Constitution like this, if it is properly thrashed out, and if we are reasonable one with another and do not try to play politics but realise the responsibilities of the work in which we are engaged should be of great national benefit. We are not going now to say that the last line of this Draft should become law.

I do not at this Stage want to follow Deputy Costello into another mistaken argument of his that this is an amendment of the old Constitution. It is not. I do not think we could amend the old Constitution in this way. The only way in which you can get a Constitution is to get the people themselves to enact it or get them to elect a Constituent Assembly to enact it. That is my view. I do not think there would be any Deputy more quickly on his feet than Deputy Costello if I suggested I was moving in that direction. Deputy Costello would be telling us that he would have a grand time going to the Supreme Court asking them to say that the Constitution was ultra vires. But neither Deputy Costello nor anybody else can tell us that this Draft Constitution is ultra vires for it is the people themselves who will enact it. They are the authority. The people have power to determine from time to time who their rulers will be and also what their Government will be. The Government can go back to the people and the people can effect that revolution and change their form of government as long as it is referred to themselves. In this case they will be doing that and I would like to see the lawyers who would stand in their way. This Draft Constitution, if passed at all, is going to be passed by the sovereign people who are above the lawyers and above the Government and all others. Their will is the final decision and once they have voted on it and their elected representatives come together this Draft becomes, in accordance with its own terms, law within a certain date.

If the new Dáil passes a resolution that this Constitution is to come into operation, then before six months it comes into operation. If the new Dáil neglect their duty, even whether they like it or not, it becomes law within six months from the date of the plebiscite. Therefore, it is that in this case we are not bothering very much about what the lawyers think or say about this Constitution. I know, however, that the lawyers would have a lot to say about it if it were brought in as an amendment of the old Constitution. This is a new Constitution put before the people and the people will enact it with such amendments as we may make here. When it is enacted it is the foundation law of the sovereign people of this country and, I, therefore, put it before the Dáil. Any amendments or improvements will be considered by us with an open mind. All we ask is that these amendments be moved in good faith—we assume that—that there is strength and sense behind the amendments, and that this Draft is capable of being amended. There is a requisite period in which that can be done but we must get our work done. There are certain fundamental principles for which we must fight, otherwise the whole thing will go to pieces. We must bear in mind what the acceptance of these amendments would mean. We must bear in mind whether in principle these amendments would be acceptable or not. The amendments will have to be upon questions of detail. We would naturally have to resist amendments which would strike at the whole thing and interfere with the principles of the Constitution, which will make for stability at home, in as much as it will incorporate the greatest extent of agreement as far as political opinion about the foundations are concerned.

These other matters about external relations and other things are outside matters and they will have to be fought out in a different way. We can, I think, if we only had the will to do it, approach this document in the spirit of its Preamble—that it is intended to provide a basis for internal good order, social order, here; that it is intended to secure the dignity and freedom of the individual and that it is intended, finally, to have peace here, to bring about the unity of our country as a whole, and to have accord with other peoples.

Comment on this

When the President says there are some parts of this document that we have to fight over, am I to understand that the Government Whip is on for the Second Reading?

Comment on this

Of course it must be on in regard to principle. We must get some order.

Comment on this

So the Government Whip is on for the Second Reading?

Comment on this

I have got to take the responsibility that anybody who prepares such a measure with care has to take. The passage of this measure is in the interests of the country, and everybody else who is in the Party will naturally expect the same thing. I have indicated the position to the Party and to our people generally. I have indicated the procedure. This is not a thing in which we have no interest. We have an interest, and when the Second Reading is over and the principle is accepted, then, with regard to points of detail, we have definitely an open mind. Quite clearly in this case of the Second Reading it is a question whether we are going to have this Constitution or none at all. That is a matter of fundamental importance, and it is one which we have to fight just as we would in the case of any other measure.

Comment on this

I move:—

To delete all words after the word "That" and substitute the words: "the Dáil declines to give a Second Reading to Bunreacht na hEireann since, while purporting to establish a Constitution for the whole of Ireland, it offers no basis for union with the North and contains various provisions tending to prolong partition."

During the last two and three-quarter hours I have been coming to the conclusion that the arrangements for an early general election will have to be reconsidered, if all Ministerial utterances on this Constitution are to be delivered, first, in what both the old Constitution and the new Constitution somewhat misleadingly call the national language——

Comment on this

Why misleadingly?

