Agreements between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom.
Contributions 1–102 of 211. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
I move:
That Dáil Éireann approve the Agreements, Exchanges of Letters and Understandings between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom which were signed in London on the 14th day of December, 1965, and copies of which have been laid before Dáil Éireann.
I assume, Sir, that in accord with the normal practice of the Dáil this motion and the amendments which have been tabled to it will be discussed together.
No trade agreement emerging from a long hard process of negotiation could be presented as giving us all the trade advantages that we would have wished or that we could have thought of if the British Government had left it to ourselves to settle its provisions as we desired.
The first comment that must be made on the Agreement now being considered by the Dáil is that it was a negotiated Agreement which, even if it does not give us everything that we sought, provides, nevertheless, a fair balance of advantages and which was accepted and signed on behalf of the Government because we believe it to be a good Agreement which will contribute to Ireland's future economic progress, to the expansion of exports on which the country's economic progress depends and to the adjustment of the national economy to the conditions which are now developing generally in international trade.
The second aspect which should be noted is that it is a permanent Agreement which contains no provisions for its termination. It is our intention that it will continue to regulate our trading arrangements with Britain until it is absorbed in an agreement for our membership of a wider international trading group, whether the European Free Trade Association or the European Economic Community or, perhaps, a combination of both. Changes in the Agreement can be envisaged and may be discussed from time to time, but, if and when they are made, they will be by the process of consultation and agreement and only when mutual interest makes them as acceptable to this country as to Britain. This element of permanency in the new Agreement gives us a degree of security which was lacking under previous Agreements and which will facilitate us in the planning of our national economic progress.
Another aspect which it is desirable to stress is that the process by which the Agreement came to be negotiated began on our initiative. Understanding of this basic fact may help to remove some misconceptions. The idea of making a free trade agreement with Britain, while awaiting developments in the European Economic Community, was first put forward to the British Government by us. It is not an arrangement which anybody asked or urged us to accept but one which we ourselves desired and which we proposed because we considered that it was necessary in this country's interests.
Following the interruption, in January, 1963, of the negotiations for British membership of the European Economic Community and the consequential suspension of action by the EEC on our application, we had to give careful consideration to the best course to take to protect our economic interests in this uncertain situation. Some of the decisions which were taken then were explained to the Dáil early in 1963. Amongst those decisions was one of considerable importance regarding the policy of industrial protection out of which developed the proposal to the British Government for the making of this Free Trade Agreement. I informed the Dáil on that occasion, in 1963, of our intention to continue with the process of reducing our industrial protection which we had initiated in the previous year, 1962, in anticipation of, and as a part of our preparation for, our membership of the European Economic Community.
This policy decision was based on a number of considerations, all of which were stated and, to some extent, debated here at that time. There was, first of all, the consideration that the policy of protection had ceased to be effective in our circumstances as a means of promoting industrial expansion and had been replaced by the policy of capital grants, technical assistance and tax inducements. Secondly, there was the consideration that the maintenance of high protection was in some instances supporting inefficiency and high costs, both of which this country could no longer afford to carry, and also there was the understanding that the reduction of tariffs was a necessary stimulus to greater industrial efficiency and to the expansion of industrial exports by industries to which tariff protection continued to apply.
Thirdly, there was the consideration that the country had to be made ready in all aspects of its economic organisation to meet the situation with which it would be faced when membership of the European Economic Community would become possible, which it was assumed would be before the end of the present decade, that is, before 1970. It was accepted that this could involve us in a very rapid rate of elimination of our protective tariffs if the process was not started in good time and if the full obligations of the Treaty of Rome had to be accepted by this country by 1970 without qualification.
It was clear to us that the reduction and the eventual elimination of our protective industrial tariffs was a course dictated by our own interests and it was a course on which we had decided to embark regardless of any reciprocal advantages which other countries might be willing to give us. We made known in the Second Programme for Economic Expansion our intention to have another look at the whole position in this regard after three ten per cent across the board tariff cuts had been made, that is to say, in 1965. We had decided to continue the process after 1965, however, if the prospects of European Economic Community membership seemed to be closer at hand, or if other countries, and particularly Britain with which we now do 72 per cent of our export trade, were prepared to extend corresponding trade advantages to us.
The first approach to the British Government for a new trade agreement of the kind now completed was made in 1963, after the deadlock had developed regarding European Economic Community membership for both countries and when Mr. Harold Macmillan was the British Prime Minister. There had been an earlier approach for a comprehensive revision of the existing Trade Agreement on a different basis in 1960 following on the breakdown of the Free Trade Area negotiations and the setting up of the European Free Trade Association, but this had in its main purposes been unsuccessful, as I informed the Dáil at that time, although some amendments of the existing Agreements were negotiated in that year.
We know now that the British Government were during that period in process of making the change in their policy which led in 1961 to their application for membership of the European Economic Community. In 1963, however, after the EEC deadlock had arisen, Mr. Macmillan expressed interest in the wider free trade suggestion which we then proposed and we arranged for further discussions on it at official level; but, mainly I believe, because of the political situation in Britain at that time, including the uncertainty of Mr. Macmillan's continuing in office as Prime Minister, and also about the date of the general election in Britain, the official talks which took place following my meeting with Mr. Macmillan made little real progress because, as it seemed to us, the British officials participating in the talks had no very precise instructions other than to discuss and to explore our ideas.
This position remained virtually unchanged until Mr. Harold Wilson's Government came into power. When I went with the Ministers for Industry and Commerce and Agriculture to see Mr. Wilson and his Ministers in November 1964 to discuss the implications of the British special import charge on the trade relations of the two countries, he indicated that he was aware of the proposals we had made to his predecessor and that he was prepared to discuss them. Because of the deterrent effect on our development prospects by reason of the uncertainty regarding our future trade arrangements with Britain, arising from the special import charge in contravention of existing Agreements, we were most desirous of getting effective negotiations on future trade arrangements between the two countries under way as soon as possible. There was reason for our anxiety in that, in the absence of any effort to work out a new agreement, our industrial expansion would mark time until the special import charge had been ended or the future trade relations between the two countries had in some way been clarified.
Arrangements were made with Mr. Wilson for the commencement of the examination of our outlined proposals in detail. The talks between officials were resumed early in 1965, when it soon became clear that they had a new sense of purpose and that the British officials had the backing of a Government decision that such an agreement as we had envisaged should, if at all possible, be worked out. The discussions soon ran into some difficulties and in July, 1965, I went with my colleagues, the Ministers for Finance, Industry and Commerce and Agriculture and Fisheries, to London once more for further talks with Mr. Wilson and his Ministers. We succeeded in securing some provisional decisions which enabled us to announce that the objective of the negotiations was a Free Trade Area Agreement, and which allowed the negotiations to proceed, although there were still some months of hard negotiations before us. Indeed, the duration of the negotiations and the process of reaching agreement —agreement on arrangements we could accept—were much longer than we had originally either expected or desired. British officials are highly experienced and skilled practitioners of the art of negotiating trade agreements and they retreated very slowly from the positions they had taken earlier.
When the officials of both sides had brought the negotiations as far as was possible for them in the light of their instructions and had reported to the two Governments on their inability to make further progress on important aspects of the negotiations, the final ministerial talks were arranged. Because other problems were occupying the attention of the British Government these final discussions took place some weeks later than we had expected. In this connection I should like to pay tribute to the officials of both sides who, particularly in the closing stages of the negotiations, worked continuously for very long hours, sometimes all night, to complete the drafting of the technical provisions of the Agreement and to clarify the options that had to be left for the ministerial discussion.
Before entering on these final talks, we settled amongst ourselves as a Government in respect of the outstanding points and in the normal way the arrangements we should strive to obtain in regard to the matters still outstanding, the fall-back positions for which we would settle if we had to, and the circumstances in which we would break off the negotiations. As it turned out we got what we sought in most respects and the fall-back positions in others, and there was no break. I must say that I do not believe that this could have happened but for the personal intervention of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, at the final and crucial stages of the negotiations when, as is perhaps not unusual in these matters, the main purpose of the negotiations was becoming obscured by arguments about details.
This new Trade Agreement with Britain must be considered against the background of the European situation as it is developing and in which this country has to earn its living by expanding its exports. Any Deputy who fails to keep this background situation constantly in his mind may not fully understand its significance and importance for this country at this time. Within 12 months all the countries of Western Europe with which we have any significant trading relations will have completely removed their tariffs and other trade restrictions against one another within the ambit of the European trade groups, the European Economic Community or the European Free Trade Association. Except for this division into two blocs, Western Europe will then have entered the era of free trade. Their industries will have completed whatever reorganisation was required by reason of the elimination of protection of their home markets and their access to wider tariff-free export possibilities.
We have not heretofore participated in this movement and this reorganisation to anything like a similar extent and the efforts to bring about similar progress and similar changes here were frustrated in some degree by the continuing uncertainty regarding our situation and about our future trading relations with the countries of Western Europe. This has been for some time past a serious threat to our industrial progress. This uncertainty has now to a considerable extent been removed and this is one important advantage of the situation created by the new Agreement.
It is, as Deputies know, our assumption that within some period of time Member States comprising the two European trade groups will come together in an enlarged free trade area or common market. Views may differ as to when or how this may come about but few in any country in Europe deny its inevitability. The only sensible course is to assume that it will come sooner rather than later and to make our own reorganisation plans accordingly. We have already lost valuable time and we have now to make it up without further hesitations or delay. These changes and developments in Europe are not going to stop and it would be only wishful thinking to believe that they might stop. It is certainly not in our power to stop them, much less to turn back the clock to the older international trading system in which tariffs and quotas regulated trade and which has now departed probably forever. Nor would it be in our interest to try to do so even if we had the power because to a much greater extent than other European States, not excluding Britain, this country lives by its external trade——
Comment on this
——and can achieve economic and social progress only by expanding its exports. We could not maintain ourselves as a nation except for a minimum population at very low living standards if we were to be cut off or were to cut ourselves off from external markets.
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The emergence of the prospect of tariff-free trade and the general removal of all artificial barriers to the expansion of our exports of every kind, no matter what transitional problems it may create for us or what adjustments we may have to make in industrial organisation, must be welcomed as conforming to our long-term national interests, and we can congratulate ourselves that we are now approaching the stage of industrial development in which we can face up to it with the assurance that it will contribute to the country's continuing industrial growth.
It was with these considerations in our minds that we participated between 1956 and 1959 in the negotiations for a European Free Trade area, although not, I confess, with very much enthusiasm because of their limited scope. We were not unduly dismayed when these negotiations broke down in 1959 because that operation envisaged a Western European free trade area for industrial products only which would afford countries like Ireland, which are still, and always will be, largely dependent on agricultural exports in one form or another, no compensation, in increased agricultural exports prospects, for the problems and the difficulties likely to created for us on the industrial side.
When the European free trade area project disappeared in 1959 and when seven of the countries of Western Europe which were not in the European Economic Community, including Britain, which is our principal export market, came together to set up the European Free Trade Association, we were again faced with a great problem and the need for an important decision. We decided we should not seek to participate in this new association which was again concerned solely with industrial trading and offered no advantages in regard to agriculture.
In 1959, this decision was easier to consider because of our expectations at that time that pressure to open up the European Economic Community to include Britain and other Western European countries was likely to build up. Of the member States of EFTA, however, only Britain has any significant imports of agricultural produce of the kinds we export and the conclusion now of an agreement with Britain which settles the terms of our trading in agricultural goods with that country opens for consideration again the question of our EFTA membership on the basis that the provisions of our agreement with Britain, including the rhythm of tariff reduction, the exclusion list and the safeguards, would be acceptable to the other members and that we would be entitled to all the benefits of membership. These benefits, however, would not be considerable as the present pattern of trade indicates. Our aim is, of course, to achieve membership of the EEC and, if we should decide to explore EFTA membership, this aim should not be considered as modified on that account. It is, however, unlikely in the extreme that membership of the EEC will be feasible for us except in circumstances in which it will be feasible also for EFTA countries——
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——or arises from a situation in which the two European groups will amalgamate in one way or another. Deputies who have been following events in this respect will be aware that on the initiative of the British Prime Minister, efforts are being made to promote contacts between the two European groups with the ultimate aim, no doubt, of bringing about some arrangement of this kind. Membership of EFTA might become a matter of urgency as well as of importance to this country if these efforts should look like making progress, though it cannot be said this is so at the present time.
