Agreements between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom.
Contributions 287–425 of 425. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 3 parts.
As the price would be lower, in actual fact we are saving money by increasing our quota to Britain even if we have to subsidise.
Comment on this
As I say, we have reserved the right to protect our fishing industry. The duty on smoked fish has been doubled. That is because we have in mind the development of fish-smoking here. Export markets for our fish are now secure beyond all doubt and we are, at the same time, in a position to protect our home market. Our fishermen can accordingly increase their catches in the confident knowledge that adequate markets are available. That, I think, answers the case made by Deputy Jones and also the case made by Deputy Mrs. Desmond earlier today.
Deputy Jones raised the question of tomatoes. He inferred we had given permission for increased imports of tomatoes from the United Kingdom. In view of the importance of tomatoes to our horticultural industry and, more especially, in view of their importance to the growers in parts of the west, it was vitally important that we should protect all those concerned. On the other hand, we have unrestricted access to the United Kingdom market for our production. We already have a sizable export trade in Irish tomatoes to Northern Ireland, including some exports across the Border from the Donegal area. I confidently look forward to a steady expansion of this trade as a result of this Agreement. During the control period there is a restriction on the importation here of tomatoes. I do not know if Deputy Jones missed the point but there is an import duty of 4d per lb. during that particular period on imported tomatoes.
During the course of the debate, Deputies on the opposite benches, in referring to the Agreement relating to Trade in certain Agricultural and Fishery Products, pointed out that most of the Articles in the Agreement involved undertakings by our Government and they sought to establish that the Agreement should also include a large number of undertakings by the British. They maintained there were no undertakings by the British Government corresponding with ours. It would appear that these Deputies have not studied the Agreement very closely. Under the Free Trade Area Agreement, we have retained the right to protect quite a large number of agricultural, horticultural and fishery products. These are all listed in Annex A. In the other Agreement, that is, the Agreement relating to Trade in certain Agriculture and Fishery Products, we have in turn undertaken certain commitments which, in the main, merely continue the status quo for the existing volume of trade. Britain, on the other hand, has no similar list of protected products such as we have in Annex A to the Free Trade Area Agreement.
Comment on this
There was a restriction on exports of cereals from this country to Britain. I know we will not be selling them any but the restriction is there.
Comment on this
I shall be dealing with that. Surely Deputies on the other side are not suggesting that Britain should have restricted the import of a large number of products so that we could have some undertakings from them by way of supplementary agreement. The few products in respect of which Britain has restrictions are products like bacon, butter and sugar. They are already dealt with, and the cereals mentioned by Deputy Corish are also dealt with and are the subject of special provisions which adequately safeguard our position in that regard.
Comment on this
All matters were thought of. They are specifically mentioned. I am satisfied that the Irish farmer himself is satisfied that the provisions of the Free Trade Area Agreement gives him substantial and concrete new advantages. The new position certainly constitutes a much firmer and more lasting basis than we have hitherto had for the development of our agricultural production and exports.
Comment on this
The opportunities for development and expansion are now available and I am sure that our farmers and fishermen will make the most of them. This applies to all our farmers, both large and small, and covers the full range of agricultural, horticultural and fishery products. Particular care has been taken to provide for the products of the small farmers—milk, pigs and especially horticultural products with their high employment content. The framework for a great expansion of our agricultural output has now been erected and I am confident that in the years ahead, this expansion will certainly take place and will be to the lasting benefit of the Irish farmers and the Irish people generally.
Comment on this
I am quite sure that in the few days that have passed everything that could possibly be said for and against this Agreement has been said, and I do not want to take up the valuable time of the House in repeating all the things that have been said. We as a Party have made it quite clear what our feelings are in connection with this Agreement, but we think it only proper that every member of this Party should record his disapproval of it.
We have valid reasons for registering that disapproval. We are not opposing this Agreement for the sake of opposing it, for the sake of providing opposition to it. We sense a danger here that, as a result of this Agreement, irreparable damage will be done in connection with the availability of employment in industry. I agree that this is a very complex and difficult Agreement to analyse. In fact some of our greatest economists are not as yet satisfied whether it is good or bad. One of our most prominent economists has clearly stated that this is probably one of the greatest gambles that this nation has ever taken. In that context and accepting, or partly accepting, his view, it would be ridiculous for the Labour Party, committed as we are to a particular section of our people, to gamble away the right of these people to live, to accept a situation that would bring uncertainty into any Irish industry with the possibility of extensive laying off of men. It is in the light of this uncertainty that we register our complete disapproval of this Agreement.
If we were to get an assurance from the Taoiseach and from the Ministers who participated in this trade arrangement that nothing in this Agreement was going to damage employment here or weaken our hand in regard to employing Irish people at home, our approach might be very different. We believe that danger is there and nothing has come from the Taoiseach or the other members of the Government who participated in the negotiations to allay those fears. Therefore our approach to this Agreement must remain unaltered.
In connection with agriculture, about which much has been said, we are no more blind than any other political Party here, but we can see nothing in this arrangement that is spectacular in the field of agriculture. Every Deputy who has spoken knows very well that irreparable damage has been done to agriculture in the past ten or 15 years. Most rural Deputies must know that the great majority of our farmers are caught up with moneylenders, banks and financial racketeers to such an extent that the farmers, or the sons who will follow them, are most unlikely to extricate themselves from the perilous financial situation in which they find themselves. That is a factual statement and it is not playing politics.
We know of nothing in this measure that will give the shot in the arm to agriculture that agriculture deserves. We are not suggesting that anything in the Agreement will worsen the situation as regards agriculture. It may well bring a slow process of improvement but too slow, we would think, to give the benefits to the farming community which they have been denied so long. It must be remembered that all other sections of our people received increases, whether they were sufficient or not, to help them keep up with the cost of living, having regard to ever-rising prices and ever-rising expenditure. There was a complete disregard over the years of the farming section of our community. Whatever the glib-tongued speakers of the Government might say to offset that factual statement, we are still entitled to have our own way of looking at the situation which I believe is the right way.
I am not at all impressed by the approach of Fine Gael to this issue before the House. They did afford very constructive criticism of what they saw in this Agreement. They have said things with which we, in the main, would agree but it is appalling that a Party should criticise a measure to the extent that they have criticised it and, at the same time, indicate to the House and to the nation that they did not intend to oppose it. It reminds me of a man trying to gamble with a two-headed penny. If this Agreement in any circumstances should prove to be a good one, they will be in a position to say: "We did not oppose it", but if it turns out to be bad for the nation they can say they were not in favour of it. In any case, we would prefer that they lined up one way or the other—voted with the Government or, if the Agreement is as bad as they have led us to believe, voted against it. They have a definite responsibility to vote against it for the reasons given by the many Deputies who spoke from these benches.
In spite of what the Parliamentary Secretary said a few moments ago, we are not doing a service to the nation if we continue to subsidise butter for the British housewife. Sane mathematics must prove that this butter arrangement, by its very nature, must be a further imposition on the Irish taxpayer. All Deputies, from whatever side of the House they come, must accept that as the truth. Deputy O'Connell from these benches said it may cost up to £2½ million a year. I am not prepared to say what the statistical implications will be but certainly it will be a heavy imposition on our taxpayers.
Taking a generous view of the entire Agreement, complex though it may be, it is only reasonable to assume that if British industrial goods can flow in here in unrestricted volume, the uneasiness and the fear in the minds of employers and employees from Cork to Donegal will be justified. I speak for a constituency where these fears are rampant. I instance the worsted and woollen mills in the town of Portlaoise. I have had an assurance from the manager of that firm that he can see no way out for the industry, that it will die in the next five years. That presents an appalling picture and, as we know, it is a definite possibility.
The Government have said that the Labour Party have not produced an alternative to this Agreement. Our alternative is that the Taoiseach give an assurance that employment in industry will not be damaged. It would be very easy to meet us over this Agreement if we were given the assurances sought by Deputy Corish. However, they are not forthcoming. I trust our approach to this has been an honourable one. I trust it is an understandable one both to the House and to the nation. We are not half as ridiculous in this matter as Fianna Fáil would have the House believe in recent times. We are as competent to deal with the implications of this very serious arrangement as anyone else. All I have left to say is that we have rigidly opposed this Agreement for the reasons outlined by speakers from these benches.
Comment on this
(Cavan): The Free Trade Agreement between this country and Great Britain was signed in London on 14th December and as from that date it became a binding international agreement, not requiring approval or ratification either by this House or the British House of Commons. That is the first thing I should like to have clear—that irrespective of whether this House approves of the Agreement or rejects the motion of approval, the Agreement is binding between the two countries. Even if there were a change of Government in the morning the Agreement is still binding until it is rescinded by mutual agreement between the two countries.
Comment on this
(Cavan): The point I wish to stress is that, irrespective of what happens here, the Agreement is lawful and binding. The object of the Government in going to London was to negotiate an Agreement under which this country would abandon its protective tariffs on industrial goods, under which industrial articles and objects could come into this country eventually free of tariffs. In exchange for that, it was hoped to get a favourable market for our agricultural produce. From that, it would appear that the Fianna Fáil Party at last accept as a fact that our economy is predominantly an agricultural economy and that the British market is our only market for all practical purposes. In the course of his speech recommending the Agreement to the House, the Taoiseach stated:
The idea to negotiate this agreement sprang from us because we thought it was in the country's interests.
In another part of his statement he said:
Countries like Ireland which still are and always will be largely dependent on agricultural exports of one kind or another....
That is a significant statement: "Countries like Ireland which still are and always will be largely dependent on agricultural exports of one kind or another...." It is implied in that reference that this country still is and always was largely dependent on agricultural exports of one kind or another. The Taoiseach referred to Great Britain as our principal export market and as our principal customer. Let us couple these statements with the Preamble to the Agreement which states:
Bearing in mind the close economic links long existing between our two countries, the special trading relationship which has developed under the Trade Agreements concluded between them in 1938, 1948 and 1960 and the substantial measure of interdependence of the economies of the two countries....
I suggest that anybody listening to the statements I have quoted from the Taoiseach and reading the Preamble to the Agreement could scarcely believe that the Taoiseach is the Leader of the Fianna Fáil Party which, in the early 1930s, were feeding the unfortunate people of this country with statements such as: "The British market is gone and gone for ever, thank God": "We could get on well if every damn British ship was at the bottom of the sea": "Burn everything British except their coal". That was the sort of policy preached by the then Leader of the Fianna Fáil Party, by the present Tánaiste of the Fianna Fáil Party and by many Ministers of the present Fianna Fáil Party.
At that time, not alone did they preach an isolationist policy but they also disparaged and ridiculed agriculture. I remember when I first took an interest in or notice of politics early in the 1930s. I got the impression that according to the Fianna Fáil Party a person who had a few bullocks should be ashamed to own them. It was a crime to have cattle. It was a crime to farm in a proper way. That was the sort of doctrine they then preached and that was the sort of doctrine they then appeared to get away with. The tragedy of it was that in those early 1930s, immediately before the war, when this country should have been preparing to take advantage of a second world war, which it was apparent to everybody was coming, the farmers of this country were being made bankrupt. The land of this country was being denuded of its cattle. Generally speaking, when the war came in 1939 we were completely unable to cash in on it successfully and to reap the benefits that a prosperous, thriving agricultural community here would have and should have reaped from it.
At any rate, it is good to see even after 34 years the Fianna Fáil Party accept the policy that the Fine Gael Party have always stood for, that is, that our economy is primarily an agricultural economy, that the bedrock of the economy in this country is tied in with the land, what grows on the land and what is reared on the land. They appear to accept the Fine Gael policy that the British market was something that should be exploited in the interest of the Irish people and exploited to the full and that where we could, economically, develop our industries here, we should do so. Mind you, the Fine Gael Party and their predecessors in the 1920s believed in a sound agricultural and industrial policy.
We introduced the Livestock Breeding Act before the last shots of trouble had died down in order to improve the livestock of this country, and in order to qualify them for the British market. That was in 1926. In the same difficult period we established the sugar factories. I make no apology for referring to the sugar factories again because such industries should have been developed in this country from the beginning instead of being decried and derided as something unprofitable or not worthwhile.