Comment on this

——and are then subsequently delivered in the language which is the only one understood by 80 per cent. of the Deputies with sufficient thoroughness to follow an argument closely. I confess that the procedure had a damping effect on my spirits, and I do not think that I was singular in that experience; for many were the Deputies who, during the part of the speech in the national language, folded their tents like the Arabs and slipped silently away; and among those who remained, many were the heads that drooped on to Deputies' breasts, wrapt, no doubt, in profound reflection; and even in the case of those who were apparently awake, the expression of eager interest and attention with which they were wont to listen to the accents of their Leader was conspicuously absent.

But, joking apart, I do think that it is almost unbelievably frivolous that this measure, a measure so important, a measure which, once passed, will be so difficult to change after three years, because I should think the Oireachtas would be very slow to put the people to the trouble and expense of a referendum for the sake of a constitutional change, a measure which we will have such difficulty in any case in discussing adequately before the time set for the general election—I do think it is frivolous to waste the time of the House, and I do not wish to say that offensively, by spending one and a half hours or so explaining it in a language which very few Deputies understood and then re-explaining it in a language which they did understand.

I find myself in a somewhat peculiar position in moving the rejection of this Constitution, because, except in so far as it affects our relations with the other nations of the British Commonwealth and our relations with Northern Ireland, I like this Constitution. I find that the greater part of it commands not merely my support, but my warm support. I think that the bulk of the criticisms that have been directed against it have been misconceived. I scanned it personally with a jealous eye to see whether there was anything in it that amounted to even a tendency towards dictatorship. I think the short answer to those who say that there is, is that the President of the Executive Council has infinitely more power at the present moment than either the Taoiseach or the Uachtaran has given to him under this Constitution.

But, if the President has had to meet criticisms of that nature, it has not been solely the fault of his opponents. There have also been some indiscreet and misguided friends who have created that impression. The Irish Press has published enthusiastic laudations of the Constitution from Italy and Germany. The reason why the Constitution has appealed to Italy and Germany has been because it is regarded by them as an attack on Great Britain. At the present moment their feelings towards Great Britain are extremely hostile, and their hostility towards Great Britain is, to a large extent, bound up with their hostility towards democracy. And so it is that the Italian accounts of this Constitution go the length of suppressing, when reproducing Article 5, which says that Eire is a sovereign independent democratic State, the word “democratic.” The Italian accounts go to the length of suppressing that word, “democratic,” and the German article quoted by the Irish Press this morning makes the suggestion that what President de Valera intends to do is to absorb in himself both the office of Uachtaran and the office of Taoiseach.

Comment on this

Which would be impossible under this Constitution.

Comment on this

I quite agree; but I wish to point out, merely, that enthusiastic friends may be just as responsible for certain misunderstandings as interested and hostile critics.

Before I turn to the main subject of my motion, having referred to this question of dictatorship, I should like to say a word about the Seanad—a question in which I have been specially interested. I am satisfied with the powers given to the Seanad in this Constitution, but I think that the President might have been a little more encouraging and a little more inspiring than he was in his speech, or in the tone of his speech, to those who will be composing this Seanad in the future; because I am bound to say that, in my opinion, the President spoke about their functions with a good deal less respect than, I think, they deserve. I think that the members of the future Seanad will play a very important part in the political and economic life of this State and that they will perform a very valuable function. I agree, of course, since I was one of those who recommended it, with the idea of vocational panels; but I disagree with the method of the choosing of Senators from these panels. I am glad to say, however, that there is one Article which seems to have escaped attention, which mitigates this evil: and that is the Article which says that provision may be made by law for the direct election by any functional or vocational group or association or council of so many members of Seanad Eireann as may be fixed by such law in substitution for an equal number of the members to be elected from panels of candidates. My view, however, is that there is no reason, assuming that the panels are small, as they ought to be, and that they are carefully selected, as they ought to be, why the selection of the Senators from the panels should not be carried out by lot. Every single person who finds himself on the panel will be there because he is considered to be a person who is qualified to be in the Senate, and I do not see why the limited choice that will remain to be made should not be made by lot. If, however, there is some insuperable objection in the minds of the Government or of Deputies to that, I should far prefer the Council of State to make the selection as against election by a mixum-gatherum of successful and unsuccessful candidates for the Dáil.

Now I come to the question which interests me most, and that is the question of the unity of Ireland, which all of us here in this House have agreed ought to be the paramount issue in our politics, and in that regard I feel compelled to take the view, and to ask the House to take the view, that the Government, in this draft Constitution, have misused a great opportunity. It is not of course that any legislation here could immediately solve the problem of partition; that problem can only be solved by inducing the Northern Unionists to give their first allegiance to Ireland— to put the peace, dignity and happiness of Ireland before any other loyalty. For this to be possible, we have got to offer them an Ireland in which a place can be found for their traditions and aspirations as well as for ours. Until we are willing to do this we are partitionists at heart, no matter how loudly we shout about unity.

