Committee on Finance. - Motion by Minister for Finance—(Resumed).
Contributions 116–225 of 225. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I appreciate that. The truth of the matter is that Deputy McQuillan is very concerned about his seat and, if he could forget the safety of the seat, he would be one of the best Deputies in the House. He can deal with that particular piece of advice as he thinks fit.
Comment on this
I want now to come to the remarks of the Central Bank of Ireland in the opening pages of the last two numbers of the bulletin. They concern themselves, rightly, with what the Central Bank considers to be a major financial problem. Mind you, it is a serious enough economic problem, but it is a more serious financial problem because of technical difficulties. I particularly want to refer to one paragraph of what they had to say, on page 3 of the January bulletin. They say this:—
"Of the total reduction in net external holdings of the Associated Banks during the last nine years (1947-1955) amounting to £73.8 million, almost half, i.e. £35.6 million—roughly the same as the external payments deficit—occurred in 1955."
Then it goes on to say:—
"In view of the close connection that has emerged in 1955 between the increase in the excess of imports, on the one hand, and the reduction in the net external holdings of the banks, on the other, the following additional comparison may be of interest."
I do not take any particular pride in the fact that I noticed this particular coincidence many months ago. The fact of the matter is that it is purely a coincidence. When the famous £62,000,000 deficit occurred, the banks, to the best of my recollection, lost £17,000,000. In other years, when there were deficits, as Deputies know there were, the banks added to their holdings. If you got a statistician on the job and asked him to calculate the coefficient of correlation between the loss of external assets by the banks and our external balance of payments deficit, he would be very lucky if he got a coefficient of point one. There must be some little coefficient, but the statistical maximum is plus one, and he would be very lucky if he got a point one coefficient.
Comment on this
I do not quite know what the Deputy means by coefficient in this case, but does it not point to certain buffers being exhausted?
Comment on this
And is it not a danger signal if it does go together, because the buffers are exhausted?
Comment on this
We do not know if the buffers are exhausted or not. I will come back to that in a moment.
Comment on this
Do not let me forget it, as I might do. The purpose of my reading that passage from the bulletin —and the same applies to the third page comment in the October issue—is this: nowhere in these three or four pages is it suggested that the Central Bank of Ireland had anything whatever to do with this. Would it interest Deputies to know this, that if you subtract £35,000,000—the deficit of last year—from £73,000,000, you get £38,000,000 that the commercial banks have lost in external assets? Where did that £38,000,000 go? Would anyone chance an answer? It went into the Central Bank of Ireland, the whole £38,000,000 of it. If the Central Bank of Ireland do not like that comment, they can pull their hats pretty close over their ears. It happens to be true.
Comment on this
Yes, they got cash for the legal tender notes which are really till money, the ordinary money in circulation in the community and they turned that into British Government securities.
Comment on this
You will get it in the table related to the Legal Tender Note Fund, but it only goes back to the year 1951 in this publication. If you go back to 1947 you will find that I am right.
Comment on this
Maybe I misunderstood the Parliamentary Secretary. Did I understand him to say there was a net increase of £38,000,000?
Comment on this
Will the Parliamentary Secretary help us by precisely defining the nature of that increase?
Comment on this
The Deputy will find the information in relation to the years since 1951 on page 4 of the bulletin.
Comment on this
It is a decrease in the external holdings of the commercial banks, which is the subject we are discussing, and an increase in the external holdings of the Central Bank.
Comment on this
Then there is no deficit? The deficit has not been accounted for.
Comment on this
If anywhere in these two numbers the Central Bank, in their commentary, had said this, even devoted one sentence to it, I would not have mentioned it at all in this House but they point the finger at the politicians as much as to say: "They are not doing their job. Look at what they are allowing to happen." They do not say one word at all about the particular part of the job the Central Bank is doing.
Comment on this
That £38,000,000 will show as a net increase in the external holdings of the Central Bank?
Comment on this
Some little while ago I became interested in an effort to see how our external holdings had gone in the last eight or nine years. I had some calculations made; I did not make them myself, but I asked them to be made, and I want to say I take responsibility for them. This was the answer provisionally which came out of the calculations which were made. The figures I will give are the current cash values of our external holdings. In the middle of 1947, £450,000,000; that did not change seriously in the immediately following years. It increased in the year 1951 when it amounted to £460,000,000. It dropped to £400,000,000 in 1952. Since then it has increased steadily and it amounted to £500,000,000 in the middle of the year 1955.
Comment on this
Yes, gross. Deputies will, of course, appreciate that there has been a change in the current market value of some of the assets but that has cut both ways because certain Government securities held have gone down in value but, on the other hand, the industrial shares have tended to go up. It does not prove there has been no realisation of the assets, but it does prove that until the middle of last year there was no serious drain on the gross assets. On the contrary, if you take nominal values, you will see they had increased.
Comment on this
That would mean there is no balance of payments problem?
Comment on this
If the Deputy would only understand, the balance of payments problem which we are discussing blew up since the middle of last year.
Comment on this
Is there an ascertainable deficit in that period?
Comment on this
I would be inclined to think it is probably since the middle of last year of the order of £25,000,000 to £35,000,000. It is hard to be sure.
Comment on this
In other words, there is a deficit there. Where is it covered?
Comment on this
There is a good deal of evidence it was financed from the commercial banks. It is like every other problem; you cannot answer it absolutely.
Comment on this
The Deputy said earlier £38,000,000 was simply transferred from the commercial banks to the Central Bank, and that would leave no net change in the external field. If that was so, simpliciter, I am asking the Deputy where was the deficit in the balance of payments covered?
Comment on this
Could I refer the Deputy to page 3 of the document he has in front of him and to the paragraph which says that the net total reduction in the external holdings of the Associated Banks was £73,000,000 over a period of nine years. If the Deputy considers that, he will probably agree that £38,000,000 is what is left.
There is perhaps one other proof about these buffers. Our balance of payments shows that the income from our investments abroad went up from £17,500,000 in 1947 to £24.2 million in 1954. That certainly does not suggest any serious running down up to that.
Comment on this
I understand it will show some increase again in 1955. Again I am not suggesting that we have not been realising external securities in recent months. I am just saying it is a proof that we have not drawn yet to any great extent on our external assets. As the Deputy will know, there is the Marshall Aid loan which, of course, was an indebtedness. That increases our indebtedness to foreign countries and there have been, I take it, investments by foreigners here. But certainly, so far as our gross figures go, any reduction in the nominal value has come about in the last six or eight months. Will anybody suggest that, in such circumstances, the Government should have waded in the moment a deficit appeared?
I wanted to make certain comparisons in regard to the capital Budget, a matter to which one of the Deputies opposite referred. The subscriptions to public loans increased up to the middle of Deputy MacEntee's term of office: £20,000,000 in 1950, £20,000,000 in 1952, £33,000,000 in 1953, £25,000,000 in 1954 and £20,000,000 in 1955. Notice the gradual drawing down again, although State expenditure on capital was much the same as it was in the middle of Deputy MacEntee's period of office. It has varied only marginally in recent years. It has been somewhere in the region of £33,000,000 or so. I am talking now about the capital expenditure that comes out, not the expenditure that is outlined in the Budget. It has been in the region of £33,000,000 ever since 1951.
There is one other point, as a comment on the way the present Government has been managing the finances of the State. I took the total debt outstanding and subtracted from it the liquid assets, meaning the moneys there in liquid form, funds easily realised and so on, and I found that the increase in the net—that is, the difference between the gross debt and the liquid assets—in 1951/52 was £36.7 million; in 1952/53, £29,000,000; in 1953/54, £32,000,000; and in 1954/55, £28.6 million. In other words, we must have financed in 1954/55 some of the capital expenditure from revenue otherwise obtained than from the creation of debt.
Comment on this
I can give you the figures. Perhaps if I take one, it will explain what I mean. On 31st March, 1951, the gross national debt was £173.7 million and the liquid assets were £34.2 million. The bulk of that was moneys in Marshall Aid Counterpart Fund, actually moneys in the Central Bank. That was well down the following year! They are moneys of various kinds which are easily realised.
Comment on this
If we are going to talk about liquid assets, I have just one comment on them. They were £34.2 million on the 31st March, 1951, and £8.3 million on 31st March, 1952. We all know how that came about, I think.
Comment on this
I feel that the Minister for Finance deserves the commendation of all for the manner in which he has been working in recent months on that problem, and there is not the slightest doubt, from the absence of criticism with any punch in it on the far side of the House, that he has, in fact, got the commendation of not alone this side of the House, but the other side of the House also, even though they cannot say it in public.
Comment on this
I was rather amazed to hear the speech of the Tánaiste here to-night. It is quite obvious to me that something happened to him on his recent American visit. Not only is he the same man with different clothes, but he is a changed man with a different mentality. Svengali never had such an effect on Trilby. Nobody having listened to the Tánaiste over the years gone past, could really believe they were listening to the same person here to-night. I think that he still imagines he is strolling down Times Square, New York, with the leader of Local 109. He devoted most of his speech here to-night to appealing to the country to buy Irish goods in the year 1956 as his contribution, as Tánaiste of this Government, to solve our national problem here. He appealed to all sides of the House to deal with, what he terms, this storm that the nation must weather, but anybody listening for the past 15 or 20 minutes to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, who seems to think there is no storm and who has devoted his time in this House to an argument suggesting there is no problem——
Comment on this
I beg the Parliamentary Secretary's pardon. I refer to the gentleman sitting behind him who is, I understand, Parliamentary Secretary to the Government. At all events, one would have thought that the Tánaiste in this Government would have informed the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government that there is a national problem—a problem to meet which the Tánaiste feels that he should appeal to the whole nation, whereas the Parliamentary Secretary thinks the whole thing is eyewash, that everything is being exaggerated, and that in a short time we will see that there was no such thing as a problem at all.
Comment on this
On a point of order, the Deputy was in the House when I spoke and is he entitled to pretend that he did not understand my speech in that fashion? There ought to be a limit.
Comment on this
I have listened patiently to the Parliamentary Secretary. He stated time and again——
Comment on this
On a point of order, is it not the custom of this House, when a Deputy states that he did say a certain thing, that his word is accepted? It is only a few minutes since I made these statements.
Comment on this
I listened to the Parliamentary Secretary endeavouring to prove that there was not such a problem, endeavouring to suggest, and he did in fact state—and the records of this House will show it—that time will prove that what we consider a problem is completely exaggerated; whereas, just before him, the Tánaiste was appealing to the nation, telling us that we were facing a national crisis and calling for the co-operation of all the people. I do not know whether it is true that the Taoiseach, a couple of days ago in New York, when he was presented with a green donkey by the Democratic Party, told them to save their breath because he had one at home in his office.