Some time ago I received an invitation from the President of the Council of Europe, Monsieur Pflimlin, to address the Assembly in January of this year. This was unconnected with the British trade negotiations but I decided to accept it because of the opportunity it will afford to relate this agreement with Britain to our wider European objectives and to place it within the ambit of our general policy of support for the economic integration of Western Europe within an enlarged Economic Community. I have tried in various public statements in recent months to promote understanding that the negotiation of a new trade agreement with Britain was necessarily the first step in a general rearrangement of our external trading situation, whether this comes about on a world-wide scale through GATT or in limited, regional negotiations. This is clearly the case if our participation in a European multilateral system is to be brought about through EFTA, where agricultural trade would not be involved.
An agreement with Britain settling the conditions under which our agricultural trade would be carried on had to be concluded before the question of EFTA membership could even be considered. To have negotiations for EFTA membership involving the dismantling of our tariffs for all EFTA members including Britain without having a prior agricultural agreement with Britain would have been a very shortsighted procedure. Whether in regard to EFTA or EEC there may be some advantages in having this agreement with Britain, with its precise provisions relating to our industrial situation already in existence. It would not be possible now to assess the strength of this advantage in regard to EEC or to assert with any confidence that it may be possible to arrange for any modifications on similar lines of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome when negotiating for membership. It would, however, be highly undesirable that any misunderstanding of this position among Irish industrialists should operate to generate an atmosphere of complacency.
It is necessary to reiterate that it is our firm intention to join the European Economic Community as soon as this becomes possible for us, on whatever terms may be negotiable. Our industrialists must therefore face up to the possibility, even if it is put no stronger than this, that on our acquiring membership of the European Economic Community we may have to accept a more rapid rate of tariff reduction and may not be able to retain all the safeguards and escape clauses negotiated in the British agreement. In the case of any industrial enterprise not yet preparing itself for free trade, there should therefore be no putting on the long finger the reorganisation and re-equipment which may be needed to enable the industry to cope with free trade. The full impact of free trade may, by reason of our membership of the European Economic Community during this decade, conceivably come sooner than the terms of the British trade agreement would require.
In considering the merits of an agreement of this kind, it is also necessary to keep the alternative courses clearly in our minds. If anybody argues that this agreement should not be made or should not now be approved by the Dáil, he has an obligation to state his mind on the options, the alternatives, open to us. Some criticisms of the agreement are no doubt reasonable—suggestions that some clauses might have been worded differently, that it would be advantageous to have some provisions which the agreement as it stands does not contain. I doubt, however, if any Deputy can think of anything of this character that we did not think of ourselves and that we did not discuss in the negotiations.
When speaking of alternatives, I am thinking not of minor changes but of more general aspects of national policy and the direction in which we visualise the development of our external trading policy taking shape. If this agreement were not made or is now rejected by the Dáil, what other courses are open to this country? It would be irresponsible to argue against this agreement while leaving that question unanswered. The negative approach expressed in the Labour Party's amendment is not good enough unless it is amplified during the debate. It would be equivalent to the repudiation of the clear responsibilities of any political Party who wish to be taken seriously not to offer positive solutions to national problems.
The alternatives open to this country are not very many. We could have decided to go on without making any changes either in respect of our own protective tariffs or our trade relations with Britain until membership of the European Economic Community became possible or some new and now unforeseeable development took place in the European economic situation. Such a policy of inactivity, of waiting for something to turn up, would be fatal to our future development. It would have meant continuing the climate of uncertainty which was a real handicap to our economic progress during 1965. It would have meant facing and accepting the possibility of having to undertake a very rapid elimination of our protective tariffs, to secure European Economic Community membership when it became possible, without any period of preparation for our protected industries. If, when that time came, we were forced by our unreadiness to decided that we could not undertake this very rapid reduction of tariffs, or to face the consequences for our unprepared industries, it would almost certainly have compelled us to a decision at the time when European Economic Community membership became feasible to postpone our application or to seek something less than membership if that were possible, and it might not be, involving also the postponing or reduction of the advantages of membership in consideration of the lessening or delaying of the obligations which we were unable to carry.
Deputy Cosgrave in a Press statement on behalf of the Fine Gael Party said that the Government should have explored the possibility of an arrangement with the European Economic Community by which, he suggested, we might have secured some new outlets in that market without losing access for some key products in the British market. This idea, that we could achieve some form of association with the European Economic Community which would give us some or all of the advantages of membership without having to accept the obligations, has been expressed here before. It is a foolish idea which probably even those who make it do not take very seriously. It is based on a complete misunderstanding of the provisions of the Rome Treaty and of the considerations which determine the policies of the European Economic Community.
Formal association with the European Economic Community as is provided for in the Treaty of Rome, and as was arranged with Greece, would involve, as it did in the case of Greece, participation in the Community Customs Union, including commitments on our part to abolish our tariffs on Community goods and at the same time to align our tariffs against outside countries, including Britain, with the Community's common external tariffs. I have tried again and again to explain this to Deputies opposite. Both those commitments would involve a disruption of our existing trading arrangements with Britain with unpredictable and probably disastrous consequences for this country's economic welfare and for the maintenance of employment. The reluctance of some Deputies to face realities in this respect has constantly astonished me, and I am not often astonished by this attitude. The idea that there is a possibility of negotiating some arrangement other than formal association with the European Economic Community in relation to their common external tariffs which would still give us free access to the European markets and, at the same time, would permit of the maintenance of some or all of the British preferential rights in our market, in return for which we might retain access to the British market for some of our key products, is equally divorced from the realities of the situation. The Government have to deal with realities however freely Opposition Deputies may let their imaginations roam.
There is no reason to think that arrangements of that kind would be negotiable either with the European Economic Community or with Britain. We discussed various possibilities with the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1964. In November, 1963, a delegation was led by the Minister for External Affairs to Brussels, which discussed the situation as it then was with the European Council of Ministers. In March, 1964, there were discussions by senior officials with the European Commission and in March, 1965, there were further discussions by a delegation led by the Minister for Agriculture. We found no indications of any readiness to make an arrangement with us of such an exceptional nature as would enable us to concede to Britain, to any extent, preferential rights in our markets without which we could not hope to negotiate or retain preferential treatment for our exports on the British market.
Later in 1965, as everyone knows, a situation arose in the European Economic Community which precluded the possibility of useful discussions of any kind on topics of this character, and that situation still persists. A link with the European Economic Community outside the common external tariff might in theory take the form of an exchange of trading advantages on a non-discriminatory basis, that is to say, reductions in the Community's external tariffs or changes in their levy arrangements negotiated with us which would apply equally to all other countries supplying the same goods to the European Economic Community as it would apply to us. There could be no question of preferential treatment for this country exclusively. All the European Economic Community countries are committed to the GATT rule of non-discrimination. This possibility was discussed with the European Economic Community at the time when the Community were preparing to propose reductions in the common external tariffs in the context of what is known as the Kennedy Round in the GATT and they were not prepared — and this is readily understandable—to discuss such a reduction with us in advance of the GATT negotiations.
That is one reason why we want to get into the GATT in time, although it must be said that, because of the position which is persisting in the European Economic Community, the prospects of the GATT negotiations for all-round tariff reductions being started early in this year do not now look to be very bright. Definitely I can say to the Dáil that there are no trading advantages negotiable with the European Economic Community which would at the same time permit of the preservation of our preferential access to the British market. This is a will-o'-the-wisp with no more solidity than Fine Gael's desire to present something which could pass as an alternative policy. If, at this time, the negotiation of our membership of the European Economic Community, or an association with the European Economic Community, or a trading agreement with the European Economic Community relating to specific products, is not open to us—as it is not —what alternative courses are there for us to follow?
For this country, with a limited home market which can support, without exports, only a restricted range of the smaller, less sophisticated industries, the only alternative to joining in the European movement to free trade, and the negotiation of an agreement of this kind with Britain is the first step, would be to decide to withdraw from European trade, except to whatever extent we are prepared to lower our living standards so as to permit the selling of our products in the European market over the tariff walls against us, nursing our high cost, inefficient, soon-to-be-obsolete industries behind ever increasing tariffs, accepting the inevitable contraction of the level of our economic activities, the accelerated emigration of our workers and the death of our nation. This is an alternative which most of us will reject. There may be some, however, who will still argue for this alternative without attempting to face up to, much less to define, what it would mean.
This appears to me to be the position of the Labour Party, but that is for them to clarify. The Party opposite now are in favour of the policy they opposed 30 years ago. As I have said before, 30 years hence they will be defending this Agreement. The wiser course is to look realistically at the world in which this nation has now to make its way.
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Would the Deputy mind desisting for a time? If his interruptions were sensible, I would not mind.
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We have systematically to prepare ourselves for this real world and this means accepting the wisdom and inevitability of eliminating our high protective tariffs and completing the process of reorganisation in the protected industries and relying upon other, more modern and more effective methods of encouraging industrial growth of the kind we need. Because this policy is so clearly dictated by the circumstances and so clearly in our own national interests, we must count it as fortunate that we found our principal customer agreeable to the proposition that in consideration of our doing what we had already decided for ourselves was necessary, they should give without any delay substantial trading advantages in respect of both our agricultural and industrial products without limit in time and in this way to help us to strengthen our national economy during the period while the process of preparing for European Economic Community membership is being pushed ahead.
Deputies will have had time now to study the details of the Agreement, and the White Paper published by the Government has translated its legal and technical terms into comparatively simple explanations. The Ministers who participated with me in the negotiations, the Ministers for Finance, Industry and Commerce and Agriculture and Fisheries, will speak in this debate to explain its provisions even more clearly and to elaborate on their significance in relation to our national economic development plans. For my part, I propose to refer now only to its more general characteristics.
Deputy Cosgrave at his Press Conference said that the Agreement lacks balance and the Labour Party say the same in their amendment. They would of course have felt constrained to say that, no matter what agreement had been negotiated. This is the stock in trade of political argument as they see it and need not be taken very seriously. So far as our agriculture is concerned, the Agreement is all gain.
Comment on this
Maybe there are some who would have wished that we would have been able to secure more advantages but, be that as it may, for agriculture there are no disadvantages even in respect of the retention of protection in our home market where this is justified by reason of special circumstances or to assist us in the development of new activities. It would be easy to say that in the negotiations the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries had the pleasanter task, though this would not be wholly true, although I can testify that he fought tenaciously for every possible advantage for our farmers. For the Minister for Industry and Commerce, even more than the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, the signing of the Agreement marks the commencement of a great new period of activity rather than the completion of a specific operation. This will involve the preparation and submission to the Dáil of a number of Bills during this year. Irish industry now has to accelerate the process of reorganisation which was commenced some years ago, and the drive to bring about the establishment of new export industries has to be intensified. The future course of our national economy has been charted and everybody can see both the problems that have to be resolved and the opportunities which must be used.
It is, I believe, generally agreed by industrialists that the safeguards and escape clauses in the Agreement which the Minister for Industry and Commerce succeeded in having inserted in it, and which will give some latitude in dealing with the problems of adjustment in industry, are reasonable enough. Not all the problems of adjustment can at this point of time be estimated with any precision, or perhaps even foreseen, but these provisions allow reasonable latitude.
Deputy Cosgrave at his Press Conference implied that the safeguard against industrial difficulties provided in the Treaty of Rome for members of the European Economic Community would be of greater value than those negotiated in the British Agreement. I can only assume that he was informed to this effect by some self-described expert in these matters and did not take the elementary precaution of checking the facts for himself. The safeguard clause in the Treaty of Rome operates only for the duration of the transitional period and provides that a Member State experiencing difficulty in a particular sector may request the European Commission to sanction protective measures. A country cannot act on its own initiative. If the Commission decide that protective measures are justified, it is they also who decide what these measures should be and how long they should last. There is no specific provision in the Treaty of Rome for safeguard measures after the transitional period.
In the British Agreement, on the other hand, some products are excluded permanently from free trade and after five years the number may be enlarged by our own decision; at any time during or after the transitional period, difficulties in particular industries may be met by the imposition of quota restrictions for 18 months, again by our own decision. There is provision by which, with the agreement of the British Government, the transitional period may be prolonged for some products. There is no similar provision in the Treaty of Rome. Under the British Agreement, we can deal with the problems of dumping by taking action on our own initiative and justifying it afterwards. Under the Treaty of Rome, we will not have this power. The statement that the safeguards in the Treaty of Rome are stronger than those in the British Agreement does not stand up to examination.
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I hope—although not, I may say, with very much confidence—that in negotiating for membership of the European Economic Community we can persuade them to give us, if only for a limited time, the safeguard clauses of the British Agreement, which are obviously more suited to our circumstances.