The six Northern counties will have no part in the coming plebiscite on these constitutional proposals. They are not represented here to-day, except perhaps the constituency of South Down. We, who are claiming jurisdiction over all Ireland, have therefore imposed upon us the duty of exercising imagination and sympathy, of acting as the trustees of those who are absent, of taking into account the objections that would probably be raised by the spokesmen of the Northern Unionists if they were among us participating in our deliberations.

From this point of view, Sir, the first great fault of these proposals is the omission of the King except in so far as he survives, precariously, as an organ or instrument for external use only. Every other self-governing unit in the Commonwealth disdains the conception of employing some agency outside itself for the conducting of international relationships. The other members of the Commonwealth find it more dignified to adopt the King as an integral part of their internal constitution, so that they are in a position of complete equality with Great Britain instead of becoming a sort of hanger-on or satellite, which is what is implicit in external association. I suggest that it would be far more valuable to employ the King as an organ or instrument for securing Irish unity than as an organ or instrument for appointing Ministers to foreign countries. There is an intense sentiment about the Throne in Northern Ireland. I shall not deny that it is often unworthily exploited, often mixed up with less respectable feelings and passions, but the sentiment is there, and is, I believe, as fundamental with them as our love of independence is with us. Events like the Coronation could be so used as to contribute powerfully to Irish unity; we prefer to let it raise fresh barriers and harden feeling against us. In this new Constitution we are creating a ceremonial head of the State with considerable dignities and powers. He could also be the King's representative without the smallest infringement of our nationhood or our liberties. As, however, he is not to be the King's representative, his existence will make us less attractive than ever to the Northern Unionists.

The next point to which objection would certainly be taken is our failure to make an open declaration of our membership of the Commonwealth. My own feeling is that the fears of the North on this subject are exaggerated; no Parliament here will ever leave the British Commonwealth unless it is turned out willy-nilly by the other members. Separatism has run its course. Once again our republicans have abstained from declaring a republic. The moment for breaking the last link has not come, and will never come if they can help it. For some time past the pretext for delay has been that our writ did not run in the Six Counties, but that objection applies equally to the present Constitution. To declare a republic for the whole of Eire would be no greater an excursion into the realms of unreality than to do what this Constitution purports to do. Why is it not done? Because we cannot afford to be treated as aliens by Great Britain. But however unfounded the fears of the North, they exist. They fear the severance of political and racial ties that are dear to them. They fear a customs barrier that might destroy their shipbuilding industry, their linen trade, their agriculture. Their stomachs turn—and I do not blame them—at all the huggermugger with which our membership of the Commonwealth is associated, and at our fear of going into conference with the representatives of the other States that compose it.

Thirdly, and less importantly from the Partition point of view in my opinion, there is a clause in this Constitution about the special position of the Catholic Church. I confess that this clause appears to me to be entirely without meaning. No preferential treatment is in fact being given to Catholics or Catholic institutions as compared with other religions. Some people, apparently, think that it is the business of the State to declare that one religion is true and others are false, but the clause in question does nothing of the kind. It merely states that the Catholic Church is the guardian of the religion which holds the allegiance of the great majority of our people, and that special position, if it be a special position, would apparently have to be accorded to Presbyterianism, Mohammedanism or Buddhism if it happened to be the religion of the majority. If equal treatment for all religions by the State is heretical, then I am afraid that this Constitution is as heretical as its predecessor. Professor Berriedale Keith, writing in the Irish Independent, has fastened on this clause as the one most likely to obstruct union with the North. I can hardly attach much importance to it, because I do not perceive that it has any practical implications. But certaintly it would be better absent as far as Partition is concerned. I do not know if there are any other arguments for it that have not occurred to me; I am open to conviction.

Finally, the Northern representatives, if we had them here, would, I think, object to being compelled, even when speaking English, to refer to the Prime Minister as the Taoiseach, and to the Second Minister as the Tanaiste, and to our common country as Eire instead of Ireland. What have we to gain either in patriotism or culture by this kind of childishness? This may seem a trifle, but it is the sort of thing that irritates as well as lending itself to ridicule. I wonder why it is that the office of the President is to be exempt from this process of Gaelicisation. Is it possible that the future holder of that office fears that the solemnity of some of his ceremonial functions would be impaired if people had to address him as "Uachtarain" instead of "Mr. President"?