When the Tánaiste appeals to the nation and to every member in this House to look upon this as a national problem, and when the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government takes a completely different line, I wonder how is any Deputy to make up his mind as to whether there is a problem or whether there is what the Tánaiste calls a national financial storm. It is quite obvious that, not alone is there a problem, but that there is a storm; it is quite obvious that, although the Government realised that it was there for a very considerable time, they did what the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government stated a few minutes ago. They stopped, they looked and they listened; and they come in here now with a Supplementary Budget in what they say is an endeavour to meet this problem.
Everybody—even those with a most rudimentary grasp of finance—knows that the problem facing the British and the problem facing us is fundamentally this. The economic problem in both countries is different and applying the same solutions which this Government proposes to apply here as are being applied by the British is fundamentally unsound. The solutions enshrined in these measures are too small, too late and misconceived.
We all know that to stop the working man buying a bicycle or an autocycle will not solve this nation's problems. Stopping a woman, who was promised that when she got rural electrification she would be saved from all the drudgery, from buying a washing machine will not solve the nation's problems. Anyone listening to the Tánaiste, who purports to be an Irish Labour leader, the man who signed his name to these Orders, would never realise that he is the same man we heard preaching up and down the country some years ago. When Deputies opposite go down to meet the bog workers in Offaly, who will now have to buy an extra pair of Wellingtons because the Labour Tánaiste has prevented them from getting a bicycle, they will get their answer.
I suggest to those Deputies who are fooling themselves and misleading the nation that these half-baked measures will not solve our balance of payments problem and that they are doing a disservice to the public. There is only one way of dealing with this problem and that is by increasing output and exporting more. It is strange that we have the Tánaiste appealing to Irish industrialists to produce more because these were the people who, a couple of short years ago, were held up by the Tánaiste as the robbers of the Irish community. A gospel was preached from one end of the country to the other that firms that made more than 10 per cent. profit were to be treated as national parasites. That doctrine was preached for consumption by the people up and down this country.
The people who were manufacturing goods were held up to public odium, ridicule and contempt. These are now the very people with whom the Tánaiste is wining and dining, and to whom an appeal is made to increase output. It is perhaps late now to talk about the time gone by. It is late now to talk about the way the people were misled. It is late now, when we have gone a long way in a national crisis without taking any proper measures to meet it, to regret what happened in the past but it behoves all of us to see what we can do to solve the problem that confronts us. I want to make it quite clear that I consider the measures introduced as being useless from that point of view.
One of the first things the nation must tackle is to take some particular branch of agriculture, endeavour to increase output and increase the agricultural exports of the nation. I often wondered that there was not an agreed national policy on agriculture just the same as in other countries where you have an agreed foreign policy as between different Parties. I often regretted that we had not a system like the Dutch where the Government can call in a particular expert to take charge of a particular Department and have an agreed policy for that particular line from the point of view of the nation.
I should like, as briefly as I can, to deal with one aspect of our exports in agriculture which has declined and is steadily declining. It is an export, the volume and value of which we could increase very many times what they are at the present time. I refer to the export of pigs and bacon. Let us see how far we have gone downhill in this matter. If we take the percentage decreases in the industry between January, 1954, and January, 1955, we will see that breeding sows decreased by 15.5 per cent. and other pigs decreased by 14.4 per cent. In January, 1956, breeding sows decreased 9.6 per cent. and in our total pig population we have the astounding decrease of 16.9 per cent.; we are now down to a total pig population of 672,000.
These are figures in respect of an industry which used to be the second largest exporting industry in this country. There is no reason why, if the proper policy is adopted, in six or nine months the exports in connection with that particular industry could not be very substantially increased. These exports would contribute in a very substantial way towards reducing our adverse trade balance.
The whole question of the bacon industry is tied to the price of feeding stuffs. It was announced yesterday, I think, by the Minister for Agriculture that 235/- would now be paid for grade A bacon.
Comment on this
That price is, in my view, useless in view of the cost of feeding stuffs at the present time which is approximately £32 per ton. In dealing with bacon exports we have got to look at what our competitors are getting. They get whatever price they might get in a free British market less 10 per cent. but their costs are far below ours. Their costings are approximately £23 per ton for feed, plus an export subsidy to the bacon exporters, plus an individual subsidy to the farmers who produce bacon for export. Accordingly, it is the height of absurdity to suggest that we can compete with these people in the British market, people who have their feed at the price they have it and special inducements towards production.
The whole question of succeeding in that market against our competitors boils down to whether we can give pig feed to our producers at an economic price. Otherwise, it does not matter what price is fixed for bacon, because our producers will not produce unless it is economic for them. It cannot be economic for them at present having regard to the present price of feeding stuffs.
Deputies on the opposite side of the House may not like to be reminded that we have a Minister for Agriculture who stated publicly, in his own flamboyant way, that while he was Minister for Agriculture, Indian meal would not cost more than £26 per ton. Those days seem to be far off now but pig producers remember that in January, 1944, their produce was commanding 244/6d. per cwt. Since 1944 not only have their costings not gone down, they have gone up. Our present price —about which, I am sure, our Minister for Agriculture will start waving flags —is 235/-, which is considerably less than the price commanded for pigs in this country approximately two years ago. So here we have it.
What are we going to do about that? How are we going to gear our industry which, as I have said, we can increase in a very short time? It is one of the industries we can expand in a short time and in relation to which we can very substantially increase our exports. To my view, there must be essentially a long-term planning on this matter. There is the need for guaranteed prices over a minimum period of five years. Then there must also be continuity of supply in the market to which we are exporting. It is the height of absurdity to do in the bacon industry what has been done over the past few years, that is, to export one month, then to have no exports for two or three months and then to start exporting again for another month or two and, furthermore, exporting when there is already a surplus on the market. Irish bacon has become known on the British market for its nuisance value. The people in Smithfield market who could build up a trade in Irish bacon find that having got some supplies and sold them to their customers and created a liking for Irish bacon then, perhaps for a month or two months, there are no further supplies.
Apart altogether from the quality of our product, it is clear that in the selling of bacon as in the selling of other things such as, for instance, cigarettes, the question of taste arises to a great degree. Take as an example a man who is selling Sweet Afton cigarettes. His customers come in to him day after day and buy Sweet Afton cigarettes from him. Then, for a period, he has no further supplies of Sweet Afton cigarettes and he starts to supply his customers with, say, Player's cigarettes. The next thing that happens is that the customer gets used to the Player's cigarettes and will not take Sweet Afton cigarettes any more. It is obvious, therefore, that we must have continuity in our bacon supplies. If we establish a trade for Irish bacon and then if we cease to supply it for a period so that it cannot be obtained regularly and at a competitive price the position will be that Danish bacon and other bacon will be stocked in the shops and the customers will get into the habit of buying the other bacon and will stick to it.
I have been emphasising that in this branch of our agricultural industry we must plan ahead and ensure a continuity of supply. We must announce the price at least 12 months ahead so that the farmer will know what he will have to pay for his pig feeding. The farmer must know how he will be able to produce at the fixed price for which he has got to sell his pig. If the farmer is not given these particulars then we shall not get the production or the supplies. There are different ways in which that might be done. I believe that the bacon industry could, themselves, deliver feeding at first cost to certain centres, to farmers, if the scheme were worked out in that way. We must produce more barley for pig feeding. There is an obvious way of doing that, namely, by price inducement and other inducements.
A very obvious method would be this. Since the emergency days, the Government have the percentage of arable land on every holding in this country. If, in the morning, the Government wanted to do it, every acre over a certain minimum percentage of that arable percentage on each holding could be derated. In that way we would get more tillage. In that way we would be able to till double the amount because we would be producing here the cereals we import from the far ends of the earth and we could export from here at first cost and compete with our competitors, in the British market at all events, very fully and favourably in the bacon industry. If there is some realistic thinking about this whole matter, I think something can be done in relation to bacon.
I urge that industry particularly because pigs are animals the production of which you can increase in a very short period of time, and time is very urgent so far as our adverse trade balance problem is concerned. To meet the urgency of that problem by in-increasing very substantially and in a comparatively short time part of our exports, I think one of the quickest results we might get would be obtained by stepping up our bacon exports as a whole and I urge the Government to think along such lines. It is true that we shall have to make a couple of changes before we get realistic thinking on this matter. It is not so long ago since our present Minister for Agriculture was threatening to drown the British in eggs and to choke them with butter. I believe that many of the farming community at the present time are convinced that one of the prerequisites to stability in the Irish agricultural industry would be to drown the Minister for Agriculture—at all events, it might be the cheapest way of getting rid of him—and to put somebody in his stead who will not be as blinded by personal prejudice as he is, who will think of the necessities of the nation and ensure that we shall have increased agricultural exports and that the Irish farmer will be given a chance. I believe that, if given a chance and if given a lead and encouragement, we will get results quickly from our agricultural industry in particular.
If we take the complete change that we have had in Government mentality, as expressed by the Tánaiste in this House to-night, we can see and examine some of the very curious results we have had on the financial policy of the present Government. It is only about two or three short years ago since we had to listen, time and time again, to lectures from the Tánaiste and members of the Government about the sacred cow of sterling. I was sick and tired of sitting here and listening to speeches on the awful admiration that we, in Fianna Fáil, were supposed to have had for the sacred cow of sterling. We were told we were putting up the price of money at the behest of the British Government. We were told we were accepting dictation from the British Chancellor of the Exchequer.
I would like Deputies to examine now the sacred cow of sterling. In particular, I should like Deputies to examine the financial result of the artificial insemination of the sacred cow of sterling as a result of Coalition policy—and then observe the Tánaiste coming in here and telling the nation not that the plutocrat must not ride in his car, not that the millionaire must not ride in the airplane, but that the poor bog worker cannot buy a bicycle and the poor countrywoman cannot buy the pram or the washing-machine.
I can see a very good reason why the Minister put a tax on razor blades. He has a far-seeing mind. I am quite sure he is afraid that many of his former supporters would cut his throat if they got him down the country with the same blades in view of his past promises to the workers and his present performance. We were told that there were financial buffers, but it was disproved by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government. We have listened to some financial buffers in this House for quite a long time. If the people on the opposite benches think they can convince the Irish public that these tax measures are for any purpose other than the getting of revenue—that they are going to solve our present ugly problem abroad from the point of view of our balance of payments—I can tell them that the people of the country will not fall for that now. Listening to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government, one would come to the conclusion that these measures are a fraud and a sham. He seems to think that they are a fraud and a sham and that there is no necessity for them. Listening to the Tánaiste, if he could shake off the effects of the New York air, we would be led to believe that we are facing a national storm. The Taoiseach, before he went to America, I think, referred to it as a problem. I wonder what is it?