So much for the background of this Agreement and the history of the Party that introduced it. If I were one of the young men recently drafted into this House as Fianna Fáil Deputies, I would be very ashamed indeed to listen to the speech made by the Taoiseach in introducing the debate on this Agreement and to be reminded of the carry on of himself, his Ministers and his predecessor in the 1930s. I think it is something that the young people of this country should be reminded of.
Comment on this
(Cavan): They should be reminded of that freely and often just as it took the death of the late W. T. Cosgrave to bring the Fine Gael Party largely before the people and what they did for this country. It takes this Agreement to afford us an opportunity of going back and reminding the young people of this country what the Fianna Fáil Party and the Fianna Fáil policy did to damage the economy of this country in the 1930s.
Comment on this
(Cavan): The Taoiseach and his Party have for some years back been waiting for something to turn up, for something to happen and for something to solve all our ills. I entered the Seanad in 1961 and in 1962 we heard of the Common Market. We then had the Common Market for breakfast, dinner, tea and supper. We had it on the introduction of every Bill introduced to equip us for the Common Market, which was just around the corner. We were asked to suffer anything which was unpalatable for the sake of our entry into the Common Market. That was the position in 1961 and in 1962.
Then, in the middle of 1963, when it became apparent that the Taoiseach's forecast that we were to get into the Common Market by 1st January, 1964, was at an end, the Taoiseach tells us that he thought of the Free Trade Agreement with England. That was in 1963. If he thought that he kept it a great secret. He fought, between 1963 and 1965, a number of by-elections and if he thought that the negotiation of this Agreement on those terms was something that would enhance his popularity in the country, he should have mentioned it.
I will go further. He fought a general election in April of this year. We were told about many things in the campaign leading up to that election just as we had been told on the eve of the Roscommon by-election about the drainage of the Shannon. We are told now that that is something that it will take years to bring about, and that the reference to the drainage of the Shannon on the eve of the Roscommon by-election was a reference to the preparation of the plans, etc.
Comment on this
(Cavan): However, there was not one solitary word about a Free Trade Agreement, or any new Agreement with Britain, during the campaign in the early part of 1965. I say that it was the bounden duty of the Government to tell the people that they proposed to negotiate, if they could, a Free Trade Agreement with Great Britain. I think it was something that was their duty, something they were bound to do, and something which they neglected to do. I believe this Agreement was negotiated in a panic. I believe the Taoiseach and his Ministers accepted from Britain whatever terms were available.
In support of that statement, I should like to refer to another statement which the Taoiseach made introducing and recommending this treaty to the House. He said:
It is necessary to reiterate that it is our firm intention to join the EEC as soon as it becomes possible on whatever terms may be available.
Those are weak words. Those are words which do not equip a man to be a strong bargainer. He says he is going to join the EEC on whatever terms are available. I believe he went to England to negotiate a free trade agreement and that he accepted whatever terms were available.
I should like now to deal with this treaty and try to find out how it succeeded in attaining the objects which its negotiators set out to attain. As I said, the object of the Government was to abandon over a period of ten years, to dismantle over a period of ten years, our protective tariffs on industry and industrial exports and, in return, to get a favourable market for our agricultural produce. I shall deal with the industrial aspect of the treaty first because it is clear, and very clear, that protective tariffs are, generally speaking, to be dismantled over a period of ten years, and, broadly speaking, British manufactured goods are to be imported here free of duty, first at a lower rate of duty and eventually duty-free by 1975.
The Government, as such, in the same period are to abandon their Buy Irish campaign and, whether the Ministers who spoke here like it or not, that is exactly what this treaty means. I listened carefully to the Minister for Finance speaking this morning and he confirmed that within a few months the British Government will abandon in favour of us their preference for the use of British manufactured goods in Government Departments there, and our manufactured goods will be equally as acceptable as Britain's. In return we are to do the same. We are to abandon our preference for Irish manufactured goods in Government Departments and State-sponsored bodies. Right well then will Deputy Corry have reason to complain about what CIE are doing and the type of foreign goods they are buying.
That is a significant step for the Government to take, because I fail to see how the Government can come into this House and exhort the private citizens of this country to show a preference for Irish manufactured goods if they, in a solemnly negotiated document, recorded as an international Agreement, abandon their preference for such goods. It will not be good enough for them to come here, or spend money on advertising, exhorting people to buy Irish goods because the people will say to them in return: "We will follow your example."
Another very significant concession conceded by this treaty is on the question of quantitative restrictions, or protective tariffs, for the purpose of remedying a balance of payments crisis. Under the 1948 Agreement, if we had a balance of payments crisis here we were entitled to impose levies, or tariffs, or quantitative restrictions, call them what you like, on British imports in order to cure our balance of payments difficulties. Under the 1948 Agreement, the British Government in similar circumstances had not the same right. In other words, no matter what the balance of payments situation was in Britain, she had not the right to depart from the terms of the 1948 Agreement by imposing quantitative restrictions or levies, or tariffs on our produce. There can be no doubt about that.
To give a simple illustration of that, under the 1948 Agreement, the action of the British Government in imposing the levies last year was against international law and against the 1948 Agreement. They did it. I admit, but it was wrong. One would have thought that when our Ministers went over to negotiate this Agreement, they would have solemnly restated the position regarding balance of payments difficulties as enshrined in the 1948 Agreement. But what did they do? They accepted as a fact the right of the British Government in the future to impose levies, thereby accepting the levies imposed by the British Government a few months ago as having been legally imposed. Certainly, they say to the British Government: "In the future you can do it and you need not blush." No decent British Government could have imposed the levies last year without blushing because they were doing it in contravention of the solemn Agreement entered into by two sovereign States in 1948. In the future, however, they are to be entitled to do that.
Perhaps it is no harm to labour this a little. Under the 1948 Agreement, we had the right to cure our balance of payments difficulties by imposing tariffs or quantitative restrictions: Great Britain had no such rights as against us and, as Deputy Cosgrave stated, the point behind that was simple. Any such steps that we might take to cure our balance of payments could not possibly do any serious damage to the British economy, but, on the contrary, substantial measures taken by the British as against us to cure the British balance of payments difficulties could ruin us. The people who went over from the inter-Party Government in 1948 were shrewd enough and farseeing enough to see that and guarded against it, at least as best as they could. It is therefore a tragedy to think that the Government have now accepted the right of the British Government to damage us in that way.
The Taoiseach, when asked whether this Agreement would cause some factories here to close down, stated that he feared that some factories would not survive and when he was asked to specify what factories would survive, said he could not do so. Statements like that are calculated to damage Irish industry. I wonder will statements like that affect the investment of capital in industry. I wonder will people now be as free or as anxious to invest capital in industry, having regard to the statement made by the Taoiseach that some of these industries may close down but he is not in a position to say which of them will.
It was the duty of the Taoiseach, and his Government and their advisers, to investigate Irish industry before entering into this Agreement in order to see what harm would be done and where it would be done. When our Ministers went over to England to negotiate this Agreement, they were prepared to concede something on the industrial front. You cannot have it both ways; you cannot have every post a winning post. As I say, they went over prepared to concede something but what I blame them for, and blame them very much for, was for failing to gain sufficient compensation on the agricultural front for their losses on the industrial front. Deputy Dillon and other speakers from these benches stated that this Agreement does nothing more than codify or schedule the 1948 Agreement, as amended. That is the opinion of this Party, that substantially speaking, this 1965 Agreement does nothing more than codify or schedule the provisions of the 1948 Agreement as it is amended.
Comment on this
(Cavan): In agriculture. I am dealing with the agriculture aspects of it now. As I said, that is our opinion but we can get corroboration of that opinion. The President of the British Farmers Association is a gentleman named Sir Harold Woolley. I do not know what his views are on British politics but being President of the British Farmers Association, I believe that he would be conservative in outlook because, by and large, the British farmers are conservative. Therefore, one would think that he and his association would approach this Agreement with a critical eye, would read it with a view to ascertaining if anything worthwhile had been given away from the British farmer. After considering it, in conjunction with his association, Sir Harold Woolley says that it merely codifies the provisions already there.
I have not heard the Minister for Agriculture, or his Parliamentary Secretary, or any of the speakers from those benches, quoting the President of the NFA as saying that this Agreement is all that could be desired from an agricultural point of view. Indeed, I think that when the President of the NFA was asked whether he was influenced by this Agreement in calling off the rates boycott, his answer was: "Not to any appreciable extent". That, I think, confirms the views expressed from these benches and by the President of the British Farmers Association. From the agricultural point of view, the Government claim that this Agreement represents a gain all the way and the Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Lalor, speaking a short time ago spent a considerable time impressing on the House the great benefits that free access for store cattle into Great Britain would confer on the Irish economy. One would think from that, and from the remarks of the Taoiseach, that the British Government had to be persuaded to accept 638,000 store cattle per annum from this country. Such is not the case.
As I understand the Agreement, we imposed no obligation on the British Government to accept 638,000 store cattle from us; on the contrary, this Agreement imposes on us an obligation to deliver to Great Britain 638,000 store cattle. That is a very different thing. It is as easy to sell store cattle to the British as it is to sell fur coats to the Eskimos. They want store cattle and cannot get them anywhere else. They have asked us to undertake to deliver to them 638,000 store cattle, being the number of cattle we sold to them in 1964. Admittedly, that was a good year; but there were better years during the inter-Party Government period when we sold and delivered more than 638,000 store cattle to England.
Under Article IV of the Agreement, do we improve one iota on the price we are getting for those cattle? We do not. We are getting the same price as we got in the 1948 Agreement when, for the first time in our history, the price paid to the Irish farmer for cattle was linked to the price paid to the British farmer for British cattle. Admittedly, it is a fact that under this Agreement, our cattle will qualify for British subsidies and deficiency payments after being in England for two months, whereas heretofore they would have to be there for three months. But, notwithstanding the slick arguments of the Minister for Agriculture, I want to put on record once again that the first time it was set out in a formal Agreement between this country and Great Britain that Irish cattle would qualify for British deficiency payments after two months was in the year 1948. I defy contradiction of that.
The Minister for Agriculture has stated that there was a provision arrived at informally in 1941 under which cattle qualified after two months. I shall make him a present of that. In 1948, the whole cattle trade between the two countries was in the melting pot again and we were negotiating a formal Agreement. Our Ministers held on to the two months and insisted it be written into the formal Agreement. Again, the Minister for Agriculture said in 1956, during the last year of the inter-Party Government, the term was increased from two months to three months. That may be. I think it had something to do with the fact that we were not clear of bovine tuberculosis here. There was also some adjustment in the price. Another Agreement was negotiated between the two countries in 1960. If what we did in 1956 was not correct and would not have been done by the Fianna Fáil Government, they had an opportunity in 1960 of rectifying that and getting the period back down to two months. But they did nothing about it. They accepted the two months and, again for the first time, the period of three months was solemnly written into the formal Agreement.
Therefore, I want to present to this House the clauses of this Agreement dealing with the store cattle position as being an exact replacement of the 1948 Agreement. I defy contradiction of that. The only thing in it now is that we are tied to deliver 638,000 store cattle to Britain and to accept the British price for them whether or not we can get alternative markets on the Continent or elsewhere at a higher price. Again, I defy contradiction.
There is another very important aspect of this Agreement on the agricultural side to which I should like to refer. It is the provisions of Article II on page 182 under which the British Government agree to pay to the Irish Government deficiency payments in respect of carcase beef and lamb— 25,000 tons of carcase beef and 5,500 tons of lamb. The British Government agree under the provisions of that Article to pay deficiency payments in respect of that carcase beef and lamb but they do so on condition that the money paid by them to the Irish Exchequer will be used or appropriated by the Irish Government only with the agreement of the British Government. Again, there can be no doubt about that because paragraph (e) of Article II reads as follows:
The sum so paid shall be applied by the Government of Ireland to such purposes and in such a manner as may from time to time be agreed by the two Governments after consultation together.
For the first time in modern history, we concede to the British Government the right to come to this country and tell us how to expend our money and how to run our agriculture.
