Agreements between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom—Motion of Approval.
Contributions 1–194 of 375. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I stated last night that I welcomed this Agreement and that I regretted sincerely the tone that the debate took here yesterday. However, I suppose these things will happen. It must be remembered that apparently the last attempt to settle the financial difficulties existing between the two countries was made in 1930-31, the price of our agricultural produce in the English market having fallen by over 50 per cent. during the previous four years. From 1938 onwards, the price of cattle and of agricultural produce had steadily fallen in the English market. At that time the President of the day, Deputy Cosgrave, went over and endeavoured to get some relief from the financial burden which was imposed under the secret Agreement.
Comment on this
I am sorry to have to interrupt the Deputy but, as a matter of fact, I did not go over.
Comment on this
It was all the same, anyway. He tried it. It did not matter whether he went over himself or whether he sent the boys. The fact remains that, realising the financial position of the country at the time, and realising that the people could no longer bear the burden which was falling on the agricultural community and which was a very serious burden indeed, an attempt to obtain some relief was made. The burden was so heavy in 1929, long before there was any economic war, that the Cumann na nGaedheal representative for my constituency in this House had to move that the Minister for Lands be requested not to collect any further annuities from the farmers because they could not pay them. He moved that resolution and had it carried unanimously at the Midleton Urban Council. That was the position in 1929 and in 1930-31 when this appeal was made to the British Government—not to wipe out the annuities but only for remission of a small portion, a moratorium on £250,000 of them, which was refused. That was the atmosphere and the position at the period when we took over office here.
We took over office with a mandate from the Irish people to refuse to pay these annuities to the British Government, and we refused to pay them. We were told then that we had not a majority verdict, and in 1933, with the penal tariffs of 40 per cent. on our cattle, there was a general election at which the Irish people repeated their mandate to hold the annuities. One would think after two general elections, at which the mandate was repeated, that the representatives of the Irish people would stand behind that mandate. What happened? As far back as June, 1932, before there were any tariffs at all put on, we had a demand from the opposite benches that the annuities should not be collected from the farmers, because the unfortunate people wore already suffering from the effects of the economic war. That kind of thing continued gradaally until the famous Ottawa Agreement, which was mentioned by Deputy Gorey yesterday, when the Minister for Agriculture told us that the reply he got from Mr. Thomas at Ottawa was plain and straight.
Comment on this
The statement was that de Valera happened to be in office but would not be there long; that there was a great White Army forming and that it happened the colour of their shirts was blue. Every effort that could be made was made by a large section not to support the mandate that had been given by the Irish people, but to give every succour and aid to those who were endeavouring to collect the annuities from them by force. That situation continued, so that we had to fight not alone enemies abroad but enemies here. That campaign was carried on here, and I leave it to any Deputy to say to the contrary. I have heard statements made that this dispute could have been settled five or six years ago.
Comment on this
You got into this House then by a bare, majority, and they even kicked you out since then.
Comment on this
Having regard to the position that we had to face, that is the reason no agreement or settlement could be made. I say that this settlement, or something like it, could have been got at the end of 1932 or 1933 if the position was not such as it was in this country. If one had a quarrel with a neighbour, and if that neighbour's family and relatives supported him in the fight, that would be one story, but if, on the other hand, his family and relatives shouted out for a settlement and if that did not succeed they went and helped the other side against him, what kind of settlement could be hoped for? Having regard to the position that existed here down to 1934, what kind of a settlement could be expected? When I think of that position, I cannot blame those across the water saying: "Oh, there will be a general election soon; the Blueshirt army will be mobilised, and they will wipe these fellows out of existence and a new dictator will come in." I say that the British Government, in view of statements made by Deputies on the Opposition Benches in regard to what was going to happen, believed that there would be a general election and that Deputy Cosgrave would be back in office, when they could tell him, as they told him in 1931, that there was nothing doing, and that he had better go home and pay up. At that time I appealed to Deputies opposite to say nothing concerning this matter for three months, as there was a chance of settling it. They would not agree to that. Now they come and tell us that we have accepted the Fine Gael policy or something of that description. We have not moved a single inch from the position we took up at the start of the dispute.
Comment on this
Take your chance and do not upset the apple cart. That is a condition of affairs that did prevail, and, as I have stated, we have carried out the same policy all along. What is the position to-day? There were other financial demands besides the land annuities, the yearly payment of which was agreed to under this Agreement of the l2th February, and under another famous agreement. I know that as soon as I sit down Deputy McMenamin will be up, to tell us that this is the greatest betrayal since Adam. The Deputy is famous in that respect. As a matter of fact, I have here before me a copy of a speech delivered by Deputy McMenamin in Ballybofey during the general election held in June, 1927, in which he stated "that the 1925 Agreement was the blackest document in Irish history, and the greatest betrayal since the Act of Union." That is what he said about the last Agreement, and God knows what he is going to say about this one.
Comment on this
We have been told about the slaughter of calves and all the cattle that are gone. That statement has been made by every Deputy on the opposite side. We have also been told by them that we will have to re-stock the land for the farmers. It is a pity, I think, that Deputies would not take the trouble and spend a little time in the Library, in getting authentic information, before they rise to speak here. The actual position in regard to cattle is as follows: that the total number of cattle in this country in June, 1931— that was before there was any economic war and when, as we have been told by the people opposite, everything was flourishing—was 4,029,084, while according to the census taken in 1937 the number was 3,955,185.
Comment on this
The Deputy ought to be able to calculate it himself. The number of milch cows in the country at the present time is about 100,000 more than in June, 1931.
Comment on this
I am not alluding to a particular period now because the Deputy might say that they were held up on account of the Agreement. The period that I am alluding to is June, 1937.
Comment on this
There is a very good reason, and a sound one, too. The number of yearlings in the country was 994,000 in 1931 and the number now is 998,000, 4,000 more yearlings even though Deputies opposite tell us all the calves have been slaughtered.
Comment on this
Certainly. The figures are 230,000 in 1931, and 160,000 to-day. Deputy keating is a cattle dealer.
Comment on this
He is a man who has a knowledge of the cattle trade, and he knows this much, that the taste in beef has completely changed. He knows that the cattle that are fetching a price to-day are two-year-old cattle; that you can get a better price for a good two-year-old than you can for a three-year-old.
Comment on this
Anywhere. I have dealt with a number of the statements that were made from the benches opposite yesterday. We listened patiently to them all day, and I suppose we will have the same thing to-day. I have given the figures. I have taken them from the official publications, which I am prepared to hand over to the Deputies.
Comment on this
I am quoting from the agricultural statistics for the period 1927 to 1933, and from the agricultural statistics for 1937, and I am prepared to make a present of them to any Deputy opposite. They give the facts. The Deputies opposite have told us that the country was cleared out of cattle, but here are the facts.
Comment on this
This fire of interruptions must cease. Otherwise the Chair will be constrained to take action.
Comment on this
You were all glad to get the 10/- for the skins of the calves that were killed. As the Minister for Agriculture pointed out last night, this Agreement that is wiping out all the tariffs is not going, in a great many cases, to benefit the farmers at all. Yesterday the Minister gave the price of butter in that English market that is now going to be free and open, but when Deputies opened their papers this morning they saw that the Minister has had to come to the assistance of the dairy farmers of the country in order that they will get the cost of production for their milk. We know that during a period of the economic war butter was as low as 70/- a cwt., and that the difference between this 70/-, the price on the free, open English market, and an economic price for the farmers producing the milk, had to be made up out of the Exchequer, out of taxes and out of the consumer. That position will have to continue. I would like to warn farmers generally that within the next three years they may have to slaughter calves again. The slaughter of the calves did one good job anyway: it compelled the English buyer to pay some of the tariffs, and he has been doing that for a considerable time now. It will all be made clear to Deputies when they take their cattle over to England and when the arrangements under this Agreement are completed.
I will be watching the prices carefully, and we will then see who will be getting the 4 a head that the Deputies opposite have been talking about for the past six years here. We will see how much of it the farmer will get when he sells his cattle there. It will be very interesting to watch that. That is one of the reasons why I welcome the Agreement. Deputy O'Leary last night alluded to derating and the halving of the annuities. I am one of those who advocated a reduction of the annuities by 50 per cent. rather than anything in the way of derating. I advocated it for one reason alone, that I wanted whatever benefits were coming to come to all the small farmers, and not to have the position of affairs which existed under the first relief in rates of £750,000 that was given here. At that period I found that a greater portion of that relief went to ranchers who were paying no annuity, who had freehold land, and who were in a better position as far as farming was concerned than their neighbour with a small holding who had to pay an annuity. That is why I would prefer any relief given to the farmers to go directly in relief of annuities rather than in relief of rates. There is no doubt that the condition of affairs which existed for eight or nine years before this Government took office, the neglect of housing——
Comment on this
The Deputy must come down to the Agreement. Regarding derating and short term loans for farmers, Deputies will appreciate that they arise only incidentally here, and that there will be a further opportunity of discussing those matters.
Comment on this
I am afraid Columcille's prophecies were all wrong this time. This Agreement had to be carried out in very difficult circumstances. It could not be carried out until the English Government were definitely certain that there was no hope of getting anybody else to bargain with except the man they were bargaining with. That is the sole reason it was not made earlier. We have been accused of some backsliding in regard to our policy.
Comment on this
What is the position? Our objective has been the absolute freedom and independence of this country as a republic. That is still our objective. I welcome this Agreement particularly because it has gone another step along that road; because it has cleared the position of our ports. That is my principal welcome to this Agreement—that the British are now cleared, bag and baggage, out of the Twenty-Six Counties at any rate, and that is a good job. We will probably be told : "Oh, yes, but there is something behind that." I can quite understand a suspicion of that kind in the mind of individuals who have been accustomed to the letters that were read out here in this House previously in regard to former agreements, letters demanding that the portion of that secret agreement connected with the annuities should be pasted over for political reasons before the agreement was published. I can quite understand that type of individual being sufficiently suspicious to say that there must be something behind this Agreement also. I can quite understand the man or the Government who allowed that condition of affairs to prevail being suspicious in regard to later agreements made by other Governments. of course that Government handed over the annuities without any demand whatsoever, or any agreement whatsoever in counection with their working. If another Government were elected here—I will not say a Labour Government because I know they would not do it—and they decided that this country, which had regained its freedom after enormous sacrifices of blood, was not worth defending, that it was not worth while spending anything on keeping nut either the British invader or any other invader, I can quite understand a Government of that type starting off by wiping out the Army, and then sitting down to wait for the first invader to pick us up. There is nothing in this Agreement which would prevent any new Government from doing that in the morning. A Government in this country might decide: "We cannot afford the expense of an army. We are not going to be bothered defending this country at all. The first invader who comes along can take it." If a new Government elected in the morning had that for a policy, they could take the old cannons and melt them down, and clear away the embankments. Under the Agreement there is nothing on God's earth to stop them. That is the position. I know Deputy McGilligan is getting uneasy.
Comment on this
I am absolutely against that policy. I believe that this country, which has made so many sacrifices in order to clear out its enemies, is worth defending. I believe it is worth while building up here a defence force which will be strong enough for other purposes, because we may have very different views as to how we are going to complete the independence of this nation of 32 counties. We may have very widely divergent views as to how it is going to be done. I personally am in favour of storing up sufficient poison gas, so that when you get the wind in the right direction you an start at the Border and let it travel, and folIow it.
Comment on this
I am speaking of the ways and means by which we can finish the job which we set our hands to in 1916.