Deputies, like members of the Government, will be concerned at the prospect that some existing and protected industries may not be able to adapt themselves to free trade, that is to say, put themselves in a position even with reorganisation, re-equipment and Government financial help, to produce goods which will be fully competitive in price, quality and variety with those that may be imported in conditions of fair competition. No existing industry, no matter how small or inefficient it may seem now, is being written off. In each case there will be an examination in depth of every possibility of reorganisation, with ample Government assistance available to ensure that not only survival but development will be fostered in each case.
In this connection I should refer to the provision of the Agreement which will enable us to transfer after five years to the exclusion list a number of industrial products, representing, in total, trade to the extent of three per cent of British imports in the immediately preceding year. The extent to which and the manner in which this provision will be used will call for most careful consideration when the time comes. Certainly, it must not be thought of as available to exempt lazy or incompetent managements from the obligations of reorganisation, but solely to help industries which are genuinely trying to maximise their efficiency—and which can be trusted to keep on doing so even if their protection is perpetuated—and which require the continuation of protection for good reasons outside their own control. But even among such industries, there will have to be a process of selection. Industries which draw their materials or equipment from other industries cannot be permanently handicapped in conditions of free trade by being forced to purchase their supplies from protected Irish sources at higher costs than their competitors elsewhere. This escape clause may, it seems to me now, to the extent to which it is used at all, have to be confined to industries which are concerned with the production of consumer goods where the higher prices and other factors which justify the perpetuation of their protection are not imposing an undue burden on the national economy as a whole or impeding the development of any other productive processes.
Irish industrialists as a whole must approach the new trade situation, not in a defensive mood and thinking of ways by which the obligations of free trade can be avoided or restricted, but instead in a spirit of aggressive development, using in full the opportunities created by the Trade Agrement and by Government development policies. Opportunity is now knocking at our door. We must go out and welcome it. The making of this Agreement opens the way for a new era of industrial expansion here. This must begin now in 1966, so that the growth of industrial output and industrial employment will help the country to meet whatever problems of adjustment may arise later. It is the intention of the Government to bring this about.
Another aspect of the Agreement which has aroused interest is the reference to trade with Northern Ireland. We have already, as Deputies know, made some tariff changes for the benefit of Northern manufacturers. These changes were in technical contravention of existing Trade Agreements but they did not draw objection from any source. Henceforth, as far as Britain is concerned, this practice will have formal approval. Heretofore, these tariff changes were made in an ad hoc and unsystematic manner following approaches to us by industrial interests and commercial associations from the Six Counties. We are now considering a more systematic adjustment of our tariffs during the transitional period to facilitate the expansion of internal Irish trade across the Border. This will require consultation with manufacturing interests, although purely commercial considerations cannot be the sole factor in our decisions.
There are of course people who profess or pretend to see in this Trade Agreement some implications regarding our national sovereignty. There are of course some people still affected by the sense of inferiority which was once the main national curse, who have never been able to bring themselves to accept the reality of our sovereignty. There are others who, for the same reason, cannot conceive of an Irish Government entering into trade negotiations except from a position of inferiority. I suppose these doubts would not have been there if it had been possible for us to achieve the same trade relationship with Britain through membership of the European Economic Community or the European Free Trade Association. I have explained the very practical considerations which made it necessary, in our own interest, to place our trade relations with Britain, particularly with regard to agriculture, on a new and permanent basis before considering the other possibilities which are open to us, particularly membership of EFTA.
What we have made with Britain is a trade agreement and nothing more. It is an agreement which, as I have said, was entered into on our own initiative and in our own interest. There are no non-trade provisions in it, no political implications of a non-trade character, except to the extent that we see it as facilitating our subsequent membership of EEC on the basis of full equality of status and opportunity with other members. As the elected representatives of the Irish people, we sat as equals with members of the British Government and freely worked out a relationship in the sphere of trade which, in our judgment, will facilitate Ireland's economic growth and open the way to our further and full participation in wider international systems.
We conceive of this new Agreement as representing a great advance towards our economic development and our economic independence. Anybody who does not see that this is so either does not understand the requirements of development or the characteristics of independence. There is no real independence in a country whose products are not able to find export sales on their merits, without having to haggle for preferential treatment. When the country has adjusted itself to the conditions prescribed in the Agreement and availed of all the opportunities which it creates for us, we will have a fully viable national economy, able to sustain itself without artificial props either of protection in the home market or preference in the British market and which will facilitate the realisation of all our economic and social purposes.
More than most members of the present Dáil, I have personally been associated with the policy of industrial development in this country——
Comment on this
——and have had responsibility in Government for the formulation and the fulfilment of plans to bring it about. When the situation envisaged in this Agreement is accomplished, when Irish industry is so organised, managed and equipped as to be able to meet fair competition in the home market and to win ever-expanding markets abroad on the basis of the quality, price and variety of its products, it will have become fully mature. The swaddling clothes which I helped to fashion for it can be cast aside and the nation can face the final phase of establishing its industrial organisation with greater confidence than ever before. It is in reflecting that confidence that I now recommend this motion to Dáil Éireann.
Comment on this
I move:
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and to insert the following:
", while approving the Agreements, Exchanges of Letters and Understandings between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom which were signed in London on the 14th day of December, 1965, and copies of which have been laid before Dáil Éireann, is concerned with the inevitable effect of the freeing of trade on employment and emigration and deplores the fact that the Agreement as negotiated is unbalanced and that the concessions obtained are small in the immediate future and limited and insecure thereafter."
Having listed to the Taoiseach's speech in moving this motion of approval, one cannot but reflect that there is no zeal as enthusiastic as that shown by the convert.
Comment on this
I think it is also pertinent to observe that learning the facts of life can be a painful and costly process on occasion.
Comment on this
It is possible to evaluate and examine the actual advantages of this Agreement, when stripped of the enthusiastic language of the Taoiseach and probably the even more enthusiastic comments of the Minister for Agriculture and the chapters of a somewhat propagandist kind which have the hallmark of having been prepared in 13 Upper Mount Street, or somewhere near to it, and the other documents.
If we examine what practical changes will flow from it in respect of industry and agriculture, I think we can see that the statement issued by the Fine Gael Party in respect of it was not merely fair and reasonable but was an accurate assessment of the terms of the Agreement and the likely prospects for agriculture and industry which would flow from the operation of the Agreement when it came into effect. But, before coming to that aspect of it, having listened to the Taoiseach's historical account of the negotiations, which was in some respects rather jaundiced, I think it is right to say that these negotiations have been conducted with a certain air of mystery and the responsibility for that position rests on the Government.
When the British import levy was imposed at the end of 1964, the Government went to London and made representations, without success. It was announced at that stage that certain negotiations would be undertaken and, subsequently, officials went across and, later, the Taoiseach and Ministers went in July. But it was after the July meeting, for the first time, that a free trade area agreement was mentioned. The House will remember that, at the time that communiqué was issued, the House was in recess. In the communiqué issued after those talks, the House will remember that it was said that Ministers reviewed the results of the examination of the possibility of improving the permanent trading arrangements between the two countries which their officials had made as was arranged at the meeting between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister on 5th November. They agreed that this examination had disclosed, as one possibility, the establishment of a free trade area between the United Kingdom and the Republic and they instructed their officials to continue their discussions with a view to seeing whether a mutually advantageous agreement on that basis could be concluded. That was the first time a public reference was made, in the course of these discussions, to the possibility of a free trade area.
When that communiqué was issued, I sought, on behalf of the Opposition, to have the Dáil recalled in order to discuss it. That request was refused, as also was time, when the Dáil did resume, for a motion to discuss the possible terms of the Agreement. I think it right to say that that whole attitude was unsatisfactory and created the impression that the Government were not anxious to discuss in advance the possible terms of an agreement, although, at a later stage, the Minister for Finance spoke to the Corkmen's Association dinner in London and referred in that speech to the negotiations which were proceeding. It is a strange fact that the British Prime Minister—or the Queen, as the case may be—in the course of an address on the resumption of the British Parliament, adverted to these discussions. The British Prime Minister adverted to them in the course of his speech on that occasion: our Minister for Finance discussed it at the Corkmen's Association dinner in London. The Dáil was denied an opportunity of discussing it.
Is it any wonder that a great number of people are concerned and have rightly expressed concern? It is somewhat arrogant and intolerant to dismiss too lightly the concern of some of these people, even though we may question the wisdom of their approach or their capacity to express sound views on the actual terms of the Agreement.
We have said that this Agreement lacks balance. The Taoiseach has argued strenuously here that it is more balanced than EEC membership prospects offer. He argued here a few moments ago that, because we have a longer transitional period than was offered in the case of the EEC, there is some advantage. By means of an interjection, Deputy Sweetman rightly pointed out that there is no stabilisation fund in this, that there is no social fund such as exists in EEC membership to deal with redundant workers and workers who are transferred. There is a promise that some manpower agency may be established here to deal with it and they will be provided with funds. The difference is that the funds in this case will have to be provided by this country and not by the community. But, leaving that aside altogether, the position has been reached here that a great many firms are seriously concerned at the lack of effective measures to guard against dumping and unfair competition. The Article dealing with this dumping and subsidised imports is by no means satisfactory.
It has been alleged that because we are entitled to take action in advance without getting community sanction, as was the case with EEC, there is some improvement in our position. But what faith can we have in that when we reflect on what the British Government did in respect of the import levy? That was a breach of all existing agreements and a breach of those agreements illegally without any consultation or even without notice. They imposed a levy on imports and the most remarkable fact is that this Government, in the course of its discussions, did not even seek the withdrawal of the penal import levy. These penal provisions are being accepted in this Agreement, when they are not entitled to continue while the present balance of payments difficulties exist. How can anyone assert here with the confidence and enthusiasm the Taoiseach showed a few moments ago that we have achieved some substantial improvement in the light of the plain breach of faith we have experienced in the past 12 or 14 months on the part of the British Government, not another British Government but the British Government presided over by Mr. Wilson? We know he has mesmerised the House of Commons and the British electorate but apparently he has also mesmerised the Taoiseach.
I want to advert to the very serious problems concerned with dumping and to bring before the Government and the country the necessity for the most careful legislation allowing for effective action to be taken in advance of threatened injury and not action when injury has resulted and damage has been done. The Article dealing with this—I think it is Article II—deals with the problems which could be of crucial importance for Irish industry, especially in view of the size of most industrial units in this country, the difficulties created by close proximity to a more powerful industrial country and the fact that under this Agreement Britain will have the right to export goods to this country on much easier terms than heretofore. The clauses in the Agreement purporting to provide safeguards after 1970 are quite inadequate. The problems created for industries by dumping cannot be over-emphasised and the need to take immediate action, not after the damage has been done but to prevent the threatened injury, must receive paramount consideration.
At paragraph 165 of the White Paper there is an indication that comprehensive legislation is being prepared which will ensure effective safeguards. That sort of phraseology is the usual type of phraseology used in White Papers of this sort and used by Government Ministers when they want to create the impression that they are doing something. Previous experience does not warrant confidence in the Government's approach to this matter or indeed confidence that the Department of Industry and Commerce is alive to the catastrophic effects which dumping would have on a great many Irish firms and the consequent unemployment of workers. I have heard the very deepest concern expressed by industrialists that the draft legislative proposals to deal with dumping are still not nearly adequate and are largely concerned with curing the disease after the patient has died.
This particular problem, which has caused so much concern amongst industrialists, has also caused concern to the trade unions. Very serious problems of unemployment must arise if adequate provisions against dumping are not made. I want to suggest with all the vigour and gravity I can that this problem should be considered in consultation with representatives of industries likely to be affected, some of which have already submitted detailed memoranda, representatives of the trade unions as well as the effective Government Departments under which a special committee might be set up comprising representatives of the industries affected, or likely to be affected, the trade unions and the particular Departments. This committee should have the right to decide what prior action should be taken regarding the importation into this country of dumped goods and have the right to exclude, except under permit, dumped goods or goods operating under unfair trade conditions. Those who wish to import particular commodities would be obliged to submit all details concerning prices and costings to the committee. The committee would have available facts and information and would thus be in a position to decide whether or not the price quoted was fair and reasonable or a dumping price. The general policy of such a committee would be to issue permits for imports so long as prices quoted were fair. The approach would not be to prevent imports but would be to ensure that such commodities or articles as were brought before it, or which came to their notice, were imported at prices which were fair and did not contain any element of dumping in their structure. It is imperative that legislation dealing with this should be so framed as to prevent threatened damage or injury to Irish industry. Remedial action or the imposition of penalties after the damage has been done would be no solution and would provide no relief for those unemployed as a result of dumping.