The Minister for Agriculture, in dealing with this provision, brushed it aside lightly. He did not spend 30 seconds replying to the point. He said the only purpose of it was to avoid payments twice on the same animals. If that is what is meant, why was it not written into the Agreement? Why did we agree on behalf of the Irish people to submit our proposals for the expenditure of this money to Great Britain before expending it? The Minister for Agriculture treated this provision as if we were getting this money for nothing. Reference was made by some of the Deputies behind him to Marshall Aid. There is no comparison between this payment and Marshall Aid. We are not getting this payment for nothing. We are getting this deficiency payment in exchange for our agreement to admit into this country British manufactured goods free of duty. We are getting it in exchange for valuable consideration.
I claim on behalf of this Party and indeed on behalf of this country that, having got it and having earned it, we are entitled to do what we like with it and it is an insult to the Government, an insult to the country and an insult to the farmers that we should have to seek direction from any outside source as to how we should expend it. The sum involved is not very large but the principle is substantial. This deficiency payment on carcase beef and lamb was, for all practical purposes, not paid in England during last year. It was paid only in one week out of 35 and, again, that is something that cannot too often be emphasised because it explains how little there is in this Agreement for agriculture beyond what was in the Agreement of 1948.
Now, I should like to come to the question of butter. I wish the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Agriculture were here and that the Minister for Agriculture who came in here, as I say, to guide him, were also here. Speaking yesterday, Deputy Sweetman explained that under the 1948 Agreement, our quota for the export of butter into Britain was 20,000 tons or more. Under this new Agreement, we are entitled to export to Great Britain 23,000 tons for the year ending 31st March, 1967, and thereafter we take our chance and the whole matter will be reviewed. If words mean anything, the Agreement means that the quota may be increased or may be reduced. Deputy Sweetman said yesterday, and I intended to repeat it today, that that 23,000 tons of butter will cost the Irish taxpayer something between 1/- and 1/6d per lb in order to get the British consumer to eat it. We accuse the Minister for Agriculture of failing to get some relief for that subsidy of 1/- to 1/6d per lb which we have to pay. We suggest, as Deputy Sweetman did, that he should have done it by way of getting a deficiency payment, from Great Britain. Of course, it does not matter whether you call it a deficiency payment, a price support, a bonus, a bounty, or whatever you may call it, so long as it means that money is coming from the British Exchequer in relief of the Irish taxpayer.
The Minister for Agriculture sent his Parliamentary Secretary in here today and sat beside him to ridicule Deputy Sweetman and to endeavour to score a cheap political debating point over him by saying there are no deficiency payments in England in respect of dairy products. He is welcome to that cheap debating point because it is no more than that. There may be no deficiency payments known as such but price supports are payable in England in respect of dairy products, which amounts to the same thing. I do not care a hoot whether he called it a deficiency payment or a price support or a bounty or a levy or a subsidy, or whatever you might call it, but, whatever it is, he should have looked for it and tried to get it. According to his own words, he got everything he looked for in the dairying sector.
Now, I might deal with bacon for a very short time. Under the 1948 Trade Agreement, we secured a quota in the British market for Irish bacon amounting to 27,000 tons or more, if available. Since then, we have had the First Programme for Economic Expansion and the Second Programme for Economic Expansion and one would think we would require a much bigger quota. But the present Minister for Agriculture comes back with a quota, hard and firm, at 28,000 tons—when the quota in 1948 was 27,000 tons or more. I do not think that is anything to boast about. I do not think it took any tenacious bargaining to secure that, any more than it took any great tenacity to get the British to accept 638,000 store cattle.
I am speaking as the representative of the constituency of County Cavan, a constituency of small farmers, a constituency of mixed farming, a constituency of farmers who keep a few cows, who keep a sow or two, who rear and fatten a few pigs and who keep chickens and rear turkeys. I cannot see anything in this Agreement that was not in the 1948 Agreement for any of these categories.
I have dealt with the cattle. The Cavan farmer keeps cattle. I say that under that Agreement he has got nothing more than was guaranteed him in precisely similar terms in the 1948 Agreement. For his butter, he has got nothing more whatever. He will still, if he exports the butter, have to contribute to the 1/6 in the lb that the British public will have to be paid for eating it. I have told the House about the bacon. The quota is really smaller under the 1965 Agreement than it was under the 1948 Agreement because in 1948 it was 27,000 or more, if available, and now it is a fixed 28,000 tons.
Now we come to the poultry aspect. The Cavan farmer was always interested in keeping poultry. In the past few years, notwithstanding the activities of the Minister for Finance, the Cavan farmer was branching into the broiler business, putting up broiler houses, and so on, notwithstanding the fact that the recent Finance Act made him liable to income tax. But, under this Agreement, the broiler business and the turkey business are killed because it is solemnly stated in the Agreement that if our export of broilers or turkeys to Great Britain becomes significant—or, in blunt language, if it becomes worthwhile— we will then have consultations with the British Government with a view to allowing British farmers to import into this country broilers and turkeys. That is free trade in agriculture in reverse. We never intended that there should be free trade in agriculture. The idea was free trade in industry, in exchange for preferential treatment for Irish agriculture. It is as simple as that, and I think that is a fairly accurate summary of it. But, here in the broiler business and the turkey business, we are giving to the British the right to import their broilers and turkeys in here.
We have heard questions here during the day from some backbenchers and others as to why we propose to vote for this Agreement. We do not propose to vote for it but we shall not vote against it. We shall not vote against it because it contains the provisions favourable to agriculture which the 1948 Trade Agreement contained, but nothing more. We are rather disappointed with this Agreement. We think the Ministers who went over to Britain made a mighty bad bargain, coming back here boasting about getting the British Government to buy store cattle, boasting about getting the same quota in bacon as we got in 1948 and boasting about getting a couple of thousand more tons of butter sold than the British market accepted last year. This is a long term Agreement. There is nothing in it to boast about as far as agriculture is concerned, and there is a lot given away on the industrial front.
We are accepting this Agreement with reluctance, and we are abstaining from voting against it with reluctance. We are not opposing it because, for the first time, a leader of the Fianna Fáil Party has put his name to a document confirming his acceptance of the policy advocated by this Party for the past 45 years and because the agricultural provisions of this Agreement are the provisions of the Agreement negotiated by Deputy Dillon, as Minister for Agriculture, Deputy John A. Costello, as Taoiseach, and the other Ministers of the inter-Party Government in 1948.
Comment on this
At the outset of this debate, I did not intend to speak but several of the Opposition speakers have been making points which prompted me to make some contribution. The debate has gone on with monotonous repetition over the past few days and there is very little which can be added to the comments already made.
I stand here today as one of the free-born Irishmen to reach maturity and I was appalled to think that the members of the Fine Gael Party attempted to introduce Civil War sores into this debate. Young men of my generation in my Party had hoped to come here and discuss the problems of the 1960s, work for the 70s, and plan for the 80s but the Fine Gael Party are living in the 20s.
Comment on this
We hope they will be more enlightened in the future and that they will take a realistic view of the problem rather than living in the past, as they have been doing for the past two or three days. Most of the Fine Gael speakers have gone back periods of 44 years, and some even further. One of the greatest contributions made by Deputy Byrne of the Labour Party was when he summed up the Fine Gael attitude in this debate by saying that they would not vote against it because if it were a success they would say they supported it, but if it were a failure, they would say they did not.
Comment on this
Fine Gael, if they are not prepared to vote against it, have had no conscience in this debate. According to them, there is nothing good in this Agreement but they end up by saying there is something in the agricultural sector. If they had any conscience at all, they would do what they thought was right.
It would be easy for me to interpret the meaning of "politician". I did not understand it until this debate was under way. I now understand it fully from some of the interpretations put on it. The nation must be happy tonight that the power is in the hands of the Fianna Fáil Party, having listened to some of the Fine Gael and Labour speakers over the past couple of days. It is well known that politicians are always prepared to criticise——
Comment on this
Any person with little intellectual effort can pour out destructive criticism, as has been poured out during the course of this debate. It is a different thing to criticise constructively or suggest improvements but not one single improvement has been suggested by the Fine Gael or Labour Parties. A person who offers constructive suggestions and remedies is at least aware of some of the difficulties. But there are the gossiping scaremongers and slanderers, people who indicated we were traitors because this Agreement was signed and such were the contributions made by Fine Gael and Labour speakers. They will not vote against this Agreement, although according to themselves, we have sold the country.
Comment on this
They should record their decision against it if they have any conscience. It is quite evident that not one single member of the Fine Gael Party has any conscience.
Comment on this
The people of Ireland are interested in what has been said today, and during the past few days, but not what was said years ago. It is unfortunate that men like Deputy Collins should come in here and make vulgar comments in this House. It is a reflection on his Party.
Comment on this
He is still living in the past. We live in the present and plan for the future and that is how we will continue.
I shall not comment on any statements made by any other Fine Gael speakers; some of them were too stupid for comment. On the Labour side last night, we heard Deputy O'Connell pouring out the Labour policy. I am grateful for his statistics indicating that employment in the motor industry had increased by 1,600 between 1961 and 1965. What did he say? He said that the Taoiseach had done nothing to halt the expansion of this industry. Why, he asked, had the Taoiseach allowed the men to be employed? He wanted them sacked before they began work. That was his contribution. Only yesterday we saw that the motor industry is still expanding in certain sectors and will probably continue to expand where men of imagination are in charge——
Comment on this
The point is that Deputy O'Connell indicated that it was Labour Party policy that industry should be prevented from developing. It is well that his Party are not in power as perhaps a good many industries would be stopped. I worked in Aer Lingus in 1948 when the hatchet fell and I saw men dispersed to various parts of the world because there was no employment as a result of Fine Gael policy.
Comment on this
That was mentioned last night, and so were university professors, by Deputy O'Connell, but I am well aware of the position in 1948 and of the industrial destruction and national sabotage of that time.
Comment on this
The Deputy will have an opportunity of making his own statement. Deputy L'Estrange should allow Deputy Dowling to make his speech. The previous speaker was not interrupted and I cannot understand why Deputy Dowling should be subjected to this barrage.
Comment on this
In my constituency there was a close-down of a heavy engineering industry at that time. That was in keeping with the Fine Gael attitude through the years. On one occasion a member of that Party and a former Minister for Industry and Commerce stated that it was not the duty of the Government to provide work for the people. That was their outlook then and in 1948 when they sent people packing. Members of the Labour Party and of Fine Gael had to go.
Comment on this
Our experience over the past years, particularly in the field of industrial expansion, leaves us with a proud record. We can look back with pride and look forward with confidence because we have confidence in the future, in Irish workers, planners and industrialists. We know they can make the grade, notwithstanding the attacks made on them from time to time and the efforts to terrorise our workers by many politicians and vested interests in relation to this Trade Agreement. The Labour Party have tried to terrorise our workers and so have Fine Gael, because of their alleged deep concern. There is no need for concern. The nation is in the safe hands of the man who developed the industries of this country. I am quite sure the people have absolute confidence in him. This was shown last April. I am sure he will not let them down in the future. He has never done so in the past. He will not desert them or sabotage established industries.
No doubt in the future when many of the industries that will result from this Agreement are established, the Labour Party will try to take credit for them as they have done in the past. But their action tomorrow or tonight, or whenever the division comes, will indicate how they stand. They have no confidence in the future nor in the Irish workers or industrialists.
Much has been said about the manpower policy by members of the Labour Party who, above all, should be aware of the efforts to produce such a policy because they have been consulted. The employers have been consulted and the Minister's Parliamentary Secretary is awaiting the comments of the trade union movement and the industrialists. The question of redundancy has been raised again. We faced that problem a few years ago in CIE and we are not afraid of those problems. We can face them in the future as in the past and I am sure we shall win, despite the Opposition of Fine Gael and Labour. No doubt many problems will arise but we have faced greater problems before and I am sure that the resettlement of workers and associated problems will be solved with all other aspects of manpower policy that have been mentioned here. Unfortunately, some members of the House who should be aware of these problems have overlooked them.
