Sinn Féin Funds Bill, 1947—Committee Stage (Resumed).
Contributions 142–288 of 288. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 5 of 1947 ›
But, when we come to another case—Leatham and Quinn, I think it was—in which the Legislature did stop proceedings, what were the circumstances there? Under an international agreement between this country and Great Britain, Great Britain maintained the thesis that every subject of this State had a right to have decisions of our Supreme Court reviewed by the British Privy Council. The Irish Government held that that was not the correct interpretation of the international agreement and that we entered into that agreement with the British Government on the understanding that no citizen of this State had the right to go beyond our Supreme Court. Our Government may have been right, our Government may have been wrong, but that is what they believed and they said before allcomers: "Believing that to be so, we intend to give effect to that and if anyone tries to go beyond the decision of the Supreme Court, we will pass legislation declaring the law to be what the Supreme Court says it is, no matter what they declare, whether we like it or dislike it, for the purpose of preventing persons, in effect, bringing the Supreme Court of Ireland before the British Privy Council. We shall protect the Supreme Court with the necessary legislation to make that operation both expensive and ineffective on the people who do it."
What analogy is there between that procedure and this? Produce the rest of your cases and I defy you to find the case—I defy you to find any case in any civilised community which acknowledges an independent judiciary—in which a citizen of the State goes into court to claim her right under the law and where the Executive claims the right to reach into the court, take her by the throat and throw her out and say: "Whatever your rights are, you are not going to get them because we are going to make up our minds what we would like you to get and we are going to change the law and until we have time to change the law we are going to prevent you proceeding under it and if you do proceed under it in our despite, while we are changing the law, we fix you with notice that we will take from you your decision."
There is a category of cases in existence in which this can happen—it commonly happens in connection with Finance Acts. We pass a section of a Finance Act which we believe to do a certain thing. It is worth somebody's while to brief high-power attorneys and high-power barristers and they succeed in punching a hole in our Finance Act in the court and getting a verdict for their own benefit which we did not believe the law as we made it would allow. The moment that verdict is handed down, 10,000 people start actions and it is quite a common practice in that state to say: "The man who has got his verdict shall retain it; he is entitled to it; but we fix all others with notice that if the way in which we drafted the law begot that verdict from the courts, we will redraft the law because we did not mean it to mean that when we passed it. We will not step into the court while the citizen is in there looking for his statutory rights and stop the proceedings of the court for fear the court would decide in a way we did not want them to decide, but we fix all other citizens with notice that, if the verdict goes against us, it is not because there was any doubt in the mind of the Legislature; it was because there was a doubt in the mind of the Parliamentary draftsman and it was a doubt that our best assistance has been unable to remove, but, now that we know what words they were that gave the judiciary an impression different from that which we wished to make upon their mind, we will change those words". In that sense you prevent the other 10,000 who have instituted proceedings benefiting themselves by the loop-hole created by the first litigant. But surely no rational Deputy will draw an analogy between that and a person who goes in to seek the relief that Mrs. Buckley seeks at the present time.
The Taoiseach sometimes throws a searchlight upon this famous heart of his into which, from time to time, he looks with such catastrophic consequences. Carried away on the tide of his own vehemence to-day, he said: "That is what we have to do now, to make a law." There is the very root and essence of his sinning. It is no part of the function of this Legislature to make a law. Our duty as the Legislature of a democratic State is to make the law, the law for all the people, not a law for one man and another law for another man. The very essence of freedom is that the Taoiseach and the dustman live under the same law and that there will not be a law for the Taoiseach, a law for Deputy Dillon, a law for Mrs. Buckley and a law for somebody else. The day this House accepts the proposition that our duty is to make a law, for Mrs. Buckley or for anyone else, then we accept the principle that all men are not equal before the law and, when we accept that, we accept the principle that individual liberty and justice and freedom have perished in this land. Does the Taoiseach challenge that proposition?
