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Dáil

Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs.

Contributions 1–84 of 168. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

Patrick John Hillery Minister for External Affairs (Dr. Hillery) Fianna Fáil

I move:

That a sum not exceeding £1,085,000 be granted to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1970, for the salaries and expenses of the Office of the Minister for External Affairs and of certain services administered by that Office, including a grant-in-aid.

With your permission, a Cheann Comhairle, I propose to take the Estimates for External Affairs and International Co-operation together.

The Estimate for External Affairs at £1,085,000 represents a net increase of £67,000 over the Estimate for 1968-69, including supplementaries. The amount required for salaries and allowances is increased by £48,500; the provision for travelling and incidental expenses is up by £11,000. The other expenditure subheads show lesser variations and the receipts under Appropriations-in-Aid are expected to be £5,430 less than last year's.

The increase of £48,500 in the salary subhead, which is about six per cent of last year's provision, is due to normal departmental expansion and pay increases of staff, both home-based and locally recruited abroad. It has proved necessary to include an extra sum of £11,000 under subhead B—Travelling and Incidental Expenses—in order to meet the continuing increase in the cost of services provided for in this subhead. Charges for postage, telephone and telegraph services continue to rise with increasing commitments, as also does the incidence of foreign travel.

The amounts included for cultural relations with other countries and for information services show small increases. They are still relatively modest provisions and are at what I regard as the lowest level necessary to maintain any sort of reasonable programme for cultural activities and information services.

It was expected that the amount required for repatriation and maintenance of destitute Irish persons abroad would be £4,000 as against £6,750 last year. It now seems, however, that the level of advances in the current year may be as much as £7,000; but if that is the case there will be a corresponding increase in the repayment of these advances under subhead G—Appropriations-in-Aid. The reduction of £5,430 shown in subhead G is due largely to a reduction earlier anticipated in the repayment of repatriation and maintenance advances.

The Estimate for International Co-operation for 1969-70 is for £290,000 and is £29,000 more than last year's £22,000 of the additional amount required arises from increased contributions pledged to the United Nations Voluntary Agencies. Increases are also shown in our contributions towards the expenses of the Council of Europe, the OECD and the United Nations. These increases reflect the rise in the operational expenses of the organisations.

At the outset I should say that as I spoke on the North of Ireland situation in last week's debate I shall not deal with it in this speech. In the major areas of tension and conflict in the world, the record over the last year and a half, since the Estimates of this Department were last discussed in Dáil Éireann, has been sombre and discouraging. The United Nations Secretary-General in submitting his recent annual report to the organisation stated that it was clear to him that he could report very little progress in the world at large towards the goals of the United Nations Charter—to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations and achieve international co-operation. Moreover, the Secretary-General remarked that he had a strong feeling that time is running out.

In the period under review we have witnessed the violation of international law and human rights in the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia; in the Middle East the situation has steadily deteriorated with an ever-increasing frequency of raids and reprisals on both sides; in South East Asia, although peace talks have been in progress now for over a year, the war in Vietnam still seems interminably to drag on and there has been no progress on the basic issues which must be solved before real peace can begin to be rebuilt in the whole area. In the far-East the rulers of Communist China continue segregated from the rest of the international community. In Latin America there has been constant political tension and in the continent of Africa there are the running sores of colonial oppression and apartheid in South Africa and the disastrous conflict in Nigeria.

These problems are aggravated by the widening economic gap between the rich countries and the poor. And over all our heads the nuclear arms race still hangs as a continuous menace and a potential means of universal destruction. It is scarcely to be wondered at that throughout the world the young are rebelling against the principles and the methods of the preceding generation in the conduct of international affairs when they consider that, despite brilliant scientific discoveries and technological achievement, mankind has made little progress in implementing the universally acknowledged primary goal of achieving justice and peace among men. On most of the major issues I have mentioned, the policy of the Government is well known. In the community of nations, Ireland is a small country with correspondingly small resources and influence, but we can exercise a certain moral suasion for peace which has a useful though limited effect. Our international position is strengthened both by our own past history as a nation and by our firm commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter. We have demonstrated this commitment by the record of the Government's policies at the United Nations over the years and we have proved it in a practical way through our participation in United Nations peace-keeping in many parts of the world over the last decade.

I do not propose to enter into a detailed exposition of all the major areas of international political relations with which my Department have been concerned over the past year and a half; instead I will confine myself to a brief survey of the Government's position as regards the following: the European Economic Community, the Nigeria/Biafra problem, the question of disarmament and our role in United Nations peace-keeping.

The House will be aware that the question of enlargement of the European Communities by the admission of new countries, including Ireland, has again become a live issue. The talks I had last July with representatives of some of the member Governments and with the EEC Commission indicated that a decision to open negotiations with the applicant countries could be taken before long. I have received the same impression from the discussions I was able to have in New York with Ministers of the Six and the applicant countries, and from the reports of my Department's Missions in Europe. Every effort is accordingly being made here at home to ensure our readiness for negotiations should these become a reality in the fairly near future.

While the prospects for negotiations now seem brighter, I would, nevertheless, hesitate to predict how soon they are likely to commence. The Common Market is at present faced with a number of formidable internal problems on some of which at least progress will apparently have to be made before negotiations could start. If the member countries of the EEC should find themselves unable to reach agreement on some of these fundamental problems in the coming months, then there is room for doubt as to whether it will be possible to set an early date for negotiations with the applicants.

A foremost objective for us in the negotiations when they do commence will be to ensure that they lead to our accession simultaneously with the other applicants, particularly Britain. Earlier this year there was a suggestion that enlargement should take place by stages, with Great Britain admitted to membership in advance of the other applicants. I do not have to tell the House of the grave consequences this would have for us in view of our close trading links with Britain. It was largely my serious concern at this suggestion that prompted me to seek meetings last July with the Foreign Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands, and the President of the EEC Commission and with the French Foreign Minister in New York last month. Fortunately, the idea of a Community of Seven now seems to have been abandoned but, nevertheless, I intend to have the situation carefully watched.

The hopes of the applicant countries are now fixed on the summit conference of the EEC member States, which is to take place in The Hague on 17th and 18th November. This meeting could well prove of historic significance for the future of Europe if it leads to the opening of negotiations on the four membership applications, thus giving a new impetus to Europe's aspirations and resuming the movement towards the goals set by those who framed the Treaty of Rome. Even if our hopes in the outcome of the summit conference are not fully realised, I am, nevertheless, convinced from the different discussions I have had that the great fund of goodwill and the self-interest of the member Governments must, sooner rather than later, surmount the obstacles to enlargement of the communities.

At the Hague Conference the heads of state and government of the six will no doubt be greatly assisted in their deliberations by the commission's updated opinion of the 1st October on the question of enlargement. It is appropriate, therefore, that I should call attention to some of the more important aspects of that document, copies of an unofficial translation of which have been placed in the Dáil Library. The document supplements an earlier opinion of 29th September, 1967. In its latest opinion the commission pays special attention to the development and strengthening of the community in the context of enlargement, as it believes that only a strong community can act as a proper vehicle for the reception of new members. The commission consequently urges rapid progress in the adoption of a number of measures to strengthen the community's institutions. It points to the necessity for the applicant countries to accept what has already been achieved in implementation of the Rome Treaty and to co-operate with the measures being taken for the future strengthening and development of the communities. The commission rejects the idea of enlargement by stages. It feels, however, that fully concurrent negotiations with all the applicants may not be possible but recognises the need for adequate co-ordination on questions which cannot be negotiated with individual countries in isolation. The accession of the four candidate countries would then take place simultaneously. The importance of co-ordination and consultation on problems of common interest is, indeed, a matter on which I laid particular stress in my talks with representatives of the member governments and the commission. Finally, the commission recommends that negotiations with the applicant countries should be opened as soon as possible. I should like to take this opportunity of publicly welcoming this valuable and constructive document of the commission.

With the improved prospects in relation to the EEC, it is vital at this stage that the country should not only continue but, indeed, intensify its preparations to meet the obligations of membership. The time available to us to carry through further desirable adaptations and improvements in efficiency over the whole economy may now be relatively short. The precise terms of our entry and the transitional arrangements we receive can only be determined in the course of negotiations. One thing however is clear, namely, that membership of the European communities will subject us to new disciplines extending over the entire range of our economic life and will also have implications in the social and political spheres. These we must be prepared fully to accept.

The Government remain convinced that membership of the EEC represents the best means for realisation of our full potential as a nation. On the agricultural side we undoubtedly stand to gain from our participation in the common agricultural policy even though that policy may have undergone certain modifications by the time of our accession. Industrially we can look forward to the much wider possibilities which will be opened up to us as a result of our ready access to a vastly increased market. The experience which Irish industrialists have had in adapting to the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement has undoubtedly been a most valuable preparation for membership of the EEC. This experience also provides gratifying cause for confidence in the capacity of our industry to meet more broadly based competition in the future.

This House and the country will be kept as fully informed as possible on future developments in relation to the EEC and on the likely effects to be expected from membership. It is only right that this should be done given the far-reaching implications of membership for the nation. As the Taoiseach indicated last week, a more detailed or firm assessment of the implications of membership than that already given is scarcely possible at this stage when the member Governments are confronted with finding solutions to a number of major internal problems likely to affect the future evolution of the Common Market.

Finally, I should like to assure the House that the closest contact will continue to be maintained with the Governments of the Six and of the applicant countries through Ministerial and official visits and through our missions. It is, in fact, my intention to take the earliest opportunity for further talks with some of these Governments.

The conflict in Nigeria has been going on now for over two years. As Deputies are only too well aware, there has been vast suffering and loss of life with hundreds of thousands of people on both sides either killed in the hostilities or dying the slow death of hunger and disease. I do not wish to enter into the causes of the conflict: these were complex and there were certainly legitimate fears and grievances on both sides. Even before the war began, we strongly urged reconciliation between the two sides and an avoidance at all cost of recourse to arms. Here I would recall the words of His Holiness Pope Paul VI when in his "message to Africa" shortly after the Nigerian conflict began, he urged that the rulers of the African nations will "look for peace" and "be quick to dialogue and to negotiate rather than break off relations and resort to force". The war in Nigeria has not only led to human suffering on a vast scale but it has also already left a terrible legacy of tribal bitterness and recrimination, particularly in the areas which once formed the eastern region of Nigeria: this bitterness will not be easy to eradicate.

