Committee on Finance. - Recommittal.
Contributions 225–438 of 668. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 3 parts.
Am I to take it from the intended amendment that there is to be unanimity in the size of the panel?
Comment on this
Is it that every panel shall contain 11 members or five members, or that one panel may have one number and another panel another number?
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I wish the Deputy would not interrupt. The amendment says that not less than five members and not more than 11 shall be elected from any one panel. Does not that rather suggest that every panel is to have equality in the number?
Comment on this
That is not suggested, and if there is any point in that I would have to have the text before me to satisfy myself completely about it. Originally we had an amendment to the effect that from the panel you were restricted in choice to this extent that not less than five persons could be elected from one panel and not more than 11. We would have to have the whole scheme back again to see the full effect. When dropping the electorate we wanted to preserve that one condition, the purpose of which is to prevent the Legislature in its laws from juggling around with numbers in the panel, giving what would be unfair representation to one panel and denying just representation to another panel. The intention was to have any number which would fit in. I had to work it out for myself to make sure that it was workable. I had worked out a scheme by which we could say that law would be brought in to follow the provisions of the Constitution. I worked out the number under various panels, and I think I gave an illustration in Committee of the need for a certain amount of inequality.
I said the universities are given six members. Presumably the professions and education will be fairly well represented on their selection. Hence there does not seem to be as good a reason for giving on the education panel as large a number as there might be, for example, for giving labour or industry or agriculture. Again, as to public administration, there does not seem to be as good a reason for giving as large a representation to public administration as there would be for giving it, say, to agriculture or to labour. I wanted to provide for inequalities within a certain range. We were leaving it over to law to determine the exact numbers to be elected from each panel, but we wanted to restrict the law so that it would not be open to the Legislature to say: "We will only put on half-a-dozen, say, from agriculture, and we will put them on from labour," or "We will give only one for labour," or something of that sort. We wanted to provide for inequality within a reasonable range, and the five and the eleven were a range within which I have been able to work out a scheme myself.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 30:—
In page 40, line 23, Article 19, to insert before the word "panels" the words "the corresponding".
The idea I have is that, if you had a direct election on to panels, and, let us say, you had a functional organisation which was clearly one of a type that it should have its members elected, say, to the first panel, you would not make room for them by robbing the second or third panel of its members. You want to have a correspondence between the functional organisation and the panel to which they would be allowed to elect members. The best we could do was to put in the words "the corresponding". To do it more fully would require a very long section, and I think it is sufficiently clear.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 31:—
In page 46, lines 5 and 6, Article 23, Section 1, to delete the words "in respect of which a resolution shall have been passed by Dáil Eireann" and substitute the words "the time for the consideration of which by Seanad Eireann shall have been abridged".
Amendments 31 to 35, inclusive, are really textual amendments. The original words were "in respect of which a resolution shall have been passed by Dáil Eireann". These would not be sufficient, because it is when the full procedure had been gone through and when the time was, in fact, abridged. It is a mere textual change to make clear beyond doubt what was the intention.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 36:—
In page 58, lines 7 and 8, Article 28, Section 1, to delete the words "of Eire, herein generally referred to as the Government".
That is a mere textual change, deleting these words and making the word "Government" instead.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 41:—
In page 68, line 5, Article 31, Section 1, to delete the word "under" and substitute the word "by" and in line 6 after the word "Constitution" to insert the words "expressed to be".
This is of the type I have already referred to, namely, changing the word "under" and substituting the word "by," where it is clear that "by" is the better word. Then we want the words "expressed to be" inserted. The Article reads: "There shall be a Council of State to aid and counsel the President on all matters on which the President may consult the said council in relation to the exercise and performance by him of such of his powers and functions as are ...," then it will be "by this Constitution expressed to be exercisable and performable," because we have it expressed in the Constitution that they were to be exercisable. It is simply "expressed to be exercisable and performable" by him.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 43:—
In page 76, line 1, Article 34, Section 5, sub-section 1º, to insert after the word "Constitution" the words "and the laws".
This is simply that a judge is to swear to uphold not merely the Constitution but the laws.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 44:—
In page 78, lines 11 and 12, Article 35, Section 5, to delete the words "of the Supreme Court or of the High Court".
There was a certain wish expressed from the Opposition Benches that the judges of the Circuit Court and the other courts should not be, as regards remuneration, in a less satisfactory position than the other judges. This puts all judges in the position in which their salary cannot be changed, so as to give them an assurance that their independence is not being interfered with by the Executive.
Comment on this
This amendment may effect the purpose which it is proposed to effect, but is there anything in the Constitution in which Circuit Court judges and district justices are mentioned at all? So far as I know, the provisions here about the courts simply deal with the High Courts. There is no definition of a judge anywhere, so far as I know. Article 35, 1º, may possibly help you.
Comment on this
Or Article 34, Section 5, sub-section 2º, which refers to "the judges of every other court".
Comment on this
Article 35, 1º says: "Judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court and all other courts," but we are not told what the other courts are. We have no definition of a judge.
Comment on this
We speak of justice being administered in public courts and we say that "the courts shall comprise Courts of First Instance and a Court of Final Appeal."
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The President may be right. If he is satisfied that it covers Circuit Court judges and district justices I am satisfied. Of course, I have not had very much time to go through it this morning, but if it makes it clear that Circuit Court judges and district justices shall not have their salary altered, it is an improvement.
Comment on this
This would cover anybody who would be characterised as a "judge." We are speaking about courts that have been established. Of course, these courts have to be established by law and those who have been administering justice in public courts come under the name of judges. I do not think there is any definite or immediate definition of "judge."
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I am not pressing it as the President is satisfied that the district court judges are covered. I only wanted an assurance that they were covered.
Comment on this
I suggest that every person who takes the declaration at the bottom of page 74 and at the top of page 75 is readily identifiable as a judge.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 45:—
In page 80, lines 30 and 32, Article 39, to delete the word "Eire" and substitute in each case the words "the State".
This amendment is of the usual type.
Comment on this
That was not conveyed to me, or at least it did not reach me. I respectfully submit that it is in order and that it arises completely out of the previous paragraph about differentiation of function and capacity.
Comment on this
I do not want to argue but I do submit that in the case of employees in the State service, they are directly concerned in the previous paragraph of this Article. However, if the Ceann Comhairle has ruled I cannot controvert his opinion.
Comment on this
On behalf of Deputy McGilligan, I move amendment No. 47:
In page 82, line 12, Article 40, Section 1, to add after the word "function" the words following: "Such enactments shall, however, contain no sex, class or religious discrimination."
We had a similar amendment down on the Committee Stage, and it was withdrawn to enable the President to consider certain points that arose in it. I do not know whether the President has any views on the matter or not.
Comment on this
My views are not changed on this matter. There was no suggestion at any particular time pointing to any particular class. Section 1 of Article 40 is of a positive character. It is simply declaratory. But in this amendment there is a new principle binding the Legislature in future with regard to "sex, class or religious discrimination." I do not know whether "discrimination" means distinction or only discrimination; it possibly means differentiation. I think we would be going very far if we say we are not going to make any distinction in the laws. Without expressing an opinion I do not see why we should bind ourselves completely, in advance, in that respect. It would seem to me to be putting something in Section 1 which is not contained in it at all at the moment.
Comment on this
The amendment may be open to the verbal objections that the President has raised as to the meaning of the word "discrimination" or whether it is unjust discrimination or otherwise. The substance of the amendment, as proposed on the last occasion, was to the effect that it should be provided in the Constitution that the law in dealing with any of the matters covered by Article 40 should contain no sex distinction. It was thought proper that coupled with that particular consideration as to discrimination or class distinction in legislation, that class distinction and distinction in religion should also be provided for. Section 1 of Article 40 being open to certain constructions, the general object of the amendment was, that it should be made apparent that these constructions would not allow of the enactment of law by the Legislature discriminating between classes of workers, and industrialists and different religions. The President, apparently, has made up his mind on the subject and there is very little use in going over the ground that we went over before. I understand that the President, while objecting to the word "class," promised to consider the question and to put something into this Article which would calm the fears of these ladies or women's organisations in the matter of these expressions here "differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function." These words might be held to allow the Legislature hereafter to pass laws in such a way that sex or religious qualifications might be imported into our law.
Comment on this
There is no doubt that it would be possible, as far as we can go, to prevent the Legislature in future doing things that would be unfair or unjust. But the danger is that in trying to prevent injustice we might also prevent justice from being done.
