Committee on Finance. - Bunreacht na h-Éireann (Dréacht)—Coiste (d'ath-thogaint).
Contributions 1–118 of 249. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I move amendment No. 69:—
In Section 1, sub-section 2º, lines 1 and 2, to delete the words "save in so far as may be provided by specific enactment in each case."
Comment on this
I do not think that it is necessary to say much on this section, having regard to what was said on the previous Article. The aim is to enable the existing practice to be continued. The views of the Department of Finance, who have been operating the procedure, must have great weight with the House and they are anxious that these words should be retained. The words, I understand, are in the existing Constitution and the deletion of them might lead to a great deal of inconvenience. On these grounds we are opposing the amendment.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 70:—
At the end of Section 3 to add the words "after the elected members have been returned".
I understand that the practice suggested in this amendment is that which would ordinarily be followed. If the President can bear me out on that, I should not wish to press the amendment.
Comment on this
Perhaps it will be helpful if I say publicly what I said to a deputation from the United Chambers of Commerce which came to see me on this matter. They urged that I should accept an amendment in the form of that which Deputy Dockrell has down. I pointed out that it was almost inconceivable that a Government would make the nominations until they had seen the whole field, that I could not understand why a Government would take the opposite course. Consequently, I pointed out that it did not seem to me that there was any need whatever to introduce an amendment on the lines proposed, as that was what would happen. Everybody who has to exercise a nomination of this sort is anxious to use the nomination to the best effect. If you want to give the nomination the greatest effect, you will hold back until you see the whole field and you will then be able to see how the nomination can be utilised so as to be most effective in securing the purpose you have in mind. The purpose the Government should have in mind is to produce the best possible Seanad. If they had any other purpose in view they would also hold back. If they wanted to make the nominations on one particular side, they would hold back because they would then be able to see who was elected and how the greatest value could be obtained from their nominations. I think it was almost certain to happen in practice that the Government would hold back its nominations until the others were elected, and that the amendment is not necessary.
Comment on this
On behalf of Deputy Costello and Deputy McGilligan, I move amendment No. 71:
In Section 4, line 1, before the words "the elected members," to insert the words "six of."
I am sure that this amendment has received the consideration and close attention of the President and his advisers, and I would like to know if it is being accepted. The effect of it is that, instead of leaving the whole Seanad to be elected from within the three group proposed, six members should be elected from particular panel or groupings.
Comment on this
I think the Deputy does not quite see the meaning of it. The Deputy will notice that in the plan of the Draft Constitution you have six members who will be elected by the universities, and then you have 43 to be elected in a certain manner by law. I take it that this amendment is really consequential on the more important amendment which Deputy McGilligan and Deputy Costello have down. I think that their idea is to leave the whole thing practically to law. They want to work out a general systems in which you would leave more to law than is left in this Draft.
Comment on this
I think the President is certainly right in that. I presume he does not think it desirable to take that view of the case?
Comment on this
No. On the contrary I would be rather inclined to go in the other direction. For practical reasons, I think I will not be able to go as far as Deputy MacDermot would like me to go in the other direction, namely, as far as possible to make the constitution of the Seanad a stable thing so that it would not be open to variation by successive Governments and successive majorities. We are doing the best we can in that direction in the Draft. Perhaps it is that Deputy McGilligan and Deputy Costello would like to have it easy to change the constitution of the Seanad by law. I would be bound to oppose that view, and consequently to oppose this amendment which is of a consequential character.
Comment on this
On behalf of Deputy Costello and Deputy McGilligan I move amendment No. 72:
In Section 4 to delete lines 6 to 8 inclusive (paragraph iii) and also to delete Sections 5 to 10 inclusive and substitute a new section as follows:
"The elected members of Seanad Eireann shall, subject to the provisions of the immediately preceding section of this Article, be elected on a franchise and in the manner and for the term to be provided by law."
Comment on this
I take it that the object of the amendment is to provide far greater elasticity in the method of election of the Seanad than is provided for in the Constitution.
Comment on this
It is opening the whole thing, and leaving the constitution of the Seanad to law. I think that is not advisable. If we are going to have a Second House in the Constitution, I think that we ought to go as far as we reasonably can here. We will differ, I suppose, as to the exact time to which we should go. Deputy McGilligan and Deputy Costello evidently take the view that we had better not go any distance at the present time except to admit that the Universities should have representation. There is no suggestion, I think, of a change in the number of members, but they do suggest that the whole method of election should be left to law. We have gone a certain distance in what I may call stereotyping the frame-work of the Seanad, and I understand from his amendment that the view taken by Deputy MacDermot is that he wants us to go farther than I think we can go at the moment. At any rate, I will have to oppose this amendment as leaving it too elastic, and unnecessarily so, and I may have to oppose Deputy MacDermot in his attempt to stereotype before we are in a position to do so.
Comment on this
What is the objection to a little elasticity with regard to the constitution of the Seanad at this stage? With regard to the Seanad generally, provision has to be made by law for its constitution or resurrection. I take it that most of the time of those who drafted the Constitution was taken up with the Constitution itself rather than with the details regarding the constitution of the Seanad. Moreover, the President has repeatedly stressed the point, since the Draft Constitution was first introduced, that it is designed by its very construction to be loose in some respects and indefinite in other respects, and that the explanation of that lack of definiteness is that it is hoped it will be permanent and lasting. Now, if the Constitution itself is to be regarded as a permanent structure, why bind us to a permanent and everlasting structure with regard to the constitution of the Seanad? It may be that if we were given the opportunity, which the amendment asks for, to study the constitution of the Seanad in a perfectly detached way, not wedged in between hundreds of important clauses in the Constitution itself, a far better Seanad would be constituted than is likely to be brought about by limiting Parliament in advance as to the type of electoral schools that will be developed for the future Seanad.
I think it is rather unwise and unfortunate that the President should adopt the attitude he is adopting on this amendment. If the proposals made by the movers and sympathisers with this amendment are unacceptable to the Government, then the machinery that will vote them down is the same machinery that will decide the constitution of the Seanad as constructed subsequently by law. However, any attempt to limit discussion in advance, when so much time has been taken up in the discussion of the Constitution—and people do not want to delay the matter unduly by going into it in any detailed way— is prejudicing the position. I do not think that the President would be giving anything away by saying that he would leave this matter to be provided for by law. That does not mean that he is giving anything away. He can wait and see that the law is still in accordance with his viewpoint.
Comment on this
I do not know why Deputy O'Higgins should object to the framework of the proposed Seanad being provided for in this Constitution, when the framework of the former Seanad was provided for in the last Constitution.
Comment on this
Very well, but I still do not know why Deputy O'Higgins should complain about such provision in this Constitution, when there were similar provisions in the former Constitution. Deputy O'Higgins complains that he and his Party have not had an opportunity of dealing with this matter in a detached spirit.
Comment on this
Perhaps I may have misunderstood the Deputy. I understood him to use the words: "We have had no opportunity of dealing with this in a detached spirit," and I took it that he was referring to himself and his Party; but, of course, he may have been referring to the whole House. In any case, however, he and his Party did have an opportunity of discussing this whole matter when they were invited to send representatives to take part in the discussions of the Commission that was set up to deal with the matter of the Seanad; but they did not do so. I think that, when a Constitution is submitted, with provisions contained in it for the setting up of a Seanad, the people have a right to know what is the general framework of the Seanad that is in contemplation. This Constitution is not unduly rigid in its provisions in regard to the Seanad. I am glad of that. It adopts, in general, the scheme recommended by the Minority Report of the Second Chamber Commission. There are certain divergencies from the Minority Report of that Commission, and, naturally, as one of those who signed the Minority Report, my inclination is to regard any divergencies from that Report as divergencies for the worse. However, it does represent, in general, the report of that so-called minority. I use the word "so-called" in connection with that Minority Report, because actually it was the only report that got as many as eight signatures beneath it and that held together as an organic whole.