Comment on this
Does he think it right that we should make a law for Mrs. Buckley or does he think that our task is to make the law which should apply to every man? The Taoiseach admits that when the scheme was first put before him his reaction was to say:—
"This smells a bit. I do not like it."
He told us so to-day. He said:—
"When this first was brought to my attention I thought if the expense was not too high the court action was the best method and that the best way to dispose of this business would be to let it go to judgement."
What was it about this procedure that he did not like? Why did he think the best method was to let it go to judgment? He is not the kind of person who makes snap judgements. He is not the kind of person who rushes into decisions. He had plenty of time to think this thing out and his own testimony is that when this plan was first proposed it smelled a bit. He did not like it. He thought the best method was to let it go to judgement. Why? If he bared this bleeding heart of his we might find common ground altogether in this capacious Chamber. Buried therein is the deep conviction that this whole procedure smells a little, but with sufficient oratorical perfume he hopes to get it through. He is mistaken. That kind of smell that he got when this proposal was first made to him is penetrating and enduring. We may sprinkle it with all the perfume you please, we may hold as many plebiscites as you like, we may get 90 per cent. majorities and public demonstrations but when people begin to assassinate liberty the instrument whereby they stop that operation smells a little, but penetratingly. The Taoiseach's first instinct was right. His nostrils did not deceive him and I do not believe that they deceive him now. He knows it smells a little of corruption—the corruption born of liberty dying. The Taoiseach is trying to force more than one person in the House into the assertion that he has designs on this money, for himself, his Party or whatever else you please. Let us go on record about that at once. I do not believe the Taoiseach has designs on this money for himself, for his Party, for his friends, or for anybody else but he just wants to get the best of Mrs. Buckley. He is just determined that Mrs. Buckley is not going to bring him down and cross-examine him in the courts, and scandalise him, and ask him about what he said in 1924 and 1926, and make a hames of him. That is what all this is about.
I was amused to hear the Taoiseach tell the House how the necessity for this Bill arose. Here was the insoluble problem! The people who had subscribed to the fund could not be found. Many of them were dead. The primary purpose of the fund was no longer there to be served. What were we to do? How out of this dilemma except by a Bill? I saw Deputy O'Connor shift uneasily in his seat. His years of studentship in the Incorporated Law Society and of practice thereafter had taught him to know that the poor, rigid, incompetent old courts of law had evolved a procedure for just that contingency so long ago that the judges were still talking French. That difficulty arose 800 years ago, when some old dafty left money for a preposterous purpose, on trust, and the preposterous purpose shortly afterwards ceased to exist and the old dafty was in Heaven and could not be reached, and somebody said: what are we going to do? We cannot ask the old dafty what she wants done with the money now, and the poodle for whose maintenance she left the money is dead and buried. What now to do?
Comment on this
I do not think he does, but any time he cares to enlighten me I shall be glad. The courts of equity of that day said to themselves: "This is a situation which is likely to occur from time to time and it is a situation in which we shall have to devise a method which will be equitable and just," and they evolved the doctrine of cy pres. That doctrine has grown into a formidable body of law the existence of which is fully recognised by the Statute which created the Commissioner of Charitable Donations and Bequests who, not infrequently, has to direct the attention of the courts to the existence of such a fund, and the courts have to be asked in that situation what is to be done with the money. In such circumstances, the courts will consider all relevant matters, prepare a scheme, and, subject to objections that interested parties or parties who think they are interested, can make, after a given time, they finally settle the scheme and the trust moneys are diverted to the new purpose. It is nothing new. It is as old as the law. But it was not invoked in this case, because Mrs. Buckley might have gone after the Taoiseach and she was not going to be let.
