Committee on Finance. - Finance Bill, 1967: Committee Stage.
Contributions 138–270 of 270. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 8 of 1967 ›
The situation is not similar. From the time compulsory disclosure of bank deposits was brought in, there was a considerable fillip given.
Comment on this
Could I have some further clarification from the Minister? Is the position that, if anybody in the office of the Revenue Commissioners, maybe a junior clerk, decides that somebody has not paid his lawful dues to the State over a period further back than six years, they can re-open the case immediately? I take it the Minister is arguing the point that it can be opened only in a case of fraud? Surely any time they go back over six years it is, ipso facto, a case of fraud? Therefore, it brings in the point made by Deputy O'Higgins. What chance has the individual of defending himself against a charge of fraud? I cannot see any difference between the assessment being made by the officers concerned. They say: “You have not paid your lawful dues. Therefore, we are going to re-open the whole thing.” Again, there is fraud. There is no difference between the two.
Comment on this
On that last point, I want to put a very practical point of view to the Minister. It is not the full use of these powers unjustly which is to be deplored; it is their continued existence. While they remain, they are used in terrorem. They are used to intimidate the taxpayers, threaten them with a full investigation back for donkeys' years: “We will establish that there is fraud if you do not settle now”, and taxpayers may be bullied into a settlement which would not otherwise arise when dealing with the investigation. I think it is quite clear that at present on the question of fraud, there is no appeal. It is fraud “in the opinion of the Revenue Commissioners”. The Minister is endeavouring to give a group of civil servants superior rights to the courts of the land.
Comment on this
I would hope that the Minister would at least reconsider this matter. I do not know whether it would be wise to press him on this particular amendment at this stage because I would hope that he might see some better way of doing it than has been suggested in these two amendments. Like other Deputies, I do much prefer that all tax provisions should be enshrined in legislation.
I gather now from the Minister that the Revenue Commissioners have no hesitation in giving an assurance that their practice would continue to be that of limiting themselves to a period of six years, except in cases of fraud. If that assurance has been given without any pressure, it is only reasonable to assume that the Revenue Commissioners are perfectly happy with a period of six years for ordinary day-to-day operations. There was an intervention about how much money was recovered in arrear and I gather that a sum of £¾ million per annum was recovered in respect of arrears of tax but I do not believe for a moment that any considerable proportion of that sum would be in respect of periods in excess of six years previously. I doubt very much whether any statistics could be produced to show that this power is of any great value at all.
Similarly, I cannot see that the proving of fraud would throw all that amount of undue burden on the Revenue Commissioners. What you are dealing with is a man's sources of income and there is a very limited number of sources of income—wages, salary, commission, annuities, investments and property. I cannot think of any others on the spur of the moment and I doubt if there are any which I have omitted. A person can scarcely be able to be very credible if he says: "I did not know that I had a farm down the country" or "I did not know that I was in receipt of an annuity". If the Revenue can establish that there was an annuity or that there was property, it is almost an open and shut case that the taxpayer must have known and it would be very difficult for him to prove complete ignorance.
Here again, I feel that undue power is being given to the collectors of taxes, not because they need it but because in their imaginations, they feel that a situation might conceivably arise where they might conceivably want to use it and I do not like that for a moment.
If we do something along the lines of the two amendments—although I am not quite happy with them as they stand—it is quite possible for us to go back and rectify the mistake we have made if in fact it is discovered that we have made a mistake but I do not think we would be making a mistake by withdrawing this power.
Like other Deputies, I do not believe that this is a game to be played between taxpayers and collectors of taxes, with each one trying to delude the other. But mistakes can be made in all good faith and it is not really sustainable to say that a new assessment can be made at any time whether there is fraud or not. If the Revenue Commissioners have been perfectly happy to give an assurance that they will continue to limit themselves to six years except where they are satisfied in their own mind that there is some question of fraud, we should take them at their word and say: "If you are so happy with that arrangement, why not let us put it into a Finance Bill?"
I would hope that we would not have a collision on this particular point and that, at least, the Minister might give us some indication that he would be prepared to look into it further because my whole training, just as his whole training and the training of the other Deputies who have spoken here today, is that we must have certainty in any question of legislation, and particularly where taxation is involved. I do not like any system which imposes on the taxpayer the horrible doubt in his own mind that an extra assessment may be landed on him without any warning and real responsibility on his part for that situation. There are always questions of the possibility of a mistake in a return but to say that this must be subject to reassessment at any time during the lifetime of that taxpayer is going much too far.
If the Minister could say that the powers to go back for a period in excess of six years have been exercised over the past few years at an average of 50 times per annum and that the revenue recovered by reason of going back in excess of six years has averaged a considerable sum each year, I might be prepared to reconsider it, but, as matters stand, I am not happy with section 186 of the Income Tax Act. I think it does give unnecessarily wide powers to the collectors of taxes and I would ask the Minister to give some further consideration to it. We have a Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill still before us and even if the Minister cannot reach a decision here at this stage, I hope he might consider it under that heading.
Comment on this
I do not want to bulldoze the House about this. I would much prefer to persuade the House to agree with me than to proceed otherwise and I thought I was succeeding somewhat in presuading Deputies that this was not altogether unreasonable. I am afraid that when Deputy Booth got up to speak that hope was shattered because we all know that Deputy Booth is the most reasonable of men and if he cannot be persuaded as to the reason in this, I will have to look at it again. But I want to deal with a couple of points he made and I will deal with the net issue he put forward.
Deputy Booth says that it should not be difficult to prove fraud. That is probably the nub of the matter. This seems to be what drove the British to amend their statutory position as distinct from practice. It is difficult to prove fraud. You have to prove mens rea and all that sort of thing. I do not mind its being difficult on the Revenue to prove fraud when the proving of that fraud would lead to penalties and so on. I think it is perfectly legitimate that they should have to go to trouble to establish that there was fraud if they are going to punish a man on the basis of the fraud committed but that is not what we are concerned with here.
