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Dáil

Committee on Finance. - Bunreacht na h-Éireann (Dréacht)—Coiste (d'ath-thogaint).

Contributions 119–249 of 249. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Not at all. Certain people will be nominated to the panels but the method of appointment of panels is to be determined by law. If there is a new Government which finds that its predecessors have left some method of selection which does not suit it, cannot that method of selection from the panel be changed? There is much more likelihood of the new Seanad being a complete reflection of the new Dáil than the old Seanad was of the Dáil in the past and that circumstance is the one thing that marks these new proposals. I do not think there can be any argument about that.

Comment on this

You are wrong in that.

Comment on this

If I am wrong, it is because some people have the belief that the interposition of this new panel business is going to change the complexion of the Upper House.

Comment on this

Read sub-section 1º of Section 7.

Comment on this

"Before each general election of such members, five panels of candidates shall be formed containing respectively the names of persons having practical knowledge and experience of the following interests and services," etc. Then they are set out.

Comment on this

How does the Deputy interpret that?

Comment on this

I interpret that in the light of the next sub-section, which says that the number of members to be elected from each of these panels shall be determined by law.

Comment on this

And the method of nomination.

Comment on this

And the method of nomination to the panel. Once you control the method you control everything. The last Seanad was supposed to be a body of men who had done honour to the nation under various headings. Deputy Donnelly has said that it was a home of political derelicts.

Comment on this

No.

Comment on this

He said it was rapidly becoming a home for political derelicts. If it was possible to elect men of that type to a body which was supposed to consist of men who had done honour to the nation, this thing can be worked in exactly the same way, and will be worked in the same way. It seems to me that Deputy Donnelly, whose chief endeavours over a long period of years have been connected with political organisations, knows how easily that can be worked, and Deputy Donnelly will be at the back of the movement when that change is proposed unless he has lost much of his energy and enthusiasm in regard to political Parties. He is a man who ought to know how easy it is to work this method of nomination to a panel in the interests of a political Party. I can imagine all sorts of arguments to the effect that this Seanad will be a better Seanad than the old body, but none based on the point that the old Seanad was a reflection of the Dáil and that this will not be. On that I shall take up the challenge with anybody.

Comment on this

The Deputy does not suggest that he cannot work lawyers in under that section?

Comment on this

What section?

Comment on this

The section to which the lawyers belong.

Comment on this

They are not in any category.

Comment on this

Oh, yes, they are.

Comment on this

No more than amateur miners. Deputy MacDermot thinks that there is a condemnation of the old Seanad from the people who brought in the proposals about the new Seanad. He cavilled at their wisdom because the old Seanad had to be changed. It had to be changed. It was recognised always from the start that it had to be changed, and there is a great deal to be said for the forethought of the people who brought in the Seanad and made the conditions such that it was possible to have a method of trial and error. The conditions were such that the whole Seanad could be abolished, but I do not think there was any way of stopping that. But remember what was proposed here. The old Constitution had in it that the Constitution could be altered by way of ordinary legislation, originally for four years. That itself was capable of enlargement; it was enlarged to eight years before the Constitution left the Dáil as an Act, and it was eventually enlarged to 16 years. Every clause, including the one with the time limit in it, was capable of enlargement. This Constitution is brought before us with a clause in it which states that the Constitution itself may be amended by way of ordinary legislation within three years, except the one clause with the time limit in it, so that you cannot have any enlargement of the period with regard to the amending of the Seanad unless we change it here when we come to consider it. If it is passed as brought in, you tie up the Seanad in whatever form you leave it when passed here, and whatever President is elected can control any little amendment which can be done in it. Even though an amendment of the Seanad may be passed by a unanimous House in the three year period by way of ordinary legislation, he can send that off to the people by way of referendum as being a matter vitally affecting their interests. You have two barriers. One is that the period of ordinary legislative change is tied to a period of three years, and inside that period any change to be made in it can, if the then elected President thinks fit, be sent off to the people by way of referendum. I suggest that the idea with regard to the old Seanad was far better. I suggest even that its method of building up was far better. I suggest that, whether it was or not, there was sufficient experience about those who brought it in to realise that it had to be left capable of being freely changed within a certain period.

Comment on this

That was not the original intention of the framers.

Comment on this

They had a specific number of years which the previous Government altered.

Comment on this

It was a period of four years as it was brought in, which was changed on the appeal of the then leader of the Opposition.

Comment on this

But not by the framers.

Comment on this

The request had only to be made, and eventually it was enlarged to 16 years.

Comment on this

But not by the framers of it.

Comment on this

It was enlarged by the framers of it. The period was left open so that the people now in power were able to work their will on the Seanad. I want the contrast observed. We now have here given to us a completely new body with a novel electorate for which there is no example. After three years you can only change it by a rigid referendum and inside the three year period the President can make you have a referendum on any point.

Comment on this

There was provision for a referendum in the last Constitution but it was removed.

