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Dáil

Committee on Finance. - Recommittal.

Contributions 1–224 of 668. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 3 parts.

I move amendment No. 1:—

In page 6, Article 2, line 9, after the word "whole" to insert the word "island".

The object is to make clear here and there the territorial significance of the State and the area in which the State can have effective jurisdiction. Consequently, the word "island" is helpful there.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 2:—

In page 6, to delete Article 4 and substitute therefor the following new Article:—

"4.. The name of the State is Éire, or, in the English language Ireland."

It is well that we should have it, not simply in English, seeing that the Irish text is the fundamental text, that "Éire" is used here and there.

Comment on this

It is rather a cumbersome name for the State.

Comment on this

It is a very short name. There is the equivalent in the English language.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 3:—

In page 6, Article 5, line 23, to delete the word "Éire" and insert in lieu thereof the word "Ireland".

This is a consequential amendment. Deputies wished to have the name "Ireland" as an equivalent in English. A number of changes that occur are consequential.

Comment on this

Perhaps the President would explain how sometimes the word "State" is substituted for "Ireland". We could then get rid of these amendments straight away.

Comment on this

In most cases it is a question simply of not putting in "Ireland" throughout the text. When we come to that we will deal with it.

Comment on this

I take it that this amendment is an amendment to the English text only, and that it does not affect the Irish.

Comment on this

That is so. For example, in the case of the next amendment, there will be an amendment in the Irish text to correspond with it. The understanding, I take it, is that we should go through the amendments in the English form, and then make the Irish text correspond, and on the Final Stage have a comparison of the Irish and the English texts. That was what I was working on and what I thought was understood.

Comment on this

I should like to know how we stand upon that. I thought that suggestion was approved by the House. I am not doing this for the purpose of obstruction and will state my objection. I understand this House is solemnly to go through and pass each section of the Irish text.

Comment on this

What I had in mind was this: That as practically every Deputy was able to follow the discussion in English, and follow the English text closely, we should deal with the amendments in the English language and get finished with them, until we have what I might call the complete text in final form. When we have arrived at that stage, the House will be presented with an Irish text, supposed to be an equivalent. The equivalent will be tested by the House. There are on both sides of the House Deputies who are able to follow closely the English and the Irish texts and to see that the intention of the House is carried out in the English text and in the Irish text. For that purpose, it would be advisable, as the Deputy mentioned, to go through each text to see that the meaning is clear and that, as far as possible they would be precisely the same.

Comment on this

I take it that on each section of the Irish text the question that will be put to the House is: "That this section stand part of the Bill." I will tell you my objection to that procedure. I gather that there might be ten or a dozen Deputies capable of expressing an opinion upon that question and not more. I should say, roughly speaking, there would be about half-a-dozen Deputies on each side of the House, and that would mean that about 90 per cent. of the House would solemnly pass a series of sections which they did not understand. To do that solemnly would, to a certain extent, make a farce of the proceeding; that we should decide to pass something we did not understand and accept the verdict of an informal committee of six or seven. That would be abdicating our functions as Deputies. It might be better if a committee of the type suggested by the President was appointed to report to the House and then let the House pass some resolution as to the text. I would object solemnly to pass a thing we did not understand or to the passing of some other resolution that it is the correct text. We could pass a resolution, if it satisfies the President, that the Irish translation is the official text, but I do not think it is proper that the House should solemnly pass a series of sections that it does not and cannot understand.

Comment on this

Surely we are just as incompetent to pass a resolution as to pass the sections.

Comment on this

If the Deputy had followed me he would know that I corrected myself. I said that on consideration I was opposed to the danger of passing a resolution, but that we could pass a resolution that the Irish text is the official text for the courts. We do not say it is.

Comment on this

That is taking a tremendous risk.

Comment on this

I agree. The other proceeding to me seems absolutely farcical.

Comment on this

Everyone must be obliged for the point in Deputy O'Sullivan's remarks, that it is difficult, when a large section of the House is not sufficiently acquainted with the Irish language to be able definitely to express their own individual judgment on each Article. At the same time, I think we should make the Irish language the basic text. As Deputies know, we have sometimes to take authority for a number of things. We have to act. We appoint special committees very often and act on the report of these committees, trusting to their good faith. It may be argued that this would be carrying that principle further than would ordinarily be justified, and that objections might be raised to it on that account. I think we ought, if we are serious about trying to restore the Irish language to its fundamental position, in the case of a text like this make the Irish text the fundamental text. We can assure ourselves either by getting the opinions of scholars or by a committee as the Deputy suggested. We can get reasonable assurance as to the text.

Remember, what is going to happen in practice will be that for a considerable period I have no doubt the English text will be taken as conveying the sense of the Irish text—for example in the case of judges who do not know Irish—and it is only when there is a dispute as to the fundamental meaning that there will be ultimate reference to the Irish text. At an early stage I saw that difficulty and I suggested to the House that we should wait until we had the complete English text and then take whatever steps were considered best to get over the final difficulty. As to passing it section by section, I do not know that you need formally go through the act of passing the section, but simply approving of it if you like. If we want to deal with this in detail I suppose it simply means that we, at the end of each section, say, "Are you satisfied?" The question would seem to me to be, "Are you satisfied that that section does represent the intentions of the House as shown in the English text?" That would rather approximate to the question that should be put at the end of the section. If, on the other hand, there is a strong view in the House that we ought to proceed by some other course, I am open, naturally, to consider it, because the difficulty is a real, genuine difficulty and everyone must appreciate it.

Comment on this

I think most of us appreciate that there is no sensible way out of the farcical situation created by the decision to make the Irish text the basic text. The Gaelic League have got their pound of flesh.

Comment on this

It is not the Gaelic League. Even if there was no Gaelic League, as there is a policy agreed upon generally by the country that we do want to try to bring back the Irish language to its proper position as the spoken language of the people, assuming we are serious about it, here is an opportunity—we are talking about putting the names of streets in Irish and doing all sorts of things in Irish—to put the Irish text in its primary position and I cannot see how we can do that except by this means. I think Deputy MacDermot will admit that there are a number of things we pass in this House, things of which we individually have not convinced ourselves absolutely; we are depending very largely upon expert reports given to us, information given to us in various ways. There is the old example of the earth being round. The few of us who had the opportunity of travelling round it were pretty well satisfied it is so. So that in this case I do not think we will be stretching that principle abnormally far; perhaps I should not say abnormally, because we are stretching it a little beyond what is normal; but we are not extravagantly stretching it. I am sure that the Opposition as a Party can quite well satisfy themselves that the Irish text does correspond to the English text as far as two languages can ever really correspond one to the other. Similarly, on this side of the House, we are able to satisfy ourselves, and I think the Labour Party, too, if they want to approach it from that point of view, can satisfy themselves as a Party that that is so. It is a difficulty I see no way out of but this, either by means of an informal committee of members or by reference to experts. If the Deputy wants——

Comment on this

I only want to point out the rather farcical nature of the thing.

Comment on this

I have nothing to say to that. It is a just criticism that we are certainly going a distance from the usual practice.