The Taoiseach returns gaily to the proposition that in the last analysis in a democratic country the will of the majority must prevail. Agreed. The Taoiseach forbore, with his accustomed delicacy, from referring to the fact that his Party constitutes an absolute majority of this House. I declare it does. What is more, he stands at the head to-day of the most freely elected Government in Europe. There is not a Government in all Europe with a better title to function as the Executive of the State in which it acts as the Government of this country. We will give him all that. But he deliberately avoids one matter in that connection to which I sought to draw his attention. I said again and again, even to the disedification of the Ceann Comhairle, that where the Government side of the House stand on principle and the Opposition stand on theirs, I entirely agree that the Government side of the House should prevail. It is the only solution when both sides have had their say. But, suppose the Government themselves say and believe that there is no question of principle involved, that their Bill is founded merely on a desire to devise expedient machinery to give effect to a purpose about which there is no dispute in principle and suppose the Opposition say, even wrong-headedly, but bona fide and honestly that for them——
Comment on this
If the Deputy will tell me how we will just be able to get at that then I will be prepared to consider it. Am I to be accused by every speaker of doing things and not acting fairly, hiding my sentiments and so on, and are the Deputies who make these charges to be judged by me as saying what they mean?
Comment on this
What does the Taoiseach want? Does he want me to stand on the floor and spin round like a teetotum in order to carry conviction to his heart? If he believes that I have been trying to pull his leg for the past two days, he is just playing. I have a heavy cold and I am speaking under great difficulty. I am doing it because I am deeply concerned. The Chief Justice is a man for whom I have the warmest affection and I wish to think that I enjoyed his friendship. I have never discharged any more detestable and painful duty in my life than to be the means of involving him in a controversy of this kind. I do not want to express the slightest regret for having done it. I would do it again if I had to. But why does the Taoiseach doubt that this could be a matter of principle to me or think that I would want to cause people pain?
Comment on this
My submission is that where he is satisfied in his mind that we, a minority, stand on principle and that no principle is involved for the majority, it is the essence of any democracy for the majority to say: "We gladly give way". But, where we are arguing about the way, whether it is the most expedient way to do the thing, and the Government have a way of their own, the Government need not give way. That is a fair rule. That is, I suggest, the only rule which it is desirable for a democratic Parliament to pursue. I have pressed that as far as I can. To tell the truth, I think about as much has been said on this Bill, certainly by some of us, as could be usefully said. On the Fifth Stage, there will be something more to be said and in the Supreme Court I trust the matter will be tested and our instinct in this matter vindicated by the judiciary. For everybody's sake, I would much sooner see this Bill dropped and the method advocated by me for the solution of this problem adopted. It does not seem likely that that will happen now. I assert that that is the right thing to do. I am certain that it will be a blessing from every point of view. I am certain that it will avoid occasions where a man like Deputy O'Connor, himself an officer of the High Court, comes in here and tries to persuade his colleagues that there is an identical principle underlying the Erasmus Smith Act, where there was an agreement between the trustees and the Attorney-General and where the agreement was——
Comment on this
"Whereas with a view to setting such doubt at rest the said governors instituted an action against the Attorney-General of Saorstát Éireann by summons dated 12th day of November, 1929;
And whereas the said governors appealed from the judgment and order of the High Court of Justice in the said action..."
Comment on this
I did not make much impression on the attorney because the minute I got the book he went out of the House.
Comment on this
I should like to say that it was not because of Deputy Dillon that I went out of the House.
Comment on this
I hope the Deputy has come back furnished with a copy of the statute. If he has not, I will oblige him.
Comment on this
I am trying to find out where Mrs. Buckley's consent is contained in this Bill. I have argued that it is strange that Deputy Moran and Deputy O'Connor, both officers of the High Court, inasmuch as they are solicitors of the High Court and members of that great profession, should come in here and tell their non-professional colleagues that there is an identical principle underlying the Erasmus Smith Act and this Bill, when to demonstration there is not. I invite Deputy O'Connor to get up and rebut that. I will sit and listen to him.
Comment on this
My reason for mentioning the Erasmus Smith case was because there was a certain similarity in the circumstances.
Comment on this
In the Erasmus Smith case there was pending litigation in regard to certain funds and it was feared that if that litigation were continued the entire funds might be wasted in legal costs and this House passed an Act to settle the issues.
Comment on this
It did not pass an Act to settle the issues. It gave legislative approval to an agreement.