Comment on this

There is the situation. Can anybody say that the proposals which have been put forward here have been canvassed and thought of and that the people are satisfied with regard to them to the extent that we should write them as part of our organic law? Naturally the best situation would be that in which the limited powers of the Seanad could be determined by law. That is a much more reasonable proposition in the circumstances than the novel features of this, in view of the fact that this Constitution has not been considered and is not going to be considered prior to its passing. It is not going to be considered. Deputy MacDermot says that if we were to wait until there was agreement on the plan about the Seanad there would be confusion. Nobody wants that period of waiting. There was no such argument. The suggestion has been made that it is wrong to write this in as part of the fundamental law when there is not agreement. Let the matter be subject to easy process of change, and by degrees and after many changes we will get some approach to agreement. All the while there will be some Second Chamber being tested by experience, and people will be watching to see what it is doing.

Comment on this

The House is being asked, in fact, to agree to certain general principles with regard to the Seanad. The question is not whether it is absurd to pass this without agreeing to it. The question is whether we shall agree to it.

A great many of the arguments which Deputy McGilligan addressed to the House seemed to me to contradict each other. He talks about the wisdom of allowing the possibility of change. We are allowing the possibility of change. The extremely important and difficult matter of the composition of the panels is left to be dealt with by ordinary law. One moment we have the Opposition complaining that they are being asked to vote on something blindfolded because they are not being given all those details now, and the next moment they are insisting on the wisdom of allowing for experience and being able to make alterations on the basis of experience. The truth of the matter is that if we are going to try this vocational method at all we can only try it in this sort of way. This division of certain matters to be put into the Constitution and certain matters to be dealt with by ordinary law was foreseen by the people who made the reports of the Second Chamber Commission. Deputy McGilligan says that there must be something wrong with the reports of the Second Chamber Commission because they aroused so little interest throughout the country. I venture to say that any plan for a Second Chamber that might have been produced would have had the same fate. The average man is not in the habit of addressing his mind to complicated constitutional questions. The Opposition are constantly saying at the present moment that this Draft Constitution is arousing no interest. There is a lot in that. I think that complicated constitutional measures always will bore the man in the street; that is inevitable. But the members of this House whose duty it is to address their minds seriously to the subject have had ample opportunity of considering the reports of the Second Chamber Commission during the last 12 months.

I personally agree with Deputy McGilligan in his objections to the particular electorate which has been provided here for choosing from the panels, but it is possible to make further suggestions with regard to that electorate, and I have not seen any amendments put down by the Opposition for doing so. They seem to limit themselves to being obstructive. It is very easy to be obstructive in this particular matter, because there is not a single arrangement with regard to a Second Chamber that is not open to a thousand objections. Deputy McGilligan says that the new Seanad will be a more Party affair than the old one. I am not denying that this new Seanad can be turned into a Party affair. In fact, I will go so far as to say that any Seanad in the wide world can be turned into a Party affair. All you can hope to do is to provide some alternative to Party allegiance; and that is what we are attempting to provide by these proposals. We are attempting to provide some other motive that should replace the motive of Party. It may turn out that political Parties will not play the game, that leaders of the Government will be unscrupulous, and set aside all the ideals behind these proposals, but I do not see why we should be so pessimistic as to take that view. It is quite true that in the case of the old Seanad there were supposed to be certain factors with regard to services to the State. After all these were extremely indefinite. The proposals here, though necessarily not as definite as they might be, in view of the fact that we want to leave something open to experience, something open to change, nevertheless do provide something more to give a non-Party atmosphere than existed in the case of the old Seanad.

Comment on this

Can the Deputy define for me any man who has a practical knowledge of culture?

Comment on this

I cannot. If the Deputy will turn to the report of the Commission, and the basis on which these proposals are framed, he will see that these groups have not been just thrown down on paper without consideration as to how they are to be formed. We were fully aware of the difficulty. Let us take the group in industry and commerce. We suggested that some members should be chosen from the Federation of Saorstát Industries, some from the National Agricultural and Industrial Development Association, some from the Chambers of Commerce, some from the Standing Committee of the Irish Banks, some from the civil engineers, some from the chartered accountants, some from the Royal Institute of Architects, and so-forth. One does not want to bring all these bodies into the Constitution. They may not always exist or they may change. We were not sure that these were the most perfect bodies that could be found in existence at present. That is the sort of thing that is properly left to ordinary legislation. It would be a dereliction of our duty in this Constitution not to give some outline of the way the Seanad is to be formed. If Deputy McGilligan will join with me in trying to get a better electorate I should be exceedingly grateful. The question of the mode of choice from the panels might perhaps be left over for ordinary legislation to fix. That is a matter of opinion. But as for a general outline of the groups composing panels, that it should be put into the Constitution seems to me to be obvious.

Comment on this

I made no argument about the man in the street. A series of proposals were put forward that men were to be elected by bodies such as the Irish Trade Union Congress. It is a year since that was passed. Has the Irish Trade Union Congress done so? Has the Council of the National Agricultural and Industrial Development Association done so?

Comment on this

I think it has.