The Government's policy, as I have already stated in the Dáil, has been concentrated on doing whatever is in our power to do to promote a peaceful settlement between the parties to the conflict and, concurrently, and most urgently, while the search for peace continues, to increase the supply of relief to the civilian victims of the conflict. As I informed the Dáil last July, I made a complete review of the whole situation after I took office but my conclusions did not lead me to hope that at the time we could take an initiative which could have any real influence in helping to solve the major issues.

In my general debate speech at the United Nations on 26th September, I expressed the sincere hope that a just settlement of the Nigerian problem would be speedily reached with the assistance of the Organisation of African Unity. As Deputies are aware, the OAU is the regional organisation with the primary responsibility of providing good offices in disputes in Africa.

Moreover as an African body, it is ideally suited to offer mediation in situations where attempts by European Governments or groups of Governments meet with mistrust no matter how pure the motives, in view of Africa's well-founded suspicion of European colonialism, based on bitter experience.

In September, 1967, the Organisation of African Unity meeting in Kinshasa established a six-nation consultative committee on Nigeria, and this committee under the very active and positive leadership of Emperor Hailie Selassie of Ethiopia has been constantly working to achieve a settlement between the two sides. It hardly needs to be said that no matter how many offers of mediation are made or how hard the mediators work, it is ultimately the two sides that must agree on a settlement.

Delegations from both sides have under the auspices of the OAU put forward their respective views at Niamey, at Addis Ababa and at Algiers in 1968 and in Monrovia and most recently again in Addis Ababa in the present year. Also in this year His Holiness Pope Paul and the African Hierarchy endeavoured to bring the two sides together in Uganda. However, despite these meetings and the intense diplomatic activity that is constantly in progress, the basis for a negotiated settlement does not yet appear to have emerged.

In July last, our Ambassador to Nigeria on my instructions travelled to Addis Ababa, where he had discussions with both the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry and the Secretariat of the Organisation of African Unity. We have been, of course, also in close touch with both sides to the conflict, and recently at the United Nations General Assembly I have had discussions with many delegates including in particular the representatives of several of the African countries most involved. While we recognise the duty of the whole international community to promote peace in this terrible conflict, and particularly the duty of countries such as ourselves who for many years have had close bonds of friendship with the people on both sides, the policy of the Government is aimed primarily at supporting the efforts of the OAU and its member States to bring the parties to the conference table and to suggest ways in which negotiations may prove fruitful.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister declared earlier this month that Emperor Hailie Selassie will continue his efforts, undaunted by the lack of progress so far until a solution is found to the conflict. Recently, since the meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa last month, both General Gowon and General Ojukwu have been reported as indicating a willingness to enter into negotiations. I sincerely hope that such negotiations will take place, and that with the ground prepared carefully and quietly in advance, progress will be made.

As Deputies are aware, we have always urged direct contact between the two sides, if only on an informal basis and on limited topics: we feel that such contact, if made away from all publicity, could help to bring about a climate of trust between the two sides, if only in a very limited way to begin with. The absence of all trust between the two sides at present is, I think, the greatest obstacle to genuine negotiations.

In the last few days I have been glad to note that there has been new activity in the search for peace. On Sunday the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, accompanied by the Secretary General of the OAU, delivered in Lagos to General Gowon a special message from Emperor Hailie Selassie, Chairman of the OAU six nation consultative committee on Nigeria, who is constantly in touch with both sides. Yesterday General Gowon had consultations with the President of the Congo, who is a member of the OAU committee. And today, he is having further consultations with the President of the Cameron Republic, who is Chairman of the OAU itself.

I should like to emphasise that the Government are convinced that the only solution likely to last is a solution that comes from negotiation, not from war. Any such solution that can be agreed on by the parties concerned will be welcomed by us, provided always that provision is made for adequate guarantees for the fundamental human rights of the peoples involved. Apart from this stipulation, we have no preconceptions of our own about the type of relationship which should ultimately be evolved to allow these people, for whom we have the greatest of good will and sympathy, once again to live in peace and mutual co-operation. Agreement, however, if it is to come should surely be postponed no further.

While this tragic war goes on, the Government will continue to urge respect by both parties for humanitarian behaviour in accordance with the internationally accepted standards of conduct of war, as set out in particular in the Geneva Conventions. As Deputies know, the Government have frequently deplored all aerial attacks on non-military targets and centres of civilian concentration whichever side is responsible. Such attacks result in the wanton killing or wounding of large numbers of defenceless civilians, they terrorise the local population, make the task of eventual reconciliation more difficult and serve no military purpose whatever.

We have deplored all such attacks that have been brought to our notice in the past. A recent incident, as Deputies will be aware from press reports, was an attack on a road near Owerri which resulted in the death of among others an Irish sister engaged in the relief operation there. The Government have been greatly concerned by these reports and we have taken the matter up with the Nigerian authorities through our Embassy in Lagos.

I am sometimes asked why the Government do not recognise Biafra as an independent State. This question is usually based on the assumption that by so doing some humanitarian gain could be achieved. This is, of course, not so. The Government have never contemplated granting recognition as a separate State to the areas claimed by the secessionist authorities. There are many and weighty reasons for this but one important practical reason is that if we were to do so, we would immediately cease to be able to conduct a dialogue with both sides in our endeavour to promote peace and to increase relief, and most important we would seriously hinder or possibly be the cause of ending the very valuable humanitarian work being carried out by Irish people, particularly our missionaries, on both sides. And let me emphasise that this humanitarian work on the spot is the greatest contribution by far that Ireland can make to help the people of Nigeria, particularly those in the war affected areas, at this critical time.

In accordance with this premise, the whole question of relief for Nigeria and Biafra has been a major preoccupation of my Department during the period under review. The heroic work for relief and rehabilitation being performed by our missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, and by our medical teams in the field has been generously supported by contributions in cash and kind and offers of service from the public here at home. A survey made in the first quarter of this year ranked Ireland as eleventh among the world's largest donor countries in Nigerian relief and placed the Irish per capita contribution in fifth place among all countries. The general concern of the public in this matter has been fully shared by the Government.

As Deputies are aware, while there has been suffering on both sides in the conflict the major suffering among the civilian population has been taking place in the Biafran controlled areas, where the people have been concentrated in a small enclave, only a fraction of the former area of Eastern Nigeria. In this congested area, the civilian population have had to depend since early 1968 on the nightly airlift of essential relief supplies organised by the international relief organisations, with Caritas Internationalis as the courageous pioneer in the whole relief operation. The organisations have been principally the ad hoc interdenominational group of Church agencies known as Joint Church Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The principal relief negotiator with both sides has been the ICRC supplemented since February of this year by the work of the United States Government Special Co-ordinator for Nigerian Relief, Ambassador Ferguson. The ICRC has, of course, also been continuously engaged in its primary responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions in regard to prisoners of war, civilian victims of the war and so on. The relief negotiations which were extremely complex and delicate, were aimed at obtaining agreement between the two sides for new improved methods of supply, whether by land, by water or by air. It has long been recognised that not only are the relief supplies which are brought in by the night flights inadequate but the hazards of the present system have been shown by the fact that to date 25 pilots and crew have paid the supreme penalty in this humanitarian cause.

Early in the current year the Dutch Government took an initiative in an endeavour to assist the relief negotiations, by inviting a group of the major donor countries sharing a generally similar stand as regards the political issues in the war to meet for informal discussions on the problems involved. This group which has come to be known as the Hague group comprises Austria, the Benelux Countries, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, the United States and ourselves. The relief negotiations involved have been concerned principally with the opening up of a water route into Biafra and of an air corridor for relief flights in daytime to Uli. As the possibility of a water route appears to be no longer feasible under present conditions, I will confine my remarks to a brief description of the negotiations for day flights.

The ICRC have always been in favour of day flights, and they have been engaged in difficult negotiations with both sides on this question since May, 1968. As Deputies will recall, in the earlier part of this year, the ICRC came under attack from both sides during these negotiations and on 5th June an ICRC relief plane was shot down by the Federal airforce. This was followed by the declaration of the ICRC Commissioner General for West Africa as persona non grata in Lagos and the removal by the Federal Government of the co-ordinating role which had been given to the ICRC as from 30th June.

Despite all this, the ICRC made a further attempt at the beginning of August to suggest to both sides the general framework of a compromise plan for daylight flights. This plan required a main concession on the part of the Federal Government to allow flights to take off from the ICRC bases outside Nigeria with inspection at these bases and on the part of the Biafran authorities the dropping of their condition for third party security guarantees. Already on 30th July the United Nations Secretary General U Thant had addressed an appeal to both sides urging the restarting of the ICRC emergency flights "even if concessions are required from both sides".

Basing ourselves on the new ICRC proposals and on the appeal of the Secretary General, we made approaches to both sides, pointing out that the Government strongly reject the idea of the starvation of the civilian population no matter who is responsible. We asked specifically that both sides should make compromises, as requested by the ICRC and the UN Secretary General, and we urged acceptance of the ICRC compromise plan.

By the latter part of August, the Biafran authorities had indicated their agreement in principle to the ICRC relief plan, with the proviso, however, that it was "the understanding of the Biafran Government that its acceptance of the ... proposals is without prejudice to the continued use of Uli airport for its own operations": and a detailed agreement was worked out on 27th August between the Biafran authorities and the ICRC in Geneva. In this agreement there was no mention of the vexed question of third party security guarantees. The Federal Military Government, despite an initial unfavourable reaction, continued the relief negotiations, and finally on 13th September signed with the ICRC in Lagos a separate agreement which in the main provisions was similar to the previous agreement between the Biafran authorities and ICRC. Similar to the clause inserted by the Biafran authorities, the Federal Government included a clause that "this agreement shall be without prejudice to military operations by the Federal Government".

The agreement with the Federal Nigerian Government specified a trial period of three weeks and a relatively small number of flights per day was envisaged. The ICRC hoped that these separate agreements, which apart from the clauses referring to military operations, were similar in their provisions, would be accepted in a positive spirit by both sides as a basis for beginning daylight flights on a trial basis. As to the so called "military clauses", it was always conceded that, relief flights or no relief flights, the war would continue to run its course, but that the relief agreement should be of no military advantage to either side and that the ICRC would guarantee this.

