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Dáil

Committee on Finance. - Defence Bill, 1949—Second Stage.

Contributions 1–108 of 224. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Bill Defence Bill 1949
Lapsed

No. 43 of 1949 ›

General Seán MacEoin Minister for Defence (General MacEoin) Fine Gael

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. This Bill has been under consideration for a very long time. For many years the demand was made, sometimes violently and sometimes mildly, that a permanent Army Bill should be introduced. Various Deputies while in Opposition and in Government had the view that such a Bill should be introduced and enacted. The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923, was introduced as a Bill in Dáil Éireann on 24th July, 1923, and became law on 3rd August, 1923. Due to circumstances at the time, the passage of the Act was rushed and, for the reason that there was not time for adequate discussion and consideration in the Dáil, it was introduced as a temporary measure. The Minister for Defence when introducing the measure said:—

"I have framed the Bill to be a temporary Bill, the intention being that the Oireachtas would be asked to pass the Bill as it stands, as a temporary measure, to run for, say, 12 months, when actually the Bill or a Bill on these lines could be introduced .... In my opinion, it might be left until the beginning of next year .... You would have plenty of opportunity to see the likely effect of the Bill in different directions."

That Act has continued in force up to the present time with amendments as circumstances demanded. It is more or less a patchwork quilt Act. The amendments are so many that it is very hard to make reference to them.

I should like to say at this stage that an annual Bill has certain merits. It gives Parliament control over the armed forces of the State and secures that the civil arm has complete control over the armed forces of the State. That is a very great merit from the constitutional and democratic point of view. At one time it was alleged that the reason a temporary Act was in force was that this Parliament had not the power to have a permanent force. That argument, of course, has been discarded. But it is true to say that the people who were the founders of the State, if you like, had the view that this Parliament should always have complete control over its armed forces. Secondly, the temporary Bill had the merit that the Second House, the Seanad, had an opportunity of discussing it. How we will get over that in future I do not know. I think it is a matter that will have to be considered during the various stages of this Bill.

Comment on this
Mr. de Valera

It could be re-passed every year by resolution of both Houses.

Comment on this

I think we should have something like that.

Comment on this
Mr. de Valera

I agree.

Comment on this

I think there should be some method to enable the Second House to have an opportunity of discussing the Bill.

This Bill purports to combine in one legislative measure all the necessary provisions in the existing Acts (amended where required to bring them into line with modern conceptions and practice) and to provide for additional powers considered necessary for defence purposes and suitable for inclusion in permanent legislation.

An outline of the provisions of the Bill is contained in the explanatory memorandum which has been circulated with the text. The Bill is a lengthy one, containing 316 sections, but it has been subdivided into almost self-contained parts.

Part I contains provisions of a general nature. It provides that the Act will come into operation on a date to be fixed by an Order of the Minister. A considerable number of regulations will require to be prepared and to be ready to come into operation simultaneously with the Act. This is the only reason why the operative date is being postponed. This part also contains provisions, similar to those in existing legislation, that persons subject to the provisions of the Bill—for example, members of the Permanent Defence Force—will continue to be subject to military law whether they are serving within or without the State. Later in the Bill (in Chapter III of Part IV), it is provided that, except in the case of persons serving on State ships, members of Óglaigh na hÉireann are required to serve only within the State. This does not, however, preclude members from serving voluntarily outside the State, e.g., on training courses or, as in the case of the Equitation Teams, in competitions of various types and kinds. Part I also continues the provisions in the existing legislation regarding the declaration of a period of emergency for the purposes of the Bill, the definition of active service and the effect of employment on State ships (i.e., ships used for defence purposes).

The opportunity has been availed of to include in Part II provisions which will replace those in the Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924, in relation to the Council of Defence and the functions of the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. These provisions are more appropriate to the present Bill. I will deal with that matter in more detail at a later stage.

Part III deals with the general organisation and maintenance of Óglaigh na hÉireann and continues the existing provisions regarding the Government's powers in these respects. The description Óglaigh na hÉireann is used as applying to the entire Defence Forces. It is proposed that Óglaigh na hÉireann will consist of the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force and provisions are included for the establishment of service corps of Óglaigh na Éireann and different classes of the Reserve Defence Force.

Under the heading of "Miscellaneous Provisions in relation to Óglaigh na hÉireann", provision is included for the compulsory acquisition of land where it cannot be acquired by agreement. The lack of such a provision in existing legislation has, on occasion, been a drawback, and having regard to the importance of military defence, it is necessary that this power should be provided. Other new provisions in relation to general defence matters would give the Minister powers, similar to those given to the Minister for Industry and Commerce in relation to civil aerodromes, to erect apparatus, e.g. warning lights, radio masts, etc. on lands in the vicinity of military aerodromes and to restrict the erection, on these lands, of such buildings, masts, etc. as might obstruct aircraft.

Power to make by-laws for military lands is also proposed subsequently (in Part VIII). By-laws would enable better provision to be made for controlling the use of military lands and for protecting the public against any danger arising from the use of the lands for defence purposes.

The provisions for the appointment, promotion, retirement, etc., of officers remain practically as they are at present. There is only one material change in the provisions affecting the service conditions of soldiers, and that is that power is proposed to retain non-commissioned officers and men in service during the whole period of an emergency, whether or not they become due for transfer to the Reserve Defence Force or discharge during that period. This provision applies only to men enlisted after the operative date of the Act, and men enlisted before that date retain their present liability only, i.e. to serve for 12 months after the date on which they are due for transfer to the Reserve or discharge, if that date occurs during an emergency.

The present Acts set out the automatic forfeitures of pay and the penal deductions which may be made from pay, but provide that other deductions may be made in accordance with regulations. It is now proposed to provide for forfeitures of pay, deductions of all types and stoppages from pay by regulations. The pay and allowances of members of Óglaigh na hÉireann and the conditions governing their issue do not remain static. Varying conditions may involve alterations, from time to time, of the extent and nature of the forfeitures, deductions and stoppages which may be made, and it is considered more convenient and preferable that provision for these matters should be made in regulations. Regulations regarding forfeitures, deductions and stoppages will be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and will be capable of annulment by a resolution of either House.

The provisions dealing with redress of wrongs now propose that every member of Óglaigh na hÉireann shall have the right to have a complaint against a superior officer brought before the Minister. At present, officers only have this right and men may not demand that their complaints should be submitted to the Minister.

A very large portion of the Bill is, as might be expected, concerned with the discipline of members of Óglaigh na hÉireann. There are no essential changes in the provisions as to the persons subject to military law. The offences against military law as set out in the Bill vary in form and description considerably from the provisions in the existing Acts. It is generally known that the provisions in the 1923 Act followed very closely the provisions in the British Army Act of 1881. In the 1940 (No. 2) Act, naval offences were prescribed in the Sixth Schedule. These offences were based on the offences set out in the British Naval Discipline Act, 1864. In the Bill, all personnel are now made subject to the one code described as military law and any distinctions as to separate offences under army or naval law are removed. The offences sections have been rearranged and altered but this does not mean that, except for certain provisions in relation to aircraft and air operations, any essentially new offences have been introduced. The existing provisions have been rearranged, definitions have been inserted where necessary and verbal alterations have been made in the description of the offences. Largely, the alterations in the offences sections arise from the consolidation of a variety of offences covering army, air and naval personnel.

The procedure for the investigation of charges against officers and men remains essentially as it is under existing legislation. The provisions for the constitution and jurisdiction of courts martial also remain as at present with one principal difference. That difference is that it is now provided in the Bill that an officer who, in an advisory capacity, dealt with the charges to be tried by a particular court martial or the evidence to be produced at that court martial or the conduct of the prosecution at that court martial shall be disqualified from serving as a member of, or judge-advocate at, that particular court martial.

A number of changes is proposed in relation to the action following a court martial. The first change is that the Government and the Minister will no longer be confirming authorities. At present, the Government is the sole confirming authority for a sentence of death imposed by court martial and the Minister has power to confirm the findings and sentences, other than a sentence of death, by any court martial. This alteration is being made on the grounds that neither the Government nor the Minister should exercise judicial powers in relation to findings and sentences of courts martial. The confirming authorities are otherwise the same as in present legislation and have the same powers of confirmation, mitigation, etc. with the addition of the power, at present given to the Government, to mitigate a sentence of death.

It should, of course, be emphasised that, while the Government is no longer a confirming authority, Section 225 requires that a sentence of death be not executed until the Government has approved of the execution of the sentence. This ensures that the Government will have an opportunity to advise the President, if such a course is considered desirable, to exercise his prerogative under Article 13.6 of the Constitution.

New features have been introduced by the inclusion of provision for the mitigation and suspension of sentences and imprisonment which have been imposed by court martial and have been confirmed. Under these provisions, a new stage is proposed in the proceedings for dealing with the results of courts martial and new authorities are proposed with powers to review sentences. A person tried by court martial would, therefore, have the safeguard not alone that the findings and sentence of the court martial must be confirmed but that even after confirmation, and even while he may be undergoing the punishment imposed by the court martial, his punishment can be reviewed and mitigated or suspended. In the rules of procedure provisions, it will be found that arrangements are proposed for the submission of petitions by or on behalf of persons convicted by court martial. A further new provision has been included in relation to confirming authorities to enable an officer to whom the finding and sentence of a court martial have been submitted for confirmation to refer the confirmation to a higher confirming officer. This would enable a confirming officer who feels that he is not competent, or would not be acting fairly in exercising his powers as a confirming authority, to refer the case to another confirming officer. It is felt that, under the Bill, adequate provision is made for securing every safeguard for the fair trial and revision of punishments awarded by courts martial to persons subject to military law.

Under Chapter X of Part V, it is proposed to make it an offence for an officer or man of the Reserve Defence Force to join the armed forces of another State. This is a new but a common-sense provision.

The Bill contains in a separate part (Part VI) the matters which are general offences in relation to Óglaigh na hÉireann and military property. That part concerns members of the public to a large extent. The only new provisions included are those which prohibit the alienation of identity and similar certificates or documents issued to a soldier as evidence of his right to pay or pension, e.g. as security for a loan, and the prohibition on the sketching or photographing of military fortifications, etc. by unauthorised persons or trepass on such fortifications.

