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Dáil

Bunreacht na hEireann (Dréacht)—Coiste (d'ath-thógaint—Airteagal a 20).

Contributions 1–135 of 276. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

I move amendment No. 88:—

In Section 1, lines 10 and 11, to delete the words "and if the President, after consultation with the Council of State, concurs."

This amendment is in the name of Deputies Costello and McGilligan. I do not see why this power should be given to the President. I do not see why this power should not be in the hands of the Dáil and the Government. Again, Sir, it is being assumed that the President will be a non-political personage, but of course that is all camouflage. That, however, is at least the pretence—that he will be a non-political personage and will be above politics—but this Article, as it stands, means that the President will be brought into the most controversial matters.

Comment on this

The principle behind this Article, Sir, is that where the Seanad—as Deputies who have read the Constitution know—has relatively limited powers in this Constitution, and when there is a question of still further encroaching on these limited powers, it is advisable that that should only be done in such circumstances as are provided for—such as a case of emergency, and so on.

Comment on this

Hear, hear!

Comment on this

It must be remembered that such a thing can happen. There might be an emergency of a kind in which the Seanad would have to pass a Bill at whatever time the Dáil would say was necessary. Consequently, we should have whatever checks we can possibly get in connection with that time limit and the power of the Seanad; and obviously, as the President is there as an extra party, it is right that he should be used as a check. After all, the President would be in close touch with the Government, and there can hardly be any doubt that, if there were a reasonable case to be put forward that there was a state of emergency, he would concur in that; but you have that check, at least, that a man, not immediately in the Government, but who has placed on him a special responsibility to see that the Constitution is properly worked, can exercise that function. That is the intention in bringing in this provision, and I think it is a good provision. I think it is a safeguard against the possible abuse of the very great powers that are here given to the Dáil.

Comment on this

I cannot agree, Sir, with what the President has said. I cannot believe that the President is still serious in saying that this President that he now proposes would be above politics and Party. I find it is extremely difficult to debate a Constitution of this kind on that presupposition, and I hold that the continued repetition by the President of that phrase throws a doubt on the case he makes for this Constitution, or for any portion of it, or for the fairness of it. One or other of two things can occur, and one of these is the most dangerous thing that could occur—so far, at least, as being a safeguard for any alleged rights is concerned. The President, whoever he may be, will have the same political views as those of the Party to which he belongs, and he will be the nominee of the Party that is dominant in the Dáil.

Comment on this

That is looking very much ahead at the case.

Comment on this

I did not catch what the President said.

Comment on this

I said that the Deputy was looking ahead very much. I simply said that he was predicting what would happen.

Comment on this

I did not use the word "predict." I was pointing out that there were two alternatives. Surely the President can understand the difference between two alternatives, as I said, and actual prediction. My point is that the future President will be in close touch with his Party, and that he will be the nominee of the Party in power. I do not see how any person can be elected as President, under this Constitution, unless he were a member of the dominant Party. Therefore, the holding of a so-called watching brief for the rights of the people and the rights of the Seanad, as suggested by the President, will be non-existent, or else the proposed President will be a person who, in a time of crisis, will use that time of crisis to embarrass the Government or to embarrass whatever side is in opposition to him. Even, as I said, if there were any likelihood or possibility of the man concerned, by virtue of his office, becoming a non-Party man, I suggest that bringing him into a thing like this will only stultify that intention.

Comment on this

It seems to me that this is an amendment without a single spark of merit. I also think that it is an amazing amendment to be introduced by a Party that always stood for a strong Second Chamber of some kind. It is amusing to hear Deputy O'Sullivan using the same old argument now, in connection with the President, that he always characterised as contemptible when applied to a Second Chamber. What is the issue here? The Constitution is providing for a case where it should be possible to abridge the very limited period of time during which the Seanad is to be entitled to delay the passage of a Bill into law; and, so that that power of abridgement by the Dáil shall not be abused, it is provided that such abridgement shall not be carried out without the consent of the President after consultation with the Council of State. I cannot imagine a more reasonable or a more desirable provision, and, as I have said, the amendment which seeks to remove that provision seems to me to be without a single spark of merit, and to be in flat contradiction of the theory and record of the Opposition with regard to a Second Chamber.

Comment on this

I want to point out, Sir, that my idea of the function of the future President is that he should be a purely ceremonial head, and I object to any powers being given to him.

Comment on this
An Ceann-Comhairle

Is the amendment withdrawn?

Comment on this

No, sir.

Comment on this

I beg to move these amendments. Will the President accept them?

Comment on this

Oh, no.

Comment on this

Why not? It is only limiting the power of the President.

Comment on this

It is contrary to the whole scheme.

Comment on this

I wonder whether the President has consulted his lawyers in connection with this matter? He made a reference last week to Article 25, Section 2, and said that this was a compulsory power in connection with the President. I do not think it is a compulsory power. It merely delimits the time. He told us the last day, before he consulted his lawyers, what the lawyers would say. I should like to know whether he since has found out whether this does anything more than to delimit the time so far as the President is concerned?

Comment on this

It seems to me that the paragraph is quite clear. It says that every Bill shall be signed by the President not earlier than five and not later than seven days after the date on which the Bill shall have been presented to him.

Comment on this

There is no compulsion there on the President to sign at all.

Comment on this

If Deputy O'Sullivan has to do something between 1 and 2 o'clock on any day, and that it is laid down that he shall do it between 1 and 2 o'clock, it is surely obligatory on him to carry out that duty.

Comment on this

I suggest that the obvious meaning, the only legal meaning of the section, is that the thing, if it has to be done, must be done within these times. The effect of the section is to delimit the time but there is no provision to compel him to do it.

Comment on this

It is rather like "the oath to be taken."

Comment on this

It is a question of law.