In that report, we specially recommended that certain things should not be put in the Constitution—that they should be left open for further consideration. It is a very interesting and novel experiment, so far as this country is concerned, and, indeed, I think, so far as any country in the world is concerned, to form a Second Chamber on what may be called a vocational basis, and it was clear that it would be unwise not to leave something open to the effects of experience —not to leave it possible to make such changes as experience might show to be desirable. If, however, you are going to construct an elaborate constitutional system such as we are constructing here—as system of checks and balances, with a Dáil and a Second Chamber, and a ceremonial Head of the State, who has also got certain powers—I think we have no right to abstain from laying down, at any rate, the general lines of what the Seanad is going to be.
The provisions in this Constitution are reasonably elastic. In fact, in some respects, as the President has said, they are more elastic than, I think, they ought to be; but it would be an insult to the intelligence of the electorate to present them with something which was called a complete Constitution and which did not give any notion of the general system on which the Seanad was going to be constituted. It seems to me to be a curious thing that if Deputy McGilligan and Deputy Costello were taking the view that we should not make any arrangements at all about a Seanad except to say that we were going to have one, they should suggest including a provision to the effect that six members of the proposed Seanad should be elected from the Universities. If it is illegitimate to make certain other arrangements with regard to the proposed Seanad, why is it not illegitimate to make that arrangement? Why should we go to the country and say, in effect, that we are going to have a Seanad: that we know nothing about what its constitution will be except that there will be six representatives from the Universities? I hold that, if we were to go before the country on such a proposition as that, we would only stultify ourselves in the eyes of the electorate.
Comment on this
I think that this should be taken in conjunction with paragraph 3 of Section 7 of the Article. Paragraph 3 was directed against that particular method of election, and I think that the President will admit that that is the purpose of the amendment.
Comment on this
And, therefore, it is not quite so much in the air as the last speaker would lead one to believe.
Comment on this
Yes, it goes wider than that; but it is necessary, if that is to be defeated. Let us take it in conjunction with Article 15 (3). Of course, I never know what, precisely, the President's views on Second Chambers are.
Comment on this
The Deputy says that they vary. The views vary, but the expression remains the same. Here, however, we have a proposal for what the President himself confesses is not an ideal House. He abolished a former Seanad which, according to him, was not ideal, but here is one proposed, which does not seem to differ so much except that, to an ordinary man in the street like myself, there is an absurd method of electing it— exceedingly absurd so far as paragraph 3 of Section 7 of this Article is concerned. Now, I was quite interested in the President's statement to the effect that he could not change an iota, practically, in this Constitution without changing its general principle— that he could not give way in this, because it was too broad, and that he could not give way to Deputy MacDermot, because it was too rigid. The President reminds me of an old tutor of his—a man by the name of Siéyes— who was very keen on constitutions and who held that every change that was made in a constitution of his liking thereby ruined the constitution, and that he would take no responsibility for it. We have been watching the President for the last few days taking that attitude on practically every amendment that has been put forward to this Constitution. His attitude has been that, to accept any of these amendments, would be to upset the Constitution as an organic whole —that any amendment would mean upsetting the Constitution entirely. I will make one suggestion to the President, for what it is worth, and that is that sub-section (3) of paragraph 7 of this Article, which is an absurd method, fits in admirably with the Constitution as a whole.
Comment on this
I do not think, Sir, that we can get any further in this discussion. I think that Deputy O'Higgins would agree that it is advisable, in the Constitution, that we should go as far as we can in designing the framework of the proposed Seanad. Our attitude, in general, about the Seanad—I do not want to bother Deputy O'Sullivan now because I am afraid it would lead us into another Second Reading speech——
Comment on this
Our attitude on this was that we asked the Opposition, if they were anxious for a Seanad, to give us a plan for one. We were setting up a Commission to deal with the matter, and we asked them to co-operate. They, however, felt that it was not their duty to do so. We set up that Commission, and the Commission sat, and I think it will be admitted that anything I have said about the difficulty of framing a Seanad will be justified by the report of that Commission. There was one method indicated in what was called the Minority Report— as Deputy MacDermot justly said, that was probably an inappropriate name for it—and that was to give us a Seanad that would be different in character from the Dáil and which, possibly, would have advantages which could not otherwise be got. Therefore this is an attempt to give effect in general—it is not followed out in detail—to the ideas put forward in that. How far can we go to reach agreement ? We have gone here to the point of indicating the panels which they have mentioned. We have gone further than that in regard to the universities, because these are statutory bodies and could be depended upon to elect their own representatives. "Very well," we say, "let them elect their own representatives." If we had functioning here councils or associations of a vocational character, if they were properly constituted or statutory bodies and recognised as such, a very good case could be made for saying, "Let them elect so many from that panel." The difficulty arose when we came to consider how many each group or council should get in the Seanad. In this scheme we have got, first of all, a certain number of nominations, a certain number to be elected directly by the universities, and a certain number drawn from certain panels to be elected by the electors. Only two electorates were put forward in the Commission Report, as far as I remember. It may be held that proportional representation would get a better reflection of the country as a whole.
Comment on this
What would be the extent of the electorate, having regard to the figures at the last election?
Comment on this
I think about 200. Somebody went to the trouble of finding out from the figures of the last election.
Comment on this
I have given that as a figure that I have not verified myself. Somebody told me that he had gone into this matter and that he had found that there would be about 200 electors.
Comment on this
No. The idea is that these would be the electors, but the voting would be in proportion to the number of first preference votes cast. We have not in the present form a paragraph which we had in an original form, that the number of votes would be one for each 1,000 first preference votes, cast at the election. That is not here at the moment but it could be re-inserted. The report suggested that each of the candidates at the Dáil election should get one vote for every 1,000 first preference votes cast for him, and that in addition, for every fraction of 1,000 more than 500, he should get an additional vote, but that no vote should be given for any fraction of less than 500. That would mean that a candidate who got 1,200 first preference votes would only have one vote in this election, while a candidate who got 1,700 votes would have two votes in this election.
Comment on this
On a point of order, should we not discuss this on the actual section of the Constitution?
Comment on this
There are amendments down dealing with this particular subject when we come to it. This amendment goes much further than there is any need for it to go, that is to say, instead of abolishing this particular method of electing to the panel, it goes so far as to destroy the panels themselves.
Comment on this
If the Chair is willing, I think we should discuss the matter now. We are getting a general picture of what we are trying to do and the difficulties in the way, and we shall be able to fit in the other amendments, it seems to me, once we come to them.
Comment on this
It is on the report that this system is based in general. It does not follow it out in detail. We have accepted what the electorate recommended. A number of people say that it is not a satisfactory electorate. All I can say is that a Commission sat on this matter. I have been for years considering the question as to whether there was any method by which we can get a Seanad which would go somewhere towards fulfilling the functions which we ideally associate with a Seanad and I have failed to find one. I put it up to those who were in favour of a Seanad to try and devise some method of doing so, and this is what we have got from the commission. It is the best of the recommendations that I have seen. I am not at all saying that I am satisfied with it. I think it is very difficult for anybody to be satisfied with any method of building a Second House. This is the best we could get and it has come from a commission that gave very careful consideration to this matter.
Comment on this
If we are discussing this question in general, I should like to make it quite clear that this particular electorate is not the electorate suggested by the minority.
Comment on this
Let us consider, if we are going to look at this thing in a broad way, what object we had in mind when we tried to establish a Second House. I wrote an article about this matter, some months before the Seanad Commission sat, in which I asked for a Seanad entirely nominated by the Prime Minister and entirely unpaid except for such expenses as actually would be incurred by members in attending a sitting and some allowance for loss of time. At £2 per sitting that would mean, if the sittings numbered, say, 35 in the year, as they have in the past, that the total amount paid to a member of the Seanad would be about £70 per year. The feeling is that to argue in favour of an unpaid Seanad is undemocratic. I do not agree with that view. In some very democratic countries they are paid only the sort of amount I have just been indicating—a mere allowance for expenses. Of course, the county councils are unpaid. Thirty-five afternoons in the year is not an inordinate amount of a man's time for him to devote to the service of his country, and to the defence indeed of his own vocational and professional interests. It seems to me that, provided a man's expenses are covered in the way I have described, there is nothing undemocratic in that. You must not try to set up a Second Chamber of whole-time politicians. That is not what a Second Chamber ought to be. It is laid down here that the object is to have people actively engaged in certain professions and occupations. If they are actively engaged in these, obviously their duties in the Seanad will take up only a comparatively small proportion of their time. There is, therefore, no need to pay a man enough to live on. There is no need in the world for it. The question of payment is very intimately bound up with the question of nomination, because, if you have nomination and have the sort of salary that it is possible to live on, the task of the nominating authority becomes impossible. The Prime Minister of the day is bound to have an intolerable amount of pressure put upon him in order to provide for people who have done good service to his Party. If, on the other hand, there is no monetary advantage in being in the Seanad, the duties of a Senator would come to be regarded as rather burdensome than otherwise, something that a man undertakes for the good of the State, and for the good of the particular section of the people whom he represents.