I wonder why the Government thought fit to bring in all these tax Orders if they themselves cannot make up their minds whether it is a problem or a financial storm, as they are saying, with different voices.
There is one thing clear in the Estimates before the House and it is that when we come to the question of capital expenditure and what these people will do about it, the doubts expressed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government, as to what will happen, are justified because in the Estimates before the House the provision of £1,000,000 for hospitals is left out. Last week a deputation from my county looked for money for our hospitals from the Government and we were told by the officials of the Minister for Health that there was no money to deal with us. At the same time £1,000,000 that went towards solving that problem is being removed from the Estimates here. That is one way to control Government spending, but not the way, I suggest, that would meet with the wishes of the vast majority of the people.
When the people have digested the present measures advanced by the Minister and when he returns with the next Budget, in five or six weeks' time, to tell them that not alone will they have to meet Deputy MacEntee's cruel imposts, as he described them, plus all the taxes that are being imposed this week plus the taxes he is going to put on cigarettes, tobacco and the working man's pint that he talked about a couple of years ago, let the public then judge the Minister and this Government.
I hope the balance of payments problem will last this Government out for at least another twelve months. They are entitled to it. They have got away with it so far and they will never get the opportunity again when the Irish public have a chance of casting their votes.
Comment on this
Deputy Childers, when speaking in this debate to-day, suggested that this discussion should be conducted or continued in an air of realism. That is probably a very sound suggestion but I greatly doubt that even the contribution of Deputy Childers himself or the contributions of many of his colleagues to this debate do add an air of realism to the discussion of this problem. A very great number of Deputies opposite devoted their contributions or a large proportion of their contributions to this debate to an over-persistent or over-strenuous attempt to prove once more that the Budget of 1952 was a justified Budget. The very fact, even to a very impartial observer, that so much energy and so much excitement is now brought in to the strenuous defence of that Budget at this stage is a fairly clear indication that it probably was not sound and that anything that required so much defending for so long after it was done is unlikely to have been good on its own merits. But, whether it was sound or not sound, I do not think a re-fighting of that particular battle is likely to bring an air of realism to a discussion of the problem which arises on this Vote on Account or on the measures which have been brought in to meet it.
With regard to those measures, and that, after all, is what we are discussing, that is, the action which we will take or which we ought not to take, according to the Deputies' views, what view has been put forward by the Deputies opposite? There have been two entirely separate views put forward. I think, probably, the Front Bench view is that the measures are correct. Some people are—may I put it this way?—kicking for touch by saying that they are correct but not sufficiently drastic. We then have the view of Deputies, such as Deputy Moran, who suggests that it is a drastic imposition on the people of this country and that it is a new hardship brought on to them by this Government.
Let us take the first view, namely, that the measures are correct but not sufficiently harsh. All through this debate one thing largely unsaid has become more and more apparent—that the real division of this House on this problem and on the measures needed now to cure it is that if the Deputies opposite were now in control of the financial policy of this country we would have a re-imposition of their previous policy. I believe that the real key to the view of the Fianna Fáil Party on these measures and this problem is to be found, not, strangely enough, in any of the speeches that have been made on this Vote, but in a speech made by Deputy Childers about a week ago on the Supplies and Services Bill. In that speech he referred to the sordid dispute about the cost of living. I believe that attitude of the Fianna Fáil Party, in which the business of the cost of living is sordid and the question of the balance of payments is on a slightly higher level, is the real difference between the Deputies opposite and the Deputies on this side of the House.
It has been put forward here on a number of occasions in the last few days that the problem which now exists is somewhat similar to that which existed in 1952. We do not accept that. Deputy Lemass has said that the problem which now exists is much more serious, "more threatening" were his words, than that which existed in 1952. We do not accept that. But it is quite clear that if the Fianna Fáil Party were now on this side of the House they would apply the same remedy, in greater or lesser degree, as they applied to what they considered to be the problem in 1952. The basic differences between that remedy and the remedy now being proposed by the Minister to the House is that, whereas it is reasonable to assume that these remedies will not result in any substantial disturbance in the employment conditions in this country, the remedies which were proposed and put into effect in 1952 shattered the employment situation in this country. I think that is the real division between the members supporting the Government and those opposing the Government on this Vote.
There are more ways of curing blood poisoning than amputation and I believe there are more ways of curing a problem of the balance of payments than anything which will throw some twenty-odd thousand people out of employment. Of course, if you bring in measures resulting in the disemployment of twenty-odd thousand people in this country you will cure your balance of payments problem overnight. We, on this side of the House do not believe that is necessary, do not believe it is justified, and we do not believe that sacrifice should or need be made. We have been twitted here with imposing taxes on bicycles and autocycles. Deputy Moran has just said that stopping the working man from buying a bicycle or an autocycle is not going to solve this country's problem, but those on the far side of the House believed and still believe that, while the working man should not be stopped from buying autocycles, his country's problems could be solved by stopping him from buying bread, butter, flour, sugar and tea.
That is the real difference between the two approaches to this problem. I think the Minister for Finance, in selecting the 68 objects the import of which he desires to restrict, had one supervening and all-important standard of measurement to apply to them, and that was that, in so far as it was at all possible, he was going to avoid affecting what are ordinary necessaries of ordinary working-class families. The same approach never came, and in my view never will come, from the far side of the House and I think that is where we must part on this issue.
I appreciate, in so far as some of these objects are by no means necessaries but matters of common purchase in all strata of society, that there will be a certain amount of sacrifice and a certain amount of cutting down in purchasing by every section of the public. I think that is necessary and justified, but I do not think that cutting down the power of the ordinary people to purchase the necessaries of life is any justifiable alternative to preventing the import of razor blades and auto-cycles. That belief sets me apart from the Deputies opposite and makes the real division between us.
The other measure that has been taken is that concerning hire purchase. Before I go on to that, I make one appeal to the Minister for Finance in regard to putting these measures into effect. He himself emphasised, when introducing the Bill, that the protection which will necessarily be afforded by the imposition of these duties is incidental and not intended, and he has emphasised that the Government will take very active steps to ensure that there will be no priceraising by manufacturers or distributors of Irish-made goods of the type on this list as a result of this incidental or by-product protection. I appeal to the Minister to try to ensure that, apart from any rise in prices, no conscious lowering in standard of Irish-produced goods takes place under the umbrella of this protection. It is quite clear that, for the purpose of restricting imports of a kind which are not essential and of a kind which form a substantial part of our import trade, protection will be given to manufacturers and distributors of Irish-produced goods who up to this moment have been fighting a very tough battle with imported competitors. That is no harm in itself, but I appeal strongly to the Minister and to the Government to ensure that none of these people takes advantage of that incidental protection to lower the quality of his goods.
It is utterly reasonable that a man going to purchase say, cutlery, or some of the gadgets or apparatus for photography or something of the sort mentioned here, if there is available an Irish equivalent at its ordinary reasonable price, should have to pay more under present circumstances if he wants to go in for fancy, imported articles, but it would be unfair, however, if next week, when he goes to purchase the Irish equivalent, he found that the quality had been lowered, while the price remained the same, by reason of the protection afforded.
With regard to hire-purchase restrictions, here again, it seems to me that a lot of the comments that have been made have moved away from the reality of the problem and from the intention of the cure. It has been suggested here—I think, by Deputy Briscoe—that a more desirable and a more urgent thing would be the provision under the hire-purchase code of some means of preventing the repossession of articles bought after a certain amount of payments have been made. I do not think that is a problem at all. The problem is as has been shortly stated here— people buying who have not got any part of the way towards saving the cost of the article. The actual figures shown for deposits and for the period of repayment are moderate. I can well envisage the circumstances under which more drastic figures than those would be justified, but the present figures should have the effect of preventing people who have made no attempt to save up any proportion of the cost of a new article from embarking on its purchase and tying themselves down for a considerable period to its purchase.
A circumstance which has arisen in many cases, I think, is that of a man who goes in to buy what is quite an ordinary purchase under the hire-purchase system, a wireless set. He is asked to put down a minimum deposit, at present a very small amount. He is asked to pay 5/- a week for a 14-guinea set, but for a 20-, 22- or 25-guinea set, he is asked to pay only another 1/- or 1/3. That is where it seems to me the great temptation arises and I do think the measures mentioned by the Minister should have the effect, without unnecessarily damping down the trade and without unnecessarily restricting the purchasing power of people who have not got the opportunity of running an overdraft in the bank, without unnecessarily doing any of that, of putting more reality into the system of hire purchase.
It has been suggested by Deputies here that the whole system of hire purchase is somewhat repugnant. I for one would not subscribe to that view. In effect, hire purchase very often provides the same facilities for a man on a weekly wage as others with businesses or land can get by raising an overdraft in the bank. If you seek to inquire into the number of people purchasing, in effect, on the hire-purchase system, that is, by paying the £20 cash price down now and raising an overdraft over a period in the bank, it would be quite large. Unnecessarily to restrict hire purchase is to hit one section of the people without hitting the other and would be unjust and unfair.
Shortly, therefore, I should like to congratulate the Minister on the measures he has taken. I do not believe, in regard to the existing problem, that they are insufficiently drastic. I think they are flexible; I think it is a mistake to make a slash at the problem now and impose very drastic measures which may turn out to be unnecessary. These measures do not carry with them any guarantee, and they should not carry with them any guarantee, that further measures may not be necessary. I believe, above all else, that they are aimed in the right direction.
I believe the public are freed, or largely freed, from the penal consequences of the measures which the Deputies opposite imposed on a somewhat similar opportunity before. I believe the measures will not have the same effect on the employment situation in this country. I think that is the real difference which separates us, one side from the other, and the Minister and the Government are being logical in their attitude and consistent, if that is such a valuable virtue. In taking these measures rather than the ones which had been imposed before, and which the Deputies opposite would impose again if given an opportunity, the Government have avoided the imposition of a general depression on the economy of the country. While we must look with seriousness upon this problem of the balance of payments, it is right to say that it is undoubtedly the outcome of an expansion of our economy. I believe that any methods, whether designed or not, of depressing that economy, which would have the effect of a large increase in unemployment are not the answer, and are neither necessary nor justified.
Comment on this
It is rather intriguing to see that Deputy Finlay is at odds with the Minister for Finance because Deputy Finlay has just told us that this deficit in the balance of payments, which is causing so much concern to the Government, may be, according to him, an indication of an expanding economy. That would of course mean that the deficit in the balance of payments had been largely occasioned by an undue amount of imports of capital goods. I would recommend Deputy Finlay in this matter to read the speech of the Minister for Finance in which he told the House plainly and fairly that the deficit had been largely occasioned by the importation of goods for consumption and that he would not have been so concerned if, in fact, the statement of Deputy Finlay had any substance—that is, that the growing deficit was an indication of an expanding economy.