I have always contended that the second clause here has not the meaning which is attached to it. The second part of Section 1 is to provide that the first part of the section should not be stretched in a direction in which it was never meant to be stretched. The point aimed at was equality before the law. That is justice in the court. I think the amendment is importing into the Article completely extraneous ideas. I see no reason why we should do that.
Comment on this
May I put one particular example of the kind of thing that would appear to be allowable under the paragraph of the Article as it stands and as it is proposed to stand? The clause provides that the State shall in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function. The expression "enactments" would, of course, include administrative action or orders made pursuant to statutes of the Legislature. Now, under these administrative actions and orders the Civil Service of the State is divided into certain classes or categories. As between various categories in the Civil Service we find a distinction made between married men and unmarried men. We find a distinction made as between men and unmarried women. It is really to cover that class of case that the amendment was put down in its original form. It is well known, of course, that there are people working in the Civil Service in the same category and doing the same class of work. One is married, the other unmarried. They pass the same examination, but one gets more pay than the other. That is permissible under the present law. But not merely would it be permissible, if this Constitution goes through, but it would get constitutional benediction and that is a matter that should be considered.
Comment on this
I do not know about getting a constitutional benediction. I do not agree with that. If we have to provide for other things it does not follow of necessity that there has been a benediction for doing it in one particular direction. I am not going to argue here the merits of that whole scheme of laws. They were enacted by the previous Government and are continued by us. If there is any injustice being done, there is no reason why it should not be remedied. I am not accepting it that there is injustice, but if the Deputy has a case to make, there is nothing here to prevent it being followed up or any representations being made in regard to it.
Comment on this
It is quite clear from the discussion that has taken place that this is the situation: The President desires that the Legislature of the future shall not be deprived of power to legislate along sex lines, if they think it necessary to do so. The President feels that some future Legislature may desire to have regard to differences of capacity, physical or moral, as between men and women and he thinks it would not be right to prevent an enactment along those lines, if such were thought desirable. I take it the President must see the possibility of legislation being required here which will make a distinction as between men and women and it is his desire not to have that prohibited.
Comment on this
This does not suggest that at all. I am not taking the Deputy's summarising of the case as being accurate. The position really is this. I have not had sufficient examination of all the possibilities that might arise in connection with action such as the repeal of these enactments to which Deputy Costello has referred to say at this particular time that we would have here by means of the Constitution to override the existing situation. That can only be done by examination afterwards. We are not going to pass something in the Constitution which might overrun and be pleaded against the whole of the existing situation. If that situation is not satisfactory, let it be remedied on its own, and not by an Article in the Constitution.
Comment on this
The Article sets out that all the citizens shall be held equal before the law. Then we have the first exception, that the State may, however, in its enactments, have due regard to differences in capacity, physical and moral. I suggest as an amendment that such enactments shall not contain any sex discrimination. Why will the President not accept that? I suggest it is because he wants to leave the door open to future legislation based on grounds of sex.
Comment on this
The Deputy knows full well that that is not so. I say that if there are things of that sort that have to be remedied, let them be remedied on their own. If there is something unfair in the existing situation, let it be remedied on its own.
Comment on this
There will not be acceptance of an amendment which sets out that there shall not be discrimination on grounds of sex. The Constitution starts off with a phrase about the rights of the people, that the people shall be equal before the law. But then we have it that the State must have regard to differences of capacity. When an amendment is moved suggesting that you shall not have any regard to discrimination based on sex there is a refusal to accept that. What can one conclude?
Comment on this
This is a matter in which I take a special interest. I think this should be preserved, because it is possible that a conscription law would be passed, and if everyone is equal and if equal rights would imply equal duties, it might be very unfair to women that they would be conscripted in the same way as men. Therefore, there should be some protection for them. I do not know what Deputy McGilligan means by discrimination.
Comment on this
Does the Deputy understand the Constitution? This phrase is copied from the Constitution.
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I am interested in that particular aspect. Perhaps the Deputy will explain what would happen in that case?
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In any case, the same door was left open in the old Constitution and there were a great many sorts of evil legislation that could have been thought of by the framers of the old Constitution and that they could have sought to provide against and did not provide against because they very sensibly thought it was a hopeless task to bind the Parliaments of all time in such a way as to prevent them passing mischievous legislation. Is it, therefore, fair to say that the framers of the old Constitution were not legislating blindly, that they must have thought of all the evil things that could be done, and as they did not put anything in the Constitution to prevent those things being done, therefore they must have contemplated their being done, if not actually wanting them to be done?
Comment on this
That is a very puerile argument. The fact that some door was left open by a previous Constitution is not an answer to a question of principle. Whoever drafted that Constitution may have been wrong, but we have a chance of remedying it now if it was wrong. To say that something else was done previously which ought not to be done now, that if the door was left open it ought not to be shut now is, to put it mildly, merely puerile. I was not endeavouring to remedy existing grievances or injustices. The whole purport of the amendment is to provide that the law will not make any undue discrimination against women and in favour of men. Could anything be clearer?
Comment on this
The Deputy qualifies his discrimination with the word "undue." When Deputy McGilligan spoke it showed me how necessary it was to have this second portion here. I was not completely and absolutely convinced of the necessity for the second part until Deputy McGilligan went on to interpret the first part in a way altogether different from the manner in which it arose originally. I think Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, when he was speaking on this particular matter, restricted the use of that to equal justice in the courts. I have no doubt that was the original intention, that when people came before the courts, where it was A or B, the case was investigated irrespective of who A or B was. Now, undoubtedly, it has stretched from that meaning to mean that in all law citizens should be regarded as equal, which would make all law impossible, because we have constantly to distinguish between classes. If we want to be just we have to do it. We have to distinguish in our laws between the functions in the community. Whatever doubts I had before, I am satisfied from the way in which Deputy McGilligan has interpreted the meaning of the first part of this that it is essential that we should have the second part.
Comment on this
Deputy Mrs. Concannon asked me the meaning of a phrase that is here. Does she admit she does not understand what a religious or a class discrimination is?
Comment on this
Then it is only the difficult word "sex" she is concerned about? Deputy Mrs. Concannon does understand what a political, a religious or a class discrimination would mean.
Comment on this
But the Deputy has voted for Article 40, which contains that. It was introduced by the President, who also said he did not understand what this word "class" meant. But his Constitution contains the word. If Deputy Mrs. Concannon cannot understand what a sex discrimination is, but does understand a political, a religious or a class discrimination, then I am not able to answer her.
Comment on this
What I mean is quite easily explained. I do not want any discrimination in laws made based on this, that some laws are to apply to men because they are men, and others to women because they are women.
Comment on this
I have not yet found the case in which it is necessary. The Deputy talked about conscription, but have we that here?
Comment on this
We will see what happens if conscription is introduced and if the phrase corresponding to the phrase in Article 3 of the old Constitution were here. That is where Deputy MacDermot has not even read the old Constitution. Article 3 simply stated that every person, without distinction of sex, who had done various things— there were certain qualifications that had to be passed of birth and residence —becomes a citizen of the Free State, and, as such, is subject to obligations and duties and has the rights of citizens. If anything was passed thereafter, that being the constitutional proviso, a constitutional case could have been argued as to whether it was right or wrong. The phrase "without distinction of sex" put into this Constitution—the Article being "all citizens without distinction of sex shall be held equal before the law"— would suit perfectly. If there is any case arising hereafter, it is a matter for constitutional argument, and if it is necessary to have it done as a matter of conscription, a constitutional amendment with regard to that special matter could be brought forward. That is what is asked here, and that is what Deputy Mrs. Concannon, as a lady Deputy, is going to vote on.
Is the situation not absolutely clear-cut? I do not think there is any necessity for further argument on it. The Article says "All citizens shall be held equal before the law", and thereafter it says: "The State shall have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral." I want to know does that mean a discrimination on the ground of sex broadly on the basis that certain people are going to be affected as men and certain others as women? I want to prevent that. Deputy Mrs. Concannon does not understand what I want to prevent, and she is anxious to let that discrimination occur on the sole ground of the possibility of there being a conscription law.
Comment on this
We will get the others when the Deputy thinks of them, but at the moment we have one, and for that possibility of conscription being introduced here, Deputy Mrs. Concannon agrees with the President that the door should be flung wide open and that in all sorts of enactments under the Constitution regard should be had——
Comment on this
Who is to decide on the "due regard"? The people who pass the law. There again we get this discrimination that runs right through the whole Constitution. You give a right. Who is going to determine whether the right is being properly given to the people? The courts, and then you subtract from that right by the law. Who is going to determine the law? The Deputies. You can eat away from what the courts ought to be the guardians of, by what the Deputies, the majority at any time, like to do. Is it a right thing to have such a big point as the rights of citizens and their equality before the law to be determined hereafter not by the independent judiciary but by a Party majority in the House? That is the big test there is.