Comment on this

There is no comparison whatever. It is quite clear that the section provides that a certain thing shall be done by the President. It says that a Bill shall be signed by the President not earlier than five days and not later than seven days after the Bill shall have been presented to him. What else can it mean?

Comment on this

Has the President consulted his lawyers?

Comment on this

I do not think this was the question upon which I was to consult them. I do not remember having promised to get the opinion of lawyers on this question.

Comment on this

The President might get the opinion of his lawyers without being asked.

Comment on this

The amendment would not make it any more compulsory.

Comment on this

I must say it seems to me as clear as noonday.

Comment on this

The Deputy is confusing this matter with something else, I think.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 91:—

Before Section 4 to insert a new section as follows:—

If the President fails or neglects to sign within the respective times appointed by paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, a Bill presented to him in accordance with the said Section 2 or Section 3 of this Article, such Bill shall be signed by the Chairman of Dáil Eireann.

The remarks I made just now apply to this section. I suggest to the President that it does make it definitely compulsory and that if the President fails there will be power given to somebody else to sign a Bill.

Comment on this

Now we are on quite a different thing. A man may have a legal obligation to do something and fail in doing it or neglect to do it. In that case something may be said for making certain that through his neglect the thing which was to be done, will not cease or fail to be done. Consequently you may have to make further provisions to ensure that in the case of failure, the act which he should have done will be performed by somebody else. That matter did arise in another connection and we had the general Article which says that in case of failure by the President to do certain things, the acts which he should have performed, will be performed by a certain commission and that the Council of State, as a further reserve, would come in to do it. There is just a small point arising here as to when failure has occurred. If the Bill has to be signed within say a period of from four to seven days and you do not know until after the seven days whether he has or has not failed, the question is to ascertain when the time has passed by which the action should be performed. We would want to make provision for that, possibly. We shall look into that point and we can decide the matter on the Report Stage. This is quite a different matter from the question as to whether it is or is not obligatory on him to sign. It is obligatory on him to sign. He must do his duty and you will have to make provision as to when that duty will be done. You will have to make provision for somebody else doing it after the time within which it should have been done by the President, has elapsed. I do not accept the amendment, but I shall see about a later amendment.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Amendment No. 93 is governed by the decision on amendment No. 39.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 95:—

In Section 2, sub-section 1º, to delete the word "thirty" and insert in lieu thereof the word "sixty."

The purpose of that amendment is to give a longer time to the courts to hear a case and to arrive at a decision. It is hoped, of course, that the court will do it as soon as possible, but it has been represented to me that to fix the time that we have in the Draft at 30 days might make it difficult for the court to examine fully the questions involved, and consequently we are extending the period from 30 to 60 days.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Amendment No. 97 is ruled out by the decision already come to on amendment No. 31.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 98:—

In Section 5 to delete sub-section 2º.

The objection here has been urged already, namely that it practically means that the Government of the State will consist of two people, the Prime Minister and the President. I think a decision was taken on that.

Comment on this

That is an extraordinary statement.

Comment on this

I am prepared to treat amendment No. 99, standing in my name, as governed by the decision on the question of the Taoiseach.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 103:—

In Section 1 to delete the words "may be" and insert in lieu thereof the word "are."

Comment on this

Perhaps the President might indicate whether it is intended that the Council of State should be remunerated for their services.

Comment on this

I was rising to say that, but I was not sure if it would be in order when this amendment was not being moved.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Strictly speaking it is not in order but the President may make a brief statement.

Comment on this

The intention is that these should be honorary positions, but I do not think it is necessary to put it in the Constitution.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

There is a series of amendments to this Article. I do not know to what extent they are met by the Government amendments which were submitted after the others had been circulated.

Comment on this

I think our purpose was to see that the Habeas Corpus Act should be really effective, and that there should be therefore with the High Court the possibility of discussing or taking into account the question of the constitutional validity of a law. I think that is the purpose of the amendments.

Comment on this

I think the intention of this set of amendments is rather to change the position in regard to the testing of the validity of a law—to take it from the Supreme Court, and put it back to the High Court as before.

Comment on this

There was an alternative there, to leave it to the High Court alone. There is something to be said for that inasmuch as you would have the same court dealing with constitutional matters all the time, but then there are objections from another point of view. We understood that, on the whole, it would meet with a greater degree of approval to have it go to the High Court. On that account we changed back, and this series of amendments is simply to make that position clear.

Comment on this

If that position is clear, namely that the High Court would have jurisdiction in taking into account the constitutionality of a law, I am satisfied, but it is not quite constructive, if I may suggest that to the President. Take the case of the habeas corpus. Unless a judge of the High Court can take into account the constitutionality of a law, a citizen of this State who was arrested under a law the constitutionality of which he contested, could not apply to a judge of the High Court for a habeas corpus. This is not a case of tweedledum and tweedledee between the High Court and the Supreme Court; it is a matter of great importance to the liberty of the subject that that particular right should not be taken from him. If the President is quite clear that his amendments will allow that jurisdiction to remain in the High Court I am satisfied.

Comment on this

That was not the point on which we were deciding; as a matter of fact that only emerged at a later stage. We were dealing with the general question as to whether it is better that the High Court should have the initial jurisdiction as regards the constitutionality of laws, with an appeal to the Supreme Court, or whether you should have the Supreme Court being the first court to deal with it, and have no further appeal. Much could be said on both sides, and it was not easy to make up one's mind as to which was the better. The point brought out by the Deputy is undoubtedly an extra reason why it is well to have the High Court having the original jurisdiction in that case.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It is not clear to the Chair that amendment No. 110 is one of the series.

Comment on this

It is one of the series surely.

Comment on this

I think it is a consequential amendment.

Comment on this

In case there should be any point that the Opposition wishes to raise upon it when it is in its new form, I suppose they will be at liberty to do that?

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Yes, when those amendments have been embodied.