During this period, the Government were through our permanent mission in Geneva closely in touch with the ICRC and my Department was represented specifically in connection with Nigerian relief at the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross which took place in Istanbul early in September. In addition, we were in contact with other interested Governments particularly the members of the Hague group. The ICRC were confident of success and they had their relief planes standing ready at Cotonou. On 14th September, however, the Biafrans announced that the agreement reached in Lagos was unacceptable because of the so called military clause and they reverted to their previous demand for third party security guarantees.

We were greatly concerned by this reaction. The Federal Government had shown humanity and courage in making the important concessions which the ICRC, supported by many Governments including our own, had requested. I can fully appreciate the deep-seated Biafran fears about security, but in this case I feel that these fears were exaggerated, particularly with the agreement being backed by the great authority of the ICRC. This lack of progress is greatly to be deplored, because of the serious consequences which may result for the civilian populations concerned. If the ICRC compromise plan could be put into operation and tested for a limited time, we would have hoped that a better and more extensive plan could be worked out based on actual experience and on the trust built up between the two sides. Such a legally agreed scheme acceptable to both parties could be of the greatest importance particularly when one bears in mind how tenuous the present arrangement is and that if, some day, the risks prove too great for the night flights to continue, the sole life line that is keeping hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in existence would be cut off. I should add that the Government made known their willingness to consider favourably any request that might be received for the provision, with the consent of the parties concerned, of Irish personnel to assist with relief inspection.

As regards the Government's contribution for relief in Nigeria-Biafra in the current year, as Deputies will recall, we have already pledged, subject to the approval of the Dáil, £25,000 for Irish Red Cross medical teams for either side and 25,000 dollars for the UNICEF Emergency Programmes for Nigeria/Biafra. My Department is at present engaged in urgent discussions with the Irish relief organisations including the Irish Red Cross and Africa Concern as to further ways in which we can assist.

Apart from the suffering in Nigeria, there has also been great suffering in another part of Africa. I refer to the recent flood disaster in Tunisia which has resulted in considerable loss of life and has left over 250,000 people in North Africa homeless. The League of Red Cross Societies and the Tunisian Red Crescent have launched an international appeal to aid the victims of this disaster and the Irish Red Cross is making available out of the emergency relief fund a sum of £500 to the League of Red Cross Societies for this purpose. The Government have the greatest sympathy for the people of Tunisia in this time of natural disaster.

On the question of disarmament, the Secretary General of the United Nations in a recent introduction to the annual report of the organisation has stated that the momentum and promise of previous years appears to have been lost and that the past year has seen little progress. He has pointed to the disquieting fact that the solution for the problems of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is still hanging in the balance, that the testing of nuclear weapons continues apace, that global military expenditures continue to mount at an alarming rate and most dangerous of all that the world seems threatened by an uncontrollable escalation of the nuclear arms race.

As a government we are deeply anxious at this lack of progress in the various proposals for collateral disarmament and particularly in the failure to halt once and for all the spread of nuclear weapons both within and outside existing stockpiles. Deputies will recall that there were high hopes early last year when the two rival super powers, the USA and the USSR, agreed on the final text of a non-proliferation treaty. That treaty was widely commended by the General Assembly and was finally opened for signature on 1st July, 1968. As the first member of the United Nations to propose in 1958 a draft resolution in the General Assembly on the prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weapons and as having proposed in 1961 the conclusion of an international agreement for this purpose, we were naturally gratified when our suggestions in this vital field of disarmament appeared at last to be bearing fruit.

In the debate in the General Assembly in May, 1968, on this item numerous delegations paid tribute to the wisdom and the perseverance of my predecessor as Minister, Deputy Frank Aiken, in the pursuit of his ideas in this matter. As an example of these tributes I quote from the official record of the General Assembly of 30th April, 1968, when the Foreign Minister of Canada, Mr. Sharp, speaking in the First Committee said:

Many delegations will recall the early proposal put before the Assembly, designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. That was the renowned "Irish resolution" of the late fifties which was eventually and unanimously adopted on 4th December, 1961. We are all indebted to the Foreign Minister of Ireland for his foresight and fortitude in persevering in that initiative—often in the face of formidable odds.

The Government have never considered the non-proliferation treaty as a completely satisfactory instrument or for that matter as an end in itself. We have considered, however, that the first essential is to obtain the widest possible adherence to the treaty both on account of the immediate effect of the treaty in halting the spread of nuclear weapons and also because this itself will help to create the climate for the negotiation of many other very desirable agreements. Such agreements might include for instance measures to cover further security guarantees and the vast field of making available the peaceful uses of atomic power for all humanity. We have stressed this view both in the General Assembly and also at the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States which took place in Geneva in August, 1968. Recently we submitted our application to join the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to participate more fully in all these developments and my Department was represented at the Vienna meeting of that agency last month. As yet, however, the non-proliferation treaty has not entered into force because the required number of ratifications by 43 states including those of all the three signatory nuclear powers have not been forthcoming. Only 17 states so far have ratified the non-proliferation treaty and these do not include either the USA or the USSR.

As Deputies will be aware Ireland was the first country to ratify the treaty. Already at the present session of the General Assembly I have expressed our concern that the treaty has not yet become effective, and we shall continue to urge the vital necessity for the entry into force of this treaty as the single most important and urgent disarmament measure which can be effectively implemented at this time.

At the present session of the Assembly, we intend also to support any further constructive disarmament measures which are proposed. These will probably include proposals on bacteriological and chemical warfare, the draft treaty on the denuclearisation of the sea bed, and the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty to include testing under ground. We are glad that preliminary discussions on the opening of bilateral US-USSR strategic arms limitation talks have now been announced for next month.

Turning to the question of peace-keeping, an area in which the United Nations can operate with the greatest of practical effect, I regret to report that a solution to the fundamental problem of achieving adequate financial arrangements seems to be as distant as ever. The special 33 Nations committee which was established in 1965 to undertake a comprehensive review of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the United Nations, has been taken up with discussion of a number of side issues and has made no progress on the central question of financing.

It seems unfortunately true that at this stage the political will to substitute an adequate system for the present unsatisfactory method of ad hoc voluntary financing is lacking among member states. We regard this as a central flaw in the structure of the organisation and we shall continue to bring to the attention of the Assembly the duty of all member states to see that a comprehensive and soundly based solution should be found if the United Nations is to go forward as an influence for peace and security in the world.

As regards the practical aspects of peace-keeping, we have continued to maintain our contingent of troops with the United Nations force in Cyprus. The strength of the contingent, stationed in the Lefka district in north west Cyprus, was 507 all ranks up to September, 1968. Since then, as a result of a decision taken by the Secretary-General in view of the improved situation, the size of the force has been reduced considerably. The present Irish contingent numbers 419 officers and men including the Irish element at the headquarters in Nicosia.

The basic function of the United Nations force in Cyprus, as defined by the Security Council, is to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions on the island. The Secretary-General has recently stated that the situation has continued to improve slowly but steadily from the point of view of the return to normal conditions of civilian life. He has further stated that this is in good measure attributable to the tireless efforts of the United Nations peace-keeping operation, now in its sixth year. I should like to pay a tribute here to all the Irish soldiers who have served and are still serving with the United Nations in Cyprus. They are held in high regard by all with whom they have come in contact and in addition they have reflected honour on the United Nations and their country.

The Secretary-General has, however, sounded a note of warning as regards the future of the peace-keeping force. He has pointed to the urgent need for progress in the talks aimed at restoring normal relations between the two communities—the Greeks and the Turks— in Cyprus and stated that the passage of too much time may hamper rather than facilitate a settlement. He has described how in the five and a half years since the violent disturbances first abruptly severed communications between the two communities, a new generation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots has been growing up who hardly know each other at all except in hostility.

The Secretary-General has expressed his view that the members of this generation will have a far greater difficulty in finding a basis for living in peace with each other than those of the older generation now searching for a solution. The Government fully share the Secretary-General's concern at the slow rate of progress which has been made in seeking solutions for the basic issues dividing the two communities, and we are pleased to note the Secretary-General's offer of good offices to the parties concerned either directly or through his Special Representative in Cyprus.

In the Middle East, the second area in which Ireland is helping the United Nations in its peace-keeping role, the situation, as Deputies are only too well aware, has gravely deteriorated. There have been an increasing series of incursions and counter incursions across the cease-fire lines, large scale guerilla activities, and reprisals which have grown in frequency and extent. The Secretary-General has recently said that war actually is being waged throughout the area, short only of battles between large bodies of troops. In the last few months the Secretary-General has warned the Security Council on two occasions of the almost complete breakdown of its cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector and the virtual resumption of war there despite—and, I quote the words of the Secretary-General—"the unceasing and valiant efforts of the United Nations military observers, who are exposed to great danger, to maintain the cease-fire."

It is in this situation that our officers with great courage are providing such a valuable service on both sides of the cease-fire line. Fourteen of these officers are currently serving in the difficult Suez area, two are in Damascus, two in Jerusalem and two in Tiberias. We are of course constantly in touch with the United Nations Secretariat about the safety and welfare of these men and I can assure you that the United Nations is taking all reasonable precautions and safeguards. I think all of us owe a very great debt of gratitude to these officers.

As regards the fundamental issues involved in the Middle East, the views of the Government are well known. As a first step, however, it is urgently necessary that both sides should desist from all provocative acts of any sort, and that they co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, in his efforts to negotiate for a settlement between the parties concerned in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter.

In the present year the Council of Europe has celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its establishment. As a founder member it has been our policy during those 20 years to co-operate to the maximum extent possible with the other members to achieve the basic aim of the Council which is the greater unity of its members.

In line with this policy we have continued to participate fully in the deliberations of the organisation at parliamentary and governmental levels. The parliamentary delegation attended plenary meetings of the Consultative Assembly which met at Strasbourg in May and September, 1968, and in January, May and September, 1969. Members of the parliamentary delegation also attended the several extrasessional meetings of the Committees of the Assembly. Ireland was host to one of these meetings, that of the Economic Committee, which was held in Dublin in July, 1968.