If we, on the Second Chamber Commission, had known for certain that there was going to be a Second Chamber, if we had been told, "There is to be a Second Chamber of some kind, and all you have got to do is to decide on the best kind," we might conceivably have come to different conclusions in this respect from the conclusions to which, in fact, we came. The truth of the matter is that almost everybody on that Second Chamber Commission was anxious to see a Second Chamber. There was certainly a considerable majority who were anxious to see a Second Chamber, and, therefore, in our findings we were influenced by the fear that if we produced something which was likely to be unpopular the whole plan of having a Second Chamber might be rejected and nothing might be done, so a scheme like an entirely nominated and unpaid Second Chamber was one which was hardly practicable for the Second Chamber Commission to recommend.
Whether the majority of the Commission would have recommended it in any case is highly doubtful, but I, personally, would prefer that system to any other, although I should like the nominating authority—the Prime Minister or head of the State or whoever he might be—to look to the sort of considerations and follow generally the sort of headlines that are set forth in this Constitution as it stands. At any rate, for good or ill, it was decided to recommend that only a proportion of the members should be nominated by the Prime Minister or the head of the State.
Then the question was how to get the rest. We wanted to get a Second Chamber that would have a different atmosphere from the First Chamber. It seemed to us that the main objects of a Second Chamber are two. One is to defend democracy against itself; in many countries Party passions have reached such a pitch that the country has been rent asunder by Party violence, and, as a consequence of people getting sick of all that, or as a consequence of one violent Party overcoming the others you got a dictatorship. Secondly, a great advantage of having a Second Chamber is that you have a chance of getting each question that comes forward discussed in a different atmosphere and from a different point of view from what has been surrounding it in the First Chamber—in the popularly-elected Chamber. For both these purposes it is essential that the Second Chamber should be, broadly speaking, non-party. That is not to say that the members of the Second Chamber should have no previous affiliations to any political Party or that they should have no preference for one Party over another—of course, it would be impracticable to achieve that even if you wanted to— but that on the whole questions there should be discussed in a different frame of mind from the frame of mind of somebody who was obeying a Party Whip. We would desire that in the Second Chamber it would be a rare thing to have Party Whips put on at all. In fact, some of us even hoped that there would not be any Party Whips in the Second Chamber, and that things would not be on a Party basis.
If you are not going to have a Party basis, you have got to have something to take its place. That something is indicated here as being broadly vocational. Those panels were devised in order to get a broadly vocational Seanad. That is something which I would have thought would be welcome to the members of Fine Gael in particular, because it is carrying out the idea which was embodied in the Fine Gael heads of policy which were formulated at the end of 1933 or the beginning of 1934. It was there laid down that it was desirable to incorporate vocational bodies in our political system, not as an alternative to democracy but as something to improve the working of democracy. This is an attempt to make a start in that direction. It is not proposed, and never was proposed by the Fine Gael Party so far as I am aware—possibly it might be by some individuals who are no longer with them—that any corporative system should be substituted for the existing system so far as the popular House is concerned, but here is a chance to do something on those lines as regards the Second Chamber. That, it seems to me, ought to be welcomed by Fine Gael, having in mind what their first statement of policy was after the Party was founded. It should also be welcome to many people in this country who are constantly urging us to do more in the way of embodying the principles of various Papal Encyclicals into our political system here.
Comment on this
Deputy MacDermot built up a very fine structure on a very faulty foundation. I doubt if anybody listening to him was aware of the fact that he was speaking to a proposal that the construction of the Seanad should be as decided by law. There is nothing in that amendment to express the views of any Party, or to offer an opinion as to whether the Seanad should or should not be paid. There is nothing in that to indicate whether it is reasonable to have a corporative system of representation or otherwise. The only thing in the amendment, which we understood the Deputy stood up either to support or to oppose, is a suggestion that we should go into all that at a time when we are not in the middle of an important Constitution—that we should study it by itself. There is no argument which has been advanced by the Deputy that is not a pungent argument in favour of special consideration for the constitution of the Seanad. The fact that there was a special commission established to consider the Seanad—a commission which sat on very many occasions and over a great span of time—is an argument why the only consideration it would get from the Dáil should not be such as could be dovetailed in between another few hundred sections of an important instrument such as the Constitution. If the establishment of that particular commission and its labours are to be justified, and if a tribute is to be paid to the work done by the commission, it can only be by the Dáil considering the construction of the Seanad and the recommendations of the majority group and the minority group separate and aside from the other important clauses in this Constitution.
I myself cannot see where exactly the payment of Senators comes into this amendment to deal with the Seanad by law in the future, but if opinions are to be expressed on that, I should like to put it on record that it is the simplest thing in the world for anyone comparatively well blessed with the world's wealth to lay it down that all or some of the institutions of the State should be on an unpaid basis. There are wealthy men in the Dáil and there are poor men in the Dáil. The poor men have given as good service as the wealthy. They could not give that service were it not for the fact that there were certain financial arrangements made. There were poor men and wealthy men in the Seanad. The poor men gave just as much service within the Seanad in the past as the wealthy, and it would not be in the interests of the Seanad or of the country to deprive the Seanad in the future of the services of that type of person. However, that is entirely beside the point of the amendment.
The amendment and all the very weighty arguments advanced by Deputy MacDermot, and the historical account of what decided himself and other members of a certain Commission to arrive at a certain decision, are surely worthy of the very fullest consideration of Dáil Eireann. Surely, the efforts of the Deputy should stand alone in the centre of the picture, and should not be treated merely as a little addition to the more important things. Surely, when the Deputy so generously gave his time and services to that Seanad Commission, and when he thinks well to reprimand his late colleagues for not doing likewise, he should pay us the generous tribute of recognising the fact that we had such confidence in him, that once he was a member we thought it would be only pushing him out of the picture for others to be there. It is neither here nor there what particular motives decided members of this Party not to participate. They had been standing for an institution that was moderately good in the minds of some and moderately bad in the minds of others. Those who considered it moderately bad razed it to the ground, and it just ceased to be. We stood strongly against that act of destruction. Some of us felt that it would be condoning that act immediately on its ashes to participate in a tribunal to resurrect some other type of structure there, because obviously the destructionists had to justify and defend it. Repudiation of the act of destruction would be read into the construction of a Seanad similar to the previous one. I do not want to embarrass builders who had lately been destroyers. Our only desire was that there should be another Seanad.
Comment on this
You do not seem to have had any area of land outside the foundation for the new house. If there was dry rot in the other, it certainly has eaten into the timbers of this one. Perhaps part of the dry rot is the best portion. Be that as it may, the new Seanad deserves fair play and full consideration. It deserves close study, and I strongly urge the President and the Government that the constitution of the new Seanad should be "as defined by law" rather than that we should tie ourselves up to a certain type of Seanad now in a Constitution, which subsequently, if we have any reason or desire to change our mind as a Dáil or Parliament, might make it impossible to express that change of mind.