Comment on this
This is, as I stated, a definite follow-up of policy. Those ports which were in the hands of the British, well as everything which was in British occupation here in the Twenty-Six Counties, are now in the hands of the Irish people, and whatever Government the Irish people care to elect. The only thing I regret in this Agreement is that there is still a portion of this nation left to be brought in. There are still six counties of those 32 counties which I sincerely regret do not appear in this Agreement. The only regret I have in regard to the whole issue is that we have not got a 32-county Ireland instead of 26 counties —but God is good.
I firmly believe that, if Deputies opposite realise that their policy for the past four or five years has been a very foolish policy, that this thing of helping the enemy is a very foolish game and that it only put suffering and cost and sacrifice on their own people—extra suffering, extra cost and extra sacrifice—and that, having realised all that, they will now be prepared tv come in behind whatever Government is elected here in order to help towards fiuishing the job— whether it bo the present Government or any other Government that comes in there to finish the job that has cost centuries of sacrifice even to get it as far as it has been got—the job will be finished. I welcome this Agreement. I do not wish to delay the House further. I see Deputies over there who are anxious to speak and I would not like to stand in their way for a moment.
Comment on this
The only man I can see here who backed a winner is Deputy Keating. For the last three months or so, he has been on a sure winner.
Comment on this
The speech we have just heard, is one of the most scandalous speeches we ever listened to in this House.
Comment on this
Having heard that speech, I hope that one of the Ministers will get up at the first opportunity and entirely disown the Deputy. Some of the statements in that speech are a crime against this country. Irrespective of any consideration, it is a crime for any man, who wishes to see the unity of this country established, to make such statements. How can the Taoiseach go to London, after a speech of that kind, and ask for the unity of this country, or how can any other person go and ask for the unity of this country when speeches of that kind are on the records of this House? It makes me sad that such a speech should be made, irrespective of who made it.
I want to say this on behalf of Ulstermen, and I am one of them myself, that we have no terror of the Deputy's poison gas, and I would not like to think that my Protestant fellow-countrymen would submit to such an insult as that, and the Deputy may take it that they will not submit to such an insult. That is not the way to take Ulster and Irish unity will never be achieved on that basis. It must be taken on a broader outlook and on a basis of goodwill and common citizenship and common heritage of an Irish nation. There must be no poison gas about it, and if there were, I, personally, would ask my Protestant fellow-countrymen of Ulster to resist it to the last man.
We have a lot of talk here about everything except what is in this Agreement. Why? They are deliberately avoiding it. Deputy Corry speaks of a speech that I delivered in Ballybofey in 1925. Does he not yet, and do others not yet, conceive what was implied in that statement? I then foresaw what has since occurred and what has brought us and is keeping us here to-day, what has reduced this country to the state of going to London when this country was down on its back; and, foreseeing that, I made that statement. In the statement I made then, I foresaw that some unscrupulous person would launch a campaign in this country with regard to the land annuities—a campaign that would ultimately destroy the peasantry of this country—the finest peasantry in Europe. A few months after I made that statement a campaign was started in Donegal by a certain gentleman known to the members of this House, in the person of Peadar O'Donnell. Fianna Fáil had not even then been able to conceive this nefarious nonpayment plan, and it was Peadar O'Donnell who went down to Donegal.
Comment on this
It is not the sort of thing, Sir, that the gentleman in question would ask for any defence on.
Comment on this
Let this House remember, however, that within twelve months a campaign was launched in West Donegal; and the force of the law was used against these poor peasants; and a poor old farmer of 70 years of age was sent to jail, but Peadar O'Donnell went hack to Dublin and left these poor people there to suffer. Deputy Corry says that he does not stand for derating. Dr. Ryan, the Minister for Agriculture, told us yesterday that if he had £1,000,000 he would rather use it in some other way than for the purpose of derating. Deputy Corry says that they got two mandates, in two general elections, not to pay the annuities. How did they get the mandate? Has the Deputy a Leader? Does he recognise him? Here is the manifesto on which the votes of the electors were got in those two elections. It is signed by Eamon de Valera and is dated the 9th Fabruary, 1932. It reads as follows:
"(2) To retain the land annuities in the State Treasury. There is no contractual obligation binding us to I hand these annuities over to Britain. The British Government is neither legally nor justly entitled to receive them. That is the signed and published opinion of several prominent lawyers. With £2,000,000 to £3,000,000 involved, the farmers can be relieved completely of the rates on their holdings. Another £1,000,000 is available for the relief of taxaion, or for such purposes as the Dáil may determine."
Irrespective of anything that has happened since or will happen in the future with the contents of th Agreement, it can be seen plainly now that mandate was got in 1932 and 1933—by an appeal to the cupidity of the people and the implication that the Government that had been collecting these moneys from the people and paying the interest and the sinking fund and so on were doing a national wrong and committing a national crime. This is not partisan with me at all. Let the historian look at this. He will examine it. Is not th at the reason why you got your mandate in 1932 and 1933? Is it not a fact that you got your mandate by that appeal to the cupidity of the people—that they were being cheated and robbed—although you knew perfectly well that the money was due legally and morally, and that our fathers had signed their contracts to pay that money? Now, you have gone and acknowledged that by this present financial agreement, and you have broken, as I said, the finest peasantry in Europe and made them so helpless that they are not able to pay anybody—a peasantry that, all through its history, during all the tyranny that Britain could impose upon this country, struggled in the bogs of this country, maintained their nationality and paid and discharged the last penny of their obligations and claimed no Statute of Limitations, whether to the shopkeeper, the landlord, or anybody else.
There are Deputies in this House— and I am one of them—born of peasant parents, whose peasant ancestry, driven to the bogs of this country, reared large families and, in doing so, accumulated enormous debts while these children were being reared, for ten, and 20, and 30 years. When these children were able to go out and earn the money, the last penny of their obligations to their creditors was discharged, and no Statute of Limitations was claimed by them. Through this appeal to cupidity we are here to-day being asked to consent to this document. What is in the document? What are we asked? The Taoiseach told this House, in opening, that this Agreement or this settlement could not have been made sooner than now. Let this House and this country definitely under stand that that is not the reason why the Taoiseach did not settle in the past. So far as he is concerned, he told us, it was because these moneys were neither legally nor morally due, nor justly payable, as written under his hand in a document signed in February, 1932. That is the reason why there was no settlement—because the President wanted some base appeal that would appeal to the cupidity of the people, in order that the flags would be waved and he would be a great national hero, for defending the peasantry of the country from the exactions of the Government that went before this. That is the reason why this settlement was not made for the last six years. It was done now because the peasantry are ruined. It will take years to repair the damage done. But they are a manly people. They were crushed before, hut they rose from the ashes. I am not without confidence that they will have the power and vitality to do what their fathers did and, on the ashes on which this Agreement was made, that they will yet build up a happy. prosperous and united Ireland.
What is in this Agreement? I will not make any comment upon it—just simply refer to it. In my opinion, even in connection with the 1925 agreement, when England was after winning the Great War, and was then the most powerful nation in the world, one of the greatest nations the world has ever seen, it was a desperately mean think of her that she did not then wipe out the £5,000,000 and the other payments. She had had 150 years approximately of over-taxation from this country, and also a complete monopoly of the business of this country. Would you not think that a great nation like that could for once be generous to weak people like us? But no, not even in 1938, when we were led to believe that England was in imminent danger of being crushed.
Our Government had the misfortune to go to London when the British Prime Minister was in the strongest position of any British Prime Minister in history—certainly in the last two centuries. He had just brought about a position in which he was ready to gobble up the whole of Europe. He was pulling the head of one State after another into the British net. Mussolini, who was to cut the British Empire in two by closing the Mediterranear, was gobbled up in a few days. We dropped in next. Hitler is to be the third. Yet they could not afford to be generous even in regard to a sum of £10,000,000. Why were they not? What is the spirit behind it? What is £10,000,000 to the greatest nation that history has ever known? I loath to say it, but nothing could be meaner than paragraph 2 of Clause 3: "The payment of £250,000 a year by the Government of Eire to the Government of the United kingdom in respect of damage to property under the Agreement of the 3rd December, 1925." Think of poor England insisting on the payment of a quarter of a million while she is throwing thousands of millions away on armaments that will be scrahhed in a few years. The President and his colleagues went to Downing Street and were ladled out a lunch by Mrs. Chamberlain. Our Ministers were put on a par with these gentlemen and statesmen of a nation of similar standing to them. But when Mrs. Chamherlain had ladled out the black coffee they were asked to go to an adjoining room.
Comment on this
I think this is the bitterest cup. We are all involved in this. The dignity and independence of this country are involved in this. Our Ministers were asked to step into an adjoining room to sign—what? A document to pay a quarter of a million pounds in interest and sinking fund for damage to property done by the Sinn Féin organisation in this country. I do not know where the Taoiseach was sitting at the table, but I take it that it was to the right of Mrs. Chamberlain. I am not an enemy of anybody. I have pleaded- all my life for friendship and good will between this country and England, and I hope I have done something to bring about that friendship.
Comment on this
They were not omitted from previous debates on certain matters. I am not saying that they should be used now.
Comment on this
I have no object except to point out the treatment that was meted out to us. S o far as I am concerned, they are not going to deceive me. It might as well have been any of us. At one moment they were treated as gentlemen, and then brought into another room and treated as bandits and told: "You destroyed this property and we are going to make you pay for it." That is supposed to be a settlement that is going to put an end to a feud of centuries. I want to put on record how they behaved about that miserable sum, how they treated representatives of our nation. I am not going to take silently such treatment of a Minister of any Government that represents me anywhere.
We have got control of the ports. You have come home to shout about that. What have we got? Does this House appreciate what we have got? Does this House appreciate that during the entire last war not a single shot was fired by the forts on Lough Swilly? This Agreement, of course, involves the sovereignty and independence of this country- £10,000,000 in lieu of £100,000,000 that is due, and that sum of £14,000,000, in my opinion, as I said before this matter arose, as I said in 1933, the night I was elected in 1933, would be the amount payable in settlement of this dispute. The war lords might fight. I knew they would, until the coffers were empty; and I knew when the coffers were empty and there would have to be a settlement that it would not be the war lords who would have to pay. I remember, when I said that, there were boohs and shouts of "John Bull." That did not intimidate me in the least. I then proceeded to examine on what basis this dispute could be settled, and I said this dispute must be settled on the basis of a lump sum here and now or whatever time it was made. I asked the question what would that lump sum be. What can it be? What is its maximum?