On the contrary, though the Minister did not say so in so many words, it is an indication of a wasting economy, of an economy which has been struck with pernicious anaemia. The Deputy also complained that certain speakers on this side of the House were concerned to defend the 1952 Budget. The 1952 Budget requires no defence. It has become the foundation of the Coalition's financial policy; it has been fully justified by them and by the fact that not one tax imposed by that Budget has been repealed, that not one subsidy reduced by it has been restored to its former level.
However, in Ireland of to-day we have to be grateful for small mercies. A couple of weeks ago I heard the policy of the present Government aptly expressed in a rhyming couplet which I think I should inflict on the House. It goes something like this:
While our cost of living soars How our Coalition snores.
Now I will confess the rhyme is no longer entirely apt. It is now only half true. The cost of living is still going up so it is still true to say that the cost of living soars. On the other hand, even we in the Opposition benches are constrained to admit that, since Monday last, the country has some reason to thank providence that the Government have stopped snoring. It would be just and fair to the public to say that within the last few days the Government appear to have become half awake. They now have one eye open to the danger that menaces our whole economy and the nation must be grateful for small mercies.
It is something to be thankful for that the Government are half alive to the hard facts of the situation and now admit that the deficit in the balance of payments has become a matter of grave concern to them and to all of us who have to live under them. The Government have been long forewarned as to the inevitable consequences of the policy which hitherto they pursued. The Central Bank has warned them, the responsible heads of financial institutions have warned them, experts in the realms of economics and finance have warned them, and during a debate here on the Government's policy on the 26th and 27th of October last we warned them what the results of their actions would be.
However, the members of the Government, and with them the Minister for Finance, have turned deaf ears to these warnings. They have shut their eyes to the unblinkable facts and, with the stubbornness usually associated with Coalitions as with other quadrupeds of mixed ancestry, they have brought the country to the verge of crisis. We should be grateful that at least they are so concerned with the financial and economic jeopardy in which they have placed our people that they are now proposing to take what they describe as entirely exceptional measures to deal with them. Various terms have been used by those supporting the Government to impress us with the idea that the Government are making strenuous efforts to grapple with the menace which their own policy has created.
I am glad to see that Deputy Finlay does not appear to be one of those who have been misled by that pretence. He realises that, far from these efforts being strenuous and heroic, "feeble" and "futile" are the only adjectives which can be applied to them. The Government are only half awake to the gravity of the situation. They have been able to screw themselves up to take only half measures. My view— and I feel sure time will confirm it—is that the steps which the Government are taking will prove to be quite ineffective in retrieving the situation which the procrastination of the Coalition has created.
I have no doubt whatever, and I think a number of people will agree with me, that if the measures which the Minister has outlined constitute the whole of the Government's plan to deal with the threat to our economy, then the deterioration in our balance of trade and in the value of our currency will continue and at an accelerated rate. It will in fact be the story of a repetition of the previous failures of the Coalition —the story of the tea prices all over again. We shall have a repetition of the bank rate fiasco, of the biscuit flour flop and of the five per cent. loan fiasco. It might be well to recall some of the statements made by the Minister on the balance of payments position for 1955 when he spoke in the House last Tuesday. As reported at Col. 325 of the Official Report, Vol. 155, the Minister said:—
"If we assume invisables at the same net figure as in 1954, as indeed we must in the absence of clear evidence of a variation, then the balance of payments deficit for 1955 was of the order of £35,000,000. A deficit of such magnitude would, in any circumstances, give cause for concern, arising as it did, not from the import of capital goods, but goods for consumption."
I regret Deputy Finlay is not here to hear the words of the Minister which contradict the reasons which he advanced. The Minister continued:—
"In addition, when we see it, as we must in the present instance, not in isolation but as part of a developing trend, it is one we cannot allow to continue."
Having said that, the Minister proceeded to examine the prospect for the coming year and stated that his survey—
"must rest on the basis of last year's probable £35,000,000 deficit, not as an isolated deficit, but as one likely to continue this year and even to grow unless other factors supervene."
By implication, two important admissions may be discerned in that statement. The first is that the inevitable consequence of continuing the inflationary policy which the Government has hitherto pursued would give rise to annually recurring deficits of dangerous dimensions on our balance of payments; and the secoond is that such deficits would tend to grow.
Those who are familiar with the history of our balance of payments over the past few years will realise that when the Minister contented himself with saying that the balance of payments deficits would be likely to grow unless measures were taken to curb them the Minister considerably understated the probabilities. Now, there are many Deputies who are new to this House and for the benefit of those who may be in that position and, therefore, not likely to be acquainted with the facts which support the Minister's case, as I am supporting it, in regard to the tendency and the trend of the deficit in our balance of payments, it may be well to recall the precise figures.
The deficits in our balance of payments in recent years ran something as follows—I am giving the figures to the nearest £1,000,000: for 1949 we had a deficit of £10,000,000. In 1950, when Deputy MacBride, Minister for External Affairs, took over control of the Department of Finance, the balance of payments deficit was trebled and rose to £30,000,000. In 1951, when the course had been already set by the Coalition, the deficit in the balance of payments was twice as much as it was in 1950, and stood at £62,000,000. Following the introduction of the 1952 Budget and the steps which we took to deal with that calamitous situation, the deficit in our balance of payments fell to £9,000,000. In 1953 it fell further, to £7,000,000. In 1954—during the first half of which we were in office—the deficit in the balance of payments stood at £6,000,000. In 1955 the balance of payments deficit suddenly jumped to nearly six times that figure, namely, £35,000,000. The total in round figures for the seven years I have enumerated is £159,000,000.
Let us revert now to the Minister's statement. Last year's probable £35,000,000 could not be taken as an isolated deficit but as one likely even to grow unless other factors supervene. It will be seen from the figures which I have given to the House that in the economic history of the last seven years, certain years are outstanding in their sinister significance. These years are, first, 1950 for which the balance of payments deficit was £30,000,000; 1951, for which it was £62,000,000—more than double, as I have said, what it was in the previous year; and, thirdly, 1955, in which it was £35,000,000—not so great as 1951, but greater than 1950, in fact, the second highest on record.
Comment on this
We may ask ourselves, in the light of past experience, what might the deficit be in this year, 1956, if a really serious endeavour is not made to redress the situation. The statistical records show that a deficit of £30,000,000 in 1950 was more than doubled in 1951. Will the deficit for 1956 be £70,000,000—that is, double what it was in 1955? The trend would appear to be that way.
Comment on this
The Deputy had better read the Minister's speech and take it to himself; and let the House take to itself what the Minister is saying about the probable future price for cattle.
Comment on this
As I was saying, the trend would appear to be in the direction that the deficit for 1955 will be doubled for 1956. Indeed, the Minister himself went very close, I think, to admitting that when he said on Tuesday last:—
"From what I have said, Deputies will realise that the forces operating on our balance of payments this year are adverse and in the absence of countervailing influences and controlling measures would enlarge further this year the deficit of last year, estimated approximately at £35 million. That is a situation no Government could allow, for, if it did, a point would ultimately be reached—and that sooner than some would care to realise—at which our available external resources would be exhausted."
One does not require to be exceptionally perspicacious to discern between the lines of that statement the gravest warning that this Dáil has ever heard from a Minister for Finance. It must be repeated to-night and I trust it will be listened to, even by the financial charlatans within the Dáil, and outside it, with which our country has been plagued in recent years.
On Tuesday last, the Minister for Finance told us that if the present trend in our balance of payments deficit continued:—
"a point would ultimately be reached—and that sooner than some would care to realise—at which our available external assets would be exhausted."
The full significance of that warning will be brought home to us if we turn to page 2 of the Central Bank Bulletin for January, 1956, and study the figures which are given in the table in paragraph 3. Those figures show the changes which took place in our banking system during the year 1955. They are all of the gravest import and they all tell the same story. They all point the same moral. However, the figures which are most pertinent in the present context, are those which show the changes in the external assets of our associated banks.
At 31st December, last, the net external assets of the banks were valued at £85,710,000. The previous year, at 31st December, 1954, they were valued at £121,331,000. Thus, in one year, the external resources of the community were reduced by £35,621,000. It is not a mere coincidence that the deficit on our balance of payments over the same period should also amount to £35,000,000. There is a close causal relationship between these two facts— a relationship which must not be lost sight of. Where has that £35,621,000, by which the net external assets of our banks have been reduced, gone? The Minister for Finance has told us that it has gone like last year's snow, that it has gone with the wind. It has been consumed and we have nothing in the year 1956, virtually nothing, to show for this £35,000,000.
It is necessary, however, to come back to that figure of £85,710,000 of the net external assets of the banks, which I have referred to. It is necessary because of the important warning which the Central Bank of Ireland gives in regard to it in the following terms—I am quoting again from the January Bulletin of the Central Bank:—
"Here it must be pointed out that the banks' true capacity to sustain domestic credit cannot be estimated by reference to all the net external assets, since a large part of such assets cannot be realised or called in in the ordinary course of banking business (e.g. loans and advances, working cash and money at call, premises, etc.). In fact, out of the total net external assets held by the Associated Banks in December last amounting to £85.7 million, only slightly more than one-half represented items available to meet drafts on banking resources."
From that passage, one may safely conclude, without being unjustifiably pessimistic, that, by 31st December last, the true capacity of our banks to sustain domestic credit had been reduced to little more than, say, £50,000,000. It would be proper also, and lamentably it would be proper, to take the view that to-day the capacity of the banks to sustain the present rate of community spending is appreciably less. The view that the capacity of our banks to extend credit has been sensibly diminished, even since the opening of this year, is substantiated by figures given by the Minister in his statement found in column 326 of the Official Report. These show that, as he said:—
"The deficit was built up over the year at an accelerating rate. In the first quarter of 1955 it was £3.8 million, in the second £5.4 million, in the third £9.7 million and in the last quarter £10.3 million."
How, in the light of these figures and in the light of the trend to which the Minister himself has referred, has the position developed so far this year? In January last, the Minister told us it was nearly £5,000,000 worse than the preceding January and in February something more than £2,000,000 worse, so that in the first two months of this year the position deteriorated by around £7,000,000 as compared with the first two months of last year. The deterioration, then, in our trading position—in our balance of payments position—has been developing at a rate of about £42,000,000 per 12 months. Therefore, if this trend were to continue, the deficit on our balance of payments would be about £40,000,000 greater than last year; that is to say, it would be of the order of £75,000,000. The experience, in short, of the years 1950 and 1951 would thus be repeated in 1955 and 1956, with the added complication that our available external reserves would be virtually exhausted.