Comment on this

Because it is difficult to get the word after the article in Irish without a change in form.

Comment on this

I am rather shocked that the President should make that concession to our weakness.

Once again, Sir, partition can only be cured when we attain some unity of heart and mind, when we are able to gather up conflicting traditions and aspirations and fuse them into one national life. The preamble to this draft Constitution states that we remember the heroic struggle of our fathers to regain national independence. It is right and proper that we should. But that is not the only thing that we ought to remember. We ought to remember the guarantee for the preservation of that independence that would be given by full membership of the Commonwealth, securing us from attacks from all quarters, even from Great Britain herself. We ought to remember the share that our forefathers had in founding and developing that Commonwealth and the place that our kith and kin have to-day in guiding its destiny. We ought to remember that there are about 1,000,000 of our people, with so many generations behind them that it is absurd to call them invaders and intruders, who have got to be conciliated if this nation is to grow to its full stature. We ought to remember the long agony of Irish history—an agony not wholly due to wrongful oppression but also in part to tragic misunderstandings, prejudices and inability to compromise. Much as we differ from them, horrible as are some of the deeds committed by what I may call their underworld, there is much in the Northern Unionists to like and admire. It is true that adroit politicians have often inflamed their passions for party purposes, but I question whether any political loyalties could have lasted as long as those of our Unionist fellow-countrymen in the North, if there was not something in them deserving of respect. It is we who seek unity and it is on us that the burden lies of showing vision, kindliness and courage. It is because we stand at a turning point and these proposals invite us to take the wrong turning that I ask the House to reject them.

Comment on this

I formally second the amendment proposed by Deputy MacDermot. I think it is desirable that the President should have an opportunity of clearing up the obscurity of our relations with Northern Ireland to which Deputy MacDermot adverted. I may say, too, that I agree with most of Deputy MacDermot's remarks about the Constitution, that it is a well-framed, well-balanced, equitable piece of work, thoroughly democratic, broad-based on the people's will, but it is rather lamentable that our future relations and our present relations with the North should remain in this ambiguous position. I do not know whether Article 15 was designed to erect a bridge with the Northern Counties. Perhaps the President would clear up that matter for us later.

Comment on this

I move—

To delete all words after the word "That" and substitute therefor the words "The Dáil declines to give a Second Reading to Bunreacht na hEireann until six months after the reassembly of Dáil Eireann following the next general election."

My original intention was that the additional words should run like this:

"so that urgent matters of vital interest to the people might have at the present time the undivided attention of the Government, the Dáil and the people."

I propose the amendment standing in my name because this is May, 1937, and the next month is June, 1937.

Comment on this

And the last month was April.

Comment on this

The economic war again.

Comment on this

I know the last month was April, and I shall be prepared to hear the Minister for Finance or any Deputies on his side reply to the things that I am bringing before the House now that have a direct relation to the matters that the President spoke of, particularly in the latter part of his contribution here to-day, the only part in his Second Reading speech that had any really vital interest for the people. It is because this is May, 1937, and the next month is June, 1937, that I consider that in the interests of those things for which the Constitution has been framed, that is the fundamental rights of our people, the Government, the Dáil and the people to-day should give their undivided attention to other matters not specifically dealt with in this Constitution, but that ought to have some more effective reference in this Constitution than they have, that I am asking that this matter should be postponed. The President in his Irish statement, after a long description of what I have come to call the "an ox, my ox" type of contribution to the Second Reading debate on the part of Ministers, then referred to those sections of the Constitution dealing with cirt, teaghlach, creideamh agus maoin-phriobháideach, and he said "Ní gadh morán do radh ortha san." We need not say much about the family, about personal property, about religion, about personal rights. In his Second Reading speech the President tells us that he need not, in his speech, say much about these things. He spoke a lot about the Irish language; he spoke a lot in the Irish language. What I want to tell the President, and what I want to tell the House is that in this Constitution, written as it is, carefully prepared as it is, and in his speech to-day he is laying cut flowers on the grave of some of those things that he mentioned with such particular care to-day if he does not look after the thing alone that can support any of those things—the family, or constitutional rights, or culture of any kind—and that is the economic well-being of the people. The Irish language is to be saved. It outrages my feelings to think of the meticulous care that has apparently been given to details in this Constitution, and how completely, in the President's address here to-day, the fundamental fact was ignored. Our dignitary of one kind or another is to be called "Taoiseach" or "Tánaiste," because if he was called an Uachtarán we might have the unfortunate and ignorant people of this country talking about "an asal" instead of "an t-asal," about "an ubhall" instead of "an t-ubhall."

