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Dáil

Bunreacht na hEireann (Dréacht)—Dara Céim (Resumed).

Contributions 1–193 of 417. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Frank Aiken Minister for Defence (Mr. Aiken) Fianna Fáil

Deputy Costello speaking here last night accused the Government of drafting a Constitution which would set up two dictators in the country. Before Deputy Costello spoke other Fine Gael Deputies in the House accused the Government of setting up only one dictator. When the President was speaking on the Second Reading of this Draft Constitution he asked the lawyers on all sides of the House to criticise the measure fairly and to make use of their legal knowledge to put forward amendments that would make this Constitution a Constitution that would be respected by the vast majority of the people. Unfortunately Deputy Costello did not use his legal knowledge to that end. Instead he did, in my opinion, a very bad day's work for the profession of the law. It is a noble profession, one which the layman can respect. I think it is up to the representatives of the legal profession in this House to show that the lawyers of this country, as professional men, will do their duty to the people, to their clients, and give them clear advice on the law and Constitution of the land.

Deputy Costello, instead of trying to explain the Constitution and its implications, endeavoured, in my opinion, to misrepresent it. Instead of trying to give the people clear advice as to the constitutional safeguards which it provides for their liberties, he endeavoured to scare certain sections of the people and tried to make them believe that this Constitution was robbing them of the liberties that rightly belong to all citizens. Deputy Costello and the members of the Fine Gael Party were asked to substantiate this charge of dictatorship. Instead of substantiating the charge that we were endeavouring to set up one dictator, Deputy Costello went one better and charged that we were setting up two dictators. I do not know how two dictators could get on in one country. "Two dictators" is an expression that cannot very well be used for it conveys no sense. If a dictator is a man who dictates, a man whose will is law, no matter what anyone else says, we cannot have two such men in the country at one time. Instead of the President under this Draft Constitution being a dictator he is, in my opinion, a person who will guard the rights and liberties of the people against any attempt to set up a dictator by either the Executive Council or the two Houses of the Oireachtas. I was myself very anxious to see that there should be a functionary of that sort above ordinary or everyday politics who would be specially sworn and specially charged and who would in an especial way pledge himself to look after the constitutional rights of the people and be their guardian against any internal dictatorship. The President will have two functions.

He has two powers which he may exercise at his own discretion. One of these is to refer a Bill, which in his opinion contains an amendment of the Constitution, to the Supreme Court for their judgement. If the Supreme Court holds that that piece of legislation does, in fact, amend the Constitution, the President has the right to refer that to the people for their decision. He is not himself deciding whether the Constitution shall be amended in that respect. He simply decides that the particular piece of legislation is an amendment of the Constitution and that, therefore, before it becomes law, it must be submitted to the will of the people. The other power that he exercises at his own descretion is this: if in his opinion the Executive or the Oireachtas of the day passes a piece of legislation upon which, in his opinion, the people should be consulted; he has a right to refuse his signature to that Bill, he has the right to refuse to allow that Bill to come into law before the people are consulted upon it. Where is the dictatorship in that?

One of the biggest criticisms made against this Government in the last few years since the abolition of the Seanad was that we were absolute dictators; that we had here a Parliamentary majority which acted according to the will of one man or one set of men composing the Government and that no matter what the desires of the people were that the President, with the help of the Executive Council, could amend the Constitution in any way, and pass any law he desired to pass. We put in a safeguard here against such a thing happening, and for the future neither the Taoiseach, the head of the Government, nor even the Dáil and Seanad combined can pass laws amending the Constitution or laws of such a nature as clearly to indicate that the people should be consulted about them, without the people being so consulted.

It is usual when you read a Constitution, at least in any Constitution I have ever read, to see provisions made against the greatest evil from which the people have suffered in the past. In my opinion, one of the greatest evils that this country has ever suffered from was the fact that the Executive of the day completely ignored the wishes of the people; completely ignored their pledges to the people, abolished the Constitution under which they were elected, and proceeded to set up a completely new State. The new State that they set up was not one which went further to uphold the sovereignty of the people, but was one which surrendered the sovereignty of the people and made their will subject to laws passed in another land and subject to a Treaty that was passed by threat of force. If we had had in 1922 a functionary such as the new President will be, whose duty it would have been to safeguard the Constitution and safeguard the rights and liberties of the people, no such thing as the coup d'état of the 28th June could have happened and no such unfortunate occurrence as the civil war would ever have occurred. You had then the Constitution abolished; you had a new State set up in which even the representatives of the people were not called upon to attend. Eventually when the Parliament was summoned a large number of the representatives of the people were either dead or in gaol and were, consequently, not available for consultation upon the Constitution that was brought in.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It was once stated by the leader of the Opposition that the worst possible tribunal to fix responsibility for the events of 1922 would be this House. That is because of the fact of having protagonists on both sides. In the circumstances the less said on that matter the better for calm debate.

Comment on this

Hear, hear!

Comment on this

I entirely agree with the Ceann Comhairle. I did not intend to go into the merits or demerits of the civil war beyond saying that in my opinion had there been such a functionary as the President in power then, that unfortunate occurrence would never have taken place.

Comment on this

He would have held it all up; he would have held the Dáil up.

Comment on this

Deputy Costello also accused the Executive Council of wishing to take away women's rights. He said that the new Constitution, if passed into law, would leave it in the power of either the new dictator, as he called him, or the Dáil to abolish the right of women to the vote and could even abolish their rights as citizens. He claimed that the old Constitution safeguarded their rights in both those respects. If you read the old Constitution you will see that the right of the citizens to vote was granted, but that the termination of that right was left to an electoral law. You will also see that the right of citizenship was granted to all persons resident in Ireland or born of Irish parentage; but in that regard also the conditions governing the future acquisition and termination of citizenship of the Irish Free State shall be determined by law. This Constitution is as tight and binding as the old Constitution, both in regard to the rights of all sections of the people to vote and to the rights of citizenship.

The words "without distinction of sex" have been left out, and it could be argued that, the majority of the citizens of this country being women, they could exercise their majority right or their majority voice and select representatives and so deprive the male citizens of votes. I do not think that is at all likely; neither do I think it likely that any Party in this country would be so foolish as to abolish the right of the great majority of the electors to the exercise of the franchise. He would be a foolish man indeed who would go forward on a policy of the abolition of the rights of women to vote and expect the majority of the electorate, who are women, to support him. If they did not support him he could not get elected, and if he were not elected he could not pass such a Bill into law. It seems to me that instead of derogating in any way from women's rights, this Constitution has gone very much further than the Constitution of 1922 and it has not only guaranteed the right of women to be citizens, their right to a vote, but it has also guaranteed to them the support of the State in getting a livelihood.

The people who are now very exercised about the rights of women to vote were in office for ten years here, and they left the section of women who are most in need of support without the support that was their due. I refer to the widows and orphans. It was left to the Fianna Fáil Government, in what is described by the Opposition as the greatest depression this country has ever suffered, to provide money to give pensions to the widows and orphans. In this Constitution it is indicated that it is the desire of the people of this country—and this Constitution when passed by them, will indicate the desires of the people of the country— that instead of derogating from women's rights the Government elected by the people should do their best to support the home and the family and enable mothers of families, if it is their desire to stay at home and look after their families, to do so, and not be forced out into work unsuited to their sex in order that they may provide a livelihood for themselves and their dependents.

It has been truly said that such is not the case to-day. We admit it. We make no claim to have made this country an ideal State in the five years of our office, but we are indicating in this Constitution that, with the help of God, all classes of citizens will be in a better economic and social position in this State in the future. I think it is advisable that we should enshrine in this Constitution the ideals which the vast majority of the people have. We are doing it in regard to our national rights. We are doing it in regard to various other matters and there are clauses in the Constitution which indicate that it is the duty of the State, as soon as it is possible for it to do so to arrange the social life of the community so that mothers of families will not be forced by economic necessity to neglect their children and engage in work unsuited to their sex. I would like to put this to the Opposition: Which of them stands for the abolition of that section?

Comment on this

It is only a pious resolution. It is the most ineffective section in the Constitution.

Comment on this

Which of the Deputies opposite will move an amendment to delete that section?

Comment on this

It is quite harmless; nobody wants to delete it.

Comment on this

I do not care what the Deputy may say in regard to his refusal to put in an amendment to delete it, but the fact of the matter is that he will not put in such an amendment. Another accusation that was made by Deputy Costello last night was that the liberty of the Press and the liberty of the subject was being taken away; and that heretofore the Press and the citizens were guaranteed liberty, and that it was stated in the Constitution that that liberty was inviolable. Without going back into past history, let me say that that guarantee did not count for much. In the last 15 years, I do not think it can be claimed that either the liberty of the subject or the liberty of the Press was inviolable. Drastic action was taken both against individuals and the Press, and certainly it would require more than the mere insertion of the words "the liberty of the subject shall be inviolable" to get the people to believe that, under the right circumstances and under a right Government, either the liberty of the subject or the liberty of the Press would be held to be inviolable.

Comment on this

Why do you leave out the word "inviolable"?

Comment on this

The fact of the matter is that those words were a lie. They conveyed to the people, who had a right to know the truth, an untruth. They left the people under a false impression.

Comment on this

Have no houses ever been raided?

Comment on this

Of course they have.

Comment on this

And still you say that you have the inviolability of the house or residence.

Comment on this

The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and cannot be invaded except in accordance with law. The inviolability of the house cannot be invaded, and the liberty of the person is inviolable, and no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with law.

Comment on this

Why is it that you have left in the word "inviolable" with regard to the dwelling of the citizen, and have not left it in with regard to persons?

Comment on this

When the Deputy himself was Minister, both the liberty of the Press and the liberty of the person were violated, although the Constitution said that they were inviolable.

Comment on this

Neither was done. Why does the Government leave in the word "inviolable" as far as the residence of the citizen is concerned, and not as far as the person is concerned?

Comment on this

I shall go into that point later.

Comment on this

Why not go into it now? The Minister is trying to evade it.

Comment on this

Let the Deputy refer me to the section concerned and I shall deal with it now.

Comment on this

The Minister read it himself.

Comment on this

I have read all of it, but I do not pretend to have all the sections in my head.

Comment on this

Does the Minister suggest that that does not occur?

Comment on this

If the Deputy will refer me to the section he is referring to, I shall read it out and deal with it. Is not that the best way?

Comment on this

I am refer ring to Article 40, sub-section (5), which says that the dwelling of every citizen is inviolable, and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.

Comment on this

Yes, save in accordance with law.

Comment on this

Why have you not the word "inviolable" in with regard to the citizen—that the liberty of the citizen shall be inviolable save in accordance with law?

Comment on this

It seemed to me that the words "save in accordance with law" were a very big saver in the old Constitution, when they permitted, as constitutional, acts done by the previous Government. That is all I shall say about it.

Comment on this

In other words, the Minister cannot answer the question.

Comment on this

I have answered it to my own satisfaction, at any rate, and if it is not satisfactory to the Deputy, let him say so when he is replying.

Comment on this

The Minister dodged the point.

Comment on this

When Deputy Costello, last night, was making the charge that the rights of women would, or could, be abolished, I was reminded of the fact that, when he was Attorney-General, a Bill was brought in abolishing equal treatment for women and men under the Civil Service Commissioners. In 1926 a Bill was brought in giving the Civil Service Commissioners power to exclude women from certain posts. Last night Deputy Costello pretended that this Constitution was doing away with the complete equality of men and women—that heretofore they were, not alone equal as human persons, but were taken to be of equal capacity, and that all classes in the State were taken to have similar social functions. It is a pity that Deputy Costello should so prostitute the legal profession—he spoke as a lawyer and in the name of lawyers—and that he should so drag the name of lawyer in the mire as to try to confuse the issue in the way in which he did. I said last night, and I repeat, that I would much prefer to take the opinion of a chance passer-by in any public place in this country— at a fair or market—on constitutional law than to take the opinion of Deputy Costello.

Comment on this

Yes, because it would be more likely to coincide with your own.

Comment on this

It looks like that.

Comment on this

Judging from Deputy Costello's behaviour last night, it would be more likely to coincide with the truth.

Comment on this

If the Minister would listen more carefully to the prompter behind him he might do better.

Comment on this

Deputy Costello, of course, is a most peculiar gentleman. He was responsible for introducing and passing, with the help of Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney and a few of his friends, Article 2A.

Comment on this

Which you have put in force yourselves and which you are enforcing.

Comment on this

Of course we have, and with very good effect in regard to certain things.

Comment on this

With great respect, I should like to point out that Deputy Costello was not a member of the Government.

Comment on this

He was the Attorney-General.

Comment on this

He was the legal adviser to the Government. He advised the Government, and I take it that Article 2A was constitutional. It was put into the Constitution and made a portion of it.

Comment on this

Now, be careful.

Comment on this

I am being very careful. Whether it was constitutional or not is a matter of whether it was passed as an Act of Parliament, but it was put into the Constitution and made portion of it.

Comment on this

That is not what I meant. Deputy Costello was not a member of the Government.

Comment on this

He was responsible for giving advice, and I take it that Deputy Cosgrave took his advice. Now, after having done that, when we came along and endeavoured to enforce the authority of the Government, with the help of Article 2A, Deputy Costello went into court and pleaded that that Article of the Constitution, which he had drafted and put in, was unconstitutional, ultra vires so far as the Constitution was concerned, and, in fact, according to constitutional law, never should have been put into operation. That is the type of lawyer that Deputy Costello is.

Comment on this

For what purpose did he do it?

Comment on this

For what purpose?

Comment on this

For the liberty of the subject.

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this

He should put his own work before that?

Comment on this

He should put truth before his own work, anyway, and before his own political interest. The court did not hold with him.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

And this is not a court of revision.

Comment on this

Last night, Deputy Costello held himself forth here as a constitutional lawyer whose every word on the Constitution was to be held to be the last word on the subject.

Comment on this

Would the Minister tell us what he himself called Article 2A in 1931? Would he give us the name he called it at that time?

Comment on this

I am dealing with this Draft Constitution now, and Article 2A is going out of it.

Comment on this

Will the Minister deal with Article 2A?

Comment on this

I shall deal with it, if I am allowed to do so. One critici m of this Constitution made by, I think, Deputy MacDermot was that the word "Eire" was a misnomer and that the new State we are setting up should not be called Eire. I think he put it forward, as one argument why it should not be adopted, that the powers of this Government would not in fact be operative throughout the whole of the ancient Irish nation called Eire. That is a fact which we must admit, that when this Constitution is passed and made law by the people it is not likely that its powers will be operative over the 32 counties of Ireland. Is that any reason for not calling it Eire? Was Germany any less Germany when the Saar was outside her constitutional jurisdiction? Was France any less France when Alsace-Lorraine was outside her jurisdiction? Was this old nation any less Eire in the old days when the only portion outside the jurisdiction of its native kings was this little bit of a Pale around Dublin? We had a Pale in the past. It happened to be around Dublin. We have a Pale at the present time. It happens to be the six northern-eastern counties. At present we cannot enforce the authority and sovereignty of the Irish people, and of the Government elected by them, over the whole of the new State of Eire but, with the help of God, that position will be abolished some day.

Comment on this

The Minister will perhaps allow me to correct him. He has not correctly stated the point I made, which was that it seemed to me childish to compel us, when talking English, to refrain from using the name "Ireland," and that that seemed the kind of thing that is likely to keep the people in the North from being attracted towards us.

Comment on this

There is nothing in this Constitution to prevent the Deputy calling it Ireland if he wishes.

Comment on this

There is the fact that even throughout the English text of the Constitution the country is described as Eire, and not as Ireland.

Comment on this

I say that, if the Deputy wishes to call it Ireland, he is as much entitled to do so as France minus Alsace-Lorraine was entitled to call herself France. There was one very significant note in Deputy Costello's speech last night, and that was the utter contempt he had for the voice of the people as a whole and for the votes of the majority of the people. He said that the people although they would have a few months to consider this Constitution, would not know what it means. He said that there was no greater tyranny than that which masquerades under the cloak of democracy. I think that the vast majority of the Irish people—99.9 per cent. of them or more—will have a complete understanding of this Constitution and of the principles and the ideals which it embodies. Not alone will they understand it, but I believe they will all come out and vote for it. I am glad to say this for the Opposition, that up to now they have not opposed it. This has not been at all a Second Reading debate. I am glad to say that the principles enshrined in the Constitution have not been opposed. A few of the Opposition Deputies have spoken on this measure. Some of them steered completely clear of the Constitution and talked about economic matters. Others of them made it a Committee debate and went into detail on certain arguments which would suit very well on the Committee Stage. But the principle of the Constitution as a whole has not been debated. It has not been opposed, I am glad to say, and I hope it will not be.

Comment on this

What does the Minister call the principle of the Constitution?