The uncertainty of the situation has been removed. Industrialists and farmers now know they can plan for the future and will do so. This nation is on the march and we are going to establish a national economy stronger than ever before. In this world of ever-changing conditions and markets, it was necessary to recast our trading agreements and it may be necessary again, perhaps on many occasions. Now, after examination of the free trade situation on a much broader scale, we are prepared to bring about a situation in which we shall reap benefits when we enter EEC or some other free trade organisation in which we may participate.
We can condition ourselves to the new situation and industrialists and workers alike will reap the benefits of free trade. We shall be prepared for that situation to an extent which would not have been possible if we accepted some of the advice thrown out in the past few days. The signing of this Agreement has given us the advantage that we can examine in greater detail the implications and problems of free trade confronting other members of free trade organisations on a broader scale. I am sure industrialists, farmers and workers will reap great benefit from the foresight and ability shown by the Government in doing what they have done in the last few months.
An effort has been made to terrorise the workers. The Labour Party should be thinking in terms of offering suggestions for alleviating the distress likely to be caused by any industrial disruption. Instead, they choose to speak in terms of jobs gone and more for the emigrant ship. At no time have they offered a single suggestion that would be for the benefit of the workers. The only sensible point put forward by them was that made by Deputy H. Byrne when he said that he could not make head or tail of the Fine Gael mentality in not voting for or against the Agreement, that they wanted always to be on a winner. The Labour Party is on a loser and now they know it. The Labour Party had an ideal opportunity to establish themselves in the eyes of the people by a constructive approach to this problem rather than a destructive one. Their approach will not gain them any support. In future they will be treated with the contempt they deserve.
As I have said, there are defects in our industrial set-up which must be remedied. Labour-management relations must be improved. Possibly something is being done in that connection but the efforts have not been sufficient. One has to read the papers to know what the efforts are. There are some good men and there are some who are not so good. Labour-management relations must be changed. There must be better understanding. In the last few days, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Dr. Hillery, has endeavoured to make some sort of rapprochement to bring the parties together with a view to ironing out the situation that has been developing for some considerable time. Great credit is due to the Minister. It is not the first time that the Minister for Industry and Commerce has brought about a situation which alleviated distress among workers and helped the development of better understanding between labour and employers.
We are conscious of our responsibilities and confident that we can tackle all the problems that confront us. We are confident that in the future we will lead this country to the prosperity it deserves. We will see that the workers get the concessions they deserve and the standard of living to which they are entitled. That can only be done by an expansion of industry in a manner never before achieved.
Undoubtedly, there are defects in management. Management has been appalling in some cases. Some managements should pull up their socks. In very many cases the rejects and misfits of the medical and other professions are thrown into industry and impede progress. Efficiency in industrial management is just as desirable as efficiency in trade union and other sectors. Technical and planning personnel and managerial supervisors need to be experts in order that industry may meet future competition. I am confident that we can and will meet that competition successfully.
In conclusion, I should like to say that there is one word that spells success, whether Parties vote for or against this Agreement or do not vote at all. Now that the Agreement is signed, national cooperation is the answer to any problem we may have There must be national cooperation between Parties, politicians, industrialists, workers, trade unionists. It is only on the basis of national cooperation that we can proceed at the pace which is necessary and desirable. Undoubtedly, there will be sabotage on the way, just as there was before. I hope that on this occasion there will be a balanced outlook and that all Parties. irrespective of the way in which they vote on the Agreement, will participate in national cooperation and bring about a situation which will do credit to the workers, to industry and to the country as a whole.
Comment on this
Our Party, in opposing the motion before the House, did so, not to gain political advantage or because, being an Opposition Party, it is our job to oppose practically every measure, but after deep deliberation in the time available on the propositions involved in the Agreement and the effects of it that we can visualise.
Since the first intimation was given to the country at Dublin Airport to an unknown reporter by the Taoiseach, the country has not had much information to go on in relation to this Agreement. History does not record the name of the reporter but presumably his interview with the Taoiseach will be worth something yet to historians.
The fact is that our Party all along in relation to this Agreement were concerned about the employment position and about our industrial development. Indeed, our concern was expressed by our Leader on more than one occasion and was summed up in our annual conference resolution of last October on the matter.
There has been surrounding this Agreement over the period during which the negotiations have been going on, roughly the nine months before the announcement was made at Dublin Airport, an extraordinary degree of secrecy as to the nature of the negotiations and the factors involved in them. We noticed here in the important economic debate in this House in the last session that the Taoiseach was careful to avoid any mention of free trade in reviewing the economy at that time and the prospects for the future. The opportunity was not taken at that stage to keep the House informed or to give us some adult status in this decision-making on a matter of such importance. There was no reference made to it. Ample opportunity was taken by the Taoiseach and other Ministers in that debate on the economy to deal with the credit squeeze. The Taoiseach used the language of advance and retreat to which we have become so accustomed. There was no mention of the Trade Agreement negotiations, possibly the most important negotiations that this country's Government have been engaged in for many years. From first to last, an attempt has been made to limit discussion on the Agreement.
We pointed out at the start of this debate that we wanted this debate to take place during the coming week. It was neither our intention nor our desire that the debate should take place at this time. As Deputy Corish said at the outset of his remarks, we did not feel the people had sufficiently absorbed the implications of the Agreement. Whilst the strategy of a responsible Opposition Party before this Agreement was signed would have been to bring this debate to the floor of this House, go into the details of it and the attitude of the Government in endeavouring to make it, immediately it was signed, that responsible Opposition Party would seek to delay the debate on it. There is no inconsistency in that. In fact, the very consistency lies in that, that whereas beforehand our policy would be to alert the people to the direction in which the Government were going, once the Agreement had been signed, our job would be to give the people as much time as possible to digest and understand the implications of the Agreement. It was noticeable that, whereas before this Agreement was signed, the Government were reluctant to give time here for a discussion of the matter, their attitude changed to something bordering on almost unseemly haste immediately it was signed. We owe it to the Christian tradition. I suppose, that Christmas intervened; otherwise, they would have had the debate on this Agreement on Christmas Day. As it is, they went as near as possible to that by having it on 4th January.
It has been our deliberate policy in this debate to go into every aspect and, as far as possible, to use the only forum available to us to highlight the defects in this Agreement. It shows a very poor understanding of democracy, and how it works, for the Taoiseach to suggest more or less that an Opposition Party in a situation like this is there solely to make political capital. Others of his backbenchers took the attitude that we were practically committing national sabotage in opposing this Agreement. In fact, we have a job to do, a job which may not be remembered next year but which will certainly be remembered in the years after because this Agreement, if it does not achieve an undesirable sensational interest next year, or even the year after, will certainly become more and more important as the years go by, and the names of those who voted for it, or who abstained, will be remembered.
There may be many anonymous Deputies in the other Parties here who do not speak very often and whose only action may be to cast a vote; that vote, their names and their constituencies will be remembered when people begin to examine in the years ahead the full implications of this Agreement. Even if their constituents are not vitally interested in the Agreement at the moment, their interest will be aroused by events in the future. If Fianna Fáil Deputies, looking over their constituencies, are satisfied that the industrial concerns in those constituencies and the economic interests of those constituencies will benefit by this Trade Agreement, or even, indeed, if they are not satisfied, no constituents will be able to warn them at the moment of the consequences because, to my way of thinking, there is not much political capital of the kind mentioned by the Taoiseach since the Agreement has been obfuscated by so many exaggerated claims and so much inaccuracy that the people as a whole have lost interest in it. We do not see much political capital accruing to us because of our stand in this debate, but we are vitally concerned, as a serious Party with serious obligations to the working people of the country, to play our part so far as the strength of our 22 Members allow us.
In the events leading up to this particular Agreement, the Agreement was mentioned on at least three occasions in the British House of Commons. Here, in this Parliament, we could not get any discussion on the matter. The Taoiseach did not avail of the opportunity afforded him in the debate on the economic situation during the last session to raise the issues involved in this Agreement. But any reasonable man would admit that the Agreement involved economic consequences for this country. Possibly the only people in this island who were aware of every step of this Agreement, of each proposal and counterproposal, were the Unionists in Stormont, an administration which Fianna Fáil have been courting lately, Ministry by Ministry. That administration, elected on the most shameful basis, was well aware of all the elements in this Agreement from first to last. Knowing that, we can well understand how false and how dishonest it is to say that the representatives of the Irish people went to Westminster in a spirit of equality, bargaining as colleagues with the British Government.
The material involved in this Agreement needs far more careful analysis than that given it by the Ministers responsible and by the Taoiseach himself. The Minister for Agriculture has gone on record as making astronomical claims as to what this Agreement will mean to the Irish farmer. His father-in-law, the Taoiseach, has made claims of the same high order. He has spoken of factories in the way in which one would talk about mushrooms, five factories springing up overnight for every one that closes. He has spoken of some mysterious foreign company coming in to save the vehicle industry. His attitude to the vehicle industry is very like the attitude of the Irish poets of the 18th century: someone will come from across the water to save the day.
The White Paper published is different from the normal type of White Paper we are accustomed to receive. Several of the alternatives it proposes are nothing but deliberate Aunt Sallys. It does not set out to give us an honest and complete version of the events leading up to this Agreement.
It is just not honest on the part of the Taoiseach to say that our Party, or anybody opposed to this Agreement, are filled with a spirit of national inferiority, that we do not realise the marvellous revolution that has come about and that now puts Irish industry in the position of facing competitors. The fact is that, in our reading of the Agreement, we are a bit more realistic. Our Party are more closely in touch with our industrial potential. We have been asked to pose our alternatives; if we oppose the Agreement, then we must give the alternatives.
The Labour Party have no desire to wipe Europe off the map. It is on the map. It is on the map that free trade is something gaining force in Europe, even though Europe is divided into two blocs. The alternatives posed by the Taoiseach are not strictly the only available alternatives. The alternative he poses as between acceptance of the present Agreement and complete isolation, acceptance of the present Agreement with rising living standards and industrial development, or, on the other hand, a position amounting to stagnation and the lowering of living standards—these are not the only alternatives. Indeed, Deputy Dowling's speech just now would be more proper to the market place than it was to intelligent discussion in this House.
The Taoiseach treated us to this physical force economic language to which he has lately become addicted. We retreat and advance. The British negotiators retreated. We, on the other hand, advanced. It took a great deal of time before the British retreated from the positions they held. That may be good enough for Fianna Fáil Deputies out at Dublin Airport, who will receive good news anyway and who must, because of Party affiliation, receive it, but it is not good enough for any Deputy coming into this House to hear facts in a serious situation.
One can appreciate the difficulties under which the Fianna Fáil Party laboured in supporting this Agreement. It was more important to them than possibly for other political groupings in this country to prove that this present Agreement was a novel thing, was something that was absolutely tied to the European venture, something connected with previous applications to the EEC. It was extremely important to prove that it was not what we think it is, reabsorption into the UK economy.
The Fianna Fáil Party had a republican tradition and they represented the best of the radical elements in this country in previous years. It was important for the Fianna Fáil Party to prove that it had nothing to do with a capitulation to a stand taken by a previous Party and by a previous movement in our political history. One can understand the reason why a Fianna Fáil Government should be so anxious to prove that this was a step of the modern order, this movement back into reabsorption into the British economy. One does not have to weigh one's case too heavily in the year that we are in, but one can refer to history for our previous experience of absorption into the British economy and what that entailed.
We have said that the balance of this Agreement was in favour of Britain. We have said that there were no great gains for agriculture as a result of this Agreement, and we have said we do not see this Agreement affording expansion in employment. Anyone who is not blinded by a Party Whip will accept that these are reasonable deductions to make from this Agreement.