We are concerned here with a situation where fraud exists and all that does is to operate to relieve the Revenue Commissioners of the restaint they have put on themselves not to go back. If they want to do anything about the fraud, they still have to prove it fully and comprehensively, and if they want to do anything about the assessment, they still have to prove it in court. The only thing I am objecting to is that they would be statutorily prohibited from re-opening a case unless they could prove fraud, because fraud is difficult to prove. Deputy Booth said it is not difficult, but the British evidently did find themselves in difficulty in that regard.
There are some other points about which Deputy Esmonde was worried, for instance, that some faceless clerks with brown boots in back offices might be taking the vital decision in regard to these matters. That is not so. First of all, the ordinary inspector of taxes is not permitted to re-open cases. It is only the Investigation Branch which can begin to operate this at all. All cases of this sort, before they can get under way, must be personally approved by the Revenue Commissioners, so there is no question as to the level at which these decisions are taken.
The Revenue have to operate an efficient administration. They do not pull figures out of the air and slap assessments gaily around the countryside in the hope they might stick somebody. These cases are based on evidence and information that has come to light. We all know the usual case where some bank account or some assets have come to light which had hitherto been suppressed. It is only where there is some material evidence like that that the Revenue Commissioners decide to take any action; otherwise they would be wasting a great deal of time and money.
I do hope that I can persuade the House that the present situation is reasonable and flexible and operates fairly well. It is clear practice—and I am sure Deputies accept that when we say it is the practice it is the practice— not to go back for other than serious reasons. If you force me to legislate that the Revenue Commissioners are statutorily prevented from re-opening a case unless they can prove fraud, then I think that would be putting an unreasonable restraint on them. I do not think it should be pressed. Perhaps it would be a solution if I were to undertake to the House to discuss this matter again with the Institute of Chartered Accountants between now and Report Stage and see what their present view is about it. For myself, I am not convinced there is any need to provide this by statute.
Comment on this
Would the Minister consider putting a floor on the amount, stipulating that investigation would be made only in respect of a reasonably substantial figure? In other words, would the Minister accept that where small amounts were involved and where in the bulk of the cases possibly ignorance or wilful neglect was involved rather than deliberate fraud, the Revenue Commissioners would not pursue the matter?
Comment on this
Apropos of what Deputy Booth was saying, I have some more information which may help him to come to a decision on this matter. The annual yield from back duty cases is around £900,000 a year. It is very difficult to give reliable information on this, but the best information I have is that about half that amount is applicable to the six-year period; in other words, back duty cases outside the six-year period account for about half of that.
Comment on this
That is a non sequitur. If Deputies had their way, the Revenue would be prohibited from re-opening these cases unless they could prove fraud, and as I say, fraud is very difficult to prove. Deputy Booth is saying the taxpayer could not conceal the fact that he had an annuity, but the taxpayer could say: “I did not know that that income was taxable. I did not know that receipts from such a source were taxable,” and the Revenue would have to prove that he had mens rea, that he wilfully concealed it.
Comment on this
But a person has to return all his income, whether it is taxable or not? Is that not right?
Comment on this
A person only has to prove taxable income. For instance, let us take the current topic of builders' profits: the code applies only to income; it does not apply to capital gains. A taxpayer might affect innocence and say: "I thought that was a capital gain. I did not realise that was taxable income." I think Deputies would all agree that where the Revenue would set out to inflict penalties for fraud, then they should be obliged to establish it beyond yea or nay, but where it is simply a question of giving them power to abandon a restraint they have placed on themselves, then I do not think it reasonable to expect them to prove fraud in that case.
Comment on this
Could the Minister give us any information as to how many fresh assessments were made in respect of a period more than six years previously? I know what he has told us now is that of the arrears of tax recovered per annum about half of the total is in respect of over six years. To my mind, that is not sufficient, because what I should like to know is in how many cases have the inspectors, with the approval of the Revenue Commissioners, made fresh assessments, say, last year, in respect of a period more than six years ago. I have a very strong suspicion that in actual fact they have done that. Cases may be under review or under discussion and the final assessment agreed may date back over six years, but it is quite different from the provision here where a new assessment could be raised in respect of seven or ten years back.
Comment on this
We shall accept the Minister's suggestion that he is going to look at this between now and Report Stage, withdraw the amendments and put them down again on Report Stage. However, I think there is an unanswerable case for them and the Minister gave us the unanswerable case when he admitted that the moneys collected in back duty cases in excess of six years were, in fact, all based on fraud. Nobody is trying to cover up the fraud cases at all, and that seems to me completely to make the case for the amendments. In the unlikely event of the Minister being able to find any valid argument to reject this amendment between now and Report Stage, I would put this to him—I do not think it is likely he will find any valid argument, but if he can find one and persuade us——
Comment on this
The Minister has not made much of an impression on me so far. He certainly cannot put forward any argument for the rejection of these amendments with any validity, without at the same time saying that he proposes to withdraw completely the restriction on the taxpayer getting a refund for six years only. What is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander.
Comment on this
I was listening to what the Minister had to say from the little room at the back actually. The position is that, if it is necessary for Revenue to retain these provisions, and I do not accept that it is, there is certainly nothing to justify the retention of the six-year repayment rule. The argument the Minister made about the taxpayer knowing what he had, and so forth, is not a valid argument at all. If it works one way, it should work the other way as well.
Comment on this
On the Report Stage would the Minister have the amount involved—the total, the average, the amount for six years, for ten years, for 15 years? At the moment we are in the dark.