Comment on this

Have the Chamber of Commerce, the banks, the civil engineers, the Institute of Chartered Accountants, the architects, or the National Teachers' Organisation done so? How many of these people discussed that report? I am not talking of the man in the street.

Comment on this

The whole thing turns on the panels. In the old days in Greece they had something like the panel system and they did very well for a while. They decided by lot who was to be general and did very well. How are we to be sure that our panels will be perfect and properly tested? I see the difficulty here and my sympathy is with the President. I wish I could help him. He should concentrate on that point.

Comment on this

If a classical example is to be brought in, a process-server was brought in in the past and made leader of an army.

Comment on this

Amendment No. 73 in my name deals with the electorate that chooses from the panel. I am very glad to hear Deputy Alton's remark about the panels. The principle of the amendment is this, that by definition everybody who is put on the panels is supposed to be a person fit and proper to be a member of the Second Chamber. If vocational organisations were sufficiently developed in this country there would be no need of panels at all. The organisation could elect direct to the Seanad and we could get rid of rather cumbersome machinery. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and for that reason the panels were put into the scheme. By whatever method the panels are constituted the aim will be to get on only people who are fit and proper for the Seanad. It was assumed in the Commission's report that the panels would be small. The recommendation was that where there are ten Senators to be elected the panel from which they are to be elected would number only 20. Consequently, if you select ten from a panel of 20 by lot, it seems to me you are not trusting any more to Providence than is reasonable. Leaving Providence out of the question, it seems to me that, on the mathematical law of chance, you have a larger probability of satisfactory results than you are likely to have if you choose from panels by means of an electorate of such a political character as either the Dáil or an electorate composed partly of members of the Dáil and partly of defeated candidates. The great trouble will be if you have the Dáil or political candidate electorate to keep Party politics out. Here is the thing we had in mind. Even when we had racked our brains to think of all the institutions that could possibly be made use of for the purposes of getting representatives for the panel and, even after we had racked our brains, to the best of our ability, to get suitable organisations, we were still left in this position, that there had to be a certain number of nominations in every group, except the Labour group, and we could think of no other nominating party except the Minister and, out of the suggested total of 80 persons who were to be on the panels, there were no less than 19, according to our scheme, who were to be nominated by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, the Minister for Agriculture and the Minister for Education. You have, therefore, these Ministerial nominations and you have, in addition, the 11 nominations of the President of the Executive Council. In the case of all of these, obviously a certain danger of Party politics creeping in exists. If the President and Ministers play the game, that danger can be enormously diminished; but it does exist and it makes it all the more desirable that the remainder, those on the panels who are sent there by organisations of one sort or another, should not have to look to members of this House, or to defeated candidates either, in order to get on to the Seanad. It seems to me that the danger of canvassing is tremendous and it is very undesirable that that danger should exist.

There is a question as to whether the Dáil itself, or the Dáil plus defeated candidates, would be the best electorate. They both seem to me extremely bad as electorates, but as between the two, I personally would prefer the Dáil itself. There is what Deputy McGilligan called a fancy electorate which seems to me really a bit too fantastic—that elaborate system of people getting so many votes for the Seanad according to the number of votes they themselves got from the electors. After all, what are the people down the country going to know about engineers, or doctors or architects? They will know nothing about them at all, except in so far as those people have received some form of publicity, and the easiest and the most normal sort of publicity, I suppose, is political publicity. The average member of that electorate who is seeking to choose people from the panels will have no other resource, if he is asked to vote for a lot of names he has never heard of before, but to go to the Party leaders and say, "What about it?" and then follow the instructions given by the Party leaders. We had reached a pitch in the case of the last Seanad, when at each election a member of a Party was not only told for whom he was to vote, but was told in exactly what order he was to vote for each of the candidates. The thing became just as machine-made as anything could be. It would be deplorable if the same thing were to happen in connection with the new body we are trying to create.

Comment on this

So it will.

Comment on this

I think we can avoid that, and we would obviously avoid it if we adopted the suggestion in this amendment, that the selection from this very small limited body of competent persons should be by drawing lots. The other people will get their turn in a few years. It would really be little more probably than a rotational system. There would be no absurdity about it, because all the people you would be choosing from would be, by definition, competent. You do not have to go so far back in antiquity as Deputy Alton went for examples of people being chosen by lot. You had the pricking of sheriffs which was choosing people by lot from a limited class of suitable persons. The jury system surely amounts to a system of lot for all practical purposes, the assumption being that any man in the street is a suitable person to be a juror, and so they must each take their turn in serving. So I suggest that any of the people put upon the panels must be regarded as fit and proper people to be Senators, and they may quite reasonably be selected by lot, rather than introduce a system which allows the Party motive to come in so easily as the system of this particular electorate would do.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

I take it the Deputy is discussing the two amendments together?

Comment on this

I cannot take the two together, because the next amendment is inconsistent with this one. It is only in the event of this one being rejected.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The question will be put in the form: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."

Comment on this

Can an amendment not be put to the House affirmatively?

Comment on this

Surely it is possible to have two amendments moved?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The question I have to put is: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."