The de facto agricultural position is preserved in this Agreement, and if the waiting period for cattle has been reduced, that was reduced before. If we look to this Agreement as being one which gives us advantages in agriculture that compensate for the undoubted risks that were taken in the industrial sector, I do not think that those benefits, those marginal improvements that we have gained in agriculture, really counterbalance what we have lost in industry. In relation to one gain that we have made in agriculture, the British deficiency payment, this Agreement contains no clause that says that in relation to these deficiency payments the policy of the British Government at the moment will continue in being forever in respect of agriculture. In fact it is quite possible that this will be one element of British domestic policy that will be changed in the years ahead. The Conservative Party decision of earlier this year should remind us of that. In the last session I asked the Taoiseach this question, and he admitted that this was possible at all times. Therefore, if there are a number of gambling points in this Agreement, this is one of the major gambling points involved.
The waiting period for cattle is reduced, so that our balance of payments position will be improved. However, that improvement and the improvement in the cattle trade does not give us, even in agriculture, any possibility of even holding the employment that we have at the moment in agriculture. Again, nobody looking at the number in agricultural employment, looking at the numbers leaving agriculture, in excess of what even our Second Programme contemplates, will agree that the improvement in the cattle position will hold the present population on the land in the future.
Even more unsettling in this connection is that over the past year, 1965, the price of cattle has seldom fallen as low as the British guaranteed price, except for a short period in 1965, a matter of weeks. Therefore, unless the British Government substantially increase their deficiency payments to their own farmers, it is doubtful if any of the payments made will be made because the world price is continuing to rise for this commodity; the continental trade is quite buoyant and could take perhaps even more than we are at present giving them. In fact, this could be one of the casualties we anticipate because of this Agreement. The commitment to give the figure to which we are committed, at least 638,000 store cattle and 25,000 tons of carcase beef, will have some effect on our continental trade which we had been building up.
Comment on this
We shall wait for the Minister for Justice to prove it is nonsense later on. These are the gains we have made in agriculture against the disadvantages that will arise for industry. The butter quota cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be shown to be an extraordinarily big increase. Even under the old system, we have been approaching to within a couple of thousand tons of what we are now given in perpetuity. We do not wish to labour the point in this regard. It is symptomatic of the general Government decision to refuse to argue the facts, to come out with the facts on this Agreement, that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries refused to give the figure of what the expansion of the butter quota would mean in extra taxation. The Federation of Irish Industries and employers generally expressed the opinion before this Agreement was signed that if it was to deserve support, the gains we would have to get in agriculture would need to be overwhelming to compensate for the damage our industry would suffer.
I do not think the gains we have received in agriculture under this Agreement can be described as overwhelming. Very marginal indeed is a correct way of describing the gains we have had in the agricultural section. Agriculturally, this is not a free trade area. The Minister for Agriculture yesterday said that Irish agriculture could never survive in free trade conditions—that it needed this type of protection. The logic of that escapes me. I do not know which is the more tender now in the Government mind—Irish Industry or Irish agriculture. It seems as if the Minister for Agriculture is setting up a new protective régime, one for agriculture. He says the British have been very kind to us in this respect. Have they, when we recall that their own agriculture is feather-bedded, subsidised, paid for by the taxpayers? Is it all that generous on their part, in the circumstances, to allow us this protection?
On the industrial side the man-made fibre industry is that most quoted as benefiting from this Agreement. Unfortunately, the undoubted benefits that will arise for this industry have been overestimated and the figures greatly inflated. I admit there will be benefits but a figure of £10 million has been churned about without mention of the fact that this entails the elapsing of a number of years, that certain measures will be required before the benefits can be realised and that it is all very problematical in view of the type of management we have in a great deal of our industries.
In exchange for all the agricultural benefits, we throw open our hitherto protected market and take on British industry in a free for all fight in perfect competition. As other Deputies mentioned during the debate, the competition is extremely imperfect between an industrial giant like Britain and a small country like ours. The Taoiseach may claim, as he did at the outset of the debate, that he brought forth Irish industry from the swaddling clothes stage. He may go down in history as having dismantled what he created and disposing of it.
The employment position will not be affected immediately by the Agreement. The effect will be felt in the years ahead, probably about 1970. One of the protective clauses gives the protection that where employment is affected, Irish goods may be exempted from further tariff reductions provided the total value of the excluded goods is not more than three per cent of the total value of British goods exported to Ireland in the preceding year. There is also the clause that where there is heavy unemployment, quotas may be imposed on imports for up to 18 months to hold them at their previous level. It must be remembered that there is a clause also which says that if the British Government agree, industries with heavy unemployment may get tariff reduction extension for five years. It must be realised that this will really not give us the protection necessary in the circumstances because there is a run down in agricultural employment far in excess of the figure predicted in the Second Programme. The slow down of improvement, of expansion, which will come after 1970 will not take up the slack created by this redundancy.
The 1971 review must be carried out in company with the British Government. We must remember in this respect that in the 18 months clause it will not be simply enough for the Parliamentary Secretary dealing with manpower to forecast or merely to think there will be unemployment: it must be proved before we approach the British Government on this aspect. One wonders what in fact happens to our policy of grants, tax reliefs and subsidies to Irish industries which will be affected by the Agreement. Fifteen years to go from 1966 and then our attitude on these inducements to industry to expand over a period of years will have to stop. Corporation profits tax, one of the main instruments used by the Taoiseach and his Government, and all the other tax inducements will have to cease and anything that would affect what, in the British Government's view, would be unfair competition will have to come to an end.
In that situation, one wonders what will be the fate of some of the British branch factories here set up initially merely to cater for this home market. Many of the results flowing from this Agreement cannot in their totality be seen at this time: we can merely conclude from clauses in the Agreement what in fact is likely to happen. Arising out of it, one may wonder what will happen to the expansion of the State industrial sector in our employment, a more important element here in the provision of employment, relatively, than in Britain. How will a future Irish Government have the power to expand the State arm with the lessening of control we will have as a result of this Agreement over our own market? Any State industry at the beginning must have some form of control over the home market to help it expand in its formative years.
What will happen, as a result of this Agreement, to the unfortunate Buy Irish campaign? I do not know if the staff of the Buy Irish committee have been informed of what is in store for them but there are clauses which will bury that campaign very quickly. One may look forward to the absence of the embarrassing disclosures we have had in recent months by different Departments about their purchases of non-Irish goods because in future they can point to the Free Trade Agreement for their defence. Presumably it will save this House a lot of the time we have had to spend in the game of chasing the Departments who were not buying Irish.
Again, the British, with their older industrial traditions do not need, as we do, a new industrial nation, to urge on our people the necessity to buy home manufactured goods. The control of Irish industry, of which we have been having less and less in recent years, will, of course, pass more steadily and quickly out of our hands as this Agreement begins to take effect and one may ask—I appreciate it can be said it will not be necessary—if higher taxation will be required in the years ahead, arising out of the Agreement. One cannot rule out the possibility of extra taxation being needed to relieve the many casualties arising from this Agreement.
Now, to say that it amounts to lack of patriotism and to ascribe lack of patriotism to those who are genuinely worried about the competitive position of Irish industry under this Agreement or to those who are, shall we say, more realistic about Irish industry, is utter nonsense. Those who say that Irish industry is strong and go ahead should examine the CIO reports, which were the most expensive exercise we have had in recent years on the actual state of Irish industry. It would be far better to examine those reports than say that we are suffering from an inferiority complex and a lack of patriotism in our attitude towards this Agreement.
It is pretty chastening to read through the CIO reports for those who expect tremendous results from Irish industry in the years ahead and for those who contend that we are up to the standard of other countries with regard to free trade competition. The final CIO report referred to all the other twenty-two reports and it remarked that very few firms appear to be interested in export markets. There was lack of interest in export markets. There was a lack of knowledge on export markets. They remarked on the inefficiency of management and the state of equipment in regard to particular industries. Indeed, on such an analysis and in the short period ahead of us before we move towards freer trade it is hard to understand where the confidence of some of the Deputies who think Irish industry is up to this competitiveness comes from and on what it is based.
The CIO reports recommended co-operation to ensure rationalisation of production and increased specialisation, etc. They remarked on the external association of much of Irish industry with Britain. They remarked in the case of wireless, chemicals, electrical equipment and the foundation garment section of the ready-made clothing industry that rationalisation and improvement was much more difficult because of their connections with foreign firms. Indeed, we can see this difficulty repeated in the present Agreement.
When the CIO had gone through the whole exercise they had to report that very few industries had any development plans on hands. This was merely in regard to development plans on hands but as you know quite a period of time may elapse before the actual making of a decision and before we can actually see the fruits in increased employment and factory space. In previous years the Taoiseach and some of his Ministers spent quite a time going around the country exhorting Irish industry to prepare for Europe but very few industries have actually equipped themselves for entry into the Common Market. They have not prepared themselves in readiness for freer trade conditions. If the Taoiseach and his Government came to the conclusion that nothing but an exercise as drastic as the present one was the only alternative to buck up Irish industries it was an extremely drastic one.
We were told in the CIO reports that in the chemical and the steel industry 50 per cent of the plant was out of date. We were told that in the printing industry much of the machinery was very old. Government assistance which was so lavishly extended to various industries appears to have been unavailed of only in cotton and steel wool production. There is a considerable amount of old and out-of-date machinery in the cotton and steel wool industry, the make-up industry like shirts, the ready-made clothes, gowns and men's outwear. It was discovered in the course of the Report that in the shirt industry one third of the stitching machines were over 20 years old.
Comment on this
They may have been. We will need those in the future. Much of the machinery was also obsolete in the cotton and knitwear industry and much of the cotton industry had extremely out of date looms still operating to the amazement of the staff and management. The furniture industry is scattered around the country in old and unsuitable buildings. In fact, the CIO Reports in one sense were amusing but it is a wry amusement. It certainly is amusing having regard to some of the problems confronting Irish industry. They discovered that in the furniture industry, there were hand soldering techniques. That is the kind of equipment we have in this country but Deputies in the Fianna Fáil benches have come here ignorant of the facts. They think we are able to meet competition with Britain, Europe or anyone else who comes in afterwards. No amount of Party loyalty should blind conscientious Deputies to the facts.
The footwear industry is far from satisfactory. Fianna Fáil Deputies would do well to return to these CIO Reports instead of giving us chunks of the advertising campaigns of the Fianna Fáil Party in recent elections. The position with regard to our industry has not changed very dramatically to date and I suppose it will not change very dramatically tomorrow, despite the ten per cent reduction. It is clear that the casualties in the inefficient Irish industries, because of our failure to face the facts of modern industrial life, will be the unfortunate operatives in those factories and industries.
We hear there is a manpower policy in gestation. The Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Seán Flanagan, yesterday, protested he was doing a great deal of work in relation to manpower policy. It is not unfair to remind him that the problem of freer trade, which will show up the undoubted problem of retraining and dislocation of industry, has been with us for some considerable time. Although he may be working very hard in 1966 it is ridiculous to be talking about working very hard on a manpower policy when we still do not have one. One could be cynical about this and say that probably a great deal of his problems will disappear in the boat train to Manchester and to other places while he is still talking about the manpower policy.
Comment on this
Well, we will want it very shortly because we have quite some problems in relation to this manpower policy. There are some other problems consequent on this Agreement. There is the problem of people leaving agriculture and looking for work in other jobs. School leavers will be looking for jobs, while some industries will be going to the wall as a result of this Agreement. These problems must be tackled by this manpower authority in a little less than five years. If after that period the Fianna Fáil Government have tackled those problems successfully, the Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Seán Flanagan, can stand with some pride in the position normally occupied by the Taoiseach.
The fact is that there is a huge task before this manpower authority. The Fianna Fáil Government have been in office during the immediate period in which this European idea was gathering force, and their answer in 1966 is that they are now practically on the eve of —I was going to say "destruction"— the preparation of this manpower policy. The size structure of Irish industry will not help them, but will be an added problem. One half of our 3,106 manufacturing industries have less than 15 persons on their payroll and rationalisation will make that figure look peculiar. It will show that we have some problems of rationalisation in looking for an industrial complex of this elementary nature. One-tenth of our established industries only top the 100 mark on their payroll.
There is the problem too that certain skills will become obsolete and job-training will be necessary. That problem must be tackled successfully in a little over five years. There must be job training and retraining, and workers coming from agriculture will need special training. The problems of industry itself involved in this Agreement, and the problems of the vehicle building industry, will also have to be looked after in the years ahead.
