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Dáil

Agreements between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom—Motion of Approval.

Contributions 195–375 of 375. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Would the Deputy be good enough to give some corroboration, some proof of that statement?

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Is not this document corroboration?

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The Deputy said that the statement was made outside, on Fianna Fáil platforms, before Fianna Fáil came in here.

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Is not this document here corroboration?

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Not that document.

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Then, this claim was not meant?

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I am asking the Deputy for proof of the statement he has just made.

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In any event, we had £400,000,000 in one sub-head, £64,000,000 in another, and the land annuities in dispute against us; we say that we owe Britain no money, and then we go and ask the people to say in the end: "We will pay you £10,000,000." That is presented to us as a good financial agreement, an agreement that was characterised by the President with such words as that, if justice and equity were to prevail, we would not be paying anything, but we would be getting something. What does that mean? Does it mean that the Prime Minister is dissatisfied with what has been got? Does it mean that he has been subject to duress? Does it mean he still believes in this fantastic claim, and that something should come to us? If so, why are we giving moneys away?

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He does not want to bankrupt the British Empire.

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We are giving them away because, as everybody knows, this Agreement has been forced on us under much greater duress than was ever paraphrased about the previous Agreement. Everybody knows that there was one thing lurking in the background of Ministers' consciences when they went over to London. There is a Banking Commission which has to report soon. The town is thick with rumours of what that report contains. The rumours are so bad that they will probably even drive the Government to publication before they desire to do so. But, apart from what the Banking Commission is likely to report, everybody knew that the farming community was on its knees and that there was at least coming to the minds of Ministers this consciousness, that unless the farmers were saved or given some chance to succeed, the country could not last. Ministers may tell us that they waited until a good Prime Minister came into control in England, and that they waited for a favourable opportunity to get the negotiations through. That may be all right, but the goad from behind was the Banking Commission Report, and the fear of it and this Agreement has been grabbed at, and possibly has to be grabbed at, because of the immediate relief that is likely to come to the country through the operation of the agricultural side of it.

There has been an acceptance of the Commonwealth, an acceptance of a particular position by the Politicians and by the political head of the Government. There has been an acceptance of a certain financial position by the Minister for Finance. Thegreatest conversion of the whole lot was that of the Minister for Agriculture, as outlined in his speech here. For years we were told that this country had been built upon ranches. We were told at one time that we were going to have, possibly, surplus agricultural products which could be easily disposed of elsewhere. We were told we were going to have such a change in our agricultural economy that we would grow only for consumption at home and there would be no necessity to rely upon Britain as a purchaser for our goods. The Minister for Agriculture got handed to him a very carefully prepared agricultural economy, one that had been moulded by the passage of years, one that had been adopted by the farming community because it best suited their needs and gave them the best profit from the land. Then, like a child with a valuable watch, the Minister took that apart, pulled out the springs, broke the case, and what he could not prize out he shook out, and, like a, child, he cried with glee when he had all the parts of that carefully arranged mechanism in ruins around him. Then he was forced to alternatives and substitutes, and we have the sorry picture of him through the six years backing his way through all the agricultural production of the country.

Despite his efforts there was an exportable surplus of agricultural goods. Despite his promises there was no place to lodge these except in England. Despite the promises of his whole group of Ministers, those goods could not be got into England without paying taxes, and the Minister was forced to the most absurd devices to try to get over that difficulty. First of all, we sold, and sold to our loss, in Belgium and Germany, what we could not sell to England. Then we decided we would give away free to those whom we had made hungry the beef that was still coming in such a wealth of production that it could not be got rid of, and eventually the killing process started. The Minister paid for the calves that were slaughtered, and, finally, he was driven to the sorriest of all positions that was revealed here when we discussed the Roscrea factory. He tried his best to destroy agricultural production. When it flooded in on him despite his efforts, the first plan he devised was to give away, the second was to kill at the source, and the third was to give away not merely the beef but himself into the hands of those who started the Roscrea factory . When this matter was exposed here the Minister's phrase was that it was big business, business with a capital B, and the capital B was Deputy Briscoe. That was his first effort to get over that trouble that he himself had caused.

There was political effect given to all this. We were told at that time that it was only a Government that was lost to all National outlook that would allow that type of agriculture to continue. There was going to be a change, and that change was going to raise the people from being serfs on the land to becoming people of wealth and standing. After six years we now reach the point that use are glad to get entry into Great Britain, the entry that at the beginning of 1932 we had free. The Government said that they had an industrial policy, and while they said that-this has to be weighed with it-while this scheme was being pursued, that policy meant high tariff walls around every class of commodity coming into the country. The Minister for Industry and Commerce in an endeavour to bring about more propitious circumstances for the signing of this Agreement, made clear that he too, had changed. His speech indicated that he had begun to think that the helter-skelter progress that was being made did not amount to anything. He began to talk about profiteering and the necessity for lowering tariffs at the appropriate time. That was because he had in mind the need for signing this Agreement. The details of these things can be gone into when we come to deal with the matter later.

In these Agreements it is clear there is a balance struck between the entry of agricultural produce into England and the exports of manufactured goods from that country. The position has to be compared with the situation that did exist in 1932. There our goods went freely into the British market. We were, in addition, protected there against foreign countries by a 10 per cent. preference. On the other hand, British goods came in here at any tariff that the Dáil wished to impose. There was no binding agreement as to the limits of that tariff, and there was no condition upon which free entry of our goods would be permitted into England, while there was a tax imposed on British goods coming in here. Now we are dealing with this Agreement which is being held up by the Government Party as the great triumph of 1938. We are back in the position we were in 1932 with this difference that in 1932 we had free entry for our goods into the British market unhampered by any conditions. We were not hampered by a document like this Agreement, the full extent of which has not yet been interpreted.

The Minister for Agriculture, when speaking yesterday, referred to the terms that were got by the Dominions at Ottawa. But the Minister was very careful to put before the House the terms of the Trade Agreements of only two of the Dominions. There was an important distinction to be made as to agreements that were made at Ottawa between Great Britain and the various Dominions. That was that some of these Dominions sold far more to Great Britain than they bought from her, while others bought more from Britain than they sold to her. The harder terms were naturally imposed upon those with whom England had an unfavourable balance. It was the agreements made with the countries with whom England had an uufavourable balance that were picked out by the Minister as models. Remember, these countries sold more to Britain than they bought from her.

Now an important matter in connection with this Agreement is this-that there is one item of our exports to Englaud that would never have been considered and never weighed in the balance in the matter of the trade of the two countries. We were the greatest exporters of live stock to England. England wanted our cattle. There was no question of imposing a tax upon them. But we meet now here in 1938 when the situation is completely changed and when our cattle are going into Britain subject to a heavy tax. We did not expect from Great Britain in this matter of cattle the harsh terms that she imposed upon the Dominions with whom in 1932 she had an unfavourable balance. We will go into the terms of these agreements at a later stage.

This again must be recognised, that in 1932 whatever taxes were imposed by us on British goods coming an here, were taxes imposed at the sole behest of the Dáil. There was nothing to stand between the imposition of these tariffs and the judgment of the Dáil. There were no terms of reference as to what the Dáil should consider. We had nothing to consider except whatever in the opinion of the Dáil was insufficient to give protection to Irish indnstries. For the future there are terms of reference here. The tariffs have got to be reviewed at the end of three years with the possibility of having quotas replaced by tariffs. The tariffs are to be built up only to such a height as will allow full opportunity for reasonable competition to British manufacturers. That may work all right, and it may not, but it is not as advantageous a situation as we had in 1332. Then the Dáil could pass its judgment freely on whatever tariffs we wished to impose. There was no outside body to call that judgment in question and to recommend a change.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce, who started off by being a Republican Minister, has got to hear the burden of that imposition. The House in future is going to be ruled in its judgment by the operations of the Prices Commission. These are the terms of reference. There are reservations of importance but the thing that sticks out is this, that the tariffs must be moulded so as to allow a full opportunity for reasonable competition to United kingdom manufacturers. The United kingdom manufacturers are to be allowed to make their appearance before the Prices Commission and to make their case there. Not merely that, but the British Government has a right to regulate the order in which these cases will be taken by the Prices Commission.

It may be that the Minister for Industry and Commerce had to be disciplined to the point that he would permit what he would himself have described, when in Opposition, as British interference. Again we are going to accept this Agreement without the slightest hint of duress and no suggestion of the forces behind it. We are going for the future to accept the position that Irish industries are to be moulded not in the way the Irish people think they should be moulded. They are under this Agreement to be moulded in such a way as will allow the full opportunity for reasonable competition from the British manufacturers. The details of the Agreement on the industrial side are so complicated that they can only be dealt with at a later stage. I do not think there has been any realisation yet as to what the full effect of this Agreement may be. Until we hear what the industrialists, when they have studied these documents, will say about them, we are not in a position to say much more except that there is that obligation that I have pointed out.

Comment on this

Will the Deputy vote against the Agreement for that reason?

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I will not. I could not do so. The farmers of this country are at their wits' end to live. The man who would cause one avoidable day's delay in holding up the passage of this Agreement into law would be, a criminal.

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Even though the Deputy would not allow the debate to conclude last night.

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Like the Minister on a recent occasion.

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It is not the first time Deputy Heron played ball with Cumann na nGaedheal.

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The Minister occupied one and a-half hours in addressing the House recently.

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Am I to be criticised for holding up the debate? Apparently I am.

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The settlement.

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Apparently I am.

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No.

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Then what was meant by the Minister's phrase?

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Nothing. I am just merely pointing to the consistency of the Deputy's attitude.

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Will the Minister say that this Agreement would become effective one hour sooner if this debate had concluded last night, than if it were carried on until Tuesday?

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I shall answer the Deputy later.

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When the Minister rises, it will be answered.

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I shall answer on both points.

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I shall certainly vote for this Agreement. Even if I thought it much worse than I believe it is, I would still vote for it. It is hardly possible to conceive a situation that is not better than that which was in existence on January 19th, when our Ministers first entered into negotintions. I do not think anything could be worse. That does not mean that we have got to accept every part of the Agreement as good. It is a great thing, however, to see as Deputy O'Higgins stated last night, that sanity rules again, that a very big number of shibboleths have been cast away, and that there is some appreciation of the difficulties in the country. I do not know even that, on the industrial side, it is going to work badly. I have apprehensions about it, but I should like to be advised on them by industrialists who have studied the impact of the provisions on their industries. I should have thought that Ministers might have even taken the opportunity of consulting these people before they signed.

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Even as to the backroom factories?

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Even on them.

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And the child labour?

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Even on the child labour.

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And on the constant play made by the Deputy during the past five years on factory conditions?

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All I said over the past five years was that if they were being inefficiently run, it was because there was no stimulus to efficiency and that there was a great deal of child labour and for that I had statistics from Deputy Coburn.

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Was it true?

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Yes.

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Mr. Kelly

It was not true.

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It was true.

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Would you mind having that fight between yourselves ?

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Mr. Kelly

This is the first time I opened my mouth to-day.

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Looking back upon it, would it not have been better if the Deputy maintained complete silence?

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Mr. Kelly

It would not.

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Surely the point made by Deputy Lawlor is an important one, that people were induced to put money into enterprises that could not last in this country under ordinary conditions. A lot of these people are now concerned as to how they are going to get their money back. Similarly, a lot of people were induced to take up employment on promises that that employment was going to be continuous, and they may now find themselves thrown out on the streets. I think that even in respect to these back-room factories which it might have been better never to have established, it would be well worth while to take the advice of industrialists as to the effects of this Agreement. The negotiations have been spread over a long period, and there was plenty of opportunity to get consultation with them. However, these are questions upon which I shall have to ask the advice of people connected with these industries and who are in a position to express an opinion as to the effect of this Agreement upon the industries.

Apart from that, the Minister knows that there is extreme urgency in the situation. The farmers of the country are near destruction, and if you want to save them and to get some little spirit of hope revived in the country, this Agreement has to be rushed into operation even if it means accepting some of the bad things discovered in it and possibly some worse things still to be discovered which might have to be amended at a later stage.

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The farmers did not discover that they were near destruction last July.

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Did they not?

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Be careful about Wicklow.

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I think one of the effective causes of bringing about this Agreement was the result of the last general election.

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They voted against the Constitution in Wicklow.

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lf there had been no change in the vote given for Fianna Fáil that Agreement would not be presented to this country. There were two things which impelled the Government to enter into negotiations. One was the knowledge and the consciousness that they were losing support even in gerrymandered electoral areas—that and the fear of the report which one of these days will have to be published.

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That is a prophecy?

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If you are speaking of the report, that is a matter on which I can be confounded by the immediate publication of the report.

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The Deputy is speaking now with private knowledge of its contents?

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I am speaking from my own observations and I am discounting a number of the rumours which have been circulating in the city recently. I say that these rumours if they are ill-founded can be dissipated by the immediate publication of the report.

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The Deputy knows as well as I do that the contents of such reports are not known until they are printed and considered.

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That is the pivotal point. How long are they going to be considered?

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As long as is necessary for their proper examination.

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I am going to be a prophet again. I guarantee that that will be a very long time, but the Agreement must be passed. It must be passed even in its present form. It is undoubtedly open to grave objection, and the greatest objection is that if it had been passed after five years of comparative harmony between the two countries we would say that it was the result of reasoned negotiation, that it was not secured amid the clamour of an economic war. Then we could have a proper feeling of security amongst us. We know the conditions under Which this Agreement was brought about. We know that our Ministers were compelled to approach British Ministers, and that they were not in the advantageous position in which they might have approached them in 1932. The British Ministers were dealing with men whom they knew to be broken, men who knew that their own policy had been defeated. Before reaching that point they had to drop a lot of the old shibboleths with which they beguiled the people in the past. If the shibboleths remained there would have been no Agreement.

There was one phrase which the Prime Minister used to use to arouse the spirit of his followers when their spirits began to droop. He used to say: "We are in this fight with the British, and we mean to continue it until we secure victory. If you give in now, you give in for all time. If once you weaken in front of the British they know they have you, and once they have that knowledge no attempt on the part of this country to get from the British what we consider our just rights will have any chance of success." We did not hear anything from the Prime Minister about victory in connection with this Agreement. I did hear him use the word ransom, and he made some reference to justice and equity. He did not use the word victory, nor did he say that if we did not win out in this, the British knew they had us fixed for all time.

How do you apply that to the Agreement? In this way. There is a balanced Agreement, and the British are getting certain things positively and precisely, and we can do certain things. How is the possibility of trouble over the interpretation of that Agreement to be resolved? In this way. The British on their side retain this power that if the ordinary regulation of the marketing of certain things demands it, they can impose taxes, tariffs and quotas all over again, and, on our side, if the proper protection of industry deserves it, we can also impose quantitative restrictions as well as tariffs. There is the way in which, by the absurd mishandling of this document, the two countries might be thrown back again into the struggle of the last six years. If the British do play fair we will start. If we do not through the Prices Commission, give fair play to British producers, they have the whole of the ordinary regulations for marketing, and in the background there is the ominous and ill-omened phrase used by the Prime Minister, that once you entered into a contest with Great Britain in 1932, you were placed in this, position, that unless you went through completely, the British knew where they were with you. Has that bluff been called? Is it believed that this is a win through for Ireland, or is it that this time the British have our measure taken?