Comment on this

Are we so tied up by the precedent adopted by the Chair for putting amendments that it is not possible to move two different types of substitutions for what is contained in the Constitution? If that is the procedure, it reduces this House to a point of futility that I never thought was possible. I should like personally to have the second amendment debated and defeated first, because the only preference I can see myself having for substituting the word "lot" would be if I thought there was any fear of the Council of State being substituted.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

The question I must put is: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand." The Deputy sees the difficulty?

Comment on this

Surely it is possible to put the question: "That the words ‘Council of State' be put in?"

Comment on this

I do not feel very strongly on the subject, and I am prepared to deal with the two amendments together. I am no enthusiast for selection by the Council of State. I would prefer selection either by the Prime Minister or the head of the State actually, where there would be a sort of personal responsibility. The Council of State is put in because I was afraid that the Government might be unreasonable enough to refuse my excellent suggestion of lot, and in the event of their doing so, I would personally prefer the Council of State to the Dáil electorate, or to an electorate of the Dáil plus defeated candidates. I would hope the Council of State would function in the same sort of spirit as the Appointments Commission. I wish, however, to make it clear that, of the two, the suggestion which does appeal to me is the suggestion of lot. I may say, incidentally, that far from this being a recent development, so far as my opinions are concerned, I advocated the use of the lot in connection with the Seanad even when I was enjoying all the safety and glory and companionship of sitting on the Front Bench of the Opposition.

Comment on this

With regard to the question of lot, I think the Deputy thinks you can have a limited panel to start with. I am afraid he cannot. I would be much more anxious about having this in the Constitution if I thought that there was any possibility that you would definitely have to get a number like 20. I think you will have to leave it pretty open—that the filling of the panels will have to be fairly open. You have all sorts of organisations. Consequently, I think that you must envisage something like 20 on each panel. I do not like to speak of the chances of a particular individual when you leave it to lot to pick out. You are certain to get one type—certainly they ought to be generally of the same type from a panel. It is necessary to leave elasticity at either end to do the thing at all. I think that the system of lot is ultimately a policy of absolute despair. That is my view of it. I think that it would immediately set up a desperate prejudice against the whole institution. But I am not going to attack it in that sense. If you have a very limited number and it is a toss up as to which of them you would take —each one of them a good representative of a particular interest—I would say it would not be right to toss up in a case like that. It would be more reasonable to look at the individuals, to size them up and take your choice. I think this would create a prejudice against the whole institution which would be very damaging to it. Consequently, you should not do it by lot. There is every reason why you will have to leave a certain amount of elasticity as to the number on the panel. If you increase the number on the panel on which you are going to vote, that will be a help if you have an intelligent electorate going through the panel. Let us suppose there are eight or ten to be selected from that panel. A number of difficulties, raised here with regard to the method of selecting the Seanad, are difficulties in practice which largely led me to believe that we are trying to get something which it is not practicable to get. When I was talking in that strain Deputy Rowlette said: "Very well, let us accept this, that even a bad Seanad is better than no Seanad." The arguments put forward here about the Seanad are not new to me at all. The difficulties which I experienced when I tried to get a Seanad which would be fairly satisfactory were these: First of all the Opposition got itself into a very safe position. They got themselves into the position that they could criticise anything knowing that there is no proposition that one can put up that cannot be criticised. The Opposition left themselves free to criticise any proposition, and they are availing of that freedom to the full. Their arguments are not very logical because they are arguing two ways at once. They say: "We ought not to stereotype this and put in the panels," and Deputy McGilligan says they can vote on any particular individual they want to put in in any of these panels. Yet, at the same time they tell us it is too narrow to be stereotyped. Then they tell us about its not being representative. If you look at the classes you can analyse them and see that they are fairly representative.

Comment on this

The President, if he wishes, can start all over again.

Comment on this

With regard to getting down to the narrow question of "lot," that will come in immediately. On the point as to whether you can at this stage limit the number you have on the panel, I do not think that can be done. If you cut it down you will see one big difficulty which you have to face at the start and that is how many should you give to a particular organisation. Each group may say: "Why should another group have three and we have only two?" If you do not limit the number which you give to two organisations, each could possibly claim a different number. Then if you restrict it to two each the fact is that as long as you give them as large a number as they can possibly elect, they will have no grievance. Consequently it is essential not to restrict the number to twice the number the Deputy had in mind. I think on the ground of prejudice it would be definitely bad.

On the question of the Council of State, that is only one step removed from nomination. You would have a great difficulty if you had a Seanad nominated in that way. It would be suggested that it did not represent public opinion in any way. But you will have it representative of public opinion in this way: you will have separate interests selecting the panel; there will be a certain number of representatives of the activities of the nation, and then you will have over and above that the selection from this class made by this electorate here. As to the suggestion that it is not much better than the Dáil, I am prepared to give assent to that. But the members who have been in the Dáil will preponderate in this election, particularly if they get a voice in the proportion of the first votes. The members actually elected will have a great preponderance in the voting strength.