At governmental level Ireland was represented by my predecessor at the meeting of the committee of ministers held in Paris in December, 1968, and at that held in London last May to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the organisation. We are represented at all meetings of the committee of ministers' deputies which meets in Strasbourg about once a month. Officials from Government Departments regularly attend meetings of committees of governmental experts of the Council which provide the committee of ministers with technical advise over most of the fields of activity of the Council.

Since the Estimate for my Department was last presented, the Government have ratified the European Agreement for the prevention of broadcasts transmitted from stations outside national territories and signed the European Agreement for the protection of animals during international transport. In addition it is intended to ratify within the next few weeks the European Agreement on the abolition of visas for refugees.

Perhaps the field in which the Council of Europe is best known is that of human rights. With the ratification in October, 1968, of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Government became a party to all the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe. In order further to achieve the collective advancement of human rights, the Irish Parliamentary delegation at the Consulative Assembly, led by Deputy Aiken, submitted at the September meeting a motion for a Recommendation calling for an additional Protocol to the Human Rights Convention. The Irish motion secured a total of 42 signatures from 11 countries, was inscribed on the Register of the Assembly without objection and has now been reffered for consideration to the Assembly's Legal Affairs Committee. While it is clear that these proposals will need careful consideration by all European Governments I feel that great credit is due to Deputy Aiken and the entire delegation for their initiative and constructive efforts on this important question.

Deputies will recall that the year 1968 was designated as the International Year for Human Rights to commemorate the adoption in 1948 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a major part of the programme emphasis in this country was placed on the signature or ratification of the various international conventions or agreements which deal in one way or another with this subject. I have already mentioned the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention. In addition the Government in the course of the year signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, acceded to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women and also acceded to the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The Government have also approved the preparation of legislation to enable this country to accede to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

It must be accepted that trade and foreign earnings are virtually the lifeblood of this country and I am most anxious to see my Department's Missions abroad playing an everincreasing role in these spheres. Indeed, the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of our Missions in these fields of activity is a matter I feel deserves my closest attention. I have no doubt that the Missions are well placed to make an increasingly important contribution to the country's efforts to increase its foreign earnings. They have ready access to the necessary contacts for this purpose and can draw upon a wealth of accumulated knowledge of local conditions. While my Department's Missions are, I am confident, serving their country well in the economic field, I am particularly concerned to ensure that their potential is exploited to the full. In this context I attach particular importance to the suitable training for economic work of the Department's officers, and this is a matter which is being kept under constant review. I also feel that the effectiveness of our Missions would be improved if greater use were made of their facilities by exporters and others concerned with the increase of our foreign earnings.

Owing to the increasing liberalisation of world trade, the scope for the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements at Government level has tended to diminish. Our Trade Agreements with France and the Federal Republic of Germany have been renewed, but their content has naturally been reduced because of the operation of the Common Market. The possibility of negotiating a Trade Agreement with Japan continues to be explored. Because of the continuing import surplus in our trade with Eastern European countries, the Government recently decided to seek discussions with certain of these countries with a view to the negotiation of Trade Agreements which would open the way to increased Irish exports to them. It is now expected that talks with some of the countries concerned will take place fairly soon.

Ireland continues to make its due contribution to the work of the OECD. Among the matters now receiving close attention in that organisation is the proposed scheme of general tariff preferences for the developing countries. Each prospective participant in the scheme has been requested to submit to the organisation a provisional offer of tariff preferences. There is almost universal agreement that a worthwhile tariff preferences scheme could be of real benefit to the developing countries. We have supported the scheme and have tabled a provisional offer. It is not possible to foresee at this stage what the final content of the scheme will be or when it is likely to come into operation.

As we all know, the general question of aid to developing countries has been a matter of increasing public interest here during the last few years. This, no doubt, derives from a growing awareness of the immense problems facing those countries in their efforts to raise the living standards of their peoples. Indeed, in the world generally there is mounting interest in the whole question and the approach of the Second Development Decade, which begins on 1st January, 1971, has helped to focus the re-thinking which is being done on the subject.

I have no doubt that our people generally feel deep concern about the needs of the developing countries and would wish this country to make, and to be seen to make, a worthwhile and realistic effort in the aid field. I have accordingly thought it appropriate to initiate a review of the whole aid position at this stage. My Department, therefore, recently commenced discussion on the subject with the other Departments concerned. It is intended that the inter-departmental consultations should produce an evaluation of our aid performance to date and frame recommendations for future policy.

I would not wish to appear to be in any way complacent about our performance to date in regard to aid. I can say, however, that our total official aid has been steadily increasing. It has been in excess of £1 million for each of the last three years and our stated aim, as expressed in the Third Programme for Economic and Social Development, is to increase it further. This official aid consists mainly of contributions to international organisations concerned with development aid such as the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the World Bank and the UN Children's Fund. We also do what we can to aid the developing countries by providing training and educational facilities here for their nationals and by recruiting qualified Irish personnel for service overseas.

But by far the greatest part of our contribution to the developing countries comes from the private sector. We cannot but feel justly proud of the great work being done in these countries by our missionaries, doctors, nurses, teachers and others. In addition, substantial help is being provided as a result of the fund-raising activities of private organisations here. It is only right that I should use this opportunity to pay well-deserved tribute to these truly humanitarian efforts.

There are no ready or immediate solutions to the difficulties of the developing countries. For our part we must, I think, continue to keep their cause in the forefront of our minds and resolve to play what part we can in assisting them at the cost, if necessary, of diverting some resources from uses which would be of more immediate selfish interest to ourselves. As I see it, a degree of self-sacrifice and unselfishness must inspire our policy if it is to be really creditable.

Ireland has continued to serve as a member of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Our three-year period of membership extends to the end of 1970. The 27-mem-ber council, which has two main sessions every year, directs and coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and its related agencies. Its work programme embraces a great volume and diversity of problems and we have been concerned to make what contribution we could to the council's deliberations and decisions.

My Department continues to attach importance to the provision and dissemination abroad of accurate and up-to-date information on Ireland in support of our objectives in the international sphere. Amongst its activities in this field are the development of contacts with the press and other communications media by our diplomats abroad at all levels; the briefing by the Department of foreign journalists who visit Ireland and the invitation to Ireland of selected groups of journalists from time to time to familiarise them with the Irish scene. In addition, the Department produces a fortnightly bulletin which is widely distributed abroad, booklets and brochures in several languages and films on various aspects of national life. I am arranging to have the Department's information activities further expanded.

With the advice of the Cultural Relations Committee the Department is pursuing abroad a varied programme designed to make our culture better known abroad. I would like to pay tribute to the work of the committee, the distinguished members of which are unstinting in giving of their time and talents. I am glad of this opportunity to express in public my sincere thanks to the members of the committee.

I am sure the members of the Dáil would like me to express our pleasure that General de Gaulle chose Ireland for an extended stay earlier this year.

Since I became Minister for External Affairs the two matters which have most engaged my attention have been the North of Ireland problem and the EEC. As I explained, because of my intervention in last week's debate I have not mentioned the North of Ireland problem today.

The statement I have now made to the House has dealt in varying detail with some of the more important aspects of my Department's many responsibilities. Each of these has its own particular significance in the context of our over-all foreign policy. If I were to single out one subject, apart of course from that of the North of Ireland, which will require my special attention in the coming months, as I see it now that subject will be the EEC. While there is, as yet, no assurance of early progress towards enlargement of the Communities I feel I must spare no effort in promoting our interests in this matter.

Comment on this

Like the Minister, I propose to take the line that as we discussed the North of Ireland last week it is not desirable to go over the same ground again today. There has, perhaps, been no single international tragedy which has evoked such a spontaneous feeling of sorrow and regret in the minds of the Irish people as the tragedy in Biafra. It is one that affected the missionary houses which had sent missionaries to Biafra and Nigeria; it is one which has affected the relatives here of those in those missionary fields, and it is one in which modern means of communication have brought home to everybody the appalling suffering there, suffering from which humanity naturally shrinks. That does not mean that because one says all that, direct positive steps will always help in the solution of the problem.

It would be an easy and facile way of trying to solve the problem by saying we would be making a stride towards that solution by recognising Biafra but to do so would mean, on the one hand, that we would lose the channels of communications to which the Minister has referred, and on the other, involve us in very considerable difficulties of precedence in another sphere. The utmost that we can do, and the utmost that must be done by the Minister and his Department, is to ensure that no opportunity is lost of making our influence as a small country—but a small country with widespread social, educational and missionary contacts— felt and to ensure that not merely is there material aid brought to endeavour to alleviate the suffering but that the parties are brought together in an effort to find a permanent solution, and a permanent solution on a political basis is the first essential towards providing in the future adequate means to prevent the appalling starvation and degradation of which all of us are aware.

I want, therefore, to say that I agree with the Minister that much though it does appear perhaps that we are not doing anything it is, nevertheless, in our view correct that there should not be a cutting off of ourselves from one side by accepting or taking the line that recognition was the same as human concern. Of course it is not, and indeed, very often the greater the human concern the harder it is not to take a step that would at least make it appear that one was doing something, though that step taken openly would not have any real effect.

I want to join with the Minister in the tribute he paid to our troops in Cyprus. They have brought honour on our country and in a real way they have supported the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. However, any peace-keeping force in Cyprus, or anywhere else, can only be a temporary expedient pending the time when it is possible to work out permanent solutions. They provide a breathing space, a breathing space to enable the two sides in any dispute to get together to try to see where the permanent solution lies. In Cyprus the peace-keeping force has been successful in preventing warlike attacks but, of course, the longer it goes on as a temporary expedient the harder becomes the finding of a permanent solution.

The Minister has not adverted in any way to any efforts that he has made in that respect. With the experience we have picked up through the peace-keeping force it should be possible for the Minister for External Affairs, with the confidential reports available to him, to make suggestions for a permanent solution of what indeed is a most difficult problem. I want, too, to join in the commendation of our officers in the Middle East itself. All of us feel the same in relation to the Middle East, that we never know, when we turn on the news on the radio, or open our newspapers, whether the powder keg will have blown up not merely in a small explosion but in the big explosion of which we are all so very much afraid. The fact that our officers are there is again in keeping with the initial principles of the United Nations Charter, although I am sorry to say that they do not appear to have there the same success as they are having in Cyprus.