If that is the situation then I suggest that these two circumstances, closely balanced as they are, are very ominous, and that they will always have the whip hand, because they can act upon the clause for the ordinary regulation of marketing. We have our-retort, whatever it may be, and whatever its strength or weakness, that we can impose tariffs on their goods. A paper that now supports the Government described their efforts in respect of these tariffs at one time in this. way—"like the efforts of a maddened rabbit against an elephant." Is that the strength we have been displaying, to them? Is that part of the circumstances that surrounded the making of the Agreement? If they are, that explains a good lot.

I think no one will say this of the Agreement—that it is bad. A lot will say with the Irish Press that it is the best that might be made in the circumstances. People looking at it from the agricultural point of view will say that it is really a good Agreement and gets. them out of their difficulty. People looking at it from the industrial point of view may be full of apprehension that it is not as good as they thought might be got. How these apprehensions will work out will have to be left to the test of time. There are good omens about it. There is first the realisation that there is more to be got from a neighbouring country by bargaining in the council chamber than by the fatuous nonsense of an economic war. Even though it took six years and cost many millions of money, maybe it was not time lost, and that the money was well spent, if Ministers were brought to that realisation, and if people who come along will learn the lesson from their sad experience, by trying the method of negotiation before endeavouring to break down an obviously stronger and heavier competitor than they can ever hope to be.

Comment on this
Seán MacEntee Minister for Finance (Mr. MacEntee) Fianna Fáil

I am not going to delay the House by following the last speaker over the ground which he has traversed. I do not think it would be in the national or the public interest to take that line. I am glad this Agreement, to which my name is attached, has been so well received in all quarters of the House. I think even the Opposition think it a good Agreement, their only regret being, if one might judge by their speeches, that it has not been made by them but has been made by us. I share that regret. I am sorry it was not possible in 1931, when the agricultural depression in this country was particularly serious, for the Administration which was headed by Deputy Cosgrave to sign this financial Agreement which the Taoiseach, my colleagues and myself have signed. It would have been a fortunate day for the country if, say, Deputy Cosgrave, Mr. Blythe, Deputy McGilligan and the late Mr. Hogan had been able to sign an Agreement which for a single payment of £10,000,000 released this country from the obligation of paying over, as was paid in 1931-32, and had been paid every year since the Agreement of 1923 was signed, the annual sum of£5,079,000.

It would indeed have been a very good thing for this country if Deputy Cosgrave's Government had been able to sign an agreement which, as I have said, for a single payment of £10,000,000 relieved our people of the crushing burden which had been imposed upon them by the Agreements of 1923 and 1925. I am sorry indeed that it has had to wait until it has fallen to our lot, and that it has been our good fortune to sign the Agreement relating to Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. It would have been of great benefit and of great advantage to this country if Deputy Cosgrave when, as he said he was offered the ports, whether in 1926, in 1927 or in 1931 had been able to get these ports and the unchallenged sovereignty over them as our territory upon the same terms and conditions as we have got them. If he had got them without any commitment, without any obligation, and quite unconditionally. and got with them all the naval and military rights over territories of this State which Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty conceded to the British, he would have rendered signal service to the people. As the Opposition regret that it has fallen to our lot to sign the Agreement, I share that regret, because it would have been of inestimatable benefit to the country if they had been able to sign such an agreement years ago. It has been said that all this could have been done six years ago. Why was it not done? If it could have been done by us in 1932 or 1933 why, in God's name, was it not done in 1930 or 1931 by those who had no constitutional difficulties with the British Government? Why did they not do it, and give to the country the advantages, which Deputy McGilligan said he did not wish to deprive them of for one single day? We have been told what this struggle cost the people. Deputy Brasier said that the British had collected £35,000,000 during the last six or seven years.

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£25,000,000.

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I beg the Deputy's pardon. I thought he mentioned £35,000,000. I agree that £25,000,000 is a more representative figure, and that that sum was collected by the British in what they described as special duties. That caused the farmers of this country untold suffering, and yet we are told the Agreement could have been signed six years ago. I think if it could have been signed seven, eight or nine years ago that much more might have been saved the farmers than even £25,000,000 or £26,000,000 that the British succeeded in collecting by way of special duties, and Irish agriculture might have been much more prosperous in 1929 and 1930 than, in fact, it was during what night be described as the boom years of world trade. I say again I regret that this was not done, but I do not blame our predecessors for the fact that they did not do this in 1930. I recognise, as I am sure the country recognises, that it was not possible in the circumstances of the time to get three such Agreements as we have succeeded in bringing back home here for the approval and ratification of the Dáil. They are not due to any great merit of ours. We think that these Agreements are the fruit, as the Taoiseach said, of the "concurrence of propitious circumtances" which have arisen. We have been able to take advantage of that concurrence, and I am glad that everybody recognises that in the circuLnstances of the time the best has been done for the country lhat could have been done.

Now, I do not wish, in view of some of the statements that have been made from the other side in the course of the debate, to be over-coutroversial. There is no need for me, because I think that these Agreements and the manner in which, on the whole, they have been considered by all Parties in the Dáil have brought a new feeling into political life in this country. I signed the Agreements not merely because I thought that they would end the economic war upon terms which I considered advantageous to our people, not merely because they gave us back our ports and abrogated those clauses of the 1921 Treaty which were full of menace for us and for our future good relations with our neighbours: I signed them not merely because they would lead to a striking, and, from the national point of view, I think, a beneficial improvement in our relations with our neighbours, not merely because I regarded these Agreements as a practical step towards the political reunification of our country: I signed them also in the hope that they would lead to an appeasement of Party bitterness here.

I am only too conscious that, during the past five or six years, in the heat and passion of the circumstances in which this economic war had to be carried on, I said many things which on calmer consideration I do not think I was justified in saying. I would like publicly, as I said these things publicly, to say that I regret them very much, and I hope that they will not stand as a barrier between myself, my colieagues in the Government, and my colleagues in this House on the Opposition and other benches: that they will not stand as a barrier or as an impediment to that co-operation which, I think is essential if we are to secure full benefit and advantage out of these Agreements.

The circumstances of the time have enabled us to sign these agreements. The circumstances of the time, too, let us be quite clear about it, are not altogether propitious from the point of view of the world and possibly of our country. We Irishmen will have to take with these Agreements the responsibility of defending our territory. I do not think that the efficient defence of that territory can be undertaken without the willing co-operation of all Irishmen, no matter how they were born or where they were born: whether they were born in the Six Counties or in the Twenty-Six Counties, whether born Protestant or Catholic, Unionists or Nationalists, Orangemen or Hibernians, Republicans or Monarchists: as I say, the efficient and effective defence of the territory of this country and of this island is going to require the willing co-operation of all her sons when the need for such defence arises —though I earnestly hope it will not.

I believe it is in the recognition of that fact that, ultimately, the political reunification of this country will be brought about, because one of the Agreements reposes responsibility on us for the defence of our territory. We are not going to take over the ports and assert our sovereignty over them without making, at any rate, the necessary exertions to defend those ports and our sovereignty against whosomever may attack them. I believe the fact that the people of this country must face up to the responsibilities of their sovereignty will lead to a better and truer appreciation of the conditions which are necessary in order to bring back the political unification of this country. I think that is going to be one of the great benefits that these Agreements are going to bring: that inevitably, because they have been signed, the political union of this country will be established, and established by agreement and not by coercion.

When we talk of union, we do not think of Ireland merely in terms of territory, we think of it in terms of human beings, of those in the North who differ from us about a great many thing, who hold their views and their ideals just as strongly as we do. We will have here on our side to cultivate an appreciation of the fact that those who hold those ideals are as strong and as tenacious in regard to them, as courageous in upholding them, and as valiant in defending them, as we have shown ourselves to be through the long years of our history. We are not going to bring them in either by threats or by coercion. There is no use talking about what may happen, in what ways we may sweep out the Border. The Border exists, and exists to some extent in the hearts and minds of our own people. We have got to bring those hearts and minds together in a willing co-operation. I am glad to have signed these Agreements, because I think they bring that day of co-operation and that day of sentimental union amongst all Irishmen nearer.

Comment on this

The debate on this motion is one of the most important that has taken place in this House for many years. I am not going to congratulate the Government on anything they have done, but I do want to congratulate the unfortunate farmers who have been taken out of the front-line trenches. The Government are making a great fuss about all that they have done. To my mind they have not done very much at all. They have simply put us back in the position that we occupied in the year 1932, if they have succeeded in doing that much. They signed those Agreements through sheer necessity. They signed them, as Deputy McGilligan said, because of what is contained in the report of the Banking Commission, a report which, I suppose, will be published some time, and when it is the people will be able to read it. Everyone is aware that that is a most alarming report, and shows that bank. ruptcy and destruction were facing the agricultural community if something was not done immediately. I am glad that something has been done, and that these Agreements have been signed, because their operation will bring relief to a large number of people. They will bring relief also to the country as whole. The signing of the Agreements also puts an and to the highfalutin and the tom-foolery that has gone on here for the last five or six years, such as "Break the connection,""Up the Republic,""To hell with John Bull." All that is finished and done with now.

We have still to face the fact that there are large and difficult problems to be solved. We have a horde of unemployed men. We have over 120,000 men looking for work and longing to earn honest wages. We have the men who fled out of this country to Great Britain to try and earn a living longing to come back here to get a livelihood by working on the soil. The farmers of this country are on the verge of bankruptcy. Something must be done immediately to put those men In the position that they can be of use to the country and of use to themselves. We want to float cheap money to enable those men to get on their feet again. We want to see something done to help those farmers out of the debts which they have incurred during the last eight or ten years. Nothing has been done for those men. We see them in the unhappy position of being nothing more than herds on their own farms. We have Jews and Gentiles from Dublin and all over the country coming down into Meath and taking land on the 11 months system. There is certainly something wrong here when Jews are taking grass lands. It was never heard of in the history of Ireland before. I am also glad that this settlement has come because it will put an end to this mad wall of tariffs which has been created here for the last four or five years. The building up of a wall of tariffs is one of the maddest things a country has ever done. We all know that a country cannot always stay at war, and that when peace comes the wall of tariffs will crash. Here, the majority of those so-called factories which were built up in the last five or six years will crash with it. What about the men who got employment in the boot factories, the beet factories and so on? Where do they stand to-day, or where will they stand to-morrow? I suppose they will have to line up at the Labour Exchange as they did before We believe that the welfare of this country should be built up and rooted in the soil, where an agricultural people can live in peace and comfort. This is an agricultural country, and nothing more, and it is time the Taoiseach realised it. Unfortunately, he realised it six or eight years ton late. If there is one man in this country who must be humiliated, and who must have qualms of conscience, it is the great leader of the Fianna Fáil Party, Eamon de Valera. That man went around this country for the last 12 years as the most ardent republican who was ever heard. He said he would never settle with England until every inch of Irish soil belonged to Ireland; until England gave us back the £400,000,000 that she owed us for a great number of years. What did he come back with? He came back with a settlement, a settlement far less than the great Collins and Griffith gave us in the year 1921. What a pity it is that Eamon de Valera had not sense enough at that time to say: "I do not accept this settlement, but at the same time I will go into lawful opposition in an Irish Parliament, and I will fight my way up to power by lawful means." instead, the skidaddled out to the lads in the country, and cajoled them into falling in behind him. He moped around for two or three years, and brought this country into the most deplorable position that any country could occupy. He plunged it into civil war and strife, for what? He has proved to-day that it was for nothing.

To-day, we must face the fact that we are part of Imperial England still, and part of Imperial England by the signature of Eamon de Valera himself. We are part of England for the next European war. We must build up our forces and man our defences, not for poor old Ireland, but for rotten old England about which we heard so much in the past. What of the people here who marched in the ranks of the Republican Army and did it honestly and sincerely, as I did it myself? What has this man done for us? We were marshalled to fight for Ireland and establish an Irish Republic, but we were not told that in 1938 he would sign an Agreement shackling us to Mr. John Bull. He did not tell as those things, because the lads would not follow him if he did. Why is this Agreement signed to-day? It has been signed because the poor old ship was sinking, and when a ship is sinking it is said that the rats skidaddle away out of it. The President found that some of the rats in the clubs all over the country were skidaddling out of them. He realised that something was wrong, and that something had to be done. The only alternative was to jump out of the poor old Irish boat and jump into one of John Bull's battleships.

I suppose we will be told in a few months' time that we have to spend £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 on an Irish navy. We have our ports and our guns, and now we will defend this country. I know that England is longing for the day when Ireland will say "Build a few battleships." We know that England, under the articles of international agreements, cannot build any more battleships than she has built, but we know that Ireland as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations has the power to build a few battleships. In doing so, she will not be building them for Ireland but for dear old England. We know the game behind John Bull when he got poor Eamon de Valera to sign this scribble. We are told that in final settlement we have to pay only £10,000,000, but I will tell you how much has been paid from the year 1921 to the year 1938, and it is not even the full amount. In the years 1921, 1922 and 1923 this country went through a civil war at a cost of over £50,000,000, with the loss of thousands of young lives. In the economic war from 1932 to 1938 there was a loss of £50,000,000. Now, you must add the £10,000,000 which we have to give England as ransom money. That is £110,000,000—for what? To get Eamon de Valera to sign his way into the British Empire. Where are the great marches to Bodenstown? Where is the great "Break the Connection" policy? Where is the grand army that used to march to Bodenstown and the G.P.O. headed by the Taoiseach? Where are those great republicans, Who shuddered at the thought of Collins and Griffith? Ah, poor Wolfe Tone, you can sleep in peace, and thanks be to God you can, because there was a lot of tomfoolery and rot going on for the last 12 years. Instead of a few prayers over the poor patriots' graves, there was nothing but scuffles and fights, and I thank God that we can see the day when they can rest in peace, and that instead of those mock parades and shouts they will get some silent prayers from honest and sincere Irish Christians.

I am glad the day has come when the Fianna Fáil Party, who paraded around this country for the last 20 years with their nonsense and humbug, are beginning to recognise the struggles of Griffith and O'Higgins, those men who were hounded to early graves. I am sure their spirits floating around here to-day are saying: "Well done, Cosgrave, and your gallant band. You have acted constitutionally and lawfully, and to-day you have set the Irish nation on the high road to justice and stability. You have saved the Fianna Fáil Party from the damage which they had done in the last five or six years.""Although we were done to death by the members of the Party on the opposite benches," say Collins and Griffith, "we forgive them, and thank God that they have come back to the true road." I certainly am sorry for the Taoiseach. He must have qualms of conscience, and I do not think he will stay long in political power after this. I think he is fed-up, and sorry, and lonesome, a wounded man. He is only a plain man who has feet of clay. Some said he was something of a divine nature, and others said that he was one of those who would grow horns. I say he is one of those plain, poor men who is full of vanity, but his vanity has vanished and I hope that, along with that vanity, he will go himself.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

Discussion of the Taoiseach does not arise on this motion.