I had recent evidence of two large firms, both having connections with large British firms. One, and possibly both, received industrial grants here. Both of them had been in negotiation, had discussion and had, in fact, purchased commodities sold by an Irish firm. They sought permission to import similar commodities from elsewhere although there was a 20 per cent duty on the commodities. Subsequently, as a result of discussions with the Department of Industry and Commerce and all the parties concerned, permission was given for licences for the import of the particular commodities at something less than 50 per cent of that which was originally requested. Although, in this particular case, after full examination of the commodity being supplied by the Irish firm, after tests carried out in the presence of Department of Industry and Commerce officials and representatives of the other firms concerned, these two firms imported, without notice to the Irish supplier, goods and commodities which cost eight per cent more than a similar commodity produced by the Irish firm.
The danger of that situation is that if action is not taken in advance to prevent it, with the gradual elimination and reduction of tariffs here, with the obvious increase in the tendency of British firms to get a larger and larger share of the Irish market, many Irish firms which will become fringe associates of British firms must, faced with competition elsewhere or with any pressure which the British firms feel, find themselves either put on short time or closed down. I believe that these examples, of which full details are available in the Department of Industry and Commerce, indicate the real gravity of the situation from the point of view of industrial firms and the danger which must be guarded against in respect of dumping and unfair competition.
The Taoiseach dealt at some length with the negotiations in the European Economic Community and in this connection neither what he said nor what is contained in the White Paper is satisfactory. There is absolutely no evidence that any real effort was made to negotiate either membership or some form of association between this country and EEC.
Comment on this
Even the phraseology of the White Paper is vague and indefinite. It says at paragraph 128 on page 41 that it was clearly established, however, that there was no possibility of a bilateral exchange of preferences, except within the framework of the Community's customs union, participation in which would involve the application of the Community's common external tariff to imports from third countries. It said it was clear also—note the indefinite phraseology—that there was no disposition on the part of the Community to agree to any modification of obligations, and so on. It then says that the Community, however, preferred that any such negotiations should take place in a multilateral context such as that provided by GATT.
In that connection, who suspended work on our application to join GATT? The Taoiseach now says we are going to re-activate or revive it. It was suspended on our application and the Taoiseach asserts here that "there was no disposition..."
So far as Austria is concerned, my information from representatives of this Party who attended at Brussels, is that the one country they do not want to hear any mention of is Austria because they have been agitating persistently and consistently over a long period to get some form of association and some form of agreement and so far as one can gather they have now succeeded in reaching some conclusions on this matter. It is true that Greece and Portugal both got extended terms.
I freely admit that our industrial development and general economy would be regarded as much more advanced than either of these but surely there was some in-between arrangement which would have been possible? The Taoiseach described it as foolish to contemplate anything like the Austrian approach. Can the Taoiseach or the Government say what real effort was made? The Minister for External Affairs went there in November, 1963; then officials went and the Minister for Agriculture on his way to or from Berlin for a completely different objective, called to Brussels to the Community. He was not sent specifically and I assert he had no directions and made no formal application in respect of this country, and if the Taoiseach can contend to the contrary, we ask him to publish the documents setting out the application or claim and the manner in which it was pursued in respect of our application.
It is common knowledge that we are more interested so far as international affairs are concerned and this vital matter of EEC, in the United Nations and something that happens in Timbuc-too. The Minister for External Affairs has only once gone to Brussels to the Community: the invitation to address the Council has come to the Taoiseach at this stage. There was some rumour last year that he was to come to the Council of Europe and speak there but apparently that invitation did not materialise. It is not without significance that no real effort was made to pursue our application for membership or secure some form of alternative arrangement. There is this advantage and distinction between EEC and the arrangement that has been negotiated: in this, whether we like it or not, we are not the dominant party: we are but a small country beside a powerful industrial country with large exports. We may leave aside whether the British economy is as strong now as it was in the past because it is still a powerful industrial economy. We know from experience in regard to the levies that we are not an equal unit or an equal partner in the arrangements. The Community institutions provide safeguards which are designed to provide for the needs of small countries as well as for great and in that we would be one of a number of small countries, while in this case we are obviously the weaker partner.
A good deal of reference was made in the Taoiseach's speech and he was liberal enough, in that respect, in praise of his colleagues and officials and of Mr. Wilson and his colleagues. We do not object to that, but I think in his remarks he adverted to the fact that when the Conservative Government were in power, there was no disposition to have such an Agreement because of the possible political situation and the uncertainty of the Government at the time and the fact that the Macmillan administration was coming to an end. Is it not equally obvious that in the present political situation in Britain the Government is not unmindful of political considerations? It is equally obvious from past political experience and assessment that the Irish vote is an influential factor and has never been unfriendly in Britain to the Labour Party and that Mr. Wilson and his colleagues probably had some of these factors in mind when these negotiations were conducted. Small parliamentary majorities, as we know from our experience in this House, make people very susceptible to the political winds.
The situation we are concerned about is that in the arrangements that have been made and particularly the arrangements in respect of agriculture, the present deficiency payments system has only been provided in respect of a limited amount of carcase meat, both beef and lamb. Here it is important to advert to the Conservative Party approach in Britain to this matter. When Mr. Heath recently announced certain Conservative policies, he said that the Conservatives had two priorities in agriculture, to maintain an efficient and competitive agricultural community making its own contribution to the balance of payments and getting a fair return and to shift the emphasis gradually from more commodities from support by deficiency payments to support by import control.
The NFA in their remarks on this Agreement expressed concern at the fact that there was an absolute limitation under the clause dealing with carcase meat on the quantity for which the British Government would be liable to pay deficiency payments. They also adverted to the fact that in this Agreement a great many of the phrases associated with different Articles of the Agreement provide for consultation, provide for discussions or state that the British Government "take note of" the targets in the Second Programme. "Taking note of" in international agreements means damn-all. We all know that from experience. It means absolutely nothing. Even when the actual terms were in the Agreement they refused to honour them. Why are they likely, in the case of vague phrases like "take note of" and "aim to", to do any better? These do not mean anything. The significant thing is that according to the NFA statement, it is expected that by 1969 or 1970 there will be available here over 100,000 tons per annum of carcase meat for export. What arrangements have been made to provide a market for the surplus over and above the 25,000 tons which are being provided for in this Agreement?
In respect of butter, we get 3,000 tons more than was provided for in the 1948 Agreement, which is nearly 20 years ago, and any future increase in that is both vague and uncertain. There is no absolute guarantee either in the Article itself or in the letter from the Minister for Agriculture of any increase in that. There is a reference to the fact that they aim to deal with it.
In the case of bacon, the quota is slightly above—I think 1,000 tons—the quota that was fixed in the 1948 Agreement. In the 1948 Agreement the British Government undertook to import bacon at the annual pre-war rate of 27,000 tons "or more if it is available". In respect of butter, they undertook to import butter from Ireland at the annual pre-war rate of 20,000 tons, "or more if it is available".
Comment on this
Two ounces a week was the ration. In 1948, we changed that. We provided adequate supplies of butter for our own people, and over and above that we sold all the surplus there was.
Comment on this
There is a great claim made that this Agreement gives us unlimited access. With the exception of bacon and butter, and then only for a very limited period, was there ever any restriction in respect of orderly marketing? This is merely changing the phraseology to satisfy the susceptibilities of the Ministers who went to negotiate and to create the impression that we are getting some advantage over and above what was there. We have expressed the view that we are in favour of exporting, or aim to export, 638,000 head of cattle— the same as was exported in 1964, which was regarded as a good year but not as good as two years during our period when we exported over 700,000 cattle.
It is time that we wiped out from this Agreement and from the speeches in connection with it the exaggeration, the claims of advantages that are not in it for the future, either remote or immediate. The only way in which we can get advantages out of this Agreement is to examine it critically, carefully, detachedly and, having examined it, to see what steps can be taken to strengthen the economy to overcome the disadvantages and to avail of whatever limited advantages that are in it.
Our approach to this Trade Agreement as, indeed, to all trade agreements, is realistic. With all its defects, as we said earlier, we are not prepared to oppose it but we are concerned, as I have said now, with over-optimism. It is important to bring home to the country, probably most of all to the Government, the measures necessary to minimise the effects of the weaknesses of the Agreement, to curb, as I have said, the disadvantages and to exploit its advantages.
Our approach to industrial policy has been based on positive and not negative measures—the establishment of the Industrial Development Authority, the measures taken to attract foreign investment. I want to bring the House to remember the visits which Mr. Dan Morrissey as Minister for Industry and Commerce made to the United States of America, the visits and promotion campaigns which the late Deputy Norton made to attract capital to this country and which received a good deal of criticism; the introduction by the late Deputy Norton of the Industrial Grants Act; the tax concessions introduced by my colleague, Deputy Sweetman, in 1956, and which have been described as the biggest technical factor in the growth of industrial exports. All of these were positive measures. They did not erect tariffs or quotas to protect inefficiency. The greatest critic of the inefficiency in this country at the moment is the Taoiseach. The inefficiency was created in many cases behind wholesale protection. Having built up industries, having provided employment, having given people the impression, in fact convinced them, that their employment was dependent on a measure of protection, they having committed themselves and their families to work in these industries, we are entitled to say that you cannot disemploy them or worsen their position without taking appropriate action either to compensate them in a monetary way or to transfer them to other employment where and whenever it becomes available.
Ten years is a short time in the life of a country, particularly where industry is concerned. It is a pity, as we said earlier, that these negotiations were so mistimed, that the Government had not yet created the necessary machinery. The Taoiseach was critical a few moments ago of the fact that industry had not prepared itself, the fact that opportunities had not been availed of either in GATT or otherwise. Who was responsible for not gearing industry to prepare itself? Who was responsible for suspending the processing of our GATT application?
We want to say that we believe that ordinary measures will not do to gear industry and to gear the country to meet the problems created by this Agreement and by the advent of the European Economic Community. The maximum possible encouragement by means of the right incentives must be provided. First, industry must be given something like a ten year tax holiday. At least, the exporter should be given not merely the export tax remission which he at present enjoys but also the further concession of a double subtractional set-off against tax on all advertising and other promotional costs incurred in the building up of foreign trade, a subtractional set-off which could be carried forward to be set against future taxable profits.
Secondly, the battle for Irish industry will be largely a battle of good management. We cannot afford a tax system which taxes, as our present system does, incomes of managers in Ireland more severely than the taxation that managers would have to pay even in a country of high taxation like the United Kingdom. I am aware of cases where people have considered coming back to this country to make their talents available for the building up of the country but, when they examined the tax structure and took advice, they found that they could not afford to make the move.
In that connection, it is important to reflect on the adverse effects which the taxation that was introduced in the last Finance Act may have on businesses in this country. The aggregation of insurance policies with other free estate must have a penal effect not merely on industry but on agriculture and on farms and is certainly detrimental and will provide no incentives, will provide nothing to attract businesses here or even to maintain at the appropriate level existing businesses or firms.
Thirdly, I do not see why export tax concessions should be enjoyed merely by the promoters of industry. They should in some manner be extended so that, in effect, higher remuneration would be enjoyed by those people whose efforts were directed towards building up the country's foreign trade. In that connection, we negotiated a number of trade agreements with European countries. In many cases time has eroded the benefits of these agreements and circumstances have changed. There is an obvious obligation on the Government to pursue similar arrangements with individual countries, if they cannot pursue them in the context of the EEC, in order to secure markets and outlets, particularly if we are to sell the increased numbers of cattle that are likely to be available and the increased quantities of carcase beef over and above that quantity which the limited concessions secured in this Agreement will allow us to sell in Britain.
Fourthly, some of the costs of Irish industry such as power and freight are not competitive. These must be made competitive to give Irish industry a chance.
Fifthly, industrial development should be given absolute priority in town planning and a directive should be issued to accelerate all proposals for industrial expansion and development.
Sixthly, and this is important in the context of what I said earlier, firms here particularly firms in receipt of Government assistance or State help in one form or another, and Irish consumers must be made resistant to dumping and foreign competition and something analogous to the export tax concessions enjoyed by industry should be given to retailers whose profits are derived from selling Irish manufactured goods. With measures similar or analogous to those, I believe it is possible to gear this country to meet the competition and deal with the problems inevitable if the tariffs and other protection, which this Agreement will see the end of, are not to place Irish industry in a very serious position.