Comment on this

On Article 35, Section 5 provides that the remuneration of a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court shall not be reduced during his continuance in office. I take it that that is intended to establish the independence of the Judiciary which function through those two courts, and is probably intended to demonstrate to the community as a whole and to judges in particular that judges are not liable to have their salaries reduced if for any reason they do things which incur the displeasure of the Executive Council. I should like to know why the same principle is not extended, for instance, to District Courts, where it is just as necessary to demonstrate the same considerations. The District Court, in the main, is the poor man's court. District justices may from time to time do things which the Executive Council may dislike, and if the Executive Council dislikes the decision of the District Court they would appear, under this Constitution, to have power to reduce the salary of the district justice. At all events, the district justices are being treated differently from judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court, and I should like to know from the President why there is that distinction.

Comment on this

Here we are dealing only with the Supreme Court and the High Court. Those are the only two courts explicitly dealt with here, but the law gives, as I understand it, to to the District Court the same immunity as is given here to the High Court and Supreme Court.

Comment on this

But does the law not give immunity to the judges of these two courts?

Comment on this

To these two as well?

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this

The point is that here you do not go further down the list than the Supreme Court and the High Court.

Comment on this

If the President makes the point that there is already immunity in law in the case of these two courts, why repeat it and single out the members of these two courts for this fortified declaration as to their rights, while not at the same time giving the same rights to people in a lower court?

Comment on this

The Deputy seems to have missed this point; if we were dealing here with the District Court we would undoubtedly have used the same terms in regard to it, but we simply have not got it here at the moment in this scheme.

Comment on this

They are not explicitly mentioned; neither are they in the old Constitution.

Comment on this

Now, what an excuse when making an entirely new Constitution!

Comment on this

Otherwise you would have to go through a very lengthy code.

Comment on this

By virtue of the fact that you declare that the remuneration of judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court is not reducible during their continuance in office, you appear to imply that the judges of another court have no such protection. It is much better, it seems to me, to leave out the section and to let the judges as a class have whatever rights they have, rather than to appear to give a benefit to two sections and by inference deprive another section of such rights.

Comment on this

Either Deputy Norton or I appear to be under a misapprehension. My impression is that we are confirming the existence of the Supreme Court and the High Court in the Constitution, with the idea that these courts cannot henceforth be changed in their structure, except by amendment of the Constitution, and consequently a referendum. It is not the desire to create that position with regard to district justices. Any future Courts of Justice Act might reconstruct the whole of the legal system as far as district justices are concerned, and it is only because they do not come, in any shape or form, into the Constitution, that they do not come in with regard to this particular protection and their salaries.

Comment on this

I merely want another excuse than that it was not in the original Constitution. Many people are persuaded that a provision of this kind, which applies to the other courts and safeguards the judges of the High Court and of the Supreme Court, should apply also to the district justices, both as regards fixity of tenure and their salaries. The President knows possibly that there is a tendency to treat district justices as if they were civil servants.

Comment on this

Oh, no.

Comment on this

That is a feeling that is abroad, that they are more under the thumb of the Department of Justice than the judges of the Supreme Court or of the High Court. That feeling is abroad. District justices can be changed, while other judges cannot be changed, their salaries can be interfered with in a way in which the salaries of the others cannot be interfered with, and they can be brought to book in a way that the other judges cannot be brought to book, so that there are possibilities of interference with their independence. If the President gives the matter consideration he will find that they deal with more numerous cases than the other judges. As far as the ordinary man is concerned, it is the fair administration of the law by these judges and district justices that gets good repute or bad repute for the administration of the law, more than the conduct of the judges of the Supreme Court or the High Court. A great deal of the respect that the administration of the law has gained in the last 15 years is in no small measure, due to the manner in which the district justices carried out their duty. All these considerations and the merits of the case are in favour of putting them in the same privileged position as the judges of the Supreme and High Courts. I would be more eager to safeguard their independence and judgments than the independence and judgments of the Supreme and High Courts. Now that we are completely re-amending the Constitution some definite reason must be given for the exclusion of this particular class.

Comment on this

If Deputy O'Sullivan had listened to what Deputy MacDermot said, he would realise what the position is. Here in the Constitution we are providing special mention for constitutional courts. If the Deputy looks at Article 36 he will see that it states:

"Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Constitution relating to the courts the following matter shall be regulated in accordance with law, that is to say:—

i. the number of judges of the Supreme Court, and of the High Court, the remuneration age of retirement and pensions of such judges,

ii. the number of the judges of all other courts, and their terms of appointment, and

iii. the constitution and organisation of the said courts, the distribution of jurisdiction and business among the said courts and judges, and all other matters of procedure.

In other words, we have not set out to deal with all classes of courts, their organisation and terms of appointment. We have dealt, to a certain extent, with the Supreme Court and High Court and, having done so to that extent we lay down the terms of appointment and the remuneration of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court. The immunity that the rest of the judges get is a question of law. By the Courts of Justice Act which was passed recently the circuit judges are given practically the same immunity as judges of the High Court. The only way to deal with the matter Deputy O'Sullivan is raising would be to put in the whole legal scheme here or a great part of it. We cannot afford to do that. We think it would be an unnecessary overloading of the whole system. No one has suggested at either side of the House that the same position will not continue in the future as existed and we may take it that all are anxious to preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

Comment on this

It is not an answer to my argument that this was not in the Constitution. I am protesting against the fact that it is not in it. The reason given by the President is the usual one, that it was not there already, and that he does not want to put it there, as it would occupy another page.

Comment on this

The Courts of Justice Act is there to deal with that.

Comment on this

We are dealing with the Constitution. Can the President explain why certain judges are put into a privileged position while others are not? Practically the only argument he made was that it would occupy one or two more pages in the Constitution. Why are these people not protected by the Constitution? The President said they were not protected by the original Constitution. That is no argument. I am protesting against the fact that they were not protected. I want to have Circuit Court judges and district justices put on the same basis as the other judges, as regards immunity and fixity of tenure. Why are they to be removable by a different method to the other judges? The President told us that that will be decided by law, but he refuses to do it by any constitutional safeguard. For them there is to be no constitutional safeguard and they can depend on the law. The President has said nothing to show there should be a distinction between these two classes. He must know that it is highly desirable there should not be interference, especially with these two classes of judges, and more particularly with justices in the District Courts.