Comment on this

I do hope, at any rate, that with the signing of this Agreement all those political catchcrics and all this nonsense will end, and that the power of Fianna Fáil and the power of the Taoiseach will also end and that they will go back to where they came from, the bogs and the highlands, and try to build up our country as they should have been doing for the last 20 years. Evidently it was not good enough that we were to sign ourselves over to England, but a few years ago we had to proclaim a British King as King of Ireland, and now we have openly signed ourselves as part of England. Well, there is one poor man, at least, that we should think of in this connection, and that is the poor old Duke of Windsor. I think we should bring him over and put him in the Viceregal Lodge.

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

I allowed the Deputy a good deal of latitude in wandering beyond the terms of this motion. The Duke of Windsor does not, by any stretch of imagination, arise in connection with this motion.

Comment on this

Well, Sir, I may have been granted a little latitude, but I think we have all been granted some. However, this has ended a chapter in our history which we are all glad to see ended, and I hope that in the future we will have an Ireland of business and honour and not one of political jugglery such as we had in the past.

Comment on this

In listening to the speeches that have emanated from the other side of the House in regard to this matter, I was struck by the fact that there has been a good deal of concensus of opinion to the effect that this settlement has been a marvellous settlement, and that it has been a considerable advance on anything that has taken place hitherto. In fact the burden of each speech delivered from the other side reminded me of the famous verse in one of Southey's poems:

"But what good came of it at last?" Quoth little Peterkin.

"Oh, that I cannot tell," said he,

"But 'twas a famous victory."

It is in that spirit that it has been attempted to hut this settlement across for consideration by the Irish people. The most emphatic statement of all, in dealing with the matter, was that of the Minister for Industry and Commerce yesterday when he said, deliberately and emphatically: "Whoever started the war, we won it." Well, whenever I hear of the Minister for Industry and Commerce being particularly emphatic about a point, I am at great pains to inquire into the truth of what he says with that emphatic gesture of his. If we have won the war, if victory has been ours, why is it that this country has been called upon to pay a sum of £10,000,000 in settlement? What becomes of the old cry, "Vae victis”? Is it not the loser that always pays? If the Taoiseach had not spoken before the Minister for Industry and Commerce had been so emphatic, one would be led to believe that we did win something or that we had achieved something.

The issue in this matter of the annuities has also been sought to be clouded by various speakers who have tried to support the contention of the Taoiseach that he has made in this House from time to time, that we never, deliberately and of our own accord, would pay one penny of these annuities, and that neither would we compromise on any point, because compromise with regard to the rights of this country, even to the smallest extent, would be, for our people, surrender. In the statement made here by the Taoiseach, in recommending this settlement to us for acceptance, he glosses over this whole question of the payment of the £10,000,000, and he says that, if there was justice— what he conceives to be justice—the demand would not be one way, but would be the other way. Why is it not the other way? It is because the Taoiseach has found it necessary in the end to compromise on this question. He says: "You may, if you like, regard it as ransom money."

Now, that is a very important phrase —ransom money—and I think it should be emphasised that it is ransom money. What is ransom money? It is something claimed by a person who has done some wrong, or by a person who has acquired some property unjustly and who will surrender it only upon payment of ransom money, which is money handed over simply by force. Perhaps it is in this way that the Taoiseach would like to regard it. He goes on further and says that if there are Deputies in the House who think that we must secure what appear to be our rights in justice, well and good: they will have to vote against this Agreement and say that this money should not be paid. In other words, he has recommended to us the acceptance of this Agreement with the fact, the explicit fact, that he knows the Agreement to be unjust and that this money is being unlawfully taken from us. He has recommended to us, in other words, an Agreement which, in right and justice, he cannot recommend to us, but he gives it to us as a bargain which is the best he could achieve. If he were frank on that point, I think we would all be at one with him. Sometimes it is difficult for persons, in international relations or international negotiations, to insist upon all their rights and see that everything is done in strict accordance with the justice of the claim made. But I do believe—and I want it to be emphasised—that this payment of £10,000,000 is going in settlement of the annuities in dispute as well as in settlement of the other moneys in dispute, and it is set out definitely so that there can be no doubt about it that we have accepted, at this last, final hour, the right of England to collect these annuities, and we are making these payments in the full recognition of that right. It does not matter if the money were ten pence or £10,000,000, still this great Government of ours, which declared that these moneys were neither legally nor morally due, have recognised England's right to them. In paragraph 2 of the Financial Agreement, on page 4, it is stated conclusively that this is a settlement of all financial claims of either of the two Governments against the other arising out of matters occurring before the date of this Agreement. In fact, it is interesting to note the attitude of the English papers in this connection, in commenting upon the Agreement. I have one English paper here before me, which deals with this matter. It is the Daily Sketch of last Wednesday. According to it, it would appear that not only have we sold our-selvss commercially and financially on this matter of the annuities, but we have politically sold ourselves to the service of England. There is an important article here, entitled “Irish Patriotism will now serve England.” In the course of that article, it is stated:

"The squabble over the land annuities has been ended by an agreement to settle for a payment by the Free State of £10,000,000. The sum is equivalent to two years' purchase of the annuities. But how much more worth having is the lump sum down than a dribble of yearly payments is import duties which not only hamper the natural trade between the two countries, but advertise our political differences to the world? The most satisfactory part of the new Agreement is that which throws on Ireland the responsibility for her local defence. The coast stations in Ireland now occupied and maintained by the United kingdom are now to be transferred to the Free State Government. I have no doubt that the resultant security will be greater under the new system than it was under the old. Ireland was never so necessary to our defence as it is now, but Ireland, in defending herself, will now, for the first time since the post-war settlement, be making a definite contribution to our security, too. The Imperial Navy will still be responsible for defence of all the sea communications of the Empire; but its bases in the Atlantic will be Irish property and defended as such."

That last is an important point and a great concession to our sentiment—they will be Irish property. Then he goes on to say: "Because this patriotism will also serve England, it will not be the less Irish on that account." Nothing about England's difficulty or Ireland's opportunity.

I lot has been said about this question of the forts, and the Minister for Defence brought in a pile of files and stated they were all lies if Deputy Cosgrave was right. Of course, at no time has it transpired, or has the Minister quoted anything from the files to show us, that we could not have got back the forts or tho defences at the time scheduled in the original Treaty of 1921. In the Treaty it is stated that England was to maintain the defences of Ireland until—remark the word "until"—the Free State Government was prepared to take them over on her own account. It further went on to state that within five years of the signing of the Treaty there was to be a review of the position for the purpose of having the question considered so that the Free State, if it wished, could take them over.

Comment on this

That is what the Deputy thought.

Comment on this

That is what I thought, and what I think still, and what any reasonably-minded person would think on reading that.

Comment on this

I will quote one portion of this for the Deputy.

Comment on this

I am quoting the particular points in the original Treaty. If anything happened afterwards why they were not taken over, I take it it was because, in the first place, political considerations arose, and, in the next place, that the expense of maintaining these forts would be too great. Now that we have got them—and I give you all the credit in the world for having driven the last British soldier off the soil of Ireland—will the Taoiseach tell us what ultimate use they are going to be to this country? He has definitely told us in his speech that he is going not only to maintain them, but to re-arm them and see that they are kept in an efficient condition.

Comment on this

Deputy Dillon said that I did not say such a thing at all

Comment on this

I must say that I do no agree with Deputy Dillon. The Taoiseach did say very definitely in my hearing that he was going to take them over. That is the thing with which I find fault. If we do take them over, I think we ought to get rid of them as defences because they are of no use. These forts are very obsolete at present. The Taoiseach has a sentimental reason for getting the dust of Ireland off the boots of the soldiers of Great Britain. But when he gets these forts, what use are they going to be? If he mans them and puts modern armament into them, who are we going to fight if we become aggressive, which I do not believe? If we are not going to become aggressive, who is going to attack us? I do not think anyone is going to attack us, except someone who is going to attack England. In that case, why should we go to the expense of defending England, when England is very well able to do it herself?

I have always had the feeling in my patriotic soul that it would be a good thing to see the British gone off the land of Ireland. At the same time, if we are now to be friendly with England, why not let the ports be free to the British Navy to come in and out—not to use them, of course, as before as a threat to our sovereignty, but as a courtesy to people to whom the Taoiseach has given the pledge of our people, which I accept, that he will never allow the soil of Ireland to be used as a jumping-off ground for anybody wishing to attack England. I think that was a very important pronouncement. Although the Taoiseach told us that the ports were given over unconditionally, I think it was a sufficient condition for him to have pledged his word to that extent, and I am sure that, as between honourable people, England accepted that statement to the effect that we as a nation, in safeguarding our own rights, which would be the paramount consideration for us, would not permit our shores to be used in any way as a jumping-off ground for an attack on England.

Nothing has been said in this Agreement about the control of other coastal matters. I refer to lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and other things which have hitherto been maintained by Trinity House, or as we call it, the Irish Lights Board. I think that matter ought to be made clear. Personally, I think it is a service that we could not deal with so effectively as it is being dealt with under the present Administration. I do not think that there is very much national sentiment involved, although the Taoiseach, I am sure, would be very annoyed if he went into cobh some morning and found that, although the Union Jack was not floating from the Carlisle aud Camden forts, still the Blue Peter was fluttering in some part of the harbour. That might hurt his patriotic soul but, from the point of view of efficiency and economic administration, I would advise that the maintenance of this service should be left as it is at present.

We were told that this Agreement could not be made five years ago. Of course, it could not. In the first place, the Taniseach had not developed the mentality that has brought him to the present position. We had not until 1936 accepted the King as a person to be used in our foreign relations—as the Minister for Lands described it. We will keep the King for our forsign affairs because it is in the best interests of our country to do so. That is all very good and fine. But I think that if there was a little more frankness it would be very much better, and if the situation as it develops were accepted by each side of the House it would lead to a better feeling. A lot of problems become difficult because they are approached from different angles. One is a sort of pretence that we are approaching these things, as the Taoiseach said, as symbols and symbols are shackles in one way and we are getting off the shackles one by one. We believe that it is better to be frank, and face up to the situation and take it as we find it.

There is one thing paramount in the whole of the relations between this country and England and that is, that this is an English-speaking country. As an Irish speaker, that is a thing I do not care to admit. I must, however, say that I am afraid the possibility of ever restoring it to anything else than an English-speaking country I seems very remote at present. While that is so, and while we have discovered Lhat our economic existence depends practically altogether upon the value of the English market to us —and this agreement admits it more emphatically than ever before—I say that we ought to be more frank with each other in realising our position and in realising the difficulties that arise and the problems to be solved in connection with the re-arrangement of our relations with Great Britain in that regard.

There were other matter that would have made this impossible four or five years ago. The economic condition of this country was not then in the parlous condition in which it is to-day, nor was the condition of our basic industry, agriculture, so weak. We had thrown the farmers into the front trenches straight off and we kept telling them what brave fellows they were, but we were doing nothing to help them. We kept on fighting the economic war until the farmers practically had fought to the last dead calf. The position has arisen that we have now to do something to save our financial souls. Other financial considerations have pressed the Taoiseach and pressed his Government. He knows that as well as I do. The Banking Commission and various other considerations have financially pressed us and urged us to try and save the financial soul of this country by making some settlement, for God's sake, with England, and that is the reason why at this particular juncture this settlement was made. Now, the Minister for Industry and Commerce told us the war was won and that he won it. The Minister for Finance told us it was won five years ago. Well, there was a frightful lot of misery for the people and the war was not won. As I said, I am not going to deal with the facts that may arise out of consideration of the various schedules and articles of the Trade Pact. They will be discussed in various connections hereafter, but I do think at the moment on the face of them that they seem to take from us a lot of our liberty, and a lot of our fiscal liberty that we like to enjoy in the proper regulation of that industrial development to which the Minister for industry and Commerce has set himself, and of which, I think, in a great measure he has made a great success.

Now, coming on to the last matter of our position towards this Pact, we believe that it is a good Pact. I believe it ought to be accepted by the country; it ought to be accepted for its true worth. We ought not to accept it owing to the fact that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald threw his hat in the air in Piccadilly; we ought to accept it for the way that it benefits ourselves, not so much for what it gives us but for the opportunities that it offers us in dealing with problems of various kinds in the future. And there is one thing I particularly accept it for. We from this side of the House have always been urging upon the Government, the other side, the necessity of getting down to reasonable talk about problems when they arise, and there is no use in shouting here about England; when difficulties arise with England, we ought to take up our beds and walk and go over to the English people. I am glad that they have done it, and they have done it on our advice, and I must congratulate them on their courage to do so because I do think it took a considerable amount of courage on the part of the Taoiseach in trying to live down his past and do what he has done in connection with this Pact. There was a time when it would have been impossible to get the Taoiseach to do this. I do not want to go back to the era of Document No. 2, but I do think if this document is going to be of value that we must receive it in the proper way and consider it in the proper spirit, with regard, not as I said for what actually is in it, but in regard to its future potentialities, and not alone its trading or fiscal potentialities, but to its political potentialities and the opportunities that it may give. As the Minister for Industry and Commerce said yestarday, we here on both sides of the House ought to be able to face problems in a united way and in an Irish way, and considering our own Irish difficulties in connection with those problems. Before we have that beautiful unity which we all desire, I think the Ministers, or some of them, ought to go down penitentially and reverently to a little place called Bealnablath and there they ought to ask forgiveness of the greatest man that lived in our generation, Michael Collins. He was a man who brought back the Treaty, and because he brought back the Treaty he was maligned and subseduently murdered. He had no efficient staff of civil servants as our present Ministry have. He had no High Commissioner in London to help him out. He went over with practically a price on his head and manacles upon his hands. Still he brought ns back something and I do say it was that something that gave us freedom and gave you the power to make this Pact to-day. It is on the same lines as he worked that you work, and it is because he was successful that he has enabled you to be successful. It is a pity that in between there has been frittered away a lot of valuable Irish time and a lot of valuable Irish resources and Irish lives. I mention these matters not so that it may evoke any bitterness, but because I think matters of this kind ought to be related in their proper way in the pages of history, and perhaps even now close the cover on it, it will enable us to start a new volume. We may not be enthusiastic about this document. We may not be able to cry with you enthusiastically a great laudamus, but we may be able to say at all events, sursum corda.

Comment on this

I would be slow to impose on this House if it was not for the fact that it is a momentous occasion. I listened with some care and sympathy to the explanation given by the Taoiseach—a very honest and complete explanation of the matters that occurred in London. I do not think that he had any reservations. I appreciate that because I feel that the man is inherently honest, if sometimes mistaken. I also believe that he has not marred the knowledge that completes his education by treating with men who are less honest than himself. But I do rise here, and I am the only one in this House to make a protest against this Agreement. I think it ought to be examined in a much more detailed way. That is the approach that ought to be made by , the House generally, but there has been one approach to this grave matter—grave and historic matter— that all sides are favaurable to it. I do not desire to intrude upon the mutual admiration society, but I am compelled. I understood there were two great Parties in this Chamber and an Independent Labour Party. I find that the two Parties, the two political Parties, as such, are practically at one, that they admire each other—with the exception of Alderman Tom kelly and Deputy Dillon. We were told, in the choice phraseology of Deputy Dillon, that a marriage of convenience has been arranged and the blushing "bride"—that is, the spokesman of this nation—had put himself in a rather invidious position because he was absorbed. It would be a pleasant thing for humanity that somebody should absorb him. But the marriage of convenience has been arranged. I hope it has not been consummated, but I suggest to the Toiseach that he get a quick and permanent dispensation—in this country called a divorce —because the offspring of that marriage will suffer from scrofular empiris, a very virulent and deadly disease. However, I am not going to deal with the very pleasant and friendly and sympathetic phrases hurled at the benches opposite by Deputy Dillon. His contribution can be weighed up and valued by the word that he rolled over his tongue again and again—"It is all cod." We will finish it at that. This momentous hour in the history of this race and this nation of the matters that took place in London of great importance is "all cod, all codology." So that the soldiers trained by the men in these benches, and the men in those benches, have committed crimes against this nation! I say that it is because of the men who drew the sword on behalf of this nation, few as they were, because of their sacrifice and the blood that was shed, that such as Deputy Dillon is allowed to speak in this House.