Comment on this

I used the word "lot" first. I am not suggesting that we might have that method here. What I want to stress is the importance of getting a perfect panel. I do not want to limit the number. We do not know how fit a man will be. It is to keep out the duds. If any clearer method could be shown, my difficulties would be dissolved. I think the scheme is an ideal scheme. I do not know how to make that ideal a real one. That is my difficulty.

Comment on this

When we come to the law and to implementing this, I want to say that I have had to try to look ahead and to see that we are not putting down something that could not be worked out at all. I have looked ahead to the extent of saying: "Can you do this?" and I say you can. I do not say that the methods I would recommend here would be accepted by the House. There would probably be a variety of proposals put up from the House to deal with the arrangements for the members from each panel, but when you come to the question of how the names that are to go on the panel are to be selected finally, you will find that these are the things that will have to be put into the law. That will give the first implementation principle. I think that that principle can be worked out. I believe on the whole it will lead to a type of Seanad different from the Seanad where you have in a way had direct election by the Dáil without a panel.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

That governs amendments Nos. 74, 76, 82, 84 and 85.

Comment on this

Amendment 75 is partly met by the new amendment that has been put in by the Government. Amendment 75 provides that each panel shall supply a fixed quota of members, with a view of securing that there shall be fair play as between the different panels; that the electorate should not choose an undue number of Senators out of any one panel. I see that the President evidently considers that there should be more elasticity, because he proposes that there shall be a minimum and a maximum figure to be chosen from each panel. I am prepared to withdraw my amendment in favour of the one the Government have put in.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Does the Deputy agree that amendment No. 76 is governed by amendment No 74?

Comment on this

No, because Section 5 says: "Every election of the elected members of Seanad Eireann shall be held on the system of proportional representation, by means of the single transferable vote and by secret postal ballot." I wonder whether that provision could not be left over to an ordinary law instead of being put in the Constitution? We may decide that the electorate should be the Dáil and not this body of the Dáil, plus defeated candidates. In that case the provision about the secret postal ballot might be inappropriate. In any case, I am not clear that this is not one of the matters that would not be better left over to ordinary legislation, when our ideas about the composition of the panels are more complete than they can be at present.

Comment on this

Does not this immediately relate to the question as to whether we are going to have an electorate in the Constitution or not? It is the electorate that would be affected by this section.

Comment on this

And the method by which the electorate should exercise their choice.

Comment on this

We are proposing in this that the electorate should be actually put in the Constitution.

Comment on this

If the electorate is in the Constitution it does not necessarily follow that the way in which they should choose their representatives——

Comment on this

The Deputy's argument does not then apply. He is speaking about leaving something to a law which is to be passed later and which might provide for something different to what is envisaged in the Constitution. The law must be in accordance with the Constitution. If we determine the electorate we can determine equally well the method of election. It was in order to work out and carry the scheme as far as we can in the Constitution that we put this proposal in here.

Comment on this

If, when we come to sub-section (3) of Section 7, which describes what the electorate is to be, we succeed in persuading the Government to substitute the Dáil for this mixed electorate of the Dáil plus defeated candidates, and if we can persuade the Government to abolish this plan of giving a sort of fancy franchise depending on the number of votes secured, will Section 5, describing the method of election, still be appropriate?

Comment on this

My view is that if there was to be a consequential amendment in regard to any matter like that, it could be brought in on Report. If we did something later on which would make inappropriate something we decided upon, I take it that it would not be out of order to move on Report that a consequential amendment be made.

Comment on this

Why is proportional representation suitable as the scheme for the fancy electorate and not suitable for the Dáil as the electorate?

Comment on this

The proportional representation system is suitable enough. The point is, what about the secret postal ballot? In any case, I withdraw amendment No. 76.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Is amendment No. 77 governed by amendments Nos. 73 and 74?

Comment on this

Yes, it is closely bound up with them.

Comment on this

Amendment No. 78 is, perhaps, bound up with amendment No. 6.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Is the Deputy not moving it?

Comment on this

I do not propose to move that amendment as it stands, in view of the decision on amendment No. 6, but on it I would like to say that if provision is to be made for representation on the special panel of national language and culture, I hope that culture is not going to be defined as excluding everything that is non-national in the sense of being non-Gaelic.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 79:—

In Section 7, sub-section 1º (i), line 1, after the word "Culture" to insert the words "Literature, Art".

This proposes that literature and art should be specially mentioned as forming part of the same group as language, culture and education. It seems to me that they ought to be specially mentioned and I see no case for leaving them out. I would ask the Government to put them in.

Comment on this

I do not think you recommended that in the Commission Report.

Comment on this

I recommend it now, in any case.

Comment on this

It is apparently an afterthought. The Deputy must not have read his own report.

Comment on this

I read it many a time.

Comment on this

The only point is whether "Culture" would not cover that.

Comment on this

"Culture" is a most ambiguous word. I suggest that the Government should accept Deputy MacDermot's amendment.

Comment on this

If Deputy McGilligan would take the trouble to look at page 34 of the report he would see that we did recommend that one person should be chosen for being prominently associated with literature or art.