The provisions in existing legislation regarding the holding of manoeuvres lack specific definition. The existing legislation (Section 30 of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act. 1923) simply provides that the Minister may appoint areas wherein military manoeuvres may be carried out and that he may, by regulation, prescribe the conditions under which compensation may be claimed by or paid to owners or occupiers of land in the areas in which manoeuvres are carried out, in respect of damage or loss sustained by them in consequence of the use of their land for manoeuvres. The only prohibition is on the erection of a camp within a radius of 200 yards of a private dwellinghouse. A separate part of the Bill (Part VII) is devoted to manoeuvres, etc. and in this part it is proposed to lay down a specific procedure for the declaration of a manoeuvre area, together with a clear indication as to the powers which may be exercised by the military authorities and the restrictions to be observed by them. Part VII also sets out clearly the prohibitions, as they affect the public, on interference with manoeuvres and repeats existing legislative provisions in relation to temporary stoppage of traffic during manoeuvres and other military practices.

The statutory authority for the existing Army Nursing Service derives from the powers of the Minister to employ civilians for duty with the forces. The Army Nursing Service is now an essential part of the defence organisation and it is a misnomer to describe the service as civilian. Furthermore, the position of the members requires clarification to ensure that there is no doubt as to their protection in time of war under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. For these reasons, the Army Nursing Service has been declared to be a component part of the Permanent Defence Force, It is not considered desirable at this stage, however, to treat the members of the service, for all purposes, as members of Óglaigh na hÉireann and so, for instance, to make them subject to military law and trial by court martial. The intention is that while the service is declared to be a component of the Permanent Defence Force, the members will serve under special conditions to be laid down in regulations, as at present, and that the engagement of members will continue to be on the basis of signed agreements. The members are, however, being disqualified from being elected to the Dáil or Seanad or a local authority.

At a time when Óglaigh na hÉireann or any part of it would be engaged on active service, all persons employed with it or attached to it would of necessity have to be subject to military law. For this reason, and to allow flexibility with regard to any other changes in organisation which might be necessary in the future, it is proposed in the Bill to provide that the Minister may by Order apply any of the remaining provisions of the Bill to members of the Army Nursing Service. The Bill proposes that such an Order would, however, require confirmation by both Houses of the Oireachtas before it could come into operation. It is not the intention that the enactment of the Bill should interfere with the continuance of existing agreements.

Part X contains provisions to secure the continuity of service of existing personnel of the Forces and the Reserve and the continuance of those rights which they hold at present in regard to discharge at the termination of their engagement, service during a period of emergency and service in a particular service corps.

The enactment of the Bill will necessitate the adaptation of some Acts, principally those in which reference is made to the existing or former Defence Forces and the amendment of other Acts arising from certain provisions in the Bill. This is covered by Part XI of the Bill.

In Part XII are contained the miscellaneous provisions which could not be fitted into any of the earlier subdivisions of the Bill. These miscellaneous provisions relate to certain restrictions on recruiting for armed forces of other States and the wearing of foreign uniforms in the State. Provision is also made for the exemption of service entertainments from certain statutory restrictions as regards the use of premises for public entertainments or amusement and for the necessity for complying with certain steps in the licensing procedure in order to obtain a licence for a canteen. Provisions are also included covering salvage claims and continuing certain facilities to solicitors' apprentices who served in the Defence Forces during the emergency. All these are in continuance of existing legislation.

As I say, the Bill is a very extensive one and a White Paper was circulated with it which, if Deputies had read it, would considerably assist them in dealing with the various sections. I do not know whether it is necessary that I should go through it section by section. I presume that that would be better on the Committee Stage. There are, however, a few points to which I would like to draw special attention. One is Section 11, which establishes the Council of Defence. It adds the Secretary of the Department of Defence as a member of the Council of Defence. Heretofore he was just the secretary; he had no function. As he has already certain executive authority as secretary, it is felt that it would be wise to add him to the Council of Defence. That, of course, means that there would have to be an amendment to the Ministers and Secretaries Act.

Comment on this

Is there any good reason for appointing the secretary on the Council of Defence?

Comment on this

Except that he is there and when you make him a member of the Council of Defence he is bound by its rules the same as in any other statutory body and the procedure that has always applied has been nearly like that of the Cabinet. A decision of the Council of Defence is a decision of the lot.

Comment on this

Will he have a vote?

Comment on this

Yes. We are making him a member of the Council of Defence, and that brings such rights with it.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

Does the Minister think that is a wise procedure?

Comment on this

I merely want to draw special attention to it, though I do not suppose it would be overlooked. It is a matter that can be remedied. For these reasons I think that the foregoing remarks, taken in conjunction with the explanatory memorandum, will have given Deputies a general picture of the Bill and will enable them to consider its provisions.

Comment on this

The first point I want to make is in the form of an objection. I want to object to the manner in which the Second Stage of this rather important Bill is being taken. It must be obvious to every Deputy in the House that on this occasion it is being used merely as a stop-gap.

Comment on this

The Army is being thrown into the defence.

Comment on this

In the normal way the Estimate for the Department of Agriculture which was talked out by the Government on last Thursday should be before the House to-day. I suppose the Government considers the counting of heads more important at the present time than what the long title informs us is "an Act to make further and better provision in relation to the defence of the State and the Defence Forces". In addition to that protest, I want to make another. The Minister, I think, on the conclusion of the Supplementary Estimate, and his predecessor, I think, on the question of the Defence (No. 2) Bill, made certain statements which were intended to suggest that heretofore nothing had been done in respect of this Bill. The Minister's predecessor said, in Volume 119, column 889:—

"At least, I can claim that after 27 years of talk—talk about a permanent Army Bill—I have introduced it."

The Minister himself quite recently said:—

"In conclusion, I may say that for years this question of a permanent Army Act was raised by the Opposition when they were in opposition before, and it is raised by them now, but when they became a Government they were not able to produce it."

I do not know whether the Minister believes that statement or whether he had an ulterior motive behind it.

Comment on this

I would say a better phrase instead of "able to" would be "did not".

Comment on this

If anyone is interested and looks at Volume 76, column 2116, he will find there that leave was granted to introduce a Bill entitled—

"an Act to make further and better provision in relation to the defence of the State and the Defence Forces and to make provision for other matters connected with or incidental to the matters aforesaid".

Comment on this

What date?

Comment on this

On the 7th July, 1939. The House ordered the Second Stage of that Bill for Wednesday, 18th October, 1939. The words which I have just read out are identical with the Long Title of the Bill which is before the House to-day. When the 18th October, 1939, arrived a world war was in progress and had been in progress for a period of something like six weeks. The Government was concerned with matters of far greater importance then than this Defence Bill and, anyhow, the Army authorities, in consultation with myself, agreed that it would be futile to go on with the Bill in view of the many and numerous changes that were almost certain to arise in the course of the emergency.

Every year during the emergency we had to take advantage of the Temporary (Provisions) Act to bring in changes that were found necessary as a result of the experience which was developed in the course of that emergency. I made it clear on numerous occasions, when questions were raised as to when the permanent Bill was likely to be forthcoming, that these were the reasons which were governing our action in not producing it. The Bill was there in the safe in the Minister's office. The Bill was there in the form it is in at present, with the exception of the amendments which the Minister's predecessor included in this Bill and thought it desirable to include in it.

On the 7th December, 1949, the First Stage of this Bill was agreed to and the House ordered the Second Stage for the 15th February, 1950. Here we are to-day 14 months after the date for which the Bill was ordered and we are about to discuss the Second Stage. Even though repeated requests were made to bring forward the Bill so that it could be discussed in a proper calm atmosphere, we find to-day that it is in the position of being, as I have described it, a fill-up, a stop-gap, a means to kill time, while the Government is considering the question of its own existence. I think that this is not the atmosphere in which a Bill of this importance should be brought forward. However, it is here now and it is up to us to discuss it and examine it to the best of our ability.

When I got this Bill myself my reactions were—and I am pretty certain that my reactions were the reactions of most other Deputies—that it was a formidable Bill. I found, on casual examination, that it contained 12 parts. It contained 316 sections, ten schedules, 12 chapters and the entire was printed on 147 pages of foolscap. I must admit that, on closer examination, I discovered that it merely consisted of the Temporary Provisions Acts which have passed through this House over the period of the House's existence and that with a few exceptions it was not such a formidable document at all. My own impressions —they may not be shared by my colleagues or other members—were that, in fact, it was not what could be described as a very controversial Bill. In my opinion, the Bill before the House has been in operation, in fact, throughout the years. It could be described as the standing orders or the rules and regulations by which the Army has been governed and will be governed. From that point of view, I do not think it can be very controversial.

However, there is this about it. In Section 12 there is something to which I feel the Minister ought to give very serious consideration. In that section it is stated:—

"Every holder of a principal military office shall hold that office for such term (not exceeding five years) as may be specified in the instrument of his appointment."

That is in (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 12. Then, in (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 12, it goes further. It states:—

"A person who had held a particular principal military office shall not be eligible for reappointment to that principal military office unless a period of 12 months has elapsed since he last ceased to hold that principal military office."

I think that that is a very dangerous inclusion in the section and I would strongly advocate that the Minister would have it very carefully examined. As far as I am aware, the period before this was three years. I want to say that I am in thorough agreement with the extension of the three years to five years. I think that it was quite impossible for any individual, accepting that highly responsible and honourable office, to have studied completely and digested all the difficulties, the administrative regulations, etc., that he should have at his finger-tips in such a short period. As far as I am aware, it does not necessarily mean that the person appointed held office for the three or five years. I presume that the person so appointed will be there for that full term.

If my recollection is correct, there have been, at least, two or three cases where the holders of that office did not complete their full term. But against that, there have been two cases where the holder of the office exceeded that term, and exceeded it by a number of years. The first of those was Lieutenant General Brennan. Lieutenant General Brennan, as the House will remember, was the holder of that office when the change of Government took place. My predecessor, Deputy Aiken, very wisely, in my opinion, did not make any change when he assumed office. In the course of the first few years the Volunteer Force was organised by the then Minister for Defence and it reached to my mind the astonishing figure of something like 10,000. General Brennan was the responsible officer in respect to the organisation and administration of that very fine body of men. No doubt it was because of the excellent work which he performed during that period that he was reappointed. I can hardly imagine that any Deputy in this House would have any objection to the reappointment of an officer in such circumstances.