Comment on this

Possibly the President may have been influenced by the consideration that was so strongly impressed on us yesterday by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney that the less we put into the Constitution the better. It is obvious that the Supreme Court and the High Court ought to go in because they have constitutional functions. It is equally obvious that with the rest that does not happen.

Comment on this

The President has certainly made some effort to explain why district justices and Circuit Court judges are not included in the protective provisions of Article 35. Of course, his case was a most unconvincing one. The President says that it is necessary to set out the structure of the High Court and Supreme Court in this Constitution. That is so, perhaps, and we do it. But would the functions of the Supreme Court and High Court, as set out in the series of Articles dealing with them, be incomplete and unworkable if Section 5 of Article 35 were excluded? I suggest that the structure is there, just as strong, just as effective, just as immutable, if Section 5 were not included. The President goes on to say to judges of the Supreme Court and High Court: "Your remuneration shall not be reduced during your continuance in office." I urge that district justices and Circuit Court judges should be made as independent of the Executive as Supreme Court and High Court judges are. The President says these people have rights in law at present. So also have High Court and Supreme Court judges rights in law. Why not, therefore, either leave the whole class to have their rights in law, or give the whole class constitutional protection in the manner that the President is giving this special class of Supreme Court and High Court judges that protection?

It is most vital, if we are going to have a satisfactory kind of legal and communal life, that the judges should be absolutely as independent as the Legislature can make them. One of the most effective ways to make judges independent is not to give the Executive Council of the day a grip on the pockets of the judges. But, as the President knows, when this Constitution is passed, the position will be that he dare not introduce a Bill to reduce the salaries of the Supreme Court or High Court judges, unless, of course, he can get endorsement for his proposal through the medium of a referendum. But he can introduce a Bill and say to these Circuit Court judges and district justices that their remuneration can be cut. The fact that the President is seeking to put the Executive of the day in a position to cut the remuneration of certain judges, while not being in a position to cut the remuneration of other judges, is a most serious anomaly and, it seems to me, is calculated to demonstrate that the Legislature and the Executive Council do not regard Circuit Court judges and district justices as being entitled to the same measure of independence from the point of view of exercising their normal functions.

Deputy O'Sullivan is perfectly right when he says there is a mentality which regards district justices as civil servants. Of course, there is. The Department of Justice and the Department of Finance are responsible for the creation of that mentality. We frequently read in the newspapers outbursts by district justices, when they receive a circular from the Department of Finance, or from the Department of Justice transmitting a communication received from the Department of Finance. These justices are compelled to complain that they are not civil servants and that they are not subject to instruction in that way from the Department of Justice. Because the Circuit Court and the District Court are poor men's courts, I want to ensure that, so far as possible, those who dispense justice and equity in these courts will be as independent as it is possible to make them. I do not think this Constitution does that. Section 5 ought to go entirely and let all the judges have their rights in legislation. But, if the President is sticking to Section 5, he ought to extend the same guarantee to all judges, so as to indicate that, so far as salary is concerned, they are all regarded as independent.

This is a fairly verbose Constitution. It has not suffered any great pruning. Another few lines in it would not outrage anybody's feelings. Article 36 deals with courts other than the Supreme Court and the High Court. What is the difficulty of declaring somewhere in that Article the same principle as is enshrined in Article 35, Section 5? I think there can be no real difficulty in doing it. I cannot imagine that the legal advisers of the President or the Parliamentary draftsman could not devise a form of words which would not take up very much space to demonstrate that the remuneration of judges is untouchable in order to show that the Legislature regards these persons as being as independent as it is possible to make them.

Comment on this

With regard to the general independence of the judiciary, you have Article 35, Section 2, which states: "All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions and subject only to this Constitution and the law." So that, so far as stating the principle is concerned, it is stated in the most general terms. Obviously it is important to have the higher courts dealt with, because if the higher courts are all right, then, by appeal, you can get to them in any case, so that you have the position safeguarded.

Comment on this

Who can get to them— a penniless man?

Comment on this

I am talking about the general principle. It is important to have the higher courts definitely safeguarded by the Constitution itself. In this Constitution, as in the old Constitution, having dealt with these courts, the organisation of the other courts is left to law, and I think for a very good reason. The organisation may have to be changed from time to time. The case that Deputy Norton is making is that, if we leave this in here—which he does not object to, I take it, in its own particular application—and if we do not put in something about the other courts, by implication, perhaps, we suggest that the other courts which are to be organised by law need not have the same immunity as regards interference with salaries. Anything that would shake their independence will be contrary to the general spirit of the Constitution. Therefore, to do anything by direct method like that would be in itself contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. I cannot and will not undertake to set out the organisation of these courts and go into the Circuit Court and other courts. It is all very well to say that it will only mean an extra section. It is advisable not to do what is not necessary. What I will do is this. I will examine the question to see whether we can put the word "judges" in the full sense there—whether we can bring it into this without upsetting the general scheme, if that will satisfy the Deputy.

Comment on this

As long as you make the judges independent, I am quite satisfied.

Comment on this

The judges are made independent by Article 35 (2).

Comment on this

Why will the President not apply Article 35 (4) to all judges?

Comment on this

Article 35 (5)?

Comment on this

Article 35 (4) (1). Look at the last paragraph of page 76.