Comment on this

Evidently the Deputy was not listening either to Deputy MacDermot's question or to my reply.

Comment on this

I say that somebody here is to be called "Taoiseach" or "Tánaiste" because if we called him an Uachtarán we might be calling an t-asal an asal and the Irish language might be destroyed. Somebody is to be called an Cathaoirleach lest we have the destruction of the Irish language by people in this House being unable to say "A Chinn Comhairle." Those are the finnesses that have been introduced into the President's work on this Constitution. He has heard, and so has his Ministers, the voice of the Irish-speaking people in the Irish-speaking districts, who want their personal rights maintained, who want their family safeguarded and secured, who want their religion safeguarded, who want the right to have some personal property of any kind. What cry comes from the Irish-speaking districts? It is "...Go bhfuil feirmeoirí na Gaedhealtachta so i ndeire an anama.... Tá cuid mhór des na feirmeoirí beaga agus na sclábhaidhthe gur truagh é a gcás ag iarraidh greim bídh a shólathar dóibh féin agus dá leanbhaí bochta; cuid aca chómh dealbh san nach féidir leo mála plúir deich gcloch a cheannach le chéile." That is the cry which comes from Ballyvourney. That is the cry which comes from the Irish-speaking families. The small farmers and labourers there are so poor that they cannot go out and buy a ten stone bag of flour at the present time to keep their families alive. Why? The President is again told, in the cry from the Irish-speaking districts: "Caithtear beatha-lámh a thabhairt dos na ba bainne sa cheanntar so ar feadh naoi mí den bhliain. An mhin bhuidhe a thugtí dhóibh. Caitheadh eirghe as." They cannot give hand-feeling to cows because they have not the money to buy it. Their cry still is: "Tá tionnscal na muc ar bruachaibh báis. Tá na feirmeóirí ag eirghe as bheith ag tógaint banbhaí agus ag ramhrughadh muc. Ar an gcuma gcéadna, tá luigheadú éachtach tigithe ar an méid eanlaithe a coimeádtar anois, agus, mar thoradh ar sin, ar líon na n-ubh. Díoladh na gamhna nú na croicinn ar 1/6 an ceann anuiridh agus arbhú anuiridh. Gheibhtí £2 agus £3 an ceann ar an gamhna roimis seo."

That is the cry which comes to-day from the Irish family that wants its rights protected; from the Irish family that is maintaining the Irish language, and maintaining it in a way in which none of the President's speeches can be of any assistance, and no Constitution written bilingually can be of any use. The people of the Irish-speaking districts in their cry in Irish, tell the President to-day that they cannot feed their milch cows because they have not the price of the hand-feeding that has to be fed to them in those districts for nine months of the year; that their bacon industry is destroyed; their pig industry; that an enormous reduction has taken place in the amount of poultry that they had, and the amount of eggs that they had to get; that the calves which long ago brought them in £2 or £3 had to be sold for 1/6 each last year and the year before.

That testament has come from the Irish-speaking districts, not in any political pamphlet, but from a public meeting presided over by the parish priest in one of those districts where we have fixed up a preparatory Irish college for the retaining of the language there. Unless the rights of those people to make, in their own natural way, the best use of the resources they have, unless they can get some chance of developing their resources in their own way without the type of interference they have recently had, no Constitution that the President or anyone else is going to draft will be of any use to them. The President told us that they are in no hurry to get this Constitution there. He told us that in Irish. In English he told us there is urgency. Why? Because the Opposition have pointed out that the Government to-day have powers which they ought not to have, and therefore there is urgency, according to the President, at the present time to correct some of his constitutional mistakes. As to the constitutional mistakes that are being corrected this month and next month, the corrections are going to be a continuation of those mistakes. What we want, if the constitutional rights of the people are going to be preserved to them, is that the economic mistakes of the President and his Government be corrected to-day. The reason why I ask for the postponement of dealing with this matter on the part of the Dáil now is that if the opportunity of May and if the opportunity of June are allowed to pass, then there are economic mistakes of the President and his Ministers for the last five years that it may not be possible to correct. I want to point out to the House that there is an attack being made to-day on our economic future, and that at the time when that attack is being made we are being asked by the Executive Council to discuss all those fine details of abstract rights. While we are being asked here by the Executive Council to discuss all those fine details, the real foundation upon which men and women can be raised in this country either to appreciate their rights or to use their rights, and using their rights, to build up a Christian civilisation here, is being dug from under our feet, and right well the President and his Ministers know it.