Comment on this

It is only another element of humour in the Constitution. Before we pass from that I gather that the word "Eire" stays in the Irish text. Is that so when the word "State" occurs?

Comment on this

No. I might also point out that, of course, in this, if I might refer back to No. 2 again, both of these should be italics to make the name stand out both in Irish and English.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 4:—

In page 8, Article 9, to delete Section I and substitute therefor the following new section:—

1.—1º. On the coming into operation of this Constitution any person who was a citizen of Saorstát Eireann immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution shall become and be a citizen of Ireland.

2º. The future acquisition and loss of Irish citizenship shall be determined in accordance with law.

3º. No person may be excluded from Irish citizenship by reason of the sex of such person.

The purpose of this is to try to meet some of the criticism levelled at the section as it stood. I have tried to get over the difficulty in connection with this matter by trying to define the body of citizens but, as I pointed out already, that could not be easily done in the present circumstances; and the best we can do, to try and get a comprehensive catalogue at the moment, is to take over the existing position. That is the intention in the first part. The third sub-section is to meet the point raised by Deputy Mrs. Redmond's amendment, and I think it meets the point fully. There was a point about religion and class in Deputy Mrs. Redmond's original amendment, but I pointed out the difficulty I have with the word "class." I dislike seeing it anywhere in the Constitution, because I think it is too difficult to define. With regard to religion, we have met that by another amendment in which to make it quite clear we have separated the phrase about endowment of religion and made another one in which we make it quite clear that there is to be no discrimination and there are to be no disabilities imposed on the ground of religion. That will cover this as well.

Comment on this

No disabilities to the citizens, is it? No disability will be imposed on citizens on the ground of religion—is that it?

Comment on this

That is important. It is amendment No. 57:

The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status.

It is quite general. It is not on any citizens. If the Deputy will look at amendment No. 57 he will see that:

The State guarantees not to endow any religion

and that,

The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of any religious profession, belief, or status.

It is quite general. It does not refer to citizens.

Comment on this

I am not quite clear as to how this operates. Are we basing this fundamental Article of the Constitution on law?

Comment on this

On the existing position.

Comment on this

That is based on the existing law?

Comment on this

It is to an extent. It is taking over Article 3 of the old Constitution. It is more or less linked up with Article 3 of the old Constitution—taking over Article 3.

Comment on this

Is it not doing more than that? Is it not taking over the ordinary law as regards citizenship as well?

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this

That is rather a peculiar position for a Constitution to be in which is fundamental to all laws—depending on an ordinary law itself.

Comment on this

I think the Deputy will admit that in most Constitutions, in the nature of things, you have to allow that the future acquisition of Irish citizenship shall be determined in accordance with law. The question is that you have a certain body of citizens at the moment. You want to take that body over. It is really a question of defining what class, so that you may know who are citizens and who are not at the moment. It is not a question of saying that in future such-and-such shall be citizens. It is simply a question of taking over a class.

Comment on this

We are entitled, if we wish in future to change the position, to pass new citizenship laws?

Comment on this

You are, except that you have restrictions as to your liberty, namely, the restriction imposed there in Section 3º: "No person may be excluded from Irish citizenship by reason of the sex of such person." That is a definite restriction. There is also the restriction about religion contained in the amendment I have read, No. 57.

Comment on this

Then we are not taking over the actual provisions in the existing Constitution as regards citizenship?

Comment on this

No, we are not.

Comment on this

Well, that is not very much of a guarantee for anything.

Comment on this

You will have the same guarantee that the Dáil has now.

Comment on this

There is a question which I would like to put to the President. I do not know whether it is relevant. The case I have in mind is where an English woman or a French woman married a man domiciled in Ireland, say, in 1917. He got killed or died in 1920. Is his widow a citizen of this State or not?

Comment on this

I would not undertake to say straight off in any particular case that the Deputy would put to me.

Comment on this

This is a special case I have in mind.

Comment on this

I do not pretend to be able to answer that. I would have to be accurate about it. The Citizenship Act is one which takes over the body of citizens in Article 3. There are provisions made to deal with the situation that has arisen since 1923. There are certain marriage provisions in which, under certain circumstances, a foreign woman married to an Irishman can become, in a short period, a citizen.

Comment on this

In this particular case the man died in 1920.

Comment on this

I have just been informed by some experts that, in fact, she would not be a citizen.

Comment on this

So we do not know who is or is not a citizen by law.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 5:—

In page 10, Article 10, to delete the word "Éire" wherever it occurs in the Article and to insert in lieu thereof the words "the State."

We have here the words "all royalties and franchises within that jurisdiction belong to Éire." This will read "the State." We have that definitely there. We could have put in "Ireland" of course with the same meaning as before, but it is considered that putting in "the State" there would, perhaps, be better.

Comment on this

The State is put in where there are legal rights, where there is any authority.

Comment on this

I would not say that. Sometimes it is a question of mere words. We are putting in "the State" sometimes and "Éire" all the time. In other cases if there was any possibility of ambiguity——

Comment on this

If you drafted that Article originally with the word "State," nobody would have thought of changing it to "Éire."

Comment on this

Sometimes it is merely the case that we are tired of "Éire."

Comment on this

No, it is because we want not to have a document full of repetitions and sometimes it is to avoid ambiguity.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 6:—

In page 10, line 27, Article 12, Section 1, to delete the word "Éire" and insert in lieu thereof the word "Ireland."

This is the same as amendment No. 5.

Comment on this

No, it is not the same.

Comment on this

Well, if the Deputy wishes to——

Comment on this

I approve of it.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 7:—

In page 12, line 16, Article 12, Section 3, sub-section 1º, after the word "incapacitated" to insert the words "to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court consisting of five judges."

There we have an amendment in substance. The question was whether the incapacity of the President was to be determined by the Council of State and it was considered, generally, after hearing some criticisms and so on here, that these words might be put in. I came to the conclusion that it was better to have the incapacity of the President determined by the Supreme Court consisting of a full court of five judges.

Comment on this

Who has the initiative in promoting an action of this kind?

Comment on this

I would take it the Government would have the initiative.

Comment on this

The Government only?

Comment on this

Any body or person that was affected by the President's complete inability to perform his duties. The Government would naturally be the body.

Comment on this

The President says "any body" might. Suppose a county council passes a resolution would that mean that this inquiry would have to be held?

Comment on this

They would have to apply to the court.

Comment on this

But we were told just now that any body can do it.

Comment on this

If one tried in a document of this sort to meet every possible circumstance we would have not a document of this kind but a document 30 or 40 times its length. We have to depend upon ordinary reason operating. At the moment I cannot think of any case in which any other body but the Government would take the initiative. If the Government that is responsible for getting certain things done finds that the President is incapable of performing the duties that are placed upon him to perform, it will take action to bring the matter to the court. There is nothing to prevent anybody else doing it.

Comment on this

But very vexatious applications may be made to the court in these circumstances.

Comment on this

Yes, but the court would dispose of them.