Comment on this

Because of the fact that we cannot go right through the whole; we want a clear picture. The Deputy had an opportunity of discussing these principles when the Courts. of Justice Act was going through and when all these things were dealt with. I am not prepared to state generally how the matter stands. I would want to examine all possible classes of judges in the State to see whether it would be right that a judge appointed in some petty capacity could not be removed except by some extraordinary resolution here in this House. This Article is in accordance with the principles adopted here on the Courts of Justice Act when that measure was debated here. I was not here then but I expect the whole matter was debated. What we are doing in this Constitution is this: first of all we are dealing with the special courts and making them as copper-fastened as possible. In Article 35, Section 2, we state: "all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions and subject only to this Constitution and the law." That states a general principle.

Comment on this

May I ask what the word "judges" does mean in this phrase in Article 35, Section 2? I want to know what "judge" means in this Constitution?

Comment on this

I am afraid the Deputy is asking me to answer a question that would take some time to examine. I could not give the Deputy the answer off-hand.

Comment on this

But the President is asking the House to pass this section.

Comment on this

Yes, but I would not like to give a definition straight off.

Comment on this

The word "judges" has the same meaning in Section 2 as in Section 1 of Article 35.

Comment on this

I would say that the judges would be defined both by the Constitution and by law as "judges." They would be so defined. We have certain judges here defined in the Constitution. Their class is defined but their number is not. It is left to law to settle that. With regard to the other judges, these would be defined by law. The House has a general idea what judges are and, when the law is being passed, every person who would be set up would be defined and characterised as a judge, how they were to be appointed, what qualifications they would have before being appointed, and so on. When you say "qualifications of judges" I take it they would be classed as the judges that are here mentioned in the Constitution and such other judges as would be set up or provided by law. And all such who would get the character of judge, whether by Constitution or by law, would be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions. That is how I read the section. It is the clear meaning of it.

Comment on this

I understood the President to say that he is anxious to fix definitely that there shall be a Supreme Court and a High Court, but he regards all other courts as being in a state of flux. Surely the continued existence of courts of the type of the District Court and the Circuit Court is inevitable. Remember the amendment of the Constitution is always possible. We might take it for granted that these four types of courts will continue to exist—the Supreme Court, the High Court, the District Court and the Circuit Court. Why not give these four courts full immunity? Why not give the judges in the Circuit Court and the District Court the advantages that Section 4 of this Article gives the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court? If you say it is against the spirit of the Constitution that they are to be interfered with, now that we are legislating and making a new Constitution, why not put that in?

Comment on this

The Opposition feels so strongly about this that it is very surprising they did not put down a series of amendments for the purpose of achieving the object they are aiming at now.

Comment on this

Or why did they not put it into the old Constitution?

Comment on this

I very much doubt whether any Minister for Justice would be in favour of this amendment. I wonder what Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney would have said about it when he was Minister for Justice. It would surprise me if there is such a provision in any Constitution in the world. I wonder if there is such a provision which lays down such hard and fast rules for every type of judicial official, even petty magistrates, as Deputy O'Sullivan seems to look for. I cannot feel that his arguments are seriously addressed to the House at all.

Comment on this

Nobody knows better than Deputy O'Sullivan himself that there is no analogy between the High Court and the District Court.

Comment on this

The High Court is the last word in the land in legal matters.

Comment on this

We have the Supreme Court as well.

Comment on this

Apparently Deputy Donnelly is on common ground with the President. The President says you can start an action in the District Court and you ultimately get a trial by a judge in the High Court. I am sure that information will be a powerful revelation to the people in Gloucester Street. It will be a great revelation to them to know that a penniless man can get into the High Court and the Supreme Court. The courts, he says, are open. It is nonsense to tell people that the courts are open to them. One might as well say that the Gresham Hotel is open to everyone, as to tell the people that the courts are open to them. You can go into court if you have a pretty big bank account and if you are capable of paying cheques to a bevy of legal men in order to get a verdict from the courts. I think it is very important in the interests of the judiciary and of everybody else to ensure that the persons who dispense judgment are as independent as we can make them.

The President says there is a declaration in Article 35, Section 2, that the judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions and subject only to this Constitution and the law. That is a platitudinous declaration. The British Parliament once passed an Act saying that everybody was entitled to the wherewithal to live, but they took very good care not to say who was to provide the wherewithal. Now we are making a provision that all judges shall be independent but we are not doing the obvious thing to take steps to ensure that when they exercise that independence it will not be possible for the Executive Council to get at them. I want to guard against a position arising like that where a person was reported as saying that his soul was pure though his tongue had been sold. I want to prevent the possibility here of the District Court and the Circuit Court judges suffering retaliation. I want to protect them against that. If, for instance, the Department of Finance and the Department of Justice mentality were to develop to a degree greater than exists to-day, I want to prevent the judges from suffering or from the possibility of suffering from that mentality. Deputy Donnelly says there is no reason for protecting the judges of the District Court and the Circuit Court. I think there is. These two courts dispense more justice than the High Court or the Supreme Court. They affect closely and intimately the lives of the poorer people. These courts are the courts to which the poor people go for justice, and they are, to me at all events, of much more importance than the High Courts. They have to deal with a type of case which ordinarily does not trouble people higher up. These courts affect the lives of the ordinary plain people of the country.

Comment on this

The Dáil has recently passed a Courts of Justice Act which deals with the organisation of the courts and the judges in the various courts. Certain immunities have been given to the judges, but we cannot, in this Constitution, cover the whole domain. I am just as anxious about the independence of the judiciary as Deputy Norton is; I am just as anxious that the poor man's court would be as free from interference by the Executive as any other court; but there is a limit to what can be done in a Constitution, to what it is reasonable to do in a Constitution. Does anybody imagine that we can prevent injustice or wrong things being done by legislation in the future? We cannot, and it is an idle dream to think that you can. You cannot possibly meet in the Constitution every case where an injustice or a wrong thing may be done by a future Legislature. You cannot do it. It would be an absurd thing to attempt it.