The President spoke, at the end of his English address here, about the position of mothers, but anything that he had to say was on the position of fathers. The President has a pious idea in his mind that he wants to see mothers in the position that they will not have to go out and either supplement or bring in a substitute for the earnings that the fathers of the house ought to have. When he talks so piously about the future that he sees for mothers, or that he wants to see— the position for mothers that he wants to scrap the present social order in order to bring about—he is talking about the position of fathers. We have seen that the position of fathers has been worsened in this country during the last five years; that the position of women has been made more secure; of boys more secure still; and of girls even more secure still.

So far for the constructive work here. In so far as there is constructive work going on here, the position of the father has been made less secure than the position of the woman; the position of the boy has been made more secure than the position of the woman herself, and the position of the girl has been made more secure than that of the boy, the man or the woman. On the destructive side the whole of their future is being dug away. We have the position to-day that in London, in spite of what the President may say with regard to what is going to be done in regard to the Economic Conference there—I am not talking about the President going to the Economic Conference or any particular kind of conference—but I am talking about him going into those places where we require our arguments to be heard and our ears and eyes to be opened in order to see whether our economic interests are being prejudiced to-day. There is being discussed, and there will be discussed during this month of May, in London, matters that are going to affect the whole future of the commercial and trading policy of Great Britain. There is in Great Britain, and outside of Great Britain, an attack being made on the policy which is being pursued by Great Britain at the present time which is of vital interest to us; and not only are the members of the Executive Council and of the Fianna Fáil Party neglecting to keep a watch on that, but they are dragging a discussion of this measure before us, the Opposition, at the present time and before the country in a way that is going vitally to prejudice the interests of this country in the future.

I just want to refer briefly to the volume of interests that we have in this matter, and to the amount of damage that is going to be done. An attack is being made to-day on the principles upon which economic arrangements were made between the various countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations at Ottawa. A definite preference was given to Commonwealth countries in respect of agricultural produce. On the dairying side there was prevented, by the co-operation of the members of the British Commonwealth, the putting of quantitative restrictions on dairy produce in Great Britain. On the meat side, in fact, there was prevented the putting of quantitative restrictions. We did not help in any way in regard to that. Our representatives went to Ottawa and came away losing the advantages that we had when they went there, and bringing greater disadvantages with them on their way home. The agreements that were made at Ottawa had certain results in increasing the value of the British market to the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that position is now being attacked.

Comment on this

On a point of order. Would the Deputy say what this has got to do with the Constitution?

Comment on this

It has got this to do with it, that the rights of Mayo families cannot be preserved except they get a chance of earning their living.

Comment on this

Do not be talking clap-trap !

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

As I understand the Deputy, he is relating his remarks to proposals which, I dare say, he has under consideration, that in the Constitution special provision should be made for trading with Commonwealth countries.

Comment on this

No. My point is that I want this proposal postponed in this House because, during this month, we should have the attention of the Government, the Dáil and of our people concentrated in an undivided way on critical matters affecting the economic present, and, particularly, the economic future of our people. I want to inform Deputy Walsh from Mayo how much more vital it is that we should give the Government here an opportunity of considering those matters during this month than that we should be held here and have our people distracted in considering in an abstract way the family and the family's rights and the family's future.

Comment on this

Please do not be talking clap-trap. This is all electioneering.

Comment on this

It may be clap-trap to certain people in this House to say that there is no use in talking of the family and of the family's rights, that there is no use in talking of religion or of private property while you have this position: that at a meeting in one of the principal Irish-speaking districts in which we have set up a college to preserve the language, the people there have memorialised the Minister for Agriculture saying that they cannot keep their milch cows, that they have had to give up the rearing of pigs, that, to a considerable extent, they have gone out of the rearing of poultry and the raising of eggs, and that no longer have they any income from their calves. All that may be clap-trap, but I would like if the Deputy would allow me to go on and deal calmly with these matters.

Comment on this

And the Deputy knows that that resolution was drafted in No. 3 Merrion Square.

Comment on this

The Minister for Finance, not for the first time in his life, has shown that he is quite capable of using his imagination.

Comment on this

I wonder what the Deputy did for those people when he was a Minister?

Comment on this

I am dealing with a simple matter that can be put very briefly. I was saying that British trade policy——

Comment on this

Will the Deputy show how his resolution is going to help the people?

Comment on this

I am going to show exactly how it is going to help the people. When we did arrange to go to Ottawa after we had got the Statute of Westminster passed——

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There is no Ottawa conference for six months after the next general election.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Order!