Comment on this
I will try to get any useful information possible. Deputies who have experience in these matters realise that it is not a very clearcut situation at all. Usually what happens is that the Revenue Commissioners discover that Seán Citizen has £100,000 tucked away in the bank about which he never told them. They can establish roughly that he must have accumulated that amount over a period of ten years. They issue assessments for the ten years to cover that £100,000. What happens then is that Seán Citizen comes in and makes a clean breast of it and a settlement is made on the basis of agreed figures. From that point of view, the figures of assessments would not really convey very much. However, I shall see what I can do about it, but I am not very optimistic about getting a clear picture.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 6:
Before section 10 to insert a new section as follows:
"Section 480 of the Income Tax Act, 1967, is hereby amended by the repeal of subsection (6)".
This amendment deals with the Revenue's right of distraint set out in section 480 of the Income Tax Act. That section has been repealed in part at the behest of the President. Our proposed amendment relates to the right of distraint in respect of lands not occupied at the time of distraint. Subsequently these lands may be occupied by another person and distraint can then be made on that new occupier. The property of the new occupier can be seized. That is a very bad principle.
Comment on this
I do not know that the Deputy has a very valid point. This deals with the attempt made by the collector to collect Schedule A tax. The position is that, if the collector calls and finds no goods there, then he can come back again, and again, until such time as he finds some goods to satisfy his warrant. If the land is sold, the collector can do nothing. He cannot seize any property belonging to the new owner. That is clearly set out.
Comment on this
Then cattle or, whatever it may be, can be seized. The situation we are confronted with here is one in which we want to avoid putting the collector in an impossible position. If we were to accept this argument, then the occupier could say that the property was not his, that it belonged to his sister, or his aunt, or some other relative. The collector of revenue should not be frustrated by that device.
Comment on this
Surely, when it is pointed out to him that he has taken property belonging to someone else, he should return that property?
Comment on this
It is better than pinching someone else's goods, is it not? To allow Revenue to pinch another fellow's goods is surely the line of least resistance.
Comment on this
It is not a question of the line of least resistance. It is a question of making the law work.
Comment on this
This is an anomaly— to all right thinking people I should think a somewhat shameful anomaly— in our law. Leaving aside the question of anonymous cattle, is it not true that under the Local Government Act, if you drive your motorcar up to the door of the defaulting ratepayer, the rate collector can come in and collect your car although that car is registered in your name and it is possible to demonstrate conclusively that the car in question is not the property of the defaulting ratepayer but the property of a visitor on his tenement. Whether that is constitutional is open to doubt. It is a right which any rate collector has and the Revenue Commissioners have it by the same principle of law if you can call it a principle at all. I see the force of the Minister's argument that distraint becomes impossible if the Revenue Commissioners are prevented from distraint by the simple denial of ownership by the person on whose land the chattels happen to be. On the other hand, how can he justify the local authorities or the Revenue Commissioners taking property which they know does not belong to the defaulting ratepayer or taxpayer?
Comment on this
That may be so, but is it fair that if a man owes Schedule A income tax and it is proposed to distrain against him and he sets his land in conacre and his tenant puts 20 cattle on the land, the Revenue Commissioners can come along, collect his 20 cattle and sell them for the debt due by the owner of the land, although the cattle belong to the conacre tenant? The Revenue Commissioners say to the tenant that that is his bad luck and that he must sue the owner of the land. I know that this procedure makes the enforcement of the income tax code simpler than it otherwise might be and I sympathise with the view the Minister advances when he asks us to show him some other way in which the ultimate sanction of distraint can be invoked against the property owner. The fact that such enforcement is difficult does not justify us in legislating unjustly and in representing the Revenue Commissioners as ravening wolves preying on the citizens.
We are accustomed to inveighing blandly against the Revenue Commissioners, oblivious of the fact that they are only doing what we are telling them to do. I do not think we ought to give them the power to do this and if the Minister asks me to tell him how to get the tax without having this weapon, I cannot see why the Exchequer or the local authorities cannot proceed like an ordinary creditor, that is, secure a judgment, register it as a mortgage on property and in due course close the mortgage and sell the property. The Minister may say that no one will buy the property in such circumstances, but so long as the mortgage remains, the property cannot be sold. The whole commercial life of the country carries on through the collection of debt by the ordinary processes of law.
If any of us should get a judgment against our neighbour for £10 or £20 or £100, nobody would suggest that we should have the right to distrain the chattels of a third man which happen to be in our debtor's tenement but we place the obligation on the Revenue Commissioners to do this. I have not heard any convincing argument advanced as to why the Revenue Commissioners should not proceed in the ordinary way. It is true that it is not always easy to sell land to realise a mortgage but the man who owns that land will not be able to sell it without discharging the mortgage because no one else will buy it. It might be difficult to sell the land over the debtor's head but if a third party bought the land subject to the mortgage, I do not think anybody in rural Ireland would object. It would be no harm if the Minister would look at this matter from the point of view of the Revenue Commissioners and the local authorities. I expect that Deputy Sweetman is saying to himself that this is the kind of nonsense that all Ministers for Finance have to listen to from their colleagues——
Comment on this
I know that, but I think I know also what is running through his mind. I have had to do with many Ministers for Finance and they are all inclined to think that the Revenue Commissioners have a dirty job to do and that they should be given the means of doing it. That is the occupational hazard of all Ministers for Finance and they come to realise that the Revenue Commissioners are not Balubas or savages but decent people doing a job of work. They are conscientious public officials who carry out our instructions but people like Deputy John Costello and I, who are at the other side of the fence, look at these matters with a more disillusioned eye. I would suggest to all Ministers for Finance that they should stand back from the situation and ask themselves if they think it right that we should authorise the Revenue Commissioners to seize the property of a third man and whether it would not be better to put the Revenue Commissioners and the local authorities on a par with the ordinary creditor who has his remedy in law.