Comment on this
——is to stop court proceedings in the present action that the moneys may be made available for the benefit of the men who took part in the War of Independence, and their dependents.
Comment on this
Perhaps Deputy Dillon would prefer if that object were changed to provide for the men who fought for another country instead of their own.
Comment on this
Might I draw the Deputy's attention to the fact that the moneys to be distributed do not come under this section?
Comment on this
There were references to this House interfering with the courts and the suggestion was made that if any Bill is brought into this House relating to a decision of the courts, the House is overruling the courts. I have heard that suggestion made here many times.
Comment on this
I would like to remind Deputy Mulcahy of a very courageous step he took in 1928, when there was a decision given in the Circuit Court in regard to the Local Authorities Mutual Assurance Act. That decision was against the public interest and within a very short space of time Deputy Mulcahy introduced a Bill into this House which, in effect, set that decision aside because it was in the public interest to do so.
Comment on this
There was a rather interesting debate on that:—
"Mr. Fahy: ... Of course, the purpose of it, I presume, is to reverse Judge Davitt's decision.
An Ceann Comhairle: I do not like that phrase. The purpose of it is to alter the law for the purpose of future decisions.
Mr. Fahy: It amounts to the same thing."
Comment on this
The debate proceeded:—
"An Ceann Comhairle: No; there is a very important distinction. We make laws; the judges interpret them. If the interpretation does not meet the intentions of the Oireachtas, the Oireachtas can change the law."
Comment on this
That disposes of the statements to the effect that we are trying to interfere, to intimidate or overawe the courts.
Comment on this
Deputy Dillon referred to the doctrine of cy prés. I must confess that I had almost forgotten it, but I have some recollection that it applies only in this way, that where there is a general charitable intention and also a particular intention and that the particular intention cannot be carried out, the courts will settle a scheme. I do not think that has any application to the funds which are the subject of this Bill.
Comment on this
It is my opinion that if this litigation is continued the State would become the owner of the property, but before that there would be very heavy inroads into it by the costs of the litigation. I could give Deputy Dillon precedents where that happened in circumstances of a similar nature to this, but I do not like to waste the time of the House speaking on legal matters.
Comment on this
I will give the Deputy the references if he wishes, but I do not think he wishes it. I think Deputy Dillon is quite pleased because this gives him an opportunity of emitting that poisonous political propaganda of which we have had so much in recent years. I consider the section should be passed. It is for the benefit of the country that the litigation should be stopped so that the funds may be available for the purpose stated in the Bill.
Comment on this
The gentlemen on the opposite benches have been complaining all day of misrepresentation from this side of the House on the issues involved in this measure, and Deputy O'Connor and others have stood up to confuse the issues still further by introducing a number of irrelevancies. The Taoiseach to-day misrepresented the law, the constitutional law in relation to this whole issue, and I want to direct his attention to the fundamental rights of the citizen, guaranteed to him under the Constitution. Article 40 (1) states:
"All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law."
Article 40 (3) says:
"The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizens."
Article 40 (3) also says:
"The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack, and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and property rights of every citizen."
I hold that these matters are in issue and are brought directly into issue by the introduction of this measure.
Comment on this
I am dealing with the section, which endeavours to set aside the personal right of every citizen to have direct access to the courts in any matter in which he feels that he has a right cause of action. I am here to defend that right and that right only. I am not concerned, as I said on Friday last, with the merits of the action, with the facts in issue in the case before the courts relating to the Sinn Féin funds; I am concerned solely with the right of the citizen, or any group of citizens who feel they have a grievance and who seek in ventilating it to have access to the courts. That is the fundamental issue and the basic principle that we have been discussing. But a number of side issues have been dragged in to confuse the public mind. I said on Friday last, and I repeat, that there is no question of the public interest being involved in this measure. I say again, as I said on Friday last, that the common good is not served by any particular section or sub-section of this Bill. As I argued last Friday, the common good dictates that this Bill should be withdrawn. The common good dictates that the citizens who regard themselves as the lineal successors of the old Sinn Féin should have the right to go to the courts and fight the case to a conclusion there. These are the fundamental issues we have been fighting. That is the big principle that is involved.