Now, when we take these considerations in mind, the full significance of the phrase used by the Minister for Finance becomes clear. We now know where we are going—we now know the disaster towards which we are heading—the time when, as the Minister said, our available external resources will be exhausted, the time which will come "sooner than some would care to realise," the time when—and this is the important fact—because of the exhaustion of the resources, our Irish £ will no longer be able to maintain its parity with sterling. Then we shall see and experience the ill consequences of the fact that the link with sterling will be broken indeed and we shall have to devalue the Irish £. It is this menace which has moved the Government to the appearance of action. I use the phrase "appearance of action" deliberately.
It is opportune, perhaps, to ask what has produced this situation. There is only one answer: the deliberately inflationary policy the Government has pursued since it took office. On 26th October last the Dáil debated a motion to which the Government moved an amendment, an amendment in terms which, to those who grasped the implications of it, conveyed but one thing —that the Government had agreed to pursue an openly inflationary policy. The evils that would certainly ensue from such a policy were pointed out from this side of the House, but the Government disregarded the warning.
Now, less than six months later, the Minister for Finance comes to the Dáil and points out that "in the light of the experience of the past year or so which clearly reveals both the direct connection between high wages and still higher prices and the disturbing effect on the balance of payments of increased expenditure not matched by increased production, it is my earnest hope that at least until we surmount our present difficulties, there will be stability in money incomes."
Earlier in the same column, he told us: "In 1955, the high level of imports arose because we were consuming more than we were producing at home and therefore brought in imports to fill the gap."
I do not question either of these statements. On the contrary, I endorse them and hope the Minister for Finance, in the councils of the Government, will stand firm upon them. But there is nothing new in them—nothing that the Minister might not have learned had he listened, in October last, to the arguments addressed to him from this side of the House. But even more significant than the admissions to which I have referred—the statement is in the same column—the Minister declares:—
"A further increase in money incomes not matched by improvement in production and productivity could only at this juncture drive up domestic prices by causing an internal inflation or increase still further the volume of our imports for consumption purposes or effect, perhaps, a mixture of both."
That passage is the most momentous, carries the greatest weight of anything the Minister said in his statement. If the Minister means what he says and if—and I grant that the supposition is a large one—if he is authorised to speak for every element in the Government, it means that the whole disastrous policy, as enunciated in October last, the whole distastrous inflationary policy, has been abandoned by the Coalition.
The policy has been abandoned, but in the meantime how great is the damage done to our economy? How near have the whole of us—the community and every individual in it—been brought to the verge of collapse? In my belief, it has been brought to the point at which, if the present trend had been allowed to continue, we should have in a year or so been face to face with the urgent problem of a currency devaluation.
Now, we know how grave the situation is. Let us see how the Government proposes to deal with it. I heartily wish I could, in all honesty, commend the measures the Minister for Finance has announced. But I am convinced that, so far as the deficit on our balance of payments is concerned. they will prove to be little better than futile gestures—take the goods on which the special import levy has been imposed. The Minister has described them as the less essential consumer imports. Many of them—indeed, the great majority—can be described as less essential, but some of them, under modern conditions of life and with the present level of costs for certain services, have become essential to those who can no longer afford domestic help.
In every home, in every middle-class home at least, where there are young children and where appearances have to be maintained, a washing-machine can scarcely be done without. The lack of domestic help and the high cost of laundry services have compelled people, and will continue to compel people, to buy them. With the need, which high prices have enforced on everyone, to cheese-pare and save on every scrap of food, the same might be said of refrigerators. Neither can blanks for razor blades be described as less essential unless it is the aim of the Government to convert all gay bachelors into "hairy mollies." Fountain pens, ball-point pens and refills for them are certainly essential to the greater part of our people including every element from the schoolchild to the President.
Let us be frank about it, the special levy will have little effect on the importation of any of these articles. They will continue to be imported, perhaps in slightly reduced volume but not so reduced as to have any appreciable effect on our balance-of-payments deficit. The Minister for Finance will collect the import levy on them. They will substantially increase the revenue from Customs and that, I suspect, is the true purpose for which they have been imposed. The Minister will get 25 per cent. on this wide range of essentials but they will be that much, and more, dearer to those who cannot do without them. The items I have mentioned cannot be described as less essential.
Now let us turn to some of those which undeniably come within that category, like precious and semiprecious stones and pearls, pearls such as the Minister might cast before swine at a country cross-road meeting.
Comment on this
Precious metals, jewellery, certain types of watches, furs, radio-gramophones, pianos, record-players and music rolls. No one is likely to contend that these are essential articles, the importation of which could not be forgone without occasioning anything more than inconvenience or annoyance to the would-be purchaser. But that the importation of articles of this kind will be appreciably cut down by the new duties is, I submit, extremely doubtful. These are articles which are bought mainly by the well-to-do, to whom 25 per cent. or so means little if they desire to possess them. The wife who has screwed her husband up to the point at which he would like to see her in a mink coat is not going to be baulked because he may have to pay the Minister 25 per cent. on its cost. As well as that, we have to consider that the margin of profit on these articles is so great that, if need be, the trader will pay some part of the levy, so that the luxuries will continue to flow in—to the benefit of the Minister for Finance without any doubt, but to the continung detriment of the balance of payments.
Not only, therefore, will these articles come in as before—it is odds on they will come in in even greater volume. That may seem to be a paradox but it is not so paradoxical as appears at first sight, if we remember that these articles—precious stones, pearls, goldsmiths' and silversmiths' wares—are, in themselves, possessions which become stores of value. Precious stones, precious metals, jewellery, and such like, are articles in which people invest to save in security when inflation is open—as it has been in this country under the Coalition—and when the currency is weakening. The feeble pretence which the Government is making that the serious position in which the country finds itself is being tackled seriously will, in itself, ensure that the Minister for Finance will get substantial and, I think, an increasing revenue from imports such as these. And with these increasing imports and with the Minister's increasing revenue, let us not forget that the deficit in our balance of payments will continue to grow—and they are not capital goods, nor are they consumer goods; they are, as I have said, stores of value.
The Minister's new taxes will be levied upon no less than 68 categories of articles, including almost everything required for the home. They range from hot-water bottles, quilts and coverlets to engagement rings and even wedding rings. It is ironical that the Government which was returned to reduce taxation is now imposing additional taxation upon practically everything that comes into the country. Naturally in these conditions the gain to the revenue at the expense of the taxpayer will be considerable, but the effect upon the balance of payments deficit will be very small indeed. The Minister in his own statement admitted that. His own estimate—and, in my opinion, it is an under-estimate—is that the new import levy of 25 per cent. will be collected on about £18,000,000 worth of imports. This will give him £4,500,000 additional revenue, but the deficit on our balance of payments will not be reduced by more than £7,000,000 or £8,000,000. On his own statement, that is what he expects from this import levy. That is what he expects to be the reaction of this import levy on the balance of payments' deficit.
When it is understood that since the beginning of this year the deficit has been running at the level of about £75,000,000 per annum, it will be realised at once how inadequate to deal with the situation this import levy will be. Under this Coalition, it would be true to say that in the last 18 months our life substance has been flowing away like blood from an artery and now the Minister for Finance is trying to stop the haemorrhage with a postage stamp. The more one considers the Minister's levy, the more one is coerced to the conclusion that the main purpose of these new duties is not to redress the balance of payments' situation but to raise more revenue for the Government. Having studied the matter and approached it with a great deal of sympathy for the Minister's position and with every desire to be fair to him, I believe that the new taxes have been brought in to bolster up the coming Budget, to bolster up a shaky Budget.
Comment on this
It is to be a sort of a push upon it to enable the Minister to secure more revenue while pretending not to increase taxation. It is imposing upon the ignorance and the gullibility of the people to make this pretence at dealing with a situation which is rapidly becoming critical. I say that the situation is already becoming critical because the Minister himself has admitted that our external resources are being dissipated at an alarming rate. He has warned us that if they become exhausted
"those from whom we have to purchase supplies of essential goods, not merely for direct consumption but also as raw materials for industry and for capital purposes, would be able to enforce their terms for granting us credits before delivering such supplies."
He told us also on Tuesday last that
"the Government is determined that this will not happen and that there will not be such a drain on our reserves for consumption purposes."
I could believe that, if the Government did something to show that it was in earnest, but, unfortunately, the Minister's proposals do not show that. It is true that the newspapers which support the Coalition are trying to put some appearance of strength on the Government's weakness. They are pretending that heroic measures are being taken to deal with the situation. One organ has even found a name for the Government's policy. It is calling it "The Sweetman squeeze." A soft and tender squeeze indeed is "The Sweetman squeeze."
Comment on this
If this is indeed the Minister's approach to the balance of payments' problem that is threatening our whole economy, if this represents the full content of the Government's plan to deal with our precarious situation, then I would say that "The Sweetman squeeze" is more likely to be the kiss of death to the Irish £.
Comment on this
Is the Government as concerned about the situation as the Minister's statement would imply? I doubt it. I have no doubt whatever that the Minister himself is concerned with it. He could not honestly hold the portfolio he does, have the knowledge he has and be otherwise than gravely concerned, but are all his colleagues concerned? Are those who have extracted from him sanction for the expenditure included in the Estimates for the coming year so concerned? Those Estimates express much more accurately the real policy of the Government than anything the Minister has told us. That policy remains what it was under the first Coalition and remains what it has been hitherto under the second Coalition—to take more and more from those who have less and less to spare.
Despite his warnings about the dangerous unbalance that exists between consumption and production, between our standard of living and the work we do to sustain it, despite his warning that nothing should be done to aggravate the present inflation, what contribution has the Government made to rectify this situation? None whatever, except to endeavour to make it worse. Into this highly inflationary situation, which the Minister himself has described, the Government proposes to throw, like nitro-glycerine, a chunk of highly inflationary additional expenditure. That, in fact, is some measure of how lightly regarded the Minister's warning has been and how little his colleagues are concerned about the situation which they have created.
The total of the Estimates, as introduced in March, 1955, for services not regarded as capital services, was £92,750,000. The total of the Estimates for these services for the next year is given as £97,500,000—an increase in round figures of about £4,750,000. There is a striking coincidence between that £4,750,000 in the demand for non-capital services and the £4,500,000 which the Minister is expecting to obtain from the new import duty. There is, in fact, a coincidence so striking that it might strengthen our doubt as to whether the true purpose of this new levy is to raise revenue for a shaky Budget rather than to ease our balance of payments.