The other case was that of General McKenna. As everybody who takes an interest in defence must be aware, General McKenna assumed office in January of 1940. There was then in existence for something like about five months a war which had come to be described as "the phoney war". As far as the ordinary man or woman in the street could see, the only thing the belligerents were throwing at each other were compliments, and it looked as if that war would be settled by some other means than by force. We were all sadly disillusioned later on, but during that period there was an insistent demand from the men of the Reserve who had been called up for return to their various avocations, to their family life and so on. That demand had to be met, but the manner in which it was to be met had to be studied very carefully by the Chief of Staff, and, instead of being engaged in a study of his duties and of the requirements he had to meet, he was engaged in an examination of the ways and means of fairly releasing a number of these individuals and returning them to their homes.

That was the work he was engaged on from the time he assumed office until the "phoney" war came to an end in May of that year. When that occurred, not only was the Reserve which had been released to the extent of something like 5,000 men recalled, but there was also a national appeal made for recruits which resulted in the Army being more than doubled, so that, in 1940, we had something like 40,000 men under arms in various barracks and places throughout the country. At that time, instead of being engaged on an examination of the ways and means by which he should conduct his office, he was endeavouring to find accommodation for this vast influx of recruits for this more than trebled army. He was endeavouring to provide uniforms, to provide food, and to find cooks to cook that food, and so on, and, together with that, there was going on all the time the intensive training which was so necessary to turn these raw levies into trained soldiers, men capable of doing the work which we at least expected they should be capable of doing.

That is the type of work the Chief of Staff was then engaged on. In 1941 that sort of work went on and the intensive training went on, and, in 1942, we had the great manoeuvres which provided the officers with the opportunity of handling large numbers of men which they had never had a chance of handling before, except in theory. When 1945 came, the question of demobilisation arose and all this time this officer, acting as Chief of Staff, was engaged on one or other of these very difficult propositions. I can hardly imagine that there is any Deputy who would suggest for a moment that there should have been a change of command in the Army during that period. To me, it would seem to be quite wrong.

Here we had an officer, a highly capable officer, carrying out his task in a manner which satisfied the Government of that day and which gave confidence to the Army itself and to the people, and I am suggesting to the Minister that, if this clause in Section 12 is to be gone on with, it will in future prevent such an officer from being reappointed by the Minister if he desires to reappoint him in circumstances such as I have described.

The section can be very easily amended. In its present form, it sets out that a person who has held a particular principal military office shall not be eligible for reappointment to that principal military office unless a period of 12 months has elapsed since he last ceased to hold that principal military office, and I suggest that after "unless" he could add "in circumstances recommended by the Minister and approved by the Government", in substitution for the words in the section. That will rule out any suggestion that the officer in question is either a pet or a pal of the Minister, because, in the first instance, he has to decide himself on the question of the reappointment and, secondly, having done that, has to get the approval of the Government, and I do not think there could be any greater safeguard.

If the Minister, in his reply, tells me that he is not prepared to make that amendment, all I can say is that, if it is deemed wise to provide such a method in this measure, why not apply the same penalty, if you like so to term it, to the Taoiseach, to Ministers, to Parliamentary Secretaries, to secretaries of Departments, to Deputies and so on? We could go on giving quite a number of reasons why any person should not be allowed to exceed a period of five years, but I hardly imagine that the Minister will tell us it should not be amended in the way suggested, because what I am suggesting is, I believe, a safeguard for the Minister and the Government of the day. There is this about it also, that, if it is not accepted now, there is no reason why some other Government at some other period would not make that amendment. Why put the State and this House to the trouble and difficulty of doing such things?

It has been made pretty clear, I think, as a result of statements of Ministers that the policy of this State, in the event of war, is one of neutrality. In that policy, I think I can say that the Government will be supported not only by every Deputy but by the people outside. I could scarcely imagine that there is any section of our people who would be opposed to the policy of neutrality in the event of another war, but what I want to point out to the Minister is that the declaration of a policy of neutrality is a simple matter but giving effect to such a policy is another. We find ourselves at the moment with an Army which—I believe, anyhow—is greatly under strength. We find ourselves with a Reserve greatly under strength and with an F.C.A. which is decreasing. I doubt very much if it would be possible to ensure to the nations who would be belligerents that we, as a nation, are well capable of protecting ourselves. If we were not in a position to ensure that our own territory could not be taken over and used against one or other of these people, then it is almost certain that we would find this State of ours in the hands of one or other of the belligerents, whichever of them deemed it suitable to get there first. I should like the Minister to tell us, when he is replying, the actual state of the Army. Has it increased? What is the actual state of the Reserve—has it increased? What is the position of the F.C.A.—has it increased?

As far as I remember, the Minister's predecessor, in the course of an article in the Sunday Independent, warned Russia that in the event of her attacking this island, she would find it adequately manned by tens of thousands of courageous men standing to their stations. I do not know whether that was mere rhetoric or pomposity or whether the then Minister believed what he said. If he believed it, I should like to know where these tens of thousands of men, standing to their stations, are? If the strength of the Army is in the 8,000 mark and if the Reserve is in the 5,000 mark, I fail to see where the tens of thousands of men, standing to their stations, are. Perhaps the Minister will be able to enlighten the House as to where this apparently mythical Army exists. We do not want Ministers to make statements if there is no truth in them. If there is truth in them, the people are entitled to be kept informed, and they are entitled to be kept informed in regard to the present danger situation.

In 1939 we mobilised 19,000 men and that included about 7,000 volunteers. To-day it is doubtful, if we had a full mobilisation, if we could mobilise to within 5,000 of that number. I should like the Minister to tell us the exact position.

Comment on this

Surely the position is not altogether as bad as that.

Comment on this

In 1940 we had 40,000 men under arms, but it would hardly have been true to say that they could adequately have manned all the vital stations in this island. It was only after the hardest possible work on the part of the officers and N.C.O.s of the Regular Army, the Reserve and the Volunteer Force that these men were turned into capable soldiers and, in the course of more than 12 months, made capable of adequately manning any station into which they were placed. If we have not the men to train now, will we be in a position to say that we can adequately man these stations to which the present Minister's predecessor referred?

In the past three years, expenditure in this State has been increased by tens of millions of pounds. We have only to look at the Estimate for Defence to see the interest that the Government appear to have taken in regard to defence. Out of all these tens of millions of extra money, over and above that which was being used in 1947, only the merest fraction was expended in respect of defence—and then only to meet the extra costs of subsistence and the purchase of goods, and so forth, for the Army. We have, therefore, to ask ourselves if that is a common-sense policy or if there is any sense in it at all. We are not advocating a strong Defence Force in the belief that it will be capable of defeating any invader that attempts to come within our shores. Our purpose in advocating a strong Defence Force is that we believe implicitly in our freedom and that, because of that belief, we should protect that freedom by every means in our power. If the recommendations of the Army authorities, which were accepted by the former Government, had been accepted and put into operation by the present Government the Minister would now have at his disposal a Reserve force of probably something in the region of 12,000 men. I suggest that that would not only give confidence to the Army authorities themselves but that it would give confidence to the people of the nation. It has not been done. Three valuable years have been lost in respect of the building up of that type of Reserve which is much more valuable than anything else we could produce. In that Reserve you would have men who had undergone their period of training in the Regular Army and who had, year after year, come forward for their refresher course, so to speak. Therefore, it would be true to say that we would always have an Army at our disposal in the region of about 20,000 or 25,000 men—taking the Regular Army at 12,000 men and the Reserve at something about the same figure.

I should be glad if the Minister, when he is concluding, would give us as much information as it is possible for him to give, within the limits of safety, as to what the actual danger position is, having regard to the position which exists to-day. It is desirable that that should be known. I am not suggesting that statements should be made, as somebody said, to frighten the people, but if they would frighten the people into doing their duty, joining the Army, training, or joining the voluntary services, they would do useful and valuable work. As far as I can see, no Minister or person of any responsibility advocated joining the Army during the recruitment campaign initiated by the present Government. That campaign for the Regular Army ended in failure and that campaign for the Reserve ended in failure also. The Minister's predecessor said in this House very recently that he regretted that his views had been upheld by the failure to secure the number of recruits which the Army had hoped to get into the Reserve. I must say that I am not too surprised at that, because the Minister's predecessor never created the impression in my mind—and I have no doubt that the same impression would be created in the minds of others—that he was defence-minded or that he was taking a proper interest in the Army.

I had reason at one time—it might have been on the Temporary Provisions Bill—to ask if the Minister's complacency about the defence of our country was due to some understanding which he appeared to have with some outside State. He appeared to resent that suggestion and in the course of his reply said:—

"It has been stated by the Head of the Government that we cannot possibly ally ourselves with an army that occupies portion of our territory."

That was quite all right and we could all agree, but the doubts in my mind and in the minds of people outside were caused by other statements of the Minister's. For instance, he said (Volume 72, column 773):—

"If our policy is that we are going to stand alone, and absolutely alone, the most reasonable defence policy for us is absolute disarmament.... If we are to look after the security of the people in this country then we have got to do it in co-operation with some country that has a navy."

He was speaking to Deputy Aiken at that time and he said:—

"The Minister for Defence knows this much: that an island without a navy, in terms of defence, is a joke."

It is because he held these views and was known to have made similar statements on a number of other occasions that some of us on this side of the House had grave doubts whether we would get anywhere with a defence policy while he was Minister. When at one time we went out of our way to purchase a number of corvettes in order to establish a naval service for ourselves in a small way, our action was met by gibes from the then Deputy O'Higgins. "Rubber ducks" I think was the description he gave them, so that attempt to establish another arm of defence in this State apparently did not meet with his approval.

However, there is another arm of State defence that can and should be given as much encouragement as possible—the F.C.A. I do not know what its strength is at present or whether it has decreased or increased, but whatever its present position I would suggest that it should receive every encouragement, in order to make it not only strong but dependable, because primarily it is a force that should be situated in every part of the nation however remote. Everything to encourage that unit should be done. It can be regarded as a much cheaper form of defence than the Army, but that is not the aspect at which we should look but rather at the value it will eventually give to the Army proper.

One of the best possible ways to encourage that force is the provision of suitable means of training, and heretofore that has not been done. In 1947 I secured approval from the Government to build a number of halls, and the Office of Public Works was instructed to provide plans and ways and means, and a token sum was made available in the Estimate of the Office of Public Works. It was agreed that, I think, 25 halls should be proceeded with in 1948, and it would be interesting to know if any attempt has been made to proceed with them. Approval was given, and a Minister anxious that that force should not alone continue in existence but increase could have gone ahead with those halls and ensured, at least, that 25 were built in 1948. If the plan had been continued in other years, quite a considerable number of halls would have been available for these men at the present time. One cannot ask men who are giving their services voluntarily to turn up and train in the open, perhaps in almost impossible circumstances, so anything we can do to ensure that that unit is increased will be of value to the nation.