Comment on this
Deputy McGilligan keeps talking about throwing open doors. I repeat that there are no doors being thrown open. He suggests that I have not read Article 3 of the old Constitution. I had it open before me when I spoke, and I have it open before me still, and Article 3 of the old Constitution, so far as women are concerned, does no more than to assure them the rights of citizenship on the same basis as men. It does nothing whatever to protect them against the kind of legislation which Deputy McGilligan now says he is afraid of. It is relevant to consider what was done in the old Constitution, because, in the first place, it is relevant to the question of the sincerity of the objections that are being made to this Constitution by the people who amended the old Constitution freely while in office and who might have amended it in this respect——
Comment on this
——if they considered it necessary to do so. They did not consider it necessary to do so.
Comment on this
That is what I am saying. They did not feel, while they had power to amend the Constitution, this urgent need to close the door against discriminatory functional legislation. Why do they feel it now? There is nothing in the principle laid down there about having regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and social functions that is in any way novel. During the last year, throughout the Christian Front movement and Christian action activity and the propaganda based on Papal Encyclicals, great stress has been laid on all this and it is amazing that Deputies should now treat it as if it were an unheard-of novelty to suggest that there were these differences; but the statement of that undeniable fact, a statement that there may be cases when we are not prepared to rule ourselves out in advance from making any difference in our legislation between men and women, does not mean that anybody has a desire to start anti-feminist legislation. After all, the fundamental fact with regard to this Constitution, with regard to the last Constitution and with regard to every Constitution is that you are essaying an utterly hopeless task if you try to close every door to bad legislation in the future. You cannot do it.
Comment on this
It is extraordinary that it is now Deputies on the other benches are discovering all these prohibitions that were in the old Constitution. I take it that they accepted in 1924 and, particularly in 1926, when the matter was raised, this question of the discrimination between men and women in the public service, for example. They had the old Constitution and, nevertheless, they went ahead and made that difference. Reading Article 3, I see nothing in it which closes any door. What we are doing here is trying to safeguard the first part of that Article from being stretched in a direction which I believe was an altogether unwarranted direction. It has, however, been stretched in that direction and I wanted to meet it in the statement that all citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. I believe that phrase originated in quite a different way from that in which it is sought to be used, that you must in law not differentiate between the sexes. I believe you may have to differentiate in some cases and I am not prejudging the situation in this clause of the Article at all. I am saying that citizens as human persons are held equal and that it shall not be held to mean, as Deputy McGilligan wants it to mean, that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity and so on. I think we are acting wisely in leaving that section as it is.
Comment on this
It seems to me that while Deputy MacDermot was speaking President de Valera must have been shouting out to himself “non tali auxilio” because I think Deputy MacDermot's intervention must have been a very sore and unpleasant one to the President. What is his argument? The old Constitution is impeccable the old Constitution is perfect. Is that not what it comes down to? You have something in the old Constitution and, therefore, it ought to remain. Taking it for granted that Deputy MacDermot is right, that the old Constitution cannot be improved upon, then the whole ground is cut completely and entirely from under the President's feet and I think the President obviously cannot be very happy when Deputy MacDermot brings the force of his mighty reasoning powers to his assistance, but certain things are expressed and, as the President himself has stated, everything cannot be dealt with precisely at the same time. In every measure, certain questions remain dormant, so to speak. Then, they become vitalised. They come under discussion and are considered for the first time. Then it becomes necessary for a decision to be come to one way or the other. This particular question did lie dormant while the old Constitution was being discussed. It is not dormant now. It has come to life. There are issues now before the House. Since these issues have come to life within the House and have been, if I may say so, vitalised by discussion outside the House, the House cannot refuse to give a ruling on points which did not arise during the discussion of the Constitution now in force.
Comment on this
This Article merely provides that the State shall have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social functions. I think that is already well recognised in the existing laws. I may cite two examples of laws in which the State has due regard to the differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function. Recently, we passed a Widows' and Orphans' Pensions Bill. In that measure, discrimination is made between a widow and a widower. A widower cannot qualify under that Act for a pension. If we omitted a statement of an obvious fact from our Constitution, would it be constitutional for us to discriminate between the social function of men and women and to grant pensions to widows while we denied them to widowers? The second example occurred to me while Deputy McGilligan was speaking. I refer to the Slander of Women Act. That is an Act in which the State has due regard to the differences between men and women. No such Act applies to men. From those two instances, it will be seen that the statement in the Constitution is a statement of an existing fact, already recognised by the laws of the State.
Comment on this
The discussion has been useful from this viewpoint—that it has made quite clear that the President did not like to put in the phrase "having due regard to difference of sex" and, therefore, cloaked it under "due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral". The examples given by Deputy Keely and Deputy Mrs. Concannon and any other examples that can be thought of are indicative of the intention that there should be discrimination on the ground of sex.
Comment on this
Let us leave out of the argument for the moment whether that is right or wrong, whether it is right that one thing should be written into the Constitution and that the subtraction should be by means of law, instead of putting it all in the Constitution itself. Deputy Keely has his mind absolutely clear on this matter. He has given two examples from the past. That is the sort of thing he is projecting into the future. He wants to be able to discriminate on the ground of sex.
Comment on this
It was not in our mind at all. The whole of this discussion was raised by the Opposition. The possibility of sex discrimination originated with the Opposition.
Comment on this
When the other side wanted to disprove the case made, they founded themselves entirely on the argument as to discrimination on the ground of sex.
Comment on this
All the arguments were arguments showing discrimination on the ground of sex. That is what is wanted.
Comment on this
Discrimination on the ground of sex occurs only in your amendment. There is nothing about it in the Constitution.
Comment on this
Not explicitly. Deputy Mrs. Concannon might be in trouble with ladies of her acquaintance if it were explicit. It is not explicit but it is implied.
Comment on this
I shall give the Deputy the woman's privilege in a moment. The Deputy brings forward one example where she holds there is a discrimination between men and women. Deputy Keely gives us examples from the past. That is the whole atmosphere of the argument— the necessity for this discrimination. Let us move on to another point. Suppose you do want to discriminate on ground of sex, look at what is done. A grand constitutional right, to be adjudicated upon by the courts, is set out—that all people are equal. Then immediately comes in the question of the law. The law will not be thrown down because it is contrary to the Constitution. The judges will have nothing to say to that. The requirements of the law will be set out, and we make clear here that we want to be able to take into account the differences between the sexes.
Comment on this
We want to be able to pass laws discriminating between the sexes and to put the matter in such a way that nobody can go to the High Court or Supreme Court and question that law or get it set aside on the ground that it is contrary to the Constitution. Away goes the Constitution! What is the point raised by Deputy Donnelly, after reading the Article for the first time to-day?
Comment on this
"With due regard." Is the argument that, though you have passed laws discriminating between the sexes, the question as to whether you have had "due regard" can be brought before the High Court or the Supreme Court?
Comment on this
If there were lawyers like those on the Opposition Benches, they would probably bring it before the court.
Comment on this
The brilliant mind of the President does not conceive that that ought to be allowed—that it should be open to bring a case before the High Court on the argument that the law had not had "due regard." The President would not like to have that made a constitutional question. It is not possible to make it a constitutional question under this Article. The Legislature will pass the law. Does Deputy Donnelly think that the High Court or the Supreme Court is going to set aside under that Article as it stands any law passed here on the ground that due regard has not been paid to "differences of capacity, physical or moral"? If the Deputy is thinking of taking a constitutional case on these grounds hereafter, let him remember my admonition to him now: "Do not take it; it would be foolish."
Deputies on the opposite side want this discrimination and they want it mainly—if I am to judge from the examples given—on the ground of sex. This other phrase about "capacity, physical and moral" is only a nice way of getting Deputies like Deputy Mrs. Concannon to vote for the Article and be able to say that sex discrimination was not referred to in the Constitution.
Comment on this
Deputy Mrs. Concannon will walk blindly behind her leader into the lobby and proclaim to all the world that there was no question of sex discrimination.