When I made that speech when I was declared elected in 1933, I said in my opinion it was £10,000,000, that the last penny that could be extracted out of us as a lump sum was £10,000,000. Why? Because that amount depended upon the amount that any Government in office here could raise in a single loan. There it is in 1938. I went further and I pleaded then, as I did before, and I do now for a generous gesture on the part of the British Government towards this country, to lay down the sure foundation of real peace between the two countries. That is by generosity, generous treatment to us. I thought that England then would accept the sum of £5,000,000. To-day she demands £10,000,000, the maximum sum she could get, in my opinion, in 1933, and she asks along with that the sum of £250,000 for damage to property. Yes, she demands £250,000 from us. What did she demand at the same time in the contemporaneous negotiations with Mussolini? Sir, I am afraid I am tramping on your corns. Sir, England has always filled up the cup for us. I have pleaded for generosity on her part. I hope here and now—when this Agreement was made I was confident that she would at least make a generous gesture to this country and lay the foundations of real peace. Is it contained in that document? I am not saying, Sir, that if I was in the position that the Government delegates were in that I would not have to swallow the pill, the country being reduced to the position she is in. What I am pleading is that England all through her history has made us drink the last dregs out of the cup. You will appreciate how galling it is to me, and anything I have said or done with regard to England during my life was to bring about reconciliation and peace between the two people. Naturally, there we are, twin sisters. Geography has placed us there. No amount of ranting or flag-waving or anything else can destroy that geographical fact. For that reason every patriotic man should take the long view, in deciding the welfare of both people. It is too narrow to talk otherwise, and I have never done it and will not do it now. In this document I was hoping, I was confident, that they would do a generous thing towards the President and his colleagues in London. Instead of that, they come down and make them drink the last dregs of paying £250,000—an infinitesimal sum, less than a penny to me. Why did they do that? What is behind it? Was it a final act of humiliation to this country, not to the Government of this country, but to us? Then we are asked to gloat over that. Sir, I want to put it on the records of this House that I do not gloat over it. It is done out of sheer necessity. I am glad that it is done, to put an end to the suffering and torturing of the hearts of my people and the sufferings of the last five years.
Comment on this
I have dealt with that and explained it. Does the Deputy even to-day understand the implications of my speech? No, he does not. I welcomed the Agreement as laying the foundations to put an I end to the sufferings of our people. The whole thing is tragic. The whole thing was a misfortune. It was a tragedy for the poor people, the law abiding people, men and women, boys and girls, who for the last few years saw the last few pounds they had put by for a rainy day being drained away. So fan as they are concerned, so far as they stand to-day when this dgreement is made law it is not worth that to them unless the Government goes further. We will deal with that on some other occasion. Let us not gloat over it. That document is a national humiliation and let not outsiders or let not the people of England think that I am deceived by it. In a few weeks this country will not be deceived by it. I hope, Sir, that these agreements contained in this doeument will be law at the first available opportunity so as to give to the people of this country an opportunity to start afresh. They have a difficult and a long road before them but, as I have said, they are sprung from a people who have known adversity and surmounted it. I am confident, nay, I am sure, that given a few years—with reasonable prospects they will repair the damage that was done. It is a regrettable chapter . I am glad it is closed. So far as that is concerned I congratulate everybody that is associated with it. The only regret I have is that it was not done in 1933 and it should have been done and it could have been done then, on no worse conditions than it is to-day. In my opinion there can be no dispute about that. It could have been done in 1933 and saved tho wreck and ruin that this country is faced with to-day.
Comment on this
A Chinn Chomhairle, I rise to express my approval and support of the Agreement that has been come to and when we realise that this Agreement has been brought about by the plenipotentiaries from a small and a poor country who have been carrying on a war with a powerful and a rich country I think that we are justified in according our approval to what has been carried out. It was the best that could be got in all probability and I am confident that those who went over did their best to get the biggest measure of value out of the negotiations.
Like Deputy McMenamin, I am not at all impressed by the amounts that have been given by Great Britain. They could easily have been more generous. They could easily, having regard to what the people of this country have gone through, and the necessity for maintaining friendly relations with us, they could very easily have been more generous in what they gave away. They have fought and they have driven a hard bargain enough. I listened with a certain amount of interest to an astute and successful businessman expressing his perturbation of mind with regard to the possibilities of what representatives of certain trades could do if they came into any discussions with the Prices Commission. Although he accepted assurances that those trades and interests were adequately protected, I have no doubt that when a powerful nation wants to get a certain thing done, it will use every possible effort to make its opponents bend to its will, and it is quite open to the representatives of Great Britain again to use certain measures which would nullify any possible economic arrangements we might make, and can tell us: "If you do not give us certain things, we will adopt certain other economic measures to make you do so." There is no question that they have the power to do it, if they want to, and I have no doubt, from previous experience of the measures they are able to take, that we must try to meet them half-way, if we can.
I am glad this has been settled. The position of businessmen throughout the country is one of—I will not say bankruptcy—very nearly bankruptcy, simply because they have been unable to get in debts due to them by the agricultural community over a fairly long number of years. That positian has become acute of recent years, simply because they could not get from their debtors the money necessary to carry on their business, and I say definitely that shopkeepers in country districts are exceedingly badly off by reason of that state of affairs. It has been brought about solely through the operations of the economic war, which. in turn, were brought about by those who professed to tell us that the farmers were never better off, although the position in country districts gives. the lie to that assertion. I am perfectly aware that the standard of living amongst the agricultural community has reached a seriously low ebb. It has reached a point at which they have to wear shoddy clothes, to do with inferior food and to put up with every possible shortage known to those in poor circumstances. They are not able to provide their families with the education they at one time provided; they are not able to provide them with the means of a living; and the only alternative for the younger people is the emigrant ship. That is the position which farmers' sons and daughters have had to endure, and the same applies just as strongly to the agricultural labourer who was dependent on the farmer for something approaching a, reaonahle living.
An endeavour has been made to convince us that the penal tariffs now being taken off were not deducted from the agricultural community in respect of exports of live stock and agricultural produce from this country. We know very well that is not correct. We know very well that they fell directly upon those men who were exporting cattle, pigs, and the various products of agricultural entenprise in every direction. Those men have had to bear the brunt of it. It has been alleged that they were patient in that situation. I say they were not, but five or six years of intense poverty is enough to break the spirit of the stoutest heart, and the men who were able to fight for their privileges, to fight for the land which they now are supposed to enjoy, have gone down under the operations of the infamous economic war. The allegation has also been made that cattle prices will not rise very much with the removal of the penal tariffs. That may be so. Markets are very tricky things, but it is a principle of commerce that if you once take off a duty which has been deducted from the price of the article, the producer will get the benefit. I am thankful for the new position, and it is a course we have been urging on the Government for the past five years. The sum of £10,000,000 has been accepted as the balance to be paid to Great Britain, after they have collected during the last five years, something like £5,000,000, making in all £35,000,000. That 10,000,000 is a capital sum representing a half per cent. of a sinking fund which repaid the loans to the stockholder, and adding 2¾ per cent. interest, it represents a very much larger sum than at first appears.
Although it has been alleged that we could not have got such a bargain five years ago, we heard over and over again that a small sum would have settled the matter, because it would have represented an immediate payment of a cash advance, and, divested of interest attached to the land annuity, would have meant a very much larger sum and would have meant an immediate taking up of stock by the British. We all know that if a farmer wanted to redeem his land annuity, the redemption price could be paid by the farmer going on the market a few years ago, buying 100 land stock at somewhere about 56, and handing that to the Land Commission, which would accept it at its face value of £100. The British will hand this £10,000,000 back and redeem so much of the land stock. They will pay it back to the bondholders, and it certainly will represent to them a very much larger sum than it appears at first sight. What is the Gonernment going to do for the men who have paid back £25,000,000 to the British while, at the same time, they paid the revised land annuities to the Land commission? I ask them what are they going to do for those men who have borne the brunt of that imposition at a most critical time, when the slump had taken place and had depressed prices far below their natural level on the then market? What are they going to get? What are the agriculural community going to get for the losses, the sorrow and the perturbation of mind which they must have suffered when they found themselves unable to carry on even an ordinary method of living, and when the flying squad went amongst them and took every beast they had from their farms? Are you going to do anything for those men who have been in the first-line trenches, who have borne all those losses and who have paid back to the British the best portion of the sum which you have compounded and who will have to pay their share of this £10,000,000?
Derating and restocking loans at low rates of interest have been suggested. I am not going to say what method should be adopted. That is a matter for the Government and a matter for future discussion in this House, but I say emphatically that there is an obligation on the Government to repay those men who have lost their all. They are entitled to restitution, and restitution is the proper word to use, for the losses they have sustained. They will not be content to see that sum of £10,000,000 go elsewhere. They will not be content to go on as they are with understocked farms, shabby clothes and undernourished children. They will demand from the Government in the future something more than they had patiently to endure during the operation of the economic war. I shall say nothing about the £250,000 which has to be paid. That was an agreement which could not be avoided, and the wisest thing is to go on paying that in the hope that, on some future occasion, negotiations may be possible to avoid further payments. Once you choose the right time, there is the possibility that that sum will be got rid of. Do not take from the credit of the men who, in 1921, effected a marvellous settlement. It was, perhaps, a settlement made by untried and inexperienced men. They braved an angry and powerful Government when they went across to Britain to negotiate with them at that time, and do not take from them the credit of having done their best to help you to obtain this settlement. You have been successful in bringing back this settlement, but do not say that you won the war. I know very well that colleagues of mine will go down the country and say that they won the war.
Comment on this
I shall, and I assure you that I have not said the last word on it. I have risen to support this measure, but let not Deputies on the opposite side adopt the vainglorious attitude of heroes who have come back triumphant. With all their laudation of England, I do not regard England as having been generous in this matter. They probably drove a hard bargain. They are a business nation. They intended to get the last penny and, if they did not, it was probably because you could not pay any more and it would not be good business to press you. If they exacted the last penny, they might, deprive the farmers of all purchasing power so that their traders could not do business with them. It was, therefore, good business for them not to exact the last farthing. The people have been reduced to bankruptcy by their action in compulsorily collecting the land annuities on the stock exported from this country.
It was only a section of the farming community who were paying in that way—the section who were exporting stock and various commodities. We had to pay the annuities whether we liked it or not. Perhaps what we paid the Government here should not be called land annuities. They were really a special fund. Britain was collecting the land annuities and paying herself. Do not forget that the farmers were paying this money directly. The British were collecting the annuities from them directly while you were collecting a special fund which the farmers were utterly unable to pay. The rates are advancing rapidly year by year. That is a direction in which you can afford some relief to the farmers who have been suffering this dreadful scourge. You can renew the promise I heard my colleagues on the opposite side make in 1932—that they would derate agricultural land. That would be a direct form of relief—one the forms of relief which would best help people who cannot now help themselves.
We have had some talk about the ports. I am not perturbed about them. They have been given over, and you will have the pleasure of keeping them up because keep them up you must. Those forts will cost you half a million annually. Britain is not sighing after them. There will be less spending-power locally because the soldiers will not be coming into Cobh from Carlisle and Camden forts and Spike Island. They spent a good deal of money, and the local people also suffered through the departure of the British, who had a very large number of men there. If these forts are not to be white elephants they will have to be maintained, and anybody who is powerful enough to come in and take them over in time of war can make use of them. I ask the Government to lie generous towards those who have suffered, and in particular to be generous to the men who carried on good government in this country. I maintain that, if they had been in office in 1932, they would have made a good bargain—perhaps a better bargain than the combined sum of £25,000,000 and £10,000,000 which Britain collected from the farmers.
Comment on this
I rise with feelings of gratitude on this occasion—gratitude to a merciful Providence that has at last, shown light to the Government of this country. I think that some of the speakers from, the Government Benches have shown the height of ingratitude in endeavouring to hide the facts of the sittiation. This development was not unexpected. Is there any person who has studied the history of Fianna Fáil who did not expect this development? You have run absolutely true to form. I do not want to go back on the history of the last 17 or 18 years, but let any Deputy do that for himself. What does he find? Exactly what has happened now. We would not accept the Treaty; we would not accept the authority of this House for five years. Then the light began to dawn on us. We came into this House and, after five years more, we proclaimed that expenditure should be cut down by at least £2,000,000, that judges' salaries and Ministers' salaries should be reduced. Did Deputies opposite do that? Not at all. We said there should be no Seanad. We abolished the Seanad, and then we put it back again. Are not Deputies opposite running absolutely true to form? I thank God— and thank him sincerely—that this has happened.