We have given this Agreement the most careful and anxious consideration. We have, as I have said earlier, approached it in a realistic fashion. We believe that, in the national interest, it is better, however defective, however imperfect and however vague many of its provisions are, that we should endeavour to exploit the advantages in it rather than try to exploit, for Party political advantage, the disadvantages in it. That is the spirit in which we approach this Agreement, the spirit in which we approach the problems of our time, and that is the spirit in which we recommend to the nation energetic public service, national self-endeavour and the subordination of national partisan interests to the national good.
Comment on this
At this juncture, I believe it is only right that some reference should be made to the very serious problems that have arisen in the field of industrial relations. It was extraordinary that, in presenting an Agreement of this sort, an Agreement which affects the economic life of the country, both industrial and agricultural, and which must affect employment in the country, no reference was made by the Taoiseach to this problem. I know this is a difficult problem. I know that any words used in reference to it can be construed or misinterpreted, but I think that in this regard both employers and trade union representatives have an inescapable obligation to subordinate their interests to the national interest and the rights of the country as a whole are superior to those of any particular section. If we are to make the country prosperous and justify the claims those who went before us made to secure economic freedom for us, then we must, no matter what the cost, subordinate personal, sectional and other interests to the national good.
Comment on this
Our people are quite capable of rising to all the challenges they meet if they are well led and the right policies applied.
Comment on this
I move:
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and to insert the following:—
is of opinion that the Agreements, Exchanges of Letters and Understandings between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom which were signed in London on the 14th day of December, 1965, copies of which have been laid before Dáil Éireann, represent a balance of advantage to the United Kingdom in that they do not provide adequately for agriculture and will lead to a reduction in industrial employment and an increase in emigration.
One would imagine from the way in which the Taoiseach spoke that this was either his first or his second year as Taoiseach of an Irish Government. One was rather amused when he told the Dáil and the nation once again that opportunity was once more knocking. I heard that phrase from him many years ago. It has always been said by Fianna Fáil that, as far as this country is concerned, opportunity always appears to be just round the corner.
I regard the negotiation and completion of this Agreement as one of the most vital things that have been done and one of the most vital decisions with which this country has been confronted since we adopted a policy of protection. This represents a very serious departure from the pattern we have been used to down through the years, and particularly the pattern under Fianna Fáil. This Agreement must have been contemplated over a fairly long period. I was somewhat surprised, however, when the Taoiseach said his first approach was made in 1963. I believe he could be accused now of concealing a tremendous amount of important information from the Dáil and the country over the last two or three years.
There was no mention of free trade during the last general election. As a matter of fact, there was no mention by Government spokesmen about our application for membership of the European Economic Community. The forced determination and whipped-up enthusiasm of the Taoiseach today demonstrates how important he considers this Trade Agreement. Yet, though the free trade area was mooted two-and-a-half or three years ago with Great Britain, the Taoiseach did not think it worth his while to have discussions with representatives of important sections of the community, with the farmers, the trade unionists and the industrialists.
As Deputy Cosgrave said, he denied the opportunity to Dáil Éireann to have a preliminary discussion. The approach was very different from that in relation to the EEC some four or five years ago when there was a full discussion in Dáil Éireann. Workers, farmers and industrialists understood so far as they could the implications of membership of the European Economic Community. But, even after the Taoiseach's speech today, even after the articles that have appeared in the newspapers and the Taoiseach's interview at Dublin Airport, and despite his interview for three-quarters of an hour on television, I do not think it is correct for him, or anybody else, to say that the people of this country fully understand the implications of this Trade Agreement with Great Britain. He has, I think, done the country a disservice—his is, I believe, the responsibility—by insisting on an earlier sitting of the Dáil than was requested by the two Opposition Parties. I remember—indeed, I am quite positive of this—informing the Taoiseach that I believed there should be at least another week——
Comment on this
This Trade Agreement was completed approximately ten days before Christmas. No matter how important it is, as far as the people are concerned there are much more important things where Christmas is concerned, and it would be ludicrous to suggest that the people would concern themselves with a document of this kind over the Christmas period. I believe the Taoiseach did this deliberately.
Comment on this
That is quite untrue and, if the Taoiseach looks at the debate, he will see that it is untrue.
Comment on this
At any rate, no real opportunity has been given to the people to study and appreciate fully the implications of this Trade Agree-member—indeed ment. Unfortunately, they will have plenty of time to think about it when it will be, in our opinion, too late.
The conclusion of this Trade Agreement arose out of discussions on the British import levy, although the Taoiseach has announced now that he has been trying to negotiate free trade with Britain since 1963. Despite what he says, would there have been any talk at all about free trade but for the imposition of the import levy, the levy which we were told was to have such an adverse effect on our exports to Britain? We can well remember the indignation of the Taoiseach and his Government when this import levy was imposed. Did the Government consider the import levy a good excuse to discontinue the global reductions of ten per cent per annum in our tariffs?
In any case, we are told now that we have concluded a Free Trade Area Agreement with the United Kingdom. We are conscious of the fact that this has been negotiated by a Fianna Fáil Government, and without consultation. Despite the attitude of Fine Gael, we do not propose to take any responsibility for this. The Taoiseach admitted today that it was he, as Taoiseach of an Irish Government, who sought this Agreement. Earlier he was reluctant to make that admission. Whether he entered into this Agreement as a good agreement or as an exercise in preparation for entry to the European Economic Community, we do not know. We can see that free trading conditions are coming in this part of the world but we do not know whether it will be absolute free trading or whether it will be conditional in its final stages.
That is the thing that concerns the Labour Party. We believe the Taoiseach, despite what he said in his speech, has not made sufficient efforts to ensure that the special position of this country is protected for the sake of those who get employment in it. We know we cannot remain in isolation all the time but, again because of our special conditions, we should not assume that because we are an independent country we can compete on equal terms with countries such as are in the EEC or with the United Kingdom.
We do not believe that the Government have been consistent in their approach to free trade, and we do not believe that they have used the best judgment in their whole approach over the last five or six years. I think it is correct to say that there has been an element of confusion and uncertainty amongst all sections as to where we are going because the Taoiseach has changed his feet so very often. He tried to explain today the history of the approach of his Government towards free trade. We remember in 1960 that he rejected the idea of EFTA. Now, according to himself, he sought admission. We remember the Taoiseach insisting on many occasions that we would be in the European Economic Community by 1970. He still cannot say that in 1966, but it must be remembered that the Taoiseach insisted that our application for membership of EEC was independent of Great Britain. There is every sign on this agreement that it was made to allow this country to make application and subsequently to become a member of EEC with the United Kingdom.
It is valid comment to say that the Taoiseach was wrong in refusing to seek association with EEC. I do not say I quote his actual words but in the debate on the Trade Agreement in 1960 he did make reference to the fact that this country was regarded as one of the under-developed countries in Europe. If that is so—and I do not think there has been a tremendous improvement even though there has been some since then—we still should and could negotiate better terms than absolute membership which the Taoiseach seems to regard as imperative for this country.
There is uncertainty and confusion in the matter of discontinuing tariff reductions with other countries apart from Great Britain as a preparatory exercise for membership of EEC. The Taoiseach said at that time about three years ago that this was a vital exercise. Is it not now vital that we should make these reductions with other countries and not with Great Britain alone in order to fit us for membership of the European Economic Community? The Taoiseach has adopted this same pose today. He has approached the whole business of free trade as if we could by physical effort or by pious resolution compete with countries that have an industrial tradition going back four or five times as long as the industrial position of this country. I think it is valid criticism to say that the Government are not taking and did not take the necessary steps to prepare us for the situation in which we shall find ourselves very soon as a result of this Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom.
Exhortation to Irish industry is not enough. More Government action is necessary. The Taoiseach has, in his speech last night, given some hint that the Government would take stronger action in relation to industry and the establishment of industries. I do not think he will deny that for years the Labour Party has been advocating that the Government through the various Ministers should take positive action as far as the establishment and the promotion of industry is concerned.
We do not believe this is a free trade agreement in the sense that there is equal advantage or nearly equal advantage for this country. For that reason we put down this amendment. We believe the balance of advantage is in favour of Britain. We also believe, despite what the Taoiseach says, that the present British influence will be increased to such an extent that it may become dominant in this country as far as our industry is concerned. This Agreement will bring us to a stage that obtained in Ireland so many years ago and for so very long when we had a fair measure of free entry for agricultural goods to Great Britain and when there was free access into Ireland for British goods. We thereby became suppliers of cattle, so that we were forced to introduce protection in order to preserve and establish Irish industry here.
There are very many greatly exaggerated claims made for this Agreement. An interview was given by the Minister for Agriculture. There have been several statements from the Taoiseach. However, this Agreement should be judged as a trade agreement and we should, as against what the Minister for Agriculture does, judge it not alone in terms of pounds, shillings and pence but in terms of people. It should be judged by its effect on emigration and unemployment. All our policies, internal and external, should be directed towards keeping Irish people at home in secure and well-paid employment. This Agreement should be judged by its long-term effect and not by any immediate advantages alone.
We concede that under this Agreement the outlet for certain agricultural products has somewhat improved. We welcome this for the agricultural community and trust that all sections of the agricultural community will benefit. We trust that those who are employed on a wage basis will also benefit from this Agreement but we are doubtful if they will. We are also doubtful if it will provide any worthwhile advantage for the small farmers. The emphasis in regard to agriculture is on the export of store cattle, and the raising and export of store cattle is not associated with the small farmer. It is not associated with the man who has ten, 15 or 20 acres but with the big farmer.
We appreciate that the concessions on the agricultural side will contribute to solving our balance of payments problems and will continue to assist in that in future years. It is stated that as far as cattle, beef and certain other items are concerned, agricultural income will increase, but I want to ask this direct and simple question, maybe too simple for some people, in regard to all these agricultural advantages. Could the Taoiseach or any member of the Fianna Fáil Party tell me will it mean there will be one more man employed in that industry? I do not believe it will and that is why we say that, while we welcome any worthwhile benefit to the community, to the country, this is a concession, welcome though it may be, that will not give any extra employment where it is needed so much.
This country cannot be said to be rich in natural resources. Even compared with Britain, we cannot boast of many natural resources and, apart from our principal one, which is a surplus of workers, our main one is the grass we grow and the cattle we raise therefrom. I wonder should we be prepared for all time to export, without any processing whatsoever, this important natural resource. Are we required to export as many cattle as we can on the hoof? There has always been agitation in the Dáil to establish as many industries as possible connected with agriculture. We have not made any great progress in that respect.
If we are to utilise our natural resources, particularly our principal one, our cattle, we should be prepared to process more and more, to employ more and more at this processing, and then to export the product instead of allowing other countries to process it for us. The claim in respect of agriculture in this agreement is that there is free access to Britain. This was stated by the Government Information Bureau on the night of 14th December last. Still, when we examine the agreement as far as agricultural commodities are concerned, we find there are restrictions. There are restrictions in quantity but above all, there are restrictions in respect of the length of time during which the agreement in respect of these commodities will obtain.
The statement on 14th December said that all our pigmeat can be exported but, of course, not all our bacon. That is a pity. Bacon is much more valuable to the producer than is pork and the bacon quota does not provide any great advantage to the country. In regard to exports of butter, as Deputy Cosgrave said, here again we are subject to quota restrictions. It is proposed to increase the quota from 12,900 tons to 23,000 tons but, as has been pointed out, the present effective quota is 19,000 tons. Therefore, the advantage in practical terms is a mere 4,000 tons per year and that applies only to March, 1967. I wonder will the Taoiseach and the Minister for Agriculture tell us what will happen after that because, as far as I can see, the Agreement does not provide for an increase in the quota.
The Irish Government statement on 14th December, as distinct from the British statement, gave the impression that the butter quota would be reviewed upwards at the end of the period. The British Government stated that they would keep in mind the possibility of reviewing it upwards. Surely that is not the terminology one would associate with a trade agreement of this kind. I admit that the present butter quota will absorb our present production, but if the cattle population increases, as is anticipated, our butter production will rise and there must be a guaranteed outlet for it. However, according to the terms of the Agreement and the stated intentions of the British Government, it does not seem that we will have an outlet for the extra butter we shall produce when our cattle population goes up.
The Taoiseach boasted that store cattle, sheep and lamb will have unrestricted access to the United Kingdom. This has always been so in practice, if not in theory. It is true that the British Government could control it but they have never invoked that control and have never had any intention of invoking it. Again, and this must be cleared up by the Minister for Agriculture, the Agreement stipulates that this unrestricted access will operate up to 1970. What then is the effect of Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Agreement to the effect that if the United Kingdom introduces an import price system through price levies, there would be a review in regard to Irish cattle exported to Britain? Is that a saver for the British Government to get out of the Agreement in this respect and treat us as any other country? It is also stated that the Irish Government undertake to the best of their ability to export 670,000 cattle to Britain. From recent speeches by the Minister for Agriculture, I assume we can fulfil that part of the Agreement. We have heard from the Government on many occasions about the possibility of alternative markets. If there are more attractive markets in Europe, are the Government under any obligation to take any steps under the terms of the Agreement to see that all our cattle will be diverted to the United Kingdom?