Comment on this
Not even hidden? What was the old position, if I may return to Article 3? I am amused by the fact that, although Deputy MacDermot has been here three years, he does not yet know what Article 3 means. In a short time he will probably stop reading Article 3 and forget all about it. Article 3 was not put in to last for all time. Already I have contrasted the humility of the people who brought in the original Constitution with the attitude adopted by those who have brought in this Draft Constitution. The old Constitution was open to amendment by the easy method of ordinary legislation for eight years. That period was extended to 16 years, which period is still running. No attempt was made to close down on that although it could have been done. If we wanted to leave a rigid Constitution behind us we could have amended that Article before we left office. We did not do that. We left the Constitution open to amendment by way of ordinary legislation. It was brought in, and it was stated when it was passing through the Dáil first, that undoubtedly there were things that would only be discovered after the Constitution had been tested out by experience over a number of years. On an appeal being made the original period of four years was, without a division, enlarged to eight years, and later enlarged to 16. The present Constitution for a period of three years may, subject to the discretion of whoever is President, be amended by way of ordinary legislation. During that period the President may send any law to the people by way of Referendum, but after three years it becomes rigid and fast. One of the things that you cannot amend in this Constitution is this three-year period. The House is now being asked to pass this constitutional right, and then there is to be a subtraction of all the good from that constitutional right by process of law. That is going to be the constitutional position, that laws may be passed subtracting all the good from that constitutional right which cannot be amended except by Referendum after three years.
What did Article 3 of the old Constitution give? It established people as citizens, and went on to say that everybody who was a citizen—there was no discrimination of sex—had all the privileges and obligations of citizenship. There was a variety of Articles afterwards setting out the privileges of citizenship. One was that there could not be any discrimination with regard to sex. If there was any doubt about that it could have been tested as to whether that was the constitutional position or not, but such action was not adopted towards it. Can it be said that we will have the same situation in the future?
Comment on this
Every habeas corpus case could be derided as being more work for the lawyers, but there were men snatched out of jail against oppressive types of Governments by the habeas corpus type of activity, and all that can now be derided as work for the lawyers. There was a safeguarding of the citizen. This derision of the lawyers means also derision of the courts. Article 3 established the constitutional position. It could be amended as easily as any other part of the Constitution, but if the key had been turned in the padlock after the first eight years, then the whole Constitution was rigid. Women would then have had the particular matter of citizenship on an equal footing with men, so that whatever Articles afterwards set out the rights and duties of citizenship, they had them equally with men as part of the Constitution. That is not the position in this Constitution. Deputy Mrs. Concannon has told us that she does not believe that there is sex discrimination in the Article.
Comment on this
I certainly do not accept the words "sex discrimination." The words of the Article are:—
This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function.
I think that in these words there is a necessary protection for women. The words "sex discrimination" do not come into the Article.
Comment on this
Deputy McGilligan has accused me of not understanding Article 3 of the old Constitution, but he utterly omitted to point out in what respect I failed to understand it. I offer him this challenge. Will he mention any law discriminating in an undesirable manner against women that he can think of that would be possible under the new Constitution and that was not possible under the old Constitution? If he can, then I agree that we ought to think seriously whether some amendment is not necessary. I personally have not been able to think of such a law. Deputy McGilligan considers that all sorts of safeguards should be provided now, but they were not provided before, and I want to know whether the Constitution as it stands does really create any danger for women that did not exist before. If it does not, why should we work ourselves up into a fever about it?
Comment on this
Under the old Constitution all citizens were guaranteed equal rights of citizenship, and guaranteed them without distinction of sex.
Comment on this
Is there an amendment which prevents enactments being made having due regard to physical capacity? None. What is the good of putting in a plus while you have a large minus hidden away which subtracts everything that the plus gives you? Laws may be made having due regard "to differences of capacity, physical and moral."
Comment on this
If there was a law passed citizens were granted equal rights. You had men and women on an equal footing. One right was with regard to the free expression of opinion, and another the right to form associations or unions. There could never have been, under the old Constitution, a law passed saying that men would have the right to form certain associations and that women would not.
Comment on this
It can. What is to prevent a law being made hereafter saying that, as between citizens in the matter of the right to form associations, a discrimination is made against women on the grounds of sex? Nothing. There is no constitutional prohibition that I can see, and if there is one I want to have it pointed out to me.
Comment on this
If Deputy McGilligan's amendment were accepted, is there anything to prevent the State at a future date passing a Conscription Act, supposing the State was at war, to conscript the members of religious communities in the country. Is the Deputy's amendment designed to see that there shall be no discrimination, and that, therefore, there could be an attack on the members of religious communities?
Comment on this
In the Constitution it is laid down that there shall be due regard to social function. If Deputy McGilligan's amendment were accepted it would mean that we could not have due regard to social function because religious discrimination is to be ruled out. I suggest that is very significant.
Comment on this
Deputy McGilligan seems to have chosen a rather unfortunate example of the kind of legislation that he has in mind when he refers to freedom of association as something that was secured for women by the old Constitution and that is not secured for them by the new Constitution. This is the reference in the old Constitution to freedom of association:—
"The right... to form associations or unions, is guaranteed for purposes not opposed to public morality. Laws regulating the manner in which the right of forming associations and the right of free assembly may be exercised——
are not these sinister words when we look back on some of the discussions that took place last week—
"shall contain no political, religious or class distinction."
Why that is positively inviting sex distinction.
Comment on this
The trouble with Deputy MacDermot is that he can only read one Article of the Constitution and understand it. He cannot carry his understanding backward or forward to any other Article. Article 3 of the old Constitution provided that all persons, without distinction of sex, had the rights of citizenship, and a series of Articles after that set out the rights of the citizen. One of them was the right with regard to associations. There was no necessity to put in a "no sex" distinction, because that was already in Article 3. Once a person is a citizen, the rights flow, and you could not discriminate, when you are giving citizenship, on grounds of sex. So, if Deputy MacDermot will tire himself by reading Article 3 as closely as the other Article, he should be able to get the point clear. As to the last point made by Deputy Keely, it is hardly worth dealing with.
Comment on this
It is possible under the present Constitution. If Deputy Keely says that it is not, will he tell me what stops him from doing so?
Comment on this
I should just like to say, Sir, that I do not accept Deputy McGilligan's interpretation of the joint effect of Article 3 and Article 9, but we cannot go on arguing for ever.
Comment on this
Well, that is one of the worst decisions I have ever heard—one of the very worst I have ever heard.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 48:—
In page 82, Article 40, Section 2, sub-section 1º, to delete line 14.
This deals with orders of merit.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 49:—
In page 82, line 15, Article 40, Section 2, sub-section 2º, to delete the words "conferred on" and substitute the words "accepted by."
That is an amendment which I indicated I would accept. I think it was an amendment by Deputy MacDermot.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 49a:—
In page 84, Article 40, Section 6, sub-section 1º, paragraph (i), line 25, after the word "expression" to insert the words "including criticism of Government policy".
This is to meet a point raised by Deputy MacDermot.
Comment on this
On this amendment a very serious issue arises. A long discussion took place on this Article on the Committee Stage dealing with the effect of what I shall call, subject to protest—if I might put it that way— the proviso to clause 1 of the Article. Various suggestions were put forward from this side of the House as to the possible construction that would be put on this proviso, which would have the effect of limiting the right of free speech and the freedom of the Press. The President, I think, was to have considered some of the suggestions that we put forward, that the section was capable of being construed in such a way as to cut down the liberty of free speech and the liberty of the Press. Now I gather from the President that the only amendment that has been accepted, the only suggestion to which any weight has been attached at all, is the suggestion that the words "including criticism of Government policy" should be inserted in the proviso to clause 1, paragraph (i) of the Article. In my view the effect of that, so far from improving the Article, will, in fact and in law, render more forceful all the arguments we advanced here on the last stage of the measure in reference to the possible effect of this Article on the right of free speech and the liberty of the Press.
I do not wish to repeat my arguments again, but I must just refer to this aspect very briefly. I drew attention, on the last stage of the Bill, to the Latin maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that if you express one thing in an Act of Parliament, by implication you thereby exclude a large number of other things. Here in the first part of this section the State guarantees liberty to citizens to express freely their opinions, subject to public order and morality. I stated here on the last occasion, and I re-state it here positively, that in the phrase “subject to public order and morality” are embodied comprehensively all the so-called limitations which exist in law and under our existing Constitution on the right of free speech and the liberty of the Press. Everybody admits that the right of free speech and the liberty of the Press, which is only another manifestation of the right of free speech, are subject to certain so-called limitations.