Comment on this

The principle of setting up here Eire as a sovereign, independent, democratic State.

Comment on this

A Republic?

Comment on this

The Deputy can call it a Republic if he likes.

Comment on this

The Constitution does not do so.

Comment on this

The Deputy can call it a Republic if he likes. The principle, I repeat, which no one in this House, thanks be to goodness, so far has opposed and which I hope no one will oppose, is to set up Eire as a sovereign, independent, democratic State.

Comment on this

Is that not the principle of the constitution of every self-governing nation of the Commonwealth?

Comment on this

That principle was set up and has been in operation since 1922.

Comment on this

That is the principle of this Constitution. There are no tags on to it.

Comment on this

Nor to any of the others.

Comment on this

Under the old Constitution which we are abolishing and which we had amended from time to time, it was laid down that the Constitution had to be read according to the Treaty and that legislation here was subject to adjudication by the British Privy Council and so forth. There are none of these tags in this Constitution. It is declared clearly and unequivocally that this is a sovereign, independent State, deriving its powers, not from any British Act of Parliament or from any person outside. As I said to Deputy Costello last night, it will not be left to any set of men here in this country to judge this Constitution by what is legal in the eyes of British law. This Constitution is not being brought into operation because of any British Act of Parliament or by the legal powers conferred on the Government that existed heretofore by the British Parliament. It is simply being discussed here in the Dáil and it will be enacted by the people. No lawyer, such as Deputy Costello and certain other gentlemen outside who have the British legalistic point of view, can turn this Constitution down as being unconstitutional. It will have been enacted by the people and it will clearly and unequivocally proclaim this, our nation, Eire, to be a sovereign, independent State. I am delighted that up to now that the principle of that has not been opposed.

Comment on this

Of course not.

Comment on this

I am delighted to hear it.

Comment on this

The only people who opposed that were yourselves.

Comment on this

And you did it by post.

Comment on this

We are not to go back on the past. If we did, I should have something to say to that remark. I believe that this Constitution will be something of which we can all be proud. I believe that it holds within it the basis of security for the Irish people, security for their system of Government, security for their sovereignty and independence, and that in that way it forms the basis for peaceful progress here, political and economical, in the future. It is a Constitution such as the vast majority of us here in this House worked for at one time. Even though we may differ at the coming general election as to who will work it in the future, as to who should be Taoiseach, Uachtarán, and all the rest, I hope at least we will agree that this Constitution should be put to the people and brought into operation as the fundamental law of the land. There may be things in it that should be changed. If there is anything in some of the legal points that have been made—that additional safeguard should be given to the people; that this Constitution should not be in any way changed without their will being expressed on it—I think such amendments should be put in. I do not think such amendments are necessary, but if they are necessary it would be a good thing that they should be debated and that they should be put in. If further protections than those given under the old Constitution for the rights of citizens, the rights of the vote and all the rest of it, are needed, then that matter can be considered. I trust that the Opposition will continue to treat this as a Committee Stage debate, and that when this Constitution is put before the people it will be passed unanimously or almost unanimously by the people. If that is done, I think we can all be very proud of the work we are doing here during these days.

Comment on this

Speaking in this House as a member of the Parliament of a sovereign, independent, democratic State, set up under the Constitution of 1922, and functioning at the present moment, I wish to convey my commiseration to the Minister for Defence, because it was very painful to hear the Minister for Defence and to see him put up to talk upon a subject to which he had obviously given no attention at all. With that, I think I will leave the speech to which the House has just listened.

I think the first thing that must strike everyone, no matter to what side of the House he belongs, is that there is one criticism which must be passed on this Draft Constitution. No matter what you may think of its contents, in whole or in part, I think there is one thing which must be admitted by every Deputy in this House, and that is that no more inelegant or no worse drafted document than this Draft Constitution has ever been placed before Dáil Eireann. It is full of contradictions. It is full of general principles, which can be immediately whittled down until they mean absolutely nothing at all. In a great number of parts this Constitution, which ought to be put in the clearest and plainest language, is so involved and so ambiguous that I— I am sorry to say—am one of the 1 per cent. of the people of this country who have not got a complete understanding of the Constitution. That at least is the figure which the Minister for Defence gave the House.

The first thing which I should like to point out to the Dáil is this phrase: "We, the people of Ireland." This is not being enacted by the people of Ireland. It begins with a false statement; it is not being enacted by the people of Ireland. It is being enacted by the people of 26 counties and not by the people of 32 counties. I am not a person who accepts the present state of affairs, and I do not accept the position that the people of 26 counties, voting upon a particular measure, are entitled to call themselves the entire of the people of Ireland; we are not. I do not like to see any solemn document passing out of this House, through this Assembly, and becoming operative in this State, commencing with a statement known by everybody to be false. Ireland is not 26 counties. Ireland is 32 counties, and the people of the Twenty-Six Counties have not got the right to style themselves the people of Ireland.

I go on; if I discover an untruth in the first part of this document, I do not go very far until I come to something which shows the extraordinarily bad drafting of this Constitution, and which, in my humble judgment at any rate, comes very close to if it is not entirely and completely a heretical statement. I mean, of course, heretical from the Catholic point of view. Article 6 says:—

"All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good."

That statement is not true. What does that mean? It means that all legislative, executive and judicial powers are derived from the people; that they are inherent in the people and exercised by the people under God. That is not the fact. Every power that the people have got came to the people from God, and the power exercised by the rulers, designated by the people of the State, is power they had themselves derived from God. Whether they derived it immediately through the people, as was the view of Cardinal, now Saint, Robert Bellamy, or whether they hold it as derived immediately from God, as was the view of Leo XIII, every school of Catholic thought holds that power is derived from God. Why do we start off with a statement in Article 6 of our Constitution which, as far as moral philosophy is concerned, is completely and entirely wrong?

We asked what are the main principles of this Constitution? What new thing does it bring in? We were not answered. The main new thing which this Constitution brings in is the President and the powers which are given to the President. I should like, Sir, to examine those powers. The President is appointed by a general vote of the people. In my judgement that is not a very satisfactory way of appointing a President. President de Valera in his speech the other night said that powers should be given to the President to a great extent in order that his election by the people should be justified. But if a President is going to be elected by the people is that going to get the best President? We know what a popular election is. Think out how that is going to work. If it is anything like a close fight, is it not the man with the longest purse who is going to win? What will an election cost? Of course, it will cost the State exactly the same sum as a general election does now. There must be the same presiding officers, polling clerks and everything else that there is for a general election. There must be for each candidate likewise a personation agent or several in every booth. Deputy Kelly's famous approval of "vote early and vote often" will most certainly take place unless there are personation agents. I am sure if there are no personation agents that Deputy Kelly will urge very vigorously "vote early and vote often in favour of the candidate for the office of President that I am supporting." There must, therefore, be personation agents; there must also be transport cars to bring the voters to the poll, and the candidate for the Presidency who can supply the best transport is the candidate that is most likely to be successful. In other words, I will ask the House if there is an election for a President is not it perfectly plain that it is the man who can put down thousands of pounds in the fight for election rather than the man who can only put down £1,000 who is likely to be successful? Has not the whole cost of a Party election to be borne if that election is to be representative of the people, and if the voters are to go to the poll in any number? Is that a wise way of selecting no matter how good it may be in theory? I am not concerned with theory. Is it a good way in practice to select a President of this State? Because it means that unless a man has got the support of a Party with Party funds behind him, or that he himself is a rich man, he has got no chance against a person who has got a longer purse than he has, always, of course, assuming that there is not a colossal margin of difference in support for the two in the country. It does not seem to be wise. As a matter of fact, I think an election adequately run and adequately financed by a candidate for the office of President would cost more than a whole Party election would cost a Party at the minute, because personation agents at present give their services free. Candidates for the Presidency will have to pay their own personation agents. Is it a wise or a practical method of electing a President? When you have your President elected, what I object to and object to very strongly in this Constitution is the power which the President is given.

The Minister for Defence talked a moment ago, and so did other members of the Government who spoke in this House, that this did not create a dictatorship. We do not say it creates a dictatorship. This Constitution does not set up a dictatorship here now but what this Constitution does is that it makes it easy for a dictatorship to be set up. This Constitution takes away the barriers which stood in the way of a dictatorship being set up. It makes smooth the road for setting up a dictatorship. This Constitution will in itself enable a dictatorship to be set up.

Let me take two things. First you have got certain powers given to the President by the Constitution. You have other powers which may be given to him by law. Section 9 of Article 13 states:

"The powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution shall be exercisable and performable by him only on the advice of the Government,"

with three exceptions. Those are the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution. There are two classes of power conferred on the President. There is class No. 1, the powers conferred by the Constitution, and class No. 2, the powers conferred by law. There is no such proviso that the powers and functions conferred by law shall be exercisable and performable by him only on the advice of the Government. Any power can be given to him by law under Article 13:

"Subject to this Constitution, additional powers and functions may be conferred on the President by law.... No such power or function shall be exercisable or performable by him save only on the advice of the Government, or after consultation with the Council of State, as may be determined by such law."

Therefore, any power or function of any kind may be given to the President which he can exercise after consultation with the Council of State, but the Council of State has no power. The Council of State is purely an advisory body, and the President need not heed in the slightest bit what they tell him. Any power can be given to the President. Complete control of this State can be given to him, to be exercisable by him after consultation with the Council of State, whose advice he need not take. Is it not smoothening the road within the Constitution for a dictatorship?

There is another matter. Why it is put in, I do not know. It is Article 13, Section 5:

"The exercise of the supreme command of the defence forces shall be regulated by law."

I should have read Section 4 first:

"The supreme command of the defence forces is hereby vested in the President."

How he is to exercise that has to be regulated by law. There is not a single thing there about consultation with the Council of State. There is not a word about that:

"The exercise of the supreme command of the defence forces shall be regulated by law,"

and therefore he may be given complete power and control of the defence forces, and he can exercise that so given power—that proviso is contained in the Act giving him the power—without the advice of the Executive Council. Every dictator wants an army behind him. Most of the dictatorships have been started by armies. If the Dáil and Seanad, or a majority of the Dáil—we need not bother about the Seanad—and the President conspire to make the President dictator in this State, all they need do, within this Constitution, is to give him unlimited power, as they can do, and at the same time give him control of the Army, which he can fill up immediately with his own people. I have not heard any reasoned argument from the Government Benches as to why this one individual, who can be given these extraordinary powers; who has, even under the Constitution, such great powers as he has got, is being set up at all. What is the need for him? What is the necessity for having a President with these powers? It is a retrograde step; it is going backwards; it is setting up a Constitution much less democratic than the present Constitution.

Take the history of representative Government. The home of representative Government is in England. There you had a king with a tremendous power; you had a House of Lords with great power, and you had a House of Commons commencing with very, very small power. Even as late as the great exclusion debates in the time of Charles II the House of Lords was the Assembly with greater power than the House of Commons. Gradually, the House of Commons begins to assert itself; gradually it becomes more important than the House of Lords; gradually it is encroaching upon the king's power; until the time comes, as it did come in the complete process of development, when the one man, that is to say, the king has got no active part in the Government at all.

You want to set up one man here. Under the old Constitution we had no such one man—no one man with any power. But you want to step back from the democratic position which representative Government had reached in this country, just as it had reached it in England. You want to step back from that position and, taking a retrograde and anti-democractic step, you want to put the power, not in an elected Assembly but to a considerable extent in the hands of one man. Surely that is anti-democratic. It is a step backwards—that is undeniable.

What is the reason for that step backwards? We have had none given. We heard, to my mind, a rather unsound argument with reference to an existing dictatorship. There is no doubt that, under the Constitution as it has been spoiled by Fianna Fáil, there is a power of dictatorship —it has worked down practically to that. But it is a dictatorship which must be exercised in public; a dictatorship which is subject to criticism in this House; a dictatorship whose acts are known. It is a dictatorship that only exists because the Seanad was abolished. A dictatorship which is subject to criticism and subject to public opinion is a different thing from the dictatorship which can be set up within the terms of this Constitution without taking away the dot from one of the i's or the crossing from one of the t's. Why do you do that? Certainly, we have had no reason given yet.

If there are going to be alterations in the Constitution certainly the burden of proof to show that there ought to be alterations is on the person making the alterations. If there is going to be a new Constitution, the burden of proof to show that the old Constitution is bad is on the person bringing in the new Constitution. Neither in the speeches I have listened to, nor those I have read in the newspapers or in the Official Reports, has any sound reason been given for the introduction of this present Constitution; above all things, no reason for the introduction of this present Constitution with this very great change effected by giving power to one man. I see no reason, and I have heard no reason, why that should be done on the eve of an election, which is essentially a time when big changes should not be made by a House nearing its dissolution. If there are changes of this nature to be made, they should be made in the early days of a Parliament, not when persons' minds are fixed upon what are the real substantial issues before the country in an election.

There are other difficulties about this strange new office of President. Suppose the President does not do what he is bound to do under this Constitution, what is the remedy? There is none provided. Suppose a Bill is sent up to him and he refuses to sign it, what is going to happen? There is no method within the Constitution of making him do so. He need not sign a single Bill, and he need not do a single bit of work. He is irremovable for seven years, and there is nothing to compel him. I may be answered by saying that he makes a declaration, and that that declaration will compel his conscience. There is nothing else. Quite apart from the fact that things more solemn than a declaration have, as we know, on a famous occasion in this State been described as empty formulas, I should like the House to consider the nature of the declaration to be taken. It is very interesting, because it is on a par with everything else in this extraordinary Draft Constitution—it is contradictory. The declaration reads:—

"In the presence of Almighty God I do solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will maintain the Constitution of Eire and uphold its laws, that I will fulfil my duties faithfully and conscientiously in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and that I will dedicate my abilities to the service and welfare of the people of Eire."

Suppose a Bill comes up to him: it is his duty under the Constitution to sign that Bill. But suppose he exercises his abilities, as he thinks, in the service and welfare of the people of Ireland, and he comes to the conclusion that this Bill does not help on the service or the welfare of Ireland and he refuses to sign it, where are you? He says: "I am not violating my declaration"—though there is no punishment even if he does violate his declaration. He remains there for seven years. You have no method on earth of getting rid of him. Is not that an extraordinary state of affairs?

Let me taken another thing. You may put in the office of President a man whom the people may think is of blameless life. There may be some domestic or other scandal. Unfortunately we know of a domestic scandal that had a terrific effect on the prospects and history of Ireland. Supposing some such scandal happened, or that some financial difficulty or something like that arose in the case of this person who was elected President, still, as the Draft stands, he must remain in that office. There is no method of removing him. He is above the law. He cannot be prosecuted. He cannot be sued on the civil side during his term of office. He remains there, and the finger of scorn may be pointed at him; he may be, in the opinion of every decent citizen, unworthy of holding the position. Yet he must remain there. There is no means of removing him. I would have thought that a sensible Constitution would contain some provision by which a declaration would be got that the person who has been elected President had shown himself unworthy to fill the office, and that an impartial tribunal should be set up to inquire into the charges made against him. Probably the most impartial tribunal would be the Supreme Court. I think it would be the fairest tribunal to try a matter of that nature. You could not possibly get a fairer tribunal.

Quite apart from the details there should be some method of removing a President who has shown himself unworthy, and this Draft Constitution produces none. There is only one provision by which he can be removed and that is a most extraordinary provision. It is only if he has been guilty of high treason as defined in this Constitution or "other high crimes or misdemeanour," that he can be removed. It must be a high crime or a misdemeanour. It must be an offence known to the law. Then what happens? It is provided that two-thirds of the members of the Seanad may go back to that oldest and most worn-out method, the procedure by impeachment. Somebody has been studying the history of the Stuarts and discovered that Stafford, Laud and various other persons were impeached before the House of Lords. In those days the House of Commons impeached an individual before the House of Lords who had power to pass the death sentence.

Under the regulations here the procedure is reversed; the Seanad may impeach for criminal offences before the Dáil. Is that a satisfactory method of trial or a fair method of trial? How long will the trial last? How many witnesses will be examined? Supposing the trial lasts three or four days the President is to sit there in the dock— wherever the dock may be—and he is being impeached before the Dáil. Is not the thing ridiculous and is it not an absurd tribunal? Not only that, but there is the period which the trial will occupy. I said for three or four days. As a matter of fact the impeachment of Warren Hastings went on for eight or ten years. I am not sure of the exact duration. I know this, that impeachments have always been extremely slow. The modern method, going right back to a worn-out thing, is the method that is going to be adopted in our new Constitution! Even here the framer or draftsman of the Constitution could not be consistent because in Article 38, Section 5, we have:—

"Save in the case of the trial of offences under Section 2, Section 3 or Section 4 of this article, no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury."