Comment on this

And you with a cockney accent.

Comment on this

And an Englishman.

Comment on this

I an Englishman? You are a liar, Sir, as I have had to tell you before.

Comment on this

It is a wise child knows his own father.

Comment on this

The only difference between you and me is that you do not know how many fathers you have. My father's record is to be found in written documents.

Comment on this

A public waster.

Comment on this

Go up to killeavy, county Armagh and trace it. My mother's record can be found in South County Down. As for the Deputy who has just interrupted, certification——

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Deputy should not pursue that line of argument.

Comment on this

I did not interrupt anybody in this House nor did I challenge anybody's pedigree. I am not asking you for protection, Sir, because I can always protect myself, but I do suggest that I might be allowed to approach this question without the hatred which animates these men. I have no hatred for them. The word I would use is "contempt". I am trying to follow this debate. I have not had the privilege of sitting here all the time because I have other duties. I regret that, but I do want to approach this question, as it ought to be approached, from the point of the future of this race and this nation. I, whether they like it or not, am a part, and am accepted as a part, of this nation, and I have given service to this nation. I am not going to eulogise my own services or blow my own trumpet, but my record is to be found in the record of service to this country, and I can get documentary proof of that. However, that is all to no purpose.

This document which we are asked to implement was introduced by the Taoiseach in a kindly and statesmanlike way, in a speech in which he said he welcomed free and open discussion. I wish he had gone a step further and said that not only did he want free and open discussion, but he would take off the Whips and let us have a free vote as to the acceptance or rejection of this Agreement. The question of the machinery to implement this Agreement is a matter of to-morrow and one which can be argued and debated here when approval of the action of the four representatives of this nation has been given. The Minister for Industry and Commerce made a gesture in the course of his speech on this matter yesterday. In explaining certain details of the discussion which took place, the Minister made a laboured statement, but, he closed with a very eloquent peroration. That gesture was received in a most discourteous manner. Although it was a gesture worthy of any man, it was thrown back at him with derision and scorn. In that eloquent and generous peroration, he asked that we should forget what had led up to this quarrel. I wish that we could forget history, but one studies history with a view to getting experience of previous foolishness and faults, so that people may not make the same mistakes and so that we may organise tactics and strategy for the future and may achieve the objectives aimed at. That is the purpose of any man of intelligeince. In this case, the Taoiseach had a difficult task. Whether they were responsible for the dispute that led up to this trip to London, history will tell. Life speaks its answer and no one can deny life its message. You must charge yourself with the answer life gives and anyone who would stand up here, or outside, to suggest in an impudent manner that he would defend certain shortcomings, if charged against a certain Party, on an outside or indoor platform, is presumptuous.

History tells what led up to these heads of Agreement. Men enter your estate or country and destroy all they can destroy. They submit you to slavery and to slavish conditions and, having brought you to a state of bankruptcy, where life itself is insufficiently provided for and death stares you in the face, they come along and say: "In the interests of ourselves, having drawn from you by a process of exploitation certain moneys and values-moneys in the shape of return on goods grown in your country and shipped to ours and life in the form of soldiers and navy men—we must have a source of exploitation and, ergo, we go out in the world and borrow money and set you up in your estate and give you a chance to exist on it. You will be allowed to work on it and to pay us an annual tribute.” It was to get rid of that crime against humanity that we were fighting. The Taoiscach and the Party opposite inherited all the mistakes—mistakes that were grievous —made by this other Party when they had their ten years of Government. They came into power and place supported by the Party that represents officially the working classes and they set about trying to undo ths wrongs that had been perpetrated in the ten years of purgatory through which we passed from 1921 until the advent of this Government. The first thing they did was, although they had to pay under force majeure certain moneys, to agree that they would not pay and that there was not a righteous man in this House, or in the four corners of the earth, who would not say that it was a righteous act on their part to refuse to pay one penny more of tribute to the enemy, external or otherwise. We had loud-mouthed expressions as to its being a legal instrument and that we were liable to pay. Some of them doubted the morality of it, but none questioned the legality of it, from the Leader of the Opposition down to any of his satellites, that heterogeneous conglomeration that sits over there, comprising all kinds of political opinion. They agreed it was a legal document and that it ought to be implemented. This side of the House, and I, and those who sent me to the House whenever I asked their confidence, said: “No, we will not pay it.” So we agreed to tighten things up. The working classes contributed and I am sorry that the Taoiseach did not give them, the landless men, the men on uneconomic holdings, the ordinary proletarians in the towns and provinces, the full meed of praise that is rightly theirs. I hope he will give them credit for having upheld him in every time of tribulation. He, as the spokesman of the Party, declared in emphatic terms: “We will not pay one cent. of that annual tribute.”“We will not nay the annuities,” he said, and rightly so, but because there has been a compromise, I am going to vote against the Agreement. I say, however, with all truth and sincerity, that therc never was a body of men speaking for this country, in all its chequered history, that ever did a greater work or achieved more successfully than the four men who left here only a few months ago under very disadvantageous circumstances.

What was the story while they were away? How were they supported in the street, in the market place and, in the caravans of the city and country? We had Dame Rumour, that lying jade, and all kinds of double statements were made, some vocal and some printed. They said: "The spokesman of this nation"—giving him his name, and they are not very pleasant in doing so—"has now gone over when he would not go over in 1921. He has gone over now, but he invited himself over." I hope he had the courage to do that. Why should pot any sane and businesslike man write to another business man and say: "I want to arrange matters with you"? Why should it be a cowardly and beggarly thing to do? Why should it be suggested that he had begged his way into audience with the spokesmen of England? Why should he not say: "I want to discuss these matters with you"? He went over and he was received at a very unpropitious moment. There was a pause; there was a hiatus. What did our friends say throughout the country? They put it abroad that: "Now Mr. de Valera"— as one of them said in a caravan I was travelling with, one of these briefles barristers out of Henrietta Street—"will get a kick in the pants." We know the kind of asides that go on in the streets and highways. He did not; he was received as the recognised spokesman, not of a race of 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 people in these 32 Counties, but as the spokesman of 20,000,000. He was received with respect, but there was the other dangerous condition of things which is now menacing the entire world civilisation—the cloud over the horizon of civilisation which has its impact on the heart of the Empire. The spokesman of the British Government now in power was amongst those who received him. He will not be long in power, because his own character and policy have been impugned and challenged on the nine occasions upon which they have been submitted to the test of the ordinary people of Great Britain. They have discharged and renounced him and his policy, and I hope that in two days' time, in Lichfield, in the Cathedral City of England, in the centre of an nonindustrial popuiation, they will also reject him, and cast him into the outer darkness from which he or no other of his name ought to have come.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It has nothing to do with this debate.

Comment on this

They were received in that manner. Not very long after they were received, the threat had come to the Empire. Everything was at a standstill, and our men had to come back. Then, again, the rumour got abroad that there was a deadlock, and a little "aside" appeared in all the papers that there was a dissolution about to take place. It was rumoured that the Republican Cabinet—they are still republicans, I hope, and I am sure their objective is a republic; if I had any doubt about that, I should doubt my own sanity—was divided, that the Minister for Industry and Commerce had objected to the arrangement made by the Minister for Agriculture. That was broadcast to the public. Every body knows that. They went back again, and there was some further delay. We do not know what the intimate relations of the delegates were. But they were negotiators; they were not demanding. People do not seem to understand the application or meaning of words. It would appear from some people that we made a demand on the British Government, and that they did not give us all we required. We entered into negotiations with them with our eyes open on certain matters and, on these, we have come to an agreement—an agreement which may have its uses, but whether it will be fruitful in respect of those matters at which we aim, I know not.

They brought back a document to which they ask us to agree without the alteration or addition of a period. I say that that is not the right thing to do—that that document ought to be put before the House and that there should not only be free discussion but that there should be a right of amendment, alteration or rejection. If we cannot do that, we must take the obvious course and vote for or against the Agreement. I hope we will—the Taoiseach has not made this plain-when the machinery emhodied in the proposed Acts comes before us, have the right to amend, and that a certain point made by the leader of the official Labour Party may then be corrected. We have, however to vote yea or nay on this Agreement. What does the Agreement say? Is there any man who says he cannot accept the Agreement, let his views be what they may? I am a republican, both by birth and conviction, and I always will be. I say that there is nothing in this Agreement to stop any man or body of men or women from working out objectively and setting up a republican form of government. I challenge contradiction on that. This particular document was born in time because it was born out of conditions forced upon this country by fraud. That is admitted by all historians and by all intelligent men and women. These conditions were enforced throughout the country by fraud. Now, we have come to an Agreement out of fear. I say candidly, coolly and without any hesitation—I defy contradiction in this —that this document could not have been brought before this House six years ago, five years ago, or even one year ago. At now time in the history of the travail of this country, could you have this document presented, and you could not, have it presented now but for this menace and this fear that has got hold of the Empire and which has it almost paralysed.

We have not got this Agreement because of the love of the Chamberlain family for this country. It was not because of love of this country that the Conservative Party made this Agreement. The epitomised history of England and the Empire might convey to you that the Conservatives gave any measure of comfort which this country received. Any measure of that kind which this country received was due to the men who forced them to do that. Even in this country, we are forgetting the great Liberals, the great majority of the organised working classes who always stood on our side and made themselves heard. In every purgatorial period of the history of this country in the last 100 years, Radical and Liberal opinion was always on our side. Men sacrificed their political future and sacrificed even their personal comfort to stand by us. None of the Conservative Parties did that save one man, who went down to political oblivion— Wyudham. The others gave us only what was extracted from them.

There are one or two points to which I desire to advert. Someone has said that the farmers are at destitution point. I have taken care to inquire as to the admissions to the poor law institutions. I do not find that there were many applications from farmers —even small farmers. I have carefully perused the bankruptcy list because I was on that list myself. I was not a bankrupt for failing to pay my just or honest debts. I was forced into a certain position because of political intrigue. However, that has been adjusted. I have liquidated that and I am standing here with my full rights, as I always did. I have never made any compromise with any man or men.

Deputies here say that the farmers are against the policy of this Government. Let us examine that statement home. I submit that the men on the Government Benches represent more constituencies controlled by the farming class than the men on any other side of the House. I say that the farmers have spoken out authoritatively and that the Government have the support of a majority of the farmers—both small farmers and middle-class farmers. These men cannot, however, speak with the voice of the grazier or the would-be grazier, and I hope they never will, much as I sometimes differ with them. We, here, speak for the landless and unemployed men and women and for the organised workers mainly of the provincial towns and of the metropolis. I say—and I challenge contradiction—that 90 per cent. of the organised workers were behind the Government in their mission to London and that they would have been behind them even if they had to tighten their belts and go out into the fields or public parks and eat grass. I challenge the Taoiseach to say that at any moment he had occasion to pause and consider whether we were behind him in this mission even to the extent of 100 per cent. We were behind him because we challenged the moral right and the legal right of England to extract that tribute. We denied their right to extract it by force, majeure. We challenged the right of the British Government to use a force which is greater than physical force-economic force—to make us pay, whether we liked it or net. A Minister who was particularly active in that campaign was a renegade from the Labour Party and he has gone down to well-deserved oblivion. He was particularly bitter when he had the power. He is now removed from that position, and he has no longer power to exhibit his hatred of this nation.

What is the position? This Agreement has tremendous potentialities. I am not going to argue that. You are compelled to accept the capitalisation and commutation of this particular sum. I was not in the House when the Old Man of the Sea who hangs about the Fianna Fáil Party—a Parliamentary Secretary—said this sum was not a commutation of the annuities. He said it was a sum of money—I do not know how he made it up—which has got to be paid. I say that the leader and the spokesman of the nation said that this was a commutation of a sum of money, that the commutation amounted to £10,000,000, which would sort of liquidate all the liabilities except, and this is what I take issue upon, that we have got to continue to pay £270,000 a year. That is not a large amount of money; that is not a very important thing, but why should we not have commuted that £270,000? Why not capitalise it at two years? When you will have a leaseholder's Bill here in the early stages of your work, I suppose we will be asked to capitalise on a two years' basis. It will be a very pleasant task for you.

We have sold to the British Government a pup, and for the right to pay certain millions, which they themselves borrowed and we are paying interest on, we have sold our right and borrowed off them to the extent of £10,000,000. I think it was a good business arrangement; 1 think it was a good job, and so would any businessman think. Deputy O'Neill, who is a very important businessman in the South, would jump at it. Why did we not buy out the £270,000 tribute? May I suggest to you that the Government of England do not want to buy that commute it? They desired a tribute, because that is a tribute. I suggest you should have a further stage of negotiating and commute the £270,000. Then all the strings would be cut, except some strings that some people on the opposite side have got in their minds, because they are very suspicious people. I think your Document No. 2 is very plain and explicit —at least, it is to me. There was always some doubt about it, but I read it very carefully in the cool cell of a prison. I had time enough to read it, when I was in jail for a political action. I remember reading this document very carefully and in some places there was amibiguity, a lack of clearness of thought. The utterances you make in public seem to me very clear, but, as soon as you get a pen in your hand, you seem to overshadow clear thought by a multiplicity of words.

I do not know what you mean by sheer justice. Justice should be upright and above board and the word "sheer" seems to me to be totally unnecessary. There cannot be justice between man and man and country and country; that is obviously impossible in the existing form of civilisation and in the system under which we live. There is, however, some measure of common justice. Then he went on to speak about the equity. There is no equity in the relations between a powerful and unscrupulous—I am not saying enemy—neighbour and a country like ours, where sometimes we lack the ordinary knowledge of the machinery of carrying on government. It was an unequal bargain but I submit that history will say that these four men did good work. Some of them were scarcely ever out of the country before and one might be inclined to describe them as parish pump politicians, yet they were able to meet these great men of the Empire, who control hundreds of millions, and who have been negotiating with all the countries of the world; they were able to meet them at a round or square table, whatever you like, and they were able to come back with the goods. They delivered the goods and every man, woman and child in this country, every townsman, countryman, field-workar, ordinary labourer and industrialist congratulates them on what they have done. What have we done? We have lowered the Jack and raised the tricolour on every field in Ireland except in the Six Counties.