While I am on the F.C.A., I would like to refer to something which I am told has been having a very adverse effect on recruitment to that body, and that is the question of a distinctive ribbon for their medals. The Minister will remember this, because he and I were at a function at which this question was raised. I understand that it is a very acute question with the F.C.A. at the present moment. I was responsible, in the first instance, for the decision that they should get a ribbon distinctive from that of the Regular Army. At that time I agreed on the advice of the military, and I agreed for this reason, that it appeared to me to be right that men who had given their services voluntarily should have a distinctive ribbon as against the ordinary professional soldier. In that belief I agreed.

I must admit I did not foresee any difficulty in respect of F.C.A. taking umbrage at that decision and saying it made a difference between them and the military body. They are, nobody will deny, a military body. They will now, as a result of the passing of this measure, become a recognised unit of Óglaigh na hÉireann, and perhaps that might make some difference. I suggest that if, by any chance, there is anything in the statements that have been made to me—I have received numerous letters—to the effect that it is having a very adverse effect on recruitment to that body and that there is general dissension amongst members of that body as a result of the failure of the Government to meet their request, some remedy should be introduced.

If, by any chance, the Minister thought he was upholding any decision I made, I want to assure him that, so far as I am concerned, if I were in his position I would have no hesitation in giving these men a ribbon that would clearly define them as a military unit. That is their objection. They are getting the same ribbon as the civil units, the voluntary services. I trust the Minister will give consideration to that particular point. If he does, I think he will find the reaction will be very favourable.

As the Minister said, it will be possible to discuss the Bill more easily on the Committee Stage, when we can take it section by section, as we are interested. I know that in the section which deals with Sluagh Muirí there are rather cumbersome titles in the case of some of the officers in the naval services. That, perhaps, can also be discussed on the Committee Stage.

My only reason for discussing the Bill in the manner in which I have discussed it is my desire to see the armed forces of this State in a position in which they can feel they are doing useful work and that they are not there merely as a ceremonial force or an adjunct to the police or for some purpose other than that for which an army is designed. If the Minister will —and I feel sure he will—be sympathetic to some of the points which I have endeavoured to make. I feel the Defence Forces in general will benefit.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

I think the contribution made by Deputy Traynor merits a good deal of consideration from the Minister. His approach to the Bill has been realistic and, in common with other Deputies, I feel he has a genuine anxiety for the improvement of the general over-all lot of people in the armed forces, and he certainly has a genuine desire for the development of the forces, be they the normal serving personnel, the Reserve or the F.C.A., on the best possible lines.

I think Deputy Traynor is being unnecessarily unkind to himself by having any apprehension that the delay in the introduction of this Bill has had any adverse effect. Any of us who have served in the Defence Forces will readily realise that the delay from 1939 until now has certainly shown up many of the weaknesses of the temporary Acts, and the experience gained must have been invaluable in the preparation of this Bill. To describe the temporary type of Act as anything but chaotic would be unreal, because many Deputies listening to me, and particularly Deputy Vivion de Valera and Deputy Cowan, will realise that one could not see the Act in principle in the welter of amendments we were constantly getting, all of which added further to the confusion that already existed in that type of legislation. My recollection is that during the emergency I got no less than 270 different leaflets purporting to be amendments to the original Act. We were instructed to file these carefully and correlate them to the Act. I think that was a duty placed upon an officer that was honoured more often in the breach that in the observance.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

And you had to bring it with you, and no transport provided.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

Yes. We welcome this Bill and, like Deputy Traynor, I have many facets to draw attention to. I feel it is necessary, and a very good idea, that at this stage of development we should have a permanent Act. I feel there will have to be some machinery evolved on which we will be able to have a proper annual discussion of Army matters as distinct from the debate on the Estimate proper.

Comment on this

Why? Will the Deputy give one reason?

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

Just to keep proper and adequate control within the Oireachtas of the situation, which I consider to be the all-important factor. If the Deputy wishes to controvert that, he can have the auditorium in due course.

Comment on this

I only wanted to have your reasons.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

That is the plain, simple reason. I feel it is a very good thing that such a review should take place.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I think you are right in that.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

It is full time that this country became informed on the real situation of our Defence Forces in every facet. It is full time that the Government came to grips with the Army problem in its broadest aspect. Deputy Traynor has made inquiries as to the numerical strength of various sections of the Army, but I am very interested in another strength. I would like to know what is the morale strength of the Army. I wonder whether sometimes we lose sight of the pressing problems of the Army. It is true that advances in pay and amelioration of conditions have taken place in recent years. It is true that the Minister's predecessor, now Deputy Traynor, initiated an upward trend in some of the remunerations and allowances payable to members of the forces. It is true that there have been certain increases since then. It is equally true—and I want to impress this on the Minister at this stage— that there is a very strong case to be made that such increases are inadequate in the situation that exists.

Are we facing in any realistic way the problem of having within the confines of this Republic an Army capable of proper and adequate expansion in the event of emergency? The basis on which such an Army must be built is, unquestionably, a contented and satisfied personnel. If we are in earnest in the matter of defence, I press upon the Minister the view that he will have to hasten the tackling of the fundamental problem of raising to the ultimate limit the morale within the Army so that, on the basis of a contented and satisfied Army, he may not only build a more adequate Reserve but can undertake proper and adequate recruitment of the F.C.A.

I can stand up in this House and controvert in a very deliberate way what Deputy Traynor suggested with regard to a drive for recruits. At no place in my constituency during the period of recruitment did I lose an opportunity to add whatever voice I had to the appeal of the Minister for recruits, in particular for the F.C.A. and the Red Cross. That drive lost its effect mainly because we had not got within this House the cohesive unified effort that the Dáil on a previous occasion was able to produce. We in the House generally will have to accept the responsibility that, if we are to increase to any large extent our reserves and the F.C.A., it will have to be done on a broad, unified, national basis. If we are in earnest in our national aspirations, we can safely leave the drive for such recruits and the impetus towards that development completely outside the realm of politics.

There was one extremely significant feature about the emergency Army, in which Deputy de Valera and I had the honour to serve, that we were a unified personnel within the Army irrespective of what our political views may have been, striving to do the best we could, in what we believed to be a situation of extreme danger, to preserve the liberty that had been so hardly won.

Comment on this

Is not that the position in the F.C.A. to-day? Is it not made up of people of every political thought?

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

I quite agree, but I do not think that we here, at the head of a drive for that development, are showing the same unanimity that once existed, when we were driving for recruits in the emergency.

Comment on this

Or the same interest.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

No. Interest is conspicuous by its absence. I suppose we have to face the blunt reality and try to do our job irrespective of what the interests of others may be. It is fortunate in this House that there are some of us genuinely interested in defence or, indeed, this Bill, which is of such immense consequence, might have a passage completely unworthy of its importance.

I feel, quite seriously, that we must get down and tackle the real problems that are presenting themselves. It is true that this Bill involves technique in relation to discipline, in relation to all the facets of Army administration, but, on the Second Reading of the Bill, the real question that we must get to grips with is, what real purpose we want the Army to serve and how best we can get that done. Is the plan to be an army small in establishment, expert in training and technique, keeping at fully trained level a First Line Reserve and trained officers and N.C.O.s, to develop in an emergency period or in a call-up period, the F.C.A. into first-class field units? If that is the real purpose of the Army, the Minister must come frankly to the House to answer a number of vital questions. First of all, we must discuss in this forum actual strengths. How much are we below establishment?

Comment on this
Major de Valera

There are 7,781 of a permanent force, the normal being 12,000.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

How much are we below standard in general training? What is our equipment position? What equipment is available? What is the potential of equipment to be had? What is the real reason—the Minister will have to try to analyse it for us— why recruiting is not meeting with the response that it should? The Minister must come into the House and tell us frankly what is the nature of the war-like stores that we have and what is their effectiveness. Again, he must give us a clear indication of the potential in that particular line.

It is true, as Deputy Traynor has said, that it is easy to avow a policy of neutrality but, if we are to stand on a policy of neutrality, I feel the Minister must fairly and squarely indicate to the House what the real position of the Army is in the event of their being called upon to make an effective stand to preserve neutrality. The Minister will have to answer us frankly as to what efforts, if any, are being made to attract into the First Line Reserve the thousands of trained personnel that abound throughout the country.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Deputy seems to be dealing with the Estimate rather than with the question of a permanent Army Bill.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

With respect, every conceivable facet of Army administration and Army development is covered in this Bill.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I suppose, a Chinn Chomhairle, the title would make the Deputy's remarks relevant.

Comment on this

Anyway, Deputy Traynor discussed all these matters.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

The discussion has been on that line since we started. However, I am subject to your ruling.

Comment on this
Frank Fahy An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

It struck me that the question of neutrality in a possible war emergency did not arise on this Bill. This is a Defence Bill dealing with the future of the Army.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

I think the title of the Bill is sufficiently wide to permit a discussion on any conceivable facet of defence.

Comment on this

Or whether we defend at all.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

I, in common with other Deputies, know that there exists a very considerable reservoir of trained personnel which the Minister could encourage to join a proper First Line Reserve. What is the snag? I shall be mundane enough to tell the Minister that he will have to improve the conditions he is offering to those people if he hopes to build up a reserve. It does seem extraordinary that in a short period after an emergency, in which we had an army of an effective strength such as we never had before, we have dissipated around the country all the knowledge and the training that was given to thousands of personnel during that period. I have a lingering suspicion, and I am sure people who served with that emergency army have the same suspicion, that there is a good deal of a "browned-off" spirit in the personnel who left the forces. They were not treated too kindly; they heard many high sounding promises but there was very little realisation or fulfilment of those promises. I say to the Minister that, where the first line defence is concerned, he has to face in a hard-headed way the problem of considerably ameliorating conditions before he can attract into that reserve any considerable number of people.

I sometimes ask myself seriously the question whether there is any serious intention of bringing the Army up to strength or to try to develop a really strong First Line Reserve. I am sure Deputies Cowan and Major de Valera will agree with me that it does seem extraordinary that, with the reservoir of trained personnel that is available, no greater strides can be made.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

You mean personnel trained in the last emergency?