There is no use in pretending, as a kind of cover-up, that you have done the right thing all along. Do you not know very well that you have not? What I say does not matter: history will record the facts and the people who come after us will be the judges. Let us wait and see. There are sensible people in this House, such as the Minister for Industry and Commerce, who realise that this is a very important matter. The Minister realised, when he spoke yesterday, that a very big thing had been done for this country. But we had the Minister for Agriculture coming along to tell us that the whole thing was not worth tuppence to anybody. Deputy Corry told us the same thing in effect. From what they say, apparently, we are going to have no benefits. Let there be some kind of consistency. It does not matter how the Fianna Fáil Party try to cover it up, history will record this: that they were guilty of more political heresy and more agricultural heresy than any Government that ever existed in this world. Look at their whole record calmly and see where they have got us. Thank God, they have got sense at last Let us be grateful for it and let us hope that the future will give us an opportunity of going ahead peacefully. As Deputy Gorey said last night, one of the best features of the settlement is that it has killed the buzzards, as he called them, the parasites who made money on the backs of the people during the period of the economic war, That is quite true. Another good feature of the settlement is that it has debunked all the sheer nonsense there was about self-sufficiency and burning everything British except her coal. Mind you, we had that from the Fianna Fáil Benches not two months ago. We have a lot to be grateful for. We should be grateful that we have seen this day, when the people who have the history and the background of Fianna Fáil have come to realise what is the true state of affairs. It is quite a lot to be thankful for.
When he was speaking here yesterday evening, the Minister for Agriculture told us quite a lot of things. As a matter of fact, he endeavoured to minimise whatever good might accrue from the settlement by telling us that the increase in the price of cattle would not be very marked; that it would be very small; in fact, that it would not be there at all. I must say, in passing, that I did not think his speech added lustre either to himself or to this House. After all, agriculture is a very important matter and it ought to be treated in a very serious way. If the Taoiseach and those who want across with him to London did not think it was important to make this settlement, they would not have made it, and I do not think it is good policy for the Minister for Agriculture to endeavour to minimise and try to make a joke of it, as if were. There is no use in the Minister for Agriculture endeavouring to paint the picture that the prices for cattle next week or next month, as distinct from the prices obtaining since the negotiations were undertaken, will not be very marked. That is not a fair comparison at all. Will the Minister for Agriculture, or any other member of the House, take his mind back to 1934 and 1935, when the people of the country could not get even the price of a pair of boots for the cattle they brought out to the fair and were obliged to bring home again? They could not sell them at any price then, owing to the economic war and nothing else. The Minister for Agriculture said that some members of the Opposition, if not the whole of them, had declared that the annuities were legally and morally due. If the delegation that went to London have not proved that they were convinced of it, I do not know what construction to put on what has happened.
Comment on this
Not even one penny, says Deputy Victory. Notwithstauding all that, the Taniseach admits that they were collected, with more hardship in the last six years than ever before, and he has to admit that there were close on £27,000,000 collected by the British by way of penal tariffs, and irrespective of all that, he has agreed to give another £10,000,000.
Comment on this
And yet the Deputy says not one penny. Remember, the principle is there. Is that in the Agreement—that £78,000,000? Is there any mention of it? There is mention of £10,000,000, and we have nothing to relate it to. The facts are there, in any case, and I do not want to make any capital out of it. Were it not that the Minister for Agriculture and Deputy Corry tried to make capital out of the matter, I would not now be troubling the House by referring to it We have paid to Britain, by way of penal tariffs, a sum of £26,000,000.
Comment on this
It might have arisen in this way. The Minister for Industry and Commerce might have been responsible for it from the statement he made yesterday. I am going to confess to a complete ignorance as to the amount collected by Britain by way of protective dnties, as distinct from penal duties. I understand, however, that from penal duties Britain collected £26,000,000 on the head of the disputed moneys. The Minister for Industry and Commerce said that, in addition, there were protective duties, so possibly Deputy Brasier and myself are both right and maybe it is £35,000,000. I do say definitely that they collected £26,000,000 by way of penal duties, according to the British accounts.
In addition to that, we are handing them another £10,000,000. I am not saying it is not a good settlement. What I am saying is that it is an admission that the sums were due. After the promotion that has been given to the legal advisers of the Government for giving the advice that they were not due, we have this admission that those people were wrong. The Minister for Agriculture referred to the fact that the people on this side of the House even went to the trouble and expense of getting legal advice to show that the moneys were legally and morally due. Would you not think the Minister for Agriculture would have the good sense not to mention that? At least I would. The people who advised the Government were promoted to the benches of this country, and the highest offices they could hold, for their advice, and now it is admitted the advice was wrong, and we have to pay. Is that not the situation?
Comment on this
Are they giving us all the rest of the claims—are they conceding all the rest of the claims?
Comment on this
The claim that the Minister made has not been acknowledged at all—the number of millions mentioned yesterday, £140,000.000 or £340,000,000.
Comment on this
The other sums fade into insignificance before the Minister's clam. There is one good thing that this settlement has done, it has debunked all that nonsense, debunked the whole lot of it; we are finished with that, and the people know what value to place upon that kind of codology. When Deputy Dowdall was speaking yesterday, he expressed fears over certain matters, with regard to trade and manufactures, and incidentally he said that it was perfectly well known that we could not, and no country could, exercise complete rights in tariffs, put them sky-high, if you like. He said that everybody knew we are living in an age in which there should be exchange, and so on.
Fianna Fáil did not know that until now. Not at all. We were living in an age of self-sufficiency in which the Taoiseach wanted a situation here such as one might imagine would exist were there a big wall built around a country and the people all lived inside that wall. The Taoiseach was aiming at that type of economy. He expressed that view more than once. It was a great pity that Deputy Dowdall, who is a manufacturer did not try to educate the Government on this important matter. I do not think this trade Agreement is a good one. I do not know how it is to operate. I do not know a thing about that, but if people from this side of the House went across to England and brought home a settlement like that, I do know what would be said of them by the people who are now sitting on the Government Benches.
Comment on this
No, I am not. Deputy Davin yesterday feared the fact that the Prices Commission will have full authority to declare what the tariffs ought to be. He said whatever the Tariff Commission fixes was afterwards to be implemented by this House. He added that British manufacturera ought not to have a right to appear before the Prices Commission. I am afraid that if we go into the implications of the whole thing and study carefully what is in the Trade Agreement it will be found to be a lot worse than that. The Minister for Agriculture last night told us about Articles 3 and 9. One is a counterpart of the other. The one is relating to and in favour of Britain. The other is relating to and in favour of this country. I asked him why the difference in the wording and he could not tell me. I now invite the House to study that. The difference is there. It appears to me that that Trade Agreement will put us in this position —that we have undertaken to have all our tariffs reviewed by the Prices commission. We have undertaken that we will take them in whatever order Britain dictates. We have also undertaken that Britain will have the right to come here and sit at the Prices Commission and we have undertaken that wc will put into operation Whatever the findings of the Commission are. But remember Article 3 gives us no authority whatever over the British regulating their own market quantitatively, but Article 9 does give the British authority as regards the quantitative arrangement of our markets. I have no hesitation in saying that if people on this side of the House brought back that arrangement, we would have been told, possibly wrongly, that we had sold the fiscal freedom of this country and that we had sold our economic freedom body and soul . I do not think we have paid that but the Article does not read well.
I do not think the Minister for Industry and Commerce in speaking in the House yesterday gave us afair analysis of the reasons why the Irish negotiators had accepted these conditions. I do not think he did so at all. For instance, I thought him very contradictory when he told us first that our proximity to Britain entailed that our Trade Agreements with Britain would have to be on a different basis from their trade agreements with such countries as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the next breath he told us that our Agreements with Britain were so worded because they were the same agreements as those which Britain had made with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. That is what I gathered from the Minister's speech. But the Minister cannot have it both ways. We are in a very different position certainly in regard to Britain from the position occupied by those other countries. As far as trade and the ordinary manufactured commodity is concerned, I agree we are in a very different position. But we cannot say that the justification for that Trade Agreement is because it is the same as the agreement made with the other countries. I want to know if we are to benefit from the fact that we are in quite a distinct position as regards Britain from the position that those other countries occupy.
The Taoiseach told us that these Agreements could not have been made any time up to the present. He said there were Constitutional difficulties in tho way and various other things but particularly the Constitutional matters. It seems pretty extraordinary to me that if those Constitutional matters were, as the President says, obstacles in the way of a settlement, yet when these Constitutional matters were being amended in this House there was no murmur and no objection from Britain. Why does the Taoiseach now think that if he brought in this settlement six years ago these Constitutional points would have been raised? What evidence has he of that? Apparently the British were satisfied that these Constitutional matters should go. The point he raises now is that the British would know they were at the back of the Taoiseach's mind. When the Taoiseach took office here in 1932 he panted to know what would be the reactions from the British if he then declared a republic for the Twenty-Six Counties. Of course the President has gone away from that position. That is because it was not a realistic position to occupy. In addition to the benefits it conveys, there is one thing that the present Agreement has done. I am sure there are people of the Fianna Fáil Party, possibly men on the Front Benches, who realise to-day how big the men were who in 1921 negotiated the Treaty. They signed that Treaty after the British had shot us up and burned us out. In the face of that they were able to go over and make an agreement in that very unfavourable atmosphere. They were able to come back to this House and say: "Yes, we were able to make a bargain." That is something that can be appreciated to-day more than it has ever previously been appreciated. For goodness sake, let not the Fianna Fáil Party try now to defend the political antics they pursued in the past. We have arrived at a stage and let us thank God we have arrived at it. Let us go ahead and continue removing these things from tho sphere of practical politics. We know the disturbance these things have caused. We know the losses they have caused in the country. We are aware of the amount of propaganda that was made over these things. I hope that every Party in the country will now have the good sense not to raise any more of this sort of propaganda.
Deputy Dowdall made a good point here yesterday. The point was made from those benches in 1932 by Deputy Hogan. It is a pity that it was not then acted on. That point was that at one time Fianna Fáil represented the wild element in this country, and that Britain would be glad and anxious to get their good will. That point was made by Paddy Hogan six years ago. It was an important point; in every respect it was perfectly true. It is only to-day that Deputy Dowdall has come to recognise it. But now that the Fianna Fáil Party at last are beginning to realise that, I hope, with the blessing of God, they will continue to act on it. Let us go ahead along these lines. I do hope there will be no reason and no necessity in future to debunk the men who saw the wisdom of acting on these lines when in 1921 they signed and voted for the Treaty.
Comment on this
From the other side of the House we have got an indication of what is going to happen. We have had very reasonable speeches from the Taoiseach and from the Minister for Industry and Commerce. These were speeches of the sort that one would expect to be made here in this House. But at the same time we have got an indication from Deputy Corry of the way in which this thing will be dealt with down the country. It is perfectly obvious that, while the Fianna Fáil Government would not admit that they were wrong in the past, they had at least to admit the fact that Griffith and Collins were right in 1921 when they signed the Treaty. Yet Deputy Corry must get up and say: "We are still on the straight road, and we are going to achieve our object, even if we have to use gas." He will even talk about marching across the Border, as the Tanaiste did some years ago when he said that he would probably lead the people over it.