We take it from this Agreement in political terms that the Government Party are now a class Party. In the past the Government Party said they were for the workers, the employers and the farmers, big and small. They were the Party of the Republic. At the moment a breakdown of their support would show that the people they represent in this Agreement are big business people and big farmers. Not next month or next year, but in the years ahead it will be seen that this Agreement will benefit solely those particular classes and, as such, the political Party who signed this Agreement will be seen for what they are.
Let there be no mistake about it. This Party were not thinking of next month or next year when we decided to vote against this Agreement, but of the overall implications arising from it, what it will mean to this country, what it will mean to our potential support, and where we stand in this argument. The Government Party have seen that a policy of inducing private enterprise to bolster our economy has not worked. They have seen that the result of all their inducements to private enterprise to come forward with them in this adventure of the industrialisation of the country has not brought the employment which was promised initally.
Their solution to the problem is one which other Irish Parties have adopted in the past—absorption in Britain. In fact, the more we look at the carpetbagging that has gone on in Europe, the more we realise that the road to Brussels led to Westminster. They say they have a manpower policy in 1966, but I do not think the Fianna Fáil Party realise—and they probably do not care—that in the years ahead the position of the trade union arm of the Fianna Fáil Party, the Labour element like Deputy Dowling, Deputy Moore and Deputy Wyse from Cork, will become as anachronistic as that of the Labour element in the old Irish Parliamentary Party.
Comment on this
I am glad the Minister realises it.
Comment on this
I see that the Minister has one talent, that of observation. The Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Seán Flanagan, did not inspire confidence in me that he appreciates the problems which anyone of intelligence or any person who has worked in the trade union movement would realise are involved in the matter of employment.
A factual position arises from this Agreement. Britain will now govern this entire island much more effectively than she did at any time in the past. Her troops are now in the Six Counties. Some people in Dáil Éireann are mesmerised by her. She will not have the expense of running this part of the country. We will do it ourselves with delegated powers from West-minister. In fact, the implication of this Agreement is that we are back to the position pre-1922 as regards control of our economy, or any attempt to set up an independent Irish economy. Free trade will go ahead in Europe in one form or another, but how our industries are to become more efficient in the years ahead should be left as much as possible in our own hands. If tariffs are to be reduced, that should be done with a realisation of the implications in the case of each industry. It should not be done in the blanket way in which it is done in this Agreement at five year intervals.
We say that the Agreement, which has been attended with so much secrecy by the Government Party, and which was finally produced before Christmas, does not give agriculture the miracles which many of its propagandists were talking about before it was signed. It involves much danger for our industries and it signifies the end of the independent adventure which this country embarked upon, even with Partition, in 1922. In fact, it will be seen in the years ahead as the end of the creative period of Fianna Fáil Government, a Party now exposed as a class Party, the friend of the big industrialist and the big farmer who are shedding what was hitherto their main support, labour. For these reasons our Party tabled our amendment lest there be any confusion about our purpose, and where we stand in regard to this Agreement, we are ready to go into the Division Lobbies and vote against it.
Comment on this
At this stage of the discussion, it is not possible to break fresh ground. Possibly everything that can be said in favour or in criticism of this Agreement has been said by now in one form or another. I dare say there are very useful quotations that some of the Deputies opposite might not like to hear but I do not propose to use them. The claim has been advanced that this Agreement is as good as could be obtained. I am not in any way wronging the Fianna Fáil Party when I say that that is the attitude they take up with regard to this Agreement, that they could not have done better, that they have done the best they could. I am prepared to accept that this Agreement is probably as good as Fianna Fáil could have obtained but I do not agree that that necessarily means the Agreement is a good one, or that another team of negotiators might not have done a better job.
Whether it is good or bad, the fact is that the Agreement has been concluded. The view of the Fine Gael Party is that it is unrealistic not to recognise that fact. The Agreement was concluded on 14th of last month and it then became a binding international Agreement. I do not believe that should have been done. I do not believe it should have been signed in face of the demands that had been made for a prior discussion in this Parliament. It was the duty of the Government, knowing as they did that there was a strong feeling, not only in this Party but I believe also in the Labour Party, that the terms of an Agreement with an alteration as radical as that proposed in this one, to have it discussed either generally or in detail and, if you like, in camera by this House before the Agreement was signed. That was not done: the Agreement was signed and it has become a binding international contract and it will remain so whatever way the vote goes in this House.
As a Party with a reasonable expectation of forming a Government, we are expected, and I think rightly expected to act rationally and responsibly. In those circumstances, were we to vote against the approval of this Agreement, then logically our vote must be considered a repudiation of this Agreement and must be considered as an earnest of our intention when elected to Government to repudiate this Agreement. What would repudiation of this Agreement mean in terms of Irish trade and economy? Remember this Agreement specifically cancelled the existing trade arrangements between this country and Great Britain. If we were unilaterally to cancel out or repudiate this Agreement, we would then be left with no Agreement whatever because the Government in their drafting of this document, or in the joint drafting of it, have provided in one of the Articles that the existing Trade Agreements are cancelled out.
Even in internal matters, reasons of prudence obviously dictate quite frequently that abrupt, radical reversals of policy should not take place. That is equally true and equally as valid in international agreements and were we to adopt a position, an agreement having been concluded by an Irish Government, that a change of Government here was going automatically to mean that that Agreement was going to be repudiated and have nothing in its place, then there would not be anything left except a feeling of bad faith in so far as the people of this country are concerned and are regarded by our neighbours across the water. I do not think it is right that we should allow any suggestion of bad faith on our part to be made.
Those very briefly are the kind of reasons why we in the Fine Gael Party, while we have our criticisms to make of this Agreement, while we feel it was a very bad bargain that was struck by the Fianna Fáil Party, nevertheless feel obliged from a realistic, practical and responsible point of view not to vote for the non-approval of this Agreement. I think it was the Taoiseach who used the phrase that the Agreement was a fact of life. It is a fact of life but there are others as well, and the fact that we accept this Agreement in the sense that I have spoken of does not by any means indicate that we believe it is the best Agreement that could have been made. It does not by any means indicate that we believe it is even a good Agreement. Certainly it does not indicate that we have imposed on ourselves any vow of silence with regard to this Agreement, or imposed on ourselves any discipline not to point to the flaws and faults in the Agreement as we see them.
The examination and investigation made of the Agreement by speakers from these benches, particularly the examination made by Deputy Liam Cosgrave, shows our determination to give as ruthless and as searching an examination as it is possible to do. We have made it clear in the speeches we have made in the course of this debate that we regard this Agreement as an unbalanced Agreement, an Agreement brought home by the negotiators who did the job for this country, the balance of advantage of which is in favour of the United Kingdom rather than of Ireland. I do not want to go into precise details because, apart from anything else, I do not think we can do anything more at this stage than estimate the likely effect of this Agreement, balancing advantage against disadvantage, balancing the English position against the Irish position.
However, it has been estimated that at the end of ten years, Great Britain is going to gain something between £50 million and £75 million annually as a result of this Agreement. I do not think there is any member of the Fianna Fáil Party, any member of the Government, no matter how brassy his neck, will make the claim that the financial advantage to us, taking agriculture and industry together, is going to be even half of the estimated advantage to Great Britain. It is quite clear, and it is accepted even by the Fianna Fáil Party, that the balance of the advantage in this Agreement lies with Great Britain. I do not think that is good enough. I do not think any team of negotiators who come back to our shores with that story on their lips can claim they have done a good job for this country.
Frankly, one of the things that worries me in connection with this Agreement is that we appear under it to be obliged for all time to keep that balance of advantage in favour of the British. There are provisions regarding various matters in the Agreement, one of which deals with consultation between this country and Great Britain. This is dealt with in Article XXIII, which provides that representatives of each country shall meet once a year, or at any time at the request of either, to supervise the application of the Agreement. I do not like the idea of British Government representatives being entitled to supervise what we are doing here. However, there is reciprocity and we have as much right to supervise the implementation of the Agreement.
Later in this particular Article XXIII, at paragraph (3), it is stated:
Should either party consider that an obligation under this Agreement has not been fulfilled or that any benefit conferred upon it by this Agreement is being or may be frustrated or that any cases of special difficulty have arisen or may arise, or that a change in circumstances necessitates or may necessitate a variation in the terms of this Agreement, the other party shall on request enter into consultation immediately with a view to seeking an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution which preserves the balance of the Agreement.
That is the key phrase in this Article. Whatever consultation is entered into, whatever difficulties may arise, whatever dangers threaten here, as far as we are concerned, we are obliged under Article XXIII, paragraph (3), in whatever negotiations we carry out to try to remedy the situation to preserve the balance of the Agreement, which, as I say, is weighted heavily in favour of Great Britain. It gives a balance of advantage, fiscally speaking, to Great Britain of at least two to one, and possibly more. That is the balance the Irish negotiators have tied future negotiators to preserve for all time or for as long as this Agreement remains unrevised.
The Agreement requires revision. I hope in the course of time, with a change of Government, it will be possible to revise it. I hope that is one of the clauses that will go out of it on a revision and that we are not going to act in such a manner that, no matter what changes there are in our circumstances, no matter what hardship may be caused here even by the operation of this Agreement, we will be obliged to carry on and limit our negotiations in that way so that the balance of the Agreement is preserved.
Notice taken that 20 Members were not present; House counted, and 20 Members being present,
Comment on this
I am glad Deputy Casey has succeeded in getting the Fianna Fáil Party to take a bit more interest in the proceedings. I was dealing with the manner in which the Irish negotiators under this Agreement have tied the hands of future negotiators under Article XXIII, which obliges them, irrespective of any difficulties we may meet in the future, to preserve the balance of the Agreement in favour of Great Britain. At this stage of the discussion, even the most enthusiastic Fianna Fáil supporter is beginning to see that this Agreement is not all that they expected it would be. They are beginning to see that, in fact, as far as benefit and gain to this country is concerned, there is very little to shout about in this Agreement. I think they are beginning to see that while, on the one hand, there is very little to shout about so far as benefit to us is concerned, on the other hand, their Government have taken very great risks with the future of this country. The advantages which have been gained, so far as we are concerned, have been dealt with by most speakers.
I think that when criticising the Agreement, it is fair to point to whatever advantages are there. With the exception of one, in particular, on the industrial front. I think that whatever benefits exist under this Agreement must be regarded as in the agricultural sphere. The greatest benefit that Fianna Fáil can point to is the fact that there is to be guaranteed access to the British market in the future for cattle, sheep and lambs on the hoof. I wonder, though, when that is examined, if there is really any great reason for rejoicing. Is it not a fact, and will any Fianna Fáil Deputy deny this, that all that is being done there is that some words which could have been used to limit that access have been removed from the trading relations between the two countries? The particular words regarding "orderly marketing" have gone. But, in fact, as far as I know, and I do not pretend I am an expert in this field, the provision regarding marketing which might have been invoked for the purpose of preventing access to the British market for our cattle in the past has never been invoked, has never been applied by the British Government, so that when there is talk now about guaranteed access for cattle, sheep, and so on, we are in exactly the same position as we have been up to now except that some words that were there have gone.
Let us look at this provision from the British point of view. Is it not clear that England wants to buy our cattle, wants to buy our livestock? If she could get them elsewhere cheaper, there is no reason why she would not do it. Great Britain is looking after herself. She wants to buy our cattle and, under this Agreement, we are obliged to give a guaranteed supply of 638,000 head of cattle each year from now on. We must do that; otherwise we default under the terms of this Agreement. In addition, we must supply annually, and guarantee the supply, 25,000 tons of carcase beef and 5,500 tons of carcase lamb and, if we do not keep to our bargain, if we do not keep to the guarantee written into this by us for the supply of that quantity, then the provisions of Article 5 of Appendix 2 come into play. Article 5 provides:
If, in any calendar year, the number of store cattle imported into the United Kingdom from Ireland falls below 638,000 head, or if, in any United Kingdom fatstock year, the quantity of carcase beef and carcase lamb so imported is less than 25,000 tons and 5,500 tons respectively, the two Governments shall consult with a view to taking such measures as are practicable to meet the situation.