More important than this question of the tribute of £270,000, more important than whether we can buy boots or cattle, is the question of the Partition of this nation. History will tell you who was responsible for that. However, Partition is there. Certain politicians in the North sent out their propaganda, and they had the right to do it. I have one very important point to make. In the terms of reference that were submitted before these men met in London there was one portion that applied itself to Partition. If so, we ought to be told all about it. Was there any discussion about Partition? I do not think we are entitled at this stage to press that matter. I think we will get the information later. It would be imprudent to ask that question at the present moment. Partition is a fundamental issue and I am deeply concerned about it, yet at this moment I will not touch upon it. To me Partition is the greatest crime conceivable. To me it is more important than my right aim, or my left arm, than the whole of my life and the lives of other men.

It would be foolish to think that you could accomplish that task all at once. There are enemies who would invite you to take up that issue, but you must be careful, because that problem will not be solved in a hurry. It will not be brought to the point of consummation that every man and woman in Ireland and the millions outside so ardently desire until again England's difficulty will be Ireland's opportunity. There is no knowing whether it will be by the drawn sword, by economic laws or by political inpingement that that position will be brought about, but I do know that, as sure as to-morrow's sun will rise, that condition of affairs will be brought about. We will all accept that situation with joy and understanding, we will enter into it with pleasure and that period will mark the progressive march of this nation, the best part of this nation that never compromised and never failed when called upon. I am glad to say that by name and race and blood and service I belong to that section. I say that the problem of Partition could not immediately have been solved and I do not blame those who went to London.

I assure the men of the Six Counties, and I expect they will not fail to understand, that there has been no treachery and no betrayal by the men who went to London. There has been no betrayal by those who are going to associate themselves with the Articles of Agreement. At a given time and hour, any support we can give to them will be given. I think the time is opportune when you might invite them here to sit with us. They will be honoured guests of our contry if they sit with us here, even though they may refuse to carry out the policy enunciated by the men opposite.

We had here a denunciation of self-sufficiency. What is self-sufficiency? Is it not Sinn Fein? That was the policy of the men associated with the Sinn Féin movement. There was a time when those associated with Sinn Féin were described as foolish men. They were told that their policy was a foolish policy, that Sinn Féin was a Hungarian policy, born out of time and created in the mind of a discredited economist. We had it repeated here that self-sufficiency is all wrong, that there is nothing in it. Self-sufficiency, properly organised and supported by all the elements of this nation, by the agricultural and the industrial arm brought together and working in cooperation—that form of self-sufficiency is the only policy, and I speak as an internationalist. You cannot live by yourself. Man is an animal, it is true, but it is also true that man is a social animal and no country can live by itself, but a country can adapt itself and its productions to its own needs. I hope that in the time to come we will not go back to the days of the grazierdom, turning the land into cattle ranches. Some years ago we had the slogan, "The land for the people and the roads for the bullocks." In those days the only use for a man was to give him a goad with which to drive the cattle along the road to the ports for England. If this Agreement is in danger of Ieading to any recurrence of that, then I say let us pause. What is important is the cultivation of the land, not the grazing of the land. The Minister for Agriculture is sometimes not doing what I would wish him to do, but he will not take my advice. This country can only be run in a proper manner by the co-operation of the working classes.

In the years in which I have been associated with public life I have known of no man who has paid more close attention to his public duties than the Minister for Industry and Commerce. I say that man has charged himself with an intimate knowledge of industry. He is a man who tries to do his duty, but it is his advisers who sometimes should be corrected if not removed. I say that Minister has done all he should do. I say that every man now engaged in the manufacture of boots should be given a chance. For years I pleaded for the setting up of that manufactory. Instead of producing, as we did some years ago, £136,000 worth of boots in the year, we are now producing £2,000,000 worth. We are getting to the point of saturation, and we are making a boot equal to any in Europe. I say to the Governrnent be very careful that you do not destroy that trade. I say to the Government be careful that you do not destroy another part of your agronomy, that is wheat production. Continue to produce wheat, because the time will come when you will be able to sell that wheat in England at a very enhanced price. The time will come when, because of war, you will get a high price for your wheat in England. Keep your sugar factories going, and do not give up one thing. Your manufacturers then will be able to give the young men out of the colleges and out of the technical schools of this country a chance of learning something and a chance of adapting themselves so as to be in a position to add to the means of the nation. Do not drive your young men the nation outer parts of the British Empire without a trade or calling or profession and with no knowledge of discipline of mind or body.

I wish now to conclude. Possibly I could treat of these matters for the next ten hours, hut I am not going to abuse the confidence or courtesy of the House. There is one suggestion that I wish to make. There is one phase in connection with these Agreements to which not enough attention has been drawn. That is very vital indeed. Yesterday you could have stood against the world, and you might have here within these four corners of this nation, the four fields of Caitlín Níh Ualacháin, a distinct civilisation. I remember there was a time when to say a word in Irish drew forth the criticism that one was talking gibberish. But Irish has now got an honoured place in the four fields of Caitlín Níh Ualacháin. I am only in a position to speak myself in English, a language that was forced upon my people. I did sit at the knee of a woman who spoke the Irish language, and I sucked the milk from her breast, but I cannot speak the language. I want to live to see the day when every man and woman in this House will have to speak in the old language. I have been leading too active a life to take up the study even of O'Growney. I did say this: that yesterday we could have stood against the world. We could have set up here in this cradle of civilisation a civilisation from which men from all the nations of the world might look for a lead. Perhaps at the exhibition of 1940 we would be able to show something to the nations of the world. We might have done all these things yesterday, but not to-day. Once you accept these ports you aceept responsibility. You are now in the European vortex, but some day your sons and daughters will have to pay the penalty. You are now a part of the comity of nations and part of the European federation, either on one side or the other. You are bound to be. You are taking these ports. Take them, and I agree that every foot of land that we can get we should take, and we should maintain our rights. But having taken up your rights and having these ports, you take upon yourselves certain responsibilities; you invite the armed men of a mighty federation out side this State to cast a rock in upon you. I want to thank you, Sir, for your courtesy and kindness in allowing me to go outside perhaps the ordinary terms of the debate. I will now conclude. I will talk again upon the introduction of the machinery of these Bills in cennection with the Articles of Agreement.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Taoiseach to conclude.

Comment on this

Before the Taoiseach concludes there is just one question I want to ask. In opening the debate the Taoiseach dealt generally with the Agreement; the Minister for Industry and Commerce dealt with the economic side; the Minister for Agriculture with the agricultural side, and the Minister for Defence with the ports side. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance dealt with the financial end of the Agreement. I think the few words that he uttered on that particular portion of the Agreement have led to some discussion here. The Taoiseach stated that the £10,000,000 that are to be paid should be called ransom payment, or a two year's purchase of the land annuities. I think that was the equivalent to what he said. Some time later the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance said it was nothing, of the sort, that it was not a payment as mentioned; that it was a payment in settlement of other financial differences which were between the two existing Governments. That statement was made last night. When questioned on the matter later, the Parliamentary Secretary said he had not time to go fully into it, but that it w ould be gone into later. Will the Taoiseach clear up that point now as to whether it was a ransom payment or a payment in consideration of other outstanding differences, and if so what are these?

Comment on this

I have been wondering whether by making another speech now on this matter I can add anything useful to what I said at the start. It was inevitable in a discussion of this sort that we and those on the Opposite Benches should have different views as to what led up to the present situation and what was the cause of the trouble in the past. We have come to the point, at any rate, when an end seems to be in sight. I think from all sections of the House there was only one Deputy, the Deputy who spoke a few minutes ago, who intimated his intention of voting against this motion. Therefore, I suppose we may take it that no matter what your views in the past may have been, no matter what faults you may find with the Agreement here and there, on the whole you approve of it as something that is in the interest of our people. If that is so my work really is done so far as this matter is concerned, because I do not think we are going to do very much by way of either side converting the other as to the real meaning of the past. I have my views to-day. I hold them just as strongly as I did before.

I would not move the acceptance of this Agreement if there was in my mind any feeling that we were sacrificing anything which could reasonably be called a question of principle. We are doing nothing of the sort.

There are, as I said, three Agreements in this document—three parts of it if you wish. The first part deals with the ports. Perhaps I might repeat something that I have already said about it; lest there should be any misunderstanding in that matter. That Agreement wipes out, win the first instance, Articles 6 and 7 of the 1921 Treaty. It is suggested by some of the lawyers on the other side that the very fact that we say that something shall cease to have effect, means that we are recognising it. That was clearly before my mind and if I could get any way by which I could get rid absolutely and completely of the dangers which I saw in these Articles, other than by referring to them and saying that they shall cease to have effect, I would not have these words. I looked through the Treaty to see if there was any Article of it that could be regarded as remaining in existence, any Article, that is, about the interpretation of which these words—"shall cease to have effect"—might be used to try to revive that Treaty in any sense. That Treaty is sped. It is finished, particularly with these dangerous Articles removed. The fact that there is the reference here "shall cease to have effect," is not to be taken by anybody as being a recognition by me now that that Treaty should ever have been in existence.

These negotiations were begun on a message from me. They started on our initiative. That initiative was taken, not because as has been suggested, we had come to the last cow and the last calf. It is quite clear that that is not so. It is well known that our people have suffered during that period. I am not going to deny it. They have suffered. That suffering was necessary in order to secure the position we have got to-day. That the payment was not due legally or morally I hold now, as I have held for a number of years, that that payment should not be continued for an indefinite period of years. It was not because of the pressure on our people by the economic war, or the economic dispute, that we took the initiative. I shall tell Deputies why I took the initiative. I shall refer them to some speeches of mine which were made some years back. Speaking in the Town Hall, B l a c k r o c k , on the 6th June, 1935, I said something like this—this is the report of it in the Press:—

"A free Ireland in times of common risk could be for Great Britain only a friendly Ireland, and would be a surer safeguard to Britain's security than could possibly be an Ireland in subjection, for an Ireland in subjection could only be a hostile Ireland. If that fact has at last penetrated to the consciousness of the Government and the people of Great Britain, then indeed a new era in our relationship is at hand."

The report continues in the third person:—

"In those days of wars and rumours of wars their minds naturally turned to Articlcs 6 and 7 of the Treaty of 1921. He knew of nothing that menaced the possibility of permanent good relations with Britain so much as that Article. Were the English Government to make demands indicated in that Article, no Irish Government could accede to them and hope to retain the confidence of its people. He knew of nothing more urgent than that there should be an understanding between Great Britain and themselves in this matter. The Irish people did not want to be dragged into any European, or other, war but the Irish people would be prepared to strain themselves to the utmost to defend their own territory and to see that no nation suffered because of their freedom. It was to prepare for such an emergency that their Volunteer force was establislied. They were ready to undertake to the full the obligations of their freedom once it was fully secured. He hoped that they would be taken at their word in this matter."

The negotiations were undertaken on the basis of the views which I then expressed. Nothing could be more dangerous in this country to the relations between itself and Great Britain, than that these ports should continue in British occupation or that Britain should have a claim to make, a claim such as the claim she would regard herself as possibly entitled to make under Articles 6 and 7. I say that this Government would certainly not have recognised any such claim and it was clearly impossible for any Government to do its duty by our people here, so long as these Articles remained.

As one who was responsible for seeing that some protection should be afforded our people, and who was prepared to give our people that protection in the circumstances which I could not fail to discover around us, I said: "We must get down to bedrock in this matter and know what are going to be the relations between the two countries, if there is going to be a major European, or other, war." It was necessary to get down to bedrock to know whether we, as a people, were going to organise ourselves to defend our own rights or whether foreign people were to hold a part of our territory which would put them in a position to make further demands upon us far facilities, etc., such as they might make, or consider themselves entitled to make, under these Articles. We had to get down to bedrock We could make no plans for defence. It was humiliating to find that, when the question of protecting our people against possible attack was being considered, it was not the Government could do it; that it was people like the Port and Docks Board or somebody else that could talk about the measures to be taken to defend our people in case of a major conflict. Could we escape? Is it likely that we could escape if there was a major European conflict at the present time? If there is such a condition, will we continue to export cattle and food to Great Britain? Will the export of food be regarded as contraband of war or will it not? If we are going to send food from our ports to Britain, when Britain's enemies, let us say, will be trying to starve her, will our position be respected by other people? Will our ports be free? Will we be immune from attack? I do not know if it was in the House but someone asked: "Could we have the audacity to have our neutrality recognised by foreign Governments? Would any foreign Governments think we were neutral if our ports were occupied by Britain, or if a Government here gave the facilities which might be asked for by Britain under Articles 6 and 7? I suggest that our people would be living in a fool's paradise if they thought anything of the kind.

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

Comment on this

Therefore, we have to try and protect ourselves and we have to try to make plans for defence. We could not make plans for defence while Articles 6 and 7 existed. Now we can do so, at any rate to the extent that the removal of those Articles has made it possible for us to do it. The British are wise, and they would be wiser still if they had the courage to use their influence and see that we had the whole country here. Its manhood would be prepared to defend it. They have not got that wisdom yet.

Comment on this

They will get it.

Comment on this

I believe they will. Let Deputies opposite not taunt me later with raising false hopes. They will have sense. Twenty years ago they had not the sense to make a Treaty or an Agreement like this. This country would now be much stronger than it is, and the stronger and freer it is the better it would be for Britain. There was a time when Britain feared us because our population was very nearly as great as hers or, at least, was very high. That situation is changed. Britain has no need in future to fear an independent and free Ireland, but has every reason to wish for a stronger and bigger Ireland. The British have got, if she was wise, this much wisdom, that they recognise now that we have responsibilities placed upon us and that we cannot have it both ways.

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

Comment on this

We cannot be free and refuse to take up the obligations of freedom. If we want to be free, let us not hope that somehow or other we will "slither" out of anything that might come our way to attack us. We have to face facts. The position in this country is that of every other country. That is the spirit in which I want to have this Agreement accepted, so that we may face fully up to our responsibilities. It is true that it is going to cost us something to maintain these ports. Why do we not let them become derelict? We have the right to do so, if we wish. There is no provision to the contrary, express or implied. We could let them go but, in our own interest, we dare not do so. Why? Because in the first moment of war they are of such tremendous importance, either to Britain or to enemies of Britain, that if we had not some means of keeping out those who might want them in their own interests they would be used by them.

If we want these important positions to be held for the interests of our people, we have to face the expense of doing it. It will be no small expense, as far as I can see. We have a standing army which is very small, and barely sufficient to act as an auxiliary to the police force. We cannot stop at that. I warn you that every 1,000 men added to the standing army will mean an expenditure of £100.000 a year, or something in that neighbourhood. If there is joy, then, on the part of some people at the acceptance of this Agreement, let us not think that we are going to have a new heaven and a new earth. There will be nothing of the kind. We are going to face new responsibilities and these new responsibilities are going to put burdens upon us. We accept these burdens in the same spirit as we would accept the burdens which undoubtedly would be placed upon us if we got in the North. Is anyone here going to suggest that the inclusion of the North with the rest of this country would not impose at this moment very severe burdens upon us? Of course it would. They have 100,000 unemployed in the North, and by adding that number to our own unemployed, we see what a problem that would set. There are other big and heavy problems that we would have to face, and new burdens that we would have to bear if we took in the whole of Ireland. Are we going to grumble because there is a burden to face? We are not. We are, I hope, quite ready to bear the burden. I understand that a number of industrialists down here would be shivering if we had the whole country in now.

Comment on this

That is a remarkable admission.