Even though the situation has been debunked, we had better make up our minds that, once these people get out of the House, the bunk will be revived, the drams will rattle, the bonfires will burn, the flags will wave, and we shall be told that this is another step towards the national goat —a 32-county Republic in our time. They will tell us this is one of the greatest historic events this country has ever seen. If one even looks at the Government official organ one will see that it has referred to the signing of this Agreement and to the economic war, about which we have been arguing on both sides of this House for the past five years, by saying that it was ended in a historic ceremony. It was a historic ceremony, according to the official organ of the Government a week ago.
The greatest national advance that Fianna Fáil succeeded in getting since they came into power was made in Downing Street when Eamon de Valera got his field-glasses back, but it has not taken us very near a 32-county Republic or a 32-county Ireland of any sort. Since the l9th January we have heard from members of the opposite side of the House, and from Fianna Fáil sources all over the country, that there would be no settlement without a settlement of the Partition question, that there would be no settlement until the unnatural Border was got rid of. We had the Fianna Fáil clubs shrieking in holy horror even at the very idea of a settlement without the removal of the Border. But to-day we see what a Northern Nationalist Senator thinks of all that talk. He says: "I am now satisfied more than ever that Mr. de Valera has no policy about the North, and that he was only using it for his own purposes."
It is very easy to say that with this Trade Agreement we are getting back our ports, and that Partition was not considered, but I am perfectly satisfied, and the country is satisfied, about what happened as regards the Partition question at this conference. The Taoiseach went over to London, and he got up and said his Party piece for the papers about Partition. He rattled it out, as you would expect him, and then Mr. Chamberlain got up and said his party piece about Partition, and when both had said their Party pieces, which they knew would get into the papers, they said: "Now let us get on to business, and let us forget Partition." But something could have been done about Partition. All over Europe, all over the world one might say, minority questions are causing considerable trouble to-day. There was a minority question in Austria, a minority question in Czecho-Slovakia, and minorities are making themselves very vocal and active in these countries. I say, whether it was possible or not to remove the unnatural Boundary during the present negotiations, the Taoiseach, if he was any way sincere on the question of Partition at all, could have extracted at least some promise from the British Government with which he is so much in love and which, through the blessing of God and coincidence of time, has such a marvellous leader in his view. He could have got something out of that wonderful gentleman, Mr. Chamberlain, who again by the blessing of God and the coincidence of time, happened to be at the head of the British Parliament when Eamon de Valera was the head of the Irish Parliament. He could have got some guarantees from Mr. Chamberlain that would prevent this puppet Parliament in the North from gerrymandering, that would prevent them from victimising and treating the Nationalist minority in the North as they have been treated for the last 16 or 17 years and as they are still being treated to-day.
Comment on this
We are then presented in the first part of the Agreement with this great national advance, this handing over of the ports. The Taoiseach uses a very clever phrase when he tells us that he has abrogated Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, wiped them out completely. That is a very nice way of putting it. I would prefer to say that it was Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty which put the Taoiseach into the position of being able to take over those ports, that Articles 6 and 7 gave the Taoiseach the right to get these ports. If the Taoiseach thinks that that represents a great national advance he is welcome to the thought. I should like to get from the Taoiseach or some member of the Government some little idea of what the maintenance of these ports is going to cost. Do they mean to spend money on equipping these ports as naval or landing ports? I remember a time when if one single penny were asked for equipping an Irish Army Fianna Fáil Deputies would shout in holy horror all over the country. The reason for the change of attitude is obvious now. They will equip the ports and they will recruit men to man them for one reason—that in that way they, hope to bring down the unemployment figures.
Deputy Corry and others like him will go down the country and say that by taking over these ports we have taken one step nearer the ultimate goal, but it is obvious to everybody now that it was the Treaty of 1921, and the efforts of Griffith and Collins which put them into the position of being able to take over these ports to-day. We can say one thing anyway, when people say that this Agreement could have been made five years ago. Deputy corry says that if we were behind the Government which then got a mandate from the people, many things could have been done. I say now, and history will prove it, that if the people on the opposite benches were behind the Irish Government when that Government got a mandate from the people in 1922, it is not this settlement we would lie talking about to-day, because this country would have gone on to much better things in our generation, if the Government at that time had the support of Deputies opposite.
History alone can judge what we might have achieved at that time had Deputies opposite given their support to the efforts of the Government then in office. There is very little use in saying to-day that we are making a great national advance, remembering what could have been done during the ten years Deputies opposite stayed out of this House, when every member of the then Government and even every private Deputy who came into the House, was, according to them, a person guilty of treason, murder and rapine of the Irish people. It was the Treaty of 1921, the people who stood up for it, the ordinary people of this country who stood behind the Government at that time who put the Taoiseach into the position of being able to clap himself on the back now that he has got this settlement and that he has been able to get it by the lucky coincidence of a Conservative Government and a decent Prime Minister in England.
On the question of the Finance Agreement, it is quite apparent that there is holy horror amongst the Fianna Fáil back benchers about this £10,000,000.
What is it being paid for? Deputy Victory said a short time ago that not a penny was being paid. That was a beautiful phrase at one time. In the Six Counties the cry is "Not an inch," and in the Twenty-Six Counties it is "Not a penny." The Agreement says:
(1) The Government of Eire agree to pay to the Government of the United Kingdom on or before the 30th of November, 1938, the sum of £10,000,000 sterling.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 3 of this Agreement, payment of the sum specified in Article I shall constitute a final settlement of all financial claims of either of he two Governments against the Other...
Were the land annuities considered a financial claim on the British Government? Whether it was admitted that the money was due or not, it was still a claim. No matter what Deputy Victory thinks, I am afraid the Taoiseach admitted it. In his opening statement to the House, the Taoiseach used very peculiar words which I think absolutely proves that he admits it is not part of the settlement or whatever you like to call it. The words were:
"You may, if you like, regard it as ransom money."
People outside will be puzzled with talk about figures ranging from £78,000,000 to £120,000,000, that Ireland has been relieved of by a settlement for £10,000,000. It is not very long ago, in fact within the first three or four years of Fianna Fáil political life, when they were talking of the financial settlement that could be made some day when England would be made disgorge the robbery that took place since 1803, and made pay back over-taxation that had gone on for 120 years. I should like to ask any of the Ministers if it is not a fact that the actual claim against the British Government placed on record by the Fianna Fáil Government in 1922 amounted to £400,000,000 as being due to this country. Of course, that is forgotten. Everything is forgotten.
Comment on this
Surely the Minister is not going to re-open that claim in view of the terms of the Agreement. Does he intend to re-open the claim for over-taxation against the British Government?
Comment on this
No. In regard to that document, I am in the same position as Deputy Cosgrave with regard to the 1923 Agreement and the Ultimate Financial Setlement.
Comment on this
In regard to that question I am in the same position as the Deputy is in connection with the documents he signed.
Comment on this
Apart from the financial aspect, there is another aspect to be considered in connection with the cost of the economic war to the taxpayers. Ministers are very fond of producing statistics here, particularly about the number of cattle in the country. Coming from an area where there are no big farmers and no ranchers, where they are all small mixed farmers, I say there is a definite falling off in the cattle population there.
They are small farmers that depended for a livelihood mainly on three or four cattle which they would rear and sell in the Autumn. That trade has been dead for four years. With all due respect I am beginning to doubt the accuracy of figures compiled concerning live stock, and wondering if the agricultural statistics compiled for one year are not put down for other years so that the 14 cattle that one John Murphy might have had last year are put down for this year. In the South of Ireland, and particularly in Kerry, there is a big falling off in the cattle population. There are three big fairs within a short distance from where I live, at Castleisland, Knocknagree and Kanturk, and if the cattle were in the country they would be going to these fairs since prices rose. They are not going to the fairs because they are not there. That has been the cost of the economic war in that part of the country. Even if the statement of the Minister for Agriculture is wrong, and that the price of cattle goes up the people will not be able to take advantage of the rise, because they Will not be able to buy cattle, and they have no stock coming along to sell. As we are on this subject, there is another item that might be looked into, as I think Deputies now realise that other people suffered from the effects of the economic war as well as the farming community. It would be well worth Ministers' while to go and live in a small country town with a population of about 1,000 for about three weeks. I say that Ministers could play golf up and down the streets of such towns seven day's in the week without being in the slightest danger of hitting anyone. Country shopkeepers and small traders have felt the brunt of the economic war as much as the farming community for this reason, that up to the start of the economic war people tried to pay their way. For the last six years credit could not be given, so that in most cases people were not even able to pay debts that had accumulated before that period. Ministers may smile and may believe that to be an untrue story, but as I live in a country town I know that small traders could not meet the demands of wholesale firms, because they could not get money from people who had not got it. If Ministers lived in any of these towns they would know what the economic war has cost.
In conclusion. I have to admit that I amglad that this Agreement has been come to. I do not see anything at all in it to brag about, beyond the fact that the Government has done something that should have been done long ago. I hope this is going to end the type of polities we have had here for the last 15 years. I hope now that we have effected a practical settlement, let it be good, bad or indifferent; that we are going to have practical politics, and that Deputy Corry and others will follow the straight road, or the road back, or the road forward, and remember there is not a bit of good in trying to drive the people off their heads again, or to believe that the only hope of remaining in power is to try to get the young people to think that the Taoiseach is the saviour of the country and the only man to carry on the national fight. Let us forget that, because the people are sick and tired of that kind of politics. It is because the Government knows that, that we have got this Agreement. Naturally, I will vote for it, for this reason: that it will give me great pleasure, whatever length of time I am in this House, at least once to go into the Lobby with this Government to do something that I am delighted to see them doing now. I will feel, where marching into the Lobby with Eamon de Valera, that I see him vindicating Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith.
Comment on this
As Deputy Cosgrave is in the House, I should like to know whether he could give the approximate date on which the ports were offered to a Minister, when his Party was in office. Could the Deputy give even the approximate date on which the offer was made?
Comment on this
The Minister might have given me notice of that question, when I would be able to find out the approximate date. It was between 1929 and 1931.
Comment on this
Between 1929 and 1931. That is sufficient for my purpose. The Deputy the other day pooh-poohed this Agreement, and said it was quite a simple matter. He indicated that at any time he could have got one quite as good, at any rate in regard to the ports.
Comment on this
The Taoiseach referred to the taking over of the ports in his speech introducing the motion, and stressed the importance that we placed upon that portion of the Agreement. The Deputy, when he rose to speak immediately afterwards, said that he did not grudge the Taoiseach whatever pleasure he got from the taking over of the ports: that he could have got the same himself, or words to that effect. I think it is within the recollection of all the members who were here at the time that that is what the Deputy said. Now, I am particularly interested in these ports, and I think that everybody who remembers the time of the Treaty and the disastrous division that was caused here in our people over it, will also have a very keen recollection of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, which related to coastal defence and the ports, and to the facilities that the British claimed in time of war or of strained relations. I think there is yet an interesting portion of history to be written about these two clauses.
There were three principal objections at the time of the Treaty. One was the clause giving allegiance to the British King, the other was the Partition clause, and the third was these two Articles 6 and 7, which gave the British sovereignty over our ports, and gave them the legal right to claim whatever facilities they desired in time of war or of strained relations. The history of the clause regarding the Oath has been written. Everybody knows all about it. The Treaty was put over—was swallowed by a number of people who thought that the Oath was not obligatory: that the acceptance of the Treaty did not mean that the Oath of Allegiance would be in the Constitution. That was finally settled when the late Kevin O'Higgins, introducing certain clauses in the Constitution, said that they were obligatory, and that the Dáil at the time had no right whatsoever to reject them.