The world in which we live is, as the Minister has stated, an uneasy place, an uneasy place in which we are likely unfortunately to have explosions from one side or another. It is easy sentimentally to say that war in any particular sector must end overnight. Those of us who are old enough to remember the thirties also remember that there are occasions when to allow sentiment to overcome judgment may very well mean that the results of that sentiment will be far worse than that which same judgment shows to be the right course. All of us hope, without exception, that the war in Vietnam will end as soon as possible, but all of us equally hope that the method and the result of its ending will be such as to ensure that there will not be any overrunning of the South Vietnamese, or any other people in South-East Asia, by China or anybody else.

The Minister has indicated that his main preoccupation in the year ahead will be with the European Economic Community. We have said again and again that Fianna Fáil Governments in the past have not given sufficient attention to the affairs of the Community and to the necessary to make contacts with the people concerned in running the Six and the Community itself. We are sometimes inclined to forget that it is now 12 years, 12 years last March, since the Treaty of Rome was signed. In addition to that, the 31st December this year will mark the end of the transitional period provided by the Treaty of Rome. Those years have gone by pretty quickly and I do not think that it is unfair to say the Ministers for External Affairs in that period, particularly in the last ten years since the Treaty of Rome became effective, and the personnel of the Department of External Affairs have not directed themselves as much as they should have towards seeing where our prospects lay and where advantages to us would accrue.

There was, I think, a facile assumption by the Ministers of the Fianna Fáil Governments that, because we could not—with 70 per cent of our trade with Britain—contemplate accession to the Community unless Britain too was accepted as a member, there was no necessity to examine the problem at home or to set up the initial working parties to study the problem until British entry became more or less a real likelihood, perhaps even a fait accompli. We can in consequence, I think, justly criticise—the Minister has not been there long enough for him to bear any of the criticism—the Governments of Fianna Fáil because they did not take adequate steps in regard to this particular matter. Very often one particular Deputy voiced, in Europe and elsewhere, the suggestion that the Community would be wise to enlarge itself from six to seven by the admission of Britain and to wait then to see whether they were able to digest the seven before considering further applicants for membership. That particular view has now passed. It has been dropped not merely by the Commission, not merely by the Ministers of the Six, if they ever held it, but also by the vast majority of political thinkers in the countries of the Community.

It is inevitable that there must be some staggering in the negotiations for entry into the Community. That is inevitable because, for instance, the balance of trade we have with Britain makes it clear to us that we cannot possibly enter the Community unless Britain enters too. Equally, that very balance makes it clear that the entry of Britain into the Community without the simultaneous entry of Ireland would create problems even more difficult than the technological problems that would arise in the early formative years.

There was a suggestion in one of the leading papers last Sunday that the only realistic way in which the Community could face the issue of what had to be done in order to marry in the British economy with the economy of the Six was to postpone still further the transitional period and, with that postponement, to lay down new datelines for the various steps that must be taken, steps which have not, even in regard to the Six, been as yet thoroughly agreed at all. Obviously that is not something with which we can hope to influence the decision of the Community. It is not something in which our voice would be very powerful, even if it were the voice of the Minister, before the Ministers and the Six meet in the middle of next month to decide these matters. But it is something about which there should have been a very complete and exhaustive analysis by the Minister and his Department and that analysis should have been made available to the House in the form of a White Paper.

It is very, very many years now since there has been any up-to-date assessment officially in the form of a White Paper of the effects of our gaining access to the Community and the effects of our becoming a member of it. It is very many years since there has been any analysis of the benefits likely to accrue on the industrial side so that we could put them against the disadvantages likely to accrue in relation to the difficulty of prohibition of dumping under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The various alterations there have been in the Community's agricultural policy will have an immense impact on us in Ireland, and I must criticise the Minister strongly for not having put an official assessment of the effect of the various agricultural and industrial policies before the people in an official White Paper. I know that he may say in reply that it is difficult when there are changes being made from day to day. You will never get anything static. If you wait for static conditions for an analysis of that sort the result will be that you will never get any analysis at all.

It does seem reasonably clear now that there is an anxiety that was not there before for the Ministers and the organisations and all in the Community to see whether it is possible to have a new effort made in 1970 towards an examination of the problems that would be created by an enlargement of the Common Market. The Common Market itself, of course, has hardly been having a very easy passage in the last period. It was involved in the October of 1967 crisis in the £ sterling. It was involved in the spring of 1968 in the dollar crisis which led to the introduction of new monetary measures. We have had since May of this year the problems that have arisen in relation to the Deutschemark, culminating in its revaluation the other day, and we had before that the problems raised by the devaluation of the French franc. The one thing that appeared clear in respect of all those four different crises was the fact that they were certainly greatly exaggerated, if not caused virtually entirely, not by fundamental weaknesses in the countries concerned, but by speculation— caused, exaggerated, by speculation and the world of speculation which even in today's paper one sees has now caused the flow with speculators taking their profits from the revaluation of the mark.

I do not know where the Minister and the Government think the balance lies in relation to these problems. I do know—and there would not be any possible difference on any side of this House—it is obvious that we must get more strength from the strength of the £ and that we must suffer by any weakness of the £ sterling. That is not to say that it is not an unhappy and an unhealthy situation for us to be in when we are dependent for approximately 70 cent cent of our trade on Britain, when we are dependent, for example, also, for some 79 per cent of our trade on Britain, the Community and the other countries, Denmark and Norway, that are asking also for membership. It is one of the facts of life that it is no use blinking. We have got to accept that we must take the step if others go and that we must take the step with the knowledge that it will entail dangers on the one hand, but, at the same time, much wider scope and much wider opportunities for developing our markets and for developing the extent of certain markets.

The development of markets as a whole is something that perhaps will mean in the future much greater stress on large organisations and unless we can get a very high degree of specialisation and see where the opportunities for that specialisation arise, then we are not going to be able to take real advantage of any enlargement of the Economic Community from six to ten.

I was glad, therefore, to hear the Minister say, as he did say in his speech, that he had directed the officers of his Department to make it their business to further trade as such. I am sorry to say that from the comments and the criticisms I hear from time to time it would appear that that message has not been sufficiently strong to get across. I said this before when Deputy Aiken was Minister for External Affairs. Again and again I hear compliments on the one hand in certain instances where members of our embassies abroad have been able to help in fostering trade but, on the other hand, again and again I hear that contracts and opportunities have been lost by our exporters because the contracts were taken by other nations who were able to get the members of their embassy staff to come in and help them in a much more positive way than we have been accustomed to do. If this is so—and none of us can really tell except from what we hear unless we have personal experience as exporters —then it is something that has got to be changed because we must make certain that the embassies that we keep abroad, and particularly the embassies in the Six Common Market countries, are geared to ensure that not only do they appreciate the value and the prestige of a high official of the embassy staff coming in to assist an exporter but that it is their job as well to keep their ears open at all times and to feed back news of opportunities to Dublin to be disseminated amongst the business community to endeavour to ensure that our exports will be increased.

There was up to quite a short time ago a feeling that it was beneath dignity to engage in seeking trade opportunities. I believe that that feeling was engendered because of the atmosphere and the aura of protectionism that was built up by Fianna Fáil. I think there has been an effort made in recent years at the top to change that but it has not got down and it must get down if we are to get the value that is necessary from embassies abroad to be able to assist us to expand our living standards.

The year ahead will be one of the most vital for us in that it will decide which way we are going. If we do not succeed in gaining suitable terms of accession to the Community we must, without question, have another very hard look at the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. The agreement was accepted because it was stated to be an express advantage towards building the facilities that were necesssary and desirable to our becoming a member of EEC. It has given certain of our exporters some considerable benefit but its overall effect has been to ensure that British exports to this country now far exceed our exports to Britain. We are Britain's second-best customer in Europe and her fourth-best customer in the world. That being so, surely the Taoiseach and the Minister for External Affairs should make it their business to make cleat to the British Government that the continued breach of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, by the Special Deposit Scheme, is something we are not prepared to put up with.

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

Comment on this

We are in a different position now in that regard. The British economy, we all hope, will improve because increasing strength for the £ sterling will assist us. Equally, however, we now have a market here which they must accept as a market of no mean proportions for them. There is an unanswerable case for the revision in our favour of the Special Deposit Scheme if for no other reason than that, like them, we are an applicant to join the Community. A powerful argument could be built on the fact that exceptions to the general scheme of those who are about, we hope, to join with them in the Community—Norway, Denmark and ourselves—would not mean a breach in their whole system elsewhere. By joining EEC, they are foreseeing and making an end of EFTA, an organisation which never had very much attraction for us because it did not include agricultural produce. The increase of the Community to ten will mean the end of EFTA as it is; on the other hand, failure to make suitable arrangements for increasing the Community to ten will inevitably mean the strengthening of a different type of organisation outside the Community in Europe in the same manner as the Scandinavian States would then build up NORDEK.

These are matters about which we are entitled to get first-hand information in this House from the Minister for External Affairs. They are not matters in respect of which we should be put in the position of picking up such bits of information as we can get from papers here or from papers there, from papers reports of "leaks" from Ministerial meetings or from press reports of unilateral declaration by Ministers. They are matters on which it should be the task of the Minister to put down in black and white the information the Irish Embassies have garnered to enable us to make an assessment with the facts before us, and to enable us to see where we are going on the next step which, we were told at the time, was just around the corner when we were asked to pass the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. I suppose it would be more appropriate on the Vote for the Department of Industry and Commerce to discuss the details of that agreement and the lack of successful effort to prevent dumping in many respects but it does seem that there is another criticism to be made here of the Minister.

The Minister referred to the Council of Europe. I am not afraid or ashamed to say categorically in this House—in relation to the passage of the motion sponsored by 42 signatories to which the Minister has referred and in relation to which a very great part of the credit must go to his predecessor-inoffice, Deputy Aiken—that during the course of the recent session in Strasbourg, it became clear to me that all parties in this House had perhaps been making a mistake. In our effort to ensure that as large a number of Members of the Oireachtas as possible got experience abroad at parliamentary conferences of one sort or another at meetings of the Council of Europe, all parties in this House have changed their delegations very frequently. That is not the practice of other continental countries at the Council of Europe. The result was that when we really badly wanted something accepted, as we did want this new addition to the Human Rights Convention, by countries from all parts of Europe, there was not the same personal knowledge of the delegates from other countries as they have among themselves because they have been keeping, not a static delegation but a delegation with people going there for far longer periods than we have done.