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If the Minister for Finance faces important questions only by thinking of them at the last moment, then that is not the way that I would expect our people to think about them. If we are going to discuss in detail all the things that the Minister for Finance, with the President, has put into the Constitution, then we ought to do a couple of months' thinking of them. There will then be time enough to leave those matters aside for six months and to concentrate for the next two months on some of the things that I want to speak about, and that I beg to be allowed to speak about without interruption. I want to speak on them without heat. I could be brought to a certain heat point, but with the conditions that exist in the country I have no desire to introduce any heat into our discussions here. I am dealing with matters of economics, and I will deal with them coldly and simply. I will simply deal with one or two details of them. When the Ottawa Conference of 1932 was planned, it was planned with the hope that, so far as we were concerned and the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, we might restore our economic conditions to the level of 1930. Canada made an agreement with Great Britain then. In 1930 Canadian imports to Great Britain amounted to £38,000,000.

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Again I ask what has this to do with the Constitution? Is this a debate on the Constitution or on the economic policy of the Government?

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Deputy in possession said that he was dealing with a certain question in economics. The matter before the House is Bunreacht na h-Eireann. A reference to economic conditions as a reason, in the Deputy's view, for postponing the Second Reading of this measure is in order. A detailed examination of the economic position would be a resumption of the debate on the Budget, the Finance Bill, Agriculture, and possibly the Vote for Industry and Commerce, and would not be in order.

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I am proposing simply to show what the Ottawa agreements meant to Canada and Australia, when comparing the 1930 and the 1936 position, in bulk trade. I am proposing to show what the 1936 position in our case is, as compared with 1930. I am proposing to state briefly the principles of the Ottawa agreements which are being attacked at present in Great Britain and which prejudiced our future market there. I propose to do these things by reference to about a dozen figures, and I propose to go into no detailed examination of the economic conditions either in Canada or Australia or here.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Chair would like the Deputy to explain the relevancy of the position of Canada in 1930 and 1936 to this Constitution.

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What international agreements between three members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and Great Britain were able to do for them they are able to do for us. I want to show what an economic agreement between Canada and Great Britain did for Canada in the last five years; what an economic agreement with Great Britain did for Australia; and what we hoped it would do for us. I stated that this month an attack is being made upon the system which made these agreements possible between Australia and Canada and Great Britain, and that, except we are watching what is happening and arguing there for our interests, all this talk about the family and the family's interests and general culture and all that is so much flapdoodle. I want briefly to say that, by virtue of the agreement between Canada and Great Britain and the relations existing between them financially, Canadian imports to great Britain, which were £38,000,000 in 1930, rose to £75,000,000 in 1936, so that they had been doubled.

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On a point of order. I want to know definitely what this has to do with the debate on the Constitution. Is it a debate on the economic policy of the Government or on the Constitution?

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It is obviously hurting you anyway.

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We heard all this before.

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You are hearing it again now.

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Mr. Kelly

We want to hear something new.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

On the debate on agriculture we had all the figures which the Deputy now proposes to give.

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We had not, Sir.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Perhaps it was on some Vote other than agriculture. We have had a comparison of trade figures for Canada in different years. The Chair still fails to see what bearing Canadian agreements made in Ottawa four or five years ago have on this Constitution.

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If this Constitution, after what we have heard from the President, means anything it means (1) that the Irish language is to be saved; (2) fathers in this country are to be put into such a position that the mothers will not have to go out and work. We lost £17,000,000 in exports in the year 1936, as against 1930, that we need not have lost if we had made an agreement in 1932 just as Canada did.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The omission or failure to make such an agreement has nothing to do with this Constitution. The Deputy cannot relate an alleged trade loss of £17,000,000 to this debate.

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I am not alleging it. What I am alleging is that a system which would have obviated these losses is being attacked this very month in London.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

By this Constitution?

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No, but by economic interests in Great Britain and other international interests outside; that we cannot hope to do anything for the mothers of this country to prevent their going out to work and having to help the fathers if the losses that we met in the past are to be continued to the same degree, no matter what Government is in power, and that if our voices and arguments are not heard in the conversations that are taking place in London this month between statesmen of the British Commonwealth of Nations——

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In fact the Deputy is criticising the Government for not attending the Imperial Conference.

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I am telling the Government that there is nothing but claptrap in all the talk of the President about the unfortunate position of mothers who have to go out to earn their living and about the position of the Irish language if he continues to blind himself and to blind the Party and the people as to very foundations upon which these things must be raised in this country.