Comment on this

I have heard that. Nevertheless, although it might make them work much harder, and put bigger burdens upon all of us, because it would mean the restoration of the unity of this country, we would face these burdens willingly. In the same way, any burdens that will flow from the possession and occupation of these ports by ourselves, I, for one, recommend the Irish people to face cheerfully. This House, at any rate, seems determined to face these burdens. Deputy Dillon asked me to be frank with the House, and stated that I did not say if we were going to continue to keep these ports. Apart from the Journals of the House, I got three daily newspapers, in which it was stated in as explicit and as express terms as it was possible to use, that we did take over these ports, and that we meant not only to defend them but to modernise them. Yet a Deputy comes into the House and said that I had been trying to fool the people; that I did not say we were going to defend them.

What was his complaint? His complaint was that I would not go the distance he would go. I say that he would go a foolish distance. He told us what the Commonwealth is, but he did not take the trouble to realise what the position is in matters of defence. I have here the report of the debate that took place in the Canadian House of Commons on Monday, January 25, 1927. If the Deputy reads that report, and reads another debate in February, he will get some enlightenment on the question of defence and the attitude towards it, just as on a previous occasion we had to enlighten another Deputy as to the position regarding common foreign policy. This is the speech made by the Canadian Prime Minister. He said—I am going to read only one paragraph—:

"The question of Canada's participation in war has been discussed many times in this Parliament. Neutrality is just another aspect of the same question. Participation in war is the positive aspect, if I may put it that way, and neutrality is the negative aspect. Over and over again we have laid down the principle that so far as participation in war is concerned it will be for the Parliament of Canada to decide. Having taken that attitude with respect to participation, I think we may well take the same attitude with regard to neutrality. It will be for this Parliament to say in any given situation whether or not Canada shall remain neutral. At any rate, that is the position which the present Administration proposes to take."

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

Comment on this

Very well. If I say on behalf of this Administration that that is our attitude is Deputy Dillon satisfied, or does he want us to do something more? Does he want us to go in contravention of the terms of the Constitution?

Comment on this

I certainly do not want you to contravene the Constitution.

Comment on this

It says that: "War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Eireann". That is the constitutional position, and that is the position which must be maintained if the Constitution is to stand. Having taken over these ports, we shall have to come to the House with a defence policy. This is by no means the time to go into our whole defence policy. I can only say that in my belief it is going to impose a considerable burden on our people, but that they will have to face that burden if they want to be free.

Comment on this

May I ask the Prime Minister a question. I do not want to misrepresent him in the least degree, but sincerely want to find out what the situation is. Did I understand him correctly when he told us a few moments ago that if we continued to send foodstuffs to Great Britain in time of war it would be folly to pretend that we could maintain our neutrality? Now, that is one question. The second question is quite simple. I quite agree that he said that he intended to defend the ports taken over from Great Britain. I want to ask him, does he intend to construct defences there in the form of naval bases, or does he merely propose to erect land fortifications to resist invasion at these particular points?

Comment on this

I have already said to the Deputy that I cannot at this moment go into the whole question of national defence. The appropriate time to do that is when the Votes for the purpose come before the House. I said that we undertook these negotiations because it was not possible, in the existing conditions, to have any decent basis for our defences Henceforth we will. We will know what are the immediate and what are the likely problems, and we will have, in my opinion, to consider these defences on a double basis. The first basis would be to defend our territory against attack from any quarter, no matter from where. Secondly, we would have to consider what is the likely quarter, and when we have considered that, if it were, for instance, an attack from a European power, then we would have to ask ourselves: "How are we going to plan our defences so as to be in the best position to resist such an attack?" As I have often said before, any attack on us by a foreign power could not be ignored by Britain, because if this country was taken by a European power—if possession of our harbours and territory was taken—then Britain would be in a very parlous condition indeed. Britain, therefore, could not ignore that, and in her own interests, and not for love of us, any more than anything that we would do would not be for love of Britain but for ourselves —under these conditions Britain would have to do her utmost to prevent such an attack, so that whether she willed it or not, the force of circumstances would make her an ally of ours in our defence.

Therefore, in planning our defences to meet such an occasion, and in order that, in such situation, the greatest possible strength should be behind this nation to defend its rights, the planning should take place on the basis that we wanted to have the combined forces as effective as possible. That is how I face it. I am not a military man, and I am only giving you what a lay man looking at it in that way would consider to be best. As I have said, we can have all that discussed on the appropriate occasion in this House. As far as that problem is concerned, we would approach it on a certain line. We would have to consider whether the attack was going to come from the east or the west.

Comment on this

The west is thousands of miles away and there is nothing to fear there.

Comment on this

Looking at it in that way, our defences would need to be planned to meet attack from the east or the west or from any quarter. When we had that done we would superimpose, if you like, upon that a second plan, namely, to meet the situation in which a foreign Power might possibly covet our territory or our positions here for her own interest and for the detriment of our people. Obviously, to meet such a situation one should plan on the idea that there was one ally that we were bound to have not because of her love for us but for her own sake, and that ally was bound to be Britain, because she dare not allow a foreign Power, as long as she is where she is, to take possession of this country. Therefore, our plans would have to be made on that basis. It was in order that we might get down to bedrock, so that we could reasonably plan for defence and get out of the present parlous and impossible position, that I asked that the whole outstanding questions between Britain and ourselves should be the subject of discussion with the British Government.

Comment on this

Did I understand the Prime Minister correctly when I believed him to have said that if we continued to send foodstuffs to Great Britain in time of war it would be folly to pretend that we could maintain our neutrality?

Comment on this

I fear that it would be so, in fact. The truth is, of course, that in modern war there is not any neutrality. During the War, trade from one neutral country to another was stopped or interfered with by the belligerents on both sides. Food is, I think, conditional contraband, according to the Conventions. But, again, these Conventions are not worth a scrap of paper once war appears. Obviously, to get down to bedrock we had to clear the decks and see what we were about. We had to see what were going to be the relations between the two countries in the event of a major European outbreak. Were we going to have parallel interests or were we going to have interests in the opposite direction? I tried in vain for 20 years —partially succeeding in the present Agreement—to convince the British Government that their interests lie, like our interests, in good relations between the two countries, and I was anxious to get down and sweep away all the outstanding matters in dispute. First and foremost of those matters in dispute was that outrage to which Deputy Larkin referred—the Partition of our country. No Irishman who wanted to establish good relations between Britain and ourselves or between ourselves and Britain could ignore that. Remember that promises between Governments are not the things that matter. Treaties and signed documents are not the things that matter.

What matters most in the relations between countries is the fact that those countries have common interests, and that there are no disputes which prevent those common interests from getting their full attention. No Irishman could hope to establish good relations with Britain, really and fundamentally, as long as that outrage on our nationality and on our people persists. Therefore, if we were, as I was—and my colleagues were with me—anxious to find the basis on which we could establish really good relations between Britain and ourselves, we had to, if we were honest, as I have said, put the ending of Partition in the first place. Nothing else would so help to improve the relations between the two countries. I, therefore, said when I was going over, as I have explained to you here, that one of the matters which were outstanding and which I wanted naturally to discuss was the question of Partition. I did not say it explicitly perhaps, but "outstanding questions," in view of the statements I have made hundreds of times, surely could not have been misunderstood. And it was discussed. It was discussed the very first thing, and it was discussed, I might say, the last thing in our negotiations. It had to be, and to the extent that there is not in this Agreement a reference to Partition, and the ending of it, this Agreement is a bad and poor document.

Comment on this

That is not your fault.

Comment on this

It is not my fault.

Comment on this

I agree.

Comment on this

But I resent deeply the suggestions that were made by Deputy Dillon here, that I tried to fool the people in the North. I did nothing of the sort. I was most careful, and not a single word can be adduced at any point where I said to the North that we would not make an agreement unless Partition was ended.

Comment on this

I put in evidence an article in the Prime Minister's own paper.

Comment on this

Do not talk to me about an article in the Prime Minister's own paper. I could not do, as the Deputy's father apparently found possible to do——

Comment on this

I think the Taoiseach might let the dead rest.

Comment on this

I beg your pardon. I did not mean to be disrespectful; it is the last thing I want to do. I am very sorry. I had every respect for your father——

Comment on this

I quite agree.

Comment on this

——and he was a personal friend of mine at the end. But I want to point out to the Deputy that there were different conditions which enabled that to be done. If I were sitting on the opposite benches and had the freedom and all the rest that goes with it which the Deputies on the opposite benches might have, I might be able to dictate and write leading articles. I cannot do it. I am not responsible for what is in those articles. If it continues for any length of time with a policy which I think is inimical to the Irish people, then I can interfere. I have those powers, and that is all. I cannot interfere from day to day, and any attempt to hold me responsible from day to day for what appears in the paper is unfair to me, because I have more to do than would enable me to do that. I may from time to time give general directions as to the policy that is to be adopted in certain circumstances, but I can only do that in a very general way, and only at rare intervals. I am not responsible for them. I am responsible to the Irish people and to myself for what I myself state.

Comment on this

And for the impression you created on their minds.

Comment on this

I did not create any impressions. It is the Deputies who try to make it appear that I do those things, who create those impressions. It is not I.

Comment on this

Here is the Irish Press saying it is.

Comment on this

We have heard it several times here in this House, and I am sure that in a month's time, if the Deputy thinks it is to his advantage, he will say the same thing, in spite of what I have said to-day. I cannot do it; I have not the time to exercise day to day supervision over the articles that appear in the paper and hold myself responsible for them. I say I made my position with regard to Partition clear. It is in the first place, and it is in the last place, and until I die it will remain with me.

Comment on this

An admirable sentiment.

Comment on this

I have not ever pretended that there was a straight road to the ending of Partition. Time after time I said the reverse. Time after time when the United Ireland Party was founded I have said the same thing, that we are now, as far as that objective is concerned, on the one road and I welcome it. It is one of the things at least that is of advantage, if this goes through, that the whole Irish nation now will be consecrated to try to end that wrong.

Comment on this

And always has been.

Comment on this

I did not fool anybody. I met representatives of the people in the North. I told them that I would do everything that was humanly possible for me to do, and I have fulfilled my promise as far as I can see it. I know nothing that I could do, nothing that I could organise this part of Ireland to do with success, that I have not done and that I would not do in order to end Partition. Representatives from the North came over to meet me in London when the negotiations were on. They came at a time when the things they had got to say were not going to get much prominence in the British Press, because other matters which affected Britain closely happened to be in the papers at the time. But this has been done with regard to Partition: not merely has it been isolated, not merely has its importance in the relations between the two countries been pointed out to the British Government, not merely has the injustice that is being done to a section of our people been pointed out, but the whole British people and the whole Irish people— the 20,000,000 of whom Deputy Larkin spoke—have been acquainted with the position. They know now, if they did not know before—I am referring to the British public in this case—that there is no justification whatever for the inclusion in that territory of minorities that wish to belong here, no matter what basis they work on.

Comment on this

And majorities too.

Comment on this

I quite agree. I have never said at any time that there was a right of a small portion of this country, even though they might have a concentrated majority in a certain place, to cut itself off. I think that this island is a natural unit for self-determination, and I have seen no other unit in this country that seems to have the right to it. But I do know that there was a basis of pretence, namely, that there was in a certain part of this country, in Six-Counties it was said, a local majority in favour of Partition. I say there is not a local majority in favour of Partition in the greater part of the Six-Counties. There is in portion of it, I think. We have gained this, that the importance of Partition in the relations between the two countries is well understood; that it is vital it is understood, and I hope it will be understood by the people in this country and by the people outside it.

Now, I did not at any time deceive the people in that area. I would say that everything that Deputy Dillon said would be only half what should be said if I were guilty of that, because I, for one, do consider that there is nothing meaner than to get the assistance of people and to inspire hopes in them when the person who does it knows that these hopes are vain hopes. I did think that there was a possibility—that having come a certain part of the way on the path of wisdom, we might possibly get the British Government to go the whole way on the path of wisdom; but I recognised that Partition is not solely a British-Irish problem. It is true, quite true, that it was started and was made what it is mainly by British action, that it was the action of British Parties that made it what it is, mainly. I am not such a fool, however, as to think that—to mention the old rhyme, Humpty Dumpty—if you knock the egg off the wall, the fact that you yourself are the person that knocked it off is going to make it any the easier to put it together again; and though I recognise that it would serve British policy very well to-day to have the reunification of this country, I also recognise that they have to proceed slowly about it, and that they have to try to convince the people who are standing out against the unity of this country—that they have to convince them as they are convinced themselves.

Comment on this

Hear, hear! Perfectly right.

Comment on this

One of the first things is that they should be convinced absolutely themselves that it is good policy, and I hope that we have gone some distance in making them see that and in making them see that, as long as they are the supreme Parliament, even though they may not be able to interfere in certain legislation —as long as they are holding themselves as the supreme Parliament in that area, that they have responsibilities towards the minorities in that area, and that they cannot hold the one and shirk the other.

I do not think, then, that in so far as the first objective is concerned, these negotiations have been in vain. As far as the other parts are concerned. I think they have been reasonably satisfactory. I am not going to talk too much about the value of this Agreement. I would rather have heard it criticised a very great deal more than I have heard it criticised—criticised fundamentally— because I could have criticised it and have been criticising it for two or three months, perhaps, and the other members of the delegation have been criticising it as well.

Comment on this

Troth, you could criticise it, and eloquently, if we had brought it back.

Comment on this

I have been criticising it very hard, I can tell the Deputies, and there are many things that, but for our criticism, would be in it, and if it were given to me to write it out, I could write out a very much more satisfactory Agreement for our people, and so could every Deputy.

Comment on this

Hear, hear!

Comment on this

Later on, I will have to talk about trade, and I have a little note in which I have reference to a statement that was made by Deputy O'Higgins with which I fully agree, which was to the effect that there is probably not a single Deputy here who, if he were allowed to write out a trade agreement or a general agreement, could not write out a very much better agreement if he had not to deal with other people.

Comment on this

I quite agree.

Comment on this

Very well. This is not all a one-sided bargain by any means. It is not all advantage for us. I have told you that, in connection with this matter of the ports, there are going to be considerable disadvantages, namely, the burdens they will place upon us. Deputy Cosgrave has told us that he could have got the ports some time ago and that he was sheered off from taking them—well, I am afraid of that word "sheer"— that he refrained from dealing with them on account of the cost. I think that Deputy Cosgrave is mistaken, and anybody else who spoke in that connection. It was my business some time ago, because I was interested in this question, to go carefully into all these matters, and, whether it was the Department of Defence or the Department of External Affairs, I naturally tried to find out what the British had been, at any time, prepared to do. I have no evidence that they were prepared to hand them over. If anybody can refer me to any files or show me any evidence of that, I shall be very glad to have it, but I can say quite definitely that there is no record at any time of the British being prepared to hand over the port defences to us.

Comment on this

I can assure the Taoiseach, on behalf of Deputy Cosgrave, that his Minister for Defence met the appropriate Department in London and was informed that they would be prepared to do so.

Comment on this

Well, then, I will say that both the Minister for Defence and the President of the Executive Council did not act wisely in refraining from putting down a note to that effect because, clearly, it was going to be of great advantage to subsequent Administrations to know that. I can only say that I cannot find it and I can only say that it is denied at the other side.