It was particularly noticeable that when one was able to get a delegate from another country to the Council of Europe to agree with the case, when he had been persuaded of the justice of the case that we had made, he found it a great deal easier to make other contacts himself than, perhaps, the members of our delegation were able to do because they had not been there anything like as long as the Germans, the Swedes, the Norwegians, the Danes and so forth.

I feel that we shall have, in all parties, to take a serious look at the practice that has grown up, a practice that has grown up for the purpose of ensuring that as many people as possible in this House and in the Seanad would get that experience, to see whether giving them that experience is compatible with getting the best value out of the delegation and whether it is not better to provide that there will be at least a couple of delegates there at all times who have been there for a good many years during which they have got to know personally the delegates and the leaders of delegations from other countries.

That is not something that I say in criticism of the Government alone. I say it equally in criticism of my own Party. It is something that was brought home to all of us when we were endeavouring to push the resolution accepted by the Bureau, put to the Consultative Assembly and accepted unanimously that it should be examined by the legal committee and will come again to the January session of the Assembly we hope.

There has been in Ireland in recent times a greater awareness of the necessity for an aggressive policy, if I may use the expression to describe a policy rather than action, by the Department of External Affairs. This is partly the result of the improvement in communication, the result of television, of seeing so quickly what happens in other countries instead of having to wait, as we had to wait before, for so long to see it. That will mean a pretty radical change in the future and it will mean that the Minister for External Affairs will have to do a great deal of revitalising of thought in Iveagh House, a great deal of revitalising his own thoughts on the employment of our personnel here and in the embassies abroad. If we do not see signs, real signs, of that between now and this time next year we will be able to tell him that at least we warned him that it was coming.

Comment on this

I should like to begin by welcoming the fact that the Minister made such a relatively long and substantive statement initiating this debate. It was, as I recall, rather the practice in former years to make a very brief statement at the start, mainly of a financial order, and to reserve the major statement for the end. I feel it is useful to have this full statement at the beginning and it gives something for the debate to go on, although, of course earlier speakers in the debate, like myself, cannot have had the opportunity fully to absorb everything in this document.

I would make the point that the document in question, the Minister's introductory statement here is, in fact, more substantial and I believe longer than his statement in the general debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I think that has to do with a tendency which exists, and which I shall refer to later on, of pointing the activity of the Department of External Affairs rather more in the direction of home public opinion than of international public opinion. I shall try to substantiate that later.

I cannot, of course, go critically into all the subjects which the Minister has covered in an expository way in his opening statement. Other Deputies speaking from these benches will go more thoroughly into some of these aspects, for example, into the question of the EEC and other matters which belong not only to the domain of external affairs but also to that of internal and economic affairs.

I should like to say a few words about what the Minister says about Biafra. I welcome, first of all, the fact that he has gone into the matter at length. I think it is the first extended statement we have had on this tragic and very complex subject. The Minister said, and Deputy Sweetman agreed with him, that it would not be of advantage to recognise Biafra. I agree, certainly as regards the present time. It would deprive us of any stand we might have in mediation or in intercession or even quite possibly deprive our relief activities of some of their openings and it would, quite possibly, endanger our people, our missionaries, in other parts of Nigeria. However, I think this is not what people have been asking for. What people have been asking for in connection with this matter is that the Minister should join those who have called unequivocally, clearly, and openly for a cease-fire in this war, a cease-fire without political pre-conditions. I think that is not too much to ask. I think it would not endanger anybody nor reduce our possibilities of mediation.

On my way to Biafra last Easter, talking to the people in Sao Tome who were organising the relief flights, I heard from them the expression: "Peace is the best relief". I know that the Minister does not disagree with that. Obviously, he does not, but I think it is a question of how our policy on this has gone over the nearly two and a half years that this war has been going on; we have subordinated our views and our activities too much to those of the British Government on this matter. The British Government have supported, in fact—and I regret this very much—the policy of a quick kill, of over-running Biafra and they have supplied the arms for that. We have never criticised that course of action. I feel we should have done so in moderate but clear and firm terms. It was a very wrong policy and we have a certain right to put this point to the British Government.

We all accept here the idea, as relevant to this island, that unity shall not be imposed by force, that a minority is not to be coerced. What is happening in Nigeria is the attempted coercion of a minority, a minority, incidentally, three times greater than our population in this part of the country. What we rule out for ourselves we should also rule out in reference to others. We should support the position that President Nyerere of Tanzania took on this matter which is quite clearcut but, above all, we should throw our weight behind the proposition that there should be a cease-fire now without political preconditions. That should be clearly said.

The Minister, in the part of his statement relating to Biafra, paid a wellearned tribute to the work of Joint Church Aid and Caritas Internationalis and many private people here have contributed to that effort. In the past as I understand it, our Government have not contributed as a Government to these efforts. We have contributed to the International Red Cross and its activities which have much more of the approval of the Nigerian Government and, I may add, of the British Government. Joint Church Aid and Caritas, on the other hand, have been running the night flights of which the Nigerian Government disapprove. I believe our Government should contribute, if only as a taken of their support for what Joint Church Aid is doing and it has done in my opinion, rather considerably more in the area than the International Red Cross. The Government should contribute to these efforts financially. I hope we shall hear from the Minister that is being done.

I must own to some disappointment at the nature of the Minister's reference here to the situation in the north and to the activities of his Department on this issue at the UN and no doubt at the Council of Europe and elsewhere; to its bearing on the information activities of his Department and so on. I am aware that this matter was discussed in general and that the general question of the situation in the north was discussed here in the debate on the Adjournment. I think it is not quite enough, as far as the activities of the Department in this matter are concerned, to say that we have had a general debate on Partition and unification. This is a matter on which the Department which is under discussion——

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The Chair must point out to the Deputy that since this matter was the subject of discussion within the past week it should not be raised again on this Estimate.

Comment on this

With the greatest respect, I ask for a certain measure of indulgence from the Chair on this point, if I may explain what I mean.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The Deputy will appreciate that if the debate were to be reopened at this stage, this matter having already been discussed the whole subject matter would be again traversed——

Comment on this

Surely this comes within the ambit of the Minister's Department and its activities? The Department is carrying out extensive propaganda to which the Deputy is entitled to refer.

Comment on this

Since when have our activities in relation to the situation in Northern Ireland been debarred from Parliamentary debate? Could this possibly be done?

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The Deputy will appreciate that this matter was debated here and the Deputy contributed to the debate.

Comment on this

We are now discussing Estimates.

Comment on this

Some of the expenditure involved in this Estimates has been incurred as a result of our activities in the UN and elsewhere. I agree we cannot go into it in depth but most certainly Deputies must be in a position to refer to it in passing.

Comment on this

May I say something which I hope will help the Chair in making a decision on this? I would up for our Party in the debate in question. Deputies may recall that the Ceann Comhairle had allowed me three-quarters of an hour. I surrendered 15 minutes of that time to faciliate another Deputy. In surrendering time then I deliberately omitted the question of how this matter had been treated and dealt with at the United Nations. I did so in the confident belief that this being directly relevant to the Department of External Affairs Estimate and the International Co-operation Estimate I would be allowed to discuss it, not at any tremendous length, but to raise it here and to talk about it. I should like to appeal to the Minister for External Affairs to support me on this point.

Comment on this
Mr. J. Lenehan

Write a book on it.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The position so far as the Chair is concerned is that there has been a two-day debate on this matter and the situation in Northern Ireland has already been discussed. The raising of the matter at the United Nations was also discussed in that debate last week and consequently it would be regarded as repetition of material on this occasion.

Comment on this

Are we to understand that it is the Minister's wish that the northern situation should not be referred to on this Estimate?

Comment on this

I have at no time expressed any desire to prevent a discussion. I explained last week in the presence of Deputy O'Leary and Deputy O'Brien that I intended to go thoroughly into the UN operation on the Estimate but because of the debate arising separately on Northern Ireland I made there the contributions I would have otherwise included in my Estimate speech. I have expressed no desire to prevent discussion now.

Comment on this

The position is that we are discussing Estimates for the Department of External Affairs. There has been expenditure in relation to the situation in the Six Countries from the External Affairs Estimates and we cannot be debarred from referring to it in this debate.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The position as regard this debate is that External Affairs up to this has not included any responsibility in regard to that portion of the territory referred to as Northern Ireland. The Chair does not object to a passing reference to these matters but getting into depth on them would be bound to reopen the debate and it is because of that that the Chair must hold firm on this decision.

Comment on this

With all respect, I suggest it would be completely improper to debar any Deputy from discussing a matter of expenditure by the Department under the Estimates.

Comment on this

I agree with the Chair's desire that we do not have another discussion on the North of Ireland but could we say that we certainly may refer to our activities at the United Nations in regard to this matter? Surely this is in order and avoids the Chair's concern that the debate should not concentrate once more on the Northern question?

Comment on this

May I raise a related point? I had proposed in speaking about our foreign policy to refer in passing and in no depth to our policies in regard to Northern Ireland in so far as they form part of, or are a reflection of or are related to our foreign policy in regard to Britain. I should like to establish at this stage that such references, which are directly related to the general question of foreign policy without going into Northern Ireland affairs in any depth, will be permissible under your ruling.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The Chair must remind the Deputy that the took an extensive part in the debate on the previous occasion and had an opportunity then to refer to these matters. The Deputy will appreciate that repetition on this occasion would not be in order.

Comment on this

I am not quite clear to which Deputy the Chair is referring but the matters I should like to refer to are matters relating to our foreign policy generally of which Northern Ireland affairs form only a part. I could not have gone in depth into the question of foreign policy in the other debate. I only want to be sure that in referring to Northern Ireland as part of one aspect of our foreign policy in relation to Britain I shall not be ruled out of order in this debate.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

What the Chair is concerned with is staying within the rules of order so far as the debate is concerned. It has been a rule of order that there shall not be repetition of previous debate.