Comment on this

It would be very unpleasant for the President to have vexatious applications made to the court.

Comment on this

Perhaps the President is thinking of permanent incapacity. There is there a question of a man being deprived of his office and somebody succeeding him. But is there any similar provision made to deal with temporary incapacity?

Comment on this

No.

Comment on this

The President may remember there have been some very noteworthy cases in history, cases that have been extremely awkward. There have been cases of men in high positions, quite as high as the President of this State. There was a case of George III of England and Fredrick of Prussia who had the habit of getting temporarily insane. They did not get permanently insane. Is there any method provided in the Constitution for such a case? You have a method of dealing with permanent incapacity. Have you any method for dealing with temporary incapacity?

Comment on this

There is provision in the existing Constitution in the matter of the incapacity of the Governor-General. Supposing Mr. Buckley had been incapacitated——

Comment on this

He could have been removed immediately by the Government.

Comment on this

In one of the Articles provision is being made by which if the President fails to perform the duties which he has been performing, these duties would be performed in his stead. That does not meet the case where there would be discretion on the part of the President. But as regards that discretion, if he were temporarily incapacitated in the sense that Deputy O'Sullivan has mentioned, it would seem that his discretion would not be normal discretion.

Comment on this

The President is definitely meeting it in one case but not in a case that may very well arise.

Comment on this

It is not beyond the wit of man to deal with this, but there is no way in which we can determine that here. Just at the moment when he is deciding whether he will or will not give to the Taoiseach dissolution, there may be some aberration of one kind or another affecting his judgment. It may be of a physical character and it may affect him completely. You cannot get down to that and determine it.

Comment on this

The point is you may have a man incapacitated for a period of six months.

Comment on this

The moment you have a situation like that, it is within the power of the Supreme Court to be satisfied that he is permanently incapacitated from the point of view of doing his work.

Comment on this

Is there a provision to that effect?

Comment on this

Let us take the case of a man being incapacitated for six months. If a man, for instance, is held to be of unsound mind during that period, there would be action by the Government to declare him permanently incapacitated.

Comment on this

Why hang on to the word "permanently"?

Comment on this

As the Deputy knows, in a case of temporary incapacity the commission will act. The only question that we cannot satisfactorily determine is when his incapacity is of such a character that he cannot perform the act that is necessary. You cannot say that he has failed or is incapable of actually performing the act. If he is ill or unable to perform his functions, they can be performed for him. There is a certain difficulty in the matter. I take it that Deputy O'Sullivan was concerned with the case where a man would be mentally deranged.

Comment on this

And where it was obvious that might be temporary.

Comment on this

Unless he was insisting, notwithstanding advice given to him by doctors and others, on performing these functions, I do not think you would have to declare him permanently incapacitated. His work would be done for him over a period by the commission. You cannot pursue this thing down to the point of saying that if a man is subject to momentary delusions or fits he should be permanently incapacitated. It may be that just at the moment he is performing a vital function he gets deranged and he would not perform that function in the same way as if he were in his normal health. I think every ordinary thing is covered here.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 8:—

In page 12, lines 22-23, Article 12, section 3, sub-section 2º, to delete the words "to discharge the function of his office established to the satisfaction of the Council of State" and to insert in lieu thereof the words "established as aforesaid".

This is merely consequential.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 9:—

In page 12, lines 27-28, Article 12, Section 4, sub-section 1º, to delete the words "and is not placed under disability or incapacity by law".

The position is that if you leave these words in there without any qualification it would be open to the Legislature practically to exclude individuals or a class of individuals by legislation. Without these words it is safer in the case of a single person going for election before the people as a whole. There is little fear that any person will go forward or would have the slightest chance of election if he is of the type that would ordinarily be declared incapable by law; that is, a bankrupt or a person who was suffering imprisonment or who was guilty of corrupt practices or something of that kind. There was a long list, I think, in a previous amendment, indicating the type of disability. What I said in regard to that amendment holds here.

Comment on this

It seems to be very unsatisfactory. There are limitations upon persons who get elected to the Dáil and there are limitations on the classes who can hold office in the State. This is socially the most important post in the State and politically it is a position carrying with it great power and it seems to me that there certainly ought to be some limitation on the class of persons who should fill that position. It should not be open to any undesirable person to hold that position or be a candidate.

Comment on this

The Deputy is losing sight of the fact that the person must get nomination from 20 or 25 members of the Oireachtas, or four county councils. I think that is a sufficient safeguard that you will not have people who would be unworthy of holding office, going forward for election. In any case this is an election by the people as a whole and the people will be able to judge. If a man is guilty I am certain the people will be made aware of it and his chances of election are very slight indeed.

Comment on this

He might be elected and the Dáil, the President forgets, is elected by the people also.

Comment on this

You are not dealing with the same situation.

Comment on this

Exactly the same.

Comment on this

What is the use of trying to declare things that are obviously not comparable? The Deputy should remember that at least 30 members of either House will have to take responsibility for his nomination, or four county councils. Also, there would be only one or two or a few people up for election and you may be perfectly certain that if a man's character is not fairly good he will not be selected.

Comment on this

What is the advantage of leaving these words out?

Comment on this

There would be a danger in leaving them in. They might be used artificially to debar some person going forward whom the people might want to elect. There would be the possibility of the Legislature limiting the choice of the people.

Comment on this

In what way?

Comment on this

By passing a law which would disqualify some particular individual.

Comment on this

Tell us the type of law which might be passed which would hit at one individual and not at a class.

Comment on this

Or even a class. We had a great deal of trouble with regard to the possibility of women as a class being debarred. If you leave this clause in you could have a law which would debar a certain class.

Comment on this

The burden of proof lies on those who want these particulars in. I cannot find in the existing Constitution any similar provisions with regard to the Governor-General.

Comment on this

I doubt very much if the wording of amendment No. 10 is sufficient. The amendment reads:—

In page 14, line 3, Article 12, Section 4, sub-section 2º, paragraph i., to delete the word "one" and substitute therefor the word "either."

The section sets out "not less than 20 persons each of whom is at the time a member of one House." It is possible to strain that to mean that the whole of the 20 would have to be from one House. The difficulty is whether the words "each of whom" are suitable. It is quite clear that what is wanted to be expressed is that as regards the 20 persons who will nominate, each particular one of them, that you could read after his name "he is a member either of the Seanad or of the Dáil." I think that even with the word "either," you could possibly strain it into the meaning suggested by Deputy Donnelly.

Comment on this

Could we not say "not less than 20 persons, being members of either House of the Oireachtas?"

Comment on this

Or "each of whom is a member either of the Dáil or Seanad?" Is there any difficulty about that? The only difficulty I can see about it is that it expresses what you mean. Is there any other insuperable objection to it?

Comment on this

No. As a matter of fact, when Deputy Donnelly raised the point during the Committee Stage, I had some difficulty in seeing what his point was but, having got it, I do not know that the word "either" would fix it.

Comment on this

Would it be correct to say "a member of the Oireachtas," because you could just say "20 members of the Oireachtas?"