In other words, under Article 38 the President is given the right of trial by jury, and under Article 12, Section 10, that right is taken away from him. Yet these two sections are left standing there in their complete inconsistency. Which is it going to be? Must he be impeached if two-thirds of the Seanad wish it, or is he entitled to trial by jury? As the two sections stand they are completely and entirely inconsistent. I presume that the interpretation of that is that the general is controlled by the lesser, and that is that the right of trial by jury is being taken away. That is the ordinary rule of legal interpretation—that the lesser controls the general. But why not make it perfectly clear in your Draft? The Draft Constitution is the same all the way through. Again, I would like to know what is the reason for setting up this very strange and extraordinary person?

There are a great number of things arising out of this Constitution. I am not going through the whole lot. I have dealt at some length with the position of the President because it is a real innovation. We have the bringing in of one man, possessing powers in the Constitution such as it is proposed to give. It is a new step, a retrograde step and an undemocratic step. It is an attempt to set back the hands of the clock. Let us look through these pious aspirations which are put into the Constitution for some reason or another. I do not know why in this Constitution you get some very curious things. Take the provision about which we have had so much discussion:—

"the State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home".

That is Section 2 of Article 41 of the Constitution. That is very excellent but why not push it to its entire conclusion?

If the object of the State is to ensure that mothers shall spend their time in the performance of their duties in the home why confine it to one class? Why have this class legislation in your Constitution? Why put in about the duty of the mother being confined to the necessitous? Why not have put in that no mother in receipt of moneys from any public body shall engage in labour or in work from any public authority of any kind? Why not apply it to the national teachers, the secondary teachers and the university professors? Why not apply it to all these? Why not apply it to them if you are going to apply your good idea to mothers who are obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour? Why not also express your view in those other cases, because it flows naturally that no married woman should be engaged in productive work? It all flows one from the other. Is not that the principle which you are enshrining here? I am simply putting that forward. I am bringing it right down to the reductio ad absurdum.

If you want to put down your general propositions, you cannot put them in one Article. You must deal with every specific instance. If you are going to take that as it stands, unqualified, all the consequences which I have stated must flow from it. If you believe one, you must bring it right down to the end. There is no qualification there except that it is confined simply to mothers who are obliged by economic necessity. What is the difference between those and the ones who are not? If it is due to one, it is due to another. There may be an answer, and I would like to know what it is, but personally I do not see it at the moment.

It is rather interesting to take Article 45, paragraph 4 (1):—

"The State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the community, and, where necessary, to contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan, and the aged."

That is admirable, but there is a well-known doctrine of interpretation that if you make one statement clear, the statement of the one thing is a contradiction of its opposite, and also it is to be interpreted by what it leaves out as well as what it puts in. Why infer that the infirm, the widow, the orphan and the aged are the only persons to whom the State should contribute? Why should they not contribute to the support of an adult hungry man. What is the difference? After all, has not the adult hungry man or woman the same right to a contribution as the persons named in this Article.

There is a portion of Article 45 that is really laughable, coming from the Fianna Fáil Party:

"That there may be established on the land in economic security as many families as in the circumstances shall be practicable."

Established on the land in economic security! What a statement to come from Fianna Fáil. The Government that have made every single perch of land in Ireland uneconomic have now got the pleasure of saying that they believe in keeping people on the land in economic security. For the last five years this House has rung with denunciations of the policy which is making and has made Irish land uneconomic. Instead of spending your time in some effort towards making the land economic, you are discussing generalities here.

The policy of the Government has had the effect of driving down the price of cattle, destroying the market for eggs, destroying the market for all live stock. It has made Irish land completely and entirely unprofitable. Now, along comes this Constitution with the statement that they hope to establish on the land in economic security as many families as shall be practicable. They believe now in putting people in economic holdings. Why do they not go further and say: "We believe then in making them uneconomic as quickly as ever we can, because we have been spending the last five years in making all other Irish holdings uneconomic"?

There is behind this one very big question, and I would like an answer from Fianna Fáil or somebody who has gone into the matter and is qualified to deal with it. We are told that the Constitution shall come into operation on the day following the expiration of a period of 180 days after its approval by the people, signified by a majority of the votes cast at a plebiscite thereon held in accordance with law. Who are the people? We are told the people are the people of Ireland. There is nothing in that Article which limits it to citizens of Saorstát Eireann. It is plain there that it is only to come into force when a plebiscite of the people has been taken. But how can you take a plebiscite of the people of Ireland? I would like to know how that is to be done. So far as I can see, you cannot do it; you cannot take a plebiscite of the people of the Six Counties.

There is no limitation there and I want to know how you propose to work this. Suppose this is challenged in court. Suppose any law passed under the Constitution is challenged in court and you are asked what gives that Constitution validity. If you say it has got its validity from a plebiscite of the people of Ireland, then there would want to be proof that there was such a plebiscite. But there cannot be such a plebiscite. Is your Constitution as it stands going to have the force of law and what is going to give it the force of law? The Constitution of 1922 has the force of law from Act No. 1 of 1922, which, of course, is not repealed here and is still in force. In other words, Saorstát Eireann still remains and, after the passing of this Constitution, Saorstát Eireann will still remain until Act No. 1 of 1922 is repealed. You cannot repeal it now, because if you repeal it there would be no Constitution. You are in the extraordinary position that you have got citizens who are citizens of Saorstát Eireann and you have Saorstát Eireann still in existence.

I do not think that even a referendum could be exercised at the present moment. I should like to know how it could, because there are no citizens of Ireland at the present minute. I should like someone to tell me how a referendum could be exercised or how this is going to have validity at all. This cannot repeal a statute. A statute can only be repealed by another one. If it is tested in a court, how is it going to be argued that it is repealed? There will be such questions arising. They certainly arise in my mind, and I have endeavoured to see any answer to them, and I cannot see it.

Suppose, now, that this Constitution is brought before a plebiscite of the people of Saorstát Eireann, and that a court is asked: "Is that a binding document, or is that the Constitution now in force?" I do not see, for the life of me, how any court could say that it is. If there is any answer to that, I should like to know what it is. It may have its force because it is a repeal of the Schedule to the Act, No. 1 of 1922, which sets up the Constitution, but it does not profess to be that, and it does not profess to be enacted by Dáil Eireann or the Oireachtas. It does not profess to be enacted by any person with direct legislative authority, and I should like to know very much from anybody who can inform me where it is going to get its legislative or operative power from. It can get its operative power, possibly, if you regard it as a Schedule to the Act of 1922, but otherwise than that, it has no operative power, because we have got a Constitution which is now in force, and the Act by which it is established is not attacked and could not be attacked, because this document here can only be conceived to be of binding force if it is regarded as a repeal of the Schedule to Act No. 1 of 1922, and the insertion of a new Schedule in it.

These are big questions. They seem to me to go to the very root of the matter, and I should like to have them very seriously considered, and I should like to see a serious answer given. Mere rhetoric—and we have had very little except rhetoric from the Government Benches in the course of this debate—does not answer solid argument. Mere rhetoric does not answer, if you like, seriously meant questions, and I am putting my question seriously. I should like to have it dealt with seriously, because we may find ourselves in this position: that we have been spending days discussing this thing as members of a mere debating society, whose conclusions cannot be received by our courts. I have nothing more to say upon this matter, Sir. There is an amendment before the House to the effect that the discussion should be adjourned for six months. I think that, quite apart from the reasons put forward by Deputy Mulcahy in support of that motion, the whole trend of this discussion here has shown that a delay of six months is eminently desirable. This is not a fully digested and fully thought-out document, and, besides, it is a wretchedly drafted document. I think that it ought to be postponed. This Constitution is supposed to last for all time, and a document that is supposed to last for all time ought to be clear. This document is not clear. It is confused and involved. It is giving most extraordinary powers to a President—powers which may be made more extraordinary still—and it is all being done immediately. Surely, if ever there was a document which ought to be carefully considered and the consideration of which should be postponed, it is this document.

Then, on the question of voting for this Constitution, how are we going to vote? There are things in this document which I like. For instance, I like the restoration of the Seanad. That could have been done under the old Constitution, but at any rate it is here in this Draft Constitution. I like a Constitution with a Second Chamber. On the other hand, I loathe portions of this Constitution, such as those which deal with the new power to be given to a President. Other people will have the same difficulty as I have. How are you going to say that the document has got the approval of the electorate when the electorate disapproves of a new principle enshrined in it? There are two new principles enshrined in it, if I may put it that way, although I admit that it is rather a loose expression to use. The entirely new principle in it is the creation of a President with undemocratic power—anti-democratic power, I should put it. The other new principle is not new to us, but it is new to our existing Constitution. It is not a new idea, but the restoration of an old idea. I refer to the bringing back of the Seanad. I like one of these principles. I wish to see the Seanad back. But I do not wish to see a President being given undemocratic powers. Other people will be in the same position, and how are we going to vote? If we vote for the bringing back of the Seanad, will that not be immediately twisted into saying that there is a majority of the people in favour of the creation of an undemocratic President? That is what will be declared immediately in this House. We will be told that they have got a mandate for a President of that kind. If Fianna Fáil comes back to power, which is very doubtful——

Comment on this

The Deputy will not be here in any case.

Comment on this

Oh, I would not be so sure about that, but I think the Deputy will not be in Fianna Fáil, according to the stories I hear.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

These stories must be kept for some other occasion.

Comment on this

Have they any relation to the kicking cow?

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Order, Order!

Comment on this

Before I conclude, I urge the House and the Government to accept this amendment, and, if they want to act in anything approaching a statesman-like fashion, I urge that the whole of this discussion should be postponed until after there is a general election and the people have expressed their views.

Comment on this

But then we will have lost the services of the Deputy.

Comment on this
Hugh Victor Flinn Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance (Mr. Flinn) Fianna Fáil

My outlook upon this discussion, Sir, is that of cordial agreement with the appeal of the President that every member of this House, in every part in this House, and that every elector in this country, whatever his politics may be, will regard himself as having a serious, personal and inescapable responsibility for the personal examination of this document with a view to the forming of a judgement as to its meaning and implication, and the expression of that view in so far as it may make for the betterment of this nation. I think, in listening to the speeches, however intolerant, however exaggerated, and, in certain cases, however mad they may be, upon this subject, that it is our business to look behind the exaggerations and madnesses of them, to discount all the political prejudices of them, and as far as is humanly possible, to attemot to get out of them all the value we can in constructive criticism in relation to the Bill. For that reason, I, personally, would be very tolerant of any extravagance of expression so long as it did, in fact, lead up to something constructive. Now, 90 per cent., or at any rate 80 per cent. of this House—I am afraid it is a decreasing percentage—are not lawyers.

We come with laymen's minds to the examination of a document of this kind. There is a saying that the layman who is his own lawyer has a fool for his client, and it is very desirable that, to the extent to which legal knowledge can be made useful for the interpretation of a document containing fundamental law, to the extent to which that knowledge is useful and available, it should be used. Now, I think there are distinct limitations to the use of mere legal knowledge in relation to a matter of this kind, while the ambit of its use is very considerable. Very often, in dealing with such things as Constitutions, we are dealing with things which are not necessarily subject to purely legislatic interpretations. Phrases, words, clauses and expressions are used in Acts of this kind for the purpose of expressing fundamental ideas, the natural outlook of peoples and it is quite possible that a good many of the terms, words and expressions which would be used in any Constitution, which was sound from the point of view of being a document which was meant to represent the outlook on the present and future life of the nation, would not have a definite legalistic meaning. However, to the extent to which they have a legalistic meaning, it is very desirable indeed that lawyers ought to give us the advantage of their knowledge in the interpretation of them, and, even if the interpretation which is put upon them is an ex parte interpretation and the opinion of people who, at any rate, would rather make the worse than the better appearance of an Act of this kind, it is valuable that we should get to know the worst that can be said about it. It is better that every destructive criticism that it is possible for the ingenious mind of men who are trained into the profession of finding out dangerous meanings in the law, should be used for the purpose of making clear in advance any risks which may eventually be incurred in the interpretation of a document of this kind. It is for that reason that I, personally, have listened with pleasure and with profit to what I should not like to say was the attack, but rather the examination, of the Constitution by Deputy Lavery, and the attack which has been made upon it by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney. If there are any useful points in the arguments which have been put forward, it is our business to take advantage of them, and if there are any gaps shown by these examinations, it is our business as far as is humanly possible to close them.

Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney ended by saying that there were two principles in this Bill, one of which he entirely approved. That was the principle of the restoration of a Second Chamber, however restored. He approved of the doctrine which has been held, and which was expressed in my presence by the chairman of a chamber of commerce, that any Second Chamber is better than no Second Chamber. Without going in any way into the details or merits of that particular Chamber, its constitution or method of election, Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney at any rate endorsed that particular principle. He said there was another principle to which he did object, the principle of a President with undemocratic powers. I think the whole House would object to the principle of a President with undemocratic powers and, therefore, it is only a question of fact. It is a question of fact whether or not this Constitution does create a President with undemocratic powers and, if it does, it should not. I, voting for it, will vote for it in the belief that it does not, and with the assurance that any risk that the presence of any possible word, or any lack of words, which would create a President with undemocratic powers, will be dealt with when we come down to details.

There are phrases in this Constitution for which lawyers, feed on one side or the other, would find a different meaning. I mean it is quite possible to take two views in relation to certain Acts here. For instance, one difficulty was put up to me in relation to Article 12, Section 4, sub-section (1). Unfortunately I, like the majority of the House, am not in a position to read or criticise this document in the official text. I, also, have to use the secondary language. Article 12, Section 4, sub-section (2) (i) reads:

"Not less than twenty persons, each of whom is at the time a member of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas."

I subjected that to the opinion of two or three people, who held different opinions on various matters, and none of them is clear as to the exact meaning of that, while, when it has been examined in the Irish text, I am assured by all who have examined it in that text that it is, in fact, absolutely clear. I am only giving that as an example.

The clause to which most objection has been taken is Article 13, No. 10, which reads:

"Subject to this Constitution, additional powers and functions may be conferred on the President by law."

The second sub-section of that reads:

"No such power or function shall be exercisable or performable by him save only on the advice of the Government, or after consultation with the Council of State, as may be determined by such law."

I agree that that particular portion of the section has divided itself into two different categories. The President at the present moment is the President of the Executive Council and, as such, does affix his signature and does in that form, perform a certain number of functions under the Constitution as it now is, but those are formal functions —what I call nominal powers. He appoints the new head of this House, and the members of the Government, and he accepts their resignations. He summons and dissolves the Dáil and Seanad in normal times. He signs and promulgates laws. He has the supreme command of the forces and grants commissions. He can address the nation and the Dáil. He can exercise additional powers as conferred by law, and he exercises the prerogative of mercy. With the exception of the second part, the exercising of additional powers conferred by law, his functions are entirely nominal. He acts for and on behalf of and on the advice and by the authority of the head of this House speaking for the House. While it would be a perfectly reasonable view for people to take, it is one of the matters upon which two views can be held, that as those powers are nominal, as the powers do not rest merely in that man or in his office, and he is merely exercising those powers on behalf of some other authority—it would be a perfectly reasonable view to take, and the House can take it without in any way interfering with this Constitution—that those powers should nominally be exercised by those by whom they are really exercised.

It is a different case, however, in relation to certain real powers which he has, and the whole question is whether or not those real powers are powers inherent in himself, or whether they are powers given to him by the community, to be exercised by him, under regulation, for the benefit of the community, and for the increase of the authority of the community as a whole. I think if you look back at all the existing powers that are here—I am leaving out now the question of additional powers— every existing real power that he has is a power to go back to the fountain of authority, to go back to Caesar, to go back to the people who sent him and gave him authority, to ask them to exercise a plenary authority over this Dáil and the Oireachtas. To the extent to which that is so, to the extent to which in relation to the existing real power of this Dáil it is a power and authority to go back to the people themselves for a more immediate and more definitely controlled and more clearly exercised authority by them over the legislation of this country, it is very difficult indeed to say how the term "undemocratic power" can be applied to it. I have listened to the discussion, and I have certainly listened to it with the open mind which I have advocated in relation to other people, and no one has yet shown me any of the existing powers that are given to the President which is not definitely exercisable in that particular way, and for that particular purpose.

The question of whether or not any additional powers, other than the powers which are here declared, might have that effect, is a matter I think for consideration. No power which is given to the President—always assuming the fact that you require a new officer of this kind—to be exercised on the advice of the Government, can take away from the authority of the people who created that Government. But the powers which he exercises already, after consultation with the Council of the State, are in fact his own powers, and if this clause does bear the interpretation that powers can be given to the President of a kind which would be inconsistent with the authority of the people, then there should be some governing or amending clause. I am not sufficiently learned in the legislatic interpretation of words and clauses to say whether that is necessary or not, but the whole thing here is governed, as far as I can see, by the phrase "subject to this Constitution." It seems to me that that phrase "subject to this Constitution" is intended to prevent the handing over to the President, by law or otherwise, of any powers which do not conform to this Constitution. If that is so, then as far as I can see there is no particular difficulty. It has to be remembered that any power which is given by law to the President or anyone else subsists only as long as that law subsists, and that law is completely under the authority of the Dáil which is elected by the people and given authority to pass such law.