There is a distinction between the Revenue Commissioners and the ordinary creditor. The creditor gives credit voluntarily; he creates the debt and no one forces him to do so. The Revenue Commissioners do not do this. The Revenue Commissioners find that a debt has accrued under the law with the making of which they have nothing whatever to do. They have an obligation thrust upon them to recover that debt. However, fully conscious of that distinction, I still think we ought to invite the Revenue Commissioners to proceed as ordinary creditors do, even if that should involve substantial inconvenience.
Comment on this
If the Minister for Finance does yield to the pressure put upon him by my colleagues in this respect, I would ask him to make sure at the same time that he also deals with another similar type of power by virtue of which the customs side of the Revenue Commissioners are entitled to seize a train, the whole train to Belfast, because somebody on it is found with a smuggled handkerchief.
Comment on this
We are concerned here with a very net issue. It is simply that if the collector goes along to a property and finds no goods he can distrain, he may come back again and again and find something distrainable. I think that is perfectly reasonable particularly as there is the proviso that if, in the meantime, the property has been sold for valuable consideration and the original debtor is no longer in occupation there is no power left to the collector to seize. Subsection (6), as it stands, is a very necessary provision. It is true that it is a complication if the lands have been let in the meantime.
Comment on this
What about Deputy Dillon's suggestion that the mortgage on the land should be taken out or, as a last resort, why not give it to the Department of Lands?
Comment on this
That does not arise on this amendment. I am dealing with amendment No. 6 which seeks to delete subsection (6) of section 480 as it now stands. All that that subsection says is what I am saying.
Comment on this
It would be silly of us to invite the Minister to abandon his power of distraint without offering some constructive suggestion or alternative methods to enable the Revenue Commissioners to collect the tax. Our suggestion is that, if the Revenue Commissioners are to be asked to operate our law without this power, there is an alternative method by which they can proceed.
Comment on this
That is a much bigger question. Deputy O'Higgins, in his amendment, is not getting at the power of distraint as such.
Comment on this
It could be the same party's chattels. It could be the same man. It could be the debtor's own chattels.
Comment on this
Without regard to whether this is or is not, I think that is the purpose of the amendment.
Comment on this
The amendment may be wider than was intended but the issue raised by Deputy Byrne on the propriety of allowing the Revenue Commissioners to distrain the assets of a third party which happen to be the assets of a defaulting third party——
Comment on this
Deputy O'Higgins's amendment was quite clear. In effect, he is saying that the collector may not go back again to seize anybody's goods, even those of the original debtor.
Comment on this
That is clearly a mistake in drafting. All we want to cover is that the collector may not seize anybody else's goods.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 7:
Before section 10 to insert a new section as follows:
"Section 481 of the Income Tax Act, 1967, is hereby amended by the deletion in line 33 of the words `or from the occupier of the property charged,'; the deletion in line 35 of the words `to whomsoever they may belong' and the insertion in line 35 in lieu of the words deleted the words `property of the person charged'."
Comment on this
I do not propose to repeat what I have already said. I beg the House to take now what I have already said as such.
Comment on this
This is a very desirable amendment for many reasons. It deals again with the right of distraint with more specific reference to Schedules A and B tax. This is one of those odd provisions of the 1918 British Act, re-enacted in Section 481, which originally was made applicable to Ireland only. The very severe powers held by the collector of taxes under this provision were not bestowed on collectors in equivalent posts in the United Kingdom. I think that is very significant. It brings us back to a certain approach in Ireland by British Governments to a situation which could be dealt with in a very different manner —perhaps a much more severe and harsh approach—in other parts of what was then the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
This is a very objectionable provision in respect of tax under Schedules A and B, that is, profits arising from the ownership and the occupation of lands, enabling the collector to distrain the person charged or the occupier of the property charged and all goods and chattels to whomsoever they may belong may be distrained. This is most objectionable in this country in relation to Schedule B by reason of the system of eleven-month lettings under conacre which is widely operated here.
A lot of land is let on the conacre system. If I own the land and let it to Deputy Sweetman on the eleven-month system I am the legal occupier liable to Schedule B tax. The position could well be that Deputy Sweetman has paid me his rent and then finds himself in the position of having his cattle on the land seized by the collector for my tax. That is the position Deputy Dillon spoke about so eloquently. It is an outrageous situation. It is gravely unjust. It is one of these situations of inequity which so angers, enrages, upsets and annoys the public at large. There is nothing more to be said on the case. The machinery of the State and of the Revenue Commissioners can fully and effectively be operated without the continued existence of powers such as this.
Comment on this
Can the Minister say, for the information of the House, whether he has sought or has not sought the opinion of the Attorney General on whether this provision is consistent with the terms of the Constitution, particularly those parts of the Constitution that deal with the obligation of the Government and of this House to uphold the rights of private ownership? Has he obtained that opinion or not?
Comment on this
This may be set aside by some court and some individual, at his own expense, perhaps, will have to bring it right up to the Supreme Court in order to do something which we have the power to operate and to put right, if necessary. The Minister will remember that for some time last year we spent a considerable time discussing the question of the constitutionality or otherwise of a provision which was not far removed in principle from what we are discussing now. It is wrong for this House to pass this very particular power which Deputy Byrne said was——
Comment on this
It was passed before the Constitution. One of the obligations of this House, as far as I know, is to see that we do not pass or approve legislation which we know is inconsistent with the Constitution. If that section is inconsistent with the Constitution, it is null and void under the Constitution and therefore it is ridiculous for the Minister to say that we are not passing it. We are approving it if the Minister does not accept the amendment.