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

In so far as ordinary infantry training was the basis of making that reservoir——

Comment on this
Major de Valera

You mean from the last emergency?

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

Yes.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

The trouble is that they are five years older now.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

If they are five years older, they would seem to be a lot younger than you or I, and we would hate to consider ourselves men beyond the age of serious action. I want to direct the Minister's mind to the fact that there are in the country a splendid personnel consisting of ex-servicemen between the ages of 26 to 36. Surely they could be the nucleus of a really fine Reserve? We have laudatory allusions by Ministers and ex-Ministers to the great service they rendered to the country. They were rated by their commanding officers and by their generals very highly. They contributed in their own day a vital integral part to the nation's effort to preserve its freedom. Their training involved a certain cost to the taxpayer and, I think, with proper encouragement, the taxpayer, now asked to face the development of an Army, would get a better return if there could be some inducement held out to that type of personnel, either to rejoin the Army itself or to come into the First Line Reserve, or, failing that, to join the F.C.A.

What is the position with regard to the F.C.A.? I should like to have the Minister answer the very sensible query put up by Deputy Traynor? What is the position in regard to the development of suitable halls and training facilities for the F.C.A. throughout the country? Is the Minister conscious of the fact that the whole picture in regard to the development of the F.C.A. needs to take on a much more original and a much brighter hue than at present? Where voluntary service is asked for by the State there is a corresponding duty on the State to make sure that adequate and suitable provision is made as regards equipment, training and location to prove worthy of such a voluntary effort. There has to be a variety of originality and ingenuity employed to develop this force. It will be necessary in each particular area to build up a training course in keeping with the problems likely to arise in the area of service.

The training of F.C.A. personnel will have to take on a real significance. I appeal to the Minister, in the development of the F.C.A., to ensure that as much variety as possible is introduced, because there is nothing which can pall so quickly on a volunteer, there is nothing which will brown him off so quickly, as an overdose of musketry and T.O.E.T. I feel myself that I am entitled to say to the Minister that F.C.A. training has not got the flexibility, the imagination or the variety which is necessary to keep a volunteer force interested and active. If what I suggest could be got, and if there was something worth while made out of this organisation, then I think you would find that the question of recruitment would right itself.

This Bill deals with every side of the Army. The Minister in his opening remarks, referred to the fact that most of this Bill, in its voluminous sections, incorporates little that is new, but I, like Deputy Cowan in his interjection, want to ask the Minister seriously what is the necessity for bringing the permanent head of his Department, the Secretary to the Department of Defence, on to the Council of Defence? Surely, that is the thin end of the wedge which the men in uniform have so often complained of, that you have more civilians attached to the Army than you have Army personnel. It is quite right, maybe, taking the history of the present Secretary of the Department of Defence, that he might have some value as a member of the Council for Defence, but if the Secretary to the Department was to be, as quite conceivably he could be, an ordinary civil servant, one with no specialised military training, no military background and no military knowledge whatever, I cannot see any justification for incorporating that person as a member of the Council of Defence. The departure is, to my mind, an unwelcome one.

I should like to keep, if one may so describe it, the civilian and administrative end of the Army in its own orbit. I think the Minister might seriously reconsider whether or not it is wise to have the permanent head of his Department a member of the Council. There is much to be said for and against, but I subscribe to the view that it would be better not. In so far as administration is concerned, or difficulties that might arise there, the Minister himself, by virtue of being a Minister, can act as a safeguard in that respect. It is quite conceivable, and I want the Minister to remember this, that somebody who might be completely allergic to guns, to armies and all they stand for, might be a permanent civil servant and head of the Department of Defence. God knows, the Council of Defence is of supreme importance, and it merits more than the possible fate of having such a member. What is the need for this, in any event? That is a question which I want the Minister to answer.

Comment on this

That the civil servants can run it much more than they have been doing.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

Not if I have my way.

Comment on this

We will see to that in the next Dáil.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

For too long have we had the experience in the Army of too few soldiers surrounded by too many civil servants.

Comment on this

It was to the Minister that you put the question and not to Deputy Cowan.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

I want the Minister seriously, when replying, to justify this departure——

Comment on this

I will, through the Chair.

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

——keeping in mind, particularly, the fact that the Minister himself is an ex-Chief of Staff, and is in a position to know that civil servants have too much of a say, as it is, in running the Army. We are fortunate in having as Minister one who, in his own way, often indicated, in the days of his soldiering, how restrictive, stringent and difficult were the obstacles which the civilian side of the Army could put in his way. Here, in a permanent Bill, he may be putting a millstone around the necks of people who, some day, may be his successors in title as Chiefs of Staff of the Army as distinct from Ministers for Defence.

I am rather puzzled about the position of the nursing service in this Bill. It seems to be half in and half out. I am anxious to know whether it would not be a good idea to make up our minds on the question as to whether it is to be in or out. I am all in favour of having it in in a more positive way, of making it a properly commissioned personnel, and of correlating the salary, emoluments and preferment of the members on a sound basis with the right to promotion on service and merit. As the Bill provides, this service is an adjunct of and part of Óglaigh na hÉireann, and that, in certain circumstances, its members will be subject to military law.

Comment on this

Are there not good reasons for that?

Comment on this
Seán Collins Mr. S. Collins Fine Gael

I am trying to elicit them from the Minister. In addition, it appears that the general disciplinary provisions which affect ordinary serving personnel would not affect the nursing service. I do not know why that situation should arise. If they are people who are permanent in their tenure of service like other members serving in the Army, why should there be this peculiar type of category for them? I wonder whether the Minister and his Department have taken counsel with people of long experience in the Army Nursing Service; whether they have taken a long or a short view in this particular approach. I am anxious to see the Army Nursing Service put on the same plane as the Army Medical Service, having all the dignity and all the status that should go with the performance of their work. They have a responsible task in the alleviation of pain and in the help and service they must give to the sick in the hospitals or in the various casualty stations which they at some time may be called upon to man. I feel that this Bill does not put them into their right category.

I have always contended, maybe erroneously, but I contend it here again, that this service merits the leadership and command of proper commissioned personnel from the service itself. That is the way in which discipline in that particular service should be conceived. It is not a very extensive service, but it is one that in time of stress may have to be expanded rapidly, and I do not see any reason why the basis of such a service should not be the same as any of the other departments or corps of the Army generally. Perhaps the Minister has some good reason for producing it as a kind of mottled egg. I would be interested to hear the reasons which have driven the Minister into making this peculiar type of distinction. According to his statement to us, they are members of Óglaigh na hÉireann, but for certain purposes they are not.

I was often puzzled during the period that I served in the Army as to what status these girls held. They could never resolve it for themselves, and this Bill is not much help to the resolution of that problem. What status are they to have in the Army? This Bill gives them none, other than the right to wear the type of uniform designed for them, and still this is an Army nursing service. I want the Minister seriously to consider whether it would not be wise to have, as happens in many other armies, proper commissioned personnel controlling this particular body and that the Director of the Army Nursing Service should have a rank that would put her in the position of being a consultant with the Director of the Army Medical Service, put her in the position of being able to feel that she was an integral part of the general Army Medical Service organisation.

I listened with interest to the Minister's reference to the change in regard to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy as an appeal from a court martial sentence. I listened with considerable interest to the change that makes an appeal direct to the Minister available to ordinary serving personnel, as distinct from the previous arrangement under which commissioned personnel only could solicit the direct investigation by the Minister of complaints. That is a good departure. I am not completely enamoured of the departure in connection with the exercise of the prerogative in the event of a sentence by a court martial, but the next stage is probably the more appropriate stage to deal specifically with that problem.

In general, viewing the Bill up and down, it does not make any startling departures. It does serve the purpose of having at last some permanency about this Act. I feel that much of the delay in connection with its introduction can be offset by the experience gained over a long period of temporary Acts. I feel that the Bill should meet with general acceptance in the House. I do not know if it is possible within the rules of order for the Minister on the next stage to have this Bill sent to a general committee of the House so that we could have individual minds tuned to the problem of defence and sympathetic to the Bill to deal with it at that stage.

If the interest that this Bill should have aroused is symbolised by the presence in the House of four ex-members of the Defence Forces, I feel that the Minister should ask the House to commit the Bill to people who are genuinely interested in trying to make it a good Bill to serve the purpose that the Long Title of the Bill envisages. I do not want to delay the House unduly on this particular stage of the Bill. I am sure my former colleague, Deputy Major de Valera is "rearing to go." If the Minister will take the line of getting the right people here to deal with the Bill on the Committee Stage I believe we will be able to hammer out a really worth while workmanlike Bill that can eventually be described as a Permanent Defence Forces Act.

Comment on this

I join in the protest made by Deputy Traynor in opening against the throwing in of this Bill to-day. We have been looking for this Bill for a long period. We have made many efforts in the past to get both the present Minister and his predecessor to make it available to us by bringing it forward here for consideration. It is regrettable that it should be thrown in now at a time when there is very little likelihood that all its stages can or will be discussed.

Comment on this

Why not?

Comment on this

That is the view I have in regard to the matter anyway.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

Will this Dáil deal with it in all its stages? Will it?

Comment on this

Yes, certainly.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

This Dáil? "Yes, certainly" is the Minister's answer.

Comment on this

This Dáil. If it were left to the three of us, I am sure we would have no difficulty.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

What is your answer? Will this Dáil deal with it?

Comment on this

Put your question through the Chair and see what answer you will get to it.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

You answered it before you thought.

Comment on this

We will mark time on the Bill.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

Heads are pretty sore already.

Comment on this

Since we are marking time on it, I do not intend to say very much on it. In other circumstances I might be inclined to speak at considerable length. Whether or not this Dáil deals with it, I feel it is the type of Bill that can be more properly dealt with on the Committee Stage rather than on this stage. There are very many points one might discuss, but I do not think it is helpful to discuss too many of them in a general way now. Deputy Seán Collins, in what I considered to be a very excellent contribution to this debate, said the delay in bringing in this permanent Act had the advantage perhaps of enabling us to gain experience during the long period of operation of the temporary Act. From my own experience I cannot subscribe to that view. Undoubtedly we did gain some experience, but we learned very bad habits at the same time—habits which it will be difficult to eradicate—during the operation of the defective 1923 Act.