Comment on this
Excuse me. I happened to be in the House at that particular time—on the occasion of the introduction and the passage into law of the Constitution, and the late Minister for Justice made no such statement as has been uttered by the Minister for Defence. He stated to the House: "This is the Constitution which this Government is proposing to the House. The Dáil has a perfect right to reject or to amend any and every clause of this Constitution. This Government is standing over certain clauses in this Constitution which are regarded as obligatory in the Constitution by the British Government. The Dáil can change these if it so desires, but it will have the responsibility of electing a Government to carry on the business of the country."
Comment on this
He states that at that time the British Government regarded the clauses in the Constitution relating to the king as obligatory. At that time a number of people voted for the Treaty in the belief that that clause was not obligatory.
Comment on this
A number of others voted for it in the belief that the boundary clause meant that a boundary commission would be set up which would go into the territories under the Belfast Government and the Free State Government and re-allocate them on the basis of the opinions of the population. That myth lasted somewhat longer than the myth about the nonobligatory aspect of the Oath. It was about six years before the people found out that the clausc relating to Partition was a fraudulent clause. The other two clauses in the Treaty regarding the ports were accepted by a number of people on the understanding that at the end of five years the review that would take place would result in the handing over of these ports to the Irish Free State. The five years passed and the public got no information as to what was happening. Deputy Cosgrave says now that he could have got them sometime between 1929 and 1931.
Comment on this
That was the Conference held in 1927. I want to stress this, that a number of people in this country, those who were thinking of its defence and what its relationship would be to a major war in Europe, were greatly perturbed about those two clauses in the Treaty and were particularly perturbed about the sovereignty of our ports and the fact that they Hers in the hands of another Power. Not alone were the public perturbed about that, but officials were perturbed and some of the most thumbed files in my Department are those relating to coastal defence and the question of these ports.
Deputy Cosgrave treated this as a very minor subject the other day, but here are a few of the files—Deputies can see for themselves-on that subject. They are the biggest files in the place, because those who have had to think about the defence problems of this country over the last 15 years have been distressed about the position of our ports and the position of this country if the British at any time claimed the rights given under Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. Deputy Cosgrave the other day pooh-poohed the business, and said he could have got the ports, indicating that he could mave got them on the same condition as we got them. Deputy Cosgrave, according to himself nor any of the Ministers serving under him for ten years never told an untruth.
Comment on this
As reported at column 49 of the Official Debates of 27th April, 1938, the Deputy said: "I am making a speech here now, knowing what I say to be true. I have had in this country 20 years' experience of public life. During the ten years while I was in the Government, not one Minister of mine uttered an untruth that I know of, inside or outside my Government."
Comment on this
I am never so suspicious of Deputy Cosgrave as when he gets sanctimonious, ana the more sanctimonious he becomes the more suspicious I become. I am quite prepared to think that Deputy Cosgrave believed that to be the truth.
Comment on this
I am quite prepared to believe that he believed he could have got those ports six or seven years ago on the same terms as we got them. Deputy Cosgrave sometimes reminds me of the clown in the circus who, when he sees a man standing on his head or juggling plates, says: "Oh, that it quite simple; I could do that myself." But when he tries to do it . he generally breaks the plates or the eggs or half-breaks his neck an trying to do the trick o' the loop. In this particular instance, however, I believe he might have been convinced that he could have gone further between 1929 and 1931, and could in fact have got those ports. I stress the importance of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty in the minds of those who are thinking of defence questions in this country. One of the first files I asked for in the Department of Defence was the file relating to the ports, because it was in my mind then that, apart from Partition, those two Articles were going to cause us the most trouble internally in this country; that, if the British held on to the ports, or if in time of war or strained relations they attempted to claim the facilities which it was in their legal power to claim, not alone would it cause international difficulties for us in a world or European war, but that it would cause internal difficulties; that if the Government here wanted to maintain its neutrality, and if the British insisted on claiming further territories around the ports, or even on remaining in the ports, we would have to shed Irish blood in defence of the British soldiers who were in our territory. I saw one civil war, and I do not want to see another for any reason whatsoever. The first files, therefore, that I called for in my Department were the files relating to the ports. I wanted to see what happened in regard to the five years portion of Clauses 6 and 7. I want to say this, that nowhere in those files did I discover anything which would support Deluty Cosgrave's statement of the other day.
Deputy Cosgrave the other day said that his Ministers never told an untruth. It is sometimes very embarrassing if people tell lies. They say a lie is the deliberate telling of an untruth to a person who has a right to know the truth. If there is anything that a Government here has the right to know it is the truth in relation to the extent of the State commitments in international affairs, and what has happened in the past in regard to certain big international questions. I think that the last Government should have had on its files, available for the incoming Government, information of the important character which Deputy Cosgrave alluded to the other day—that away back in 1929 or 1931 he could have obtained those ports on the same basis as we obtained them; or back in 1927 as Deputy McGilligan now claims they could have been obtained. It was a most important piece of information, and the last Government should have transferred that information to us. I think it should be generally recognised that Governments, if they have such important information relating to the international relations of this country, should pass it on to the next Government. I believe that that is the duty of this Government, and the duty of any following Government. All I want to say about it is that we had a right to know the truth about those ports, and if Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy McGilligan are telling the truth about them, those files lie. I searched for the information from those files and from everybody who had anything to do with the negotiations regarding those ports—the negotiations which Deputy McGilligan said took place back in 1927, and the report of which is there.
Comment on this
Surely people are able to add. It was five years from the date of the signing of the Treaty. When was that? If you do not know it, look at your own Agreement. It was December, 1921.
Comment on this
I want to say again that if Deputy McGilligan is telling the truth—that they could have got those ports on the conditions on which we got them—then the official files are lying.
Comment on this
The files disclose a particular fact, that for months reams were written about the importance of those ports, and finally a conference took place in London consisting of a few of the British and about six important people from this side. They were told that they could not get the ports.
Comment on this
April, 1927. That is as far as the files go. If the files are wrong, we should know that they are wrong; we should have had the information which the Deputy says he had. That is the only moral that I want to point. I believe that Deputy Cosgrave thinks he could have got them, but certainly the files do not disclose that, and I greatly doubt whether Deputy Cosgrave's belief in the matter is correct. It certainly would have been a piece of joyous information, not alone to this Government when they came in, but to the members of the last Government Party, to think that they could have got those ports on the terms on which we got them; that that big portion of the difficulties into which we were forced was gone by the board; that certain of the national and international obligations which followed as a direct consequence of those two Articles were gone. I think that would have been worth any sum of money. Deputy Cosgrave in the past believed that settlements which I think were very much less in importance than the getting over of the ports were worth a very big sum of money indeed, and I think if he had announced to his Government then that he could have got those ports it would have conveyed great joy to them.
One thing is this: that I think that, if Deputy Cosgrave could have got the ports on those terms, he should have at least consulted his colleagues about it, that there should have been a Cabinet decision or a Government decision about it. It was important enough. It is not the kind of an offer that is made every day in the week, and do not think he should have turned it. down on his own initiative or on the initiative of the Minister who was in London. It is not every day that people are handed back portion of their territory, and I think it was important-enough to have a Cabinet decision about it. Whether it was or not, and whatever relation Deputy Cosgrave had to his Cabinet—whether or not he was prepared to take a decision like that on his own initiative—it was certainly important enough to put down on the files and, anyway, to transmit to the Government. That is all I want to say on the matter.
Comment on this
With regard to the speech we have just heard, Sir, I have only one comment to make. The Minister has instituted a comparison between Deputy Cosgrave and a clown. Well at least, there is one difference between the Minister and a clown—the Minister can stand on his head, and has been standing on it for six years past.
Comment on this
I do not think the Minister referred to Deputy Cosgrave as a clown. I certainly would not have allowed it to pass, if he had done so. The Minister said that Deputy Cosgrave reminded him of a clown in a circus attempting to do things and failing.
Comment on this
The Minister made the comparison between Daputy Cosgrave and a clown in a cirous attempting to stand on his head and breaking eggs and plates and saucers. I say that the Minister has been standing on his head for the last six years, breaking eggs, and plates and saucers, and pledges—and pledges, and one of them I am going to refer to; and if we have got him back on his feet again, I am not sure whether or not we will find that it is better, in the long run, to have him back in his Alice in Wonderland position, in which we are told the Red knight used to think better when he was standing with his head in a ditch. I am afraid we will have to wait a few years to compare the Minister's new position with his former position before we shall see whether we will get anything better from him after he has allowed the blood to depart from his head to the other end of his anatomy.
I must say that I had the utmost forebodings as to what would be contained in these agreements when I saw that a deliberate attempt was being made to postpone the settlement over hallowed Easter Week. I knew that it was deliberate, and I wondered what it meant. Now I know. Of the various speakers, so far, only one man has slipped into the old verbiage in the course of this debate. We thought we had done a great bit of work when we made the British give up the phrase "British Empire" and adopt the phrase "British Commonwealth of Nations," and I must say that they had better sense than we thought and did not seem to mind if we used the term "Irish Republic" so long as the substance of the British Commonwealth of Nations was there. Deputy Corry, however, last night, was the first man to use the phrase "the Republic." I thought that the Taoiseach might easily have started a speech here to-day with the ordinary Broadcaster's announcement — t h e S.O.S. — asking that all members of the Republican Party, who were last seen confined to brackets at the end of the Fianna Fáil organisation, would hurry immediately to their clubs where their followers were dangerously ill. I wonder would the Taoiseach take this test: Would he like now to deliver the ordinary Easter Week oration, below the plaque of Cuchulainn in the Post Office, and bring in his hand the Abdication Act, the Constitution and this Agreement, and get Deputy Corry to stand in the crowd there and throw bouquets at him for What he would say about the Republic.
The Taoiseach told us that circumstances had to wait—although circumstances were tending badly for our people—until matters became propitious for a settlement; and the whole propitious circumstances that he spoke of was the advent to power of an Englishman of a particular type and a particular calibre. Of course, the events had to wait for a more propitious turn. It was not so much that British Ministers had to be got to have a new outlook on the situation here, but the Taoiseach himself had to be got to have a new outlook. I have often wondered at the lot that Fate has dealt to this country. Nothing was more wonderful than the fact that, if an Abdication crisis had to arise in England, it arose as late as it did, and not, say, in 1933. The Minister, standing on his head even for that period, had not long enough to break some of his pledges. It would seem that if the Abdication crisis had occurred in 1933, this country would have taken the opportunity then presented to it to allow itself to drift into a republic, but the Taoiseach had to wait long enough to be able to say of his own free will and without duress or aggression, or even a hint of aggression, that he could put on the Statutes of this country an Act that named the British king. That was one of the terms. The education of the Taoiseach was a slow process. In 1933, when the then Dominions Secretary in England had made a statement, the Taoiseach issued a reply, and he issued a challenge. He asked, at that date, if the British Government would say that the form of government, republic or monarchy, was a matter exclusively for the Irish people to decide. He said:
"We will not ask to have it both ways. We will recognise that, if we vote for a republic, we cannot be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and enjoy its privileges and advantages";
and he said, in a supplementary matter issued at that time, that he knew what way the Irish people would vote if one thing were assured to them. What was the one thing? It was that the exercise of the fundamental right of declaring for a republic would not be regarded by the British in such a way that they would take active aggression against us, but that if it was only a question, of living inside the British Commonwealth or outside the British Commonwealth, in 1933, the Taoiseach knew, that, if he put that to a vote of the people, they would go for the republic.