Comment on this

The word "member" is used in two senses. Each of the Houses would be regarded as a member of the Oireachtas in a certain sense, but before we come to the end of the Report Stage, we may be able to get a better form.

Comment on this

I would suggest "not less than 20 persons, each of whom is at the time a member of a House."

Comment on this

"Each of whom" may go with the class. At first sight, this looks all right and a person reading it ordinarily and knowing what is at the bottom of it will read it all right, but if you get into your head the idea that it might mean that when you have 20 persons down on the list they must all belong to the same House, what it conveys is that each one of the 20 will be a member of the same House.

Comment on this

Even as the words stand, trying to read that meaning into them, I could not do so because it seems to me that the words are perfectly plain, that they can be members of either House. That seems plain without any amendment, but if you have any doubts, which I cannot see, I would think that "a member of a House" would suit.

Comment on this

I agree with the Deputies who say that this looks all right, but if you think of this construction as being applicable to it, namely, that you have a nomination paper signed——

Comment on this

I do not want to interrupt the Minister, but surely if there were a second meaning, you would have to say "the same House of the Oireachtas." The very fact that the word "same" is not used makes it plain that it does not mean "same."

Comment on this

My advice is that, in the ordinary way, the first form was right. I believe that the word "either" does not improve it, and consequently, I will not move the amendment. Whatever difficulty there is, if there is a difficulty, I think it is not remedied by this proposed amendment, so I do not propose to move it. So far as the drafting is concerned, I think those who drafted this particular Article are satisfied that it does express the meaning, and that each one of the nominators would say, after his name, that he is a member of the Dáil or Seanad and the mixing up of these does not matter. It means that you can mix them up and all you want is that each nominator should be able to say, of himself, that he is a member either of the Dáil or Seanad.

Comment on this

"Each" is distributive.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 11:—

In page 14, Article 12, Section 7, to delete lines 29 and 30 and substitute the words: "in the event of his predecessor's removal from office, death, resignation, or permanent incapacity established in the manner provided by Section 3 hereof, as soon as may be after the election."

This deals with the establishment of permanent incapacity to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court. It is more or less consequential.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 12:—

In page 16, lines 6 and 10, Article 12, Section 8, to delete the word "Éire" and substitute in each case the word "Ireland."

This is of the type we already have. It is not necessary to say anything about it.

Comment on this

I was unable to be here at the beginning. You are substituting "Ireland" for the word "Éire." Why is that done in the rest of the Constitution and not in Article 5? It may be a small matter but it rather puzzled me.

Comment on this

The point is that in some cases there is no good reason other than that you do not want too great a repetition of the same word "Ireland". That is relatively trifling. In the second place, where there is any possibility of ambiguity as between the geographical term and the constitutional term, the name of the State, the word "State" is put in so as to avoid the ambiguity that would be caused by reference to the State, the effective jurisdiction of which does not extend over the whole of the geographical territory of the island, of Ireland.

Comment on this

I think that in Article 5 the word "Ireland" is substituted for the word "Éire".

Comment on this

Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney means amendment No. 5.

Comment on this

The Deputy will find that there is no special point other than the one I have mentioned.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 13:—

In page 16, line 12, Article 12, Section 9, to delete the word "Éire" and substitute the words "the State".

This is the same character.

Comment on this

This is intended to mean that he shall not go to Belfast without permission?

Comment on this

Shall not leave the State.

Comment on this

That means he shall not go to Belfast?

Comment on this

Shall not leave the effective jurisdiction of the State, whatever that may be at the time.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 14:—

In page 16, Article 12, to delete Section 10 and substitute a new section as follows:—

1º. The President may be impeached for stated misbehaviour.

2º. The charge shall be preferred by either of the Houses of the Oireachtas, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of this section.

3º. A proposal to either House of the Oireachtas to prefer a charge against the President under this section shall not be entertained unless upon a notice of motion in writing signed by not less than thirty members of that House.

4º. No such proposal shall be adopted by either of the Houses of the Oireachtas save upon a resolution of that House supported by not less than two-thirds of the total membership thereof.

5º. A charge preferred by either House of the Oireachtas under this section shall be investigated by the other House.

6º. The President shall have the right to appear and to be represented at the investigation of the charge.

7º. If, as a result of the investigation, a resolution be passed supported by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House of the Oireachtas by which the charge is investigated declaring that the charge preferred against the President has been sustained and that the misbehaviour, the subject of the charge, was such as to render him unfit to continue in office, such resolution shall operate to remove the President from his office.

Comment on this

This "stated misbehaviour" is a slight improvement upon what existed before, but I think it a great pity that this very cumbersome mode of procedure should be adopted. If there has to be a trial under this, the result will bring the whole State into complete ridicule and, as well, the verdict given will carry very little weight. I think the President might very easily have the trial by five members of the Supreme Court just as he substituted five members of the Supreme Court for the Advisory Council dealing with the incapacity of the President. I think it would be far more satisfactory if there were an ordinary trial by five members of the Supreme Court of a President who was charged with a misdemeanour instead of this very stupid method of impeachment — entirely antiquated, old fashioned and bound, in effect, to prove unsatisfactory.

Comment on this

I do not think it would be right to have the trial before the Supreme Court on a matter of this sort. It is not a question of law or of the interpretation of law, but something wider in its character. Why should it be regarded as stupid? After all, the procedure of each House is at its own discretion and if there is a question of investigating a charge, it can by its own procedure arrange the method by which that is to be done. The use of the word "impeachment" does not necessarily mean that the procedure should be the same as that adopted in the British House of Commons.

Comment on this

What possible procedure is there?

Comment on this

Several modes of procedure suggest themselves at once. A special committee could be appointed to inquire into the questions of fact and the House could act on their report if it were necessary so to do. We need hardly deal with the methods by which the investigation would have to be carried out if such a case arose. You could have either a general procedure designed to cover all possible cases that could be imagined or you could have had ad hoc procedure.

Comment on this

You might have ad hoc procedure but what possible form could it take? The President has startled me by his suggestion that the facts might be investigated by a Committee of the House.

Comment on this

Why not?

Comment on this

Two-thirds of the House have to decide the issue. Each individual has, upon his conscience, to decide whether the President is guilty or not guilty of the offence with which he is charged. That the individual should act on the verdict of some other body — whether a Committee of this House or not— without having heard the evidence himself, that he should exercise the judicial function of condemning a man without having heard a single bit of the evidence upon which that man is to be condemned, would appear to me to be a terrible suggestion.

Comment on this

I think that it is very unlikely that this provision will ever be used. My difficulty is to see how the sort of thing we have in mind could be performed by the judicial bench. We are considering a case in which the President might, in the opinion of almost the entire country or, at any rate, of Parliament, have unfitted himself for his position by scandalous behaviour, which might not be criminal but merely disgraceful. He might be leading a scandalous life and Parliament might feel that it could no longer tolerate him in that position. If that were the case, I do not see what we could do except adopt some such procedure as is provided here. Though it may not be ideal, it is the best procedure that occurs to one's mind.