That Act had to be given to the then Government as a matter of urgency. It was given to that Government on their promise to the Dáil that it would only have a lifetime of one year and that a permanent Act would be introduced within that year, an Act which Deputies would be enabled to discuss and examine. Like a lot of Governments, that first Government, having got their temporary Act, forgot their promise, and every year since there has been introduced here a Bill continuing that defective Act of 1923 right up to the present day.

At certain stages when certain administrative difficulties became apparent certain amendments were introduced, and the whole legal structure on which our Army is built is like an old cabin to which several new rooms have been added. From many points of view one could carry on under the temporary Act. Nevertheless, it has done considerable harm, because under the administration that has grown up in the last 28 years very bad precedents have been created, and these bad precedents are in my view to a large extent responsible for the fact that no young soldier after he has completed his preliminary period in the Regular Army will remain a single day in that Army. Expressions have been used like "fed-up" and "browned-off". That is the general feeling right through the Army, a feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent. That is attributable in large measure to the very defective foundation on which the legal structure of the Defence Forces has been built.

The 1923 Act provides a scale of disciplinary punishments which have very often been operated harshly particularly against young officers and young soldiers. Power is given in the Act to officers of very little experience to impose rather drastic punishments. From time to time those punishments have unfortunately been imposed. A disciplinary system has grown up under that Act which is largely responsible for the dissatisfaction and discontent I have mentioned. While there are some little rights given in regard to punishments imposed by a commanding officer that involve penal deductions in pay, there is provision in the Act whereby the Minister himself may make an Order deducting substantial sums of money from a soldier or an officer. He can do that in the secret atmosphere of Parkgate Street and the solider or officer concerned has very little redress. True, he is told that the Minister proposes to make an Order against him and he is asked what he has to say about it, but I have never known any good to result from writing in about it. The decision to mulct an officer or soldier is taken by a civilian branch in the Department of Defence. Their view is that the Minister is nothing more or less than the machinery by which they mulct a member of the Defence Forces. Every one of us who served in the Defence Forces knows that that particular power has been operated unjustly and harshly.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

The Deputy means the recovery of barrack damages and losses?

Comment on this

Yes; in other words, where it may be held by somebody that a certain collision may be the fault of a particular person and there is an Order made against that person that he is to pay £60, £70 or £80 and he can do nothing about it. Clearly, a system like that is unjust. It was to put an end to the injustice of that system that I have been endeavouring since I came into the House to get this Bill brought in, so that I may be doing what I could to contribute towards removing those unjust provisions. I looked forward to doing that, though it may be that events will make it impossible for me to give that contribution. I would regret that very much, but these things do happen and may happen.

I think I have mentioned here before that under the name of discipline there has grown up this idea that a subordinate cannot be ordinarily human and have human emotions, that he dare not laugh or smile in the presence of his superiors in rank, that if there happens to be a superior around he has to keep his mouth shut and look serious. That may have been all right 30 or 40 years ago; but young people now, whether they are in the Army or not, will not put up with it. The last war, in the desert and in Europe, and probably the present war in Korea, show that all this nonsense and codology based on military rank is all wrong. A proper discipline is one that obliges officers and soldiers to carry out the lawful orders of their superiors, but it does not mean that they must treat their superiors as little tin gods and that they cannot laugh or smile or joke. Unfortunately, that is the sort of discipline which has developed here under the Act which this new Bill seeks to replace.

How many of us, during the emergency and since, walking down O'Connell Street have seen young soldiers talking to girl friends, being stopped by military police and in public upbraided or ordered to do something like buttoning up their coats. That sort of thing should not be permitted. I have always felt that it would be much better for the Army if the military police were confined to duties within barracks and military establishments. I see no reason in the world to have them parading around the streets of the city, causing annoyance and insulting our soldiers and their friends.

While this aspect of the question is important, there is another which is vitally important. I do not propose this evening to deal with the policy of defence, as that might be better dealt with at another time. But, whatever our policy is, we require soldiers to carry it out, and we cannot have them unless we pay them—and pay them wages the equivalent of the wage paid outside. It is not sufficient to say that we feed them and clothe them and give them railway vouchers twice a year. A young soldier must attire himself in mufti. He likes and should like—and it is to be admired in him— to go around respectably dressed in mufti. Unless he is paid a reasonable wage, he cannot provide himself with the clothes, the shoes, the hat and the overcoat, apart entirely from the ordinary normal enjoyment to which a young person is entitled. I avail of this opportunity of again impressing on the Minister that he must pay reasonably well, the soldiers, the N.C.O.s and the officers that go to complete the military machine.

I asked the Minister a question the other day about this and he suggested in reply that the cost of living did not affect the soldier, that they fed him in the barracks. I am sure that that was a view expressed by the Minister suddenly and without consideration, that it is a view which he would not sanction or approve of on consideration. The cost of living affects the soldier just as it affects everybody else. It affects the soldier's wife and the soldier's children. There ought to be an increase in pay and allowances to enable the soldiers and their families to live an ordinary, decent life. I do not intend to pursue that more than just to mention it, but no Minister or Government is ever going to build up a satisfactory Defence Force unless they pay the officers and soldiers that comprise that Defence Force. I know for myself and from my comrades who were serving in the Defence Forces then and from my friends who are serving in it now that they would much prefer to have a little practical appreciation from their country while they are serving than to have all this fulsome praise that one hears about them when they die.

Deputy Traynor touched on a problem this evening in regard to the Council of Defence and it is an aspect that is worth consideration. Two views have grown up in regard to the Council of Defence. There was the original view, when the Army was established first, that officers would serve in the Council of Defence, or its equivalent before the Council of Defence was formed, for such period as the Government of the time considered proper. Shortly after difficulties in the Army, known as the Mutiny period, the then Vice-President of the Executive Council, the late Kevin O'Higgins, stated in the Dáil that the Government had decided that no one would be permitted to have a feeling of proprietorship in these offices — I think those were the words that were then used by the late Kevin O'Higgins in regard to them. The Council of Defence was then established and it was provided that the period of office would be three years and that at the end of three years a person would retire from the office. Subsequent to 1932 there was a change and officers who served for the period of three years had that service extended. I had some doubt myself as to whether that was valid or not. It was done and it carried on, and the Bill now before the House wants to go back to the old idea but with a five-year limitation instead of three. Deputy Traynor is of opinion that the limitation of five years should not be there. I am strongly in favour of the old idea of three years and I think it is a wise thing to transfer an officer from the Council of Defence after he has given three years' service there and replace him with another officer, not retiring him from the Army altogether but sending him back to a command or to some other appointment to continue to serve. The great advantage of that system, as I saw it, was that it meant that all the time you were bringing to the top officers with more up-to-date experience of difficulties right down the line. Those officers coming into the Council of Defence with those difficulties fresh in their minds would endeavour to resolve them. In that way there would be a continual improvement and a satisfactory development of the Defence Forces. If you appoint an officer and retain him for too long a period, he thinks that nobody but himself has any correct ideas, and he causes quite a lot of trouble. The type of progress that should be made is not made.

To-day Deputy Traynor mentioned the marvellous services that the Government received from particular named officers because of the extension of service. I would not like to say very much on that point except that the soldiers and the officers down the line got a different impression from that of the Minister on the top. I would prefer to think that the views down the way were the sounder views.

Deputy Collins touched on one point, on which I will conclude — the reservoir of trained personnel in the country. I agree with Deputy Major de Valera that they are men who were trained some years ago, but, nevertheless, they have a wide training and very useful experience which I would like to see harnessed for defence purposes as quickly as possible. I would like to see a retiring officer or a discharged soldier, retiring or being discharged on the age limit at the termination of regular service, transferred into a reserve where he would be liable to continue to serve until he reached the age of 60 or 65 years. Every month for the past four or five years very experienced officers are being retired on pension, and the moment they retire from service they are lost as far as the nation is concerned. The nation pays them a pension, but does not oblige them to render any service to the nation in the future. I think there would and there should be agreement in the House that those experienced men should be retained on a reserve until they reached, say, the age of 65 years, and that they should be paid a reserve grant in the ordinary way for each year of service on the Reserve from the date of their retirement until they reached the age of 65 years. That would preserve to the nation very valuable services that should not be lost in the way they are being lost at the moment.

This Bill is non-controversial. It is fortunate that there are in the House many Deputies who have practical experience of the operation of the Defence Forces Code and the thousands of regulations made thereunder, and I am sure that whenever the Committee Stage of this Bill is reached those Deputies who had that practical experience will employ it for the purpose of passing into law or ensuring that there is passed into law, a Defence Forces Act from which all those defects I have mentioned here in the debates, and many others that might be mentioned, will be eliminated and that they will enable the Defence Forces to develop in a new way with a new idea of discipline based on the conception that every individual is a human being, whether he be a private soldier or a general, that there must be proper regard for the private soldier as a human being and that he cannot be treated in the way it has been the habit to treat him in the past.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I should like to emphasise, before mentioning some of the matters that have already been dealt with in another way, the fact that this Bill is nothing more than a consolidating Bill embodying such amendments of the existing Defence Forces Act as the Department of Defence thinks necessary and advisable at the moment. It does nothing in itself to implement policy and is a relatively minor contribution to tackling the serious defence problem before the country at the moment. Its value may be gauged from this fact, that, prior to 1939, this Bill was actually in contemplation. It was scheduled, as Deputy Traynor has told us earlier, for 18th October, 1939. The problems of the emergency were then upon us, but it was of such secondary importance that it was shoved into the background. That is its importance. It has an importance, an importance which I do not wish to minimise.

I wish to make it very clear that this Bill of itself is no contribution whatsoever, or very little practical contribution, to solving the defence problem which is before us at the moment. It is a provision, of course, for the legal basis for Army maintenance and administration. It is important from the point of view of the substitution of one enactment for a number of others. I also object to the Bill being brought in in this stop-gap method. I should like also to say that it is nothing the Government can claim as a contribution to the present defence problem. Over a period, there has been a problem, but at the moment I would like to approach this Bill with a background. I think it is very desirable at this stage that the background should be there.