Can the Taoiseach and Minister for Agriculture tell us whether the Agreement in respect of cattle can be or may be upset if we become members of EEC? As far as carcase beef is concerned, there is a quantitative restriction to the extent of 25,000 tons of carcase beef and a similar restriction to the extent of 5,000 tons in respect of carcase lamb. We are told the full guarantee payments will be made in regard to fat stock but there is mention in the statement issued by the Department of External Affairs that deficiency payments in regard to carcase beef and lamb will be disposed of by the Irish Government in agreement with the British Government. This appears to me to be an extraordinary clause. If this deficiency payment is to be given by Britain to the Irish Government, why should there be any consultation with the British Government as to how it is to be disposed of?
Comment on this
If this is part of the Agreement, why should there be any interference? It appears to me to be the thin end of the wedge. I do not suggest there was an ulterior motive on the part of either side but somebody ought to clear it up because it seems to me we have got to a ridiculous stage when some other Government can tell us how to spend money.
Comment on this
The Agreement provides for consultations, for discussions. About what? Are the British Government to advise the Minister for Finance on the kind of Budget he will have?
Comment on this
There is a provision to the effect that in the event of any significant increase in broilers or turkeys, the United Kingdom may export to Ireland. Is there to be an influx of British broilers and turkeys into this country? In any case, so far as I can see the benefits to agriculture are very much exaggerated. There is absolutely no free access in July, 1966, and there is no indication in the Agreement that there will ever be free access under its terms. It is true that we can protect the agricultural goods included in Annex A, with the exception of broilers and turkeys, but these goods listed in Annex A are of no particular significance.
I do not think this is a free trade Agreement for agriculture. The Taoiseach must concede all the restrictions that are there in respect of cattle, butter, bacon, sugar and cereals. Those advantages were supposed to compensate for the damage to Irish industry. There is a financial benefit. There is a benefit so far as the balance of payments is concerned, but again—let me stress this—unless the Taoiseach can show that I am wrong, as a result of this Agreement there will be no increase in employment. There are vague provisions for changes in the conditions of trading but there is nothing specific. This Trade Agreement has been worded in a very loose fashion so that it can be interpreted, particularly in regard to agriculture, to the advantage of the British Government. It talks of "aims" and "desires" and "having regard to the Second Programme for Economic Expansion,” but there are no specific promises that in respect of these agricultural items, there will be a revision upwards after a certain period and the freer access that is boasted of by members of the Fianna Fáil Party.
The British agricultural industry is heavily subsidised and protected and we will not be allowed to encroach. That has been made clear in this Agreement. It is thus far and no further, for Irish agricultural exports to Britain. In return for a limited advantage for Irish industry in this Agreement, we find that we will eventually open our home market to the United Kingdom. There will be no new export market except for one particular commodity: cloth which contains man-made fibre. The hand of the clock has certainly gone fully round.
The Taoiseach was Minister for Industry and Commerce for a long time and he cannot evade his responsibility for what happened to Irish industry. He can take a lot of credit for building it up—I do not think anyone can deny him that—but when one has regard to the situation today, one must also remember the deficiencies of Deputy Seán Lemass when Minister for Industry and Commerce. Up to 1930 we had some old and traditional industries that thrived, despite competition from outside markets, particularly in Britain, but these were few and far between. It was recognised in the 1930s that industry would have to be built on protection. That was the accepted policy of the Fianna Fáil Party, and that was the policy that got them the votes which elected them to Government in 1932 and 1933. It was always insisted that this protection was meant to be temporary, but it was continued. The Taoiseach has been a member of the Government for 26 or 27 years out of the past 33 years. Listening to him today one would think this was his first major speech. He was bursting to go ahead, forgetting all the things he did not do in the past.
Comment on this
He may have sold the Republic; we do not know yet. Some of those who enjoyed this protection believed it would last forever, and the Minister for Industry and Commerce did not disillusion them until four or five years ago. They honestly believed this protection would be there forever—and this was during a period, short though it may have been, when this country was contemplating membership of the EEC. Many of them were content with the home market, as managers, owners or bosses. They were prepared to live on the home market, and because they had the home market, they had no incentive to expand or to look for exports. The workers were lulled into a false sense of security. They are the concern of the Labour Party, not the people who were feather-bedded, not the people who made enormous profits out of Irish industry. We are concerned with the Irish workers who were fooled.
They are now being told that in four or five years' time—or certainly in ten years' time—there may not be a job for them because, they are told, Irish industry must face the open wind of competition with the United Kingdom. I do not believe Irish industry should be feather-bedded. I believe protection was essential for a time. I believe that it should always have been stated that that protection would go gradually. That should have been stated years ago, not now. I believe there should have been greater preparation for free trade conditions, for the sake of those in employment.
In the 1938 Agreement, the 1940 Agreement, and the 1960 Agreement with the United Kingdom, there was provision for a review of the protection of Irish industry by the Department of Industry and Commerce with the British Board of Trade. The Taoiseach was very conscious of this in 1960, because the debate on the 1960 Agreement which he and his colleagues brought back was one of the first debates in which free trade was stressed. In that debate the Taoiseach said a priority list for a review of tariff protection would be drawn up and that successful exports would be at the top of the list. Can the Taoiseach tell us has anything been done in that respect, apart from the ten per cent that was taken off?
Comment on this
I do not believe that review was carried out in an extensive way. It is obvious to everyone that there are industries which could have done without protection long before now—not a lot, but there are certainly some. In any case all import duties on goods from Britain will cease on 1st July, 1975. This throws open the entire home market to British manufacturers. As protection will go in ten annual reductions, the effect of the Agreement on Irish industry will be felt much earlier than 1975. I think, again, it is recognised that our tariff walls have been so high as to make it impossible for people to export as the tariff barrier goes down, and in five or six years' time, the effect will be seen, and certainly the influence of British exports will be felt to a very large extent. I do not think we should underestimate the value of this to the British exporter.
When I read in the newspapers the speeches of the Fianna Fáil spokesmen lauding this Agreement, I asked myself: "What did the British Government get?" The British Government are not fools. One would imagine from the Taoiseach's speech that we were getting a tremendous advantage in respect of agriculture, and that the British Government were voluntarily, without any return, helping us to prepare ourselves for membership of the EEC. Britain is a nation of approximately 50 million people. Some people would say that our market of three million people is not very big and that it does not make any difference, but the British are desperate for markets and a market of three million people would be regarded as a substantial contribution to the difficulties they have had in regard to their balance of payments over the past number of years. But if we should not underestimate the value of the Irish home market to the British exporter neither should we ignore the effect on the Irish manufacturer who has had the home market to himself for quite a long time.
I agree that the Taoiseach could not give the comprehensive review which must be given by his various Ministers but I heard him admit on television that some industries would be affected and that industries would close down. Of course that was not news for us but he said something which seemed very strange to me, when he was questioned by one of the members of the panel. In reply to a question, the Taoiseach said that it would be difficult to say what industries would suffer or would disappear. I think that was irresponsible coming from the Taoiseach. That is the reason why there should be consultation with the industrial and agricultural communities and the trade union movement. The Taoiseach goes to Britain to concede certain things to them and he says he does not know what industries would be affected. He signs this Agreement, he does not know what effect it is going to have, nor is he anything but vague about what is to replace these industries which are to go. I do not know whether the Taoiseach was joking but on one occasion he said for every factory that was closed down, five would spring up. Afterwards he retracted that and I am sure he was only "codding". I would like to know where are these factories or where are they coming from. If they are to come, they must come rapidly.
I want to assure the Taoiseach of this. We can appreciate the short term and immediate advantages but we have to look ahead as well. Workers will not remain idle in this country for very long. If a worker becomes idle, he is not going to wait any more than three or four weeks before deciding to go to Britain and, mark you, they are looking for workers, for a lot of workers, in Great Britain. Therefore, it is valid and reasonable to ask what plans the Government have to protect, not industry by way of tariffs, because this Agreement has been signed, but employment so that workers will continue to be employed in this country. We all know our own constituencies and many Fianna Fáil Deputies, apropos this Agreement, have thought and are thinking about their own constituencies. Many of them will be forced to admit that there are certain specified industries that are going to go. The only consolation they get from the Taoiseach is that for every one that closes down, five will spring up.
The Taoiseach, who is the chief signatory to this Agreement, will have to be more specific than he has been. We have not done so well already as far as employment is concerned. I concede that industrial employment has increased and has kept step with the forecasts in the Second Programme for Economic Expansion. Industrial employment is one thing, but we have to think about employment generally, having regard to the number of people who have been forced to leave the land over the past few decades. Under the Second Programme, we should have got 7,800 new jobs per year but we did not get anything like that. We got 1,000 jobs per year net. Does the Taoiseach think that there will be such a tremendous change in industrial employment, that there will be a change to such an extent that we can still achieve the targets laid down in the Second Programme when, between 1960 and 1970, we should get 78,000 new jobs? It merely means that people are going to leave the country, as they already have, in greater numbers than anticipated. We see that in the emigration figures which are produced from time to time, which show that rather than a decrease in emigration, there has been an increase in recent years.
Nobody has told us how this Trade Agreement is going to correct that situation. One of the advantages claimed for the Agreement and I believe that this was the sticky one, the only one got by agreement between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister of Great Britain is that in respect of goods containing man-made fibres. This concession generally is good—it will give increased employment in certain branches of that particular processing industry—but let me tell the Taoiseach that as far as power weaving of woollens and worsteds is concerned, it may not be so good. In a report of the Committee on Industrial Organisation in respect of this particular trade published about four or five years ago, it was said that there were 26 power weaving mills in the country and that seven or eight of them would survive in the event of free trade. At that time 7,000 people were employed in the trade and today we still have the same number. But the CIO report said that 2,600 would lose their jobs if there was no re-adaptation and there has been no evidence since that report was published that there has been, or will be, such readaptation or reorganisation in that trade. Therefore if that is still valid, 2,600 people will lose their employment in that trade. The seven or eight factories that will survive will not employ any more. They will produce more because as far as my information goes, the machinery they have is capable of the increased production.
The Taoiseach referred to the motor car assembly industry but he did not give what appeared to me to be a satisfactory explanation about it. He did say that there would be consultations with the industry. I remember the Minister for Finance, then Minister for Industry and Commerce, telling us two years ago that there was consultation with the motor car assembly industry to see how they could readapt, join together, to provide alternative employment and there was no good result. As a matter of fact, there was no result which indicated that there would be an increase in employment. The Taoiseach said on television that the assemblers would be allowed to import cars, provided they employed the same number of workers. I do not know what he meant by that. This is rather vague for the thousands of people employed in this industry and for those in employment ancillary to that type of work. There are certain modifications on the industrial side that have been referred to already. These are merely softening the blow and will not have any appreciable effects on the industry generally because by 1975 there will be free entry. The Taoiseach referred to the difficulties in particular sectors and submitted that quantitative restrictions could be imposed in respect of industries that had any difficulties particularly in regard to employment, but this is only up to 1975——
Comment on this
Industries that cannot be helped by temporary relief will be reviewed after five years. As far as I know, some will not survive up to this five-year review provided for in this Agreement and it will not affect them in any advantageous way. The provisions in regard to dumping and subsidised exports do not appear to be binding enough to ensure that in dumping or in the export of subsidised goods, damage will not be done to Irish industry or workers. I should like to know the definition of dumping and subsidised exports. There is no reference to this matter and, as a matter of fact, there is no definition section in the Trade Agreement to give us any detailed information in respect of such things as dumping or subsidised exports. Will it mean that goods below the cost of manufacture or distribution of the same goods here will be regarded as dumped goods? In respect of dumping, when it is detected, quantitative restrictions can be imposed not to exceed three per cent of British imports to this country. There is not as yet any machinery for the detection of dumping of this kind. Until these matters are cleared up, Irish industry and those who work in it will not get much consolation from the Trade Agreement.
In his television appearance, the Taoiseach also referred to the importation of goods into British chain stores here. This certainly would seem to me to be tantamount to dumping, but, according to the Taoiseach on television, this was a problem that would have to be sorted out and for which there was no special provision in the Agreement.