A point that might possibly be put up is that any additional powers, other than powers which would be exercised on the advice of the Government, might be regarded as constitutional amendments. As a matter of fact that was the one point which really was of any considerable importance in the speech of Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney. He suggested that there were risks and dangers there. Whether or not his opinion is well founded in law, it is a legitimate subject to give expression to, and, to the extent to which there is matter in what he said, it is a matter for consideration. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney again had the difficulty that there was no means of enforcing on the new President the carrying out even of his own functions; he can do anything he likes and he cannot be brought within the rules laid down for him. As a matter of fact, Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney was aware and did tell us that there was machinery by which that could be done, and his real complaint at the present moment is not that there is no such machinery but that the machinery itself is of a kind which is too cumbersome and complex. He said in effect, though he did not say it in fact, that if the President refuses to sign an Act, or do any other formal act which it is his business to do, the only method of dealing with him is to impeach him here in the Dáil, and he thinks there ought to be a simpler method. That again, I think, is a matter of perfectly legitimate difference of opinion. If there is any likelihood of the President refusing to carry out functions of that kind, I think some quite simple machinery can be devised to deal with the matter.

Comment on this

You say "can be." It is not there.

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It is quite in order for anyone to propose a change.

Comment on this

I want an admission that it is not in the Constitution.

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There is power in the Constitution to impeach.

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That is the only power.

Comment on this

As far as I know.

Comment on this

There is no coercive power.

Comment on this

Speaking as a non-lawyer, the only thing I know that can be made effective is the power of impeachment.

Comment on this

There is no other way in the Constitution.

Comment on this

I do not know of any other way. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney took a point in relation to the President that there were two contradictory methods of dealing with him in relation to criminal offences. He said in one clause of the Constitution it is such that every man has a right of trial by jury. It then goes on to say in relation to crimes of treason or other high crimes or misdemeanours the President may be impeached in this House. He said those were contradictory clauses. Speaking again as one who is not a lawyer, they do not seem to me to be so. The sanctions in the two cases are entirely different. The only sanction for any criminal act or any high crime or misdemeanour which is laid down for the President is that he be removed from his office. There is no possibility of trial by jury in relation to that. It seems to me that those two are two unrelated things.

Deputy Lavery spoke the other night. I must say Deputy Lavery, in my opinion, is outstanding as the one lawyer whom I ever heard who has kept the charm of personal expression in speech of which, apparently, the practice of the profession does seem to rob his colleagues normally. It is really a pleasure to anyone who has an appreciation of speech to listen to Deputy Lavery in his contributions here. His examination of the Constitution was, if I recollect rightly, divided into two classes. One was a rather philosophical complaint in relation to the fact that things had been included in the Constitution which might have been left out and had been devised in a way which was capable of ultimate extreme misuse. In the other case he raised the same small, fine points of law. I will simply take one of the examples and, mind again, it is a question open to entirely different views as to whether or not the Constitution should include declaratory clauses or not. We think it should. We think there are certain fundamental things, certain opinions we have, certain outlooks we have upon life, personal and national, which ought to be expressed in a document of this kind. A purely legal mind is entitled to have an entirely opposite view, and to say that nothing is required in the Constitution but the dry bones and skeletons of fundamental law. But if one does take the view that declaratory phrases of one kind or another must appear, or may appear, in a document of this kind, you are inevitably in certain difficulties. He took a particular case, that there should be complete freedom of the Press. But the State claim the right and the duty, in the interests of public morality and the rest of it, to exercise certain control over the Press, the radio and the cinema. He says that limiting clause, the claim of the State to exercise a restrictive influence over these particular things, could be interpreted by a particular class of mind in such a manner as to completely wipe out the whole liberty of the Press. I am not denying that. There are no limits to the interpretation which a particular mind could put upon it. But assume for a moment that you had not put in those limiting clauses and you simply had written down the liberty of the Press, is anyone going to deny that by exactly the same reasoning an interpretation could be given to the liberty of the Press of a character that no State would stand for? You have such statements as the liberty of the individual, the right to private property, but the State claims the right and the duty in the interests of the whole community so to interpret the function of the right to private property that it shall not interfere permanently with the public good. "A Communistic Government," says Deputy Lavery, "a people Communistic behind a Communistic Government, could give to that limitation a definition of private property—an extention —which would abolish private property. Undoubtedly that limitation could be left out and the right to private property as there declared left undefined and unlimited, and by a process of parity of reasoning an interpretation can be given to the right of private property which would so conflict with the public good that no State would stand for it. Now to the extent to which I think that was a philosophic point taken by Deputy Lavery in good faith it did seem to me to the extent to which it proved anything it proved too much. It proved that it could prove precisely the contrary from the same reasoning which he adopted. If I might interpolate for one moment a personal difficulty which I have both in relation to private property, the inviolability of the person and the rest of it, it is this. You have over a period of years seen many changes both in the methods and intensity of taxation. Within living memory we have seen all sorts of taxes upon inheritances and the rest of it, built up to a very high value. You have seen an income-tax of 8/- or 9/- in the £ in operation throughout practically the whole of Europe during a period of war. You have had an 80 per cent. and 85 per cent. excess profits duty in operation throughout a period of that time. How far does the right of private property exist, in fact, having regard to a condition of that kind?

During the Great War I remember making a calculation in relation to the income of a certain man who had quadrupled his income during the war and yet when you took into account all that was left to him, and attempted to buy with it the goods at the then price of the goods, instead of actually quadrupling his income, his income had gone down to about one-fourth or one-fifth. I am only dealing now with the question of the degree to which private property in the existing state of the law is real. As to the inviolability of the person, throughout the whole European War you had conscription of the life of every single adult citizen, the State claiming the right to claim the life of every single one of its citizens without question, and the right to control throughout the whole of that period the whole exercise of his life. I would be very glad indeed to see this State giving an interpretation to private property and to the inviolability of the person which would not conform to what was the common practice and the common understanding of the value of these terms during that particular period, at any rate.

There are some points in relation to the Constitution with which I am rather in a difficulty. One of my difficulties is why some things are made part of a Constitution and others are made part of a law. For instance, assume that we accept the principle that any Seanad is better than no Seanad, why should the membership of that Seanad be, at 60, sacrosanct and only alterable by the people at a referendum, and yet the whole constitution of the Seanad should be alterable by law? It is possible, by the operation of the ordinary law, to elect a Seanad on an entirely different basis throughout. I am not clear whether some of the things which are laid down to be done by the Constitution might not better be done by law, and some that are laid down to be done by law might not better be done by the Constitution.

For instance, I personally see nothing sacrosanct in the fact that the electorate for the Seanad should be made up of men who have received 500 first preference votes, any more than it might be 1,000 or that they should be elected by what would be mathematically the same thing—the membership of the Dáil which was elected by these votes. It is a curious fact that, if you take the total first preference votes for the Dáil and divide them by the number of Deputies elected in relation to the two big bodies in the House, they practically require mathematically the same number of first preference through whatever number of candidates they are divided in order to elect a Deputy. In relation to the smaller Parties in the House, the Labour Party and certain Independent Deputies, they do cast rather more first preference votes. To that extent, it might be said that voting of this character would tend to benefit the smaller Parties in the House. In practice, I am afraid it will not. In practice. I am afraid that, due to the lack of co-ordination which will exist in an election of this kind and the scattering of their votes at any postal election of this kind, any advantage which they were going to gain by this method— and I think that is the intention of this method—would be lost. If, in fact, on a mathematical examination—it is purely a question of mathematics—it is proved that election by the Dáil will in fact produce the same results as election by the candidates, then it is certainly a question for the Committee Stage as to whether or not that method might not be altered. I am rather puzzled to know why the President should always have his residence in or about the City of Dublin while the Dáil can meet in the City of Dublin or such other place as may be determined. There may be some good reason for that which I do not know.

Comment on this

To avoid Cork.

Comment on this

That is the worst possible reason. This again is a matter for legal interpretation. Article 15, I think it is, declares that acts shall not be declared to be illegal which were legal at the time of their commission. I am under the impression that under the Public Safety Act, which now exists, it is possible to declare illegal an act which was not illegal at the time it was committed.

Comment on this

You say you believe that?

Comment on this

I believe so.

Comment on this

Your Government sent a man to jail under that very Article.

Comment on this

I am prepared to ask the Deputy for information, if he will give it.

Comment on this

Commandant Cronin was sentenced under it.

Comment on this

Is that correct?

Comment on this

Quite correct.

Comment on this

I am simply concerned with the question whether it is so.

Comment on this

It shows an amazing depth of ignorance when a Parliamentary Secretary does not know that his Government got a man sentenced in that way.

Comment on this

What I am concerned with is, not any argument or discussion with the Deputy, but a difficulty which seems to me to be in the Constitution as I now find it. I find that my layman's interpretation of the law was correct. Going further, I find that the existing law will be taken over under this Constitution. Therefore, it seems to me that, while we declare in the Constitution that acts cannot be declared to be illegal which were legal at the time of their commission, we are taking over, as part of the existing law still to be repealed, a law which does contradict that.

Comment on this

That is in Article 2A of the present Constitution, which is going out.

Comment on this

Then we do not take that over. If that is so, that answers my difficulty.

Comment on this

It does not answer it. It can be re-established.

Comment on this

We will give the Deputy an opportunity to point out any difficulties he likes. I personally will be grateful to those who will point out difficulties. It is laid down that the Ceann Comhairle at the time of the dissolution shall be deemed to be elected, but it does not say that his constituency shall have the right to elect the whole of its members. I can quite see the present thing being put in a law, but I cannot quite see why it should remain in a Constitution. It seems to me that if the Ceann Comhairle's position in relation to his membership of the House is to be defined in the Constitution, then it ought to be defined in a form which would not leave the constituency for which he was originally elected short of a member.

In Article 47, which deals with the Referendum, it is made clear that a Bill which had been passed by the House and which is sent to the country on the Referendum, must be rejected by a majority of votes cast, such majority not being less than 35 per cent. of the voters on the register. It does not seem to make it necessary at all that there should be a majority for the Bill or Act. I may be misinterpreting the section but it seems that it would be possible for 30 per cent. of the people to vote against the Act and 20 per cent. to vote for the Act which was sent on the Referendum and still the Act or Bill would be passed. I take it that the intention is that in so far as the Dáil has been set up to pass legislation—and an Act of that kind has to pass the two Houses of the Oireachtas—the implication is that unless the Act is rejected by at least 35 per cent. of the voters it is accepted by the people. That is a matter which I think might be made somewhat more clear, at any rate to the lay mind. Article 51 of the Draft Constitution says that this Constitution shall be alterable by the Dáil in minor particulars, at any rate, up to a period of three years. I think it is very desirable indeed that there should be some period in which this Constitution could be altered by minor legislation. Such a clause was put into the original Constitution and the experience of the House is that when the period of the power of the Dáil over constitutional legislation was expiring that that period was in fact extended. My own explanation is that in relation to this Constitution also that this period will be lengthened.

Comment on this

No, it cannot be enlarged by way of minor legislation.

Comment on this

That is what I am not at all clear about.

Comment on this

Then read Article 51.

Comment on this

I will; I am here as a student. I am here to learn.

Comment on this

No provision of this Constitution except the provision in Article 46 and the provision in this Article 51, provides for the amendment of the Constitution within a certain period. If the Deputy will look at page 102, Article 51, he will see that.

Comment on this

It would seem then that the House would not have power to extend the period of three years?

Comment on this

Except by a constitutional amendment, that is by way of the Referendum.

Comment on this

Frankly, I think that is the case, and I am doubtful whether there should not be some power, at any rate, to extend that period. I see nothing sacrosanct about three years. At the end of two years and 11 months the Dáil will be in a position to do certain things, but after that you would not be in a position to do them at all. I do not see any reason why, on the face of it, that period of three years should be regarded as sacrosanct. I would like to see that whatever safeguards and precautions the House would think it necessary to have, there should be some power of extending this period.

In my opinion this is a Constitution that has been well thought out and into it every good purpose and intention has been put. I do think that this is not going to be the last Constitution of this State. I do think that there are a good many things which are still in a state of flux. The mere fact that we say to ourselves the Seanad may be elected in such a manner, and then say it may be by ordinary law, illustrates that. The House, in passing a Constitution of this kind, should retain, at any rate, some power of amending it in those particulars which the experience of the next few years will show.

I started to-night by saying that I regarded the invitation of the President to examine this Constitution fully—an invitation directed to every Deputy and every elector—as an invitation that ought to be seriously considered and responsibly accepted. I think in relation to a law of this kind which is going to influence the life of this country for a considerable number of years and which is going to decide the direction of the movements of the minds of the people and of the country into definitely new channels we should regard it as a very serious matter. I think every one of us should regard this not merely as entitling him but binding him to bring to the examination of that document the most critical powers that he possesses. Deputies should be anxious to find even in the prejudiced, even in the partisan and even in the angry criticism of those opposed to it any scintilla of truth and service by which it was possible to improve this Constitution. We will have to live with this Constitution for a very long time.

It is our opportunity between now and the time this Draft Constitution is to be submitted to the electors to make it a better piece of work in every way in which an intelligent examination of it and an honest inquiry into it will help us to do so. That is a duty which I hope every one of us will discharge. It is a duty to which the President invites us, and it is a duty which I hope all Deputies will accept in the spirit in which the invitation has been given.

Comment on this

I rise largely with questions in my mind about this proposed amendment to the Constitution. I know that Deputies on the Government side have got up and spoken as if the Draft Constitution were such a limpid document that it was impossible to misunderstand it; that attitude puts me in false position perhaps in asking questions about it. But I justify myself by the very obvious fact that this Constitution is not only not clear, but that it has been drafted with the definite purpose of being ambiguous. I turn, right at the beginning, to the Preamble, which begins: "In the name of the Most Holy Trinity," and then it says: "We, the people of Eire." What is Eire? There is no such word in the English language. But, if we turn to Article 4 of the Constitution, we see: "The name of the State is Eire." I want to know what is Eire and what is the State?

We are accused here of wantonly and willingly trying to misrepresent this Constitution. We are told that every body, 99.9 per cent. of the people, understand it perfectly well. I wish that the ordinary rules of this House did not apply at the moment, and that I could take on a number of bets with Deputies opposite by asking them to tell me what certain things in the Constitution mean, and get a sum from them when they failed to explain. How many Deputies on the other side can tell me exactly the procedure in relation to the single preference vote which is laid down here? But that is digressive. Here we have it stated: "We, the people of Eire," then certain other things, and the sentence continues: "do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution." What is Eire, what is the State, who are the people of Eire, and what is meant by "ourselves" to whom this so-called Constitution, which is an amendment to a Constitution, is given? On the face of it, I think that, although that Preamble begins with the most solemn invocation, it is definitely meant to be dishonest.

On the next page, Articles 1, 2 and 3 use the word "nation." Article 1 begins: "The Irish nation hereby affirms." Are the Irish nation and Eire identical? Article 2 begins: "The national territory consists of". Article 3 starts: "Pending the re-integration of the national territory". No reference to State so far. Then we come to Article 4, which says: "The name of the State is Eire." Can anybody, other than the President, tell me what is meant by Eire and what is the State? We are told "do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution". Who are the people of Eire? We read the Constitution, and what is going to happen? There is going to be a plebiscite in the Twenty-Six Counties of the Free State.

Then we read the Irish text and, mind you, part of this contemptible humbug, which is nationally degrading, to my mind, is the pretence that this Constitution is written in Irish and translated into English. I remember a time when a correspondence took place over a thing which was written in English. Interpreters were called in, but eventually, because an ambiguity in English could not be carried over into Irish, the English edition was sent over headed "English translation." There is no such word as Eire in English, but in the Irish text the people of Eire become "muinntear na hEireann." The Irish text means, in English: "We, the people of Ireland, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution." How are the people of Ireland going to do it? Is there going to be a plebiscite of the whole of Ireland and, if there is not, why the dishonest humbug contained in this Preamble? "We give to ourselves." We do not. What is the implication of "ourselves"?

I would like, if I may show a rather childish simplicity, some straight answers from the President. We have often asked for them, but long experience has shown that we never get a straight answer. Still, with that buoyant optimism that one has to maintain while reading a document like this, I shall hope for an answer. If the Irish phrase "muinntear na hEireann" is going to be the official text, how is it going to be maintained that "muinntear na hEireann" adopt, enact, and give to themselves a Constitution?