The only question worth examining is whether it would be possible to extend that phrase, the remuneration of a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, over a wider field. I will have that matter examined. As long as you leave things to legislation that is only one of the ways in which the independence of the judiciary might be interfered with. There are a number of other things, too, if we were to think of them, a number of ways in which their independence might be sapped and interfered with. Can we provide for all these things? We cannot. Certain of the arguments have impressed me, and if it would be possible, by means of a simple amendment, to meet the views that have been expressed, then that will be done. I will promise to have certain aspects examined. I will not promise to change it, but I promise to have the matter examined to see if we could extend that clause 5 to the cases of all judges. I am just a little bit doubtful whether it is possible to do it. We might deal with a class of judges, but we are not able to anticipate future arguments, and future legislation may possibly mean something of the kind where it would be inadvisable to have this thing. I will consider carefully what the possibilities are.

Comment on this

It may be possible to catalogue certain cases.

Comment on this

It may be. However, I will have the matter carefully examined.

Comment on this

The President limits himself to what I consider to be the less important portion. The President said there was no use in members of the Dáil thinking that we can prevent Legislatures doing injustice by legislation. That is quite an interesting commentary on the value of the Constitution.

Comment on this

It would apply to every Constitution.

Comment on this

I say that it is one of the harshest judgments that could be passed on any Constitution. Apparently it is the President's idea of a Constitution. He cannot do it here, but still in Article 35 (4) he takes steps to do it as regards two classes of judges. Why can he not do exactly the same thing for the other two classes of judges whom I mentioned? The President says that we cannot cover everything, that if future Dála wish to do injustice in this respect they can do it and the Constitution cannot prevent them. But the man who says that, definitely tries to prevent that type of injustice being done as regards two classes of judges and he will not make the endeavour with regard to two other classes who are much more amenable to pressure from Departments and on whom Departments try to exercise more pressure than they do in respect of the others. I got the impression from some speeches that not merely is it impossible to do this but that it would be undesirable in any case to do it. The idea conveyed to my mind was that it was wrong that this independence should be secured to this low type of judges. I do not share that view. I think it is more necessary to guard the independence of that class of judge than the more highly paid judges, the men of higher status. It is, in my opinion, supremely important, and that is the reason that I urge on the President to give consideration to a modification of Article 35 (4).

Comment on this
Mr. Rice

I agree with the observation made by Deputy Norton that from many points of view the independence of the lower grades of judges, the District Court and Circuit Court judges, is more important than that of the higher judges. The people they have to deal with are the poorest and most helpless class and it is supremely important that the independence of the judicial officers who deal with their rights should be strictly preserved. The President says that you cannot guard the independence of the judges in every way, that there are many ways in which their independence could be sapped otherwise than by the way it is suggested it could be done here. I agree with that, but is that an argument against taking such steps as can be taken to guard the independence of the judges? One way in which it can be done is to preserve the rights of the Circuit Court judges and the district justices in the same way as it is proposed to do it in Article 35 (5) of the Constitution. I do not see what difficulty there can be in the way of including the other class in this Article, in mentioning the Circuit Court judges and district justices as well. I agree with Deputy Norton that that is even more important than the preservation of the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court. The people these judges have to deal with are quite defenceless people. They have not the same safeguards against injustice as people whose rights are being determined in the higher courts. I suggest that the President should reconsider this matter and include these other classes.

Comment on this

I promise to do that.

Comment on this

As a layman trying to follow the arguments in reference to the courts, I will say that I followed the President closely when he said that the Supreme Court and the High Court are more associated with the Constitution. Then there was his point about bringing in the lower courts. Might I draw his attention to the fact that they are already brought in? In Article 34 it is stated that the courts of first instance shall include courts of local and limited jurisdiction, with the right of appeal as determined by law. I suggest that they are already included as courts of first instance. Would it be possible to give them the same status, from certain points of view, as you give the judges of the higher courts in Article 35?

Comment on this

There is one point which arises on Article 58 which is relevant to the present consideration. In Article 58 there is a distinction drawn between a judge and a justice. In the Irish text judge is translated as "breitheamh" and a justice is translated as "iúistis." In the Courts of Justice Act of 1924, district justices were called judges of the District Court and the Irish translation of that text was "breitheamh." The particular use of the word "breitheamh" in the 1924 Act gave a very considerable solace to the judges of the District Court in reference to their tenure of office. If the distinction is now made in this Constitution, particularly in the Irish text which it is intended shall be the dominant text, between "iúistis" and "breitheamh," that will tend to start an argument that the justices of the District Courts are not judges in the proper sense at all. I would like the President to consider that point.

Comment on this

I will do that.

Articles 35 and 36 agreed to.

ARTICLE 37.

Nothing in this Constitution shall operate to invalidate the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature, in matters other than criminal matters, by any person or body of persons duly authorised by law to exercise such functions and powers, notwithstanding that such person or such body of persons is not a judge or a court appointed or established as such under this Constitution.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 112:—

To delete the Article.

Perhaps the President will explain the purpose of the Article. Is it not the purpose to give Departments judicial functions? Is it not the purpose to allow Departments to exercise judicial functions, and that, if they do, it cannot be said that they are going beyond their Departmental powers and usurping judicial powers? Is that not really the purpose of the Article?

Comment on this

No.

Comment on this

Will it not have that effect?

Comment on this

I do not think so. There were questions about the Land Commission, as to whether their functions were of a judicial character or not, and, keeping to that case alone, it is quite obvious that those commissioners have been set up for a certain purpose with limited and well-defined functions, and it would be ridiculous to leave any doubt whatever as to that position by law. This particular Article is designed to cover a case like that. It is very difficult to define exactly when a body is exercising a judicial power or performing a judicial function, and so as not to get tied in the knot that judicial powers or functions could only be exercised by the ordinary courts established here, you have to have a provision of this type.