Comment on this
Deputy O'Higgins and others have had nearly a year to consider the Report of the Second Chamber Commission, and it is many months since the Government announced that they intended to incorporate in this Constitution a Seanad of the type roughly recommended in the Minority Report of the Second Chamber Commission. Why then should they treat the matter as one suddenly taken out of their hands by the President and the Executive Council; something that is quite inappropriate to be considered in connection with the Constitution; something they have not thought of, something they are not ready to consider, and something that they have not anything valuable to say about at present? It seems to me that that attitude is most unreasonable. They put a Seanad into their own Constitution. Why should there not be a Seanad in this Constitution? I am anxious to see it there, and to see the general framework indicated there. I think it provides something of value, something that might be lost for ever, for all I know, if not embodied in the Constitution. I think it would be criminal folly for anyone eager to see the right sort of Seanad to miss the opportunity now of getting the general outline of the Seanad provided here. The question of payment does not enter into the Constitution or the amendment. I only referred to it in so far as it bears on the question of nomination, and, in view of what Deputy O'Higgins said, I wish to say this, I utterly repudiate and disclaim any thought of excluding a poor man from the Second Chamber. I would utterly disapprove of anything of the kind. We are dealing with a House which is not to be a Chamber composed of full time politicians devoting really most of their time to politics, as we are here. The sort of provision for remuneration appropriate here is not necessarily appropriate as regards the Second Chamber. My view is that a poor man could be so compensated as fully to provide for any loss he might sustain. We cannot discuss the question of payment now, but I wish to repudiate the suggestion that I want an undemocratic Second House. I do not.
Comment on this
It would be very foolish of us to think that we would get anything like agreement on this here. The question of the formation of the Seanad is certainly one of the subjects on which each one holds an opinion, and also on which one differs very largely. I think the best thing is to try to make progress with this. This is the system which was suggested by the Commission that had to deal with it. With regard to the electorate, I have been looking up the report, and I think I am right in saying that the electorate suggested by the Minority Report was the Dáil itself, and not this particular electorate.
Comment on this
That is true, but there were certain reservations to the Minority Report, by some of the most distinguished members!
Comment on this
I took the wider one in the hope that there would be a better opportunity for minority representation, and also that there would be less opportunity for what a number of people feared of a sort of machine, that it was better to have a wider electorate. With regard to Deputy O'Higgins' point, that we ought to leave this liquid, I hold the same view as Deputy MacDermot, that if we are to have a Constitution with a Second House in it, it is our duty to have the framework as definite as we reasonably can. I will concede this to Deputy MacDermot's point of view, that to the extent to which we are not able to make it definite, there is a fault. If anybody can go farther to make this definite in its form here, I will go and meet him so far as I can, if he can prove that he is advancing along this line and getting a farther distance than I think we can get. I would regard as a fault the extent to which we would fall short of completely defining the Seanad, and it is our duty to do it so far as we can. As the Minority Report points out, we have not the type of organisation here to make it possible to elect directly. That would be the ideal thing. If we had that organisation, you could elect directly. The only bodies I found at my hand that could elect directly were the universities. I do not think that was exactly provided for in the Minority Report. Although they indicated generally that that was the desirable thing, I think they stopped short themselves of doing that in the case of a body that was organised in such a way that that could be done. I must say then that I am not prepared to accept the amendment.
Comment on this
The President gave us a reason for this particular method of election that he was anxious to avoid re-duplication of the Dáil so far as possible. If he looks at subparagraphs 3 and 4 of Section 7 of this Article, he will find that really what he has done is to secure re-duplication of the Dáil with other machinery. That is more or less what he has done. His slavery to the bridge score idea brings it even closer—the idea that there will be a vote for every 1,000, and that every score over 500 shall count as being equal to 1,000. That will lead to a re-duplication of the Dáil, and that is objectionable. I quite agree that we should get a Second Chamber that is different from the Dáil as much as possible, but I do not think that this method of election will do it. That is the reason for postponing it. Is that the best the President can do, although he has had this under consideration for a number of years?
Comment on this
We never destroyed the Seanad. We said we were satisfied. He is now proposing a thing that he is not satisfied with, as the result of years of meditation.
Comment on this
I want to deal with another thing to which he referred and to which another speaker referred —our non-participation in a certain committee. The other speaker, who seemed to find fault with that attitude, provided a very good justification for it. He indicated that it was impossible that the members of that committee could consider proposals for a Second Chamber on their merits, because they did not know whether there was going to be a Second Chamber or not. "Dealing with such an unreasonable man as the President," he said, "we tried to do the best we could; therefore, we will not put forward a Seanad that is good or that we think is the best, but we will give him one that we think he can swallow." I think the House will agree that that is a fair paraphrase of what Deputy MacDermot said. Strange as it may appear to Deputy MacDermot and the President, that struck us when we got the invitation.
Comment on this
Furthermore, another thing struck us which was illustrated the other night in a confession by the President, that truth coming from these benches was not acceptable to him. We knew perfectly well that any contribution we made for a Second Chamber would damn that particular thing in the eyes of the President. He stated the other night here that truth from anywhere except the Fine Gael Benches was more or less the motto he adopted. These were very good reasons for not participating. This Article, as it stands, this method of election, is really fundamentally absurd. The President speaks about leaving things vague. Section 4 is very vague. We do not know what number of votes anybody will have—that is to be determined by law. So vague is it that a distinguished member of the Commission did not know it was there at all in discussing this particular Constitution. It is there. We do not know but that a man who gets 10,000 preference votes and a man who gets 500 may have the same vote.
Comment on this
After six months the President was not able to draft that, and now he will do it between this and next week. The whole thing has not got consideration from the President. He came before us saying that he did not believe in a Seanad. He set up a committee and he said: "Give me a Seanad that will be ideal; I do not believe in it, and I will not promise to set it up," and they gave us this.
Comment on this
The fear that I had at the time of the Second Chamber Commission was that we might produce something, not that would not be swallowed by the President, so much as would not be swallowed by the Opposition.
Comment on this
When I said that entire nomination by the Prime Minister was the system that appealed to me most but that I did not think it was likely to gain acceptance, I meant that, while the Prime Minister might be pleased with that system, the first reaction certainly of his political opponents, and perhaps of a good many of the public as a whole, would be to be displeased with the system. I therefore repudiate the paraphrase which Deputy O'Sullivan has suggested. I maintain my view that it was an error of political tactics—it is courageous to say that when talking of such brilliant, or at any rate such practised, tacticians as the Front Bench of the Opposition—but also a fault in patriotism. When Deputy O'Higgins gets up here this evening and speaks as if the constitution of a Second Chamber was something which he had not ever devoted a moment's thought to and something which was unreasonably sprung upon us in connection with this Constitution, he is giving away his Party completely They had nearly a year to consider the Second Chamber Commission's report.
Comment on this
They had many months since the President announced that there was going to be a Second Chamber on the lines of the Minority Report in connection with the Constitution, and they had years before the Second Chamber Commission ever was established to think over the whole subject. They must have thought over it deeply at the time they put it into their own Constitution. Where there is a grievance at one being put into this Constitution, I cannot see.
Comment on this
This amendment raises the whole question of the vocational character of this proposed Chamber. I have very grave doubts as to whether it is practicable in existing circumstances in this country to resort to the method of the election of the Second Chamber on a vocational basis. When you come to consider the question of vocational organisation in this country the outstanding fact is that there is very little vocational organisation within the country, and certainly there is no type of organisation that justifies us in setting out in this simple, easy way of providing in this Constitution for quite a whole variety of vocational groups. I think that any effort to implement this Constitution, providing for a Seanad to be elected on a vocational basis, will evidently produce considerable difficulty and will not be satisfactory. For instance, the first panel referred to in Article 18 is one consisting of persons who have "practical knowledge and experience of the following interests and services, namely (1) National language and culture, education, and such professional interests as may be defined by law for the purpose of this panel." What type of organisation will be entitled to make nominations in this panel? If you look at the category you will find there is quite a number of organisations, a number of them without any corporate character or corporate existence, and resumably all of them will be entitled to turn up and demand their nomination on the panel.
When you come to (ii)—"Agriculture and allied interests, and Fisheries," you will have every organisation claiming under that. You will always have amongst these numbers of people demanding to get on the panel. Trying to get anything like vocational organisation in agriculture is praying that the moon will some day come down to earth. Then we pass on to the third: "Labour, whether organised or unorganised." I would like to know what type of bodies or people will come in under that category?