Now, he got his chance in 1936, and it was the easiest possible thing just simply to sit tight here, to let the Abdication crisis pass in England, or, better still, to accept the proposal that came from the other side: that here, we, too, abdicate the king, and we do nothing more. Then we were outside. Then we might cease to have the advantages of membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but then we were outside and we took the thing that happened miraculously. There was no action on our part that could possibly have called for aggression on the part , of the British. Fate had moved and swung matters our way, and there was nothing more to do except the simple performance of accepting what the British wanted, that we would abdicate the outgoing King and do nothing more, and this country had slipped as smoothly and as quietly as possible into the haven of the republic. We did not accept that. We decided to bring in the king. We brought in the King for a reason that was declared by the Taoiseach through the mouth of a, Minister of his, Deputy Boland. "We believe it to be in the best interests of this country to stay inside the Commonwealth." Three years almost to a month since the date upon which the Taoiseach declared he knew the people of the country would opt for a republic and they would not want to have it both ways and bo both inside and outside But we did by our own free vote, by meaaures passed in this House, measures that are not coloured or befogged by any taint of insecurity, duress or threat, decide then that the time had come in which we would opt to remain in the British Commonwealth of Nations and when, by deliberate act of the House, we would bring in a named British King. What was the start of the propitious circumstances.
I have asked whether the Taoiseach would consider that the presentation of the Abdication Act, of the Constitution, and of this Agreement would be a welcome offering to the plaque of Cuchulainn in front of the Post Office. I will give him another test. Many years ago, in one of the towns in the Middle West of America, an amateur theatrical society put up a shockingly bad performance of the play of "Hamlet." The editor of one of the papers in that area had found it part of his duty to sit wearily through the performance, and on the next day he had this comment: "For years there has been a dispute as to who wrote the plays—Shakespeare or Bacon. That point can now be settled. Let the graves of the two men be opened after last night's performance, and the one who has turned will be known to have been the author." I believe there has been some doubt expressed from time to time as to whether the people who are carefully segregated in what is known as the Republican Plot really were true-hearted Republicans. The same test is applicable now. Take up the Constitution and this Agreement and see who has turned below.
We may rejoice at this Agreement; we may try to disguse with phrases just the fundamental change which has occurred; but the change has occurred and it is well to have it stressed. It may be that in years hereafter the happiest act the Taoiseach has performed will be phrased to be that which he took at the time of the Abdication crisis. It is certain that he would not regard it as the happiest act at the moment, and that the gloom which appears to have settled on his followers over the Agreement is the gloom which springs from the realisation that they were swung into power in this country, not in the way that one political Party succeeds another in the ordinary play of affairs, but because their advent to power marked a new revolution which was to have its outcome in an independent republic of thirty-two counties. Some of the unfortunate dupes who left this country under the stress of economic affairs in the last four or five years thronged into the approach to Downing Street when the Ministers were over there, and one of the banners they bore— what a shocking memory it must have brought to the Taoiseach, if he saw it— was: "Nothing less than a republic for the Thirty-two Counties."
The phrase is attributed to Disraeli that at the time of the passing of one of the Corn Laws he said about his opporient; Sir Robert Peel, that he had appeared in the police court the next day charged with bigamy, having intermarried with free trade while his first wife, agriculture, was still alive. Can it be said of the Taoiseach that the same sort of political bigamy has been committed, that he has intermarried with the Commonwealth while at least his first love, if not his wife, the republic, is still alive? If the phrase is put so, he has a defence—not the old defence put forward so outrageously on one occasion that he knew the first woman was not alive because he had throttled her. Although the Taoiseach might not say that of the republic, he can use a better defence—that for seven years he, who had the best right to hear from and of the said first wife, had not heard a word about her.
I think it was a propitious circumstance that wthe six years rolled so smoothly and that even in six years the educative process brought the Prime Minister from the point where he had been as a stalwart republican writing these challenges in 1932 to Mr. Thomas through the period of 1936, when he accepted the Commonwealth, through his own Constitution, where he faced up to the realities of the situation and had a double-headed State for this country, and brought him eventually to the point where he could bring home the Agreement which amounts to the acceptance of the Treaty, first of all, the burying of all hatchets as between ourselves and Great Britain, financial, economic and political, except one, bringing in British influence as the standard by which hereafter our industrial policy is to be judged, even although at a cartain remove. But that is a big advance. Whether some people may call that retrogression, or others, advance, the fact is that the distance which has been passed is one that we should comment upon.
The Taoiseach yesterday was aggrieved when challenged on the one point that he says is still the only point standing between the two countries—the question of the Six Counties. He was aggrieved at the phrase used by Deputy Dillon, that he misled the Catholics in the North since the start of the negotiations into the belief that their fate was bound up with these negotiations, and that there would not be any agreement unless their fate was somewhere implied, somewhere tied up with the agreement itself. We are told that is not so. I agree with Deputy Dillon that the Northern Catholics believed that that was so. They may have been deluded. I agree with Deputy Dillon that quite a number of people in this part of the country felt that it was so, but they, too, may have been deluded.
The Prime Minister, at any rate, has to answer this. How did it come that the Press organ of which he is managing director also was deluded into the same belief? The Irish Independent wrote during the course of the negotiations that there were disquieting rumours that partition had been shelved or was about to be shelved, and that some bargain or agreement on questions of economics and defence was to be made. They trusted there was no truth in these stories. That was described the next day by the Irish Press as a scandalous allegation and an insidious and scandalous attack on the Taoiseach and the Irish delegation generally. They need not emphasise the gravity of the charge. They described it in plain words to be a charge of the cold-blooded, callous betrayal of the Six-County people, and that they had nothing in prospect except the apathy and resignation of despair. Paraphrasing it like that, it was described as an atrocious charge, and that it was only a malevolent invention. I can give the quotations on which definitely the Irish Press could justify its defence of the Traoiseach on these grounds. But the fact that the Irish Press did make that statement about the Irish Independent for its hinting at the shelving of Partition, the fact that they made that defence, characterised that statement as such a falsehood and such an atrocious and scandalous allegation, puts it beyond the necessity of going through the detailed quotations to show whence Nationalists in Ulster had been misled. During the course of the negotiations the, Ulster Nationalists met, and towards the end of February they issued a statement, and, later, one of them issued a statement on his own: “However strong we have been behind Mr. de Valera in the North in the past, we would regard it as a betrayal if he were to ignore the problem of Partition by getting trade and defence agreements only, although we think he has no intention of doing such a thing.” And, as Deputy Linehan pointed out to-day, one of the Senators there comes wisely to the inevitable conclusion that Mr. de Valera has not now any policy on Partition, and that he never had. When the full extent of this is realised, it may at least have this distinct advantage that the Nationalists in Ulster will realise that they cannot—and cannot even legitimately—ask the, people in this part of the country to sacrifice what is required for the good of this part of the country because the situation that we all deplore cannot be immediately rectified.
But, after being misled during the , course of these negotiations, after undoubtedly being deluded into the belief that the question of Partition was going to be one of the pivotal points and that a breakdown of the whole negotiations was to be looked to if the undoing of Partition was not accomplished, I wonder will they feel that the matter has been even regarded as of importance when they read the passing references that were made by the Prime Minister introducing this resolution un the 27th April:—
"I am confident having got to that point in regard to the Six Counties that it is only a matter of time, and I hope and believe a short time, before somebody speaking from this bench will be able to announce to the whole Irish race that at last the British people have been wise and the British Government has been wise and that our people in Ireland of all sections have been wise and that Ireland is a completely independent sovereign State"—
With those platitudes Partition is put out of the way—
"I am confident it is only a matter of time and I hope and believe a short time."
Surely people in the North who may have been wrongly deluded but who were undoubtedly deluded in the belief that there was some plan and that some plan was being urged, surely they deserve in any event to have a statement here before this debate concludes as to what, if any, plan there is and what are the details of it. Was it proposed? Was it spoken of? What arguments were used against it, and how, finally, did the question come to be disposed of? When you do get people to the point that the Government organ can say it is a scandalous allegation to say that Partition is going to be shelved, that it is a charge of cold-blooded, callous betrayal of the Nationalists if such a statement were true, when you get to that point can you possibly believe that you have satisfied all the expectations that have been aroused by simply saying that "we hope and are confident that it is only a matter of time and we hope it is a short time until the question will be solved"? If that as all the Prime Minister has got to offer to those in the Six Counties, would it not be better to drop all this pretence? Would it not be better to say: "We realise that that matter is outside our control and we will not from time to time raise your hopes and disappoint you by putting at down on a conference agenda and spending casual morning discussing the matter and letting it in any event disappear from the final text of the Agreement."
I get more suspicious of this question of the Six Counties when I hear the appeals that are made so frequently from that side of the House that now we should all join together to achieve the only objective that is now left—the finishing of Partition. Every time that phrase is used, that appeal for concentration on this issue, that invocation that we should all join together to try and end that matter— every time I hear that the more it is borne in on me that you people there have no answer to the problem. You used to say you had. We had gone through this before you. We knew the difficulties of the situation. We had ceased deluding the people of the Six Counties. It may not help them much but in any event we did not raise false hopes only to have them dashed. I would ask, if there is a gleam of light in the darkness about the Six Counties, even if it is not politic to disclose the whole of any magnificent plan there may be, let us be told there is a plan, that something has been said upon which the slightest foothold may be got by those who are endeavouring to get that question fixed. And if there has not been, if there has been nothing about it but the silence of the Agreement, let us not then just simply say to the North, in the words of tho Irish Press, that “you have got to resign yourselves to the apathy and to hand yourselves over to the apathy and resignation of despair.” It may be that when the difficulties are recognised that that will be the first time at which any approach to meeting them can be made. It has been a deluding process for years back. The North was cajoled into the belief that that Government of all Governments was the one that was going to release them.
Comment on this
I was just going to get the quotation. On the eve of the General Election of 1933, The Traoiseach made a speech and the Irish Press summary was—in 1933 mark yon —January—“The re-establishment of Fianna Fáil is also a message to the Six Counties that the day of Irish deliverance has dawned.”
Comment on this
I said the editorial. I said the Taoiseach made a speech on which the newspaper editorial is: "The re-establishment of Fianna Fáil is a message to the Six Counties that the day of their deliverance has dawned." And, in 1938, the Taoiseach says: "I am confident that it is only a matter of time, and I hope and believe a short time, before somebody speaking from this bench will be able to do this, that and the other." We have heard of the longest night of suffering but that has been a very long day seeing that their deliverance had dawned in January of 1933. I do not object to our recognition of the difficulties but I do object to this deluding process that is going on for five or six years. I think it would have been far more manly to say that it is a situation, the end of which we do not foresee. Party capital Had to be made of it; support had to be got; enough baits were required to encourage the Border to speak for Fianna Fáil candidates. In order to get that, of course, this carrot had to be waved before the noses of these unfortunate people, and I doubt if there is any man sitting on the opposite benches who, looking over the five years, can say that at any time he saw any plan, even for the amelioration of the Six-County position, let alone for its termination.