Comment on this

I do not think that that particular ipse dixit coming from that bench, without any reason advanced, has strengthened the President's position very much.

Comment on this

I do not agree with Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney that this would be a scandalous procedure. If we were charged with the investigation of a particular matter, we could choose a committee which would go into details and furnish a report. That would not mean that any member who wanted to get further information would be debarred from getting it. It would be necessary to arrange for clearing up further questions which might be raised on the report and for any further examination which might be regarded as desirable. I do not think that we would be completely washing our hands of the matter.

Comment on this

I do not know if the President ever acted on a jury.

Comment on this

No.

Comment on this

Some members of a jury believe the evidence; other members do not. In a charge against the President of, say, scandalous behaviour, witnesses will be called. The credibility of these witnesses will probably be challenged by whomsoever is appearing on behalf of the President. The credibility of the witnesses will probably be the main point. The President may call other witnesses to contradict the witnesses who have been examined. Whoever is deciding the case will have to weigh up the probability of the stories and the credibility of the persons giving evidence. You cannot decide upon the statement made by a person unless you have seen him giving evidence. Nobody reading a newspaper account of a trial or even reading through the whole of the depositions in a criminal case would be in a position to form an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of anybody charged, unless he had himself seen the witnesses in the box and was able to decide from their demeanour whether they were truthful or not. For the whole House to decide, on the report of a committee that witnesses are, or are not, telling the truth would be completely wrong. I do not see how any such procedure could be adopted.

Comment on this

I am not denying that a conscientious member of the House would demand that he himself should be present at the giving of evidence before he would pass judgment.

Comment on this

We are all conscientious.

Comment on this

I am not suggesting that you are not. There are cases in which the facts would be so obvious that there would be no need for the type of investigation to which Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney refers. But we are not prescribing any mode of procedure for the investigation of these charges. The House will be at liberty to devise, in any special case, a method which will enable it to come to a conscientious conclusion. I think that we can, with safety, leave the matter in that way. If I were to propose that the procedure should be along certain lines, the views put forward by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney would have much weight—that the only way that Deputies could effectively carry out their functions would be to sit as a jury and listen to the examination.

Comment on this

The President has had some experience here for ten years. Does he not recognise that this House is a particularly unsuitable body to act as a jury? Can he think of a more unsuitable body to act as a jury in what may be a political case? A political assembly is the last body that should be asked to investigate a charge against any individual mixed up in politics. To my mind, that is the principal objection to this proposal. The use of the word "impeachment" suggests a return to the idea of the High Court of Parliament.

Comment on this

In this case.

Comment on this

In another country, under whose influence we seem to be, Parliament has got rid of its judical functions. The ordinary members have placed these functions in the hands of a judical body because experience has taught them that they are not fitted for dealing with matters of this kind. I cannot think of any more unsuitable body than this House for dealing with a charge of this kind.

Comment on this

Would there be anything to stop Parliament from appointing not a parliamentary committee but a commission of lawyers to find the facts? Having got the facts, Parliament could then come to its own conclusion.

Comment on this

That suggestion is even worse than the other.

Comment on this

This is not a complete novelty. It has been the habit of Parliaments to deal, by parliamentary committees or otherwise, with questions affecting the honour of individual members. There have been cases where Parliament has done that by means of appointing a judicial or semi-judicial commission to determine certain definite questions and then, having got definite answers to those questions, Parliament has had to decide whether or not a case had arisen for taking action.

Comment on this

But we are dealing here with what is in the Constitution.

Comment on this

Is there any Deputy who suggests that the words "shall be investigated by the other House" mean definitely that that House would itself directly investigate, and that it could not mean that the House would cause to be investigated?

Comment on this

No, because the verdict must be given by a majority of the House.

Comment on this

We have two questions here, one, the mode of investigation, and the other the question of the final resolution. Suppose we had divided this procedure into two parts, and said, as I had suggested at one stage, that the charges should be investigated by the Supreme Court and on receipt of a report from the Supreme Court that the House by resolution should act. In view of a finding by a competent body that the charges had been sustained, would there be anything contrary to natural justice or to right in the House, by resolution, declaring that the person was incapable of holding office? I do not think so. I can imagine myself, at any rate, as a Deputy of this House, understanding that a certain charge was made against the President, listening to the report and to the finding, and satisfying myself that the investigation had been properly conducted, as well making any further inquiries that I thought necessary, coming to the conclusion that in view of that report the President was no longer fit to carry out the duties. I do not think that there is anything improper in that. As far as the resolution is concerned, and leaving the investigation aside for the moment, it seems to me that it would be by no means improper for the House, consequent on that report, to pass the resolution. With regard to the investigation, will it be held that according to our text here that the Dáil could not itself set up a body or commission to investigate the charge in detail and get its report? When the report came along for discussion questions might be asked about it. It might be sent back for further consideration. The clause, as it is set out here, does not, I think, preclude that.

Comment on this

I do not know what the law is, but it could not have that meaning. I was under the delusion that the President was asking our opinion. I withdraw my opinion.

Comment on this

The Deputy is not going to get away with it like that.

Comment on this

I gave it as my definite opinion that it could only have one meaning.

Comment on this

The Deputy said in the most authoritative way that the ordinary plain meaning was——

Comment on this

That was my opinion.

Comment on this

The Deputy did not qualify it. At any rate, we can get ahead. The position is that my opinion as to the ordinary meaning of it happens to differ from Deputy O'Sullivan's. This is a matter in which I would be guided by an expert draftsman. I would be the first to acknowledge I was wrong if he said that this view was not the meaning which lawyers would take out of it.

Comment on this

The President has stated categorically that in the circumstances he refers to he would be the first to admit he was wrong. What he really meant to say was that that was his opinion.

Comment on this

It is by no means clear whether a sub-committee could be appointed by the House to make the investigation. The words here are "shall be investigated by the other House." The natural interpretation of that would be "shall be investigated by the whole House." Let us assume that there could be read into this that the House could investigate by means of a sub-committee, and I question very much if it could, it certainly could not be investigated by anybody else. There is the sound legal principle delegatus non potest delegare, that is, that a person appointed to do a certain thing cannot appoint somebody else to do his job for him. Personally, I do not think that the House could appoint a sub-committee to investigate. Of course, the question may be argued the other way, but I think the investigation would have to be by the whole House. If the contention that it could be done by a sub-committee is right, at any rate it certainly could not be done by anybody outside. In that case you cannot then read in with paragraph 7: “as a result of an investigation by the House.” The whole House votes, and there must be a two-thirds majority, so that each member of the House has got responsibility for saying “guilty” or “not guilty.”

Comment on this

I wonder is that quite right? It says: "If, as a result of the investigation, a resolution be passed, supported by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House ... by which the charge is investigated, declaring that the charge against the President has been sustained."

Comment on this

That is a verdict of guilty.

Comment on this

You say that the charge has been sustained after its investigation, but it does not pretend to say further than that. The individual, with the information at his disposal, is able to judge of that himself.