Comment on this
I want to say in regard to this whole matter again, that tax must be collected. Tax which one taxpayer succeeds in not paying simply falls to be collected from the general body of taxpayers. We must always keep that in mind. It is all very well for Deputies to fulminate about the outrageous powers in the hands of the Revenue Commissioners, but we, as responsible legislators, have always got to come back to the fact that people do not like paying taxes and unless the Revenue Commissioners have efficient methods of collecting, then the whole machinery of the State will grind to a halt. This is a question here of trying to maintain a balance between the rights of the individual on the one hand, and his obligations on the other.
I want to draw a distinction here. This right of the collector of taxes, or the Revenue Commissioners, to seize the goods of a third party applies only to the two particular property taxes, either Schedule A or Schedule B, and they are, if you like, directly applicable to the property of the individual. The Revenue Commissioners, presumably on that basis, have been given the right to go specifically against the property to collect the tax. This right to collect and to seize the goods of a third party does not apply in the case of other income tax, surtax, or what have you. We are only dealing with the goods and chattels of a third party in relation to Schedules A and B.
I suggest to the House that we might as well abandon these two taxes if you do not leave with the Revenue authorities this power, or seek to remove from the Revenue Commissioners the right to seize these goods. The Revenue have found invariably in regard to the other taxes in which they are confined to the individual's own goods that they get a return of nulla bona because the invariable answer which they get from the man is: “Oh, this land is let and these cattle do not belong to me”, or, if there is any other type of chattel involved, the answer is: “I only have that on loan; it belongs to a neighbour” and so on. Therefore, if this system is to work—and I must emphasise again that it applies only to taxes under Schedules A and B —we must leave this power with the Revenue Commissioners to seize any goods on the property because, as I say, the tax is leviable on the property and therefore any goods on the property should be seizable in satisfaction of the taxes. For instance, if you remove this power from the collector, what happens in the case of a man who has property here and lives abroad permanently and refuses to pay Schedules A or B taxes?
Comment on this
I am afraid that would just not work. It would place such a legal burden on the Revenue Commissioners if they had to go to the extent of getting judgments, registering mortgages and putting lands up for auction, that it would be getting them to do something which would not be physically possible.
Comment on this
If they had not got the power? Deputy Dillon well knows the answer, that if we had not got the power at the moment, there would be far more cases. That is precisely the point. If people knew that the Revenue Commissioners had to go through the whole gamut of getting judgments and registering and selling the property and so on, then I do not think anybody would pay his Schedules A and B taxes. At least, if I were a professional man, I would certainly advise them not to.
Comment on this
The Minister is getting the institutional disease worse than any Minister for Finance I knew.
Comment on this
Commonly called occupational myopia and maybe it is, but I cannot see my way out of this problem. I just do not think it would work. The Revenue Commissioners could not carry out the administration of these two Schedules if they had to go to the length of registering judgments and mortgages on lands all over the country, particularly in most of rural Ireland. Whatever about the neighbours being prepared to buy a farm being put up by an ordinary creditor, they certainly are not going to buy it if the Revenue Commissioners are putting it up.
Comment on this
Could the Minister not compel the Revenue Commissioners to insert an advertisement in the local paper stating that this man's land was now in this position and that anyone putting cattle on it would do so at his own risk? In this way there would be some opportunity for the innocent bystander to be protected. The Minister's argument is that the Revenue Commissioners must be efficient but they must also be fair. The Minister also said that when somebody does not pay his tax, it must fall on the shoulders of the general body of taxpayers but that would be better than that it should be put on one particular individual.
Comment on this
I am talking about where the third party is involved. I am not talking about the individual who owes the taxes; that is his look out. I am talking about where the third party's chattels are involved. This is what we are concerned about. It is better that it should go on the body of taxpayers than on one individual.
Comment on this
I submit it is a matter between the two individuals, the defaulting taxpayer and the person who has rented land and put goods on that property. I would not like the Deputy to think that this is purely a rural problem because it is an urban one as well. This applies to factories, houses and shops, and not just farms.
Comment on this
It may be that because I am a private individual, I think more of private individuals than the Revenue Commissioners. The burden should be put on the——
Comment on this
I would like the Deputy to rise if he is addressing the House; otherwise I do not know whether the Deputy is actually addressing the House or not.
Comment on this
It would be better if the Revenue Commissioners had imposed on them the obligation of bringing proceedings against individuals. I doubt if any great number is involved. I have not come across any professional people who would give advice which is contrary to ordinary commonsense.
Comment on this
Has the Deputy seriously thought about this? Does the Deputy seriously think that the Revenue Commissioners should put an advertisement in the newspapers stating: "We are going into Mr. John So-and-So's land on next Wednesday"? Apart from third parties at all, is that not giving Mr. John So-and-So every indication that he should get any property off his land forthwith so that it will not be seized?
Comment on this
The land is not much use if there are no crops or cattle on it. He will have to do something with it.
Comment on this
I should like to ask one question and make one observation with regard to what I would call the utterly exaggerated statement the Minister made a few moments ago to the effect that if this power is taken away from the Revenue Commissioners, they will not be able to recover taxes. I cannot imagine anything more exaggerated than that statement. In order to test the Minister's accuracy, I want to know if he can tell us, or if he will inquire from the Revenue Commissioners, how many times during the past three, four or five years has this power been resorted to.
Comment on this
Let me finish. If as I believe, he will not be able to give me one single case in the past five years, his statement that without this power the Revenue Commissioners will not be able to collect taxes is utter nonsense. I believe this power has scarcely been invoked. The Minister said that if they had not this power, the owner of the land could take the cattle or the goods off the land, and they could not be distrained. That is a position which habitually faces any county registrar trying to distrain goods.
It is a non sequitur to say that if a third party has an interest in the land, the Revenue Commissioners should have the right to seize property that does not belong to the person who owed the tax. That is the position which faces the sheriff or the county registrar acting as sheriff not every day but very frequently during the course of the year. There is a remedy. The Revenue Commissioners can enter plenary procedures. They can say: “We will interplea”, and that would “larn” him, as they say.