Comment on this
In the category of "Labour, whether organised or unorganised," there are to be certain nominations. I wonder whether the President has any conception of the kind of difficulty that will arise in defining the persons who are to be nominated in the way this category has been set out? I presume under the category of "National language and culture" there are people who also labour. I suppose people under "Agriculture and Allied Industries and Fisheries" also labour. Why are they separated from group (iii), Labour, and why is Labour separated from them? Then we come to (iv), Industry and Commerce. That group, too, can be included in the category of Labour. I think if you have to have a Seanad—and I still have the same view as I held previously, that no case has been shown for the creation of a Seanad—it ought to be a Seanad of the kind that will work without this sort of cumbersome machinery that will be set up under Article 18. I think the former method of electing a Seanad was as good as any other method that could be devised.
That was a method by which people were nominated by members of the Dáil and elected by members of the Dáil. That was just as good a method as the one set out here. My fear is that we are simply marching ahead of time and we are trying to create a Seanad on a vocational basis without having vocational bases within the country on which to build. It seems, therefore, to be an entire mistake at this stage in the circumstances of this country with its sparse population, with its relatively young commercial and industrial growth and with very little effective type of organisation to be setting out to build a Seanad on a vocational basis, when nothing else within the country is built on a vocational basis. At all events, the proposal to constitute a Seanad on a vocational basis has not my approval. We started out here to give this Constitution a novelty which is not justified in the circumstances of this country. Deputy MacDermot said that the Second Chamber Commission felt that the order was something new and novel.
Comment on this
The Deputy was aware that the President had his knife in the previous Seanad, and if there was any case for going back to the President with the ghost of the former corpse you had to dress up the ghost in a way that would not excite the President's anger again, and this view of a Second Chamber was brought along in the hope that the President might be appeased on the second occasion and be sorry for his first act and that he would say: "I will take this." When you have said that you have put your finger on the only reason for producing a Seanad in this country. That is the only explanation for the introduction of a Seanad now. The idea was "Try something on the President which is different from the last Seanad and give him some reason for saying: ‘Oh, well, this is not the same Seanad as the last one.'" If you gave him back something that was there before in the existing Constitution it would have no chance of being accepted and they said: "Let us give him something that is novel so that he will be able to accept it and that he will be able to say ‘No one can now say I am inconsistent because I am introducing this Seanad'." The scheme has worked well. The President has accepted this proposal to form the Second Chamber Commission. The President is blowing hot and cold on the Seanad. He made speeches here denouncing the Seanad. The Fianna Fáil Party stumped the country also in their denunciation of the Seanad.
Comment on this
Deputy Norton is forgetting that the scheme was not the report of the majority of the Commission at all. It was in the minority report.
Comment on this
I am not saying that it was suggested in the majority report. I am saying that those members who signed it were very wise in their strategy. They wanted a Second Chamber. The President had abolished the Second Chamber. The Fianna Fáil Party had acclaimed its abolition with enthusiasm and one would expect that they, at least, would stand for a unicameral system. It was obvious after a time that the President had changed his mind about the Seanad question and Fianna Fáil felt that "because father changed we should all change," and they began to cultivate the view of a Second Chamber. The tacticians who worked with Deputy MacDermot on the Second Chamber Commission said: "He is weakening on the Second Chamber question, but anything like a Seanad constituted like the old Seanad would be anathema to the President. He will destroy any scheme for a Seanad that contains provisions like the first Seanad just as he destroyed the first Seanad; let us bring back a new scheme for a Seanad, something that will be novel to him so that he will not have to retrace his footsteps; having regard to the wobbly attitude he has shown on Second Chambers, he will probably embrace this scheme."
Comment on this
From the point of view of the tacticians responsible for the minority report, the theory was successful. It happened that the minority report produced a scheme for a Second Chamber and the President, wobbling on the desirability of a Second Chamber, immediately grasped this thing and so we have it in the Draft Constitution to-day. We have that scheme not because it is a method of producing a good Second Chamber but because it is different from the one abolished by the President. That is the only reason for its being here. That being the private view of the President, he would recognise that, though the former Second Chamber had better machinery for its election, still because it was different from the Second Chamber that he abolished he was ready to accept it. The old method of electing the Second Chamber gave you a certain type of people who were just as good as can be got under this method and they could be got just as easily.
Comment on this
Easier because the method of selecting the previous Seanad was that certain members of the Dáil nominated them and in that way it was quite easy to affix the test of nomination to the candidates. Under this proposal you will necessarily have to create a big superstructure in order to find out whether the people selected belong to a certain panel. Who is to certify that they belong to different interests and services? Who is to certify that a certain individual is connected with labour, whether organised or unorganised, that he is not a person associated with agriculture and allied interests, and fisheries? Who is to certify whether he belongs properly to labour or industry?
Comment on this
We saw the suggestions that are contained in the report, but they are not in the Draft Constitution. It is still possible to pass a law giving effect to an entirely different scheme and not one of the suggestions made in the Minority Report may be embodied in the proposed legislation. I am opposed to a Second House, but if we are to have a Second House we ought to be able to get one with the greatest ease and simplicity. I do not think we would be getting that under the proposals in this Draft Constitution. I think that under these proposals you are creating an unnecessarily heavyweight structure and the difficulties of that structure will become apparent once an effort is made to classify people under these different panels. I am opposed to this whole conception of a vocational Chamber in the circumstances existing in this country. I do not think you have vocational organisations adequate to enable you to resort to this method of election. You merely will get endless difficulties, big obstacles and an unsatisfactory method of election when you try to put into operation a system to which the country in the existing circumstances does not lend itself.
Comment on this
It must be remembered that the atmosphere in which the Commission with regard to a Second Chamber brought in its variety of reports was that which was engendered by the President when he said in the House that Adams was no mean political thinker; he stood for the Single Chamber. As Deputy Norton has said, after that wise pronouncement the Fianna Fáil Party went around the country shouting "Up Adams," whoever he was, whichever Adams it was, because the President had said that Adams was no mean political thinker and he stood for the Single Chamber. After the President announced that most modern minds had come round to the view that the Single Chamber government was the best, he decided that he would get as many simple people of the Deputy MacDermot type as there were in the country to go into a room and see if they could oblige him either by falling out over the details of the Second Chamber or doing what they ultimately did do, submitting to him several suggestions. I do not suppose that the President's objective was quite clear even on the day the terms of reference came out. At any rate, Deputy MacDermot went into that commission with others and he helped to give the President the justification for including this nonsense in the Draft Constitution because he provided him with what amounted to disagreement in detail and he enabled him to say that nobody could agree about a Second Chamber, but he would endeavour to provide something which people might regard as better than a Single Chamber and, retracing his steps, he submits this proposal in his Draft Constitution.
We have in the Draft Constitution this entirely novel electorate. It is an electorate which, when one reads about it first, cannot strike anybody as being a sensible one. In opposition to that is a proposal that the members of the Seanad shall be elected on a franchise and in the manner and for the term to be provided by law. The suggestion is that this matter should be left over to be determined by law. It would not be part of the organic law of this country. The proposal here is that the Seanad should be composed of a certain number, that it should have certain powers and that it should be chosen from a particular electorate. The majority here voted in favour of a Single Chamber Government and the President has had served up to him a variety of suggestions from a carefully handpicked committee. It is surely a proper thing to suggest that in a country which has had experience of a Seanad there should not be an attempt to fix here for all time what is to be the method of selecting the personnel of the Seanad.
I gather that Deputy MacDermot has some doubts as to whether there is anybody capable in this country of producing a plan for a Second Chamber. That is not so much the difficulty; the difficulty is that there are so many plans for a Second Chamber capable of being produced and they can all be considered admirable when viewed from a different standpoint. Modern thinkers are generally in favour of a Second Chamber Government all through the world, and if you took the best of these minds in countries which have had experience of Second Chambers you probably would not get them to agree on the terms of reference the President put before the Commission previously. I suggest that you cannot think accurately about a Second Chamber when the terms of reference more or less indicate "If you decide to have a Second Chamber, tell us what you think it ought to be."
The first pivotal point is, do you intend that the Seanad should take office at the same time as the representative House? Do you intend that the Second Chamber should be an elected body? Then, if you are going to have a change, with the wave of popular opinion that brings about a change, the particular powers you should give to such a body would be entirely different to those given to a House constituted under different conditions. If you think you are going to have a House so made up that it would not in its entirety go out of office or out of being on the day on which the representative House ceases to exist, if you are aiming at having an overlap and that the Seanad built up under one administration would hang over for a certain number of years, then I think you would give entirely different powers.