Comment on this

As a result of the investigation made by the man himself.

Comment on this

Suppose a report came along and that each member conscientiously read it with any evidence that was given to him in the report as to what was alleged. He would take the report and say: "I am reasonably satisfied, in view of the people who have investigated this charge, that, in fact, it has been sustained." I see no reason why he should not vote that the President was no longer fit for office by reason of the fact that a body of men appointed for the purpose had investigated the charge and found that it had been sustained. He could arrive at that decision as reasonably and as conscientiously as we can reasonably and conscientiously do most of the things that we have got to do in life. Each member would have to be the judge of that himself. At any rate, the final resolution is one which is passed by people who would have got some report on the matter, and who would say: "Very well, in view of that report, which we think is a just report, we think the charge against the President has been sustained and that he is no longer fit for office." At one stage, I thought we might put in "shall cause to be investigated," but I do not want to limit the power of direction there. I think that if you wanted to remove doubts, you would have to put in both phrases. You would have to say "investigate or cause to be investigated."

Comment on this

Or "investigated by or under the authority of."

Comment on this

The view we took about this was that the responsibility of having the matter investigated lay with the House; that the House would design its own procedure, either in general terms in advance or else that it would design its procedure to meet any particular case. Of course, the method might have to be different in different cases. For instance, the matter concerned might be something which was so notorious and so well known that there could be no doubt or question about it.

Comment on this

Well, I know that it is useless in pressing this any further, but I venture to predict that if ever any case of this nature comes up and is tried otherwise than by the whole House you will have the most extraordinary thing happening. You will have the High Court asked to mandamus Parliament. Parliament, having constituted itself a court, you will have the High Court asked to mandamus it; or rather, with regard to the Parliament, it may be a question of quo warranto as to what power it had to appoint a sub-committee. Anyhow, you will have the extraordinary thing of the courts going over the court in Parliament, and you will have a very nice constitutional issue. I say that you are hanging on to an obsolete procedure for no purpose.

Comment on this

I should like to make a concrete suggestion to the President, and that is that in sub-section 5º of the new Article, after the word "investigated," you could put in the words "or under the directions and authority of."

Comment on this

Or if you put in "or by a tribunal consisting of judges," that would satisfy the case, I think.

Comment on this

Yes. I think it would be easy to fit in some words there that would meet the case.

Comment on this

Well, I shall consider that again. We will have an opportunity later on of dealing with it.

Comment on this

Can we do that?

Comment on this

Can we do that, Sir? I mean, can we refer to this again at the end, for instance?

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

I suggest that, to meet such points as that now raised, the procedure at the conclusion of this Stage would be to report the amendments and adjourn the debate on the Report Stage. This would give an opportunity for meeting such points as the one that has now arisen. Such amendments, if any, could be taken before the Irish version is considered.

Comment on this

I hope that the Irish translation will be ready.

Comment on this

Oh, yes. I am sure it will be ready.

Comment on this

I mean, I hope that the original will not hang very long after the translation.

Comment on this

The method of procedure which you suggest, Sir, will suit me admirably, if it can be adopted.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It can be adopted.

Comment on this

Well, Sir, before we pass from this, I should like to ask whether the Deputies who have been discussing this matter from the opposite benches have any difficulty: in other words, supposing we are able to meet their suggestions with regard to the words proposed to be inserted by Deputies MacDermot and Fitzgerald-Kenney, will there be any further difficulty in connection with Section 7? As I see it, there will be two other methods that might be regarded as alternative to this procedure. One would be to let the investigation be by the Supreme Court. I dislike that by itself. I think that, if judgment is to be pronounced on the President, it ought to be by the people's representatives —the people who have a direct and definite responsibility and who, in the periods between elections, do represent the people and their authority. Now, that is one procedure — the Supreme Court by itself. The other alternative would be to lay the responsibility of the investigation of the facts on the Supreme Court, whilst leaving to the Parliament the responsibility for the final resolution on receipt of the report. Now, we changed from that idea of the Supreme Court being the body to investigate the facts, to the House itself putting the responsibility of investigation on the House itself — as far as I was concerned, on the idea that the House could design the procedure which would meet a particular case — for instance, if there were a number of lawyer members on both sides of the House, they could select a number of lawyer members who understand the rules of evidence and who would understand what was meant by a proper judicial inquiry into a case— but that it was on their report they would act. I should be very glad if we could come to some agreement about this.

Comment on this

I may tell the President that, so far as forms are concerned, I do not grumble in the slightest. As a matter of fact, I think that, very often, too much importance is attached to forms, and if there was a finding by a tribunal of judges on the question of whether the removal was made by a tribunal of the House, I would have no objection to it.

Comment on this

If what you have in mind is investigation by an outside tribunal, it is a question whether there is any point at all in the provision that the charge preferred by one House shall be investigated by the other House. If a tribunal is to be appointed, I think there is no reason why it should not be appointed by both Houses acting together.

Comment on this

You see, this is the result of a certain evolution. If we were, in express terms, to say that the charge should be investigated by the Supreme Court, we probably would not have this machinery as it is here exactly; but we have put the responsibility of investigation on the House other than the House by which the complaint is made, and I think that if we can make sure that that House can set up a sub-committee or see in what way it can set up a tribunal on receipt of the report, or cause the matter to be investigated, then we have only slightly to modify Section 7 so as to fit in with these conditions. I do not think it would be wise to specify that the Supreme Court should investigate the charge. I think we should leave it to the House to decide what the tribunal should be. I think we could, at this stage, postpone discussion of this matter until a later stage. The Ceann Comhairle informed us that we could leave it over for an interval and take the matter up again.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Well, of course, we cannot leave the amendment in the air, so to speak. It must either be disposed of or withdrawn.

Comment on this

Could we not deal with it later on?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

It can be dealt with, but as it stands now it must either be disposed of or withdrawn.

Comment on this

Very well, Sir. I withdraw the amendment on that understanding.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 15:

In page 18, line 30, Article 13, Section 6, after the word "commute" to insert the words "or remit" and after the word "commutation" to insert the words "or remission".

The purpose of this amendment is to make sure that there is both remission and commutation. I do not think there is any special point in connection with this amendment.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 16:

In page 20, line 14, Article 13, Section 8, sub-section 1º, after the word "Oireachtas" to insert the words "or to any court".

This is simply an amendment that I indicated, on the previous stage, I would bring in so as to include any court.

Comment on this

I think we had better leave amendment No. 17 over, as it would be consequential on the other amendment. It might be better not to move it now as some change might be necessitated in it by the other amendment we have left over.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 18:—

In page 20, line 26, Article 13, Section 9, after the word "provided" to insert the words "by this Constitution".

This is to meet a point which Deputy Norton put forward. It makes the text somewhat clearer than it otherwise would be.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 19:—

In page 22, lines 8, 9 and 10, Article 14, Section 1, to delete the words "to the satisfaction of a majority of the members of the Council of State" and substitute the words "in the manner provided by Section 3 of Article 12 hereof".