A number of cases and previous Acts have been quoted by the Taoiseach as precedents for this measure. May I say that not one of them has any analogy or bearing on this issue? The Lynam and Butler case, which led to the Land Act of 1931, and the various copyright cases—the Stokes' case—all were fundamentally different. In one case the issue was whether or not our citizens should have the right of appeal to an alien jurisdiction.
Comment on this
The Lynam and Butler case was introduced to oust the jurisdiction of the Privy Council. There is no analogy between an Act brought in for that purpose and this particular Bill. The Taoiseach quoted a 1926 Act and other Acts but he did not refer to the particular cases.
Comment on this
The case quoted by Deputy O'Connor was definitely in no way analogous to the present case. Deputy O'Connor walked straight into it with his eyes and his mouth open.
Comment on this
He walked into this position, that he quoted a case in which a Bill had been introduced, not for the purpose of setting aside the Circuit Court decision but for the purpose of making the law such that no such decision could be possible in future.
Comment on this
The Deputy referred to the Public Bodies Mutual Assurance Act. There is no analogy between the two Acts.
Comment on this
Since my student days I have not been very much associated with it but I do recollect that where the physical objects of the trust fail or where the original intention could not be carried out——
Comment on this
If there is any analogy between the cy pres doctrine and the present case, my recollection of the cy pres doctrine is that where the physical objects of a trust fail and the original intention cannot be carried out, then the court will endeavour, by the application of the cy prés doctrine, to formulate a scheme which will go as nearly as possible to carry out the original intention of the trust. Here it would have been very difficult for the court to carry out the original objects or the original intentions of the trust, if we regard the Sinn Féin funds in that light, but it was not beyond the competence of the court to have suggested that a scheme might be agreed upon between the parties and that effect might be given by legislation to such a scheme. That is one way of dealing with the matter. It would have been a very simple matter to have a scheme drawn up by agreement between the parties—the Taoiseach laughs.
Comment on this
The point is that although there was no hope of agreement, the Taoiseach, as representing one Party, took it into his hands to come to this House with this measure to give effect to what his Party considered should be done with the money. Is that not what we are getting? The Taoiseach has been talking democracy all the afternoon. I am beginning seriously to thing that we should spell democracy with a capital V instead of the "m." It is the Taoiseach's ego that counts in this matter; it is the Taoiseach's will. "I am the supreme arbiter in this matter; I am going to decide what is going to be done with the money and nobody else shall have that right." Other issues are brought in as red herrings. The fundamental issue here is that, rightly or wrongly, these people have made up their minds that they have a legitimate claim to these moneys and they have had recourse to courts to decide that case. If they are foolishly embarking on litigation of such an expensive character, if they have a frivolous case, I say that they should be made pay for the consequences of their folly but at least they should have the right of appeal to the courts. That seems to me to be fundamental if our courts are to function in an atmosphere of independence. On the other hand, I understand the Taoiseach to say that they might have a reasonably good case, and that the courts might not award costs against them. If that be so, there is all the more reason why the case should be allowed to go to the courts irrespective of what becomes of the money. Does anyone seriously suggest that £24,000 is going to solve the grievances or salve the wounds of the many people mentioned as beneficiaries, if this measure were passed? A sum of £24,000 will be a fleabite in dealing with many of the cases I know of which were not compensated under previous measures.
Comment on this
The Deputy knows that the question of the allocation of the money does not come under this section.