The right of free speech and the liberty of the Press must not be exercised in a manner that would be blasphemous, seditious or indecent. All these matters are, as a matter of law and construction, clearly enshrined in the phrase "subject to public order and morality." What is sought to be done in the proviso to that right is to emphasise that, in reference to certain methods by which the right of free speech and the liberty of the Press may be exercised, they are to be subject to certain limitations. The proviso, putting it in a very wide way, sets forth that the State shall endeavour to ensure that certain organs of public opinion, such as the cinema, the radio and the Press, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State. It is proposed now to make that clause read: "to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the Press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State."
If you insert these words, "including criticism of Government policy," the danger is that you will exclude a large variety of other matters and thereby make it appear that because it was necessary to put in, as a sort of exception to this controlling power, criticism of Government policy, these other matters, not being included in that exception, are subject to the right of control in this proviso. The proviso, when it is amended according to the President's amendment on the Paper at the moment, allows criticism of the Government. Does it allow criticism of a member of the Government? You can criticise the Government, which is defined in the Constitution by Article 28, clause 1. You may, if you like, criticise 15 members who are an entity called by the Constitution "The Government." But can you criticise the public actions of one of those members operating in his Departmental capacity? Can you criticise his Departmental actions? Can a newspaper refer in an adverse way, in the wind of adverse criticism, to the actions of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs? That is not included here. That may be said to be subject to this right of control in the interests of the education of public opinion. Deputy Norton may go out to his constituency at the present moment and criticise the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs because of his failure to give adequate wages to a certain class in the Post Office. After this Constitution is passed, can he go out and criticise that particular Minister, or must his criticism, in order to be constitutional, be directed against the Government? That is one of the examples which I give as the possible construction that may be put upon this. Can you criticise a Parliamentary Secretary? Can you criticise Deputy Hugo Flinn, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance at the moment, or somebody else in his position hereafter, for his actions in connection with unemployment grants and matters of that kind? Can you criticise a county council, or are you liable to be controlled, in the interests of the education of public opinion, by a Government that wants to muzzle criticism in that line?
"Government policy," I am told, is the alternative amendment. I had not seen that, I confess. I was dealing with the Paper I got this morning. I should not be surprised if amendments to this Constitution sprung out of the air. Until my colleague here pointed cut to me that there was another amendment in typescript, I had not known it. The so-called improvement in the typescript makes the matter worse, because you can only criticise Government policy now. You cannot criticise departmental actions. You cannot criticise the policy of a particular Minister. Possibly it might be said that you could, because there is a collective responsibility, and therefore the policy of one member is the policy of the whole. I have already criticised adversely the policy of the Government in this Constitution in regard to that aspect. I will even take it at "policy." Departmental action, administrative action, is not policy. Action carried out administratively in a Department by the officers of the Department, for which the Minister is responsible to the House, is not policy. It may not be policy. Can we criticise a member of the Government? Can we criticise a Parliamentary Secretary? Can we criticise a county council for their policy? Inferentially, we cannot. All you say here is that you can criticise Government policy.
Towards the close of the debate on this clause on the last Stage I asked the President would he agree with me that if a newspaper published an article deliberately intending to undermine the authority of the State, that would be something contrary to public order? He agreed with me that it would, as obviously it would. This clause still reads—and apparently it is the President's intention that it should continue so to read as part of our Constitution, if this becomes the Constitution of the State—that "the education of public opinion being, however, a matter of grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the Press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or public order." You start the phrase by saying that the right is to be exercised subject to public order and morality, and you go on to say that the State shall endeavour to secure that this expression of opinion and the liberty of the Press shall be exercised subject to public order or morality or public order. On its face it is nonsense, read in that way, construed in that way.
Already, on the last Stage, I have directed the attention of the House to the fact that the courts always endeavour to give not a nonsensical meaning to Acts of the Legislature; still more will they be inclined to give a meaning, which will not make it nonsense, to a phrase or clause in the Constitution. The courts will endeavour to construe this clause as having some meaning, being a proviso to the general guaranteed right of free expression of opinion and convictions. The courts can construe this in no other way, in my opinion, than as being a limitation upon that right, and if it is a limitation upon that right it is a duty on the State to do the things that are set out here in the interests of the education of public opinion—to control the radio, the Press, and the cinema. Why the phonograph should not be controlled, or the gramophone, or the loud speaker, I do not know. At all events, they pick the radio, the Press and the cinema. We may have television, and I suppose that will not be controlled in the interests of the education of public opinion.
The danger of this is not that it is going to be construed as nonsense. In my opinion, as it stands at the moment, it is capable of being construed as nonsense. The danger is that the courts will say that the Legislature never inserted in the Constitution, above all things, a clause that could bear nothing but a nonsensical meaning, and that, therefore, it being put by way of a proviso to the statement of the general right of free expression of opinion, it must be something inserted by way of enabling the Legislature to control the exercise of that right. Once you start controlling the exercise of that right, there is almost an end to the right of free expression of opinion and the liberty of the Press. There is certainly an end to it in the way that has existed in this country before this State was set up at all, and in the way that it was continued under our Constitution. Again, I emphasise the fact that everything that is desirable, everything that exists at the moment and that has existed in this country and in England since the freedom of the Press and freedom of speech became one of the constitutional rights of the people, is included in the expression, "subject to public order and morality."
Again, I referred to the fact that the word "libellous" has not been mentioned in this Article. It was always one of the so-called limitations on the right of free speech and freedom of the Press that it should not publish libellous matter. We find blasphemy and indecency mentioned. Criticism of Government policy is mentioned, but libellous matter is not, although it is one of the things which at the moment, in accordance with the legal definition of freedom of speech, the right of free expression and freedom of the Press is imposed upon the exercise of these rights. It may not be a very serious matter that the word "libellous" is left out, but when the words, "public order and morality" include libel, sedition, blasphemy, indecency, treason and other matters contrary to the authority of the State, and when you put in something specifically on top of that which can only be properly construed as a limitation of that right, then that Article in the Constitution is a dangerous one, and ought to be fought as far as possible.
Comment on this
I participated in the discussion of this section on the Committee Stage, and I expressed the view that the whole object of this qualifying sentence was to restrict substantially the freedom which the Press has under the existing Constitution, and under our existing legislation. The amendment which the President has submitted now in no way takes from the objectionable character of the qualifying sentence. As Deputy Costello stated, I think by its emphasis on criticism of Government policy, it appears to imply that criticism outside that narrow domain may well be dealt with as calculated to undermine the authority of the State. The President appears to think, and so did Deputy MacDermot on the last occasion, that the phrase "while preserving their rightful liberty of expression" offers some solution towards preserving the liberty of the Press to criticise freely the doings of any particular Party or of any Government. May I call attention to the fact that the whole emphasis in the sentence is on undermining public order or morality or the authority of the State. So far as undermining public order or morality is concerned, any transgression in that respect is caught by the overriding words at the commencement of the section, so that there is no need for repetition in the qualifying sentence. We are left, therefore, in the position that the whole emphasis in the sentence is that criticism may not be indulged in calculated to undermine the authority of the State. When you get a clash between what is the preservation of the rightful liberty of expression, and criticism calculated to undermine the authority of the State, the whole emphasis here is that anything calculated to undermine the authority of the State is a transgression of the rightful liberty of expression, and consequently can be banned by legislation which this Constitution foreshadows in that respect. The term "to undermine the authority of the State" is a vague and an empty term, capable of being used by any Government in any kind of situation. If a Government were so disposed, the words "to undermine the authority of the State" could be construed as undermining the political security of a Government, and legislation could be introduced by a Government carrying a majority of one, giving it power, or giving one Minister power, simply to ban and proscribe any newspaper that was a challenge to the Government's continuance in office. I am opposed to this section.
Comment on this
The Deputy will allow me to remind him that on the Committee Stage there was a motion, but not to delete the words the Deputy is criticising. The Deputy was not the only offender in that respect. That amendment was negatived. Therefore, the words stand. The matter before the House for consideration is the amendment on to-day's amendment paper. The section is not before the House as such.