This is consequential on the change in regard to the incapacity being determined by the Council of State. I think there is no point that needs to be explained in connection with the matter.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 20:—

In page 22, line 14, Article 14, Section 1, to delete the word "of" and substitute the words "conferred on" and to delete in the same line the word "under" and substitute the word "by".

We had certain difficulties about the interpretation of the word "under" and it was considered better to have the word "by" inserted instead. You will find that in a few cases we are using the word "by" instead of "under" where it is definitely applicable.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 20a:—

In page 24, Article 14, Section 3, line 1, after the word "number" to insert the words "and may act notwithstanding a vacancy in their membership."

This is simply to cover a case where there might be a possible vacancy in the membership of the commission which is to act. For example, you might have a vacancy where some question of a dissolution or something of that sort arose. This is to make sure that the commission could act notwithstanding the vacancy in the membership. They could act by two of their number — there are three in all — if two agreed to act, and then the act of the commission would be valid.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 21:—

In page 24, line 4, Article 14, Section 4, to delete the word "of" and substitute the words "conferred on", and in line 5 to delete the word "under" and insert in lieu thereof the word "by".

This is exactly the same point as arose in a previous amendment.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

I take it that this is to delete the word where it secondly occurs?

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 22:—

In page 24, line 11, Article 14, Section 5, before the word "apply" to insert the words "subject to the subsequent provisions of this section", and at the end of the section to add the following new sub-section:

2º. In the event of the failure of the President to exercise or perform any power or function which the President is by this Constitution required to exercise or perform within a specified time, the said power or function shall be exercised or performed under this Article, as soon as may be after the expiration of the time so specified.

The purpose of this amendment is to provide that the failure of the President to act will not be clear until the time within which he is to act has passed. We want to make certain that the passage of time does not invalidate the action of the commission which would perform these functions instead of the President. The amendment states that "the said power or functions shall be exercised or performed under this Article as soon as may be after the expiration of the time so specified." The point is that a certain time is allowed for the signing of Bills, etc. Suppose the President had failed to act, his failure could not be determined until the period had passed. Then the question arises as to whether the commission, notwithstanding the fact that the period had passed, could act. To make it quite clear that they could act, we are inserting this new sub-section.

Comment on this

I am puzzled in regard to how this clause will work out in practice. Suppose the President refuses or neglects to sign a Bill, then the Commission comes into action, I understand, for the purpose of signing that Bill after the period has elapsed. Does it then continue in action or does it cease, or have you got the extraordinary state of affairs that the President is exercising the powers of President for some purposes and the Commission is exercising them for some others? If the President fails to act and the Commission comes along, does it continue to act through the continuance of his Presidency or what happens? I am trying to understand it and to visualise what will happen. It seems to me that you will have the Commission acting as President, and you will have the President acting as President, because there is nothing which terminates that situation. The incapacity of the President is simple enough because as soon as it has been found by the High Court that he is temporarily incapacitated, the Commission gets to work. I take it then that the High Court — I do not really know who determines it but probably it will be the High Court — determines as to whether his incapacity has ceased. I do not know whether that is the procedure to be adopted. Though that may give rise to some difficulty, it does not seem to me to be unsurmountable but I think this is altogether too vague as far as the "failure" end of the question is concerned because it is arguable that one failure to act may mean that for the rest of the seven years, you may have to put a Commission in his place. I know that is not the intention but I am not on the question of intention. I am on the question of how the thing is going to work in practice. It seems to me that there will be some very big difficulties arising out of this matter.

Comment on this

That is a matter that will have to be watched very carefully. The intention is to give effect to the actual words inserted here. However, we can have another look at it in the interval and see, if by any chance, it may not work out in the manner desired. The intention, as the Deputy is aware, is that if there was a particular failure in regard to a particular act, the Commission would step in and perform that act. If there was a succession of failures, they would nevertheless continue to act in the same manner until such a period had elapsed that it was quite clear that something had gone wrong with the machinery generally and that the measures that were designed for dealing with a temporary or momentary business, were being used as a permanent arrangement. There would have to be certain measures taken to deal with that case. It could happen, as the Deputy suggested, that you would have the Commission performing certain acts for the President and at the same time he himself might be performing other acts which he was willing to perform. We are dealing with what is obviously an abnormal happening in this case and we only want to provide that in the case of such an abnormality the machine would not be brought to a standstill. It may appear a bit extraordinary that you should have two persons— using the word "person" to cover the body, the Commission — performing the same type of act, but that would be altogether abnormal, and when we are dealing with abnormal situations we may expect that there will be some abnormal things happening.

Ordinarily, of course, what is going to happen is that the President is going to perform his functions; that he is going to keep his oath; that he is going to act for the purposes for which he was put into office. But you have to provide for the possibility of individual failures, or something of that kind, and the provision is made here. Again, we cannot possibly arrange for everything that might conceivably arise, but we have to see, at any rate, that the duties which are necessary for the validation of Acts and so on will be performed, and that the work of the State will go along, even though it seems to be going along with two bodies for the time being where there ought to be only one. I think the Deputy will admit that that would not be allowed to continue for any length of time. You would have to get rid of the President if he continued to act like that.

Comment on this

I wonder how you would get rid of him?

Comment on this

I do not know whether it would be for stated misbehaviour.

Comment on this

I still think the very great difficulty is whether this Commission might continue to work, because there is nothing which terminates the power of the Commission. It is really as much under Section 1 of Article 14 as it is under this new section that it arises. There does not seem to be anything to terminate the action; once they have come into action there does not seem to be anything that puts them out of action again.

Comment on this

But surely it is only in the event of his failure they act at all.

Comment on this

In the event of his absence or in the event of his temporary or permanent incapacity. Those things pass away. When he is no longer incapacitated, then of course their functions do not exist, but, in the event of his failure to exercise and perform his powers and functions, who is to decide as to whether he is willing again to exercise and perform the powers and functions? That is my difficulty. Perhaps he may not be. Perhaps he may be.

Comment on this

Of course, in the case of anything in the form of permanence, resignation, death or anything like that——

Comment on this

Those give me no difficulty.

Comment on this

That is what I thought. The difficulty, I take it, is that, when there is some individual failure on the part of the President to perform an act, the Commission comes in and performs that act for him. Next day, he may be ready to perform his functions as before. Now I take it—I am saying what I believe to be here; we will have it examined to see if there is any further point in what the Deputy says—that if, immediately afterwards, he performs that act, then the Commission has no right or power to perform any functions. He is performing the Presidential functions. The Commission has power only in the event of his failure to do that. If he does not fail they have no power.

Comment on this

If he does not fail, of course the commission does not come into being at all. Leaving out the unnecessary words, it says here that, in the event of the President's failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office, or any of them, "the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution shall be exercised and performed by a commission." As this stands, it would seem to me that once there has been a failure to exercise and perform the powers and functions of his office, the rest of the Presidential powers and functions of his office are in the commission, and that the commission exercises them for the rest of his presidency. That seems to me to be the meaning of this as it stands.

Comment on this

It is certainly not the intention.