Comment on this

This proposal would mean literature and art bound up with the national language and national culture.

Comment on this

Does the President object to the inclusion of literature and art? What I fear is that I think the word "national" appears to cover culture as well as language, national language and culture. I think it is so intended. If that is so, it confines the representatives of culture in the Seanad to Gaelic enthusiasts and I do not think that ought to be. I think there should be representatives of literature and art outside the purely Gaelic side of our activities.

Comment on this

I have no real objection to the amendment and I am quite prepared to accept it, although it seems to me not to be necessary.

Comment on this

And it does not add anything.

Comment on this

I think it is wise to include those words.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 80:—

In Section 7, sub-section 2º, to delete the sub-section and to insert in lieu thereof two new sub-sections as follows:—

2º. The method of nomination to these panels shall be determined by law.

3º. The number of members of Seanad Eireann to be elected from each of these panels shall be determined by law, so, however, that not less than five and not more than eleven members of Seanad Eireann shall be elected from any such panel.

As Deputy MacDermot anticipated, it is intended to try to secure that there shall be fair play as regards the numbers that can be elected from each of the panels. I think it would be unwise to do as Deputy MacDermot has suggested, to mention a definite number from each panel. We cannot anticipate what will be the views that will be expressed or what may be the exigencies when we are making a law to implement the Constitution and when we are trying to meet different points of view. I think the provision that I have suggested here, namely, not less than five and not more than 11 will meet the case. You have five fives—25 —and that would leave 18. You will have to put five in each to start with, and you have 18 left over. If you insist on not having more than 11 in each, you will at least have to put those 18 amongst three panels. You would have to divide your loading over three panels at any rate, so I think that is fairly reasonable. With regard to the panels, six members are being elected from the universities and I think they ought to be regarded largely as supplementing the first panel. Consequently, you would have to take that into account when considering what number should be given to the first panel. As to public administration, I do not think a case could be made for putting as many representatives on that panel, if we are going to follow largely the economic side, as there would be in respect of agriculture, for example. This amendment is intended to give a certain amount of elasticity and, at the same time, to prevent such a thing happening as giving such a number to one panel as would completely overshadow the others. Deputy MacDermot has approached it from the point of view that there is not too much room to play with and, if he is satisfied with this, I think, from the point of view I have in the matter, it would satisfy us.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 82:—

In Section 7, to delete sub-section 3º.

I want to argue again in favour of the Dáil as an alternative to the electorate proposed in sub-section (3). I think the Dáil is far from being an ideal electorate for this purpose, but I think it would be a better electorate than what is proposed. In the first place, the members of the Dáil would be likely to know more about the people they had to choose from than a good many of the candidates down the country, who might scarcely have ever been near the centre of affairs and who might have a much smaller fund of general information about the life of the country than members of the Dáil would have. In the second place, I think that members of the Dáil would probably have a greater sense of responsibility; and in the third place, if you put that responsibility fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Dáil, everybody knows who is to blame if the Second Chamber is in fact turned into the political Party Chamber that it ought not to be.

Comment on this

We have argued this and I do not know that it is necessary to say anything further on it. The point is: if they know them better, what is the question about the lot? I think the other electorate is, on the whole, more suitable. It has been suggested that Deputy Donnelly might try his hand at organisation if this system were tried. I do not know that it would be as easy for Deputy Donnelly, or anybody else to succeed in that with the electorate provided, as it would be with the Dáil. The Dáil is a group which can meet for several hours to deal with this matter, but it would not be so easy to bring all the candidates in an election together and deal with them. I think, on the whole, the electorate proposed is better than the Dáil. It gives a possibility of representation to minority groups and it is for these two reasons, as I said already, that we selected it rather than the Dáil.

Comment on this

The President suggests that my argument about the lot implies that no knowledge of the candidates is necessary or desirable. My answer to that is that I would be perfectly willing to have the men chosen blindly. My fear is not that they would be chosen blindly, but that, because Nature abhors a vacuum, if every voter knows nothing about the personalities of the people on whom he is voting, he will seek for some other motive to direct his vote and that motive will, I fear, be the Party motive. The greater his ignorance of personalities, the more he is thrown back on the Party motive.

Comment on this

With regard to amendment No. 83,

In Section 7, sub-section 3º, to delete the words "and who is not disqualified by law,"

that brings in the old question of disqualification and the danger of disqualification in this whole connection. As it fits in with a number of other cases, I ask leave to hold it over until the next stage.

Comment on this

What is the meaning of it at all? What was the object of it?

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It has not been moved.

Comment on this

It was put down. Could we even have a hint as to what was meant by it?

Comment on this

If the Chair permits, but the Deputy will have the reason when we come to Report Stage.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 86:

In Section 10, sub-section 1º, to insert before the word "provisions" the word "foregoing", and to delete the words "the foregoing Articles" and insert in lieu thereof the words "this Article."

This is largely a question of drafting.