The people who were collected together at that Commission did not even think fit to address a question to the President or to his nominees, so far as the records produced show, as to whether there was anything in the President's mind with regard to a Second Chamber, what was the type he thought of, whether he wanted a Seanad with powers of delay or a Seanad with powers of amendment, whether it was to be free, or would it be confined because of money matters or constitutional matters. Anybody could have seen that confusion was bound to be the result of a commission set up in the way that that commission was set up. Can anybody say that there is sufficient thought given to this matter in this document? Can anybody say that he believes that what is here is better than any alternative suggestion that can be thought of? Is there any argument sufficiently definite as to this fancy electorate? Have the details been properly thought out? Is there any reason why there should be panels of candidates chosen more or less on a vocational basis? Is anybody convinced that the panels are exhausted or have been properly provided?
Is there any reason why a Constitution which is to be changeable only by a process of referendum after three years should contain the details that are here with regard to these panels, the people they are to represent and the electorate that is to choose them? Will any harm be done by leaving these matters over for determination by ordinary law? Is it ludicrous to suggest that any harm would be done in such circumstances? I suggest that the powers of the Seanad should be left over for determination by ordinary law. Even if you take the powers that are proposed to be given, can anybody say that this is the best suggestion that could be made? Has the President discussed any alternatives? I suggest that there is a case for leaving over certain matters connected with the Seanad for determination by ordinary law. For instance, the numerical strength of the Seanad could be left over. Can anybody see any harm accruing to the State if radical changes affecting everything that occurs after paragraph 4 are left over for determination later? I only limit it to paragraph 4 as a reasonable stopping point. Can anybody see any harm accruing to the State if the whole Article dealing with the Seanad be changed, and changed several times, in the next three years? Is there anything that would shake the foundations of the State if the particular policy in regard to the Seanad is not fixed and immovable?
There is an interesting development in all this matter. There are certain types of arguments from which one can see personality projecting and types of argument from which one can see arguments on personal experience proceeding. That is definitely Deputy MacDermot's attitude on this question of a Second House. On one occasion he spoke of what seemed to mean the desirability of having election with regard to the Second House. That was at a time when Deputy MacDermot felt secure somewhere in the country as an elected member. A little later, he became wedded to nomination. He was getting a little insecure with regard to the elective process in respect of himself. Now, he is all for the lot, which is the last gamble of a defeated man.
Comment on this
I shall be very much interested if Deputy McGilligan can produce a quotation from any speech of mine favouring election to the Seanad. I am certain he could not produce anything of the kind. He inquires what harm could be done by leaving this matter over. I reply: what good can be done by leaving it over?
Comment on this
I question that very much. What the President said a few minutes ago is perfectly true. If you put up any workable scheme for a Second Chamber, almost everybody who looks at it will think of improvements upon it. There is no perfect or ideal scheme. The number of permutations and combinations that are possible with regard to a Second House is infinite, and the longer you put it off the more difficulty and the more confusion you will have. Why are the leaders of the Opposition insisting on a course being followed here which they did not adopt themselves? They put a Seanad in their Constitution and these clear thinkers made numerous subsequent alterations with regard to the arrangements for the Seanad. The truth of the matter is that these proposals are not perfect—far from it. They are especially imperfect at a time when the vocational basis we hope some day will exist does not, as Deputy Norton has said, exist as fully as we should like to see it. Even when these things develop further, the Seanad will not be a perfect body. Few people will be found to say that it is in all respects the best of all possible arrangements for creating a Seanad. But if we have to wait until the House is unanimous, or nearly unanimous, on that question, we shall have to wait for ever.
The arguments which Deputy McGilligan is putting up are extremely mischievous because they create a danger of our having no Second Chamber at all. They are mischievous from the point of view of anybody who is anxious to have a Second Chamber, if at all possible. I do not believe that the Second Chamber the President abolished was at all as satisfactory as the Second Chamber that can be created by these proposals. I do not believe that for the reason that the last Second Chamber was a Party body. On most measures that came before it, the Party Whips were put on and a decision was taken on a Party basis. If you want a Second Chamber of that kind, which is frankly a reflection of this Chamber, except in so far as there is an overlap, adopt the Norwegian system, which many people do not consider a Second Chamber system at all, and have just a Revising Committee appointed from this Chamber.
If you want something that is not a reflection of this House, you are driven to constitute it on some other principle and to make it unlike the last Seanad. If one is to be perfectly frank, the merit of the last Seanad consisted largely in the fact that it was originally to so great an extent nominated and that it was nominated not at a time when Party warfare was in full swing but at a time when the State was being created and when the nominating authority had other things to think of than Party considerations. If the Seanad had been merely elected from this House from the beginning, without any sort of limitation as to who might be elected, if it had been elected purely on a Party basis from the beginning, I conceive that it would not have had the measure of merit to which I have referred. That is why I consider that the Second Chamber was, in fact, on the down grade at the time it was abolished. I do not mean by that that the people put into it were unworthy people, but that they went in with a Party outlook and stayed in with a Party outlook. If you are going to have another Chamber in which opinions are divided on a Party basis, you are simply re-duplicating this House, and that is not worth while.
Deputy McGilligan refers to this "fancy electorate" with great contempt. I utterly disagree with this fancy electorate. I do not favour the proposal. It is not in the report I signed, and I hope we shall get it altered when we come to it. But Deputy McGilligan himself admits that powers and composition are closely inter-related. Now the powers of the head of the State, the powers of the Dáil and the powers of the Second Chamber are closely connected. One depends on the other. We cannot pass a Constitution which says that there is going to be a Second Chamber without saying what its powers are to be. If you put in the powers, you must put in a general outline of the composition, because none of us is willing to arrange for the giving of powers to a body of whose composition we know nothing at all. At the same time, you can, of course, go too far. The minority report recognises that and says: "In connection with the proposed machinery for the selection of the Second Chamber, we are of the opinion that only the broad principles on which our recommendations are based should be embodied in the Constitution, leaving the details to be fixed by ordinary legislation." That is exactly what the President is doing. He is attempting to put as much into the Constitution as he appropriately can, leaving a certain amount of elasticity for the arrangement of the details later. It is not a thing we are passing for all time. The Constitution can be altered.
Comment on this
Even after that time, it can be altered by referendum. It is over-stating the case altogether to say we are doing this for all time. We are not. If the Constitution is to be a Constitution in any real sense of the word and we are putting in a Second Chamber, we must give some sort of outline of the principles on which it is to be formed.
Deputy McGilligan says that modern thinkers are all in favour of a Second Chamber. That is a statement that to me has no meaning. I do not know how anybody can be in favour of a Second Chamber without some explanation of what a Second Chamber means. Does it mean a revising committee, a Second House, that is a reflection of the first House? If you mean that they are in favour of something that is to be more than a reflection of the first House, then it must be constituted on some different principle. You do not want to arrange that the Second Chamber should always be in opposition to the first Chamber, that it should be Tory if Radicals are in power and vice versa. Nor do you want to arrange that it shall be identical with the first House. Here is an attempt to get something on different principles from the first House. It is perfectly easy for every individual who looks at it to sneer at it. The first instinct of anybody looking at any Second Chamber scheme is to sneer at it and say that this and that is unreasonable and illogical. Let anybody who is inclined to talk like that sit down and attempt to work out a Second Chamber scheme for himself and he will find the difficulties. If we are to postpone consideration of this matter until everybody has done that, I predict with confidence that the result will be nothing but confusion.
Comment on this
What is really wrong with the Opposition in connection with this proposal is that they were accustomed to a certain kind of Seanad which was really a reflex of this House. That Seanad was a very serviceable instrument in the hands of the Opposition. It was a very willing and pliant instrument and an Opposition accustomed to a Chamber like that, which was simply a reflex of a certain Party organisation, naturally object to any deviation from that type of Seanad. Not only was it a reflex of this House but the present Minister for Lands said, before its abolition, that it was rapidly becoming a home for political derelicts.