In this Preamble, which apparently was definitely drafted, we observe the clumsiness of bringing into the English language a word that does not exist, putting into the English language an Irish word which has an English interpretation, which is Ireland. But we do not use the word "Ireland" there; we use the word "Eire." In Irish we use the equivalent of "the people of Ireland." There you have an absolute ambiguity and a possible contradiction between the two texts.

Comment on this

We do not use the word "Speaker" here; we use the words "Ceann Comhairle," speaking in English.

Comment on this

Yes, but that has reference to reality, the person who sits in the Chair and presides here. We have an Irish phrase to convey to the mind the concept of that reality, and that phrase is "Ceann Comhairle." The English use for it and conveying the same idea is "Speaker." What I want to know is this, is "muinntear na hEireann" in Irish the equivalent of the "people of Eire" in English? Will the Deputy tell me?

Comment on this

Gan amhras.

Comment on this

The Deputy does not speak with authority, fortunately. I maintain there is no even proposed enactment by which the people of Ireland will adopt, enact and give to themselves this Constitution and, consequently, the very Preamble itself is a lie. We come to Article 6, which says:—

"All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good."

I want to know is that the affirmation of a universal truth, or is that merely an enactment in the Constitution, making that the law of this country, or is it merely stating a universal principle from which certain other things will flow?

I think that the ambiguity that I find in the Preamble has two reasons: One is the desire to pretend, when it suits, as we have seen so often done before, that Eire is the whole of Ireland, when it suits, and the other is to accept, when necessary, that Eire is only the Twenty-Six Counties. I think that the Preamble itself and all this huggermugger is for the purpose of pretending that this is a completely new Constitution, that this State, somehow or another, begins ab initio, and the Constitution then says that the people shall adopt, enact, and so on.

My colleague, Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, did mention a certain doctrine, the Suarezian doctrine. The wording of this document seems to me to have been specially arranged so as to go no farther, while what I might call the extreme Suarezian doctrine is in a different category. Suarez did say that authority belongs to the perfect community. I admit that as written in English that phrase, the people, could mean the unified entity of the people, the people in agreement of laws, or it could mean a plurality, meaning an aggregation of the individuals. When we come to the Irish in this document we find that "the people" are referred to as "Is ón bpobal." Later on we find the expression "fúta," which means "under them." Here is a statement that the aggregations of the individuals in this country themselves have the power to legislate.

With regard to Eire, I remind myself rather of Captain Boyle in "Juno and the Paycock" asking: "What is the stars?" Incidentally, of course, if "Juno and the Paycock" were translated into Irish, Captain Boyle would be known as "An Taoiseach." Now, here I remind myself of Deputy de Valera, as he was at that time, when he sat over here on these benches, constantly jumping up, with a lock of hair falling over his forehead, thumping the bench and wanting to know: "Is this Dáil sovereign? What is the law-making power in this country?" By this we are told that the plural people—not the people unified in one entity, the perfect society, but the multitude as an aggregation of individuals—have power to enact laws. Now, power essentially belongs to a unity, and if power belongs to the multitude, what are we doing here, and what authority has the Government? The Government passes laws purporting to bind under conscience, and now, somehow or other, it is implied in this document that the Government has no power whatever; that this Dáil has no power—that there is, in fact, a necessary and continuous state of anarchy in here in which the law-making authority is the dispersed multitude.

Last week, it will be remembered, President de Valera got up and spoke over the wireless and said that sovereignty belongs to them, the people, and is indefeasible and inalienable. Now, if sovereignty belongs to the individual people of this country in their aggregation, and if it is inalienable, why has the Government here purported to make laws? It cannot do it. The Government in that case has no authority whatever. Now, all this position flows entirely—this is not an assertion, but merely my judgement of the situation—from the vanity of the President, who has desired to pretend that he is creating an entirely new State. I referred to this document in front of us as a proposal to amend the Constitution. You cannot call it a new Constitution. You cannot attempt to pretend that, somehow or other, the scattered multitude of the Irish people are being drawn together in agreement of laws row. It is perfectly absurd to do so. We know perfectly well that, if that document is to be enacted and to become law, it is necessary that it should fulfil the conditions of positive law and what is considered to be the fundamental law of the land. This document cannot be enacted unless all that is laid down and required by the law of this country at this moment is duly fulfilled. You can submit it to the people of this country and try to get a majority of a section of this country, and it is not law by reason of that. If the requirements laid down by the laws of this country are not fulfilled, the question can be taken to the Supreme Court to decide whether or not it is law, and it will be judged whether or not it is law according as it has fulfilled the conditions of the Constitution and of any other positive law that might be involved. That is the condition.

Why cannot we be ordinarily honest here and admit that this is a proposed amendment of the Constitution of the Irish Free State? Why this change of name? There is the pretence—it has been put out by the propagandists— that this is, somehow or other, a great step, or a great gesture, towards the abolition of Partition. To my mind, it is quite the opposite. To make this change in the existing Constitution as drastic as it is, has definitely injured that position. When the Constitution of this State was drawn up and passed here, it was, in fact, a Constitution for the whole of Ireland. For it not to be so, a subsequent positive Act was required in order to withhold the jurisdiction of this Dáil from one part of the country. Now, however, that is not good enough. We now draw up this ambiguous document, which is merely for the fooling of the simple-minded, in a condition in which our jurisdiction has no effect beyond the Twenty-Six Counties. It does not apply in the Six Counties. So, somehow or other, we have made a great movement towards overcoming Partition by drawing up a Constitution which is necessary only for one part of Ireland, and rejecting a Constitution which was for the whole of Ireland and the application of which was withheld from one part of Ireland only by a subsequent Act. To my mind, that is a definitely retrograde step.

As I say, I should like to know, both as regards the first part of Article 6 and the last sentence in the Preamble, what exactly was in the Government's mind. There is no doubt, to my mind, that there cannot be a perfect society —that unity of people—unless there be authority. Consequently, if that is authority, where is it? It is vested in this Dáil and in this Government, I presume. Well, if we have authority, will the Government explain to me how it is that the dispersed multitude, the mere addition of the individuals in this country, have themselves that sovereignty and that authority to make laws? It simply cannot be. It is not possible for a multitude as a multitude; it is not possible for anything but a unity to possess or exercise authority; and yet we have this phrase in the Preamble: "We, the people of Eire, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution," and in the Irish text of Article 6 we have the word "fútha"—under them—implying, somehow or other, that I have authority, you have authority, and he has authority, and so on; but if it is not vested in a unity, then all I can say is that this country is in an anarchical state, and President de Valera propounded that as an immutable condition when he said that the sovereignty belongs to them, the plural multitude, and is indefeasible and inalienable. We all know, of course, that that was merely eyewash and that it was merely for the purpose of fooling and humbugging the people; but why on earth should we be called together here to assist a man in fooling and humbugging the people to, as I believe, the detriment of the people? Why should we be called here together and asked to agree to this document and to this Preamble, the first part of which, to my mind, is blasphemous, since it begins by invoking the name of the Most Holy Trinity, and then carefully lays itself out to be ambiguous and to try to mean two things at the same time, and winds up by saying that "We, the people, do give ourselves this Constitution."

What is the argument to be put up for this? I admit that the Suarezians say that the perfect community—the people in absolute unanimity—have authority, but there is nothing in positive law which says that a majority has it. One might just as well say that a majority decision, whatever position the minority may take, in this vote, will be effective. The implication, in my opinion, of the President's speech—even Deputy Hugo Flinn, a few minutes ago, talked about it—is that, somehow or other, although the people exercise a franchise and indicate the choice of rulers, the sovereignty and the authority continue to reside in the people. I could give many quotations that definitely refute that and that, as I think, authoritatively refute it. Even to give the most charitable interpretation to the English version of Article 6, there are certainly a great many authoritative writers, theologians, and so on, who definitely refute that statement as it is. I myself go to the extreme opposite of what is proposed there. Even on the Irish text, however, I do not think that anybody could possibly agree that that is what I might call a natural and universal condition. If this Dáil, as a sovereign authority, enacts that certain things shall be the positive law in this country, then, they may be against justice or against right reason—some of them have been—but certainly, with the power of the Government, they will be able to be enforced as laws. To my mind, all this comes from the desire to pretend that this is a completely new Constitution for a new State.

Why change the name of the State? So far it has been known as the Irish Free State. We are told now that either that same area and entity that has been the Irish Free State is going just to change its label and be called Eire, or that a new State out of the same element is going to be created. That is as President de Valera sees the Constitution. Another question I want to ask is this: The Irish Free State is known internationally; it is known as a moral person, speaking internationally through the voice of the King, who is himself part of this Oireachtas, and part of the law-making authority in this country. Is this Eire going to be a new State, is it going to be known internationally, and if so, how? It was asked here the other day by interpolation when someone over there was saying how the original Constitution was taken over to England and read there beforehand, if this had been taken over. I think it was President de Valera who got up and asserted: "Nothing of the sort." I do think we ought to know what the position is going to be when this comes about. Is Eire going to be known internationally as a moral person, as an international entity, and if it is, how is that going to be brought about? Is the King going to notify various States and say that the realm heretofore known as the Irish Free State is henceforward to be known as Eire? We require to know that.

I remember myself when President de Valera went over to America and spent 18 months there, at very large expense. He came back, and addressed the Dáil, and his message to the Dáil was that his experience during 18 months in America taught him one thing, and that was that it was ridiculous for us to continue to seek international recognition as we then were. Since then an Irish State, the first in history, has come into existence, has been accepted in the comity of nations and has been internationally recognised. That State is the Irish Free State. Now, we are not doing away with the Irish Free State. We are only pretending to the simple-minded outside that that is being done. We are just changing the name, and I want to know is this entity, Eire, going to be internationally recognised and what steps are being taken to see that it will be internationally recognised? What assurance can the President give us that full international recognition will be given to his alleged new entity here? These are the points upon which I really got up to speak.

There is another dishonesty in this matter. Yesterday, or the day before, in one of the instalments of that appallingly long and wearisome speech of the Minister for Finance he constantly referred to this new personage —called in the Constitution "an tUachtarán" and generally known to the people as the "Octoroon"—as the head of the State. In this draft amendment there is no reference to him, as far as I noticed, as head of the State. If this proposed constitutional amendment does not refer to as the head of the State, I want to know why Ministers refer to him as head of the State? I want a clear and unambiguous statement from the President of the Executive Council as to whether or not this proposed new functionary is going to be the head of the State. Is he or is he not? If he is, what is the State that he is head of? If he is, what steps will he take to get international recognition for the State of which he is head, namely, the State of Eire?

There was another dishonest feature in this debate. I remember, at the time the Seanad was abolished, I got up here and pointed out that by the act of abolishing the Seanad the President and his Government were giving themselves dictatorial powers such as were possessed by no other Government in Europe because, as I said, although Italy has what is called a dictatorship, there is there a King and there is a Constitution which imposes certain limits upon the leader. Here the position was wantonly created in which the Government, with its machined majority in this House, could abolish the whole Constitution, the most fundamental law, and do it in one day. At that time the President and other Ministers denounced that as a dishonest misrepresentation of the case. At that time we were denounced for asserting it. Now the President gets up here and says—he had not the ordinary decency which the Minister for Finance had to accept the situation—that as some people feel that the present condition is a formal dictatorship, to relieve their minds we are changing the situation. The Minister for Finance got up and said: "At the present moment we have this condition of absolute dictatorship. Why are you complaining of the creation of this new office with its limiting powers upon the powers of the Government"? Now, really, if that argument is going to be put forward, it did require an apology from the President for the untrue statement he made here when he said that the abolition of the Seanad was not giving that power to the Government. The Minister for Finance spoke about the complicated elastic mathematical arrangement that was resorted to here to try to pretend that we were giving the same security of tenure of office to the judges. At the time that we pointed out that the action of the Government was putting the judges in a position in which their independence was jeopardised or destroyed, we were denounced as misrepresenting the position. Then, as soon as it suits, the Government can turn round and say that is their argument, but the President has not the ordinary decency to apologise for what he stated at an earlier time.

I want to know what is Eire. I want to know whether Part I of Article 6 is an affirmation creating a condition by virtue of the passing of such law, or whether it purports to be a statement of a general and universal condition at all times. I want to know whether or not this proposed President is going to be, as the Minister for Finance said but as the proposed amendment does not say, head of the State. I think that those things should have been made clear. They would have been made clear if it were not for the fact that we have a leader of the Government who much prefers ambiguity to clarity. The Parliamentary Secretary a short while ago was saying with regard to the three years' period during which this Constitution can be changed by ordinary law, that he did not know why the period of three years was set down. It seems to me that there is one very obvious reason, that when this draft was being drawn up it was being drawn up with a view to the holding of a general election which would return a majority of Fianna Fáil Deputies. The Government coming in is nominally elected for five years, but three years is possibly about as safe a period as could be looked forward to. The only explanation of that period that I can think of is that it can give to the Fianna Fáil Government, if elected in the next election, power to change the Constitution by ordinary legislation, and will deprive any subsequent Government of that power. I should like to ask what right has this one single Parliament, on the very eve of its dissolution, to purport to bring in a lengthy, long-winded Bill like this to be imposed upon this country in such a way that a subsequent Parliament will not be able to deal with it with the same powers as this Parliament has? That, to my mind, is a perfectly arbitrary and scandalous scheme on the part of the Fianna Fáil Government.

It was elected five years ago, and it now comes along and says: "We propose to legislate now in such a way that, by ordinary legislation, our successors will not be able to change the Constitution." I remember when the Constitution was first brought in we did put in a period of four years during which it could be changed. Before those four years were up the head of the Government at that time said that that period should be extended. We extended it to eight years, and he said in any case it must be extended until such time and re-extended for such a period that it would overflow into the period of our successors, so that they would have equal power with us to change the Constitution; that it would not be one Government only which would decide the Constitution. The head of the Government at the present moment has brought in a period of three years to secure that if he is elected—if he is not elected, presumably this will not become law—his Government will have power to change this Constitution by ordinary legislation, but that future Governments will be deprived of that power.

This new functionary, the President, is given certain powers under the Constitution, and other powers may be given to him by law. Most people in this country, having read the Constitution, recognise certain handiwork in it, and can see what it is directed towards. Most people know perfectly well that President de Valera proposes to take that office himself. But just notice how it is done. There will be a general election some time this year. If, as a result of that, his Party is returned to power, he then proceeds to enact this Constitution, and for about a period of a year he will act presumably as Taoiseach. During that period, with his Government power, he can legislate with his majority to give any additional power he likes to that functionary, then he can proceed to walk into that office to exercise those powers. He can extend those powers. He can, during that year as Government head, change the Constitution in all except two clauses. By ordinary legislation, with his majority in the Dáil, he can extend the powers of that functionary, and then having extended those powers he can step in and take them to himself.

The Minister for Finance and the President have put up the theory that this President is to be the protector of the people's right; that he is to be above politics. Now, what puts him above politics? Certainly, if the idea is that he should be above and uncontaminated by association with Party politics in this country, there should have been a condition laid down in this Constitution excluding from that position anybody who had been in too recent years or too intimately associated with Party politics in this country. That is not there. We are told he is to be above politics. As has been pointed out before—I do not want to labour it too much—everybody knows that when it comes to an election in the whole country, the whole area of the State, with universal franchise, such a contest can only be run by a strong organisation. My colleague, Deputy Fitzgerald - Kenney, spoke about the need for funds in a general election. We all know that, but we also know that a general election, although it is a very expensive matter, would be ever so much more expensive but for the fact that you have a political organisation in the country which is kept more or less alive for the whole time, and revivified for the election, and which is able to call upon many voluntary workers to come out and work in the election by reason of their allegiance to and membership of that political party.

Fianna Fáil knows that well. During all the time between elections they keep their organisation going as actively as they can. President de Valera, in sending out an appeal for funds recently, stated two things which remained in my mind. First, he tells the people that for previous elections he got his funds from outside this country, but he cannot get them there now, and, therefore, the people of this country will have to pay for it. The other thing was, he assures the people that there is an abundance of voluntary workers throughout the country, and those voluntary workers are absolutely necessary for the political Party operating. If the political Party had to appoint salaried officers for all the work that is done—canvassing, electioneering and all the rest of it—it would require an enormous sum of money such as no political Party in this country could hope to get. Now, when it comes to the election for the President, that is going to be an election taking place in every part of the Free State, operating in every polling booth, and anybody who is aspiring to that office will require to run a very strong campaign. He cannot draw up an ad hoc organisation for that unless he has enormous funds. He must necessarily draw upon the existing political organisation in this country, and look to the assistance of the voluntary workers that that organisation can draw on. It means that we have an election this year in which Fianna Fáil will run their candidates and we will run our candidates, and a year afterwards there will be another election in which, if there is a contest, the whole resources of the Party will have to be thrown in, in order to give their candidate every possible chance of polling the maximum number of votes. Consequently, the holder of this office is going to be head and heels steeped in Party politics, and must necessarily be so for the reason that his appointment depends upon votes won in a general election in the whole country.