Comment on this

There is a point I want to raise on this panel, this fancy electorate. Is it intended that what possibly may happen should be allowed to happen, that a person who did not succeed in getting 500 first preference votes but did succeed in getting elected to the Dáil should not have a vote?

Comment on this

Is that the same query as was in the Independent a fortnight ago?

Comment on this

A statement, not a query.

Comment on this

As it stands it is.

Comment on this

You might have a man who was a member of the Dáil but who did not get 500 first preference votes. Do you think that is proper?

Comment on this

There would have to be an amendment to deal with that.

Comment on this

What is the intention?

Comment on this

That was the intention originally. If there is a good case for changing it I shall listen to it.

Comment on this

Surely it is not intended that a person who has failed to secure election to the Dáil should have a vote, and that a man who has, in fact, been elected should not have a vote. We all know that a person who stands for the Dáil may receive the vast majority of the first preference votes. Take the case of the President. In Clare he receives a large number of first preference votes. As a result of his transfers his colleague is elected, though he may not have received 500 first preference votes. He is not to have a vote, although elected, while a man who got 700 or 800 first preference votes, and no transfers, will have a vote.

Comment on this

That is what this provision would mean.

Comment on this

It is quite clear that that is what it would mean. The question is: is there any justification for that in principle? Why should that situation arise? Surely a person ultimately elected to the Dáil should have a prior right to a vote for the Seanad as against the man who is not elected.

Comment on this

The principle underlying this provision is that the people who get the first preference votes are a second degree removed from the people and that they vote for the people who gave them their first preference votes. They are a sort of college, created indirectly, by the number of first preference votes they get. Take the case the Deputy has suggested of a person who got a very small number of first preference votes and who got elected on the surplus votes of some other candidate for the same constituency. The idea would be that that candidate would be voting these first preference votes and that he would have a number of votes that would correspond with them. That is the principle on which the whole thing is based. You may object to it but you will find that you cannot carry out the principle unless you proceed on these lines.

Comment on this

Is there not a danger, by reason of this provision, that a political Party may so arrange their candidates at an election as to secure the number of votes for particular candidates which will secure a vast preponderance of votes in the Seanad election? They could put up a large number of candidates who would have no chance of being elected and arrange that they get 500 votes. Consequently, a political Party may be in a position to secure a majority in the Seanad by reason of the votes of persons not elected to the Dáil. That is possible.

Comment on this

I do not think so. Suppose we were to work on the basis suggested by the commission; that would give a vote for every 1,000 first preference votes cast. In general— there may ‘be odd fractions—there would be a vote cast for every 1,000 first preference votes cast in the election. There would be as many votes as there are thousands of first preference votes passed. If you went into the matter very finely, there would probably be a little room for manoeuvring, but not very much. These first preference votes may be cast for A or B. From the Party point of view, it does not matter. Assuming that the Party were able to machine the matter properly, it would not matter whether A cast five votes and B none or whether A cast three votes and B cast two votes. It is based on the principle that there will be a vote for every 1,000 first preference votes. The voting power will be exercised on behalf of the electorate, as a whole, and in accordance with the number of first preference votes the candidates got at the election. There is nothing inconsistent in that unless you say that the person who is finally elected ought to have a vote. The point is that these votes will be cast by somebody else but not by him. If cast from a Party point of view, it would not matter. From the point of view of representing the people, the candidate is supposed to represent them by virtue of the fact that he got a certain number of first preference votes.

Comment on this

That may be the principle on which it is based but the manner in which the election will be carried out is not embodied in the Constitution. It is not provided that there will be so many votes for so many first preference votes. That may be determined by law. It is, therefore, open to any subsequent Parliament to devise a system completely different from what the President has in mind. You leave it open to a subsequent Parliament to do by law something entirely different from what the President says it is his intention to do. Consequently, my objecttion stands. You may have a position in which a person will get a large number of first preference votes and his surplus votes may be cast for a candidate who is not a Party man.

Comment on this

We are taking the first preference votes as indicating his choice by the electorate.

Comment on this

They mean a preference for a particular candidate's popularity or personality. The transfers may go to different Parties altogether. The fact that a man gets 13,000 first preference votes is an indication that he is personally popular. His surplus may go to any Party, and frequently does. There is a principle behind all this, irrespective of the method by which the election will ultimately be carried out in accordance with a law to be passed. Any form of law may be passed. That is permissible under the Constitution. Some future Parliament may pass a law different from what the President intends to provide.