Comment on this

I engage myself not to repeat anything which I have said before. I did not touch on this topic before. It seems to me that the question of how our Minister for External Affairs deals with a given problem at the United Nations, or elsewhere, is something which a Deputy, with great respect, should have an opportunity to discuss, if he has not discussed it before, on this Estimate. I do not propose to and, in obedience to your ruling. I shall not enter into the substance of what happened in Northern Ireland, nor shall I go over any of the ground covered in the debate.

I want to say something on this topic because—I am a former official of the Department of External Affairs —we always used to be informed that a major objective of that Department was the reunification of our country. I believe that most people in this country assume that to be the case. The Minister's party which have described themselves as the party of national reunification must believe that and must use their Department of External Affairs to that end. So I shall confine my remarks to the Department of External Affairs and to international affairs and I am sure that you will not wish to constrain me from referring to this most major aspect of the work of the Department. As I say, I undertake to you, Sir—and I assure you that I shall keep my promise—not to go over any ground I have already gone over before.

Let me, moving aside a little from that—to the relief, perhaps, of the Chair—refer to an episode which took place at the end of the war the relevance of which, I think, will become apparent fairly soon. At that time in Italy, public opinion was greatly concerned about the problem of the Italian colonies. There was a strong wish among Italian public opinion that these colonies should be retained. At the same time, those responsible for the foreign policy of Italy had to take into account the reaction of the great powers of Britain and America in particular. So the problem was what to do about this question. It was felt that it had to be raised but how far ought it to be pressed? At that time—and the story is a favourite one in the corridors of the United Nations because it is often relevant in many circumstances— the delegates in question, the Italian plenipotentiaries, received a telegram from the then Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza which read simply: "Fight to the end but lose."

Were those, in substance, I wonder, the instructions given to the Minister as to how a recent matter of importance was to be brought before the United Nations. Speaking as one with some experience of the United Nations and having been a delegate to the Assembly, a member of the Secretariat and a student of the political workings of that institution, I offer it as my considered opinion that this, indeed, must have been the spirit and substance of the instructions in questions: "Fight to the end but lose."

I base this opinion on a study of the recorded interventions and activities of the Minister at the United Nations in August and September, and also on the observation of certain silences and nonactivities of his and of his Government during the same period. Let me explain what I mean. Up to 17th August of this year, no attempt was made to raise the issue formally at the United Nations. It might have been useful to have it raised under the general head of Human Rights. It might have exercised a restraining influence over the progress of events had it been done moderately and clearly at that time, but it was not done.

Then came the eruption of mid-August, and this was followed by formal Government activity involving External Affairs and the United Nations. We informed the British Government, as you will recall, that the British troops which were then engaged in protecting the lives of the people in the Falls Road and in Bogside were unacceptable, and we demanded that the British Government should invite the United Nations to provide a peace-keeping force to replace those troops. If we are to take that move made by the Minister at the United Nations at its face value, it was unrealistic in two ways. First, it was obvious that the British Government would do nothing of the kind and would not invite a United Nations force into what it regards as its own territory.

Comment on this
Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Deputy seems to be reopening the debate which took place here on two days last week and repetition, as the Deputy well knows, is not in order.

Comment on this

I entirely agree and I shall, of course, respect your ruling. At the same time, you may recall that speaking during that debate my own winding-up speech was truncated and, in truncating it, I assumed that it would not be out of order to refer in this debate not to the substantive question of Partition or reunification but to the handling of this matter by the Minister at the United Nations. I shall limit myself to that.

The British Government predictably and immediately rejected our Government's demand and our Minister then sought to have the request addressed directly to the Security Council. This, again, if it were to be taken at its face value, was a very large order indeed, an order so large as to border on the fantastic. Great Britain is a founder member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council. Its official title in both capacities is the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." We could not ourselves have been admitted to the United Nations without the sanction of that entity. We have never, so far as I know—and the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—formally challenged its right to that official designation. We have never in all the 14 years of our by no means silent presence in the United Nations formally requested the inscription of this question on the agenda of any organ of the United Nations.

Again I am truncating some of my arguments in deference to your ruling Sir. So, after all these years of prudent silence on this subject, broken only by a few discreet and harmless asides during debates on other matters, suddenly up we pop with the modest proposal that the Security Council should decide to send in forces against the known and firmly expressed wishes of a permanent member. I believe that, in the whole history of the United Nations since the Charter came into force, there was only one action that could have constituted something resembling a precedent for the action we were ostensibly requesting the Security Council to take. That was the decision during the Korean War to authorise General MacArthur as Commander of the United Nations Forces to cross the 38th parallel into the territory of North Korea. That is the only occasion, so far as I know, on which the United Nations forces entered what was recognised as the territory of a State against the will of that State. North Korea was not a member of the United Nations and it had already been branded as an aggressor State by reason of its invasion of South Korea.

In all the other cases where United Nations peace-keeping forces were set up and sent into troubled areas, this happened only at the invitation of the Governments in question which were internationally recognised as responsible for the areas. That was true in relation, for example, to the United Nations peace-keeping force in the Congo to which we contributed and in which so many of our soldiers served so bravely. Katanga, when there was fighting there, was regarded internationally as a province of the Congo and it was under that mandate that United Nations peace-keeping forces were there. They could not have been there had they not been invited by the Government of the Congo.

In blocking our move on this the British Government invoked Article 2.7 of the Charter which forbids the United Nations, and I quote the article.

To intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State in question.

In certain circumstances—and I shall come to that in a moment—there may be real doubt as to whether Article 2.7 applies. There can be no doubt at all that that Government was on firm ground at the United Nations both in asserting that the area had always been recognised by the United Nations, with the mute exception of ourselves, as essentially within its domestic jurisdiction and also in asserting that the dispatch of a United Nations peace-keeping force to the area without the consent of that Government would constitute an intervention in the most obvious sense of that term and would, therefore, be ultra vires.

If all that did not suffice, under Article 2.7 (3) of the Charter the Security Council could not decide to take any such action without the concurring vote of Britain as a permanent member—this was the so-called veto situation—and it was definitely known an advance that Britain's concurrence would be withheld, that is to say, that even if a minority of the Security Council, against all probability and against the letter of the Charter, should decide in our favour, the Security Council could still take no action once Britain held out, but no one supposed we could get that far and we did not get that far.

In appealing to the Security Council to dispatch a peace-keeping Force our permanent representative emphasised that, responding to the feeling of the people of Ireland, the Irish Government could not stand by and could not tolerate this situation. This kind of language, "cannot stand by", "cannot tolerate" and so on is used infrequently in diplomatic interchange; it usually indicates that the country using it is either on the verge of going to war or thinks it appropriate for internal or external reasons to give an impression that it may do so.

The Security Council considered rather briefly not the substance of our Government's request but the question of whether it should be inscribed on the agenda. It was never so inscribed but the Minister for External Affairs was allowed to make a statement to the council in explanation of his request. I shall have something to say a little later about the substance of the Minister's intervention which was couched in rather calmer though not always wiser language than the original request for inscription. Zambia's motion to adjourn was unanimously accepted. As matters at present stand, the question has not reached the agenda of the Security Council, and it has been allowed to wither away.

The next move was a request to include the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly. In this also we failed. The British delegation opposed inscription on the agenda of the General Assembly and appealed to the Minister to withdraw it. The Minister did not withdraw it but simply allowed it to lapse.

It would have been an extraordinary achievement, indeed, an impossible one, to get the Security Council to set up a peace-keeping force in such a context. On the other hand, to fail to get the matter even inscribed on the agenda of either of the main organs of the United Nations was an extraordinary nonachievement on the part of our Government. I shall read the relevant articles, 34 and 35, of the Charter. Article 35 says:

Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

Article 34 says:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or a situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

That is very widely drafted. It is true that since our request to the Security Council was couched, by our own decision, in terms of a request for the setting up of a peace force and since that request ran so clearly counter, in the opinion of most members, to Article 2.7, the decision to exclude the item was understandable, but as regards raising the matter in the General Assembly, here a simple request for inclusion on the agenda failed. That, to anyone who knows the United Nations, takes quite some doing.

Article 2.7 was invoked that article which prohibits intervention in the internal domestic affairs of any country; but for years, since 1959 at least—and the Minister himself quoted the relevant text from Ambassador Cabot Lodge, who at that time was simply summing up existing practice—Article 2.7 was never operated to prevent the General Assembly from discussing anything; in fact, nothing on earth literally can prevent the General Assembly from discussing anything because it regards it as its business to discuss everything on earth. The internal affairs of South Africa have been discussed. Rhodesia has been discussed, which is regarded as an internal affair of Great Britain, curiously enough. The question of the human rights of the inhabitants of the South Tyrol, which was in dispute between the Governments of Italy and Austria, has also been discussed, as have many other similar matters.

There is one conclusion which forces itself on anyone who studies this: The Government wished, for the benefit of home opinion, to give the impression of discussing this matter, but it also decided, in order not to annoy the British Government too much, not really to press the matter home to the full degree which was in its power— Count Sforza's dictum: "Fight to the end but lose".

I am obeying your ruling, Sir, in not entering into the substance of this matter, and as I had, I must avow, intended to enter into the substance of the matter, which seemed to me to be relevant, this places me in a little difficulty in which I must ask for your indulgence.

The whole exercise at the United Nations, from the United Nations peace-keeping force down to the exhumation of the so-called federal solution, was an exercise in semantic gimmicks conducted mainly on the platform of External Affairs and of the United Nations and intended for just two purposes, to take the heat off the party of unification, especially the internal heat and to preserve its image before the electorate. I think it is relevant to this debate to make this point because there is always a temptation to use the external affairs, the international relations of a country, for scoring points in its internal electorate. That is what has happened here and I think it is dangerous. Of course, some good did come out of this but also some evil, and here I should like to look at some of the Minister's statements which he made on this before the United Nations.

The Minister, in addressing the United Nations Security Council, said :

The use of British troops alone is unacceptable because British troops constitute a basic factor in the perpetuation of partition.

That position could be sustained only through military support from outside. The presence of a foreign— British—force in Ireland and the intransigence of the Northern Unionists remain the two elements in the division of Ireland.