Comment on this
The question of the frittering away of the money comes under this section. I am suggesting that it is "codology" to talk of this money being set aside, as the Minister for Local Government did last Saturday night, to compensate people for their losses in the Black-and-Tan war. These are, I suggest, red herrings dragged in to confuse the public as to the fundamental issue. The fundamental issue is that a group of citizens, feeling they have a grievance, think that that grievance should be ventilated in the courts. In pursuit of that policy, they have made a claim and they have asked the court to decide that claim for them. They are entitled to that and they cannot be gainsaid in any way. Every group of citizens has the same right. Unless the proceedings are entirely vexatious or frivolous they should have the full protection of this House in seeking that redress. The common good does not demand that this measure should be passed and that these people should be prevented from seeking the measure of relief which they are seeking through the courts.
The common good, as I understand it, under the Constitution which I have already quoted, lays it down that this House should not pass any law which would deprive citizens of rights which they had under the existing law and under the Constitution and that, as far as practicable, they should be protected.
Comment on this
The Constitution says:
"The State guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizens."
I say it is the duty of the House under that Constitution to defend and vindicate the rights of these parties who are seeking that measure of relief from the courts at present, and that if this House passes a measure of the kind adumbrated here, we are doing it in flagrant violation of the Constitution and in the face of that Article of the Constitution I have read.
Comment on this
It may be null and void, and it seems to me that it is a terrific waste of public time that we should be forced to fight the issue in this fashion.
Comment on this
Apparently the Taoiseach has satisfied himself as to the constitutionality of this measure. He is not only pre-judging the Sinn Féin action, but the issue that may come before the Supreme Court.
Comment on this
I am not concerned with any other issue in this matter. I want to see these people who make this claim getting their claim through in the ordinary way. I want to hear the Taoiseach put up the reason why the courts should not decide for or against these people by the ordinary process of law. If the Taoiseach made the case that perhaps these people might use these moneys for subversive purposes, for purposes contrary to the public interest and particularly contrary to the security of the State, one could sympathise with him introducing a measure of this kind, but that case has not been made. It is clear to me that if these people get these funds, they would be free to use them for political purposes. Perhaps that is the reason the Taoiseach is so anxious to prevent them from having their rights asserted in court.
Comment on this
There would be very little for them, I think, even if the money were given to them, by the time the lawyers were finished and the law costs taken out of it.
Comment on this
The law costs to date amount to £8,000 which you are going to pay under this section.
Comment on this
It is better to cut your losses at a particular stage than to continue losing money.
Comment on this
With all due respect to those who handled the early proceedings in this case, there was a good deal of bungling. This case has been pending since 1941, and, without going very deeply into the matter, it is quite clear to me that a certain course could have been taken early on and this entire case could have been dismissed for want of prosecution.
Comment on this
I rose to explain why I feel there is a definite principle involved here. That principle, as I see it, is the right of the citizen to go to court. The cases which have been quoted are all cases which certainly are not analogous to this case by any stretch of the imagination. Most of them were cases in respect of which legislation was introduced to stabilise judgements of the Supreme Court and oust the jurisdiction of alien courts, and particularly the British Privy Council. But, whatever measures were introduced here, I challenge the Taoiseach to produce one in which a citizen already before the court was prevented from exercising his legal rights before that court.
Comment on this
I am challenging the Taoiseach to produce one Act of this Oireachtas in which a precedent on all fours with this was established.
Comment on this
I am in possession, but everybody seems to be speaking. I want to repeat the challenge to the Taoiseach to produce an Act of this Oireachtas which gave legislative effect to an encroachment of this character upon the courts. I challenge him to produce that Act.
Comment on this
Deputy O'Connor thrusts himself into this argument as a lawyer. He thrusts himself in, with the confession that he does not know much about the cy pres doctrine. In that confession of lack of appreciation, he will be joined by very many lawyers, but he does know that every day before the courts consents are moved to be made rules of court. That is a very ordinary procedure. That is the Erasmus Smith case. That is the case of the Erasmus Smith proceedings— long litigation and money going to be wasted and then the parties come together and their agreement is recited in this Act, and, instead of the consent being made a rule of court in court, the consent is brought in here.
Comment on this
Because the parties wanted it done elsewhere. Is there any point in that remark because I do not want any such remarks to be taken as argument? Is there any point in it?