The Minister says that if the Revenue Commissioners are deprived of this power, they will not be able to collect. Of course they will be able to collect. I think my colleagues should realise that this privilege was given to the Revenue Commissioners by British Revenue years ago. It is based upon the old British legal theory that the Crown must be above all law, and must have privileges in the exaction of taxes which the ordinary collector has not. That runs through the whole law. It applies not merely to the Revenue Commissioners but to all Crown debts, as they used to be called. It was carried over into our Constitution. That is the privilege which is being given and there is no reason why it should extend to an interference with a third party's rights.
Deputy Dillon said that when we talk about bureaucracy and the powers of the Revenue Commissioners, we forget that it is this House that gave those powers. This is a matter we have to consider very carefully. I know that civil servants, including the Revenue Commissioners in particular, insist that they want every possible power. They say: "We will never exercise this power but we want it all the same." They want to grasp these powers.
As I say, this privilege has its roots in the old Crown privileges which were carried over into our Constitution. This is the privilege the Minister wants to keep here. There is no reason why the Revenue Commissioners should not be in the same position as an ordinary collector with exactly the same powers of collecting money as the ordinary collector would have. This is a device which has been resorted to frequently. When a person was threatened with an action for breach of promise, he shifted his cattle to another person's land, or he put someone else's cattle on his land and said they were not his. That is a device which is endemic in the country and it is not confined exclusively to moneys due to the Revenue Commissioners. We have the courts and there is ample power to collect the money and to prevent an injustice being done.
Comment on this
The only thing I can say about Deputy Costello's question is that I thought I had already replied to it—at least to Deputy Dillon. The very fact that the Revenue Commissioners have this power means that it does not have to be availed of. Therefore the figures which Deputy Costello asked for would mean nothing. We have to contemplate the situation which would arise if they did not have this power. I am quite satisfied that all Deputy Costello's suggestion would succeed in doing would be to clutter up the already over-burdened courts with a monumental amount of additional work.
Comment on this
I accept that. To suggest that the Revenue Commissioners should have to sue civilly for every item of taxation owing to them is, to my mind, to approach this whole matter from an absurd point of view. I do not think the Revenue Commissioners should be in the same position as an ordinary collector. The collection of the revenue of the land is different from any other process. As Deputy Dillon pointed out, an ordinary collector exercises a choice and vets the person to whom he affords credit. He takes a deliberate decision. That does not apply to the Revenue Commissioners. They have no knowledge of the people from whom they have to collect taxes. They administer taxation in an omnibus way. We could all be wonderfully liberal about this matter and drive a coach and four through the whole revenue code, but I should like to know where we would finish.
Comment on this
The Minister thinks the Revenue Commissioners should have more power than ordinary people. I listened in the Supreme Court to counsel on behalf of the Revenue Commissioners insisting that they were entitled to hang on to a sum of nearly £20,000 which they had obtained from a taxpayer and which they admitted in open court they had no right to get or to keep. The court asked them again and again: "Do you say the Revenue Commissioners cannot give it back, or will not give it back?" and the answer which was finally extracted was: "We will not." Eventually the Supreme Court said they must. With that attitude taken by the Revenue Commissioners in open court, we are bound to curtail as far as we possibly can these extraordinary powers given in legislation which was in operation before this State was founded.
Comment on this
I have so profound a reverence for the opinion of Deputy Costello on almost any topic that I find myself in some embarrassment at having to dissent from his view in any way. His vast legal experience usually in defending the rights of the individual against the machinery of the State, has naturally given his mind a certain bent.
As I said in the first instance, the Minister is suffering himself to acquire a Treasury squint too soon. I am bound to say quite frankly in Deputy Costello's presence that I do not agree that there is no difference between the position of the Revenue Commissioners and the ordinary trader. There is a fundamental difference. The ordinary trader makes a choice; the Revenue Commissioners do not. Deputy Costello has much longer experience of government than I have. I can only speak of my own experience. I have met some pretty tough Revenue Commissioners in my day. I found them to be stiff and unyielding in doing their duty as imposed upon them by us. I have never failed to advise persons in difficulty about their taxation problems, if they were in good faith, to tell them to the Revenue Commissioners, in the firm conviction that the Revenue Commissioners would not only give them what was their due but perhaps suggest additional advantages to which they were entitled and of which they had no knowledge.
I believe that if a taxpayer seeks to deceive the Revenue Commissioners, the Revenue Commissioners react against him by enforcing the full rigour of the law rather than its spirit. If I thought the Revenue Commissioners' general attitude was that described by Deputy Costello, I would not hesitate to join with him in speaking very trenchantly of it but I speak only of what I know from my own experience.
I want to suggest that something Deputy Costello said earlier is of coercive importance to the Members of this House. It is true we are not now dealing with the Income Tax (Consolidation) Act. Therefore, we are not making de novo these offensive provisions or taking them over in a codifying Act. What we are doing is looking at the Income Tax Act, 1966. We have already amended it in order to make it conform to the Constitution of 1937. We are now suggesting in the case of the Finance Bill, 1967, that further amendment is necessary if we are to give effect to the terms of the Constitution of 1937.
That duty devolves on us—not on the Revenue Commissioners but on us—so long as we leave in existence a certain power with our direction to the Revenue Commissioners in the last analysis to use that power. The Revenue Commissioners have to use it if they believe the circumstances conform to the situation for invoking the ultimate sanction for recovery. As Deputy Costello pointed out, and I think the House ought to consider it, suppose we deliberately adhere to the provision in the 1966 Income Tax (Consolidation) Act, which we know is unconstitutional, on the ground that it is expedient to retain the power, on the ground that it is really held in terrorem and on the ground that it has not been used, suppose we accept all the Minister says—which I do not—that a vast amount of litigation would arise if we required the Revenue Commissioners to use the ordinary processes of the law for the recovery of income tax debts under Schedules A and B—suppose all that were true and still it is also true that this provision is contrary to the Constitution, it is a dreadful injustice to individual citizens.