So there you have the situation that we give an absolute guarantee as to the amount we will export annually. We have to export that to Great Britain even though it may suit us better to export it elsewhere or to export a certain amount of it elsewhere and possibly get a better price. We shall have to turn down the better price, if that situation arises, in order to export it to Britain and, if we fail to do it, the English have a right to a say in what measures are to be taken here to remedy the situation. That is so far as what is regarded as the big gain under this Agreement is concerned.
There is, of course, the question of the waiting period for store cattle and sheep: that has been dealt with by several speakers. I think it is generally agreed it will not make any great difference. It did not make any great difference when it was increased and it did not make any great difference when it was reduced. Then there are the questions of the deficiency payments and the increase of the butter quota. So far as we are concerned, that is what we are getting out of this Agreement.
The balance of the Agreement, is, as I say, entirely in favour of the British. What do we get in the industrial sphere? I think, again, there is general agreement that the only benefit of a substantial nature to us industrially is in connection with the textile firms manufacturing goods containing artificial man-made fibres. In fact, up to the present, this is the only substantial section of Irish industry which is deprived of access to the British market and, under the arrangements which have now been made, we shall get access in respect of this particular sector of industry. That is an improvement and a benefit on the industrial front but are there any others to offset the gains that the British have made industrially? I have seen an estimate of the value of this particular benefit to us put at something in the region of £2 million to £3 million in the early years, possibly rising to £10 millions in ten years' time. As against that, the estimate given of the value to the British of opening the floodgates here to British manufactured goods, in a ten-year period, has been put at £50 million to £75 million annually. From the point of view of unemployment, I think this Agreement contains most danger so far as we are concerned in industry. In time, admittedly the period will be gradual—it will take ten years to do it—the Irish market will be completely open to British competition.
I said that this Agreement is a fact of life and that there are other facts of life. Another fact of life is that for many years past successive Governments in this country have operated a policy of protection for Irish industry. A high tariff wall has been erected and that, also, is a fact of life. It is a fact of life that should have been particularly clear to the Fianna Fáil negotiators because they have always claimed they were the champions of the policy of protection of Irish industry. They were proud of the tariff walls and tariff barriers that had been erected. How are they facing up to that fact of life here? It is clear that, ultimately, with the strength and force of British competition on the industrial front, there will be a dislocation of employment, that people will be put out of work as Irish industries will have to close down.
The Minister for Industry and Commerce admitted quite frankly in this House recently that, so far as the motor assembly business was concerned, we can virtually wipe it out under a free trade arrangement. There are other industries likely to be affected as well. In that situation, what safeguards exist in this Agreement as far as employment is concerned? They are dealt with in Article XIX of the Agreement and this, as I read it—and I should be glad if the Minister would correct me if I am wrong—enables us to take some steps, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Several conditions must be fulfilled. There must be an appreciable rise in unemployment and that appreciable rise in unemployment must be in a particular sector of industry. It must be caused by a substantial decrease in demand for a domestic product and, in turn, that increase in demand must be caused by increased exports. There are four things which must exist before we can take any steps, under Article XIX, in relation to unemployment. The Minister shakes his head but——
Comment on this
From the other country. Let us read it:
If in the territory of either Party——
(a) an appreciable rise in unemployment
That is the first condition—there must be an appreciable rise——
in a particular sector of industry or region
That is the second—it must be in a particular sector of industry or region
is caused by a substantial decrease in internal demand for a domestic product.
That is the third condition. It must be caused by a substantial decrease in internal demand for a domestic product and
this decrease in demand is due to an increase in imports from the territory of the other.
That is the fourth condition.
Comment on this
It is exports from one and imports to the other. The point I am making is that all four of those reasons must exist, and must exist together, before the steps which can be taken under Article XIX can be put into effect.
If, for example, a moderate amount of unemployment is caused in several different sectors of industry and even though the total of that unemployment, which is caused over a wide field, amounts to what any of us, or even the British, might regard as appreciable unemployment, even in that circumstance, we are not entitled to operate the provisions of Article XIX, because the appreciable unemployment must be in a particular sector. So, if you have moderate unemployment caused over a number of sectors, totalling between them appreciable unemployment, still we cannot do anything about it. If general economic malaise is caused as a result of the weakening in our industrial effort here by reason of this Agreement, in turn causing unemployment, again we cannot do anything about it under Article XIX. Those four conditions must exist and are conditions which are conditions precedent to any part of the remedies in Article XIX being brought into play. What are the remedies if we do? We can have a period of 18 months to limit imports by quantitative restrictions. We can do it for 18 months only unless we get the permission of Great Britain.
I do not know if it is necessary to say anything further with regard to the failures—and I do regard them as such—to do anything more either on the industrial, but even more particularly on the agricultural front. As I understood references made by Fianna Fáil spokesmen on what benefits are likely to accrue to us in the agricultural sphere as a result of this Agreement, their attitude was: "We got everything we asked for; we got everything we wanted."
Comment on this
That possibly is another way of looking at it. I was going to invite the Minister to tell us did we get everything we asked for.
Comment on this
I am prepared to agree that we probably got, under this Agreement, everything Fianna Fáil could get.
Comment on this
Removal of the tariffs was decided on on the basis of what was good for us and this was done in the context of the Agreement, under which we got many concessions.
Comment on this
I am talking about agriculture. In the agricultural sphere, I understood that the Fianna Fáil attitude was that we got everything we asked for.
Comment on this
We are entitled to be told by the Minister, particularly the Minister for Industry and Commerce, what efforts were made by the negotiators to get rid of the British import levy. I think the Fianna Fáil Government and every Party in this House say that, under existing agreements, the British were not entitled to impose those levies against us. Our negotiators went over to negotiate a new Trade Agreement. They have come back, having negotiated that Agreement, and the levies are still there. Apparently they will remain. What efforts were made by the Government to get rid of them? I do not know whether the Minister, when speaking here, dealt with that but, if any efforts were made, they were failures because the levies were still there. Fianna Fáil were unable to get rid of them.
I should like to ask for some explanation regarding a number of matters in connection with the Agreement and a number of matters connected with the White Paper. We have been told that anyone who criticises this Agreement should be prepared to put forward alternative suggestions. A number have been put forward because it is possible to think of other Agreements which might have been made, other efforts which might have been made to secure arrangements of one sort or another, which certainly would be vastly different and, possibly, very much more beneficial than the product of these negotiations.
The White Paper issued in connection with the negotiations discusses the question of alternatives to some extent and in Chapter 6, paragraph 120 we find this:
The long term objective remained membership of the EEC. It was assumed that this could be achieved by 1970.
Is any member of the Government prepared to tell us why this assumption has been acted on? We are told that was the assumption. "It was assumed that this could be achieved by 1970..." I take it that what that means is that that assumption coloured the attitude of the negotiators in being prepared to accept an Agreement of this sort and that assumption allowed them to nerve themselves to come back with an Agreement of this sort. But are any of them prepared to tell us why that assumption was made? On what was it based? There is simply that vague, loose comment in the White Paper without any explanation, simply that it was assumed this could be achieved by 1970.
In the next paragraph, paragraph 121, we are told in the final sentence:
Agricultural trade was expected to show a trend towards greater regulation of imports by individual countries and trading groups.
This is in the context of EEC. Who expected that? What reason had they for expecting that. We are not told about it.
Turning to paragraph 128 we see:
In the discussions with the EEC the Government explored the possibility of interim reciprocal arrangements which would provide counterbalancing advantages in the Community Market in return for reductions in Irish industrial protection.
What about telling the Irish Parliament about that exercise in exploration? What in fact was done? We are told the possibility was explored. How was it explored? What work was done? Which of the Ministers, if any, went to Europe to discuss this matter more fully and explore it?
In paragraph 128, it goes on to say: It was clearly established, however, that there was no possibility of a bilateral exchange of preferences, except within the framework of the Community's customs union, participation in which would involve the application of the Community's common external tariff to imports from third countries.
How was it clearly established? Are the Government prepared to tell us? Then there occurs this extraordinary statement:
It was clear also that there was no disposition on the part of the Community to agree to any modification of obligations in relation to the common external tariff which would enable Ireland to maintain the tariff preferences to which Britain was entitled under the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreements.
I think we are entitled to know how that assumption was made. We are told "It was clear there was no disposition..." If I may get into the Minister's field, what thermometer was used to test the height of the disposition? We are not told. Was any effort made, if there was no disposition to meet us on this, by the Government to alter the views there so that a disposition in our favour would result as a consequence of negotiations and hard work which should have been done by the Government? What steps were taken?
We are asked to believe that Fianna Fáil are endowed in some way in not only being able to look into the hearts of the Irish people but apparently into the hearts of the Europeans to find out precisely what their dispositions are towards us and how far we are able to get with them in negotiations, but we are not told what precise operation was undertaken, if any.
Again, in paragraph 130 of the White Paper it is stated:
It has been suggested that, notwithstanding the obstacles to the negotiations of trading advantages with the EEC some form of association with the Community should be established. The discussions which took place with the Community, however, gave no ground for believing that any such link would be negotiable.
What does that mean, if anything? It means the Government did not even think it worth their while to start negotiations, that because of the discussions that took place they decided it would not be possible to negotiate. Are the Government seriously telling the House they have done their work in relation to possible EEC links when we have in their own White Paper an implicit admission of that sort? It seems the Government did not think it worth while to try to negotiate. If they did, why not tell us and say at what stage did they decide to throw in the towel and discontinue negotiations? Would the Minister for Industry and Commerce tell us if it is claimed that they even began negotiations? I do not think it is.
If we look at paragraph 133, we see it deals with the possibility of withdrawing Ireland's application for access to the GATT, in which event we would be left a free hand to offer increased tariff preferences to Britain on a scale over and beyond that permitted by the GATT, while retaining the existing level of tariffs on imports from third countries. It then says:
Britain as a contracting party to the GATT would not, however, have the same freedom to join in an arrangement which conflicted with GATT rules.
Again there is no information as to how far along that road we could have come or how far Britain would be restricted. There is simply an easy, vague phrase saying that Britain would not have the same freedom and apparently, because Britain would not have the same freedom, the possibility is dismissed completely as an alternative solution. Even in the Government White Paper possible alternatives are put off. The White Paper is extremely vague in a number of respects and extremely loose and the Dáil, having eventually got this matter before it, is entitled to more detailed and precise information than we have been given.
The Agreement provides, in Article I (5), for a review after five years. Here, again, it seems to me that our negotiators have not, may I say, done brilliantly. The Article provides:
During the year beginning 1 July 1970 the Government of Ireland may conduct a review on the question whether any difficulties analogous to those specified in paragraph (1) of Article XIX... have been caused or are threatened.
Article XIX, we remember, is the one dealing with appreciable unemployment in a particular sector of industry. If difficulties analogous to those specified in that Article occur, the parties shall jointly consider whether they can be dealt with by action in accordance with that Article XIX. Then it goes on to say:
If the Government of Ireland then conclude that the difficulties are so exceptional—
I am assuming that this does not apply to unemployment difficulties because that matter is dealt with specifically in Article XIX, but there may be difficulties of one sort or another, such as balance of payments problems, or something of that sort—
that they cannot be dealt with by such action, they may exclude the goods in respect of which the difficulties exist or are threatened from the application of this Article, Article IV or Article VI, provided that the number of goods so excluded shall be few—
We are not told how agreement will be reached as to what is to be regarded as "few". That is left loose, vague and uncertain. However, the goods excluded must be few. The Article goes on to say:
and shall not account for more than 3 per cent by value of total imports into Ireland from the United Kingdom in the immediately preceding year.
The difficulties have to be exceptional and it is clearly set out in the Agreement that this particular remedy can only be applied provided the goods are few in number, without defining what "few" is, and do not exceed a particular percentage.