The Government took over on 19th February, 1948, and the Defence Estimates were before the House in the following April, that is, just three years ago. Let this be the indictment and the evidence against this Government; let this be the evidence against this Government on perhaps the last occasion for indicting them in this respect. It is on the records of the House that on the occasion of the debate on the Defence Estimate in 1948 the ex-Taoiseach, the ex-Minister for Defence, the ex-Minister for Finance and some of the rest of us who could speak with perhaps a little special knowledge on the subject stated the position as we saw it clearly and unequivocally. Let this be the evidence against this Government that in the spring and early summer of 1948, the Scandinavian countries sounded the alarm and pointed to a deterioration in the international situation. That was followed by a situation in England and a special defence debate in the fall of 1948. In 1948, in a debate in this House — and the present Parliamentary Secretary who is listening to me now was in the House on that occasion and joined in the debate — I mentioned that the British had pointed out the deterioration in the situation and had reversed engines to face a problem that was developing and that thereafter the problem was further developed. What was the attitude of the Government? The attitude of the Government first of all was that there was no problem. It is on the records of the House. I refer to the speeches on every successive Estimate since and the quotations given by myself in particular on the 1949 Estimate. Up to last Christmas, the Government pretended that there was no problem and called us scaremongers, and the Minister for Defence spoke of knocking sparks off the barrack square. The Minister for Defence contributed articles, or gave interviews to the Sunday Independent. They were demonstrably untrue in fact.

Comment on this

Demonstrate.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

It has already been done in the figures.

Comment on this

That is one way out.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I will give the figures in a moment.

Comment on this

I asked for a demonstration.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

What was said about the tanks? I ask the people who know to look up the Sunday Independent to see what was said about tanks, and let the Army officers who know the facts judge the situation.

There was misrepresentation about strengths which were dealt with, I think, by myself in a published statement later. When this Government panicked on the cost of living, Korea, devaluation and all the other things were blamed and the Taoiseach made a statement about difficult times ahead. Then we were told about emergencies. I would give them credit for changing even at that late stage, if there was any evidence of a change. From that time in December to the present moment, parliamentary question after parliamentary question has been put down to elicit what has been done and what is being done. What is the result? In civil defence, we have had no practical results. The supply position has not been coordinated, and all these other problems of co-ordination in regard to defence, fire fighting, and so forth remain as they were.

Comment on this

The Deputy knows that is untrue.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

That is the truth and the Deputy knows it. I can quote question repeated after question and replies about things being under consideration and things going to be done, but never done. I will be a little more specific for the benefit of Deputy O'Higgins. The Army was handed over at a certain strength.

Comment on this

What strength?

Comment on this
Major de Valera

It was handed over, according to the Minister for Defence, at a figure of 8,672. The reference in that case is Volume 110 of the Official Debates of 14th April, 1948. The present strength, as given in a reply to me, at column 174 of Volume 125, is 7,781, roughly a 10 per cent. decrease in the strength of the Regular Army. In the case of the Reserve, it was handed over at the figure of 5,748, and, at 31st March, as given in a reply to me, it was 5,528, in or about a 4 per cent decrease. The F.C.A. was handed over at a nominal strength of 48,000. I will grant that there may have been room for adjustment in the case of that figure, but when the Minister was asked for the effective strength, after there had been time for consideration, it was given as about 30,000. I have not got the actual reference in that case, but I can get it for the Deputy, if necessary. The present strength, as given in a reply on 31st March, is 22,591, a 44 per cent. decrease.

I need not weary the House with complete details. They are already given in parliamentary questions and if the Deputy cares to look up the record from December to the present moment he will find the information there. Then the Minister for Defence will tell the people that the country is ready. I said on the Taoiseach's Estimate, and I say it deliberately again, that I could scarcely conceive a greater betrayal of a people, if the occasion should unfortunately develop, than to find that they had been misled by assurances of that sort and that there had been failure in the practical application and development of the policy which the Government alleged it is carrying out.

These are a few matters which, strictly speaking, are a little outside the Bill, but they are very important. The Bill can be gauged in its importance by the fact, on the one hand, that it is a good contribution to consolidating the existing law and the basis for the maintenance of the Defence Forces — there are probably some welcome amendments — and, on the other hand, by the fact that, when there is a practical job of work to be done, when there are practical problems to be solved by doing something rather than by legal formulae, this precise Bill was put into cold storage for the emergency.

With regard to the Bill itself, there are a number of points which can be commented on, but, as other Deputies have said, it is largely a Committee Bill, a Bill which is most amenable to treatment on Committee Stage. Some of it deals with discipline and in that regard I think we can deal with it only on Committee Stage, but I should like to say that I am glad that this anomalous position with regard to courts martial is at last to be put in order. I think the relevant section is Section 189. Any of us who saw the matter working out always felt that there was something to be remedied, and a number of us — Deputy Captain Cowan and myself — referred to it as far back as 1948.

The over-all structure of this Bill strikes me as providing very much for the conventional arrangement that we have. There is nothing more visualised than the Army, as we knew it, in its compartment and the civil part, as we knew it, in its compartment. Such things as where the outflow is to go do not seem to have been considered in either the drafting or development of the Bill. Deputy Cowan has put his finger on one matter and I have a good deal of sympathy with his view, that is, if an officer retires anywhere under 60, he is still likely to be very useful and the putting of such on officer on a retired list until he is 60, with a liability for recall and a corresponding remuneration as an officer on the Reserve, or some suitable remuneration, seems to be an idea worth examining. There are many posts in time of mobilisation — stores, adjutant's department and office work of that nature — which could usefully be filled by such experienced personnel, and I think the idea is one which is worth considering.

A further consideration where personnel — officer or non-commissioned rank — are concerned is the question of where they are going afterwards. I have always thought that a certain reservation in relation to certain types of State employment should be made for people with long service in the Defence Forces. How it is to be arranged is not easy to see, but in modern circumstances, when the ramifications of defence organisation extend into nearly everything, there is a very big case to be made for manning barrack maintenance, stores, base workshops and similar institutions with civilians. If that is so, the civilians who should go into these bases and barrack maintenance jobs would be people with service — in our case, Old I.R.A. service or Defence Force service. This consideration also has the advantage that the purely military side is relieved of extraneous duties to do a purely military job, and, with present difficulties in supply and personnel, it seems to have something to commend it.

There was another matter which came up for discussion with the Minister's predecessor and which also came up on questions. I think there was some misunderstanding about the matter. The Minister said he was looking into the question of civilians in corps and services. The problem visualised there is the actual servicing of combatant jobs by civil servants. In the technical corps and services — the actual technical units that would have to move and fight — certain technicians are required. Clearly they must be soldiers. That is a problem in itself. The need for solving that problem by the need for the provision of proper technicians in the Army proper must not be confused with the other idea, namely, that in regard to barrack maintenance, base workshops, stores and so forth, there is plenty of room and, in fact, it is good economics in such settled employments and nonmobile, non-combatant employments to staff them with civilians, and the preference should be given to people with service. If such ideas were translated into practice in some way it would have the effect — shall I say?— of catering for the outflow from the Army to some extent and also of relieving the purely military side from onerous duties that in modern times must take away from its efficiency. I see little evidence of any such broad basis of approach to this matter in this Bill. On the other hand, this Bill is limited, to all intents and purposes, as being the legal basis for the maintenance and administration of the forces as they are. However, as this opportunity offers, I should like the Minister to consider that broad aspect which would cater not only for the problem of retiral and the problem of the old soldier but which would also relieve the actual combatant forces and the Army proper from the necessity of finding duties which can very well be discharged by civilian personnel.

I come now to some of the matters which have been referred to in this Bill. First of all, the Council of Defence was referred to. That is purely an advisory body.

Comment on this

That is right.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

Perhaps a lay person, approaching this, might ask: "Why do you have to go and specify things about the principal staff officers mentioned here in the Bill? If you specify for them, why do you not specify for every other job down the line?" It is thought that there is a certain constitutional safeguard in having the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General mutually independent of each other and responsible only to the Minister. Possibly and probably there is something in that point of view. There is power in this Bill to delegate to the Chief of Staff a power of co-ordination. With that, there is going to be no difference of opinion between us. Furthermore, the suggestion, which, I believe, came from the Minister, to appoint a time annually to have this Bill come up, that is, a confirmation annually or a motion or a resolution——

Comment on this

I said that the difficulty was that, in regard to the permanent Bill, there was the disadvantage that it could not come before both Houses. The Estimate comes before this House. This House has a full opportunity of discussing defence but the second House has not got that opportunity. I think we shall have to have some arrangement whereby the Seanad will have an opportunity of discussing defence annually. I think they are entitled to it.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I think we are ad idem on that. It is in the nature of a further constitutional safeguard, in theory. In practice, it is an opportunity for discussing the matter, as the Minister says.

The Council of Defence is an advisory body. It has no executive functions, as such. The Minister remains the Minister and the Minister and the Government remain the executive authority in Army matters. That being so — though I can sympathise, especially with the people who are in the Department on the military end, as against the civilian end, with their views and a certain amount of their suspicions as to the predominance of the pen over the sword — I cannot see anything against including the Secretary of the body. I think it is the proper thing to do. If the Minister is going to have, for his advice and guidance in the matter, a group around him, I think that the three principal staff officers on the military side and the Secretary on the civilian side would be very appropriate people to be present. I cannot see the objection to it. Of course, there is the Parliamentary Secretary, too.

There is a matter in regard to this that I should like to mention to the Minister. The Minister is, of course, aware that the duties and post of Assistant Chief of Staff have, in modern times, an importance. The Minister will be aware that during the emergency the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff were important and that that officer carried out so much of a certain type of work assigned to the Chief of Staff that he was virtually in the position of being a principal staff officer. I may be wrong in this, but at one period I think the Assistant Chief of Staff attended, without status, the Council of Defence. In that particular case, I suggest he should be added to this list. If the practice has been to have him attend — and he very frequently attended, whether it was a universal practice or not to have him attend — then why not include him? You will have the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. Therefore, if you have those members, you have practically all the military side. Then you have the Secretary of the Department. You do not want to broaden this out, but, to complete the picture — if the Minister really wanted to get round the table the people whom he wanted to question and put against one another, so to speak, at one go, in regard to his Department — I think the Minister would certainly have these people and then I would add the Army Finance Officer. The objection may be that that is too many. The plain fact, however, is that these four military officers, especially if you go into any type of expansion, and the Secretary and the Army Finance Officer appear to me to be essential advisers to the Minister in the set-up. I see the objection, of course: it is opening it out. I realise that my two suggestions would perhaps be too many.

I come now to the question of the disqualification of an officer after three years in office. Something may be argued for and against that matter, as has been evidenced by some Deputies in their speeches. Deputy Cowan's view would probably, on the balance, be one you would consider if you were looking at the Army on a normal peace-time administration basis. The balance would probably come down there. Nevertheless, you are up against certain practical difficulties.