Comment on this
He has not said so, and I do not think he will say so now. In any event, we have got it, in a timeless sort of way, a recognition of this as a problem, and we have the confidence, again without time limit. that the problem is going to be solved, and that is the end of the Agreement so far as the Six County area is concerned. That, I think, is also part of the propitious circumstances which were certainly around the making of this Agreement, even though the Prime Minister might not so regard it. I have said that the constitutional position brought about here is another of the propitious circumstances, and so it is. We go to a great deal of trouble these days to elect a President and we get a Constitution indicating his position and his power. It requires only the practised eye of anybody versed in constitutional matters to go through it to have the farce of the head of the state position revealed.
Any man glancing through the Constitution and coming to the paragraphs that deal with the head of the State knows what he ought to expect when he comes to them. The omissions are the striking things when one surveys the Constitution of this country. The head of the State has his place mainly when he turns outwards and looks towards other international persons, and the President whom we are going to instal one of these days has no functions in that way whatever; but the eye that marks these omissions will also note that the several Articles in relation to the powers of the head of the State are enlarged by adding in unusual powers, all with internal application. We have a double-headed sort of monster here operating as head of State. There is the familiar barometric construction known to most people with the two little figures, one of which comes out when there is going to be rain and the other of which comes out when it is going to be fine. Remember that is the position we have in this country, so far as the head of State is concerned—the Uachtaran and the King back to back, and when the King looks out, the Uachtaran looks in. That is the constitutional position freely accepted—no question now of duressby the people of this country, and that the section of the people represented by the Party opposite had been brought to accept that as normal was part of the propitious circumstances that led to the signing of this Agreement.
The forts have been referred to, and I want to state my knowledge of those things in the most precise way. If there was one Article in the Treaty and one part of the Treaty which we regarded as onerous, it was the section which dealt with our assuming responsibility for coastal defence. In the Treaty, it is put in a mandatory fashion. It is not that we would be enabled to do this, that or the other thing, but that we should do something. It could be alleged against us that the part of the Treaty which we had definitely neglected was that part about the forts. There was imposed upon us under that Treaty an obligation to have a conference at the expiration of five years from the date of signature. That conference was held, and there never was a more perfunctory conference in connection with all the Treaty matters than that one. I think our representative barely allowed the conference to assemble before he brought it to a finish.
Comment on this
Five years after the event of the signing of the Treaty. He brought it to a conclusion hurriedly. We did not want any responsibility for coastal defence in those days. We had two problems to face with regard to coastal defence. One was expense, and the other was a political problem which the present Government must now face and which, I think, they have faced in this Agreement, but it is not yet understood just how boldly and clearly they have faced it. Remember that we, too, had happier circumstances for avoiding any decision in relation to this. Take the year 1926, and the later period of which Deputy Cosgrave has spoken, somewhere after 1927.
Our attention from the angle of external policy was directed, not towards ports and forts and battleships, but towards the League of Nations There was not an impending war and there was no threat of it; there was no question as to what was going to be an embarrassment arising out of the Treaty position if any war occurred, and the British demanded certain rights guaranteed to them under the Treaty. We had two problem to avoid, and we did avoid them, and we avoided them deliberately. They were avoided so well at the conference imposed on us under the Article of the Treaty that the later episode took place. We did fulfil our obligations in a most scandalously meagre way, so far as that conference was concerned. It was held just so far as to enable it to be said that the conference had taken place and that the Article had not been allowed to lapse. The attitude of the British Government was one of amazement at this, with the result that the opportunity was taken on a later occasion, when Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald was in London, to refer to it. There was a certain amount of amazement at the fact that we had not asked for these forts and the evasion that was used to get around the difficulty created by that expression of amazement was that we would enter the matter on the agenda of a forthcoming conference, when we thought it suitable.
One of these days there will be a realisation in this country of the expense entailed by the taking over of these forts, and, very soon, another thing will be realised, that is, that having forts without a navy is like having a needle without a thread or a hook without an eye. The two go together. Is this country going to have a navy? Is it going to be its own navy Is it going to act in unison with any other navy? Will the situation be that we will modernise these forts, and when something of a dangerous type happens we will have the position of an S.O.S. being radioed out from the Irish forts: "Calling all fleets," and saying that something has happened, and asking somebody to steam up and take charge; or will we have something more orderly in the way of a defence plan? Will there be any arrangement for or any question of the protection of convoys? Whose convoys will they be? Will they be convoys we shall be sending across the ocean, and what will they be carrying? One of these days the political implications of the taking over of these forts will be realised, and it may be that the time has come for people to be frank and clear.
It may be that a propitious circumstance is also at hand, because remember that, in 1936, when questioned on this matter of defence, the Prime Minister said that there were too many States interested in seeing that we would not be attacked to permit of our being attacked, and when I asked why he put them in the plural, he said that, if I liked to have it, there was one nation so interested in our defence that she would not allow us to be attacked. We take over the forts, and if there is any sense about the taking over of the forts there must have been a realisation, on the one hand, of expense, or on the other hand, that the forts will be discovered to be an empty mockery, unless there is some liaison with vessels operating at sea, and there will be some clarity soon on the subject of what vessels they are and under whose control they will officiate.
It may be regarded as a dereliction of national duty. It may be that we weighed finance in the balance against propagandist effect. It may be even that we were afraid of propaganda arising from the transfer of these ports but, in any event, we could have taken them over and we did not. You can have all the kudos you like from the acceptance now, with its responsibilities both in the political and financial line, of these places. I have spoken about propaganda. We know what was said before. We know what was even written in these formal dispatches which went to the British Government. When the Treaty came about, we were told that a phrase of Lord Birkenhead's aptly described the situation—that this country was going to be held for the British with an economy of English lives. Suppose, in 1926, or in later years these forts had come into our possession, was there not every chance that we would be told again that coastal defence was going to be carried out with an economy of English lives and English money? Of course, that phrase may still be used and can still be used by those who will not see and will not become realists in regard to this matter, but it will not be used by anybody on this side although it would have been used by all the people on the other side had we come into possession of these forts in the years in which they were offered to us. These are the three matters of political importance in this Agreement. There is the adoption of the Treaty in the early part in the reference to two articles of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty, of December 1921. We have taken over these forts and we have nothing to say about Partition. That is the political side of this Agreement.
There is, then, the financial side started with a statement of all the moneys that the British owed us and, in the end, we say "We will pay you £10,000,000." That is the simplest way in which this matter can be expressed. I am sure the Minister knows the old pantomime wheeze of the two villains of the piece who decide they will teach the Simple Simon of the pantomime a new trick. They come along with a toy pistol and they hold up a fellow who comes appropriately on the stage. They say "Hands up; give us 2/6." Simple Simon thinks it is a good trick and he, in turn, comes along to another fellow and, mixing his words, says "Hands up; I will give you 2/6." We start off by saying to the British "You owe us any amount of money" and the Simple Simons go across and come back and say, "We will pay you £10,000,000 sterling." Deputy O'Higgins, last night, introduced this question of the £400,000,000. So far as I understand, he introduced it in a way which caused some confusion in the House because the House was left under the impression that that £400,000,000 was the tot of all our claims against the British. That would be to underestimate the ability of the Minister for Finance to find claims against the British, and I should not like to do him that injustice, particularly as we get the measure of his ingenuity in this Agreement.
Comment on this
We have £400,000,000 under one heading. It is hard to express this under headings because some of them contain six subhends. But take the big headings. There are 14 heads of claim. One of them only is a claim for the overtaxation of this country from 1803, based upon the report of the Childers Commission and the Primrose Report. That amounts to £400.000,000. The Minister was not done with the British there. The Minister's first Budget will be memorable to must people who heard it for the amazing accuracy of the figures he gave with regard to gold and gold ounces. Our investment income, according to him, at the end of March, 1931, was £9,750,000,' representing a capital value of £177,000,000. That was turned into gold ounces, which I am leaving out for the moment. In 1932, at the same date, the capital value of these investments of ours had decreased by the simple fact that the British, without consulting us, had gone off gold. That depreciated our investments, and the Minister's calculation, made on the 11th May, 1932, was that this country had lost a net capital sum of 11,717,000 gold ounces or, in terms of sterling at that date, £63,900,000.
Comment on this
£64,000,000 is a good enough bit to go on with. One cannot expect the British to listen in to what is said in Dáil Eireann. There are published papers relating to a conference between representatives of the Irish Free State and of the United Kingdom on the 15th October, 1932. This is a Parliamentary production, No. 824. There we set out that we claim compensation in respect of the loss sustained by Irish Free State interests in consequence of the attitude of the British Government in September in suspending gold payments. The British replied to that and we replied again. That claim for £63,900,000—whatever variation it may, have undergone since is one of the Minister's claims. It is only part his claim and he has told us of his ability in getting his claims through. That was one claim for £400,000,000— and there are 12 others. Naturally, when the tot was drawn and the balance struck between these things, there was a considerable balance in our favour. At the end of it all, we say "We agree to pay the sum of £10,000,000 sterling." That is to constitute a final settlement of all financial claims of either of the two Governments against the other arising out of matters occurring before the date of this agreement. Again, I think that the £63,900,000, when it was dismissed in these words in the document, was properly dismissed and that it got more even than its value it nothing more was said about the claim than the four lines in which it was introduced and the eight lines in which it was repeated. That was all it was worth, although it was presented here as one of the flashing items of the Minister's first Budget.
The £400,00O,000 claim was a substantial claim. It can be based on records and not on a flight of the Minister's imagination. Presumably, sober-minded, intelligent people brought out statistics and estimates on which the claim was made. I am not sure that we have sufficient information before us to warn us in throwing it overboard. We have no chance of getting that sum at the moment. We have no chance of getting even a fraction of it at the moment. It might even be left in abeyance. One does not know how this Agreement is going to work out economically between the two countries. This country may find itself harassed and hampered in finding finance hereafter. It might be a good thing to have such a claim in reserve. I am not sure that the claim would ever be pressed the way the annuities claim was pressed. I should think one effort in that way would be sufficient for all time for this country. But there are ways of pressing claims, and remember that that was a claim which was heard of long before the Minister was heard of. It was based upon solid, statistical facts. It does represent a definite charge by this country against the material results of misgovernment in the past. Without any explanation as to why, we simply say that we are glad to get relief from the present burden of the annuities, that we will pay the amount of £10,000,000 and we will close down for ever all financial squabbles with England. Not merely do we say that the £10,000,000 settles the payments immediately in dispute, but we say it wipes out for ever all claims that have arisen prior to the date of this Agreement. If that had not been put into that pamphlet, it might be said that the claim had not arisen so as to present itself to the minds of those who signed the Agreement. The position now is that nobody can say hereafter that that has not been clearly and definitely signed away.
It may be, again, a proper thing to do; it may be that the country is so glad to get rid, not merely of a dispute, but of all prospects of disputes, so heavy has been the burden of this one, that they do not want to stop to calculate it but are content to wipe it out. But there is a claim made by people earlier than any government was instituted in this country. It was carried forward; it has been introduced into arguments; it has been made a balancing factor in arguments. But for the first time, and without any pretence of duress, without being told that this is something we would not do if we were freer than we are at the moment, without any suggestion of an excuse, we now say that all financial claims between the two Governments disappear. It may be good business, but it is net presented in such a way as to make any one believe that it is good business. If, in this light-hearted way, we are prepared to wipe out all these claims, then these documents cannot otherwise be regarded than as complete and entire nonsense. It may be that the Minister realised that there was nothing in these claims. It may be that he thought there was nothing in them even though he put them on paper and made a great to-do about them, both here and at public meetings. We were told about the payments that would be made here if and when Fianna Fáil came in.