Comment on this
There are, and you have exceeded them. The Minister has told us that he proposes to make provision in the Central Fund Bill to ensure that the proceeds of his new levy will be used to finance the State capital programme. I have just two remarks to make in passing on that statement. The first is that it is a first class example of what our friends in America so graphically describe as "hokum"—the financial "hokum" which has been the outstanding characteristic of the Coalition's policy. Just as the Minister has been compelled in the circumstances to throw over the policy which was formally enunciated by the Coalition last October, so also, on Tuesday last, he abandoned what has hitherto been one of the fundamental factors of all Coalition Budgets and he is now compelled to meet future expenditure out of current revenue. There is a financial reverse turn of great significance. No one will doubt that it is being taken unwillingly. Even members of the Coalition do not like swallowing their words in public.
But the question which must be posed is: why has the Government been compelled to act in this way, throwing over their chief budgetary principle upon which they have stood heretofore? The answer is simple, but if it is simple it is also significant and alarming. The Government has lost and has forfeited the confidence of the thrifty and provident elements in our population. It has reduced the credit of the State to the lowest level it has reached since the days of the civil war. People who save habitually—and under the Coalition the number is rapidly decreasing—are no longer prepared to entrust their savings to the State or to save them in short loans. Nothing, from the point of view of the future of our economy, is more startling or more significant than the deterioration which has taken place in the public credit since the Coalition took office.
The second Coalition was formed on 2nd June, 1954. On the 4th of that month, two days after the formation of the present Government, Government loans were quoted on the Dublin Stock Exchange at the following prices: 5 per cent. National Loan, £105 to £105?—that is how we left our stock; 4½ per cent. National Loan, 100? to 100½;; 4 per cent. National Loan, 100? to 100½. On yesterday 19th March, 1956, the Government issues were rated by the investing public as follows: 5 per cent. National Loan, £98—a fall of about 7 per cent., as between the 4th June, 1954 and the 19th March, 1956; 4½ per cent. National Loan, which stood at 100? on the 4th June, 1954, 91?—a fall of about 9 per cent., 4½ per cent. National Loan—the one which the Minister for Finance floated with such a flourish of trumpets in October, 1954 —£89 per 100, a fall of over 7 per cent.; 5 per cent Savings Bonds, which were issued at 98½ per cent. on the 13th of last month, were quoted yesterday at 96?, a fall of 2 per cent. within six weeks. It is in these circumstances, when the public credit is no longer in a position to sustain the Government's spending programme, that the Minister is imposing an import levy to tax the people more heavily still.
Now, we may turn to another aspect of the Government's programme. According to the Volume of Estimates, the expenditure on non-capital voted services in the coming year will not be less than £97,500,000. That is, it will be £4,750,000 more than was estimated this time last year. Practically the whole of this increased expenditure is to be devoted to increasing money incomes. What increase in production does the Minister hope to secure in return for that £4,750,000? Will anyone start five minutes earlier in a Government office? Will anyone stop five minutes later in a Government office? Yet the Minister warned us that a further increase in money incomes, not matched by an improvement in production and productivity, would only drive up prices and cause internal inflation. On the Minister's own admission, this increase in Government expenditure is going to contribute to internal inflation against which the Government has made some gesture—some futile gesture—shaking, so to speak, its fiscal fist at the deficit on the balance of payments.
What excuse has the Minister to offer to those upon whom the consequences of this inflation will fall most heavily, those taxpayers who cannot compensate themselves or be compensated for the rise in prices of which the Government's policy is the main cause? How will the Minister for Finance and the Coalition recompense the farmer who over the past few months has seen cattle prices go steadily downwards? Over the past few months, the primary producers of Ireland have seen not only their profits and the fruits of their toil but their capital melting away with every day that has passed. They have had to sell and will have to sell their only product in a competitive market.
The Minister told us that this market is likely to be even more competitive, that the terms of trade have worsened and are likely to worsen still further against them. Our farmers will have to withstand those worsened conditions.
Comment on this
What does the Minister propose to do for them? Rates are rising, costs are rising and taxes are certainly not coming down. How does the Minister intend to put the farmers of Ireland in a position to export more in the face of increasing competition? What about the country shopkeepers? Their shops have been empty and trade has been stagnant over the past month—stagnant since the first chill blast of Dillonism struck our Irish agriculture. What relief has he in store for the country shopkeepers? What about the self-employed person, the tradesmen, the retired civil servants, the superannuated employee of a private concern and the elderly folk living on the fruit of their small savings?
Comment on this
I am addressing the Minister and I am not dealing with the gnats and mosquitoes. I am asking the responsible Minister what he intends to do for the farmers of this country, the shopkeepers of this country, the self-employed people and all those who are eking out a precarious livelihood and who cannot exploit the present situation by bringing political pressure to bear upon the Minister. What does the Minister propose to do for them?
The Minister will be replying in another three or four minutes and I hope he will have an answer to that. Every day the real value of the incomes of these unprotected classes is declining. Every day they find it harder and harder to keep body and soul together. Every day they have less and less to spend. What does the Minister propose to do about their problem? The answer is in the Book of Estimates—out of less and less that these people have to spare, the Minister and the Coalition of which he is a member are proposing to take more and more.
It just cannot go on. A halt will have to be called. If it is not, we will head for a crisis which will require, indeed, extraordinary efforts and sacrifices to overcome. Somehow responsibility will have to begin to reign in the councils of the Government of this country. We cannot go on spending and spending until, as I have said, the primary producers of this country, the people who are bearing the whole burden, are crushed closer and closer to the earth. There is no answer to that problem or those difficulties in the measures which the Minister has enunciated so far. I do not know what he has in mind in regard to the coming Budget. If he is going to do his duty it will not be an easier Budget than the Budget of 1952 but it may be a necessary Budget because of the policy which the Government has pursued.
Comment on this
I must confess that at times the temerity of Deputy MacEntee completely astounds me. Deputy MacEntee finished his statement to-night with a reference to the Book of Estimates and to the increases in those Estimates in so far as current services were concerned. One would imagine that Deputy MacEntee made that speech as the outstanding example of a Minister for Finance who in his day ensured that the Volume of Estimates presented to the Dáil year in year out by him as Minister for Finance was one that showed some reduction.
In fact, of course, the position was entirely the reverse. Every year Deputy MacEntee came into the House with much more serious impositions than the year previous. Let me take just one example, that to which Deputy MacEntee himself referred— the spring of 1952, when his Volume of Estimates was no less than £11,000,000 odd more than the Volume of Estimates of the preceding year.
Let us look at this year's Volume of Estimates. Deputy MacEntee is quite correct when he says that current services are somewhat £4,750,000 in excess. How is that made up? It would, in my view, be entirely inequitable that alone in the community, civil servants, Gardaí and the Army should be singled out for punishment and that they should not receive increases similar to those received by other wage earners and salaried people. The Book of Estimates contains approximately £3,500,000 to cover the increases for public servants commensurate in a more or less equivalent way with a fifth round of increases in the commercial community at large.
I do not think any Deputy on this side of the House would subscribe to the view that it would be fair or just or proper or in the national interest that public servants of that sort— whether the postman in rural Ireland, the civil servant, the Guard or the member of the Defence Force—should be singled out and prohibited from receiving the equivalent increase that has been granted outside. That increase accounts for approximately £3,500,000.
In addition, the Book of Estimates includes a sum of approximately £1,000,000—£971,000 to be exact—in respect of the increased contribution the State must make towards the cost of health services. That is a statutory position following from the 1947 Act. It is a position which we had to honour and it was one, therefore, that it was clearly necessary should be met. These two figures alone more or less cover the increase to which Deputy MacEntee has referred. Furthermore, there is the additional £250,000 included in this year's estimate for increased Agricultural Grant. These are the things for which it was necessary to provide. They are things which had to be met and, taking them side by side with the Estimates, we see a situation easily understandable as to how the increase in the volume is made up.
I want to put quite clearly to the House that the fact that the Book of Estimates has been limited to its existing figure and the fact that the figures included in it do not amount to more than the total that is involved is a clear indication of the manner in which the Government, in presenting this volume to the House, has given to the House and to the public clear and unmistakable signs of the manner in which avoidable expenditure has not been included in the Estimate for the coming year. I do not think it is perhaps necessary or desirable that I should discuss in very much greater detail the actual services that are included in the Volume of Estimates. One Minister in the previous Government, Deputy Traynor, devoted a very substantial part of his speech to complaints about reductions that had been effected in that Volume of Estimates. Deputy Traynor complained about the reductions. Deputy MacEntee complained that there were not adequate reductions. That, I would suggest, is further clear evidence of the manner in which the Deputies opposite, and particularly the leaders of the Fianna Fáil Party, are unable themselves to agree on any line to take in respect of any debate we have had in this House.
Comment on this
Let me not be taken to misunderstand the Deputy. Any Minister for Finance is always glad of assistance in any criticism of the amount of the Estimates. I welcome my predecessor's criticism, therefore, in that respect.
It was natural enough that the debate on the whole should range round the general economic situation and the measures that I announced on behalf of the Government to deal with that situation rather than round the Book of Estimates itself and the services provided for therein. I think one could fairly say in that respect that the debates more or less went into four different channels. We had some comparison with the position of 1951-1952 compared with 1955-1956. We had criticism from the Opposition that the measures the Government adopted and announced were too late. The third channel comprised the detailed points-dealt with by various Deputies in relation to matters before them. Finally, the fourth channel was, as I might describe it, whether or not the measures were adequate, were going to be effective. Let me take these channels in that order.
Let us go back to the 1951-1952 position. I am going back to it purely for the purpose of seeing (1) whether there is justification for the charge levelled against me and the Government by the Opposition that we have been too late in acting, and (2) exactly how, for the sake of consideration of the future, the deficit then arose and how it was dealt with. In 1951, as the House is aware, thanks to the defection of five Deputies of this House who were elected to support an inter-Party Government and who decided to cross the House and support a Fianna Fáil Government in defiance of their pledge to the elecorate—on the 13th June of that year—Fianna Fáil became the Government of the country. My predecessor, Deputy MacEntee, came into the Department of Finance. He came to this House approximately one month after he had been appointed— on the 18th July, 1951. At that time he then proceeded to wail and wring his hands about the deficit he foresaw in the balance of payments. He felt there was a problem at that moment. He painted it in the strong and violent and vitriolic language of which only Deputy MacEntee in this House, as we all know, is capable. Having painted the picture in July, 1951, the picture as he then saw it, what did he do? Precisely nothing.
Time went on. July passed, August passed, September passed, October came. In October, what did Deputy MacEntee do? Did he take any measure to alleviate the problem which he and his Government then said they saw? He brought in a White Paper— no action—a White Paper. The White Paper which was introduced included, let me say at once, statistical material and, in relation to that, may I take up Deputy Derrig on this point? Deputy Derrig suggested here the other day that we on this side of the House had said that the statistical information in that paper was not trustworthy and that we had suggested that the officials who prepared the statistical returns were not trustworthy. We never said any such thing. What we did say was that the White Paper which was produced in October, 1951, was produced, not for economic purposes but for political purposes and for nothing else and that, in so far as it contained political inference and political prophecy, as apart from statistical data collected over a period, it was entirely unjustified politically and it was brought in for a political purpose and nothing else.