For instance, take a trustee of a minor's estate or somebody in such a position that he has an obligation on him to protect the assets in his care. He says: "You have seized the assets and chattels for which I am trustee in satisfaction of a debt you say is due by them." The Revenue Commissioners invoke that power and he says it is unconstitutional. The Revenue Commissioners say it has been fully argued here and we are satisfied it is, where-upon there devolves upon the trustee an obligation to vindicate his interest in the High Court. The Revenue Commissioners have a corresponding obligation, as a result of our legislation and as a result of the debate we have here today showing we are fully conscious of the problem, to fight the case in the High Court. If they are defeated, they have a clear obligation to go to the Supreme Court. The burden of the costs on the individual who finally gets his judgment in the Supreme Court may be in part met by the costs awarded against the Revenue Commissioners in their unsuccessful suit, but will almost certainly not be fully met. The Supreme Court will declare that our failure to act in regard to this amendment showed our indifference to the terms of the Constitution.
There is great power in Deputy Costello's proposition. He reminds us that the Constitution places on the Legislature an obligation to legislate in the spirit of the Constitution. Now, surely it is a reasonable proposition on the part of Deputy Costello to say to the Minister for Finance: "With all these questions present to your mind, do you think you have a duty, once your mind has been directed to this, to submit this whole business to the Attorney General and ask him `In your judgment, does this power which the Revenue Commissioners at present have conflict with the Constitution of 1937? If you certify to me that in your opinion it does not, then I accept the opinion of the law officers. Of course, that is subject to the overriding authority of the courts, but my duty as Minister for Finance is to come back to Dáil Éireann and to say that the best advice I can get from the law officers is that we are not legislating in violation of the Constitution'?"
Once the question is asked by Deputy Costello: "Have you sought the opinion of the law officers in this matter?" I think the Minister for Finance is put in a position in which I have not seen any of his predecessors put before. There is an obligation cast on him which I think he has an obligation to discharge. We want to know the reason why. In the codification Act, we found we had collided with the Constitution. We overcame that by a rather odd legislative device into which it is unnecessary to go today.
Here is another matter which I think is deserving of consideration in this context. Deputy Costello says: "You have to tell the House have you consulted the law officers. If you have, you are out of the picture. Now it is for the courts to take the matter over." Suppose the Minister came back to us and said: "I have consulted the Attorney General and he says it is unconstitutional," what would we all say? Would we say: "To hell with the Constitution. Let us go straight ahead until the Supreme Court declares the whole Finance Act to be invalid"? If that is so, why does not the Minister for Finance arm himself with the considered opinion of the Attorney General? Certainly, so far as I am concerned, if the Minister for Finance came back on Report Stage and said: "I am advised by the Attorney General that this is in accordance with the terms of the Constitution", I do not think he has any further duty on constitutional grounds but if the Minister for Finance says: "I have not asked the Attorney General and I will not ask the Attorney General, because I am not at all sure of the answer I would get", then I ask the Minister for Finance, is he acting in the spirit of the Constitution, are the Government acting in the spirit of the Constitution and, if they do not set that example, how do they expect anybody else in our society to act in the spirit of the Constitution or of the law itself?
Comment on this
I can only say in response to that very eloquent speech by Deputy Dillon that since I have come into this House or since I have been a Minister in this House, particularly as Minister for Justice, I have been listening to Fine Gael lawyers asking day in day out in this House: "Is the Minister satisfied that this is constitutional?" That is probably only equalled by the number of times Deputies on the other side of the House have got up to assure me that umpteen things that were in pieces of legislation here were certainly not in accordance with the Constitution and would undoubtedly be ruled unconstitutional the first time they came before the Supreme Court. So I am not the slightest bit impressed by all this constitional nonsense.
Comment on this
I have never been in a case when the present Government or their predecessors came into court to uphold the Constitution since it was passed in 1938.
Comment on this
I know it would suit Deputy Costello and the Fine Gael front bench admirably to have everything dragged through the courts and to have constitutional cases day in day out. I am concerned with the practical business of running the country, collecting revenue, paying the country's debts, and I have not a great deal of time for these fringe areas. I am quite satisfied that it is a perfectly reasonable proposition to say that where tax is owing on a piece of property, you can go in and seize in settlement of that tax and that debt for tax any goods or chattels on that property. I have not the slightest hesitation in my own mind that this is perfectly constitutional. If anybody ever decides otherwise in this country, the Supreme Court or any other body, I think they would be wrongly interpreting the Constitution.
Comment on this
It may come to that, but that is my simple, straightforward view and belief as a practical man concerned with practical administration and I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that this is a reasonable, practical proposal. Without it, I do not see how either of these two taxes can continue to be administered. If the House wants to say to me: "Let us abolish Schedule A and Schedule B and increase income tax by 3d or 6d, whatever it is, in the £", that is a separate proposition. As long as we keep these two taxes, we have to ensure that everybody pays them equally and the only way we can do that is to give the Revenue authorities some speedy, efficient way of collecting them, and I do not see anything seriously wrong— I do not see anything wrong at all— with the provisions as they stand at present.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 9, in the name of Deputy T.F. O'Higgins:
Before section 10 to insert a new section as follows:
"Section 482 of the Income Tax Act, 1967, is hereby repealed."
I must confess that when the effect of section 482 as it reads was pointed out to me I was quite appalled and certainly it is not as any of us would wish it to be if it means what it says in ordinary language. This section is the re-enactment of section 163 of the Income Tax Act, 1918 and I think the same section, in the same wording, is contained in section 75 of the British Income Tax Act, 1952.