Comment on this

That is important.

Comment on this

I made it my business to look into that matter and actually, on some occasion or another, I said—of course, this is my recollection and I am not absolutely certain of the exact words—"But you were prepared to hand over these ports. What about it?" That fact was denied, and I should like to get any confirmation whatever that can be given to me by the Leader of the Opposition or his Minister that that was so, because I can find none. I do know this, however; that they would have been very glad to share our coast defences with us, that is, to give us, under what you might call Article 6—the Deputy can see what is contained in Articles 6 and 7—they would be quite willing, I have no doubt whatever, to let us take over the responsibilities for other portions of it as long as we admitted that they had rights under Article 7, certain facilities and so on. Now, Deputies on the other benches know as well as I do that no Irish Government could make an agreement of that sort. We had either to get these ports unconditionally or we would not take them at all because they would be no use to any Irish Government. I have said already that peace between peoples is what is to be made, and not bargains between Governments, and it would have been quite impossible for this Government or any Irish Government to make arrangements of that sort and hope to have them loyally accepted by our people and accepted, principally at the time of crisis. I would not take the ports if the British suggested that we should put our flag upon them and at the same time agree that, at any time the British wanted them, they could have them. I would say: "No; if you take or intend to take the ports, you will have to bear the cost of their upkeep, and if you say that, of necessity, our interests will be parallel with yours in some of the cases in which you apprehend danger, then it would be very much better to work on that basis than to work on scraps of paper." We have got the ports in our own right without conditions, but the policy that I indicated as the policy of this Administration remains the policy of this Administration, and I believe that no succeeding Ministry will change that policy in any time that I can see with the world wagging as it is to-day; but if they should, there is no commitment to prevent it. The State is not committed in any way. Neither are there any commitments upon this Government. The commitments that are given there are the statements we have publicly made because of the policy which we think best for our country, no more and no less.

I hope that every person in the House and in the country understands the position with regard to these ports. I know I will have a hard time when I go to the Minister for Finance. He is going to be a very tough customer to deal with when dealing with his Budget. I know the Labour Party will, very rightly, question every item of defence expenditure as long as the social services have to be met, as long as there is any slackness—I do not blame them at all. I think it is right, and that it is their business as public representatives that that should be done. It is also the business of the Minister for Finance to see to it that all our services get apportioned to them, according to their requirements, the moneys that we can supply from our resources. I know it is so in every country—that when a Government comes to Parliament and asks for the Votes necessary to maintain the defences everybody questions them. Unfortunately, it is one of these insurance items.

There is a vague notion about, which I can never understand, that somehow or other there will be a big war and that we can continue supplying goods to Great Britain and that somehow we will come through that unscathed. It would be a right policy for any Government, if they could see their way to do it. That is what the Canadian Prime Minister clearly indicated they would like to do if they could do it. What they want to do, and what we want to do, is to preserve for the Parliament the sovereign right of determining, in the circumstances of the moment, what action is best in the national interest. That is the freedom we wanted to preserve, and that is the freedom we have preserved. Again, I think that that freedom, though it is freedom for us, does mean necessarily an advantage to Great Britain. They could have that advantage with all my heart now if we had the whole of our country. Until that is there, there will be in the minds of a large number of Irish people, undoubtedly, a big question mark with regard to that. It is precisely because I do not want, at the beginning of a crisis like that, to find our country in turmoil that I want to clear that question away as we have cleared other questions away. However, I think I have said enough on the score of the ports.

Now let me come to the question of the £10,000,000 payment. Deputy Norton, I think, asked me if the British had recognised now that the land annuities were not due. The land annuities were, roughly, about £3,000,000 a year, the capitalised value of which they estimated at £78,000,000. Our experts, no matter what Deputy Cosgrave may say, have told me that they had no good fundamental reason for quarrelling with that. I will tell the Deputy as a secret that I did not examine it very closely because I went over determined that not one penny of that £78,000,000 would ever come from Ireland. Did I ask the British to recognise that? No, I did not—I am not such a fool. I am quite content as long as they did not want me to recognise their point of view.

Comment on this

Hear, hear. That is very reasonable as I often told you.

Comment on this

These negotiations have been successful to the point they have been successful for this reason, that neither side tried to get the other side to accept their point of view.

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

Comment on this

If they did, they would not succeed. So we wisely started—if I may reveal some happenings; I am sure I will not be indiscreet —by each saying what they could not do, not what the other fellow should do, which is quite a different thing. There were certain things as to which, I said, "We cannot do them, and if there is a question about doing them, home we go." They retaliated: "There is a certain thing we cannot do, and if you try to force us to do it, knowing we cannot do it, then you can go home." So certain things, although they were never relinquished, had to be recognised fairly early. Although each side tentatively tried at other stages to get the other side to change their attitude, there was no change of attitude. That attitude was preserved to the end. It was because of that the Agreement is of the type it is.

But the moment I saw that Partition was not going to be solved, that there was a danger that it would not be solved—I did not lose hope until the last moment no matter what was said at the beginning—but the moment there was a danger that Partition was not going to be included, I told the people as plainly as I could. I took the first occasion to do it. I told them in their interest and I told them in our interest, because I did not want to deceive them, and I did not want to have to pretend, as Deputy Dillon would like to do now, that I did want to deceive them.

Comment on this

As the Irish Press did.

Comment on this

I can deal with the Irish Press elsewhere perhaps. I cannot deal with the Irish Press here.

Comment on this

We had better send an ambulance down to Burgh Quay then.

Comment on this

I am sensible enough. I do not expect those who have to write leading articles every night—I would not like to have to talk every day; in fact, I keep out of the House a good deal because I do not want to be talking too much and it would be a good thing for other Deputies, perhaps, if they did the same; if you have to talk a lot and you do talk a lot, then you are bound some time or other to make very serious mistakes. The unfortunate thing about a newspaper is that it has to come out before the public every day and so it says something that it has to say or that it thinks right. Second thoughts are not very often possible. Of course it is only possible for other people to interpret things as they see them at the moment. I only asked that I should not be held responsible for it, because really it is a responsibility I could not hold. The man who writes would not, I am sure, hold himself responsible the next day. He could not do it. Neither could any other newspaper hold themselves responsible the next day for every article —that they would not change a line of it.

Comment on this

Look at what the Independent wrote about his father.

Comment on this

It does not matter. What we have to do is to forget or try to forget. However, I hope I have not talked too much about the ports. I talked as frankly to our people and I expressed my mind as fully as I have expressed it to anybody or anywhere. It is the whole truth—no reservation. With regard to the money payments, as I said, I did not, of course, ask the British Government that they should, as Deputy Norton naïvely remarked, recognise that we were right all the time. I could not do it. A simple sum in arithmetic is good enough for me.

There were two main classes of items. There were the land annuities and there were other items. During the years past we withheld all the payments. Why. If anybody cares to go back to the election addresses and manifestoes in 1932, I think it was, they will find the thing set out under two parts. One part was the question of local loans and other things in which the foundation was quite different; the reasons were different from the land annuity reasons and I made it quite clear that I was going to examine these things on their merits. Why did we retain them? Because I believed that the British Government had taken away from us over ten years, on the head of land annuities, some £30,000,000 and that that, even if they were entitled to the rest, was a fair set-off until the dispute was over. I did not go into detail about them. I have not argued them I have not argued them in this House. I have not argued them in the country, but I did argue and until the end of my life, if I have an occasion to do it and think it is worth while, I am going to argue that these land annuities payments were neither legally nor morally due. Deputy Larkin takes a broader view and thinks the other payments should be treated likewise. I have said about the other payments that they were set off much bigger than the sums on which these payments were charged.

Somebody said, I think here, that there was a large sum put up by us as a counterclaim in 1932, and that it has been abandoned. That is quite true. I believe—I cannot get any word to qualify justice, it must be simple justice, I suppose—that justice between the two countries, fair play, or any word you like to express the similar thing, would mean that if there were payments at all to be made by us on the head of these other payments because of the counterclaim that the payment should come in the other direction. And, therefore, I sympathise with anybody who says: "I am not going to vote for this because there is a payment of £10,000,000 to a country to whom we owed nothing, and do owe nothing, and which owes rather to us"! But as I have said, a simple sum in arithmetic satisfied me anyhow. There were two main blocks of items—£78,000,000 and £28,000,000. We pay £10,000,000. I have said I am not going to fight with the British Government if they regard it as spread over the lot. I am satisfied myself that we are not paying a cent. of the money of the land annuities that we said were not due, and that we believe were not due.

Perhaps, as the last farewell to this dispute, I might say this—for six years before we came into office that dispute was argued up and down the country on the basis that we were asking the farmers not to keep their contract with stockholders. That was the basis of the argument. That was the basis on which certain people said we were breaking the Seventh Commandment, and that we were guilty of peculation, highway robbery and all the rest of it. That lasted for six long years. We questioned that basis, pointed out that there was no contract between the farmers and the stockholders, that there was a contract between the farmers and the State. The whole essence of the dispute is not whether the farmer owes the money or whether the stockholders should get their stocks and dividends, but what State—what State—had the right to get the moneys from the farmers.

Comment on this

Do you really say that your own Deputies said that?

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The Deputy might allow me to pronounce the funeral oration anyhow.

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You dearly love the last word.

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I am entitled to it, am I not?

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Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Taoiseach has now the right to the last word, according to procedure.

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I say that the question really was which State—this State or the British State—was entitled to these moneys, and we proved, to our satisfaction, we certainly proved, that the moneys belong to this State, and we said this State and this Exchequer is entitled to hold them. They are being held in the North, and that fact itself was proof that there was no direct contract between the stockholders and the tenant farmers.

That was the basis on which we argued until we got into office, when we held them and asked the British on what basis did they claim them. It was too useful for British propaganda—this thing about the Seventh Commandment and the idea of the Irish farmers not paying their debts and being encouraged by an important Irish Party. It was too good propaganda for them to surrender. They tried to walk on two legs, but when we nailed them down and asked them on what basis did they legally demand these moneys, then we got an answer, and then we had a change altogether in the basis on which the campaign was carried on. Then we were told that there was an agreement signed in 1923.

Comment on this

And discussed in Dáil Eireann.

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And ultimately confirmed. We were told, in 1926, that there was an agreement which bound the Irish State to transfer these moneys to Great Britain, and that it was on that agreement they stood. We had then to face a new fight. The Seventh Commandment disappeared from the scene at once, and we had a new question—whether that contract was binding on the nation because of the signatures that were attached to it and the conditions under which the moneys were transmitted. We held that it was not. Deputies yonder held it was, and although they held it was they want the Irish people to believe that they could have gone over years ago and made this settlement. Well, be it so. Some individual perhaps may have come across, without any records left behind, who may have suggested to Deputy Cosgrave on the eve of an election that he could get away and that a settlement would be made with him on some other basis. I have often wondered why that basis was not given to the Irish people, why that confidential statement was being made on the eve of an election.

We have no record of it. At any rate, when we went over in 1932, the answer that was given to us, as I have repeatedly said in this House, was that if we recognised that that debt was due there would be some mitigation of the amount. "Mitigation" is not the usual word to use if there is to be a considerable reduction. However, I cannot prove that the Deputies are wrong in that, any more than I can prove, because there is no record of the statement which Deputy Cosgrave made to-day, that Deputy Cosgrave is wrong. I can only have my belief I can only say there is no record. I have seen no indication at any time that such a settlement could have been made, and I say now, as I said already in this debate, that I believe that that settlement could not be made to-day any more than in my opinion it could have been made six years ago were it not that a number of favourable circumstances have occurred. I am glad for the nation's sake that they have occurred. I did not want to plunge this country into an economic struggle if I could have avoided it, but I saw the matter this way—we were paying £5,000,000 a year and would continue to pay £5,000,000 a year for another generation at least, and most of it for more than one generation—for two—we would have continued to pay that and pay it, in my opinion, when it was not due, and I said we have got to challenge that in the interests of our people. Challenging it means a risk, but it is a risk which I think we have a right to take, because I think in the end that our claim will be recognised and admitted even if we have to fight now for it and stand out for it. We have to thank the tenant farmers of Ireland, and I am willing to do it, and we have to thank the consumers, and particularly the labour section, of the people because they stood out. But we have not to thank the big ranchers —we have not—because at every stage of the struggle, when it was important that we should be firm, they tried to weaken us. I recognise fully that the position of the Opposition in a matter like this is extremely difficult. You can be quiet for three months, and again I want to pay a tribute, as it occurs to me, to the fact that so far as the public Press and public expressions are concerned—I do not know what was happening in the streets, or at the corners, or anywhere else——

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Do not spoil the ship for a ha'porth of tar.

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I am simply stating the fact. I do not know. Statements have been made about it, but I do know that so far as anything public that I have seen is concerned, there was nothing that I could find that was weakening our hands during the last three months. I admit that, and not merely that. It had a wider field than that, because, in the most marvellous way, we have been supported, not merely by the Press here, but generally by the Press of Great Britain during the past three months, and farther than that, in the United States of America we got support and generous support. I recognise and admit that, holding the views the Opposition hold, and having the point of view regarding the interests of the country which they have, they wanted to make their point of view clear and to press it. I suppose they were hoping that their point of view would prevail——

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As it has.

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——and that the people would put into power a Government such as themselves, who they thought were able to make a good bargain for them. However, I think the people have been wiser than to give way to that policy. The people across the water have recognised that if they were to try for another six years, they would not have compelled our people to surrender. We had not to tighten our belts yet. We had not to appeal to the people to tighten them so much. The farmers were in the front-line trenches, I told them from the start, and we recognise it; but it is not fair to the rest of the community, wonderful as the work which the farmers have done, to pretend that they did not help them. They did help them, and we do not envy them now the fruit of the struggle which they have had. The fruit of the victory for them is that as long as grass grows and water runs, or at least, as long as annuities have to be paid, they have to pay only one-half of the sum they had to pay before. This time, let nobody pretend, as was pretended in the early stages of the fight, that it is as good to pay the money to Lloyd George as it is to pay it to de Valera. To pay it to your own Exchequer is not the same thing as to pay it across to Britain, because, to the extent to which it is in your own Exchequer, it is going to relieve you of other burdens and other taxation.

We have got that fruit of our struggle, and if there has been a teaching of lessons, perhaps the teaching has not been all in the one direction. Some people across the water may perhaps have thought that by putting on the pressure and by giving another turn to the screw, they would ultimately have got this country to surrender, either its constitutional rights or its other rights. They have been taught that there is a good deal of resisting power in this nation, and that is a very useful lesson to have learned. We have a good resisting power here.

I pass from the second Agreement. I have tried to point out to the House that these two Agreements stand by themselves in a special position, and that it is necessary to take the third Agreement as something which is of a kind apart. The third Agreement is a pure Trade Agreement such as might be made between any two countries in a piping time of peace, without any disputes in the air. Britain, as the Minister for Industry and Commerce told the House, abandoned its free trade policy in 1932. They changed over in that year to a policy of protection, and it protected itself even against States of the British Commonwealth, States that were in every way friendly with them. The complaint made in 1932 was that, because of our dispute with Britain, our farmers were not able to get into the British market on terms comparable with those on which the States of the British Commonwealth could get their produce in. We have made this Agreement, and I have asked that I might have a short note on it to cover some of the points that have been raised and perhaps, instead of speaking on it as I have been, it would be better for me to give it to the House from these notes.