Looking back now in retrospect on that White Paper and on the facts as they subsequently emerged, looking back, as I say, not for the purpose of criticism but for the purpose of seeing where we are at the present time, what do we find? We find that the charges that were made then by the Parties on this side of the House, then in opposition, in two vital respects were entirely justified by the out turn of events after that. The Parties that were then in opposition made it clear that one of the vital objections that they had to the political complexity of that White Paper was that it took no adequate account of the fact that there had been in the early months of 1951 deliberate stockpiling because of the Korean crisis. We turn to the events that happened afterwards and we find that that charge has been absolutely and completely borne out by the facts.
In 1952, there were substantial decreases in imports, decreases which arose from the fact that the 1951 imports were to a large extent stockpiling imports, as this Party and the Parties now forming this Government had then alleged. The actual amount by which, for example, materials fell was some £23,000,000, merely by drawing down stocks which had been built up during the Korean spending phase in 1951. The volume of stocks fell by £10.4 million in 1952, following the rise of £12.9 million in 1951, an over-all change, as I have said, of some £23,000,000, thereby clearly showing, in retrospect, that the criticism that was made in that respect by us when we were on that side of the House of the political complexity of that document was fully and completely justified.
The second criticism that was made by us when we were in opposition of this political document was that it did not take adequate account of a pending increase in production, that it did not take adequate account of an increase which we might expect in the following year from exports because of the wise policy that had been adopted in building up production for those exports. Again we find, turning to the facts in retrospect, that that charge was completely borne out by the facts, that in the following year there was an increase of some £20,000,000 in exports notwithstanding the fact that the political document in October, 1951, did not allow for any such increase.
As I said, those were the charges, political charges, that the White Paper was brought in for political purposes, and clearly it was. Those were the charges that were then made. But the White Paper was brought in and the Fianna Fáil Government, that is now charging me with acting too tardily, sat down in the council chamber and the months rolled on— November, December, January, February, March. Remember, all these months rolled by notwithstanding the fact that the Minister for Finance of that day, on 18th July, 1951, came into this House and then said that there was a situation which demanded immediate attention. This is the same Party that now make the charge against us to which I have referred.
It was not only that. I want to refer to one matter at this stage which was slightly touched on by Deputy Rooney. Any inflationary tendencies that were there in the end of 1951 were magnified and built up by the deliberately inflationary policy that was adopted by the then Government. That Government could not say that they were unaware that what they proposed to do would magnify the inflationary problem because Deputy MacEntee himself, when speaking as Minister for Finance on 18th July, 1951, made it perfectly clear that he accepted the view. From the time that they came in, on 13th June, 1951, to the end of 1951, they deliberately increased the inflationary pressure that was here existing by deliberately, of their own voluntary act, dishing out, expending, the whole balance of £22,000,000 that was then in the Marshall Aid Loan Counterpart Fund. £22,000,000 of new money was deliberately put into circulation by Deputy MacEntee in the last six months of 1951, an event which most certainly then increased the inflationary pressures and that was done by him notwithstanding the fact that he had recognised clearly, when he was speaking in July of that year, that such a policy would be disastrous. That, as I say, was their record in regard to that problem.
Let us look at the position so far as it has occurred since we came over on this side of the House and since we on this side of the House have had the responsibility for dealing with these matters. Deputy Aiken, when he was speaking here last week, quoted a speech that I had made in November, 1954, when I indicated that at that time I was not unduly worried about the balance of payments for 1954. Deputy Aiken implied, others too implied, that anyone—I was almost going to say that Deputy Aiken implied that any fool would have realised that there was then imminent danger. I want to ask the House and Deputy Aiken, through you, Sir, in the Chair, if he, Deputy Aiken, then recognised that there was a danger, why did he not do his public duty by getting up in this House and adverting to that fact? Why did he, as an ex-Minister for Finance, not then make it clear that he did not agree with the view then expressed, that he believed that we were setting for a different course? The answer is perfectly obvious. Deputy Aiken had then no such mind and it is politically dishonest of him to suggest now that that was his belief in November, 1954.
In 1954, the balance of payments was not giving us as a Government or giving the country or giving responsible thought in the country any urgent or pressing anxiety. If the case from the opposite benches has been made that there should have been in 1954 or early in 1955 a prescience that the problem was about to descend upon us, I may be forgiven for suggesting that I erred in the company of those whom many of the Deputies opposite quoted time after time in this debate. None of us on any side of the House, whether we agree or disagree with the material that from time to time emanates from the Central Bank, will ever accuse it of being wild or being other than ultraconservative, and if members of the House care to look at the report of the Central Bank that was made on 22nd May, 1955, they will see that it was then accepted that there was not any urgent or pressing problem at that moment about our balance of payments. I do not want to be unfair to the Central Bank: I am not going to suggest at all that I agree with everything it has written, but none of us could suggest at any stage that it has ever erred on any side other than the conservative side. I think that anyone who looks at that report and who studies paragraph 33 in it will agree with me when I say that there was not there the same urgent suggestion of difficulty in regard to our balance of payments which Deputy Aiken would have us believe was generally accepted throughout the community, by leaders of thought in the country, and throughout commercial centres generally last year. The fact is that the difficulty in this problem arose much later. If we study the figures and the trends month after month last year we find that, perhaps, the trade returns for August last gave the first indication. These trade returns were published in September and gave the first indication that there was a problem beginning to loom up.
The trend in the August trade statistics continued in the months that followed and Deputies are aware that following the publication of the November trade returns—that is to say, four months afterwards—action was taken in regard to interest rates. The trend continued, and we in this Government came into the House in March as soon as the January figures were available and we were able to see that trend continuing. It was on the basis of that continuing trend that I prepared the measures and the proposals I made known last Tuesday.
I want to make the case, one on which I can stand with complete and absolute conviction, that not merely has there been no tardiness, no delay, by this Government in dealing with the trend when it became apparent but that, on the contrary, we have faced the situation that arose in a far clearer and quicker way—whether one agrees with the method or not—than was ever adopted by our predecessors in office. Deputies on the far side of the House have been going round the country suggesting, advocating and stating at every cross-roads, everywhere they got the opportunity outside this House and particularly where they could not be contradicted, that we in this Government were not united on the measures that it was necessary or desirable to take. The facts that I have related, the manner in which the trend was built up this year and the action which we took in relation to that trend with such celerity, when we were sure the trend was there, completely refutes any arguments that may have been put forward by the Opposition on that score.
There was no doubt in the mind of any one of the Ministers who comprise this Government when we saw a trend such as that which developed over the latter months of last year that we would take, as I indicated last Tuesday, such measures as we considered necessary to deal with that problem and that we would take them immediately they became necessary, but that we should not be panicked into taking measures before we deemed them necessary because of any taunts or gibes thrown at us by the Opposition. It would be a crime for any Government to act in relation to a problem like that, before it was satisfied that the action it was going to take was necessary. As I said when I was introducing this Vote on Account last week, the trend was there at the end of last year, and, when we saw it was accelerating at the beginning of this year, we determined to take the appropriate measures. None of us felt, when I came in here on behalf of the Government last Tuesday, that the measures I was advocating would be popular measures; no member of the Government was under any illusion that the special import levy on the articles that are included in the Order was something likely to bring popularity. Nobody likes having to do without something which he could otherwise have, be it luxury or nonessential or anything else; nobody likes any propensity or wish he might have to anticipate his income or to anticipate production to be curbed by means of the hire-purchase restrictions which we have introduced. We took that action because we believed it was desirable and the best course that could be adopted in the face of the balance of payments trend to which I have referred.
If I may pass now to some of the details mentioned during the debate and come back to the main problem later, Deputy Aiken when speaking, referred to an alleged increase in unemployment and when I heard him speaking I was reminded at once of a statement reported in the Irish Press, occasionally described in other terms by the Minister for Agriculture, on 28th February last by Deputy Seán Ormonde. He is reported as having said that under Deputy Norton industrial production and industrial employment had decreased. Of course the facts are, and Deputy Aiken must be aware of them as should Deputy Ormonde, that the statement is not true. Deputy Ormonde could have got the true facts from the Fianna Fáil propaganda office. In fact the over-all unemployment position does not show the increase to which Deputy Aiken referred.
Comment on this
Is that a parliamentary statement? Is it not unparliamentary to say that a Deputy had uttered a lie?
Comment on this
I said only that it was a half lie. The statement that something was a whole lie made by Deputy Aiken last week was allowed to pass. However, in deference to the Chair, I will withdraw it.
Comment on this
The Minister for Finance has said that I made a statement to the effect that there was an over-all increase in the unemployment position. I referred specifically to the most important part of the unemployment section, those drawing current benefits and I said that they had increased by 5,000.
Comment on this
Deputy Aiken quite deliberately tried to give the impression that the register of unemployed at this time of the year was higher than it was at the same period when he was in office.
Comment on this
If he did not try to give that impression he certainly succeeded in giving it. If that was not what he intended he should have phrased his remarks more carefully. More than that I may not go and keep within the Rules of Order. Deputy Aiken should have been much more careful. He made the statement recklessly for the purpose of giving the impression outside that unemployment had risen. Deputy Ormonde must have known, or at any rate should have known, that the volume of industrial production to which he referred was substantially up since the Tánaiste became Minister for Industry and Commerce and that not merely the volume of industrial production was up but that employment in industry had also increased. From quarter to quarter, year by year, the figures are there for anyone to see and the Fianna Fáil propaganda machine would be doing a much better service if it turned to ensuring that there would be some truth in the information it passes out to back-bench Deputies like Deputy Ormonde before they are sent down the country.
I acquit Deputy Ormonde of deliberately misquoting figures. I believe he got that information from Upper Mount Street and that it was deliberately disseminated by that organisation knowing it to be untrue.
There was a suggestion by Deputy Briscoe, when he was dealing with certain articles subjected to the special import levy, that I should have dealt otherwise in regard to certain woollen goods. I noticed in the newspapers a similar comment made by an industrialist in the South of Ireland. He referred to these duties as did Deputy Briscoe as if they were deliberately protective duties. I made it quite clear in my opening statement that they are not protective duties, that they are duties imposed for the purpose of deterring imports because of our balance of payments position.
I said that if these duties have some protective effect that is entirely incidental. Notwithstanding that statement by me I saw this comment dealing with woollen and worsted cloths. From the protective angle the imports are under quota and the amount imported last year was what was required to make up the home deficiency mainly in variety. If the industrialist concerned would help to make up that deficiency in home production he would be doing an excellent day's work and one which would have due effect on the balance of payments situation.