I should also like to refer the Taoiseach to Article 14 which states that public undertakings—I assume that would mean CIE, local authorities and State bodies—cannot give preference to Irish goods after 1975 and cannot introduce new preferences for Irish goods even before 1975. The Buy Irish campaign initiated in November, 1964, can fold up straight away. If public undertakings, semi-State bodies and local authorities cannot decide within their own country to buy Irish, that is going a bit too far. That is an Article that need not have been accepted by an Irish Government. It looks as if it was dictated by the British Government.
In respect of balance of payments difficulties, we are told the Government may impose quantitative restrictions on imports, provided the measures are consistent with other international obligations. That is a phrase that occurs in the Agreement many times, but I must confess it does not mean much to me. It has to be elaborated on before we know what exactly can be done in respect of balance of payment difficulties. Article 18 provides that the British Government can propose other measures in order to solve our balance of payments problems. I should like to know what other measures are contemplated. I have not much idea what other measures another Government could propose to solve our balance of payments difficulties. That Article also needs to be explained in more detail.
It has been mentioned by Deputy Cosgrave that Britain retains the right to impose import levies. I suppose we have the same right. If we have balance of payments difficulties, could we not put on 15 per cent or 20 per cent tariff protection instead of going through this procedure of having to go across to Britain and saying: "Please, Mr. Wilson, we have balance of payments difficulties and what do you think we should do?" Did he come to the Taoiseach when he had balance of payments difficulties and ask the Taoiseach what he should do when he slapped on the 15 per cent? The Irish Government should at least retain the right to say, without consultation with anybody: "Here is our ten per cent or 15 per cent. Do what you like about it."
The Taoiseach should take note of the statement made by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions wherein they express their concern for Irish industry. It must be conceded they know something about the condition of our industry and the prospects for employment there. The Taoiseach should indicate what new steps will be taken to preserve that employment. The statement of Congress stresses the fact that by 1975, or somewhat before it, our home market will be wide open to the United Kingdom industries who are assisted by advertising and sales organisations in a pretty formidable way and a way certainly not within the scope of the smaller Irish units. This is one real danger, and again it is something in regard to which the Taoiseach did not give a very satisfactory answer in his television appearance.
Some time ago Deputy Tully had a Private Members' Bill down to provide for redundancy. The Taoiseach did not mention redundancy today. He admitted there is going to be displacement of workers, but he has not told the Irish workers what plans there are for retraining them or compensating them in the event of their losing their employment by reason of the operation of this Agreement. Deputy Cosgrave asked was there any fund such as that set aside in the EEC and contributed to by all members. Here we have to build up that fund ourselves. There is no indication from the Government that Irish workers who lose their employment will be compensated during any interim period.
The Minister or his Parliamentary Secretary when dealing with a manpower policy will be confronted with a huge problem of displacement of workers. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that. They will be contronted with a problem of men, aged 50 or 55, who cannot be retrained, who do not want to leave their own home towns, who will be expected to travel to other places. In this matter we have to think in terms of the physical character of the country. There is no point in the Government deciding that, because two factories have had to close down in a particular spot, those disemployed can be sent to Waterford, Wexford, Dublin, Cork or Galway. We have important assets in all those towns. We should not run riot in any manpower policy to the extent of leaving derelict or underused the amenities in these towns—the schools, churches, shops, footpaths and all other amenities. That will be a big problem.
I have always given the Government credit for the assistance they gave towards the establishment of industry, but they must do much more than providing grants and exhorting Irish industry to avail of them. The Government entered into this Agreement and, therefore, they must take positive steps to provide industrial employment. They must think in terms of direct investment and of utilising the places we have. There have been vague announcements to the effect that certain centres in the country would be developed, but we have heard nothing more about it. If we are to depend entirely on private enterprise in this country, this Trade Agreement will play havoc. I do not know whether the Government are afraid of being accused of being socialist or of being too interfering. But I think it is legitimate to say this: if private enterprise do not do their job, there is a moral responsibility on the Government to do it. We have seen far too few industries established in this country, despite the number that have been established in recent years. We will have to have more direct investment through State bodies. We also could engage in the practice of direct investment with private enterprise. It is not enough to say: "Here is the money, if you come in." More positive action will have to be taken to ensure that industrial employment is preserved.
To sum up, as far as this Agreement is concerned it seems we are getting some improvement in our agricultural exports to Great Britain, but restricted both in quantity and in time. Britain, in turn, will have unrestricted access to the Irish market by 1975 and easier access before then as the years go by. The Taoiseach asked what was the alternative. He mixed it all up in what he described as the inevitability of our going into a Free Trade Area. The question put to the Labour Party is this: we have to do it in order to enter a Free Trade Area. I have conceded we are moving towards freer trade conditions, but I say the Government are going in too easily. Over the past five or six years, the Taoiseach seemed to be bursting to get into some sort of a Free Trade Area. He talked about the ability of this country to stand up to anywhere in Europe. As far as morale is concerned, as far as the ability of our individual workers is concerned and as far as the country generally is concerned, we can. When it comes to physical resources, to know-how, to industrial tradition, we have no right to pose as mighty as Great Britain, France, Belgium or Germany. We should understand our limitations.
The Taoiseach should not have gone across and got so little and given back so much: that is our criticism of the Agreement. That is why we believe it will have an effect on emigration and employment. The Taoiseach said they sought more but did not get it, thereby admitting that, if it had been a fair agreement, he would have got more. He was content to come back and to say, in effect "This is all I have got" and every section of the community and every Party are expected to say "Well done, you did your best." Your best was not good enough, in these circumstances. If this agreement means that we shall have unemployment and emigration then, in turn, it will mean that we need not go into the EEC because they will not want us: it will mean that we shall be regarded as a cattle ranch for EEC or Great Britain.
There is no point in having one section in this country rich, benefiting from some particular aspect of a trade agreement, when other people have to go out of it. The ambition should be to increase the population here and to increase employment here. Unless the necessary steps are taken to ensure that Irish industry will be built up and will survive, I think untold damage can be done.
We have an amendment down here and Fine Gael have an amendment down to this motion. We believe in the terms of this amendment. We believe that the agreement can do damage. I do not want to preach to the Fine Gael Party but I would point out that they have condemned this as a bad agreement not alone at their Press conference but in the speech today by the Leader of the Party, Deputy Cosgrave.
The actual phraseology of the Fine Gael amendment is:
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and to insert the following:
",while approving the Agreements, Exchanges of Letters and Understandings between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom which were signed in London on the 14th day of December, 1965, and copies of which have been laid before Dáil Éireann, is concerned with the inevitable effect of the freeing of trade on employment and emigration and deplores the fact that the Agreement as negotiated is unbalanced and that the concessions obtained are small in the immediate future and limited and insecure thereafter."
I do not want to tell Fine Gael what to do. We believe a lot of what Deputy Cosgrave said, but, because we believe it, we believe it is our bounden duty to vote against the Agreement. I do not think we should have recourse to such spurious phrases as "national unity". I do not think the Taoiseach is concerned whether he gets the support of certain sections. Fianna Fáil will stand by this Agreement. Because the Labour Party believe it is a bad Agreement, we shall vote against it for the reasons outlined in our amendment, that, because the Taoiseach has given away so much, there can be much unemployment and much emigration here.
Comment on this
Deputy Corish seemed to think it was irresponsible of the Taoiseach not to be able to forecast what industries, if any, might go to the wall in conditions of freer trade. I should like to point out that the survival prospects of our industries depend so much on matters in the hands of the people involved in industry— on adaptation, on the removal of restrictive practices, on the prospects of our being able to put our house in order in the field of industrial relations and on our ability to maintain competitive costs—that it would not be possible for anybody to forecast which industry will not survive in conditions of free and fair trade. What we do believe and what we do know is that, given a clear-headed appreciation that nobody owes us a living, and the will to succeed, Irish industry has very little to lose and a great deal to gain in this transition from the old position of protection to the newer position of fair competition.
One is inclined to start off by assuring people that, in the wider trading groups established in Europe, the smaller industries found that their anxieties beforehand about their prospects of survival were not well-founded. I started my work this year by arranging that the officers of the Department of Industry and Commerce would, if possible, redouble their efforts to get Irish industry into fighting condition through readaptation, and the Industrial Reorganisation Branch of that Department, which has been working over the years to this end, is already in the process of bringing a sense of urgency to the work. Having started in that way, and seeing the healthy response of the Federation of Irish Industries to this Agreement, I felt it might perhaps be going back a little to have a prolonged inquest, either here or in the Press, on what might have been or could have been better in the Agreement. In the balance, however, I think it is good to have a full discussion of it so long as we realise that this now is the trading position in which we Irish find ourselves.
As other speakers have pointed out, our job now is to get the very best benefits out of this Agreement and to provide against any possible disruption of our industry. A healthy reaction, and the example already given by our industrialists in their pronouncement, would have been to accept this as a fact of life. But, here in the Dáil, if the Minister suggested we should accept it as a fact of life, and go on, it might be misinterpreted: it might be taken to mean that something less than desirable had been arranged. This is not so. What we have got in this Free Trade Agreement is exactly what we ourselves had decided upon as necessary for the full maturity of Irish industrial development. In fact, some years ago, we ourselves had already embarked on a procedure of unilateral removal of protective tariffs to stimulate our industry into the position of competitiveness which is necessary for us in order to gain the benefit of the export markets which are available.
I do not think anybody has argued, here or anywhere else, that it is desirable to continue in a protective state. The protective barriers were essential to the beginnings of industry but now, 30 years later, they can only have the effect of stunting the growth of Irish industry and, as elsewhere, should be replaced by other aids to industry such as technical assistance, capital grants and tax concessions. Anybody who would argue that things were going all right as they were and were going to remain that way is arguing from a fundamental weakness. We were faced with the prospect of Irish industry becoming isolated in a free trading world, stagnating and sinking, the prospect of some of our industrialists sinking deeper into the rut of inefficiency which is engendered by protection.
The fact that I have to speak about inefficiency makes it necessary for me to say, first of all, that there are honourable, and many honourable, exceptions in Irish industries who have been winning export markets and have adapted themselves to the competition which the industrialists in other countries can put up. But there are a number of firms who need a real stimulus or incentive to become efficient. It was not unreal some time ago to visualise a situation in the future in which our competitors, ever increasing their efficiency and productivity, would be able to cross any protective barriers we put up and win the markets from industrialists here who had been made more and more complacent and more and more inefficient by virtue of those very protective barriers. We were, in fact, in very real danger. The alternative of things staying as they were did not really exist and nobody can say it did. I do not think it is seriously argued that this new phase of Irish industrial development should not be brought about. Nobody will deny the need for Irish industry to bring itself out from behind protective barriers and make itself thoroughly efficient. I believe, through this Agreement, we have found the best possible way available to us now of successfully changing our industry from protection to growth in competition.
Many people see the main advantages in this Free Trade Agreement as agricultural. Others are quite certain that the important advantage is this enabling of our industry to undertake the transition which will make it possible to have fuller growth and to increase our export trade. The obvious gains, at first sight, would appear to be for our farmers. Apart from the fact that the expanded financial gains estimated to accrue from the arrangements on the agricultural side should give rise to several thousand new jobs outside of agriculture, the gains on our side in agriculture are many and will be dealt with by the Minister for Agriculture. Broadly speaking, under the former Trade Agreements, our farmers had duty-free access but this was not secure and was subject to termination on six months' notice and subject also to control in some form in the interests of orderly marketing by the British Government.
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——which is a very important example. The benefits of access to the British market duty-free have been somewhat eroded by the deficiency payments to British farmers which made the prices to our farmers fall to an artifically low level. There was a partial exemption from this in that Irish cattle would, after three months' residence, become eligible for these payments.
In this new trading arrangement, there is improved assurance and security of access for increased quantities as well as, for the first time, deficiency payments being made for beef and lamb. There is an improved butter quota and a shortening of the time necessary for qualification for the deficiency payments. It appeared to somebody who was speaking to me earlier on—and he put it this way— that maximum security had been arranged for the Irish farmer by creating insecurity for Irish industrialists. The first part—the gaining of maximum security—is undoubted but I reject the implication in the second part that the creation of insecurity for Irish industry is in any way a sacrifice of industry.
If we are to survive as a nation, if we are to maintain the standard of living to which we are accustomed and if we are to achieve the standard of living which is accepted as normal in other countries and throughout Europe, we must export. We must export to the big markets. I cannot accept, as a sacrifice, the taking away of protection from industrialists who, because of that protection, limit or attempt to limit their activities to the Irish market and, in so doing, are and continue to be inefficient, causing high prices here in Ireland.