Nobody can say that a slight deviation from that form of Seanad is any harm. Nobody who looks at the provisions of Article 18 will deny that there is a possibility of working out a better type of Seanad under it than the last Seanad. I frankly admit that I was one of those bitterly opposed to the last Seanad. Evidently, there is a volume of opinion which wants a Second Chamber and which wants delay in legislation. Whether we like it or not, that section of opinion exists. If a certain commission set up here puts forward certain proposals which are embodied in this Constitution, I consider that those constitute a better basis on which to build a Second Chamber than the basis on which the old Seanad was constituted. That should be a closed chapter. Deputy McGilligan, Deputy O'Sullivan and Deputies of their standing in this House would be well advised to close that phase in the history of the Oireachtas. Not a single voter would say, whatever may be his opinion about the plan for a new Second Chamber, that the old Chamber did not get its deserts.
Comment on this
I am very sorry that Deputy MacDermot's first inclination is to sneer at things proposed in this House. I take it that when that is the natural instinct on the part of everybody, he must be speaking from his own experience. It is really after examination that this Article demands condemnation. Deputy Norton, in speaking of the vocational basis, must have recognised that there is no vocational basis for the election of the Seanad. What is contained in Article 7 is not a vocational basis, since it does not limit in any real sense the power of the electorate or the proposers. There is no real limitation. It leaves the electorate perfectly free to elect anybody. Can you imagine any Seanad of 43 elected people which would not contain representatives of any of the grades set out? No matter what you would do, it would contain representatives of these groups. There is no vocational basis. That is one of the pieces of pretence of which we have several examples in this Constitution. I should call it a "pious resolution," only I do not know why people describe as "pious" resolutions in which they have not the slightest belief.
Comment on this
We are objecting to passing futilities, and this is merely a futility. The Deputy thinks this is a step towards the corporative organisation of a Second Chamber. It corresponds to Article 45; it is a thing without power. Deputy MacDermot spoke—I presume the President will agree with him—about certain limitations on the power of choice. There is no such limitation here. I put it again to any member of this House: Take these five groups, get a Party organisation going, select a Party Seanad, and it will be very hard for them not to fulfil the terms of that Article. They would have to go out of their way not to do that. Here, at last, I gather, is something superior to the last Chamber, because it is non-political. We have one non-political personage in the new President, and the opinion of the President of the Executive Council as to a non-political personage is, apparently, akin to the opinion that the Irish Press is a non-political newspaper. Here we are to have a non-political Seanad elected by political people—people who are first and foremost politicians and who are elected because of that and nothing else.
Comment on this
I am dealing with what is in this particular Article which is supposed to give us a non-political body. That body is to be selected by politicians and nobody else. It is quite obvious, judging from the arguments we have heard, that this proposal has not got a moment's consideration either from the President or from the Lord Chief Justice of this House, who sits in judgment on the various proposals that come before us. It has not got any consideration, and, for that reason, I think the House should adopt the amendment we have put forward. In reality, what has happened is that, for some reason unknown to anybody—possibly unknown to himself—the President changed his mind on Second Chambers and said: "Here is one; take it or leave it." There has been no argument in favour of this method of election. I have not heard a word said in favour of it. It is different from election in the case of the Dáil. Of course, it is. Whether the results will be different is another matter. I think they will be largely the same. You will have a duplication of the Dáil. It is fantastic. The only reason for it is that it is absurd and therefore the proper place for it is here.
Comment on this
I find myself in the position of agreeing with almost everything that has been said by the leaders of the Opposition, but I disagree with them in thinking that they have established a case for the amendment they propose which takes away so many of the provisions of the Draft that is before us. I gather that there was a certain amount of criticism of the conduct of the commission which sat during the summer months last year as to the manner in which it devoted itself to its duties and as to the attitude it adopted in considering the important question on which its opinion was asked. It has been suggested, on the one hand, that this commission devoted itself to considering what the President would be ready to swallow in the shape of a Second Chamber. As far as my knowledge of that commission goes, I repudiate that view strongly. I do not think that many of the members of that commission thought that the attitude with which they should approach the question was one of considering what would suit the palate either of the Government or of the Opposition. I think they devoted themselves to the duties that they were asked to undertake: to suggest the best sort of Second Chamber the country should have, if it was decided that we should have a Second Chamber, what sort of powers it should have, and to suggest in what manner it should be elected.
I do not think it was any part of their duty to consider what view the President might have, what views his colleagues in the Government might have, or what views the Front Opposition might have except in so far those views might be of value in themselves. That is to say, the commission considered it its duty to design the most useful form of Second Chamber that it could and, in the minds of most of the members, I think that was associated with the desire that a Second Chamber, if decided on, would be such as to commend itself both to the President and to his colleagues on the one hand, and to the Opposition on the other.
I was surprised that Deputy McGilligan criticised the commission for not having invited the opinion of the President as to what sort of Second House he would like. I think that would have been a grave dereliction of duty on the part of the commission—to adopt from the very start a subservient position to the President. I think that would have argued a lack of self-respect on the part of the members of the commission who accepted service on the commission to carry out to the best of their ability the terms of reference of their appointment. I think it is extremely easy to criticise any Draft Constitution for a Second Chamber. In substance, almost all the criticism that I have heard this evening both from the Front Opposition Bench and from Deputy Norton could, I think, have been brought with almost equal force against any other Draft.
I am confirmed in that view by remembering the development in view that was shown by several members of the commission who sat during last summer. The views of many of them after two or three months' discussion developed to a very great extent. They differed very considerably from the views they had put before their colleagues when the commission first sat. That showed that to them the matter was a very important and a very difficult one. It showed, too, that they were willing to listen to reason and to argument, and to modify their views accordingly. In that way a large amount of agreement was got. It is evidence, too, that where their views differed from those expressed by others they were ready to seek what might appear to be their individual opinions.
On only one point can I remember that a reference was made to what view the President might have in regard to a particular matter that came up for discussion, namely, the question of nomination. The President had expressed himself in this House very strongly on the difficulty of anyone in his position, or the head of any Government, in nominating the members of a Second Chamber. As well as I remember, he has said that he himself would be unwilling to accept that responsibility. That is the only point on which I remember any member of the Commission referring to what might suit the President's wishes. The opinion of a very large number of members of the Commission was that, in many respects, the best Chamber we could have would be a Chamber which would be very largely nominated, while they recognised that at some time such a Chamber would be easily open to attack. The same thing would be likely to happen in the future as had happened in the past: that, when those who had been in office with the power to make nominations had passed out of power, those coming in would feel themselves hampered by the nominees of their predecessors, and that those nominees would be attacked as biased and not suitable for their position. Such criticism is natural and inevitable and would certainly have occurred if a large element of nomination had been suggested for the Second Chamber. With a comparatively small amount of nomination now in the Draft apparently the President would be willing to undertake to nominate if he should be in a position to do so. I think that anyone in the position of head of a Government will, in the main, exercise an honest and detached choice in those whom he will nominate to a position of such importance as membership of a Second Chamber. It would be undoubtedly difficult for him to tear himself away from Party claims and Party ties, but still I think he could be relied on to show that he could choose men who might be opposed to him politically, whose services he believed would be of value in the Second Chamber. I have no criticism to make of the number of nominees that it is proposed to include in the Second Chamber.
I now come to the very difficult question—the suggested vocational, or quasi-vocational, basis for the Second Chamber. I quite agree with Deputy Professor O'Sullivan that what is proposed is not really on a vocational basis. I do not think it is divulging any secret to say that almost unanimously, if not unanimously, the commission was in favour of finding a vocational basis for a Second Chamber, but that when they came to consider the matter in detail they found the difficulties so great that they were deterred from pursuing it further. I think that is a fairly accurate statement of the attitude of mind of a considerable number of the members of the commission.
I admire the courage of the President in what he has done in regard to approaching towards a vocational basis, as he has done in this Draft. I recognise, however, that when legislative measures are to be brought forward, and when this matter comes to be considered in detail, it may be found extremely difficult to apply the principles set out in the Draft and to work them out in practice. A vocational basis for one house of the Legislature is found in many different countries, differing as much as Fascist Italy and Communist Russia, as well as in democratic countries. There is a body of modern opinion certainly in favour of a vocational basis of some sort for one or other House of the Legislature. I do think that there is going to be very great difficulty in framing a piece of legislation to carry the idea into practice. All the difficulties that Deputy O'Sullivan and Deputy McGilligan pointed out are likely to occur. The question for the Dáil to consider is whether they are insuperable, and whether such a basis as that is one which is desirable or not. When one considers the vocational basis one is very much inclined to slip into thinking mainly of those interests or vocations which are already well organised, forgetting that these represent really a comparatively small proportion of the community and that many of the interests which, at the moment, are in this country, relatively unorganised, deserve consideration also.