Comment on this

I agree with the Deputy that it is unsatisfactory to leave this matter to be dealt with by law. I myself had arrived at that conclusion earlier. I came to the conclusion that it would be better to go back and put the whole thing down, as it was in an earlier Draft. This was taken out because a great many matters were being left to be dealt with by law and it seemed to be an unnecessary complication. I had come independently to the conclusion that it would be wiser to put this into the Constitution, so that the principle behind it may be clear. The principle behind the scheme did not originate with me. It originated with the Commission and was adopted by me. The principle, so far as I understand it, is that you create a body of electors who got more than a certain number of first preference votes. You give to each one of these electors a vote proportionate to the number of first preference votes the individual got. That is the principle. Each of the electors would cast a vote for each 1,000 first preference votes which he got in the election, with a provision to meet the case where a person got an incomplete number of thousands—say, 1,200. The person who got 1,200 votes would have only one vote, whereas the person who got 1,700 or 1,800 votes would have two votes. They would get votes to the nearest thousand. That is the only part in which you could have manipulation by Party managers. You might possibly arrange to get the number of first preference votes that would give the Party the highest possible number of votes for the Seanad. It would not, however, be easy to do that. If Deputies who have spoken would be better satisfied to have the whole thing dealt within the Constitution, I can arrange to have it brought up on Report Stage. In fact, without any promptings from the other side I feel that it would be better to bring in on Report Stage a clause which would indicate that the number of votes that each elector will cast will be one for each 1,000 first preferences, with the appropriate fraction according as the number is over 500 or not.

Comment on this

I hope that on the Report Stage the President will make the Dáil the electorate rather than this composite body. It seems to me to introduce a complication that is unnecessary and of no value. It is a less responsible electorate than the Dáil would be. A thought that has just occurred to me is this: that a man who knew he was going to be on one of the panels might conceivably stand for election for a constituency for the Dáil as well, even though he did not expect to be elected or want to be elected. He would do so for no other purpose than to poll 5,000 votes, thereby gaining five votes that he could use to vote for himself for the Seanad.

Comment on this

I think that is very unlikely. With regard to this electorate, one of the reasons in favour of it seems to me to be this: that it can be less easily machined. You could, I suppose, if you spent enough time and trouble on it, practically machine anything, but I think this would not be so easily machined as the Dáil. That is one reason. Another reason is, and I think this is why it was put forward in the report, that minorities would get a better chance under this system than they would under the system of a vote by the Dáil. I have no strong views on it at all, and I would be inclined to say, "Very well, we can let the members of the House decide that matter if they wish." The only thing is that, if I were left to myself, my own judgment would be to take the electorate that is here in preference to the Dáil.

Comment on this

After what the President has said, this scheme, I think, will give the Seanad a much more political reflection of the Dáil than even the Dáil itself would give it.

Comment on this

What the President has said appeals to me. I wish he could find an electoral college that would be representative of a certain degree of stability in the country. Suppose you were to elect to such a college a man who had been elected to three consecutive Dála. Such a person would represent a fairly solid block of opinion in his part of the country. I wish we could have something of that sort.

Comment on this

The Deputy should ask Deputy MacDermot what he thinks of that.

Comment on this

I do not think Deputy MacDermot would agree to that. As I have said, the President's point appeals to me, because under it you give some concession to the minority. The electorate that is put before us in this Constitution seems to me to do that, and I agree with it.

Comment on this

On the point of minorities, in my view the President does not give or may not give the support to minorities at all that Deputy Alton thinks. Take the case of a man who is popular in his constituency and goes up for election. He gets all the first preference votes. There is an independent candidate also standing in that constituency, which is a three-member constituency. The surplus votes of the popular man go to the independent candidate and put him in. He has not got 500 first preference votes, and although he is in the Dáil, he has no vote for the Seanad.

Comment on this

Would the Deputy give an example, outside of the university constituencies, where any candidate has been elected to the Dáil who has got less than 500 first preference votes?

Comment on this

Certainly. I have one particular man in mind. It happened at one of the General Elections, and if the Minister looks up the records he will find that I am right.

Comment on this

I have done so, and on one occasion only there was a candidate who got less than 500 first preference votes.

Comment on this

Did he not get in?

Comment on this
Mr. Brady

No.

Comment on this

I know a candidate who got less than 500 votes, and he got in.

Comment on this

I hope the President will not give way on this point. I think he is securing a much wider basis of representation. Although the choice is made at second hand, the man who establishes the right to vote at the Seanad election is really expressing the opinions of the people who put him in a position to do that. Apart from the political reasons referred to by the President, there is this point in favour of what is proposed. At the Dáil election one man is elected and another is defeated, but the successful candidate may have received, say, only five, ten or 15 first preference votes over the defeated candidate. Therefore, in the opinion of the people both are of almost equal importance, and why should the supporters of the defeated candidate be debarred from exercising their choice in the election of a member to the Second House? I hope the President will stick to this point.

Comment on this

It is quite clear that there is not sufficient agreement to have this made part of the fundamental law.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 87:—

To delete the Article.

I want to find out if it is seriously intended that there should be this direct method of election by the people who nominate the panel if the other method is dropped.

Comment on this

It is. In the case of the Seanad, you have functional or vocational groups and statutory bodies like the universities that might be trusted themselves to elect direct. That, I think, would be the better way it could be done, though it may take some time. If there was a voluntary development in that direction, I think most people would welcome it. We do not know what is going to be the result, so that we leave it open here to put this scheme into operation.

Comment on this

Has the President in mind organisations other than the universities?

Comment on this

The Article speaks of any functional group or association or council.

Comment on this