Comment on this
I understand perfectly that it is the amendment which the President has introduced. That is all we are discussing. This is offered by the President, apparently to restore, as he thinks, some little measure of liberty to the Press. I am taking exception to the amendment on the ground that it is not giving the Press the liberty which it has to-day. I am confining my remarks to the net question of control of the Press. I have not even referred so far to the control of the radio and the cinema. I say that the amendment of the President makes this sentence just as objectionable as it was, and in no way improves the sentence from the point of view of those who want to ensure a continuance of the right that the Press has to-day. In every democratic country, where liberty of mind is prized, the Press is permitted wide liberty in the way of criticism. I think the preservation of that right of the Press is necessary for the maintenance of all the virtues which go hand in hand with the maintenance of democratic government. This section, even as implied by the President, is not calculated to permit the Press the liberty and freedom which it had in the past, and which it has at present. The whole object of the section and of the qualifying sentence is to whittle down the liberty that the Press has.
It was stated from public platforms on behalf of the Government that this Constitution is a Magna Charta, that it is the charter of the people's liberty, yet heavily enshrined in it is a clause of this kind, designed to give power into the hands of the Executive Council to throttle the Press, and power to suppress organs of public opinion if, in the opinion of the Executive of the day, that criticism is calculated to undermine the authority of the State. In every other country where efforts have been made to regiment the Press and to control organs of the Press, this has been one of the first steps for the setting up of a dictatorship and an oligarchy. Here in this country we appear to be setting out on the same road, by the foreshadowed introduction of legislation which may deprive the Press and organs of public opinion of many valuable rights which they have to-day. I do not think the President's amendment in any way improves the objectionable character of the qualifying phrase in the section. It is still possible for the Executive Council to throttle the Press, to suppress any organs with whose opinions it disagrees, and to arrogate to itself a right of that kind. That, in my opinion, is foreshadowing the utilisation of that kind of power in the same objectionable way as it has been used in other countries where that kind of power was given to the State.
Comment on this
Deputy Norton stated that the rights of the Press are being taken away. Here is the existing Constitution, for which Deputy Norton voted, in its application to an organisation known as the National Guard and afterwards as the Young Ireland Association:
The Tribunal may, on the application of a member of the Gárda Síochána not below the rank of inspector, make an order declaring any book, issue of a periodical, pamphlet, poster or other document to be seditious.
That is the present state of the law.
Comment on this
The Deputy may not have voted for it in that form, but he voted in favour of the application of Article 2A, which contains that clause, against the Blueshirts. Now the Deputy says that the liberty of the Press is being taken away. The liberty of the Press under the new Constitution, even as it stands, is a great deal safer than under the present Constitution.
Comment on this
I am not going to argue with the Deputy about definitions. I am merely speaking of his statement that the present magnificent liberties of the Press are being taken away. I deny that statement. Another clause in Article 2A says that any document issued on behalf of any unlawful association can be suppressed, and a further Article says that the Government has complete discretion when deciding what is an unlawful association. That being so, what a farce it is to speak as if the present Constitution protected the Press against the sort of attack that Deputy Norton fears. The Press have only got one real security in the present Constitution and that is the democratic feeling of the Irish people and the democratic feeling of this Assembly. They have exactly that same security in the new Constitution.
Comment on this
The Deputy talks about the safeguard there is in the democratic feeling in this House. It is impossible, apparently, to get the Deputy to realise the difference between a constitutional provision and a piece of ordinary legislation. A Government may, if it has power to pass laws in the Legislature, once it is installed in office, do more or less what it pleases during the five years' term. The only safeguard that the people have against the unauthorised use of power in the five years' period that a Government is elected for is in the Constitution, because whatever a Government does by its legislation, once it is installed, may be brought before the courts on the question: Is this unconstitutional or is it not? If the Deputy can only get that fully realised——
Comment on this
Apparently, it is only when sitting down listening to someone else, but when he stands on his feet it disappears. What is the good of the Deputy lecturing the House on the safeguard there is in the democratic spirit of the people, if they are prevented from using that for a period of five years? Such a Government may boldly destroy for that period all the rights supposed to be granted to the people. The Government have control during those five years, and the only way in which there is any impact on them is if they transgress that Constitution and may be brought before the courts for that. Here again we find this which runs right through the whole Constitution. Article 40, sub-section (6), says: "The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights," and then the phrase follows, "subject to public order and morality."
If there was nothing else in the Constitution except the enumeration of the rights of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions, if there was nothing else in the Constitution except what I have read, the situation is this. If the Government bring in a law in any way to regulate the right of citizens to express their opinions, that can be brought before the High Court and the Supreme Court. What the High Court and Supreme Court have to test is: Is that law properly basing itself on the terms "public order and morality"? The High Court and the Supreme Court are to determine whether something in the way of public order and morality is being encroached upon or not. But, add what is in the rest of the Article and you have a new situation. There is a variety of pious expressions and then it states: "The State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion... shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.""Public order and morality" are already in the qualification. Being in already, the persons to test it are the High Court and the Supreme Court. Why are they put in again? To take the determination of what is subject to public order and morality away from the High Court and the Supreme Court and to give it to the Legislature.
We have here, in addition to undermining public order or morality, the phrase "shall not be used to undermine... the authority of the State". Would a use of the Press which would undermine the authority of this State be contrary to public order and morality? Surely, it would. Why, therefore, are these things again taken down from the qualification paragraph, where they stand already, and put in here for some reason? "Public order and morality", in the first two lines of sub-section 6 (1) are thrown to the courts to determine the meaning of the words and apply them to the particular piece of law. Transfer them now, and the whole situation is transformed. In the paragraph which follows the question of undermining public order or morality, or undermining the authority of the State, no longer becomes a matter for adjudication by the courts, but for the Legislature to say what, in their opinion, is being done.
So we have again this duplicity. The right given, apparently thrown to the courts to be the safeguarding of the people, the terms of reference given to them; the people are to be safeguarded in the following rights. But the exercise of these rights all the time is to be subject to public order and morality and we say, with a grand gesture: "The courts will determine that." Having said that, we go on to write this extra thing, the full meaning of which is, notwithstanding anything contained above, if the Legislature think something is contrary to public order or morality or likely to undermine the authority of the State, then they can pass a law and destroy the freedom of the Press at their discretion.
I have endeavoured several times to get that point made clear—that there is an enormous difference between granting a constitutional right and allowing the judges to be the arbiters of the application of the qualifications and, in the sub-paragraph, to put in something leaving it to the determination of the Legislature. If Deputy MacDermot is here what he may eventually come to realise is, that the first two lines give a right which the courts will safeguard and, in the next five lines, there is a subsidiary right of determination given to the Dáil. If the Dáil exercises that right, and says in legislation, "We pass this because we think the exercise of these rights is likely to undermine public order and morality and the authority of the State," then the courts are ousted from any jurisdiction. The only thing they may be called upon to pronounce upon is: was the piece of legislation technically correct in passing through the Dáil? Once that is established, the courts cannot say it is unconstitutional.
On the last day, as far as I understand, only one amendment was put to the House and negatived. That was Deputy Norton's amendment to delete from the Article the words "the Press". An amendment in the name of Deputy Costello and myself to cut out all this matter from, "The education of public opinion..." down to "law" was withdrawn by Deputy Dillon, who said that he understood that the President intended to consider the matter raised on the amendment between then and the Report Stage. Deputy Dillon said that he proposed to withdraw the amendment, reserving the right to put it down on the Report Stage if it was desired to divide upon it. So far as I understand the situation, the House divided on the amendment to delete the words "the Press" and it was determined to keep these words in, and there was nothing more determined than that.
Comment on this
It was decided that the section stand. The question was put: "That the section stand part."
Comment on this
According to the Official Report, the question put was: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand." I am reading from column 1728 of the Official Report.
Comment on this
When the debate on the section concluded, the question was put to the House: "That the section stand part," and was agreed to.
Comment on this
There may be something which should be in the Official Report which is not here. With your permission, I propose to read it:—
An Ceann Comhairle: Amendments Nos. 120, 121 and 122 were discussed together. Are they being withdrawn?
Mr. Dillon: I propose to withdraw this amendment No. 120....
Amendment No. 122 was in the name of Deputy MacDermot and Deputy Dillon could not withdraw it.
Mr. Norton: I propose to divide on amendment No. 121.
That was to delete the words "the Press".
Comment on this
Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."
Do you agree with this result?
It could be taken out at any time if it were not in this Constitution. It did not require a constitutional amendment to remove Article 2A but for the future it will require a constitutional amendment to permit of its being taken out.
Comment on this
If Article 2A is introduced by way of legislation it can be repealed by way of legislation.
Comment on this
It can, but you cannot get out of the Constitution the Article which allows 2A to be enacted. I see the President is laughing heartily. Would he explain where his mirth comes from? Is it because of his having to use Article 2A?