Just note this: when we meet here as members of the Dáil, time and again I have heard President de Valera get up and talk on the assumption that authority here derives solely and exclusively from the fact that we have received a certain proportion of votes in the country. It is not more than a year ago, I think, that he wanted to suggest that one section of the Oireachtas, the Governor-General, was somehow or another denuded of the authority which belonged to us inherently and of right, because we had received votes and he had not. That is the doctrine which the President has at the back of his mind the whole time, and I believe it is one which is generally in the minds of the people of this country. It is to my mind a completely erroneous and false doctrine, but it is there. Now, this doctrine that authority comes exclusively and solely through the receipt of votes in the country puts us in this position. A Dáil will meet here in which roughly 51 per cent. of a Party is opposed by 49 per cent. of a Party, having received that proportion of votes. The Government here knows that it received only about half the votes in the country. It got a majority of seats, but not only did it not get the unanimous vote, but even in this Dáil it controls only a certain number of seats—about half the seats. Now, this proposed new functionary, with his enormous Party machine and his Party propaganda, will be going around trying to win the support of the people to give him a majority.

Whatever the result of that election is, it will not be a case of one side getting 49 per cent. representation and the other side getting one. That functionary will claim to be the only person elected in this country by a majority of votes of the people. He himself has been elected. If there is something particularly sacrosanct in authority deriving from votes he has the same authority as the Dáil. It can be argued to be rather more. He is going to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. We are told that he is going to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in order to keep it free of politics. In our participation in Party politics; in our organisations we might say the ignominy of that is shared with our colleagues, so that it is very complete. Here you will have a man who in his own person has been the sole and central figure in this Party propaganda, in this exaggeratedly Party campaign, and he is going to come in to take charge of the Army for the purpose, we are told, of keeping it out of politics as would be the case if it were controlled by Party government in this Dáil. The dishonesty and hypocrisy of that argument is perfectly sickening and is most unfortunate in this Dáil. He is to be called the non-political head. Anybody in this Dáil has a better claim to be non-political. We have independent members specifically claiming to be non-political. The one man in this country who clearly is steeped up to the hilt in Party politics is the man to be elected in a Party campaign with the whole country as one franchise. He is going to be elected by the people. It is not a bit of good for the Government to try to claim more authority than his. He can say to any member or the whole 12 or 15 Ministers together: "I represent the people more than you do; I got a bigger vote, you only got a majority in so many constituencies. I got mine in the whole country." To my mind, if you were going to have such a functionary, the one thing you could say about him is that he ought to be elected in a different way from the Dáil. He is going to be elected by universal franchise and the Dáil is going to be elected by universal franchise and somehow or another we are expecting him to remain completely non-political, to be the person to have formal command of the Army and the Government. I would like if one could get—it was the purpose I really got up for—a clear and unequivocal answer as to who are these people mentioned in the last line of the Preamble who are adopting, enacting and giving to us this Constitution and what is the real office to be held by this person called the President? Is he or is he not to be a real head of the State here, because if he is to be a head of the State then certain things flow from that. Can we really know this before we are asked to give assent to this? The whole Bill shows very definitely clear thinking for the sole purpose of trying to make this document misleading. There is an Irish word Eire and there is an English world Ireland. In the English text we have the word Eire. Why? Over here we are not told. We are told the name of the State is Eire. We are not told what is the extent of the State. We are not told who are those people, whether they are the majority of the people of the Twenty-Six Counties who are claiming to themselves as some inalienable right the right to rule over the Twenty-Six Counties or the 32 Counties. I think we should not have been asked to discuss these matters when these things have not been made clear. I think it was nationally disgraceful for the President to draft this draft very carefully for the purpose of enabling it to be misrepresented to the people.

Comment on this

Tá an Dréacht-Bhunreacht so fé díospóireacht againn le dhá lá, agus ní raibh ar siubhal i rith an ama ag na Teachtaí ar na binnsí thall a labhair linn mar gheall air ach ag iarraidh beag is fiú a dhéanamh dí, cuid acu a rá ná raibh aon rud nua innti gur fiú trácht air, ná raibh ann ach leasú ar an sean-Bhunreacht go mb'éigean glacadh leis cúig bliana déag ó shoin. Is soiléir domh-sa nách mór an cabhair a bhéas le fáil ag an Uáchtarán ós na bínnsí thall, chun feabhas a chur air ná chun a leasuithe, aon áit is gádh san. Dubhradh linn go láidir, ná raibh aon géar-ghádh leis an nDréacht-Bhunreacht so, go raibh am go leor fós chun é chur le chéile agus é fhoillsiú, agus go ndéanfadh an sean-cáipéis stroichte leanta a bhí againn go dtí so ár ngnó go fóill. Is dóich liom gur cáipéis é an Sean-Bhunreacht céadna nách bhféadfadh aon duine sa tír seo bheith bródúil air. Fiú ambáin na daoine achtuigh na dlighe ní ró-shásta leis nó ró-bhródúil ar a bhíodar, agus thuigfeadh aoinne é sin a léighfeadh an díospóireacht a bhí sa Dáil faoi agus é dhá ritheadh sa bliain 1922. Tá sé annso im' láimh agam agus is leor féacaint tríd agus na línte dubha go léir atá ar bheagnach gach leathanach de fheicsint chun go dtuigfí láithreach go raibh géar-ghádh leis an nDréachtBhunreacht so atá dhá plé againn fé láthajr.

Dá bhfeiceadh aon eachtrannach a bhéadh ar cuaird annso againn an sean-Bhunreacht náireach úd agus na línte dubha san go léir ann, cad a bhéad le rá aige mar gheall ar bhundlighe na tíre seo? Cád é an míniú a b'fhéidir d'aon Gaedheal a thabhairt dó a shasóchadh é go raibh bun-dlighe againn, dár gcuid fhéin. Ba chóir go n-admhócadh gach éinne go mba lánmhithid bundlighe a chur i n-áit an sean-Bhunreachta san go mba dheacair a dhéanamh amach cá bhfuil a thosach nó a lár nó a dheire. Rud eile fós, a Leas Chinn-chomhairle, is dóigh le mór-chuid de mhuinntir na hEireann go bhfuil droch-bhlas ar an sean-Bhunreacht san, go bhfuil stair ag baint leis a thug naire ar cine Ghaedheal agus da luaithe a cuirfear deire leis is amhlaidh is fearr é.

Chuala Teachtaí ar na binnsí thall ag gearán, freisin, gur cuireadh le chéile gan dul i gcomhairle roimh-ré le daoine eolasacha, tuiscionacha 'n-a thaobh. Seadh, a Leas-Chinnchómhairle, nuair a bhiothas ag cuimhneamh ar Bhunreacht a leagadh amach i 1922, cuireadh comisiún ar bun chun a dheanta, comisiún ar a raibh daoine leigheanta, ughdarasacha. Rinneadar sud a ngnó, ach, ná fuil 'fhios againn go leir anois gur obair i n-aisce mór-chuid de ghnothai an chomisiún sin, gurbh eigin cur le n-a shaothar nó baint uaidh, do réir mar d'órduigh Rialtas Shasana, sar ar bhféidir é fhoillsiú nó é achtú n-a dhlighe. Cé'n mhaitheas an Comisiún úd agus a gcuid oibre? Ach, ní thuitfidh sé seo amach an turas so agus sin ceann des na buadhanna is mó atá ag baint leis an mBunreacht nua so. Is i nEirinn a rinneadh é, gach aon bhluire dhe, gur cuireadh le chéile é gan spleadhchas d'aon chine iasachta, d'aon Rialtas iasachta, gur deimhniú é go bhfuil fuinn annso i nEirinn feasta ar ngnó féin a dheanamh, go bhfuil fuinn sheasamh ar ár mbonnaibh féin agus a fhogairt do'n tsaoghal ar fad gurab é ceart an Náisiúin so bheith saor glan ó smacht Shasana nó ó smacht aon Rialtais iasachta eile go mbeadh fonn ortha cur isteach orainn agus an ceart san a chosaint i ngach aon tslighe is feidir, aon uair go mba ghadh é. San am cheadhna, ní choscainn an Dhreacht-Bhunreacht so orainn siothcháin agus caradas a shnamadhadh idir muinntir na tíre seo agus muinntir aon tire eile ar dhruim an dhomhain go bhfuil uatha siothcháin agus caradas a dheanamh linn. Tréis do'n Bhunreachta so a bheith achtuighthe n-a bhun-dhlighe ag an bpobul, ní bheidh sé i gcumas aoinne a radh feasta gur toil Rialtas iasachta a bheas a chur i bhfeidhm sa tír seo, ní h-ionnan is mar a bhí ó 1922 anuas go dtí le deanaí agus ba chóir dúinn bheith buidheach go mbeidh áis againn feasta, ma glactar leis an mBunreacht so chun ár gcúrsaí féin a riarú agus a stiuriú annso mar is áil linn féin é.

Chuala An Teachta Ó Muirgheasa a rá na raibh sa Dreacht-Bhunreacht so ach "dallamullog agus cur i gcéill." Bhi an port chéadhna ar siúil ag an Teachta Ó Maolchatha. "Ni chuirfidh an Bunreacht so bulog aráin sa bhreis ar bhord an duine bhoicht," ars an Teachta Ó Muirgheasa. B'fheidir na cuirfeadh, A Leas-Chinn Comhairle. Ní hé Bunreacht an gleas a dheanann é sin de gnáth. Acht tá cuspóiri agus prionsabail luaidhte sa Bhunreacht gur flulaing muinntir na hEireann ocras agus tart, cruadhtan agus ceasadh agus géirleanamhain ar a son, tráth. Tá athas orm-sa agus ar mhórán eile go bhfuil na cuspóiri sin leagaithe síos go cruinn.

B'shin easnamh mór eile a bhí ag baint leis an sean-Bhunreacht—nior luadhadh ainm Dé ann aon uair amháin óna thosach go dti a dheire. Má tá aon airteagail den Dréacht so is fearr ná is oiriúnaí na a chéile, isiad na hairteagail atá ann ag baint le cúrsai ár gcreidimh. Tá no hairteagail sin do réir duthchais agus tréithe agus oighreachta Gaedheal agus tá sé coir agus cothrom go mbeadh na cuspóiri Caitleacaca san gur sheas cine Gaedheal an fhod chó daingean dochlaoidhte riamh ar a son go mbeidis curtha síos go cruinn i slí go dtuigfeadh gach aoinne go bhfuil sé mar dualgae orainn i gcomhuní oighreacht san ár sinnsear a chamhnadh agus feachaint chuige go narochtar saol ar muinntire dá réir.

Cúis gearáin cile a bhi ag Teachtaí áirithe i gcoinnibh an Dréachta so— isé sin gurabé an tUachtarán a chuir le chéile é. Dar le daoine áirithe agus dar le páipéirí áirithe sa tíe seo, is leor baint a bheith ag an Uachtarán le haon rud chun é dhamnú ach admhochaidh gach aon duine macánta gur cuireadh le chéile an Bunreacht go maith agus go cliste.

Rud eile a thaitn liom go mór mar gheall ar an mBunreacht so na an Ghaedhilg a bheith chun tosaigh ar an mBearla. Is mór an rud gur ag an leagan Gaedhilge a bheith féidhm dlighe. Rud nua agus rud bunudhasach i stáir teangan na dtire é sin. Tá súil agam agus ag Gaedhilgeóiri na tíre na fuil annsan ach chead chéim mhór eifeachtach cun na Gaedhilge a chur in-uachtar agus go geruthochaimíd fein go bhuilimíd lom dairiribh i dtaobh i thabhairt ar ais mar gnath-theangain na tire. Tá fios agam go bhfuil cuid mhór de lucht na dlighe agus nách róshasta a bheid siad leis an ngné sin de'n Bhunreacht. Is baoghal liom go bhfuil dligheadóirí annso sa Dáil a cheapann na fuil sa mhéid sin ach cur i gcéill, ach ní bheidh an sceal san amblaidh coidhche, le congnamh Dé. Le h-imeacht aimsire, tiocfaidh line dligheadóir a bhead naisiúnta Ghaedhalach agus a thabharfaidh a gceabhair go fonnamhar chun cúrsaí riaradh na dlighe in-Eirinn do Ghaedhealú.

Is deacair a mheas, a Leas-Chinn Comhairle, gur creid na Teachtaí ar na binnsí thall a gcuid cainnte féin mar gheall ar an oscailt a tabharfaidh an Bunreacht so chun deachtóireacht a chur ar bun sa tír seo. Ní doigh liom féin go nglacfadh muinntir na h-Eireann go brathach le corus Riaghla de'n tsórd son. Sílim gur thaisbeanadar é sin go soiléir cúpla blian o shoin. Pe'r dhemhan é, da dtarluigheadh go mbeadh fonn ar mhuinntir na tíre seo glacadh le deactóireachta mar cours Rialtais aon uair, ní stopfadh Bunreacht no Uactarán no aon rud elie iad.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted and 20 Deputies being present,

Comment on this

Bhíos a rá go raibh a lán cainnte annso mar gheall ar deactóireacht. Níl san chainnt go léir atá ar suibhal mar gheall ar an gcontabhairt bhréagach sin ach cur i geéill. Tá cupla airteagail sa Bhunreacht i dthaobh na Gaedhilge nach bhfuil ro shasúil dhom, go mór-mhór airteagal a 8, ach is féidir bheith ag cainnt faoi sin arís ar an gcéad céim eile de'n Bhille seo. Sílim go bhfuil moladh mór tuillte ag an Uachtarán mar gheall ar an mBunreacht so, gur cuireadh le céille é le stuaim agus le clisteacht agus le tuiscint.

Táim sásta go nglacfaidh muinntir na h-Éireann go ládir leis nuair a chuirfear ós a gcomhair é agus go mbeidh tír níos síothchánta againn dá bharr.

Comment on this

We have been told that this Constitution is not required or wanted. Deputy Fitzgerald wanted to know by what authority it was going to act. It is not going to act at least by the authority of Article 83 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922, which states:

"The passing and adoption of this Constitution by the Constituent Assembly and the British Parliament shall be announced as soon as may be, and not later than the sixth day of December, 1922, by proclamation of His Majesty, and this Constitution shall come into operation on the issue of such proclamation."

It is not going to be brought into operation in that manner, and will not need or require the assent of the British Parliament. Deputy Dillon, whom I am glad to see present, told us that this Constitution was going further to prevent the unity of the country. I do not think that this Party can be held responsible for Mr. Justice Feetham, or this operations. It is rather extraodinary, with all the loyal Article I see here in the present Constitution of this State, and all the declarations of loyalty to the King given in it, that the North did not come in between 1922 and 1923, and that the unity of the 32 counties was not achieved in that period. Deputy Dillon also told us about a change of mind on the part of our Party. Deputy Dillon should be the last individual to speak about a change of mind, considering that he was elected here to one particular Party and left that Party, apparently, without consulting his constituents. Now, when another election is coming along, he is afraid to go back to the constituency which elected him previously and has to go to Monaghan to see if they will take him there this time.

We heard a lot about the authority of the President and the powers given to him under the new Constitution. Article 66 of the present Constitution provides that—

"Nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave."

It contains a right of appeal, not to any individual in this State, not to the President of this State, but from the Supreme Court of this State to His Majesty and his Council in England. Surely, then, the Opposition cannot complain of any power vested in any individual elected by the people of this State by democratic vote. Deputy Fitzgerald paid us a tribute by saying that when we come back here after the next general election we can amend this Constitution in any way we like for 12 months. I am glad he realises that this Party are coming back here. Apparently, he has given up the ghost and has no further hope.

The Party opposite brought in 17 amendments to the present Constitution, every single one of them curtailing the powers of the Irish people and not those of any foreigner to rule in this country. I remember on a famous occasion, when we had been in this House only a short period, they brought in an amendment to the Constitution to prevent any appeal to the Irish people by referendum to remove the oath of allegiance to a foreign King. They passed that amendment through here. Every single amendment brought in by the Party opposite to the present Constitution was not an amendment giving any further rights to the Irish people, but curtailing step by step the rights of the Irish people. It is high time that the Irish people got rid of a Constitution which, as proved here by Article 83, had to be assented to by the British Parliament before it became a Constitution for the Irish people. That Constitution had to be torn into rags. Some 25 amendments to it were brought in. Seventeen of these were brought in by the Party opposite to curtail the rights of the Irish people, and eight were brought in by us to curtail and abolish the rights of foreigners.