Comment on this
I am not. As far as Deputy Briscoe's point is concerned it seems entirely a matter for consideration not under a balance of payments head but under the ordinary Industry and Commerce Department discussions that we have here. In his contribution to the debate Deputy Derrig attacked the view expressed by the Minister for Agriculture throughout the country that we might hope for some improvement in cattle prices in the coming months. Deputy Derrig queried the accuracy and correctness of the Minister's forecast. At this stage I do not propose to go back over all the ground covered and covered correctly by the Minister for Agriculture when he related again to the House how a campaign that is being carried on and which was carried on outside to the effect that the bottom was about to fall out of the cattle export market damaged the national economy.
Deputy Derrig will, I feel sure, be glad to hear and will have been glad to learn of the 12/2 increase per live cwt. announced by the British last week for their cattle prices. Deputy Derrig will, I know, be glad also to realise and understand that thanks to the foresight of Deputy Dillon as Minister for Agriculture in 1948 when he wrote into the Trade Agreement with Britain that the prices for our exports would be linked to the prices paid to the British people for there own produce there is an assurance to our farmers. Deputy Walsh followed on that line and I find it rather difficult to understand some of his comments on our agricultural position. It does not, however, seem strange that I find difficulty in following some of his comments when we realise that he, an ex-Minister for Agriculture, though corrected on the spot, proceeded to talk of the differentiation that there is in the 1948 Agreement as being 4/6, now reduced to 3/6, per beast instead of per cwt. At the time it seemed to me quite extraordinary how any ex-Minister could make such a mistake.
Certain Deputies during the course of this debate, and Deputy Cunningham by way of parliamentary question, raised with me the question of the effect of the import levy on newspapers coming in here. In relation to newspapers, the list of import levies covers two articles. It covers, first of all, a duty on newsprint imported here and utilised here in the production of newspapers. I want to make it quite clear, particularly in view of what has been said otherwise, that that duty is imposed not for revenue purposes but in relation to the general pattern of deterring imports. We hope this duty will have the effect of the public accepting during this period of difficulty in our balance of payments position newspapers of a slightly smaller size than they would otherwise get. It is for that purpose the duty is imposed, namely, to bring about so to speak a shrinkage in the volume of newsprint utilised. Whether that shrinkage is brought about by contracting somewhat the size of the papers or by providing a system of no returns, which would eliminate wastage in newsprint to some degree, is of course a matter entirely for the concerns involved; but the duty is introduced for the purpose of arriving at that shrinkage.
Having asked the publishers of newspapers within the State to co-operate in such a necessary shrinkage at the present time, it would obviously be grossly unfair to them if we did not contemporaneously with that impose a levy on newspapers which are published outside the State and imported into the State—we all regret that when talking of the State we are not speaking of our island as a whole; the position is a factual one and we must accept it—and, if I were to exempt, as Deputy Cunningham has suggested to me, newspapers published in the Six Counties from import duty, then, in fact, what I would be doing would be giving such publishers a preference over the papers that are produced within the State because the papers coming in from outside will not have to bear the newsprint levy which those published within the State will. It is essential, therefore, that I should keep a fair balance by ensuring that newspapers published outside the State, irrespective of how much we regret and we all do regret that the State does not cover our whole island, should be subject to levy.
The Minister for Agriculture, when he was speaking, dealt to a very considerable extent with the speech made here by Deputy Walsh. Let me stress just a couple of points, because I interrupted the Deputy and it is only fair that I should give the particulars, having interrupted him in the matter.
First of all, let me deal with wheat. The amount of wheat imported in 1955 had a direct bearing not on the 1955 production but on the 1954 production. We had to carry over into the 1955 cereal year a very large part of the wheat grown in 1954, because in the appalling weather circumstances of that year the 1954 wheat was not millable into flour in the same proportion as it would have been if the weather in 1954 had not been so unpropitious. We had to ensure, as had not to be ensured in other years, that at the beginning of the cereal year last year—that is to say 1955—wheat could be turned into bread; we were carrying a substantial amount of the 1954 wheat harvest into 1955 and we had to dilute that harvest with imported wheat in order to make palatable bread in the early part of 1955—a factor which arose because of the weather conditions in which the 1954 harvest was saved and from no other reason. We had to do that. On the assumption that we will have, in 1956, a wheat harvest equivalent to 1955, when, incidentally, as near as makes no difference, we hit the target mentioned by the Minister for Agriculture, a target set not merely by the former Minister for Agriculture but by the former Government as a whole, of 300,000 tons of dried native wheat in their decision on 22nd February, 1954, then there will be some saving for us from a balance of payments point of view in wheat imports in the current year.
Deputy Walsh, too, referred to feeding barley and to grains generally. He said that he had left a nice little present behind him, referring to the balance that there was in the Coarse Grains Account. When I heard the Deputy I really thought he must have taken leave of his memory altogether because there were two separate decisions of the last Government, one on 22nd December, 1953, and one on 9th March, 1954, that the balance in the Coarse Grains Account was not to be utilised in the manner indicated by Deputy Walsh but was to be thrown into the general Exchequer subsidy for bread and flour.
When I was introducing these measures last week I tried to make it clear—I thought I had done so—to the House what we intended to do. In case there may be any doubt in the mind of any Deputy let me repeat now what I wanted then to put clearly to the House. The long-term view of any Government must be in relation to any balance of payments problem that there may be in this, or indeed in any other country, that it must be met by expanding production—expanding production over the needs of home consumption, so that surplus will be available for export. It is in pursuance of our acceptance of that policy that the Minister for Agriculture announced last week that there will be next year, for the next 12 months, a guaranteed minimum price of 235/- per cwt. for grade A pigs. There will be, in addition, a scheme, the details of which the Minister has agreed with the bacon curers, by which we will be enabled to ensure that that amount of 235/- can be paid to producers for grade A pigs and that we will be able to iron out one of the real difficulties that there always has been in endeavouring to expand our pig production.
That difficulty of course—as Deputies who understand and appreciate the problem are well aware—is that there always has been hitherto a fluctuating price in relation to pigs. The farmer always felt that, immediately he increased pig production, the price would flop on him overnight. Now, by means of putting in this floor —235/—in the price, the pig producer can be expected to receive, and know that he will receive over the next 12 months, that guaranteed price. We are enabling him to get out of that difficulty and know that, when he steps up his production, he is not going to run the risk of a flop in his market, such as previously he had to experience.
Deputy Childers put some questions to me. He indicated when he was putting these questions that he thought I might be embarrassed by answering them. Not a bit. I am never the slightest bit embarrassed by telling the truth. The first question he asked was: why had imports gone up in 1955? I made it clear in several speeches throughout the country, made it clear last week in introducing this measure, and the Tánaiste made it clear when speaking to-day, that imports last year went up because the volume of home production was not sufficient to meet purchasing power and accordingly additional things were brought in from outside with that purchasing power. He asked me to tell the people plainly. I think it would be hard to find plainer words than that.
Deputy Lemass and Deputy Childers both asked: why is capital scarce and dear? Capital is scarce and dear here for two reasons. One is a world trend. Deputy MacEntee, when speaking, gave certain figures of the market price of Irish investments at the date June, 1954, and at present. I wonder would Deputy MacEntee have given, or why did he not give, comparative figures for the value of Irish investments in June, 1954, compared to similar investments through the world in June, 1954, and in March, 1956. If he did give these figures, he would find that in June of 1954 our position for Irish investments was very much worse by comparison with similar investments in Britain and other countries than the comparative figures are to-day.
I quoted in this House before what the position was in June, 1954. Then Irish 3 per cent. Exchequer bonds gave a yield of £4 6s. 6d., and British similar bonds £3 11s. 5d.—15/- of a difference in yield in those items. If the Deputy cares to work out the figures at the present time, he will find that that gap between the comparative value of our investments here and the same investments across the water has narrowed gradually all the time this Government has been in office, and now stands at a very much lower figure.
Why is capital scarce and dear here? It is scarce and dear for the reason I mentioned in my opening speech— because savings are not adequate to meet the capital investment we would like to make and because, on that account, it is necessary to induce savings to a greater degree. That carries me to the final point with which I am able to deal in the time that is allowed to me.
I have been asked do I and the Government think these measures will be effective? Whether they are effective or not depends on the people themselves. The real measure of effectiveness is not going to be action by the Government alone—special import levies or anything else. The real measure of effectiveness is whether the people accept the view of this Government that it is necessary and desirable that we should so distribute what we have, that we would put towards real productive capital investment—that in the years ahead will increase our real earnings, our standard of living—a sufficient amount in the time that is immediately before us.
Whether these measures are effective or whether they are not will depend in the last analysis on whether the people accept our view that it is desirable there should be increased savings for increased productive investment, to secure by greater production—more efficiently at lesser cost—a rising standard of living. That will be the test.
We all hope that the public will react in that way. But let me say quite clearly and unmistakably that if it should unfortunately transpire that it is necessary to take further measures to ensure that we do not go into the national position to which I referred when opening this debate, if it is necessary to take further measures, this Government will take those measures with resolve, with resolution, if and when they may be necessary. We all trust they will not be necessary, but let there be no doubt that just as we approached the problem of the present time, as I said in the very beginning, with far more resoluteness and celerity than the problem which the previous Government pointed out as being there —and have approached it in a more realistic way that is going to mean less of the bull in the china shop than their methods did—so also we shall proceed along that road.
Before I sit down may I just refer to one other matter. Last Thursday Deputy Blaney made a dirty and foul charge against a Minister of the Government. I gave him the opportunity of withdrawing it in toto. I gave the Opposition as a whole the opportunity, if they felt that it was necessary or desirable to stand over his allegation, of having a full and complete investigation or inquiry into that charge. He ran away from the charge himself. None of either his responsible or irresponsible colleagues who spoke to-day substantiated it. I think that in honour and fairness they would have done more to contribute to the decency in public life of which we have heard somewhat lately from Deputy de Valera, if they had not sung dumb but repudiated Deputy Blaney instead.
Comment on this
May I ask the Minister a question about the Six-County papers? The Minister will appreciate that in the case of, say, a 3d. paper, only 2d. of that goes back to the cost of production in the Six Counties and that therefore a ld. increase will mean a 50 per cent. increase on the cost of production. Would the Minister, in the light of that, correlate a tax on imported papers from the Six Counties to make it equal to the tax on newsprint coming in?
Comment on this
I would answer that by saying quite simply that we all look forward to the day when a Minister for Finance down here will be able to deal with manufactures, with business in every shape and form in the Six Counties. If I had that power it would be easy for me to deal with the matter.
Comment on this
Vote put.
Do you agree with this result?