Comment on this
We are discussing one of the fundamental rights of the citizens of this country. We are discussing it in the Committee Stage. When these amendments were being debated on the last occasion the President said he would look into the matter. The amendments were then held over indefinitely for later discussion. I do not see why there should be any attempt to strangle discussion on these amendments at the present moment. If the rules of the House are wide enough to preclude these being discussed, then the rules of the House are strangling discussion. The amendment on the former occasion was not put to the House or ruled upon; it was withdrawn.
Comment on this
If the Deputy will look at the volume of the Dáil Debates from which he quoted—which, by the way, is not the official record—he will find it reported in column 1847 that the question "that Article 40 stand part of the Bill" was put and agreed to. It was subject to amendment, by agreement, on the next stage. There is only one amendment before us now, amendment 49 (a). Why other amendments were not re-submitted is no concern of the Chair.
Comment on this
I still want to point out that on column 1728, amendment No. 120, which gave rise to a discussion on the whole Article, was withdrawn, on the ground that the President stated he was going to look into the points raised. I do not want to discuss it, but, if we cannot have a discussion on it, I suggest that we are having the purpose of this Assembly strangled by a rigid and narrow interpretation of the Standing Orders. However, it is most appropriate that the discussion on the freedom of the Press should be ruled in this way.
Comment on this
I want to make one last statement on this. We propose to divide on this, to vote against this amendment proposed by the President. It is apparently put forward by the President as an indication that criticism of Government policy is not to be regarded as a contravention of the proviso in this Article. We will vote against this amendment for the purpose of registering our protest on the Journals of this House that the right of free speech and the liberty of the Press are being infringed upon by this amendment and by the Article as it stands.
Comment on this
I do not know to what extent I will be free to follow some of the arguments that have been put before the House in connection with this matter. The first thing I cannot understand is Deputy McGilligan's attitude that this section somehow withdraws from the cognisance of the courts the question as to whether a particular act will or will not infringe on the liberty of expression which is provided for here. Surely the courts can, in regard to a particular act, say whether this was an infringement on rightful liberty or not? Surely the courts will consider the question as to whether rightful liberty was being infringed upon or not? I cannot understand the argument that this subsection withdraws anything from the cognisance of the courts.
What is the purpose of the whole argument? As I pointed out in the previous debate on this it is to indicate clearly to the public that there is a rightful liberty and that there is an abuse of rightful liberty, and whilst lawyers who understand what is covered by the phrase "public order and morality" may be quite clear in their minds as to what is forbidden, the average citizen, who looks to this for his rights, may not understand it unless it is made clear. The method by which it is made clear is that it is put as a duty, and I think a rightful duty, on the legislature, to endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, whilst preserving their rightful liberty of expression, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State. That is my answer. Should they be used, should they be permitted to undermine public order, morality and the authority of the State?
Deputies have admitted that the authority of the State is already contained in "public order and morality." Is there any harm in making explicit what is already implicit? It is doubtful if we can get a net definition of public order and morality, such as Deputy Costello seems to have in mind. It is founded, no doubt, on decisions of various kinds, but it is very difficult to get it in definite form. We have tried to get a clear, well-cut, well-defined definition of "public order and morality," and we have not been able to do it.
As regards the authority of the State, the only objection worth considering, in my opinion, that was raised to this Article was raised when the suggestion was made that it might be argued that criticism of Government policy, or of the Government if you like—even legitimate criticism of the Government— might be held to be somehow undermining the authority of the State; that would be held to be excluded. I have tried to meet that objection by making it quite clear that the rightful liberty which is guaranteed here includes that. I would say it would, even without express mention at all. But, lest the undermining of the authority of the State somehow or other was being capable of being in any way construed to suggest that criticism of the Government was not permitted, then I proposed to introduce an amendment. I do not care very much whether you put in "Government policy" or "Government".
Comment on this
And to repeat them somewhere else to make them clear, like "public order and morality"?
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I do not think it is. I think the construction of that whole clause is quite obvious. You start off by saying there are three or four certain rights enumerated in different paragraphs, and then you put over and above the question of right, the right to express one's opinions. You have a duty imposed, and it is in connection with the imposition of that duty on the Legislature that you have this subsidiary clause. My own view is that it is better, in view of the doubts that were expressed, to include the amendment there. I do not care very much whether it is amendment No. 49 (a). It was policy that was suggested, and policy would, perhaps, cover wider things than the Government would cover. Undoubtedly the conduct of a Department, in so far as it was an expression of Government policy, could be rightfully criticised there. I do not mind if you have both, but to say that introducing this makes it worse seems to me to be carrying some rules of construction to an absurd length.
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I know you cannot, but the Deputy knows they are capable of being applied in a very limited way, and there is nothing more nonsensical than to take rules of interpretation which are of a very well-defined character and say they apply somewhere else. I think these rules of construction are easy to understand. The situations where they apply are not difficult to recognise. But they are not applicable here. Any lawyer I have asked about this thing has been of the same opinion, that they do not apply here. It is altogether a complete straining of these rules of construction to say they do apply here. There is no use in arguing the matter further. I have given it the consideration I promised. I have done my best to meet what I consider it was really necessary to meet in the suggestions from the other side, and I accordingly urge the acceptance of the amendment.
Comment on this
I do not think the President has helped himself very much by the last remarks he has addressed to the House. Here we have got a Constitution, and this Constitution is supposed to be clear and definite. If the Constitution is to be of any value at all it should be a Constitution understandable by everybody. And yet we have the President gravely informing the House that he is using words here, "public order and morality", for which, as he says, it is utterly impossible to get a definition. He has struggled to get a definition and failed. What is his difficulty in getting a definition? Is it not as plain as a pikestaff? His difficulty in getting a definition is that he does not understand what the phrase means. Is that not perfectly plain? The President has no idea of what is meant by "public order and morality" and of what it comprises or does not comprise he is perfectly in ignorance. If he were not, why cannot he have a definition? Why cannot he even give a loose paraphrase to the House?
Take his next point. So far as I could gather from him, he thinks that the ordinary rules of construction do not apply here. That is what I understood him to say.
Comment on this
That putting forth one thing limits the general proposition put previously—is that the rule of construction which he says does not apply, and if so, will he tell us why it does not apply? He then goes on to say that the courts can interfere. Can the courts interfere? Here you have a very curious thing. You give a general statement here, to begin with— the guarantee of the State—but then you go on to set out the limitations, and they are that the State shall do certain things. "The State shall endeavour ..." is an extraordinary expression, because I do not know how the State, as a State, can act itself. I presume what is meant by the State there is the Oireachtas. I do not know what else it can mean and if it has any other meaning I should like to hear it. If the State there means the Oireachtas, there is a special duty put upon the Oireachtas. It has not merely its ordinary duty, a general duty, but a specific duty put upon it which it must interpret itself. How can you tell the State how to do certain things? To tell the Oireachtas and to make it compulsory upon it that it shall endeavour—it is not "may endeavour" but "shall endeavour"—to pass laws to the effect that certain things, while preserving the "rightful liberty of expression" shall not be used to undermine public order and morality, is surely making it the judge. Putting a duty upon a person is surely making him the judge. Telling him specifically "You are to pass laws which, in your judgement, do that"—what is that but giving him complete control and taking it away from the courts?
What help are these particular words? I do not know what the words are at present. There seem to me to be two amendments before the House, one of them referring to the Government and the other to Government policy, and I do not know which the President has moved and which he is relying on. Let us take either of them. "Criticism of the Government"—it has already been pointed out that that is a practically meaningless expression. "Criticism of Government policy"—what does that mean? What is Government policy? It is not Executive action. There are two things. There is criticism of the Government, which, I take it, is criticism of the joint personnel of the Government, and there is criticism of Government policy, which, I take it, is the policy they put into legislation; but where is the vital thing—criticism of Executive action? Is not Executive action, much more than legislation, the matter which is likely to be criticised? There is no safeguard here as to criticism of Executive action. Why not? Yet you express policy and you direct the Dáil, and this Dáil is directing future Oireachtas to legislate on grounds which will allow criticism of Government policy. Is that directly not telling them to legislate on grounds which will prohibit criticism of Executive action?
Comment on this
It was strongly contended, when this section was being discussed on Committee Stage, that reference to undermining the authority of the State would prevent criticism of the Government. This amendment is being moved to ensure that it does not prevent criticism of the Government. The Opposition are opposing the amendment, and I venture to say that the motive of the Opposition would appear to be, at first sight, to prevent their being deprived of the use of an election cry. The President has gone out of the House, and I am sorry——
Comment on this
——because I wanted to appeal to him to combine the two amendments and to make it quite plain that there was no intention to interfere either with criticism of members of the Government or the policy of the Government.