Again, with regard to Article IX, which deals with dumping, I should like to ask the Minister for Industry and Commerce, in whose bailiwick this would be, just what is intended by this Article. Am I right in assuming that paragraph (1) is intended to deal with the case of one of the contracting parties dumping in the territory of the other, or just what does it mean? Am I right in taking it that paragraph (3) is intended to deal with the situation arising where a third party not a party to the Agreement, some third country, dumps in either the British territory or Irish territory to the detriment of one or the other?
With regard to paragraph (3) there, assuming some third country dumps on the English market products for which we are entitled to expect a market and by that dumping cuts out the benefit which Ireland is entitled to expect by reason of access to the British market, is the position that in that case we can require the British authorities to take action under Article III?
It seems to me, here again, that the whole position is being left completely in the air, that there is nothing firm, nothing hard, nothing concrete about it. All we can do is to ask them to examine the possibility of taking such action as is consistent with its international obligations to remedy the injury or prevent the threatened injury.
The question has been asked already and I should like to get an answer to it, in connection with Article XIV of the Agreement dealing with public undertakings, particularly paragraph (1) (b) of that Article, if the effect of this is to preclude in future any Buy Irish campaign being initiated in this country because Article XIV (1) (b) precludes any new practice being introduced into the activities of public undertakings which
would involve trade discrimination on grounds of nationality in such a way as to frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between the territories of the parties.
It does seem to me that the effect of that must be that, whatever about the present Buy Irish campaign, we will not be entitled to initiate another Buy Irish campaign in future.
I was going to refer to some of the remarks made by Deputy Dowling but in his absence, it might be better to leave that over. I do want to call attention to one remark which he made which I thought was rather significant. He said that in the future— this was referring to Fianna Fáil—it would lead the country to the prosperity it deserves. In the future, the Government would do that. It made me ask, what about the present and what about the past? If it is conceded now, even by only a Fianna Fáil backbencher, that this country has not under a Fianna Fáil Government achieved the prosperity it deserves, what have the Fianna Fáil Party been doing for 28 out of the past 34 years, because they have been in office for that period and surely at the end of that period it is not sufficient still to talk about getting grass tomorrow? The Irish people are entitled to expect concrete results today.
Many speakers have dealt with other aspects of this Agreement and I have endeavoured, possibly not with any great success, not to cover too closely the ground that has already been covered by other speakers. Generally speaking, we have made it quite clear, I think, that we do not regard this as a good Agreement. We have, I think, made it quite clear that there are, in our view, many defects and weaknesses in the Agreement; that there is scope, and very great scope, for revision of the Agreement in the future. I want now to express the hope, because I expressed doubt previously, that I am wrong when I feel that one of the Articles in the Agreement will tie the hands of future negotiators to preserving the imbalance that exists under this Agreement. Article XXIII seems to imply that, whatever negotiations may be undertaken to iron out difficulties that may arise, the obligation will be on us to preserve the existing balance, a balance which, as I say, is a balance of advantage against us and not in our favour.
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Earlier I had no intention of intervening in this debate, but now, since so much time has been given to it, it is only right that I should make my views known. First of all, I have a certain sympathy with Opposition Deputies faced, as they are, with the difficult task of trying to put a damper on public enthusiasm as a result of this Agreement.
The Agreement is now an accomplished fact. It has been signed and sealed. It has been hailed and applauded by all sections of the community. No matter how long Opposition Deputies talk, and no matter what misrepresentation they indulge in, they will find it rather difficult to blind the public to the advantages in this Agreement. Indeed, it is obvious from the reception given to this Agreement that the people have more faith in those who represented the country in the making of this Agreement than they have in the representatives on the Opposition benches. We appreciate, of course, that Opposition Deputies are trying to gain some political popularity. I honestly think they are going the wrong way about it. It would be much better if they accepted this Agreement for what it is, namely, a good Agreement, and have faith in our people to meet the challenge, because challenge it is, but it is also a challenge that brings with it great opportunities.
I represent a mainly agricultural constituency. From the point of view of agriculture this Agreement is a godsend. It will put our farmers on their feet and, at long last, it will help to bring their incomes more in line with the incomes of those engaged in industry. Everyone will agree, I think, that both farmers and farm workers are entitled to that. An expanding agriculture goes hand in hand with an expanding economy. There is no doubt whatever but that agriculture is the backbone of our economy and the people as a whole should welcome what this Agreement holds for agriculture.
On the industrial side it represents wonderful opportunities for expansion and wonderful opportunities, therefore, to provide full employment for our people. That has always been the desire of this Government. It is because of the Government's efforts that we have now reached a stage in industrial expansion in which we have to look for new markets abroad. Where should we look but to the country which is nearest, the country in which there is a demand for our products——
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——namely, Britain. I cannot understand why my colleague, Deputy Treacy, and the other members of the Labour Party should try to paint such a picture of despair. They have shown beyond all shadow of doubt that they clearly have no confidence in the workers of this country.
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It is worth recording that every industry set up here in the last 10 years has been set up without protection. A number of them are competing successfully on the export market. In my own town of Clonmel three new industries have started within the last few months with a view to exporting and we have had inquiries from at least five other firms from abroad, firms interested in setting up industries in Clonmel. All this is as a result of the advent of free trade.
Deputy Treacy made great play about the difficulties of the boot and shoe industry. In Clonmel the industry has provided good employment down through the years but it has had difficulties and in the last few months there has been redundancy. Workers have been laid off. But that redundancy took place long before this Agreement was even thought of. I do not think this Agreement can be blamed for that redundancy. This Agreement provides protection for any industry that may find the going too tough.
As a newcomer to this House, I am disappointed to find Opposition speakers so inclined to look back to something that happened or was said in the 20s or 30s when entirely different conditions prevailed. We should, I think, all look to the future, look ahead instead of harping on the past. I should be very interested to hear what alternative the Opposition have to this Agreement. So far no constructive alternative has been suggested.
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I am reminded of the pop song: "We live in a world of our own." That is what Opposition Deputies would like us to do.
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I am at a loss to know what Deputy Fahey means when he asks what alternative is there. He is, apparently, addressing the Labour Party and he obviously expects the Labour Party as a minority Party to provide the Government Party with a blueprint for a remedy for all the ills from which the country suffers. That is not our job. We regard it as our job constructively to examine and criticise any measure that comes before this House. I think I might bring the House back to reality in this respect.
I had no deep-rooted Civil War politics. I was born in the year 1922 and in growing up, I experienced as a schoolgoing child the political life of the Fianna Fáil Party and the Blueshirts. I knew exactly what was happening. I was politically educated in that climate although I was not aligned politically, thanks be to goodness, with the Blueshirts or the Fianna Fáil Party. However, I can never forget that my schoolgoing education was this, if I knew anything at all about politics, that the Fianna Fáil Party preached the gospel of self-sufficiency and—perhaps I misinterpreted them—that we should build a wall around Ireland, that we should have nothing to do with anybody else, that we had a self-sufficient economy in Ireland. The present Taoiseach was one of the leaders in that campaign, and the Minister who is listening now was possibly only a schoolboy like myself at the time, but I am sure that is where he got his gospel and his bible.
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I would not know that. Can anybody condemn me or people of my age group, including some of the Fianna Fáil Deputies here tonight who were brought up in that political and economic climate that we should have nothing at all to do with Great Britain, nothing to do with Europe or the world at large? That is the gospel that was preached by the man who is now President of this country. All we had to do was accept his gospel and follow it up. He had some queer ideas but so long as we followed him we could live happily ever after. Our farmers and our farm labourers would be happy. Our factories would go ahead. We were told it was unpatriotic to buy British goods: burn everything British except their coal. You remember that slogan.
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Every backbencher in the Fianna Fáil Party knows, and none of them knows better than Deputy Healy, that they were quoting that slogan at that time. In spite of that, I must now accept Deputy Healy's advice and that of the Government he supports that there is now no future for this country unless we go along with Britain and sign this Trade Agreement.
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Therefore, when Deputy Healy advises me and my constituents that there is no future unless we sign this Agreement, I am entitled to examine it.
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I think I am entitled to examine the Agreement which has been signed on behalf of my constituents and which Deputy Healy advocates should be signed on their behalf, and we both represent the same people. I am entitled to examine this Agreement.
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Does Deputy Healy feel that as regards the workers in the motor assembly industry in the Ford factory, we made a good Agreement?
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I will take the political risk of saying this, that in ten years' time there will be nobody working in the Ford factory in Cork, and Deputy Healy knows that.
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Deputy Wyse knows that also. Deputy Wyse, at a private meeting to which Deputy Healy was not invited, made that prognostication.
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Because they are whistling going past the graveyard. During the last general election we all had to go to the hustings and there was absolutely no mention, good, bad or indifferent, of a Free Trade Area Agreement between ourselves and Great Britain. Not once was that subject mentioned by any member of the Fianna Fáil Party during that election. There was no mention at any time, not even an indication, that in future there would be anything on the lines of a Free Trade Area.
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The Deputy has his own troubles in Kerry. The point I am trying to make is that the issue now before the House was not before the people at the last general election and Deputies now supporting the signing of this Agreement which, to our mind, is a betrayal of everything we stand for, have no authority from the electorate to do so. They should have consulted the people about it. We say further that in bringing this Agreement so quickly before the Dáil, on 4th January, the Government have not given the electorate an opportunity of briefing their representatives.
I should like to say that in a certain hotel in this city today there was a group—I do not speak for them—who had a point of view to express and, as any democratic group might do, they endeavoured to lobby Deputies who have, after all, an opportunity of speaking and voting here. I know nothing of this group and I am certainly not advocating their case. The reason I mention it is that they were brushed aside on instructions from Fianna Fáil Deputies. I do not think that is right. If they had some cause to plead they were entitled to be heard, particularly by the Party who knew that whatever they decided would be carried in the House. Deputy Healy appears to be getting very cross and he is taking notes.
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The case we make is that all industrialised centres like Cork will lose out in this Agreement.
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I ask Deputies Healy and Wyse to address themselves to these factors. Is it not a fact that, irrespective of how the farming community benefit—many farmers in my constituency say they will not—we have been sold out? I do not mind saying that the Ford factory in Cork will not, at the end of five years, employ half the number of people now working there. In ten years there will be nobody working there and Deputy Healy knows it.
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Deputy Wyse knows it too. That is the situation. What will happen in the Dunlop factory in Cork? This Agreement gives the British Government concessions in respect of imports of cars and of tyres and if we follow that to its logical conclusion we shall find that it will be cheaper in the future for Fords, who have a factory at Dagenham, to import cars fully assembled, with tyres on them, and sell them more cheaply than they can do now. Deputies Healy and Wyse must have read all about it and must accordingly have come to the same conclusion I have come to—that this is a complete sell out for the hundreds of workers in the Fords and Dunlop factories in Cork.
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The motor car assembly industry will be replaced by imports. Is that not what the Taoiseach said on television?
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I can tell the House what the Taoiseach said on television. When questioned about the car assembly industry he admitted—he had to—that it was bunched, bunched like he said the British market was years ago. He said there would be great employment subsequently in the distribution of the cars imported fully assembled.
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He said there would be tremendous employment to offset the disemployment in the assembly industry. I leave that to the imagination of Deputies.
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The Taoiseach said that the motor car assembly industry would receive licences to import cars on condition that they would provide employment in the distribution of the cars.
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We are not allowed to restrict the issue of import licences under this Agreement. That is the difference.
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The compensation in this Agreement for the hundreds of workers in Ford and Dunlop who will be disemployed is that the farmer may at some distant date benefit somewhat. That is tremendous consolation for the fellow working in Fords. He will be told he is being paid off but not to worry about it because the farmers will benefit. He can go down to his corporation house, to his wife and six children, and tell them at some dim, distant date some farmer in Ballyvourney will benefit from this Agreement. I should not like to be the man going home with such a story. Some joker out in Ballyvourney whom he never saw will benefit. Of course, we all know there is nothing in the Agreement to show that the farm worker will gain anything at all. God knows, the farm worker has not had the best of life down through the years and consequently the number of people working for farmers has been diminishing over the years. I feel, and I propose to deal with it in the morning, that as far as the Labour Party are concerned, as far as the people we represent are concerned, the entire Agreement is a sell-out, a contract with which we could not agree.