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The Deputy in fact is criticising the Government for not attending the Imperial Conference.

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I am criticising the Government for running away from some place where they ought to be at present—I do not care whether it is the Imperial Conference or not.

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Some unmentionable place. The Opposition had Deputy Dillon there and did he do any good? He came back without a baronetcy even.

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Who made the Coal-Cattle Pact?

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As far as I am concerned, the Deputy will do either one or the other—he will stick to the debate on the Constitution or——

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Order, order.

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I am dealing with matters about which I know Deputies opposite have a certain difficulty. I want to deal with the matter in a definite way because it has a direct relation to the rights of the people which this Constitution is set up to guard. We are told by the President in his Irish voice that there is no hurry about this Constitution. We are told in his English voice that it is wanted to cover up the constitutional mistakes of the Government. I say that if the Government do not rectify some of these economic mistakes this month, it will not be very much use to the people to rectify some of these constitutional mistakes. We are interested in the import of live stock, meat and dairy produce into Great Britain. The Ottawa agreement enabled Canada and Australia to increase their imports to Great Britain and to get back to a better position than they were in in 1930 before the world depression hit them. These results were enabled to be achieved by the definite preference of a standard tariff on agricultural produce coming from these Dominions into Great Britain. That standard preference tariff is being attacked to-day. What are the Government doing about it? There was a policy on the part of Great Britain to quota meat going into that country; to quota dairy produce going into the country and we are not represented there. Other Dominions have defeated that policy and a discussion is now going on that may involve a struggle between the British farmer who wants protection of a particular kind for economic interests in Great Britain and——

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On a point of order, I again draw the attention of the Chair to the Deputy's remarks and I ask for a ruling.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Deputy has got a ruling.

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On a point of order, I want to ask——

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

I shall hear Deputy Walsh first. What is the point of order?

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I want to know whether this is a debate on the economic policy of the Government or whether it is a debate on the Constitution?

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My point of order is: How often can a Deputy intervene, merely to obstruct a Deputy who is speaking?

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It is for the Chair to say whether any Deputy is obstructing.

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That is why I am putting the question to you, Sir.

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Chair is still of opinion that the Ottawa Agreement is not relevant to this debate, and that a review of Government policy vis-á-vis Great Britain on the economic side is not in order. Matters on which the Deputy is speaking have been debated twice recently in this House on the relevant Votes.

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I accept your ruling, Sir, and I wish to bring my remarks on this amendment to a close by saying this—that the President wants to change the present social system so that a man shall be enabled to earn sufficient to cover all his domestic needs. The President asks what is wrong in trying to work for a social system under which it will not be necessary for those people, that is, women who become mothers of families and may therefore, in the President's opinion, expect to be given a preference in family work. He asks what is wrong in saying that we shall strive here for a social system which will not be such as to compel women to go out working in order to supplement the wages of their husbands, who otherwise could not maintain them. The social system this is directed against is a social system that, he tells us, he is going to remedy. I tell the President that the only thing that is wanted is to remedy the condition into which a lot of mothers and fathers in this country have got. The leaders in charge of the Government of this country run away from a vital issue every time they become faced with it. The people are now suffering on at a critical time with increasing emigration, with home assistance increasing monthly as it is this year as compared with last year, while this Government whitewash their political faces with all the words they can collect from encyclicals, philosophic works and the constitutions of all the countries of the world.

If we cannot have a postponement of the discussion on this Constitution until six months after the reassembly of the Dáil after the next general election, then the next thing to secure is to give the people an opportunity of electing leaders who will deal with the really urgent matters of the present time, urgent matters that are more fundamental than anything written down here or anything that can ever be written down in any constitution. The fundamental matters are that men and women in this country who were given intelligences and resources by the Lord should be able to bring these intelligences to bear upon their present position and be able to give a verdict on the actions of the people who are more concerned with wiping up their own mistakes in the past than doing what is best for the people. We were told to-day that it was because of the reason of urgency this Constitution was being brought in. That is not the case; the urgency for this Constitution was because of the Government's own political mistakes in the recent past.

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Not at all; we are clearing the ground.

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I would like to hear Deputy Walsh tell us during this debate why this document is so important that it should get the attention of himself and the Ministry that he put into power before, and above all matters that are being cried out from every corner of this country wherever there is a family struggling to maintain themselves? The House, I am sure, would be thankful for Deputy Walsh's explanation or for any kind of contribution that he can give towards this debate and I sincerely hope he may do so.

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The Deputy was ten years a Minister.

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