The ordinary meaning of this section is that if I am a creditor of any person and I am in possession of a decree, I cannot get the sheriff to execute my decree which is given in pursuance of a judgment in a court unless I am satisfied myself and can satisfy everybody else that the person against whom the decree is to be levied does not owe any income tax. That, of course, is nonsense and yet that is what the section means in its literal, parsing interpretation. It would mean, in effect, pushing it to its ultimate conclusion, as it is phrased, that before you put any decree in the hands of the sheriff, you would have to satisfy yourself that the debtor did not owe any income tax. You have no means to satisfy yourself that the debtor does not owe any income tax because, obviously, the Revenue Commissioners could not disclose whether a debtor did owe tax or not and it means, in effect, that this section, interpreted as it is drafted— and I accept that the drafting has been carried through—means that no decree can be enforced in any circumstances.
I draw the Minister's attention particularly to subsection (1):
No goods or chattels whatever, belonging to any person at the time any tax becomes in arrear, shall be liable to be taken by virtue of any execution or other process, warrant, or authority whatever, or by virtue of any assignment, on any account or pretence whatever, except at the suit of the landlord for rent, unless the person at whose suit the execution or seizure is made, or to whom the assignment was made, pays or causes to be paid to the Collector, before the sale or removal of the goods or chattels, all arrears of tax which are due at the time of seizure, or which are payable for the year in which the seizure is made.
It is not in respect of goods that had been taken in charge by the collector. but it is the ordinary goods that belong to the debtor, and if the debtor happens to owe any income tax, then any seizure in pursuance of a decree given by the court is negatived by this section and can be set aside. I could understand the situation if it were in relation to goods that had already been taken and charged under the power of distraint by the collector of taxes, but this does not concern those. It is a phrase that is completely at large, and when one comes back and looks at the note at the side of the section for the purpose of trying to understand it, one finds this reference: "Priority of tax over other debts". However, subsection (1) has nothing to do with any such priority. Subsection (2) might be properly annotated as being a case of priority. Subsection (3) appears to deal with the cases where the collector has to distrain for the tax due, and that subsection—whether one agrees with it is another thing—is understandable. But as far as subsection (1) is concerned, I simply cannot understand what it means. I admit at once that it has been there all through the years but the fact that it has been there all through the years does not make it any more right. When one reads it in its present form, it is quite clear that no decree in pursuance of a direction of the court is operative unless at the time of operation the debtor concerned owes no tax. No one can find out that and no one can know that except the Revenue themselves, and very often not even they, because the case might be under appeal.
Comment on this
The preference which exists for the Revenue in this case is analogous to the situation which obtains in regard to a company in liquidation or a bankruptcy. In both of these cases, the Revenue has a preferential right to one year's tax. That is all that is involved here. The mechanics of this might be a little difficult, as the wording might indicate, but all that is involved here is the Revenue's preferential right to one year's tax in the case of seizures or judgments against the taxpayer's property.
Comment on this
I am not going to argue with the Minister about the right of preference. That is a different matter. This does not give the right of preference; it nullifies decrees of the courts.
Comment on this
It is perfectly feasible for a creditor in these circumstances to ascertain what tax is outstanding.
Comment on this
No. The Revenue Commissioners are not empowered to tell anybody other than the taxpayer what is due.
Comment on this
In the case of any transfer of property, does the solicitor for the vendor not get a form signed——
Comment on this
Yes, but it it acting for his own taxpayer. That used to be section 6 of the Finance Act 1928. That is abolished now. One taxpayer, one charge, abolished that automatically. However, when that was done, it was the solicitor for the taxpayer who asked for the certificate. This is the other side, and the Revenue cannot answer it; if the Revenue did answer it, they would be leaving themselves wide open to an action.
Comment on this
I did not realise that the Deputy's point was the mechanics of the thing. I thought he was objecting to the preference.
Comment on this
No. I do not think subsection (1) does what the Minister wants to do. I think it blots out a wide number of cases. In fact, it negatives any decree in any case. However, I shall admit at once it is a bit revolutionary to suggest that such an interpretation of a section that goes back to 1918 is in fact wrong, but it is a matter which, having been ventilated here now, will have to be examined seriously by the draftsman between now and Report Stage.
Comment on this
I understood the purpose of the Fine Gael amendment was to object to the preference being given. As Deputy Sweetman indicates they are more concerned with the form of the machinery, I certainly shall look at that aspect of it.
Comment on this
May I interpolate this remark: when the Income Tax Bill was going through, I did venture to suggest to the Minister that the law was so complex that no living creature could understand it, and I think on that occasion the Minister indicated he was prepared to say he was aware of what it contained? This incident should illustrate very eloquently to his mind that, though he did believe all the legislation was present to his mind, the possibility to which I referred has now transpired.
Comment on this
I do not blame the Minister for that in the least. The Act has become so vast that no one could know what is in it, and dilemmas of the kind we are now considering will inevitably arise.
Comment on this
I do not agree. I knew, and Deputy Sweetman knew, that the purpose of this section was to give the collector of taxes a prior right to one year's tax in a case where creditors move against a debtor, but Deputy Sweetman has now questioned the machinery whereby that can be achieved, which is a different matter. As I say, it is something that can be looked at.
Comment on this
As a matter of information, would the Minister say, if somebody owes a number of years' tax and the Revenue has prior right to one year's tax, which year do they take: is it the year that is outstanding longest, the most recent year, or an average?
Comment on this
Does the Deputy propose to withdraw the amendment?
Comment on this
I am in the House's hands in that regard. I am quite agreeable about taking it tomorrow or leaving it until Tuesday. I was given to understand that tomorrow might suit the convenience of some Deputies.
Comment on this
Tomorrow would suit us, but we are quite agreeable to anything the Minister prefers.