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The Deputy is, I believe, now happily far removed from any question of anxiety about election cries.
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The Deputy puts the point precisely. I wonder would the Deputy answer the question: Does the inclusion of the phrase prevent the passage of law which would exclude the use of the exercise of free expression of opinion tending to undermine the Government through the criticism of Ministers? Does the phrase "undermine the authority of the State" override the including criticism of Government policy? Presumably, it does. If there was to be an exercise of the right of free expression which would concern itself ostensibly with criticism of Government policy, but could be ruled on by the courts, if the courts ever got a chance of ruling on it, as undermining the authority of the State, would the phrase now sought to be included stop the passage of that law? I suggest not.
Comment on this
My view is that criticism of Government policy is being defined by this amendment as something that does not undermine the authority of the State.
Comment on this
So that then, there could only be criticism of Government policy which would undermine the authority of the State. That is what the Deputy believes. So long as it was a criticism of Government policy, no matter how far it went, it could never have about it the atmosphere or the aim of undermining the authority of the State.
Comment on this
Exactly, and, therefore, the phrase "undermining the authority of the State" overrides this matter of criticising Government policy. Who is going to be the judge as to whether the matter sought to be suppressed is legitimate criticism of Government policy or whether it has advanced into the dangerous region of being something tending to undermine the authority of the State? Is it the courts? I suggest not.
Comment on this
We have been deprived of the benefits of the President's presence for a little while. We were arguing as to whether the inclusion of the phrase "including criticism of Government policy" overrides the phrase "undermining the authority of the State." I suggest it does not. I suggest that if the courts could ever have knowledge of a law of that type, and if they came to the conclusion that the matter tended to the undermining of the authority of the State, the mere fact that it was put up in the form of criticism of Government policy would not save it. I suggest that that is right. I simply want to know who is going to judge as to whether the suppression of free speech has been properly done because it undermines the authority of the State, or has been improperly done because it is merely a criticism of Government policy. It is not going to be the courts, I suggest. If the President tells me it is, I want to ask him why has he put this matter about undermining public order and morality into the section which deals with laws and has not kept it in the overriding section which deals with constitutional rights?
I suggest that there is only one result. Whether it is the result of its being divided, I cannot say. In the first two lines, where the written guarantees are given, the authority to decide is the courts. When you come down and talk about the laws that may be passed, the mind that will decide is the collective body of the Dáil by a majority.
Comment on this
The Deputy believes that a law passed to prevent free speech can be taken to the courts. On what ground? On the ground that it is not a proper use of the power given in the Constitution? The power given in the Constitution does not set up anybody as the authority to decide. It does not say that it is to be established to the satisfaction of anybody. It simply says that the State—as Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney has pointed out, the "State" in this case must mean the Oireachtas —shall endeavour to ensure that certain organs of public opinion shall not be used in a particular way. If the Dáil comes to the conclusion that the use of the Press, the radio or the cinema is going to undermine public authority, and should be suppressed, no court will inquire into that. The Dáil will not even refer to this unless it gets back to the habit, abandoned some time ago, of putting Preambles to its Bills. Otherwise, there will be no advertence to this undermining of public order or morality or the authority of the State. The Dáil will simply pass a law. There is no constitutional safeguard.
Even on the question of constitutional safeguard, I cannot understand the President. He says that the phrase "public order and morality" is difficult to define. Because it is difficult to define, he thinks he makes it clear by using it a second time. How you make anything clear by using it twice, I do not know. "Subject to public order and morality" in the constitutional provision is a difficult matter. How difficult it is will only be seen when cases arise, and these cases will be decided, on the first two lines, by the judges. We are to take this first vague phrase and clarify it by putting it in again, according to the President.
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The only question we are called upon to decide now is whether or not it improves matters to put in the words in the amendment—to say that the right of criticising the Government is to be secured.
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Let me put it this way—whether it is or not wise to say that these organs of opinion will preserve their right to liberty of expression and of criticising the Government or Government policy. I suggest that it is an obvious improvement to put in these words and that it is only special pleading to suggest that it is not. I said at an earlier stage that I, personally, would rather that the whole of that paragraph were out. But I see in it the consequence of a protracted agitation which has been going on for the last six months from which I feared worse things than we are actually faced with here. It amuses me to think that at the time I was having a Press controversy about free speech, the Irish Independent was giving great publicity to letters from people who were against free speech.
Comment on this
Against free speech. They were giving publicity, in particular, to letters from a gentleman called McCaffrey, who is President of an association called "The League of Christ the King." Now, when he is writing equally ardent letters in support of the provisions of this Constitution with regard to the Press, they are not allowed to appear in the Irish Independent at all, though, of course, they appear in the Irish Press.
Comment on this
Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney spoke of the term "public order and morality." I do not want anybody to think that I regard these words as without meaning because I said it was not possible to give an exact or net definition of them. They have a meaning. However, they are of an elastic type. Categories of offences are given in text books which would be regarded as against public order and morality. It would, in the end, I take it, be left to the courts to determine whether a particular offence was or was not against public order or morality— that is, in general terms, the peace and general welfare of the community. As it is important that the authority of the State should not be wrongfully undermined by the abuse of liberty, it was desirable that that matter should be indicated, so that there would be no doubt whatever that it came under the heading of one of the offences which could be committed. There is no difficulty in my mind except that the term "authority of the State," whether you put it in that form or leave it under the phrase "public order and morality," might be held to preclude legitimate criticism of the Government inasmuch as it might be said that undermining the authority of the Government by criticism would destroy its authority and would, therefore, be regarded as tending to destroy the authority of the State. In the amendment I have endeavoured fairly to meet that position. I am, therefore, pressing amendment No. 49A.
Comment on this
Will the President say whether amendment No. 49A, which purports to confer on citizens the power to criticise Government policy, would include the right to criticise Departmental action, Executive action and the individual members of the Government? What advice has the President got on these matters?
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It was suggested that it would not cover the action of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. When there is joint responsibility, the actions of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs would undoubtedly be part of Government policy.
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Would it include criticism of the President's actions in sending a Bill to a referendum or refusing to allow the question whether or not a Bill was a money Bill to be sent to a Committee on Privileges? That is not Government policy.
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I do not think so at all. I have got no advice to that effect. The position of the President as defined in the Constitution, and the things he is responsible for and that he is not responsible for are set out.
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I should say that the common-sense view is that you can. There is nothing here to prevent that. The "rightful liberty of expression" would include that. The fact that you throw up something, and indicate it, does not necessarily mean that other things are excluded. I do not think it holds in this connection at all.
Comment on this
The President spoke of "legitimate criticism," but the word "legitimate" is not here.
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I believe that if there was a case where there was an obvious abuse by the Executive of that principle, the courts could be invoked to hold that that was unjust, if it was used to muzzle the Press or do anything of the sort—that it would be unconstitutional and wrong. If the Deputies opposite say that cannot be done by the courts, it seems to me that constitutional guarantees are of very little value.
Comment on this
But it is only given power to pass laws subject very definitely to a recognition of avoidance of interference with the rightful liberty of expression.
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It is quite clear that the courts would have cognisance of that if there was nothing in the Article except the two lines.
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It is clear they would have if there was nothing in the Article except the two lines.
Comment on this
Would the President consider the advisability of adding as well as "Government policy" something to make sure that all administration could be included, such as "of public officials"?
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Is there any good in telling the Deputy that the more you direct attention to the few specific things you put in an amendment, the more certain you are to direct the attention of the courts to what is left out. The court in these things will not so much attend to what is given as to the matters that, by implication, are not included.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 52:
In page 86, Article 40, Section 6, sub-section 1º, paragraph ii., to delete all the words from the word "Laws" in line 4 to the word "Oireachtas" in line 13, and substitute the following paragraph:
"Provision may be made by law to prevent or control meetings which are determined in accordance with law to be calculated to cause a breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general public, and to prevent or control meetings in the vicinity of either House of the Oireachtas."
I think I indicated on the Committee Stage that I would move an amendment of this kind.
Comment on this
What is the difference between what is in the amendment and what is in the original draft?
Comment on this
The Deputy can see that in the one case you have the words, "calculated to," leaving it quite open as to who is to determine what is "calculated to." Here the words are replaced by the more direct phrase, "determined in accordance with law."