Comment on this
Then do not interrupt as if there was a point in it. Is it not clear that the Erasmus Smith Act of 1938 was founded on a consent? Is there consent here? There is not. Is that not a complete difference between the two cases? The Deputy shakes his head. What is the difference other than that? That is the big difference. Day after day, solicitors and counsel go into court and move consents and they are accepted by the courts. Not very often but now and again the consent is dragged out and made the foundation of a legislative Act. That is the Erasmus Smith case. Fundamentally, they are the same thing—consent was the basis. May I read one paragraph from Section 10 which we are discussing? It says: "On the passing of this Act all further proceedings shall be stayed"—without the consent of the parties. That is the big difference—that is the enormous difference. That is the difference between having courts of justice and having a Dáil which pretends to be a court of justice.
Comment on this
I am not talking about minor differences of detail. The Deputy knows the difference between going into court and saying, "I agree" and being dragged into court by somebody else who says, "I have power from the legislative body to stop you going any further". That is the big difference and not any pettifogging nonsense about points of detail. The foundation of the one is consent and the pivot of this is the objection by one party to relinquish its rights and what the Taoiseach has called this sovereign court, if you please, Dáil Éireann, coming in now to adjudicate upon the merits of a case at hearing before the courts. Will there be any more nonsense talked in the way of an attempt to make an analogy between the Erasmus Smith case and this?
Deputy O'Connor has brought in the public bodies' mutual assurance business and the very phrase he read out was to the effect that the second Bill was brought in with regard to future decisions. Has this to do with future decisions? Not at all; it is the present case. I was partly responsible for the Insurance Bill. I appeared as a witness in court and Judge Davitt held that that piece of legislation was not properly framed. We left it there. We accepted his decision and people paid costs and people suffered by being mulcted in costs as a result. Certain people got their costs out of it and we did not come to their assistance. But we said: "We failed in our objective; we have given a piece of legislation to the courts upon which the judges could not give the decision which it was the opinion of this House they should give. For the future, here is the new legislation", and we again threw it out to the courts to interpret and we never interfered with the decision of the court. I should be very strong in upholding the right of this Dáil, on any occasion on which it passes legislation and when the courts have come to a conclusion opposite to the views of those who passed the legislation, to say: "As from a certain date, we will re-establish our viewpoint", but that is not taking away from people the rights they have already gained.
I do not know how often that has happened in connection with the income-tax code, and the Finance Bill year by year is built up in this way, that the Revenue Commissioners seek to close gaps which taxpayers had found in the code up to that date, but they do not go in and say that such and such an action shall stand dismissed. They leave the people with what they have gained by their appearance in court and, if the revenue loses, it suffers the loss for the time being. It may make it up by extra taxation during the year, but the Revenue Commissioners do not change the law to swerve a judgement away from the person who has got it and to prevent a man from pleading in court a case which he has started there.
I asked for a case to be brought to my notice in which a piece of legislation has stayed all further proceedings, that piece of legislation—and this is an important matter—being brought in to deal with a pending proceeding. I have said that there is no such case. I know that there is no such case. The Lynam and Butler case has been referred to here, though I gather that that has been repudiated. That was a case in which it was provided that there were to be no appeals to the Privy Council. Appeals were to go no further than the Supreme Court. If we had not declared that to be the law, we would have been regarded as unnational. We provided for a final decision by the highest judicial tribunal we had and people were warned, before they commenced litigation, that they would not be allowed to go further than the Supreme Court. We interrupted no pending proceedings to take the matter out of court and into what is called "this sovereign Assembly". I need not labour that point further. Deputy O'Connor knows what a consent judgment is. This is not a judgement of that type.
We ask our citizens to believe that the Constitution really has meaning and virtue. When they go along to a certain stage, we stop them and say: "You may have thought that you had only the courts to deal with; we have another trick up our sleeve; we have the sovereign court of the Dáil; it is not in the Constitution as a court but we shall make it one and establish its action as the judgement of a court." I move to report progress.