Article 12 of that Constitution says that the Legislature "shall consist of the King and two Houses"—it is limited to one House now. Then Article 14 states: "All citizens of the Irish Free State, without distinction of sex, who have reached the age of 21 years and who comply with the provisions of the prevailing electoral laws shall have the right to vote for members of Dáil Eireann and to take part in the Referendum and initiative." These things were wiped out also. Then that Constitution contained the famous Article 17: "The oath to be taken by members of the Oireachtas shall be in the following form:—I, ............, do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State, as by law established, and that I will be faithful to his Majesty King George V, ..." I don't know if that is the joker blown up this morning in Stephen's Green or not. It is about time that the Irish people by open vote abolished that Constitution, which has been amended in most of its Articles, and adopted an absolutely fresh Constitution for themselves—a Constitution which will not have to go over to the British House of Commons to be ratified, but which will be ratified by the vote of the Irish people themselves.

We heard a lot of talk from Deputy Dillon about hungry people and about feeding hungry people on the Constitution. I remember statements like that in 1914. The advice given to the Irish farmers then was that their duty was not to look for any freedom or independence for this country, but to make money while money could be made—that it was not freedom or independence that mattered to this country, but bread and butter. Statements of that type were made then, and we know what the verdict of the Irish people was when their verdict was asked for.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

This does not seem to be very relevant to the Constitution.

Comment on this

It is very relevant in this way—that it was the ignoring of that advice at that period which puts us in a position now to bring in a Constitution here for the Irish people.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

I do not think that will be relevant to the Constitution.

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He is doing his best.

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I am not a bit surprised at Deputy Dillon. Deputy Dillon was an able-bodied young man at that period and he did not go out to fight for his King, nor did he fight for his country at home.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Deputy Corry will please deal with the Draft Constitution.

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I would like to deal with the Constitution, but I am sure the Constitution must be a very sore point to Deputies opposite.

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Deputy Corry is one of the President's shock troops.

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When we get down to business on this matter and when we have knowledge of the manner in which the Irish people and their aspirations in this matter have been thwarted, and when we know their deep anxiety to end once and for all the rule of that kind which gave us a Constitution imposed from outside, a Constitution that had to obtain the consent of a foreign Parliament, then we need not be the slightest bit surprised or amazed at the bringing in of this Constitution prepared by Irish people's representatives, submitted to the Irish people, which will be voted on by the Irish people and a decision on it come to by the Irish people without any imposition from outside. When we hear statements made here as to the powers of the President under the Draft Constitution we need only take two Articles in the present Constitution into consideration. First there was the Article that gave power to a citizen of this State to appeal, not to any court in this State but to appeal from any court in this State to the King.

Comment on this

Deputy Corry has already read that for us.

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I hope it will sink in. It takes a lot to get a matter to sink into some of the skulls over there. Then when we take Article 60 of the present Constitution, we have this, that "the representative of the Crown, who shall be styled the Governor-General of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann), shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada and in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments. His salary shall be of the like amount as that now payable to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia——"

Comment on this

What about his pension?

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"——and shall be charged on the public funds of the Irish Free State——"

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There is nothing in that about his pension.

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Ah, no, there is not, nor about the £750 piano the Deputy's Government gave the last joker.

Comment on this

Would Deputy Corry like £500 a year pension?

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There is not a word in this about the pension.

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Then your man got very well out of it for doing his whitewashing.

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Our man is all right.

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Sure he is.

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He is better off than he ever hoped to be.

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He is a better Irishman than you ever will be. "——and suitable provision shall be made out of these funds for the maintenance of his official residence and establishment."

Comment on this

That is being done.

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And £2,000 in cash.

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That is one of the Articles under the last Constitution that I have read to you, Article 60.

Comment on this

What is the new Governor-General going to get?

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The last Constitution went further. It enacted that all our judges "shall be appointed by the Representative of the Crown on the advice of the Executive Council." That is what Article 68 contained. Apparently nobody had any power in this country under the Constitution under which, as amended, we are at present acting, except he was appointed by the King himself or the Representative of the Crown. It is about time that the Irish people got a Constitution of their own.

Comment on this

What about the President of the Executive Council?

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The President of the Executive Council will be elected by the Irish people and will not be under the control and instructions of either a foreign Parliament or a foreign King— neither one nor the other.

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And he spoke in the name of His Britannic Majesty.

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If Deputy Dillon had even the pluck to fight for His Britannic Majesty when he got the chance, or if he had the pluck to fight for our own people I would say he was something of a man, but anybody who crawls out from under the bed when the fight is over is one for whom I have very little respect. I am not—and I often thank God for it—a lawyer.

Comment on this
Mr. Rice

And the lawyers thank God for it too.

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I know very little of legal phraseology of documents of that type.

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The Deputy is praising himself and saying very little.

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But I have heard lawyers here speaking on this Constitution during the last three days. Each lawyer on the other side contradicted those who had already spoken. I have seen one lawyer after another contradict another lawyer. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney contradicts Deputy Lavery.

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Would Deputy Corry give us one case in point?

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Whether there was a brief and who possessed the brief, I do not know. Deputy McGilligan has not yet made a contribution. I am sure when he does it will be rather a lengthy one. I am sure he will tell us the legal flaws and mistakes in this document. But the Irish people are not going to judge this Constitution by legal phrases or legal phraseology or anything else.

Comment on this

Why not?

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Neither will they judge it by what the lawyers say about it. They will judge it by common sense, and by their anxiety to see that whatever Constitution this country is going to operate under will be a Constitution prepared by the Irish people, voted on by the Irish people, and bearing no allegiance to anybody but to the Irish people themselves. That is why I say that this Constitution is acceptable to the Irish people, and will be acceptable to them no matter what arguments Deputies on the opposite benches may make against it. Deputies who have any kind of a finger on the pulse of the people admit beforehand what the verdict of the people will be. We hear a lot of talk about having a political head of the State. Where are you going to get a non-political head? That kind of thing makes me smile. I have seen men elected to local bodies and local boards, and I have seen men elected chairmen of these local bodies. For instance, we have in Cork, as chairman of the county council, one who is a member of the Party opposite, and he is an absolutely impartial chairman. Whatever misfortune led him into that camp over there, God alone knows. However, I will say this for him, that while he has been in the chair of the county council he has been absolutely impartial. We hear a lot of talk about non-political people and about Independents. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, or perhaps it was Deputy Fitzgerald, told us to-day about Independents. Will he tell me which of the Independents is non-political? Perhaps somebody will tell me that? We had Deputy Morrissey for a time when he was an Independent Labour Deputy. That made him independent.

Comment on this

Not a bit more than usual.

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Not a bit more than usual. I am glad to hear the Deputy admit it. We hear a lot of talk about this non-political thing. One would think, on hearing Deputies speaking here, that there was something wrong in the people electing a head of the State. Surely the head of a State elected by the Irish people is something better than the head of a foreign State imposed on us. That was the position under the Constitution adopted by Cumann na nGaedheal when they became the Government. That position will now be ended. If Deputies have any doubt as to the opinions of the people, all their doubts will be set at rest within the next few months. I do not know how many of them will be here when we come back, but they will be sadder and wiser men.

Comment on this

The one document which Deputy Corry did not open was the Constitution we are discussing. Now, it is rather the practice at the moment to take this document and criticise it, to offer it for comparison. It is impossible that that should be otherwise. When Deputies have been trained for a long time to think that a Constitution which has not a particular seasoning or relish is nothing more than cats' meat, it is difficult to offer it to a man-eating tiger of the Deputy Corry description. When the fe-fi-fo-fum type of politician is about he must get an opportunity, at any rate, be he alive or be he dead, to crunch the bones of a thing like Article 83. It may give him satisfaction.

If it was not for the peculiar change that has come over the Party opposite, we would not have the lonely spectacle of Deputy Corry speaking thus. The pack would be in full cry. They are strangely silent these last couple of days. In Bolshevik Russia, recently, they decided it was an inhuman thing to have a sheep sheared in the way that the operation used to be carried out. They discovered that by injecting these animals with a drug you can pull the fleece right off. Somebody has discovered that about the republicans in this country. The only thing is that if you give the drug in too big does the fleece does not come off neatly; it leaves a scurvy sort of patch. Apparently Deputy Corry has had too big a dose, for there is a little patch here and there and he must flutter it in the wind.

The tactics all through have been to take this document and say: "Surely we must have something better than that." Who made that what it is, and why was it done? It was an abuse of power, but that the power was left is a tribute to the people who left that power there, even though it might be abused. It is an attitude that is to be contrasted to the method by which this contribution is introduced. Let us get a brief comparison. That document was drafted by a committee of eminent people. They took evidence, if evidence was offered to them. We are told that the draft was produced as from them on the morning of an election. The election was fought on it and, as in the case of the Treaty debates, the people who fought it, fought it with all the odium that could be cast upon it in the most outrageous series of malevolent lies describing that Constitution as having nothing in it but subjection to a British authority.

The Party that came back after that election slowly discussed that Constitution in an assembly that was not tied by any oath. It was open to everybody and it secured the right to sit in this House by the votes cast by the people. When it had been discussed and amended, a further election was held within eight months, and that document then was left with a very easy power of amendment, after it had been discussed and subjected at least to the test of one election, at least to the test of the votes of one electorate having full knowledge of what was in the Constitution. It ran two elections, the first being marked by the prejudices that were attempted to be created against the instrument.

When that instrument was going through the Dáil, there was a power of easy amendment limited to a period of four years. It was suggested by the then leader of the Opposition that four years was not sufficient, and the question was immediately put: "What period could you suggest" and the reasonable answer came: "Two electoral periods; let this Constitution run the gamut of two further general elections if the Dáil lasts its full period, and three or four if the Dáil does not last the full period," and that was agreed to. A little later, consideration being given to that point, it was agreed that the period for easy amendment should be further enlarged and, instead of eight years, the period was enlarged to 16 years, and it was left deliberately open to the possibility of people opposed to our viewpoint coming in and desiring to make a change.

The Constitution as it was first phrased may have been new as a Constitution in this country, because really anything was new constitutionally in the country, but it was on ordinary formal, normal lines. There were very few novelties in it. There was nothing in the way of a constitutional tryout anywhere. Notwithstanding that it could run for eight years, a term later enlarged to 16 years, we get this document. Who drafted it? The President arrogates to himself that he took certain phrases out of it. Did he draft it alone? It is known who were the assistants in regard to the other Constitution. Who made that up? Who made up this Constitution? Are there any constitutional novelties in this Constitution? It teems with them. Are there any things upon which it might be prudent to await the experience of a five or six-year period? Is it so perfectly drafted that the lock should be turned on it immediately, so far as certain things are concerned and, taking the whole Constitution, inside three years?

The wit of mankind operating down the ages has lit on very much the same machinery in regard to constitutions. It desires to have parliamentary authority; it desires in the main to have some ceremonial head of a State with nothing in the way of real powers whatever; it desires to have a separate judiciary and mainly throughout the world parliamentary authority is divided between two Houses. The President, who has arrogated to himself a pride in having taken out certain things from phrases in the old Constitution, has told us with regard to these schemes devised by the wit of man throughout the centuries in relation to a Second House: "A Second Chamber is no good; I do not want it; but the people will apparently have some old thing rather than nothing at all and let them have it." When we come to the interpretation of the law the President says: "If there is any other way of getting it interpreted than by the Supreme Court or by the judges, I would be prepared to take it, but there is no other way out that I can see at the moment, so we may as well have it."

So this Constitution, in so far as it presents any appearance of normality at all, is put up by the President as his own draft, the draft of a man impatient of the old ideas, having no belief in the old ideas, and constrained to accept them because nothing which he considers better can be suggested at the moment. To that, he adds powers, in regard to the Presidential position, which are unexampled in any written constitution at the moment. They may not be unexampled in practices, but they are unexampled in any written constitution which is being observed at the moment, and that Constitution, as far as Article 51 is concerned, is, I suggest, to be knocked down at once except by way of amendment by referendum, and the whole Constitution, in so far as amendment by way of ordinary legislation is concerned, is closed down tight and rigid three years after the President first takes up office.

To-day the Minister for Defence thought that every man at every chapel gate in the country, not merely knew this Constitution, but could give a better interpretation of it than the interpretation, say, that was given by Deputy Costello last night. After he had finished, one of the Parliamentary Secretaries here queried that very Article and here in the House proved that he did not realise what was the effect of it, and when it was put to him that that was the effect of it, he said that it was alarming and that it should be changed. Well, if the President did discuss this draft Constitution with his Cabinet, he either discussed it with them in the Irish language, so that they could not understand it, or he certainly must have excluded his Parliamentary Secretaries from the discussion. Why should the President be so secure about this Constitution and its powers that he proposes not to leave the easy method of amending for a longer period than three years? Why is it that, in so far as he can secure it, even that three year period cannot be enlarged by an ordinary amendment? The President was given a liberty by his predecessors which he will not pass on to his successors, and he does that with regard to an instrument which contains many faults, and which contains features and matters that have been tried out nowhere else in the civilised world. The Presidential powers are the really alarming features of this Constitution, but there are two other points, and let us analyse the usual Presidential refinements in regard to them. Comment has been made here, and comment has been made in articles in the Press to the effect that the status of women in the Constitution has been definitely impaired—that the status that was given to them in the old Constitution is lessened. The President takes the stand that this new Constitution does not put women on any worse footing than men, and I am afraid that, by the emphasis that has been laid on the position of women under the Constitution, the position of men under the Constitution has been somewhat forgotten. Under the old Constitution every person, without distinction of sex, was made, by the Constitution, a citizen if they could pass certain tests. Those were tests which related either to birth or residence in the country. Under this Constitution that Article is to be repealed, and the acquisition and loss of Irish nationality and citizenship are to be determined in accordance with law. Now, however, even though both men and women are degraded from the old constitutional position, when the matter is further examined it will be found that there is still a further difference made as between men and women. They are both on an equality to the extent that citizenship can be taken from both men and women in this country by law, and it is not a constitutional amendment. It is for a new Dáil to say in this House, for instance, that only people of a certain age shall be entitled to vote. It is for a new Dáil to say that only people who pass certain birth tests shall have the vote. A new Dáil is enabled to make any sort of artificial distinction, dependent on anything—features, pigmentation of the skin, and so on—a test, and it is not unconstitutional to do that.

There was an Article in the old Constitution which gave it as a constitutional right that every person, without distinction of sex, who had passed certain years of age, was entitled to vote. Not merely can that right be taken from women, but it may be taken from certain men in the future. There is a special point, however, which has been leant on, and which is perfectly true. When we get to the level that both men and women are without constitutional rights for the future, or that both men and women are without any tie as to citizenship for the future, there is the further point that the whole tendency of certain Articles of the Constitution is towards the putting of women in an inferior position to men. Deputy Lavery used the phrase—and no part of it may be changed after deliberation—that the Constitution invites legislation to discriminate between the sexes. We are told that that is not the intention. Whether it be the intention or not, there is no constitutional safeguard for women against such a proposal.

The second point that has been queried in this Constitution is the question of the fundamental rights. Here, certainly, I feel it would be of considerable interest to find where was the directing mind, because it shows a mind which, if it had accepted any learning from history, has learned the wrong lesson. Anywhere that one searches for these fundamental rights, one finds them phrased in concise terms. One finds them positively framed. The giving of fundamental rights is always positively phrased and in concise terms. The reason for that is obvious, and that is that it was only by degrees that these rights were fought for and eventually secured, and it has come down to us, because of history, that it was necessary to give a slogan that the rights were there because they were so long denied. The thing that was paraded before the eyes of everybody in every Constitution, however, was the positive declaration that there were certain rights, and, generally, these positive phrases were not overcrowded by reservations and exceptions. Will anybody turn to our document and say that that is the position? We have certain declarations of rights, it is true, but the reservations and exceptions outweigh, as far as expression goes, the declaration of the right itself, and anybody reading that Constitution is entitled to interpret it as coming from a mind that was more keenly observant of the reservations and the exceptions than towards establishing the right itself.

When that was being done, the result is peculiar. It was put here, as a sort of a contribution by the Parliamentary Secretary this evening, that the phrase had been used that one Article in the Constitution might be operated by a Communist Government in a completely different way from that in which it would be operated by a Government of a different complexion, and he went on to say that, although that might be so, it could also prove precisely the contrary on the same method of reasoning. This was in reference to the Article dealing with the right to possession of private property. I say that it should be stated in such a form that one could start from it. If the Article is left as it is at the moment, I begin to join the President in one view, and that is that it is not an Article that should be put before a court of laymen for adjudication upon it at any time, and I say that the only court that should be left to adjudicate upon it would be a court which would consist almost entirely of Archbishops. However, that is going to be left as it is, to be operated by the two chief functionaries of the State, the President and the Taoiseach, and according to the view that they take will be determined the question of the right to the possession of private property.