I should like to examine the industrial picture now brought about through this Agreement. The trading between this country and the United Kingdom has been governed by the Trade Agreements of 1938, 1948 and 1960. The principal advantage in industry under those Agreements has been the right of duty-free entry to Britain for a wide range of industrial goods from Ireland. In the cases where goods from Ireland were subjected to duties on entering England, a preferential rate of duty was applied, the same as that applicable to goods of Commonwealth origin. The sector of goods subject to duty going from Ireland to Britain is a narrow sector but this had been assuming great importance through the years because of the development of man-made fibres. The duty on man-made fibres had become a serious impediment to the development of Irish textile exports.
By way of exchange for those concessions to the Irish side, dutiable goods exported from Britain to Ireland were, under those Agreements, entitled to a preferential rate, normally two-thirds of the full rate. There were certain other privileges which would confer competitive advantages on British goods on the Irish market. Notable amongst these was the ten per cent duty charged on goods imported under duty-free licences from outside the Commonwealth area. I should point out the advantages we had in the free entry of our goods to the British market had been declining because the United Kingdom had made reductions in their tariffs to other countries, and had so narrowed the margin of preference which our products enjoyed over goods from non-Commonwealth countries that our preference was becoming much reduced.
The formation of EFTA was particularly significant in that regard. Tariffs on industrial products going into Britain from EFTA countries had been steadily reduced, and at the end of this year, will be eliminated. By that time goods from EFTA countries will have parity with goods from Ireland over the range of goods where up to now we enjoyed duty-free entry. Consequently the advantages of duty-free entry to the British market had been very much reduced unless our industrialists were capable of competing, through efficiency, with members of EFTA.
When one considers the range of Irish goods which were subject to tariffs going into Britain under old Agreements, we had reached the stage where we were at a tariff disadvantage vis-à-vis the EFTA countries, a disadvantage which would have increased as the British tariffs against EFTA countries were cut unless we were able to have them eliminated for our goods also. Our preferences were also being eroded in the British market by negotiations in a multilateral way in the GATT. I refer to these points as any judgment of the Free Trade Agreement must be made against this constantly changing world in which the advantages we held in the British market could continue to be advantages only if our industry and industrial production was geared to a higher degree of competitiveness in price, value and design.
Under the Free Trade Agreement we are now discussing, the British protective duties against Irish goods, such as exist, will be eliminated on 1st July next. That is the first gain: whatever rhythms of reduction we have in removing our tariffs, the tariffs on this sector, and on a very important sector of goods from Ireland going into Britain, will be reduced immediately. The products originating in Ireland which are to be liable to protective duty are listed in Appendix II, page 221 of this book which has been presented to the House. The most important of these duties are on silk and man-made fibres and goods containing these products; on musical instruments; motor vehicles and parts of motor vehicles including tyres. The removal of the man-made fibres duty will be a substantial benefit to Irish textile industries in different areas and the removal of duty on musical instruments, for example, will be of great benefit to an important industry at Shannon.
It should not be necessary for me to say that the benefits of the removal on July 1st, 1966 of the remaining British tariffs will only be benefits if our industrialists are at this moment planning their sales campaign in Britain to start on 1st July. It would not be good enough to wait until the tariffs are gone to start thinking of the benefits. We shall have to get that sense of urgency across to every one of our industrialists who can benefit so that they can be out looking for the markets now which will be available from 1st July. It would not be too much to hope that an extra £5 million to £6 million in exports should be available in the second part of this year as the benefit from the removal of these tariffs.
Apart from certain products listed in Annex A, Ireland has undertaken to eliminate by means of ten annual reductions of ten per cent all existing protective duties on goods imported from Britain. The first of these reductions will be made on 1st July, 1966. The basic duties except for quota cases, will be those currently in force, that is, where unilateral reductions have been made, the cut rate will be the basic duty. Ireland has also undertaken to eliminate the protective element in revenue duties either within a period of five years from 1st July, 1966 or in stages of ten per cent over nine years, as in the case of protective duties. This is what I describe as the best possible arrangement: we could make the transition from protection to free trade for our industries over a period of nine years but I repeat what the Taoiseach said here: our industrialists should not feel any cause for complacency because they have ten years to do this. The quicker they become efficient, the better and the greater their prospects of joining a wider market sooner and that objective should be in the forefront of their plans.
It is natural that we should have certain anxieties and seek to provide safeguards for our industries during this transition period and afterwards and so the obligation to eliminate duties is subject on the Irish side to modification in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article I and in accordance with Article XIX. Under paragraph 5 of Article I, the Irish Government are enabled to make a review in the fifth year of the transition period for the purpose of selecting a limited number of products which, because exceptional difficulties have arisen, can be excluded at that stage from the Free Trade Area obligations. The goods so excluded may represent up to three per cent by value of the total imports from Britain in the year preceding the review. That is in addition to goods and products excluded from the very beginning of the Free Trade Area Agreement. In addition to goods which may be so excluded, products of other industries which are found on review to be in difficulties may, with the agreement of the British Government, be accorded special treatment under Article XIX, paragraph 3. This special treatment provides for the extension of the transitional period in individual cases up to a maximum of 15 years. This protection can be in the form of a slower rhythm or a standstill for a period.
Article XIX relates to difficulties in particular sectors and permits the temporary imposition of quantitative import restrictions where an increase in imports, due to the removal of quotas or duties, causes an appreciable rise in unemployment in a particular sector of industry or in a particular region. These restrictions may be applied unilaterally, without consultation, for a period of eighteen months and, with the agreement of the British Government, may be extended beyond 18 months.
Quantitative import restrictions of a similar nature can be undertaken as an advance action where an appreciable rise in unemployment is anticipated in a particular sector of industry or in a region. Other action as may be agreed upon by the two Governments including the extension of the transitional period, as I mentioned before, may also be taken.
Before the end of the transitional period, 1st July, 1975, the two Governments can consider whether the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Article which I have just been discussing will continue to be necessary and they may be agreement make such provision as is thought to be necessary after the end of the transitional period to deal with difficulties in any particular industry or region.
These safeguards should not, as has already been said, attract anybody as shelters from competition or give anybody the notion that it is not necessary for him to become competitive or to take measures to reorganise his industry. We realise that the success of Irish industry depends on becoming competitive and that for many the urge to become competitive and the need to adapt will arise only through the exigencies of the trading situation which confronts them. While this Government worked hard to ensure that the provision for safeguards by exclusions at the beginning, exclusions after a five year review, a slowing of the rhythm of reductions in sensitive industries and the quantitative restrictions unilaterally applied in cases of unemployment, would be as good as could be desired, we do not want our industrialists to think of these in terms of shelters to which they can run. The shelter and safeguard is there but I want no part in allaying anxiety which is necessary in many of our industries to bring about the mental change which is necessary, apart from any physical adaptation which we are undertaking.
The question of dumping was raised during the debate. It was not necessary for any of the speakers to press me to produce anti-dumping legislation. As has been said, anti-dumping measures can be taken unilaterally without consultation by either Government now. As far as we are concerned we can take unilateral anti-dumping action.
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What do you consider to be dumping?
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This is an extension of the rights which existed under the other Trade Agreements where consultation between the two Governments was necessary before anti-dumping action would be taken. While paragraph 21 of the Record of Understanding provides that, as a normal practice, we would continue to consult, each party now has the right under Article XI to take unilateral anti-dumping action if there is a threat of material injury to its domestic industry.
The fact that we have a better position now in relation to anti-dumping is due to the need for that because under the old Agreements, we were entitled to protect ourselves by increased or new protective duties or tariffs. In the new situation, where we are not so entitled, we find ourselves in a particularly vulnerable situation in relation to the possibility of dumped imports and I and the Government are very well aware of the absolute necessity to have effective anti-dumping legislation and to have the freedom which I have already mentioned to take speedy action unilaterally where dumping or the threat of dumping could result in material injury.
The legislation which will be required to protect against dumping or against subsidised exports has been under consideration for some time. We had some time ago a submission from the Federation of Irish Industries for the introduction of such legislation and a special group was set up to study the matter. This group, which is representative of the Department of Industry and Commerce, the Revenue Commissioners and the Federation of Irish Industries, has drafted proposals for anti-dumping legislation and these have been going through the process of examination by all concerned and the consequent revisions. I intend to bring in legislation here with the proposals but I do not see any benefit in discussing the nature of the proposals or even the definitions at this time.
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That is one way of getting out of it.
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There is no question of getting out of it. Legislation is being prepared in consultation with those most concerned and it will be the very best we can do because we realise how vulnerable we are.
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The definition of dumping will not change the legislation. We should know what we are talking about when we are talking about dumping.
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It is difficult enough for me to follow my own train of thought, without following the Deputy. There is an onus on me to go into some details which are quite puzzling to people who are not in trade but I should like to say something in relation to quantitative import restrictions. Under this Agreement, import quotas on industrial goods from the United Kingdom other than goods in Annex A, that is, the exclusions list, are required to be eliminated. The quotas listed at Part I of Annex B—woollen and worsted piece goods, synthetic piece goods, cotton piece goods, hose of a value exceeding 50/- per dozen pairs, rubber and plastic footwear, felt hats and screws, and also the quotas on motor vehicles and tyres, which are not listed in the Annex because they had not been subject to the two ten per cent tariff cuts—are to be eliminated on 1st July, 1966. The remaining quotas which are listed in Part II of Annex B are to be removed in stages over the transitional period, some more quickly than others.
The quota on footwear, other than rubber and plastic, will be abolished in two years' time, that on electric filament lamps in five years and those on springs, sparking plugs and brushes and hose of a value not exceeding 50/- per dozen pairs will be expanded progressively over the full transitional period. On the removal of quotas protection will be afforded by duties and these duties will be reduced progressively in accordance with the general programme of tariff reductions. There is provision where the duties applicable in quota cases have been subjected to unilateral cuts that while the duty currently charged will be applied, the basic duty for the purpose of reductions will be the uncut rate. As a result the rate charged will mark time for two years in all but one case, until overtaken by the downward progression of the basic duty. In cases where quotas are being removed over the full transitional period, the reduction of duties and the expanding of the quotas take place simultaneously. The relief provisions of Article XIX apply to quota protected goods as well as those protected by duties.
On the Irish side goods listed in Annex A are excluded from the obligations of free trade. The goods in Annex A are mainly agriculture and fishing products but some industrial products are also included. Generally the basis for the exclusion of the products from free trade treatment is that such products are price supported or otherwise State assisted in the United Kingdom or derive directly from products so assisted or supported and so the conditions of fair free trade could not be fulfilled.
In the case of industrial products on the lists I mentioned, for example, flour, bread, pastry, biscuits, sugar, sugar confectionery, chocolate and jams, wheat or sugar are the principal ingredients and the prices at which these commodities are available to the British and Irish users are, because of policies pursued in each country, unequal. Jute and jute goods are excluded under a special arrangement but this is because jute products are subject to State trading arrangements in Britain.
In the case of goods already entering duty-free into Britain from Ireland, there will be no change in the rules of origin, that is, the rules which determine whether or not an article is Irish. For the goods which are at present dutiable, there is some change necessary when the Free Trade Agreement is in force. Some change in the rules will be necessary to prevent goods made in Commonwealth countries from securing duty-free entry to Britain by being routed from Ireland. I am discouraged from going into the details of the rules of origin here. They are quite complicated, indeed so complex that I do not think any purpose would be served by putting them on the record.
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What I have decided is that those concerned who want to find out about their particular exports should get in touch with the Department and there they will be given every assistance.
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In relation to man-made fibres, will Japanese materials count as materials of Irish origin?
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For textile products— that excludes clothing—the new rules of origin provide that at least two stages of manufacture—spinning and weaving, for example, in the case of fabrics, or weaving and making-up in the case of garments—must normally be carried out within this new Free Trade Area either in Britain or in Ireland.
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There are some modifications to allow a reasonable amount of non-area materials to be introduced in the final stage so that a certain percentage of non-area cloth can be used in outer clothing.
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There are certain modifications which differ for different types of cloth, but non-area means non-area.
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Does that mean each factory will have to send to Britain some goods which have their origin in the area and they will then be permitted to send some goods which have not, or does it mean they can send all their made-up articles manufactured of materials from outside the area?
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Depending on the percentage of non-area material in them, they can send outer clothing.
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The Minister says there will be a limitation on the quantity of made-up garments sent from here to Britain when the material used is from outside the area; does that mean that one is limited in the number of certificates of origin?
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There is no problem at all involved in certificates of origin, provided the two stages of manufacture I have instanced take place within the area.
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That includes Japanese cloth which is foam-backed and made up?