When Deputy Norton said that we were trying to be before our time in this respect, I think there was a good deal of truth in his statement. I think it was necessary, if the Government had it in mind that this should be a part of our Constitution, to leave it more or less vague for the moment. As things are at the moment, I am sure that it would take a very long time to get any kind of reasonable agreement for carrying this into practice, and, therefore, I think that the matter has to be left vague.
There has been a good deal of criticism of the proposed electorate, and I think that Deputy O'Sullivan said that, so far, nothing had been said in defence of it. Well, I suggest one point that can be said in defence of it at any rate, and that is that it will represent a considerable and widespread body of opinion in the country when it is called into action. Many who have considered the matter of a Second Chamber recognise that unless the method of election is based, either directly or indirectly, on a popular vote, such a Second Chamber would lose much of its authority—that it would be peculiarly liable to be attacked as an aristocratic or an oligarchical body or something of that kind. Now, this device which the President has adopted—not, I think, on the advice of the Minority Report in this case—does base itself, indirectly it is true, on a reasonably expressed popular vote in the country. I think that the fact that those who have been candidates for membership of this House can show that they have received the support of a certain number of people and that they have a certain reasonable amount of support behind them in the country—500 in this Draft—should be sufficient to show that that number of people, at least, have confidence in the persons concerned, both as to their capacity and their probity, and that they consider them to be people of standing and suitable to represent them in the Government of the country. Therefore, by giving such people a voice in the election of a Second Chamber, I think that, not alone are you having it on popular support, but you are getting a body of responsible people to exercise their choice, and I think that it is a distinct advance on the system that, as far as I could gather it, Deputy Donnelly was advocating for the election of members to the Second Chamber by members of the Dáil alone. You will have a larger number and a more widespread authority, and you will have a body in which one could have more confidence than if they were a body elected by this House. I think it would be impossible to avoid having an election by the members of this House on a Party basis. The tickets would be drawn up by the Party whips and there would be an extraordinary mathematical calculation as to the numbers to be counted on by each Party. That will not be so easy where one is dealing with a much larger electoral college and where many of the people who will be entitled to vote in that electoral college are not amenable to Party influences at all. There will be a certain number of independent people— and, I have no doubt, a certain amount of cranks—who will be allowed to have some voice in the election of the Second House.
I think that, when one considers all the various devices that have been put forward as regards the method of election to the Second House, it is possible that you will get some as good as this, but I think that you will get few that will be open to less objection or criticism than the suggested method. The scheme, of course, is open to criticisms, easy to make and genuine in substance, but I think that any other scheme put forward would also be open to criticisms, and I think that the scheme devised by the President, who probably has done as well as could be expected in view of the difficulties of the problem, and has considered the advice given by the Commission, which certainly gave a good deal of thought and a good deal of discussion to this question of a method of election, will be open to very little objection.
Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted and, 20 Deputies being present,
Comment on this
Now, Sir, that this attractive subject has brought in a sufficient number of Deputies to pass a good vote on the matter, I think it is about time that some advertence was paid to the detail which we are going to write into a Constitution here—a Constitution which can only be changed by legislation during a period of three years and which, after that, can only be changed by way of Constitutional amendment. Let us take this detail. I object to putting in something that can be made a farce of. Let us take one of the suggested details that has been praised by the last speaker—the panels. There are five headlines there, and the next clause says that the number of members of Seanad Eireann to be elected from each of these panels, and the method of nomination to these panels shall be determined by law. The body that is to nominate the people who have practical experience of the method of building up the panel is to be determined by law. The only thing that you have fixed is these farcical labels which are to be put into this Constitution. Is it proper that they should be put in here?
Comment on this
Deputy Donnelly asks "Why not?" I think it was Deputy Donnelly who spoke of that institution on a former occasion as the last home for political derelicts. Well, I think that they could all be put in under any of the five heads that we have here. Is that any sort of an exclusive category? Can anybody say that there is some other category that should not be added? Has this matter been discussed by people in the country, and can anybody say here, with regard to it, that they know that there is a definite feeling in their constituencies about this matter? I doubt if anybody here can say that he has talked about that detail.
Comment on this
Is that what the Deputy thinks? If so, they will probably accept this as the nearest thing to no Seanad, and they will probably accept the method of electing it as being the nearest approach to bringing about no Seanad. When you have this talk about certain matters to be determined by law, why do you stop at this one thing and say, with regard to the system of panels, that a man must, in some way or another, by hook or by crook, or by some change in the law, get himself fit to be elected by managing to have himself included under one of these heads? Why should these heads be there? I would not object if there was a proposal put forward for making certain changes by way of legislation, because I think that the only way to get a body of opinion behind any scheme in connection with a Constitution is after a series of changes have been made; but where you have written down certain things as part of the Constitution and then say that certain other things are to be determined by law, I hold that they should not be written into the Constitution. I say that this question of groups or panels should not be written into the Constitution, this thing of saying that a person must be a member of a certain group before he can qualify as a candidate for election. Deputy Dr. Rowlette has talked with some praise of the panel system and has said that any other system would be subject to as much criticism. You cannot test that until you have schemes put forward. Has there been time to put forward schemes?
Comment on this
There were no signatures affixed by the majority. Deputy McGilligan ought to look at the report.
Comment on this
Deputy Dr. Rowlette flatters himself, if he thinks it caused any discussion in the country. I suggest the Deputy should not be vain enough to think that anybody discussed that document, the methods by which it was brought forth and the circumstances surrounding it. There was no argument about it. I doubt if there were more than two newspaper articles in regard to it. There has been no discussion, even as to whether the methods of election which the members of the Commission put forward in their various reports were founded on practical experience, whether they were a mixture of what had been taken from other countries or whether they had proved to be good, bad or indifferent in other countries. There has not been one exciting night, one exciting hour, in the country over the report or what was contained in it. Yet, a Second Chamber is an important matter. There are certain people in various groups who meet in various representative organisations that one would naturally assume should meet and discuss it, but they have not discussed it, whether it was that they had not the time or not I do not know. It may be that some of them turned over quickly to see what were the powers of the Seanad and that, having seen them, they decided that it did not matter whether they got representation in it or not. I do think that the powers and personnel of the Seanad are inextricably intertwined. The proper way to start is not with the personnel but with the powers.
I am told that this Seanad will be a better body than the old Seanad. I could imagine people saying that but I cannot imagine that assertion being based on the argument that the old Seanad was a reflection of the Dáil. Let us consider how the last Seanad was elected. First of all, you had a number of people who were nominated. Then there was an attempt to have an election with the whole Saorstát voting as one unit, but one experience of that condemned it. There was then a change made and we came to the time when this House elected members to fill casual vacancies and vacancies occuring on the retirement of members. How did that work out in practice? You got this situation: that the new Seanad was not elected with the same wave of popular feeling as this Seanad will be. This new Seanad, I suggest, will be far more a reflection of this House than the old Seanad was. The old Seanad was not elected in toto after a general election. It might, by degrees, be changed until it had assumed the same complexion as this House but, if it did, it retained that complexion when this House had lost it. There was that advantage about it. How is the new Seanad to be elected? An election will be held for the Dáil. There will be a wave of popular feeling on which a certain Party will be elected and that Party will appoint the Government. The new head of the Government will then nominate 11 members and then, the people who have got so many first-preference votes, getting them on that same wave of popular feeling, are going to be the electorate for the remaining Senators apart from those who are to be elected to the University seats. The elections for the University seats will, it may be assumed, be affected to some extent by the same wave of popular opinion. Is that Seanad going to be a better Seanad than the last, with these 11 people elected by the new head of the Government and the rest going to be elected by a group of people who have stood the test of whatever new wave of enthusiasm has thrown up this House——