What we say is that "Nothing shall invalidate the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature, in matters other than criminal matters, by any person or body of persons duly authorised by law to exercise such functions"—such as the Land Commission, for example—"notwithstanding that such person or such body of persons is not a judge or a court appointed or established as such under this Constitution." In other words, you have to make provision for bodies of that sort, and you have to provide that the Constitution does not get you into a position in which such bodies could not function.

Comment on this

I put a definite question to the President which he has not answered. Will this not make it possible to confer by ordinary law on Departments—not merely the Land Commission, but an ordinary Department—power to exercise what are really judicial functions and to give judicial decisions? The President is not quite so innocent as not to know that this matter has come before the courts in connection with certain Departments and that it was held that certain Departments were exercising judicial functions and against the Constitution. Suppose the purpose is what the President says, does he not realise that he is opening the door wide to conferring on Departments full judicial powers in everything that does not concern life or liberty, and that so far as property is concerned he is giving by the Constitution power to hand that power over to a Department? The tendency of Departments of Government everywhere will be to arrogate more and more functions to themselves and to usurp, if they can, the place of the courts. This seems to invite that. The President might have in his mind a case like that of the Land Commission where a court has been set up, but I suggest that it is plain that this Article has a much wider scope than anything indicated by the President and really means that our Departments in the future can be given almost unlimited authority to deal with property of various kinds, to exercise what are really judicial functions and to oust the courts altogether. There is no remedy in that case of an appeal to the courts against them on the ground that it is against the Constitution. That appeal was possible before, but it will be so no longer.

Comment on this

Does this create a new position with regard to Departments? Is there anything to stop the Departments from being invested with judicial powers by law at present, if it is desired to do so? There seems to be nothing in the old Constitution explicitly to guard against the dangers of the kind mentioned by Deputy O'Sullivan.

Comment on this

I said that there were cases brought before the court on that particular point.

Comment on this

With regard to the Military Tribunal?

Comment on this

Not at all; with regard to ordinary Departments of Government.

Comment on this

Am I right in thinking that the cause of this Article 37 is the fact that Section 1 of Article 34 says that justice shall be administered in public courts? Is that the reason it was thought necessary to put in Article 37, or what is the new situation which led the President to believe that the powers of the Land Commission might be brought into question if this Article were not put in?

Comment on this

Deputy MacDermot is apparently quite unfamiliar with the provisions of Article 64 of the existing Constitution which declares that the judicial power of the Irish Free State was vested in the judges appointed under the Constitution. On that particular Article, a number of cases came before the courts, entirely irrespective of Article 2A or the Military Tribunal, and in point of fact, the President, I think, has quite overlooked the fact that the Supreme Court has declared that the Irish Land Commission, in the exercise of its functions, does not infringe the provisions of Article 64 in the case of Lynam and Butler. That decision—I am speaking from recollection—was to the effect that the Land Commission, in exercising their powers, did not exercise powers of such a judicial nature as to infringe the provisions of Article 64 of the existing Constitution, and, in the course of delivering judgement in that case, the late Chief Justice Kennedy gave a very illuminating exposition of the meaning of the expression "judicial power." From that case, and as a result of his decision, it has been possible to determine with fair exactness, but not with complete precision, whether or not the exercise by any particular body of persons, whether departmental or otherwise, would or would not have infringed the provisions of Article 64 in reference to judicial power.

It is not possible to define precisely what is meant by the exercise of judicial power. There are a number of bodies exercising administrative functions in the machinery of the State as it exists at the moment. Certain enterprising lawyers, not confined to this side of the House, were disposed to test the issue as to whether certain bodies of that nature, in the exercise of their functions, were contravening the provisions of Article 64. In Lynam and Butler, a definition was not possible, but an exposition of the meaning of the expression was given by the late Chief Justice which was about as illuminating and comprehensive an expression as it could possibly be hoped to obtain, and that case has ruled all the efforts that have since been made to determine whether or not certain bodies were exercising powers in contravention of the Constitution. We have the special Commissioners of Revenue—that is one case; we have the lay commissioners—another case; and there are other matters. We set up here last year machinery under the Insurance Act by which the rights of people in connection with policies of industrial life assurance were to be determined by some officials of the Department of Industry and Commerce. That is the position when this Article is brought into this Draft Constitution. We had the position under the existing Constitution— Articles 64 and 65—that the general intention was that judicial power should be exercised in public by the public courts, paid for by the taxpayer, and that that judicial power should be exercised by judges who would be independent of the Executive in the exercise of their judicial powers. That was the paramount intention of the Constitution, that they should have the right to determine the existence or non-existence of rights and wrongs as between the citizens of this State, and the idea at the back of it was to prevent that growth of bureaucracy which was eating into the exercise by judges of judicial power.

We know that all judges are jealous of the infringement of their prerogatives in connection with the exercise of their powers. All permanent Departments are equally anxious to grasp the right to determine certain issues and certain questions without giving the ordinary citizen any right of being heard. In some of our statutes we have gone very far, indeed, in that connection and I am prepared to admit that some of the statutes passed before 1932, when the present Government came into office, offended against the principles of which I am now speaking. But the present Government have, in some of their legislation, exceeded anything perpetrated in the statute law in this country before 1932. I need not refer specifically to any of these powers. If necessary, I could furnish a list. It would rather appal the ordinary citizen when he discovered the vast powers arrogated by Departments to themselves, which powers really amount to the determination of rights as between citizens and public Departments—that is to say, the arrogation by Departments of judicial power to themselves.