In a small Army like ours where there are few alternative appointments — even though the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, anyway, only carry the rank of colonel while they hold these posts — there is always a difficulty in any service, whether civil or military, of putting a man temporarily into a post in respect of which he is drawing emoluments which he will lose when he vacates the post. There is a real difficulty there and the logical conclusion in face of that difficulty seems to me to be that there would be a tendency to reach these posts purely by seniority, that is that a man would get into these posts on his way out which would completely defeat the aim and object of the argument advanced by Deputy Cowan. I am afraid that these difficulties are best faced as the individual problems of the day face the Minister. If you get a specially good man or team under exceptional circumstances there may be a case for continuing longer. As the Minister is very well aware there was a unique position after the change of Government in 1932 when a Government composed of the people on the defeated side in a civil war came in over the army that defeated them. Credit was due to all sides in the history of that period but apart from personalities there was a great case for the policy adopted by the Government at the time which did in effect mean elasticity in rules of this nature. The same thing happened during the emergency when it was necessary and desirable to maintain people in appointments. I am not dealing specifically with these appointments; the argument can be induced from all appointments in the Army and the principles of change could apply to matters not covered in the Bill. There is a lot to be said for the principles but in the special circumstances there is a lot to be said for modifying them and for facing specific problems in their specific circumstances. I think it is unwise to legislate generally and in advance in such detail for such specific cases and circumstances. It would lead either to unnecessarily tying the hands of the Government and the Minister or to straining the spirit if not the letter of the law. After all as long as we have Governments and Ministers they must take responsibility and be trusted with responsibility. I think it would be just as wise to delete that as a provision in the Bill whatever about adopting such a system as a policy within the Department as there is a lot to be said for it. The Minister would be wise to take that view. This matter will come up again on Committee so there is no need to go into it in greater detail.

Deputy Cowan mentioned the question of surcharge and there is something to be said for his view. It is highly undesirable that anything in the nature of a penalty particularly in peace time and indeed even in war time should be inflicted save in a judicial manner. The trouble is that all sorts of deductions can as Deputy Cowan said be decided in the Department. An amount is simply deducted from the soldier or officer and that is the end of it. He mentioned the question of transport. If it were a big thing like a crash you would have a court of inquiry and that is all right. It is something that can be nailed down provided the thing is public enough to the people concerned. The other idea might be considered with regard to punishments but how far that can be dealt with by amendment in this House I do not know.

The Minister was out and it is only fair to say to his face that I was joining issue with him on the statement that our defences were in adequate order.

Comment on this

Adequate order?

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I think the headline in one paper was — I can very easily send out for it——

Comment on this

You need not bother. I am far from satisfied.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I am afraid that I said hard things.

Comment on this

Say them again.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I said and I think the Minister would agree with me——

Comment on this

I hope not if it was hard.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

Wait until you hear what I said. I said that it would be a great betrayal to mislead the people by protestations and declarations that we were prepared and ready to implement a policy and that we had a policy if in fact we were not so ready and were not taking practical steps to the utmost extent of our capabilities to implement a policy. There are difficulties also and nobody can expect miracles, only a sincere effort.

Comment on this

Would the Deputy say how far he would go to be prepared and ready?

Comment on this
Major de Valera

First of all there is the question of civil defence.

Comment on this

What in your opinion would constitute being prepared and ready?

Comment on this
Major de Valera

Then the building up of defence forces. This would certainly not be the picture: a 10 per cent. fall in the Regular Army; a 4 per cent. fall in the Reserve, and nearly a 44 per cent. fall in the F.C.A. I think the Minister should clarify the statement he is alleged to have made on a recent occasion. While this Bill is a desirable one—I am neither criticising it nor running it down — which provides a regular basis for the maintenance and administration of the Army, I think that the Minister will also agree with me that it cannot be considered a big contribution to the specific defence problem which we should be facing at the moment. I admit that we have all introduced irrelevancies and gone into matters more proper to an Estimate debate; I tried to ask the Minister earlier whether we would have the chance on the Estimate of going into the matter of our general defence policy and what has or has not been done, but he has not told me.

In regard to this Bill, passing or not passing it in a particular period of time will hardly make an awful lot of difference. With regard to strengths, the position of the F.C.A. is very important. We all agree that the F.C.A. is an extremely important element of our forces. Any efforts that have been made in regard to that, I think we should commend, because to get the actual strength to an effective strength is an important consideration. The schemes for training that were more or less lately developed in some commands were important also, but it seemed to me that the F.C.A. had, in a way, slid into a position that might need a little bit more clarification and bit more energetic support.

It was originally thought of as a second line local defence. Under the conditions we have, the tendency has been to have it supply the place of a First Line Reserve. In the present circumstances, if we augment our First Line Reserve, it has to be done on a voluntary basis. I cannot see for the moment any other way of doing it, and something like a voluntary addition to the First Line Reserve is indicated. If that is so, the existing Second Line Reserve, the F.C.A., seems to be the place to start. You might divide that in this way, increase the liability and the amount of training you give to some members, and let it find a first line element as well as the local defence element.

However, that is a matter for staff recommendation to the Minister in the light of all the facts. It is a very bad thing for people outside, without the necessary information, to endeavour to do staff work or to engage in laying down ideas of that nature. I merely throw out the suggestion as a kind of indication of what I mean. The net point we are concerned with is the need for having an adequate First Line Reserve, and we must consider whether that is to be found through the F.C.A., and whether part of the F.C.A. is to play a first line role. If that is so, there might be a need for clarifying these considerations in the way the staff thinks best and there might be, on foot of that, some ground for an amendment or an addition to the Bill. That is the only reason I raise it now.

The question of the Reserve of Officers is generally safeguarded in the Bill by a kind of "other category" clause. That may be sufficient, but it seems to me that some investigations in that line of country will be warranted at some stage, and the net question is as to whether this Bill is broad enough and wide enough to contain such decisions, if they are desirable.

There is another matter I would like to comment upon, but perhaps it concerns Finance more than anything else. It is the mechanism of recruiting and recruiting campaigns. I think it is more a question of administration. The point is, what prospects there are of developing the Defence Forces in the present situation and to what extent will that depend on another factor, and that is the remuneration of the forces? It is a difficult problem, I know, and a lot of people who talk glibly about these things should realise that it is a difficult thing. It will be difficult, however, to get adequate numbers into the permanent force unless they are paid on a scale that will compete with what is available to them elsewhere. Attractive terms of employment will offer in regard to a number of things.

If the disparity between the pay in the forces and in civilian occupations is such as to discourage the recruit, I fear there will be a chronic recruiting problem, as there more or less is. Before anything else is done, the Government must face the problem of properly paying the lower paid ranks. I mentioned to the Minister's predecessor on another occasion the disparity in the increases in pay. Again, pay is a matter that comes more appropriately on the Estimate. At that time the Minister asked me to postpone dealing with it and I did so, but there is a bad gap, so to speak, a sag, in the middle of the scales as disclosed there. I also commend that to the Minister's attention.

How soon this Bill can get through is another matter. There are a large number of sections, 316, in the Bill, and then there are the Schedules. The Bill will take some time to go through a Committee of the whole House; of that there is no doubt. As regards many of its provisions, I think it should go through a Committee of the whole House, but I was wondering if there is any procedure by which certain purely consolidating parts could be dealt with by a Committee sitting on behalf of the House, while the main portions could be dealt with by the House as a whole. For instance, the parts dealing with military education and with the Council of Defence — these provisions should be discussed by all of us, but the parts dealing with military crimes, the whole schedule of crimes and sentences and all that kind of thing, is purely administrative and as to whether that could not be dealt with by a Select Committee, I have some doubts. I wonder if there is any way in which we could combine the two procedures—a Committee of the House and a Select Committee as well?

Comment on this
Patrick Hogan An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Labour Party

You cannot take away from the House the privilege of discussing the measure when it comes back from the Select Committee.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

However, I am sure the Minister will be advised on that matter. There has been, I fear, an over-emphasis on the suggestion of antagonism between the civilian and military aspects of the Minister's Department. That sometimes has been exaggerated and certainly it should not be there. The equalising of Army pay with civilian pay would be a first important matter. Substantial equalising of conditions would be the first requisite and, thereafter, the less we talk about that kind of thing the better.

The difficulties, in fact, that have arisen in the past have arisen largely from the attitude of the Department of Finance. The only thing about it was that, as the administrative machinery was weighted, the Department of Finance seemed to take preponderating weight in any decisions that were to be taken. They seemed to be able, in the end, by either delaying tactics or veto, or something like that, to overrule the Department of Defence view. That admittedly was there but that can be counteracted to a large extent by this Council of Defence, if it is alive — more alive than it was in the pre-emergency years, anyway — and if the Minister himself would pay more attention to it.

The civilian end of the Department is important in itself and I wonder as to whether, on that consideration, a Department of Defence Bill proper rather than a Defence Forces Bill in the traditional style would not be a better solution.

Comment on this

I am very sorry that Deputy Vivion de Valera could not resist utilising this occasion to further the campaign which he and a number of his colleagues in the Fianna Fáil Party started on 18th February, 1948, when the Government was changed, and that he insisted on using the occasion of the Defence Bill further to endeavour to bedevil and to sabotage the work which this Government has done and has been doing for the last three or three and a half years. Deputy de Valera and many of his colleagues, ever since the change of Government — and, it is significant enough, never before the change of Government — have been endeavouring to paint a picture of national unpreparedness, to suggest that, whether it was in the interest of economy or, as some of the Deputies opposite have suggested more than once, because the Government here desired to see this State unprepared for the purpose of making it subservient to another State, whatever the reason was, the inter-Party Government were not interested in the question of defence, were not endeavouring to tackle that question as it should be tackled.

That suggestion was made here this evening by Deputy Vivion de Valera, just as it has been made in the past by that Deputy and a number of other Deputies opposite. He endeavoured to give the gloss, as he has also done in the past, that if Fianna Fáil were still in office, their plans were different, their plans were for a larger army, their plans were for an all-out drive on this matter of defence. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

I say it deliberately now that they were. There was a recruiting drive in progress and to be organised. You stopped it. The establishment provided for a greater strength than the actual one. You reduced it to an establishment below it. I say that these statements we made are absolutely true.

Comment on this

The Deputy is very fond of making charges and then running away from them.

Comment on this
Major de Valera

All right. We will get the figures.

Comment on this