The two main pillars of the Trade Agreement are the provisions under which our products are entitled to free entry into the United Kingdom market, with the exception of products such as beer, spirits, sugar, etc., which are subject to revenue duties, and the provision under which we undertake to arrange for a review of protective duties and import restrictions by the Prices Commission. There are, of course, some other provisions, but they may be regarded as subsidiary and of minor importance. A number of Deputies have raised questions about some of the concessions which we give in return for the right of free entry, and I should like, at this point, to express my appreciation of Deputy O'Higgins's recognition of the fact that there must be two parties to every agreement of this kind, and that neither party can expect to get an agreement in the form in which he would have had it, if he could ignore the point of view of the other party. Any member of the delegation, or any member of this House, could have drawn up a trade agreement which would be more attractive from the point of view of this country than the Agreement which the resolution asks the Dáil to approve. The only difficulty about such an agreement would have been the impossibility of inducing the representatives of the British Government to sign it.

There are, of course, provisions in this Agreement which would have been omitted if we could have got the Agreement without them, and what I must ask Deputies to remember is that the same is true so far as the British Government is concerned. An agreement of this kind must be acceptable as a whole to both parties and both parties must be satisfied that the Agreement as a whole is fair and advantageous to them. The Irish Government are satisfied that the Trade Agreement fulfils that condition. I think that a careful perusal of the actual Articles of the Trade Agreement should satisfy Deputies that there is no real ground for apprehension. Article 8, on which there has been a good deal of comment, provides, it is true, that protective duties and other import restrictions shall be replaced by duties which, the text sets out, "shall not exceed such a level as will give United Kingdom producers and manufacturers full opportunity of reasonable competition." Deputies, however, must not ignore the stipulations in the same Article that the Prices Commission will recommend rates of duty which will afford adequate protection for Irish industries, having regard to the relative cost of economical and efficient production, and that special consideration may be given to the case of industries not fully established. These are their terms of reference. The Government is satisfied that these stipulations provide reasonable safeguards for our native industries and that industries which are economically and efficiently run have nothing to fear.

I think I might interpolate at this stage that I sympathise most fully with the point of view which Deputy Larkin expressed a short time ago with reference to our position here. I think it would be a disaster—a national disaster—if we were to go back simply to grass, and if I thought— though I think on the whole the Agreement is satisfactory and there are things in it I want—that we were going back again to grass, simply going to be a ranch and maintaining only the people a ranch could maintain under world conditions, then I would prefer to scrap that Agreement and that my name never appeared to it.

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We never were and never will be a ranch.

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However, I and the Government are anxious, and have been right through these negotiations, to secure, and we believe we have secured, safeguards which would be suitable to see that industries which are run reasonably well will succeed and will have a chance of succeeding.

I said some time ago in this talk that our freedom gives us responsibilities, and that we cannot shirk these responsibilities. If we want to be a vigorous, strong nation, we have got to go about it in the way that nations become vigorous and strong. If we want to be strong economically we must try to work for it, but those who work for it are entitled to reward for their hire. They are entitled to the results of their labours. What I do hope is that the people of this nation will gird themselves and try to make use of all our opportunities and resources—that we will act up to our responsibilities and will try to make use of the results of the work we have inherited. Some of our people have died to try to bring about, some time, the realisation of the things we see to-day, and we should be a very poor people, indeed, if, having got these advantages, we were not prepared to take off our coats and work them to the full.

A number of Deputies have criticised the immediate reductions of duty for which provision is made in Article 10 and Schedule 5. The reductions made in accordance with this Article have been carefully considered and it is not thought that they are likely to endanger the position of our native industries which are producing goods of the classes or kinds described in Schedule 5. I should like Deputies to pay particular attention to what I am now about to say because this question was raised a number of times. Goods of the kind described in Part 2 of Schedule 5—goods such as boots, shoes and woollens—will continue to be the subject of quantitative restriction as well as the duties set out in that Schedule until they have been reviewed by the Prices Commission. Then, it will be open to the Prices Commission to recommend higher rates of duty than those set out in Part 2 of that Schedule if the higher rates of duty are required in accordance with the terms of reference.

I should also direct attention to the safeguard inserted in paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Trade Agreement. If the imports of any class or kind of goods enumerated in Schedule 5 should increase to such an extent as to endanger the prospects of success of the producers or manufacturers of such goods in Ireland and if it should appear that such increase of imports is due to the reduction of Customs duties for which provision is made in Article 10, then the Irish Government are entitled to apply quantitative regulation to the imports of such goods without reference to the Prices Commission. This is obviously an adequate safeguard for the industries in question.

I do not think that it would be desirable to attempt to answer hypothetical questions of the kind asked by Deputy Dockrell. The Prices Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors and I have no doubt that its recommendations will be fair and reasonable. The Commission is is in the nature of a judicial body. It has already been explained that there is nothing new or remarkable about the provision in Article 13, that the United Kingdom producers and manufacturers shall be entitled to full right of audience before the Prices Commission. A number of agreements between the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other countries contain similar provisions. In any event, it is obvious that, if the Prices Commission is to make a thorough inquiry into the relative costs of production, they must have information as to the cost of production in the United Kingdom. The best way to get this information is to get it from United Kingdom manufacturers and producers. Even if no such provision had been inserted in the Agreement, it is clear that the Prices Commission would wish to hear evidence from British manufacturers and producers of the goods to which a particular inquiry relates.

The Tariff Commission, which was established under the Act of 1926, followed this practice and, in fact, frequently visited factories and plants in the United Kingdom. I should also explain that the Prices Commission was established in accordance with the provisions of the amending Act passed some months ago. That Act had no relation to the Trade Agreement or to the negotiations which led to the Agreement. An amending Bill to give the Commission the necessary powers to enable it to review tariffs and import restrictions at the request of the Minister for Industry and Commerce has been introduced. Before I pass from that, I may say that this Government has always recognised that the policy of protection involved certain dangers. If anybody is interested, they can look up the Fianna Fáil programme so far back as 1926 and 1927. There is there a clear indication that it was our policy that, when our industries had had a reasonable chance of establishing themselves, there should be some tariff commission which would examine impartially the conditions under which these industries were operating and report so that the public would understand whether these conditions were fair, whether the prices charged to the consumers were reasonable and whether or not undue profits were being made. I admit that there is going to be a big difference in future so far as public opinion is concerned in regard to that matter. It would be easy to get a public opinion here to support any awards of the Prices Commission which would be brought in showing that the Irish consumer was being unfairly dealt with and that unfair profits were being made. Public opinion would be so strong that any Government would be easily supported by it. There is a danger in the new set of circumstances that those who would be profiteering or unfairly exploiting the protective position given them would be able to suggest to the Irish public that the action taken was simply designed to benefit some people in another country. I admit that and it appears to me to be a pity because, while I am anxious to see the industrial policy succeed, I do not want to see profiteering at the expense of the consumer or exploitation of any kind— unfair exploitation either in the conditions of labour or in the prices charged to the consumer. I do fear that the strength which a Government would have, with a Prices Commission whose recommendation was being implemented solely for the benefit of our people and on its merits, may be somewhat lessened under the new circumstances.

The action of the Prices Commission should be the same, namely, to consider the conditions under which the goods are produced and say what is a fair price in comparison with prices which would be obtainable if the goods were produced elsewhere. That is going to be the new position. It will be easy to misrepresent it. There is a good deal of this misrepresentation of one kind or another going on. I am not going to say that it is confined to one Party. Unfortunately, there is misrepresentation which has become, and I suppose it is in every country, a really serious evil; misrepresentation of what people say, and it prevents fair argument, it prevents a fair understanding. If we are to have any hope in democracy we can never have that hope if the people who are to be the final sovereigns and final judges are not given fair information on which to base their judgment.

Comment on this

Hear, hear! You never spoke a truer word.

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I agree—I have always held that. Unfortunately, we have misrepresentation, and I must say that in my judgment the Deputy acted in that way when he spoke about the North. I do hope that we will all on both sides do our best to stop it. It does not help anybody and it certainly does not help to make democratic institutions more workable. I will ask Deputies to bear with me while I conclude this statement. It has been carefully drawn up to meet the points raised, and it is very important from the public point of view that the information should be given. I should also explain that the Prices Commission was established in accordance with the provisions of the amending Act passed some months ago. That Act had no relation to the trade Agreement or to the negotiations which led to that Agreement. An amending Bill to give the Commission the necessary powers to enable it to review tariffs and import restrictions at the request of the Minister for Industry and Commerce has been introduced.

A complaint has been made that we had not communicated with our manufacturers in connection with the negotiations, whereas the British Government, it is stated, did communicate with their own manufacturers. But the British Government did not, so far as we are aware, communicate with the British Farmers' Union. They did communicate with British manufacturers who wanted concessions. We got all the trade concessions we could possibly get in any circumstances, for we got all the duties removed. Therefore, we did not have to consult our farmers; we had not to consult our farmers on the matter. With regard to our industrialists, if we saw our industrialists, each firm would want to be looking for its own share, and we were satisfied that the Department of Industry and Commerce had at their disposal all the information that was necessary for them in order to see what was going to be the result of any concessions which were made.

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I think they were mistaken in that.

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That was the basis on which the thing was done. There is no reason to think that the manufacturers here could have given us any assistance. The Minister for Industry and Commerce is, I believe, quite familiar with their views, just as the British Government are, no doubt, well aware what their Farmers' Union would have said if consulted about the concessions we wanted for our agricultural produce. Deputy O'Higgins has raised the question of the duration of the Trade Agreement. Deputies will notice that while the Agreement is expressed to operate, in the first instance, for a period of three years, Article 19 provides that after the expiration of that period it shall remain in force unless six months' notice of termination is given by either Government. I should like to direct the attention of Deputies to the terms of Article 18, which provides for consultation between the two Governments should either of them feel that the objects of the Agreement are not being attained. I have every confidence that any difficulty that may arise will be settled satisfactorily by consultation between the two Governments and that when the period of three years has expired, the two Governments will find it to their mutual advantage to keep the Agreement in force.

I have dealt with the three Agreements. I confidently recommend them to the House. I have always held that the only agreement one should sign is an agreement which you mean to keep and which you think can be kept. I think it is bad policy to sign any other than a document not merely that you think can be kept, but that you mean yourself to keep. So far as these Agreements are concerned, we mean to keep them and we mean to act fairly by them. We mean to see that they are carried out in the letter and in the spirit. I hope the people on the other side will mean the same, and I believe they do. I believe as regards any trade agreements between the two countries, even to the limited extent they existed, and having regard to the difficult circumstances in which they were made, that they have been fairly kept by both sides, and, in the keeping of them, both sides recognised that it was good business, apart from any other consideration, to act fairly and squarely. That is the spirit in which the Agreements made in connection with that matter have been kept. I believe that not merely is this Government, and anybody over whom this Government has influence, going to keep these Agreements in the letter and the spirit, but I believe if we were to pass out and another Administration were to take our place, the Agreements would still be kept, because they are acceptable to our people on the whole. I recommend them to you. I do not know whether there is to be a division or not, and notwithstanding the fact that the North may see differently about the advantages or disadvantages, we are all here prepared to accept the Agreements in general as being an advantage to the country.

There is one thing to which, before I sit down, I should like to refer. I understand there were some irresponsible statements made which have gone out to the Press. I regret that anything which could obviously not have been said seriously was taken as if it were a serious matter, either by Deputies on the other benches or by the newspapers. It was an expression which, I am sure, the Deputy himself could not have meant seriously and which, I am sure, no Deputy in this House on any Party or any side would stand over.

Comment on this

I need hardly say that we entirely confirm what the Taoiseach has said about that statement. There is one other matter which, in courtesy, I should mention. The Taoiseach very courteously said he made all inquiries to find out what were the circumstances under which the offer of the ports was made to President Cosgrave's Government. I am now in a position to tell him that the matter was discussed and the suggestion made that our Government should take over the ports in February, 1928, and I am sending him a note with the names of the two gentlemen who spoke to the Minister of our Government and adumbrated that proposal.

Comment on this

I am very glad to get this information, and I will have proper inquiries made into the matter.

Comment on this

There is no necessity for inquiries. It does not take anything from your action.

Comment on this

I would like to have the Deputy understand my view. I think it is of very great importance, where there are matters in dispute between two Governments like our Government and the British Government, that when anything of that sort is done or said, any offer of that sort, that it should be somehow registered for the benefit of the people who come after, if the Government should go out of office. It should, at least, be made known to the permanent officials.

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May I suggest that another lesson is to be derived in this connection—that if our Government would pursue the common practice of all other Governments, and consult the Opposition in matters of foreign policy, the work of both sides would be probably made a great deal easier?

Comment on this

I would like to respond to that suggestion. I made certain offers at one time, but there were difficulties which apparently made it impossible. I did say to a prominent Deputy on the Opposition Benches that I was going to London. I met him casually and I said: "I hope you will understand the seriousness of this position and that nothing will be done by your people to cause unnecessary embarrassment."

Comment on this

And that suggestion was generously met.

Comment on this

It has been, I say that; but I would prefer, instead of meeting a Deputy casually under such circumstances and saying that, to meet a Deputy in a responsible position and say in confidence to him: "This is our position and I want you in confidence to give me your advice and your best knowledge." Unfortunately, the relations between the Parties up to the present—I hope they will improve— have not been such as to make that possible.

Comment on this

We are not conscious of any ill-feeling on our side.

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I am not really laying the blame on one side or the other, but that has been the effect. We in this House, if I may say so, have been working under conditions which are not altogether normal in Parliaments. It is easy to understand that. There has been the Civil War, in which people on both sides of the House fought on different sides. These things are not easily forgotten. It is not always possible for human beings to forget these things. They are not over that yet, and things will be shouted by one side or the other that are interfering with the relations between the two Parties. All I can say is that I do hope it will be easier in the future to co-operate in those things that are of as much interest to the Opposition as to the Government, because what is of importance ultimately is the common good—the common good which is as dear to the people on the Opposition side as to the people who for the time being have a majority. As we are talking of these matters, I would like to say this—when the Opposition takes its work seriously and avails of its comparative freedom in properly criticising, it is almost altogether necessary for the proper working of democratic institutions— without it we could not work—that fair criticism, particularly of a constructive character, that comes from the Opposition side should always be welcomed by the Government in office. And when we get from the Opposition constructive suggestions they are welcomed by us. When we do get these constructive suggestions in the future, not only will they be acted upon, but due credit will be given for them.

Comment on this

A very grave matter has been mentioned, dealing with Section 8. Has any discussion taken place as to the right of entry of carcases into the English markets?

Comment on this

Yes.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Question put. Does Deputy Larkin want to be recorded as dissenting?

Comment on this

I want to put a question to the Taoiseach.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

There can be no discussion when the question is put. There must be a decision. The motion is carried. If Deputy Larkin desires to be recorded as dissenting he will be so recorded.

Comment on this

Very well, Sir, but I want to make a personal explanation.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Not now. I declared the question decided, and Deputy Larkin is recorded as dissenting.

Comment on this