We had reached a point where, in consequence of the practice over 15 years and the decisions of our own courts, we had arrived at an approximate idea of the limitations that could be imposed upon Departments or other bodies in whom powers of a quasi-judicial nature were vested, and I think the position would have been met by leaving matters as they were. This Article opens the door wide to complete bureaucracy. I do not for a moment say that it is the intention of the Government to do that. But that is not the test which you apply to the provisions of any Constitution. You test it on broad principles, irrespective of present-day considerations. When an elaborate system of court machinery is being established under the Constitution, the least we should see is that the functions of the judges who will man that machinery will be guarded from encroachment by departmental action. It is natural for Departments to consider that they are the best judges in reference to a particular matter. We have a provision in a statute at present by which the mere certificate of an official is conclusive proof of a certain matter without the necessity for doing any of those things which the ordinary citizen has to do. By that example we see the extent to which these powers could be pushed by an unscrupulous Government if they so desired. You cannot test this Article by thinking of the present Government or the past Government. This Article takes away the entire effect of the opening words of Article 34, which provides that justice shall be administered in public courts. The real safeguard a citizen has against any tyranny on the part of an Executive or a Department is an independent judiciary. The real safeguard in respect of any rights that may be given in any Constitution is to be found in the exercise of judicial power in public by independent judges. Article 37 provides that judicial powers of a very serious character may be exercised in public or in private by people without any knowledge of law, without any experience of the administration of law, without any experience of the construction of statutes, and without any experience of the way in which a case is conducted in court. This provision may lead to injustice. As we are laying down what is intended to be the fundamental law of the country, one of the basic principles contained in the Constitution should be to provide for the exercise of judicial functions in public courts by independent judges without danger of encroachment by any grasping Executive or Departmental authority.

Comment on this

I can quite understand that what was in the mind of the Government in drafting this Article was the desire to provide for cases such as the Land Commission, referred to by the President. The Article, however, makes too wide a sweep and provides a very big net. It is proposed to permit the exercise of "limited functions" of a judicial nature to persons other than judges. What is meant by "limited functions"? There is no definition given. It would be possible, under the Article as it stands, to give all the powers of a High Court judge to a non-judicial person, putting some limitation on these powers. These would still be "limited functions".

I see a real danger in the point referred to by Deputy Costello—the invasion by Departments of the judicial office and of judicial functions. It is the tendency of Departments not merely in this country but in other countries to arrogate to themselves functions of a judicial nature. It is often hard to draw the line between administrative acts and judicial acts, but the tendency in Departments always is to extend the domain of their own jurisdiction. We have known instances of that in recent years. I think that the Article could be drafted in such a way—if it is necessary at all —as to prevent these dangers occurring but I think it would be better, as Deputy Costello suggested, to let the position remain as it is now—that is to say, as defined by Article 64 of the Constitution as clarified by a number of judgments given in the courts as to what is meant by the exercise of judicial power.

Comment on this

I do not think that lawyers in general would agree with the views expressed by the two lawyer Deputies who have just now spoken. My information is that the existing position was anything but satisfactory and that it required a very great effort, indeed, to right the position by making fine distinctions between exercising functions of a judicial character and exercising judicial powers. It was very strongly represented to me that the present position should not be allowed to remain. It is to clear up the existing situation and make the position definite that we have introduced this Article. Everybody will admit that modern legislation requires that bodies other than the public courts should have power to exercise functions of a quasi-judicial character. You cannot precisely define those powers. You can only do your best to narrow the opening while allowing for the exercise of the necessary powers.

Now the objection is made that, in opening the door, we are opening it too much. That, of course, is always a difficulty. You want to open it sufficiently wide to admit all the things that are necessary to be done and you do not want to open it so wide as to make it easy to have abuses. That is the difficulty we have here. It was attempted to narrow this down by the use of the words "limited functions." The Deputies opposite rub their shoulders. I would be glad if they could do better. We say "the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature, in matters other than criminal matters." We clearly exclude criminal matters, and we say "by any person or body of persons duly authorised by law." They must get their functions from law. What you are really trying to do is to prevent decisions of bodies like these being upset on a purely technical point: that they were exercising functions of a judicial nature, and, therefore, should not have functions at all. You want to prevent a technical plea of that sort from interfering with things that have to be done.

It is all very well to talk about bureaucracy and about the powers that Departments take to themselves, but, unfortunately, it is a fact that modern conditions of society demand that that sort of work be done by somebody. You cannot provide that the public court will deal with all matters that arise. Take, for example, the question of referees. In various cases, are they not more or less exercising functions of a judicial nature? I would be very glad if I could get an amendment from the opposite benches which would narrow the door so as to admit just the things that have to be faced. There is no disposition on our part to make bureaucracy easy or anything of that sort. When we use phrases about bureaucracy, we ought, I suggest, be careful to realise that modern conditions are of such a character and so complex that we must have machinery to deal with those conditions. The rigid watertight department arrangement for Government in the past is not possible to-day. The Department for Industry and Commerce has to do a number of things. Some of the functions relating to that Department are of a judicial nature.

Are you going to stop that Department from functioning, so that, everything that it does of a judicial nature will have to be brought into the public courts? Clearly, that is not possible. I I am not anxious to open the door one inch wider than it has to be, but I suggest to Deputies opposite that we have a position here that has to be dealt with. We want to put the position on a sound foundation, so that purely technical pleas will not be used to hamper the whole machinery. That does not prevent anybody from having recourse to the courts afterwards. There is no suggestion of that. This is only to prevent purely technical pleas being made.

Comment on this

Would the President accept an amendment in the following words?

Comment on this

I would not be prepared to accept an amendment straight off. If the Deputy suggests an amendment I will examine it.

Comment on this

What I would suggest is that the Article should read:—

Nothing in this Constitution shall operate to invalidate the exercise of administrative functions involving the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature ....

and so on.

Comment on this

Would the Land Commission work be of a purely administrative character?

Comment on this

I think there might be cases where, in the exercise of administrative functions, certain functions of a judicial character might have to be exercised. The Land Commission clearly would come within that definition.

Comment on this

Some of the functions of the Land Commission are merely administrative. I think it would be necessary to define the word "administrative."

Comment on this

The President asked me for an amendment and I have given him one.

Comment on this

I promise that I shall have it examined.

Comment on this