Comment on this

He might fail to perform his functions. A Bill might come up to be signed, and he might forget it. Anybody may be guilty of an oversight. Then the commission might come in and sign it if the time were up. He simply failed to perform that act through an oversight, but it never would be the intention that he should cease to be President?

Comment on this

No.

Comment on this

It is merely a question of drafting. Of course those are abnormal things, but abnormal things happen.

Comment on this

I agree, and I am quite glad that the Deputy has raised the point. It is vital that the intention should be clear, and the intention undoubtedly is that the commission should only perform the individual acts which the President fails to perform, and that there should be no suggestion of the commission coming in, so to speak, to replace the President. As far as I can see from looking over this, it seems to indicate that that is the intention. On the other hand, by a bit of a strain it might possibly bear the interpretation which the Deputy suggests.

Comment on this

It is really more Section 14, 1º than this.

Comment on this

I am looking at 14 1º. I will have that matter examined carefully from that point of view.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 23:

In page 24, lines 26 and 27, Article 15, Section 2, sub-section 1º, to delete the word "Éire" and substitute in each case the words "the State".

This is only the same as we have had several times before.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 24:

In page 30, line 25, Article 16, Section 1, sub-section 2º, after the word "citizen" to insert the words "without distinction of sex".

This simply makes it clear that no person would be disqualified on the grounds of sex.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 25:

In page 30, Article 16, Section 1, to insert before sub-section 3º a new sub-section as follows:—

No law shall be enacted placing any citizen under disability or incapacity for membership of Dáil Eireann on the ground of sex or disqualifying any citizen from voting at an election for members of Dáil Eireann on that ground.

This is to make explicit what I think was already implied in the draft which we had—the fact that there should be no law placing any citizen under disability or incapacity on the grounds of sex, or disqualifying any citizen from voting on that ground. It is simply to meet a point raised by one of the Deputies on the opposite benches in connection with Article 16. There was a general right that they would have irrespective of sex, and then there was a clause dealing with disqualifications to be made by law. It was thought important that those disqualifications could not be made on the grounds of sex.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 25a:

In page 36, lines 15 and 16, Article 18, Section 4, paragraph (iii), to delete the words "by the electorate hereinafter specified" and in Section 7 to delete lines 25 and 26; and in line 27 to delete the words "such members" and insert in lieu thereof the words "the members of Seanad Eireann to be elected from panels of candidates"; and in line 28 after the word "formed" to insert the words "in the manner provided by law".

Deputies will remember that there was an amendment from the opposite benches, the purpose of which was to leave to law the whole question of the composition of the Seanad. I resisted that on the ground that the more we could put into the Constitution the better, so as to give a certain stability to the Parliament. On the other hand, a good deal of dissatisfaction has been expressed with regard to the electorate, and I do not think we lose anything by leaving that over to the law. Deputy MacDermot, I think, has an amendment here providing a different method, and I think, on the whole, we lose nothing by leaving the question of the nature of the electorate —the manner in which the members who are on the panel should be elected —to the ordinary law. If we had a really satisfactory suggestion I would naturally desire to see it in the Constitution, but I think nobody can say that we have got any really satisfactory suggestion as to the method of electing the Seanad. That was one of the difficulties which I pointed out when we had those debates about the Seanad originally. We are now up against trying to get a satisfactory electorate. This was one of the suggestions in the commission's report. I thought it was better than the Dáil for the reason that I gave on the Committee Stage, but I do not think it is sufficiently good to stereotype it and to make it permanent in the Constitution.

Comment on this

I am glad the President has decided to drop the clauses about the electorate which was to choose from the panels for the Seanad, because I think those clauses are the most unsatisfactory part of the entire Constitution; but I admit that the question they are attempting to solve is also, perhaps, the most difficult question in the entire Constitution. It is an extremely difficult problem to get a satisfactory electorate to choose from those panels. I am very glad, too, that the President has decided to retain the general scheme of panels in the Constitution, where I think it ought to be. I think it would be farcical to introduce a Constitution, creating a balanced system of two Houses of Parliament and a President, without giving an outline of the nature of one of these Houses. I have amendments down in connection with the electorate. We discussed one already, namely, the substitution of the Dáil for this combination of candidates elected to the Dáil and candidates not elected. I felt that the other amendment was impossible of acceptance before a general election, whatever chance there might be after a general election. I am, therefore, exceedingly pleased that the question should be left over. My feeling is that, if you are to have a Seanad which is not to function mainly on Party lines and with Party motives, the electorate to choose it should be a small one and a select one. Therefore, I made the proposal in the amendment, that it should be a selection commission consisting of "not less than seven and not more than 12 persons appointed by the President none of whom shall be a member of Dáil Eireann." Those who, at first sight, might be inclined to resist that should remember that, after all, other Second Chambers have functioned not altogether unsuccessfully with considerably less democratic methods of appointment.

There is in Canada, I believe, a system of nomination the particulars of which I have forgotten. In Great Britain you have always appointments to the Second Chamber by nomination of the Prime Minister. In the amendment it is proposed that selection from the panels should be not by the Prime Minister, and not even by the President, who is supposed to be a non-political authority—and whom I would therefore prefer to the Prime Minister for the purpose—but by a commission consisting of a small number of what I hope will be highly-qualified and independent persons appointed for the purpose by the President, with a full sense of his responsibility to the State as a non-political authority at the time of the appointment.

If the President had accepted my amendment now, it would, of course, have added fuel to the flame being ignited all over the country with regard to the alleged threat of dictatorship by the new functionary, the President. Therefore, I saw plainly when I put it down, that he could not accept it. It may be that in another Parliament, whatever Government may be in office after this election, some plan of this kind will be seen to give the best chance of getting a selection made from the panels on a non-political basis. All those interested in the question of the Seanad, bodies connected with trade, commerce and finance, that have been thinking about this matter during the last few weeks, have invariably felt that there was little chance under the provisions of the Constitution, as it stands, of getting the right men selected from the panels. I am glad the clauses about the electorate have been dropped, and I hope the wisdom of the next Parliament will provide a more satisfactory solution.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 26:

In page 36, line 29, Article 18, Section 7, sub-section 1º, before the word "knowledge" to delete the word "practical" and to insert before the word "experience" the word "practical".

I am simply putting in the word "practical" to qualify "experience" rather than "knowledge". I do not think there is a great deal in it. The wording will look better in that form.

Comment on this

I move amendment No. 27:—

In page 38, Article 18, Section 7, to delete sub-sections 2º, 3º, 4º, 5º and 6º and substitute a new sub-section as follows:—

"Not more than eleven and, subject to the privisions of Article 19 hereof, not less than five members of Seanad Eireann shall be elected from any one panel."

This amendment is really consequential on the dropping of the electorate in amendment No. 25a. We want to retain, however, the restriction, "not more than 11, and, subject to the provisions of Article 19 hereof, not less than five." We want to make sure that the number capable of being elected from each panel shall be less than five and not greater than 11. That restricts the possibility of juggling with it for the purpose of getting any party advantage.

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