That particular office has been discussed at length. The Presidential powers have also been discussed at length, but it is a matter of interest that in three days new terms have been discovered in these Articles.

I do not know why an attempt has been made to give the President certain powers. I know that the Presidential paragraph is weakened by the fact that there are not in it certain things which appear in nearly every Constitution and which could not be put in here because they are governed by the External Relations Bill, and, presumably, these things will have to be excogitated in some way. The Presidential powers in other States are, in the main, occupied with the conduct of the State in its international relations. These are not here; they cannot be. The President accepts the position that they cannot be. Therefore we fill up. Now, there are two tests that I would like to put to this part of the Constitution. It is possible that the President may be able to do things positively—on his own or with some aid—which the country, through his Government, does not want done. It may be possible that the President is in a position to refuse to do what the people of the country, through their Government, desire he should do. Am I speaking merely from imagination when I say that these two things are possible? Let us take one of them.

There are a variety of Articles which say that in regard to a number of things the President shall do this, that and the other thing. Can he be coerced into doing them? Supposing the President does not want to sign a law that is presented to him, who says he must? How will he be made to do it? Not merely is there no way of making him do it, but there is a most comprehensive Article which says that the President is above the law and which says. further, that no criminal prosecution shall be brought against the President. One could, perhaps, understand a provision such as appears in some Constitutions, that no civil action should lie against him for anything done in the discharge of his functions; but there is a comprehensive clearing out of the courts so that no legal proceedings of any kind, such as a mandamus, can ever issue against the President. That is found nowhere else in the world. I ask the President, if he is concerned about this matter of the Presidential powers and wants to kill an agitation that may grow up against these powers being left there, will he point to any country in the world in which there is a provision so comprehensive as the one used here to put the President completely beyond the power of the law? I suggest that is being done deliberately; but whether done deliberately or not, it means that in any one of the tests I put, the President can control the country. It is said that he shall be presented with the law, that he shall sign and promulgate it. If he does not—let us just imagine a madman, not the kind of madman that should be relieved of office on the grounds of mental incapacity, but a man so mad that he would defy the people—can he be made do it though the Constitution says that he should do it?

Let us come to the other side. Is there anything missing from this Constitution which appears elsewhere in regard to the positive use of the powers? Again I have gone through as many of the Constitutions of the world as I could get, and I find that there is always this train as between the President and the people and his responsibilities. I start off by saying that what runs through every Constitution is the idea that there shall be no power without responsibility. What is given in this Constitution is a position that one man I know would like to hold—power without any responsibility. The President in this Constitution is completely irresponsible. The way that such responsibility is fastened on him in other countries varies. The devices are generally two. In the majority of the constitutions of the world, wherever the President is given any power to do anything, the phrase occurs: "Every governmental and executive act of the President, to be valid in law, must be countersigned by a Minister." There again he acts under the thumb of the Government. Sometimes when that phrase is not used this other phrase occurs: "On every occasion on which the President acts some member of the Government bears responsibility for his action." If that member is not marked out by the fact that he countersigns, he is marked out in the way that whatever Department of the Government falls for classification, the head of that Department belonging to the Government bears responsibility and must answer to the people and may be prosecuted for his lack of responsibility. Does this Constitution fix the President with responsibility in any way? I could, if necessary, give the President, going through a list of over 20 countries, the countries in which there are Presidents which start off with a declaration of presidential acts and which provide that every presidential act must be countersigned by a Minister to be valid. I could also give him a list of countries which are monarchies which provide, in giving powers to the king, that every act, governmental or executive, must be countersigned by a member of the Government to be valid in the country. Why have we not that here? Was it an oversight? Is it just that the President is impatient of Constitutions that represent finality in this country, as he was impatient of Second Chambers, or is it that, having mixed his reading before, he is afraid that there will be another Adams mistake and that he will be found out.

Comment on this

I think it was the other side was found out.

Comment on this

I should not like to discuss the Adams dispute. It was lucky for the President that there were two men of the name.

Comment on this

And unlucky for the other person that he picked the wrong one.

Comment on this

There were two men, one notable, the other completely unknown.

Comment on this

Oh, no.

Comment on this

The President attributed a statement, possibly deliberately, to the wrong man, but we gave him the pardon of ignorance.

Comment on this

He was a well-known man.

Comment on this

The President quoted from the lesser known man, but that argument, from even the lesser known man, did not back up the President's statement.

Comment on this

You did not read enough about it.

Comment on this

Let Deputy McGilligan not limit the knowledge of mankind by his own ignorance.

Comment on this

I have read quite enough about both of them, so far, at any rate, that I would not have made the statement that the President made here about either of them. I would show more appreciation of the men's doctrines than the President did. It may be that the President has misread Constitutions. It may be that he has neglected them. It is more like him to neglect them. In any event, we have here this series of powers, some clearly laid down. Of course, the ominous thing is not those that are laid down; it is this Article 13. If we did have precisely stated here the things that the President can do, and the things that the President should do, and could concentrate attention on seeing that all that he should do he could be coerced to do, and that what he may do he did under proper authority, then that chapter could be closed. But look at this for a pipe down which there may be given more powers to the President:—

"Subject to this Constitution, additional powers and functions may be conferred on the President by law.

No such power or function shall be exercisable or performable by him save only on the advice of the Government or after consultation with the Council of State, as may be determined by such law."

Let me tackle one thing here. The Council of State, as a safeguard, can be put aside—a collection of yes-men, the President having control of the majority if he likes to use it. If he does not get a subservient group around him on the first appointment he can sack all the appointed members within a week and get a new group; he can get that group changed and changed until he gets subservient people around him. In any event, if he was to have a Council of State of the best men that this country can produce, he could act despite them. He must consult them. They must be there. They must listen to the all-highest speaking. After that, the decision is the decision of one man, and it is doubtful if it could even be promulgated that he is acting in defiance of the unanimous view of his Council of State. If there is anybody who believes that, when the President does get new functions, he can only exercise them after consultation with the Council of State, and that that is a safeguard, let such a man disabuse his mind of that view. The President can exercise those powers or functions with a group of some 14 or 15 people around him, but he can use his own discretion and can operate his own choice.

What can that be operated on? Here is a definite mystery. In opening the debate on the Second Reading the President first of all skipped rather clumsily over Article 13, but on being brought to it he indicated that its use was merely to be certain formal duties that might be put on him through this Article 13. Later on— possibly the Minister for Finance has been getting a certain amount of criticism for opening up this matter by intervention—when the discussion on the Second Reading had advanced, and Deputy Lavery was speaking, we discovered that first of all the President thought that the whole duties in relation to external affairs could be passed over to him under Article 13. He added further—and this was a general statement of his with regard to the ruling principle—that if there were no prohibition by law, by the Constitution as law, on powers being given to the President, then under Article 13 all such powers as were not so prohibited could be handed over to him. Let us take one thing. The President is to be a member of the Oireachtas. The power of making laws is vested in the Oireachtas. It has been found possible, under another Constitution which also vested power in the Oireachtas, to continue the Oireachtas when one of the Houses had been made to disappear from it. Supposing both Houses at a certain period decide that they would like to have all legislative power handed over to the President, is it possible under Article 13? I expect to be told that is a bogey. I expect to be told in any event that it is not contemplated. Is it possible? That is the only question I want answered, and I suggest it is possible. If the President tells me that he would have to exercise that in accordance with the law, I agree. But suppose the law is passed? It may be passed by a subservient type of Dáil.

We are told that when men seek to make a mighty fire they begin with small straws. There are many small straws in this that the President can collect around himself. The President may, after drawing a certain amount of small powers to himself, let his ambition grow upon what it feeds on, and decide that the legislative power should be his, and with the aid of a complacent Dáil and Seanad this may be done. I expect to be told that it is not meant. But surely the only way in which a Constitution should be judged is not by considering that the people who are going to operate it are going to be reasonable men. If you get into that mentality there is no necessity for constitutional provisions. What everybody who has ever written on this subject has accepted as the best test is to consider what the most evilly-intentioned man, greedy for power, can get for himself under the conditions of a certain instrument, and still be constitutional. Put that test. With Article 13 as wide open as it is, with Article 13 torn as wide open as the President tore it in answer to Deputy Lavery in the debate, there is hardly anything that cannot be handed over to the President. The President is intended to be a ceremonial officer. The President should be in the position of handling external relations, and is not, and can get out of that. In the meantime—and it is to make up, I suggest, for the bareness of the Articles—he does take a certain number of dangerous powers, and there can be filtered down to him everything save, according to his own statement, some such authority as is precluded by law from being given to him.

Why should the President demand that all commissioned officers of the defence forces should hold their commissions from him? Can the President tell me any other Constitution where that exists? I can tell him a few, and I should like to follow the histories of those countries on another occasion, and see what happened. It is common in Constitutions to have the President made the supreme commander of the defence forces, with this prohibition mainly put in, that in time of war that stops. But there are a few Constitutions, and they are not the best, in which the President has got that particular right—that commissioned officers of the forces hold their commissions from him. I know there is a point of vanity about this. I know it would be rather unacceptable to have a President swinging into the presidential office and finding that the majority of the Army held their commissions from another person. It would be particularly galling that one chief of the Executive Council should succeed to the presidential chair and find that the Army officers all held their commissions, or held them in the main, from a successor of his in the Executive Council. But leaving vanity aside, why should that Article be there? Is there any point of principle upon which it rests?

Can the President make a case for that? Those presidential powers can be discussed in Committee. There will be various suggestions put before this House on the Committee Stage. One will definitely be this. As far as this Party is concerned, and I hope in this we will get the help of other people in this House, we are going to insist that the Constitution will not become law without containing a phrase about citizenship and in particular containing that phrase with the addition "without distinction of sex." This cannot be accepted as a modern Constitution unless that phrase goes in. George Bernard Shaw criticised the Constitution as being in the Dark Ages because of that omission. The President laughs.

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I have good reason to laugh.

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I daresay he has the same status with the President as the Seanad and the Supreme Court.

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He talks through his hat sometimes.

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And he has not as big a sombrero as the President on some occasions. Another thing that we must insist upon, if that Article about private property in the reserve part is to stand, is that there will have to be ecclesiastical authority called in for its interpretation, and if the President is going to have a Council of State to perform any useful purpose there is no reason why that Council of State in the interpretation of that Article should not have the assistance of the Archbishop of Armagh and his colleague in Dublin.

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Why is the Supreme Court so bad now?

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I do not say the Supreme Court is bad. The Supreme Court is trained to adjudicate law, and they are the only people to adjudicate upon law. Let the President give me somebody who can, because nobody has been able to secure their practice or experience in the exposition of the Canon Law. Let the President give us somebody to expound and interpret that particular phrase in a safe way. Then we will have got somewhere.

The third amendment which I certainly will see is suggested to the Dáil and which I hope will be carried, is an amendment which I can take from at least 25 constitutions, that no act of the President will be valid in the country unless it bears the countersignature of somebody representing the Government. If the President accepts that we will know where we stand with regard to the Presidential powers. If he fails we know also what his position is.

For the rest of it, there are certain things in this Constitution which are good—a lot of them taken from the old Constitution. But let people like Deputy Corry remember this: they may revile and lament as much as they like over Article 83, but if that proclamation had not been passed, this Constitution would not be in the process of being passed. This Constitution is as deeply embedded in the old Constitution as any two things could well be. It is stuck fast in the jaws of the old Constitution. It is only now capable of being brought before this House because of Article 50 with its power of amendment so widened by us as to enable this sort of thing to be done, and this Constitution depends on the old Constitution. If it does not so depend on it, this Dáil has no way of passing it and the proposal before the Dáil is a farce. The Constitution has root in the same thing. It has been described as being the greatest wealth of make believe pivoting upon a pinpoint of reality that the world has ever seen. It is amazing that men can bemuse themselves with words to this extent. Eire when genitive is a country in shackles. Eire in the nominative is a free, independent and sovereign State. Incidentally, what is the adjective to apply to this country here? Here it is "Eire-ish," or will you have an Irish term popularised? Eire is an Irish term. We cannot call it Partition in this Constitution, but we get the delightful phrase, "pending the reintegration of the national territory." This has occurred in other fields. Emigration is no longer emigration in this country; it is the outward trend of our population. Unemployment is no longer unemployment; it is better registration. We cannot mention a King in this Constitution of ours. We cannot mention another word opposed to it. We let in the word "royalties," but only in a limited sense in a particular Article. We had a High Court, a Supreme Court, a Seanad here before, but it was Saorstát Eireann, that ugly genitive. Now it is Eire and everything is all right. I never knew a case in which it was found so easy to cure what were represented as old diseases by the plastering of a few labels as has been found possible here. Will the President, when he is replying, clear the air upon the point made by Deputy Fitzgerald on the question of the application of this term Eire? Eire has a territorial significance. Is Eire the Twenty-Six Counties or the 32 counties? Does the President know? Or is it something that has to wait "the reintegration of the national territory"? Can the President hereafter go on a visit to Belfast without getting the leave of the Council of State, or is Belfast outside Eire? Does the President know? If the President does know, will be answer that, in any event, if he cannot answer any other?

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A Chinn Comhairle, the first question I think that we should answer is, how did this Draft Constitution come into being? It is the work of one person, one man! It is going to be sent to the people under conditions quite unlike the conditions under which the Constitution of 1922 was prepared and sent! Now, that is this Assembly? Is it not an Assembly of people who have had practical experience of parliamentary institutions, a body of people who ought to be better equipped, through experience, to deal with the Constitution than, say, a body of people who were elected in 1922 when already cut and dried for them there was presented to them a Constitution which was the policy of an Executive, agreed upon with the British Government, and of such a character that it had to be enacted by a British Legislature with the nice additional words "that nothing in the Act or in the powers given under it was to detract from the sovereign authority of the Imperial Parliament." There was a body of Irishmen, a committee, that were asked in a short time to prepare a Draft Constitution. They sat down. They got the Constitutions of the world as far as they could, examined them, and prepared three drafts. These drafts we have. One of them, with certain modifications, was taken over to Great Britain, and the draft was scored and a certain number of Articles added to it. The Executive that came into the House at that time, when a certain number of the people's representatives were absent, said: "You can change this, but we hold by this draft. It is a matter for us to use the majority if we can get it to put this draft through," and there were certain Articles of it which were so fixed that the supposed Constituent Assembly could not touch it. The Constitution that was made, was made subject to a Treaty which was imposed by the threat of force, and was so admitted in the Dáil that considered the Treaty. That is the Constitution which is held up as a model. First of all the draft, immediately it was agreed upon in London, was put before the Irish people on the morning of the election, and it was held that, because a certain majority at that election voted for those who were in favour of the Constitution, the Constitution was adopted.

Now, this Constitution had to be drafted by somebody—some draft had to be presented here. We are choosing this body as the committee to consider it. When it has been considered by this committee—the committee being a committee of the whole Dáil, with a procedure which is sufficient to allow the matter to be completely, fully and thoroughly discussed —it is going to the Irish people to be enacted by them. It is all nonsense for anybody, because he is a lawyer, to ask the people to accept the statement that this is nothing more than the twenty-eighth amendment of the Constitution. This repeals the old Constitution completely. It is going to be repealed by the sovereign authority and will of the Irish people. If anybody says that that cannot be done by the Irish people, then he must suggest that the Irish people have not the power to do it; in other words, that we are still subject, as far as this part of the country is concerned.

This draft is going to the Irish people after consideration by a body that I hold is more competent than any other body you would probably get, because both sides of the House have had experience of practical government over a long period of years. If this body is not able to say whether an instrument is practical or not, then I say you can get nobody in this country who can do it. We have, therefore, here, as far as the committee is concerned, the best committee that I think this country can get from the practical point of view; with experience, not theories, of the working of Parliamentary institutions, with knowledge of the conditions in their own country over a long period of years. On the opposite benches you have men who had experience of government for ten years. We, on these benches, have had experience of it for the last five years. Many of the Deputies have been here for a period of up to 15 years and have had experience of Parliamentary institutions and their working.

I say that nothing can be said against the mode in which this Constitution will be presented to the Irish people. Somebody had to draft it. We had the work of the committees that had attempted the drafting of constitutions before. These were available to us. We had all the constitutions of the world available to us. We have had the advantage of having men trained in the working of the Constitution— people who are at least as expert as any you can get on these benches or outside as to how Parliamentary institutions work and of the dangers that have to be apprehended. With the help of all the men that I could get, both in the Government service and outside it, this Constitution has been prepared. This is not an unsuitable place to mention that I want to thank sincerely every person who has given me help, whether it came from the official staffs or outside, in dealing with difficult matters in regard to the Constitution. I hope then that nobody is going to be able to pretend that this Constitution is being presented to the Irish people without giving anybody except myself or the Executive Council an opportunity of considering it in detail. This House can consider it in detail.

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And vote according to orders.

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