I should welcome an assurance from the Minister that that statement has been superseded by the Taoiseach's statement. If British troops are, as the Minister told the Security Council they were, a "basic factor" in that situation what does that implv? Why should they be a "basic factor" if there is no intention on our part in any circumstance to coerce the majority there? If these troops are a redundancy—one might describe them as an irritation—they could not be a "basic factor" in that situation. They only become a "basic factor" if what we are saying—with half of our minds—is, "We could conquer you if the troops were not there". Then they are a "basic factor", but if that is not so then they are not.

This is a revelation on the international plain of the deep confusion which exists under the surface of our minds and all our recent good professions on this matter. The Minister should talk to the House about the logic of those remarks—I refer not to the Minister's remarks which were, I think he will agree, unfortunate on this point but to the Taoiseach's remarks— which implied that our efforts must be addressed to persuasion or to laying the ground work for future persuasion. We might expect the Department of External Affairs to play a part in that through cultural relations activity and the like. I do not think we should get bogged down in the kind of quibble —which is perhaps necessary to make legal distinctions and so on—that the north is not an external affair. It may not be in the profound spiritual sense, but as long as it is internationally recognised as part of an entity, an entity which we all agree to be foreign, the United Kingdom, then I do not see how the Department of External Affairs can avoid having something to do with it. In fact, they do not avoid that.

The activities of the Department of External Affairs which I have discussed so far are fairly typical. I do not mean to say that they are typical of the Department's activities but they are typical of the kind of use which the present Government make of that Department. I should like here to mention the case of Vietnam, which, as far as I can find out, was passed over in total silence in the Minister's speech to the General Assembly. It was not passed over in his speech to this House. I would prefer that the Minister had passed it over in silence here and had spoken about it at the General Assembly, but, I am sorry to say, the Minister chose the other course.

Deputy Sweetman said he thought the Chinese should not intervence in Vietnam. I fully agree with him. I do not think the Chinese should interfere in Vietnam and I do not mind anyone quoting me on that.

Comment on this

Or the Cubans.

Comment on this

Or the Cubans. The American Government should not have 493,700 troops, which by the latest count is what they have, out there. It is at least 493,699 more than the Chinese or the Cubans have. This is a situation which over the years has given immense concern, not only to many millions of people in the United States—possibly a majority there now recognise that it was a mistake—but to European Governments which are no less friendly with the United States than we are, who have come out against this commitment and called, in terms as friendly to the United States as they could be, but clear and firm, for an ending of this terrible commitment there. We are in default in relation to our own traditions, our own responsibilities and our own moral professions in passing it over in silence. The principles of the United Nations Charter, that commitment for recourse to peaceful solutions, which we support, is being violated by the largest war that is now going on. I do not think we should have been silent on this, nor do I think we should address our remarks solely to ourselves on this matter.

In the past we have said things about apartheid, about the practices of the South African Government, the situation in Rhodesia and also about the illegal occupation of the South African Government in South West Africa. Again, the Minister has mentioned some of these themes here but he did not judge it necessary to take them up at the United Nations. It might be said that this was because we had made our position clear on earlier occasions. There is such a thing as making a position clear and then making another position clear by a silence. That is to say while you pay lip service to this subject you are not emphasising it, you are in fact fading it out. The South Africans, of course, understand that.

I do not think it irrelevant that Córas Tráchtála, with the approval of the Government, have given their sponsorship to a South African Trade Mission here. These trade missions have political objectives. In fact, since the South African Government have no economic interest in promoting sales of our goods to that country, one might see in purporting to help us in this matter that they are motivated by political reasons and we are helping their political ends by our sponsorship of such a trade mission. I cite this example as symbolic of our subordination in practice to the requirements of the interlocking network of Western capital. In our external relations we may pay lip service to principles which transcend these, such as the "brotherhood of man regardless of race", but on the strict understanding that where there is the possibility of a lucrative deal these principles will be regarded as irrelevant. Many of our people do believe in these principles and believe that our Government in their external relations are maintaining them, but that is not the case.

In so far as there is a wide divergence between the principles which we profess and what we actually do, between the positions we take up publicly on a major national issue and how we act in apparently putting these things forward, there is a misuse of resources of high quality. Deputy Sweetman in the course of his remarks criticised some members of the Department of External Affairs. I am sure that some members of that Department, like all other human institutions, deserve such criticism. However, I believe it to be the case that we have a greater number of highly trained personnel in that Department, perhaps greater in proportion to its total size, than in any other Department.

If I am not mistaken, when these people are required to involve in activity which contains a large element of make believe, like the recent sudden chorus, equally suddenly stilled, for a major public relations campaign on Partition, they are disoriented, they are demoralised, they fail to see a consistent thrust and a consistent purpose behind external affairs. The lack of such a coherent central thrust and purpose was evident in the Minister's speech to us today. It was essentially a collection of papers prepared in different sections of the Department. That in itself is obviously unobjectionable but they were not held together by any central concept of where we are going and of what we are trying to do.

On that point, I should like to mention with regret the fact that the Department of External Affairs have sought to prevent the Irish people from finding out about foreign situations in which interest here was aroused. I am not blaming the present Minister for External Affairs, I am not blaming any personality: I do not wish to do that during debate on any Estimate but I am speaking of Government policy, in particular of the statements, rather widely made and recently brought out in an important book Sit Down and Be Counted by Lelia Doolan, Jack Dowling and another. The book is about various pressures brought to bear on RTE.

I am not concerned with any of these pressures here except in so far as they do not affect and do not bear on the activities of the Department of External Affairs. However, there were two which did. RTE intended to send a team to Vietnam so that the Irish people would be directly informed by direct coverage. That was cancelled under pressure from the Department of External Affairs. A similar mission to Biafra later was also cancelled. The obvious conclusion was that the live picture which would result from direct coverage would be contrary to the picture which the Department of External Affairs wished the Irish people to have of the situation. It is a highly undesirable situation that the Department of External Affairs should concern themselves with a kind of censorship on the inflow of relevant data to Irish public opinion. That should not be the concern of the Department of External Affairs and I hope the Minister will give an undertaking that under his guidance, the Department will altogether refrain from that or indeed any other kind of pressure or censorship in relation to our life in this country.

We on these benches believe that Ireland could and should recover and assert its independence in its external relations, an independence which has gradually eroded during the years to the point where our vote at the United Nations on major issues is entirely predictable. The Minister may wish to contest that. I should be happy if he would, if he could show us that we have a fully independent policy.

He included in his speech just now a brief and rather opaque reference to the isolation of China, an important matter, and also a test case in the UN of the independence of voting of member States. Almost all delegations in the UN, as the Minister will be aware, if they could be consulted offstage, as it were, would agree that it would lead to the strengthening of the UN and to a safer world if China, that is the real China whose capital is Peking, were seated in the UN. The reason for that is not that China would bring an extravagant importation of virtue or moderation into the proceedings of that organisation but that it is representative of a very large fraction of the human race and that it is safer to have China in than out so that the peacesaving processes of the UN can be used in relation to situations in which the Chinese are involved. They are kept out mainly due to American internal policy as between the Republicans and the Democrats, and through the influence which the US wields on other delegations, including ours.

Under Deputy Aiken, as Minister for External Affairs, for a time at least we liberated ourselves from that situation to a degree. Afterwards, we gravitated back into it and now we find ourselves saying very peculiar things about the rights of Formosa to a UN delegation of its own which nobody is seeking. I hope we will extricate ourselves from that and vote straight, as many other countries do, for the seating of the Government of China in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

We believe that by following a genuinely independent policy in our external relations we would not worsen but improve our relations with other countries and especially with our neighbour, Britain. They are among the most important of our relations. We believe these relations are not well founded when they involve, as they do at present, a general routine of subservience as on Nigeria and Biafra, for example, tempered by occasional tantrums on a subject matter to which it would not be in order for me to refer. These tantrums have been followed by private explanations, and by the public but unexplained fading out of the subject matter in dispute.

We believe a better, more even, more self-respecting, more rational way of conducting our relations with Britain and other countries can be found. It contains more respect for the interlocutors and our own people than is always evident in the present style. We hope that Irish men and women will increasingly realise that external relations are not something to be left to the Government or the so-called party of reunification. We hope they will realise that the question of reunification—which is still a matter of concern to the Department of External Affairs, I believe—depends not on some gimmick of the day but on the nature of the relations between the two communities in our island and the character of the two social systems in the two parts of the island. I quoted Mr. de Valera on this subject the other day and I hope his pregnant saying of 1933 has not been forgotten. If we can realise that, and if it stays in our vision and our actions, we can begin to make progress in this and other matters, including the general conduct of our external relations.

Comment on this

Listening to Deputy Cruise-O'Brien, I was rather amused at some of his remarks and comments on external affairs as carried on under the present Minister and myself. His reference to subservience to Britain is most amusing.

Comment on this

You look very amused.

Comment on this

In the last three years when I was in charge of the Department of External Affairs there were 23 UN votes on major issues. Of those 23 major votes, once we voted similarly to Britain and on no occasion did we vote similarly to the US.

Comment on this

What about you?

Comment on this

I will not let the Deputy interrupt me when I did not interrupt him. It is strange to think of Deputy O'Brien casting aside Formosa as if it were of no importance, as if it had not as much right to its independence as the Irish people or as 100 per cent of the countries who got their freedom since the war. It is all very well for Deputy O'Brien to say: "Let in China." I am in favour of letting in China but I am not in favour of letting in China while still holding prisoner a nation which has as much right to its freedom as ourselves and as the nations which have got their independence since the war.

Comment on this

The present China includes Formosa.

Comment on this

When Chiang Kai-Shek retreated to Formosa in 1949, when he was driven off the mainland or driven out of China, which is a better way to put it, they tried to stop him landing to reoccupy Formosa. Chiang Kai-Shek and his troops slaughtered tens of thousands of Formosans who were trying, as we were over the years, to maintain their independence against a great neighbour.

We would have no right to vote that China should be recognised as a sovereign state with sovereignty over Formosa. Deputy O'Brien accused us of not having put down a motion in the United Nations or taking some action which would have repudiated the title by which Great Britain is recognised in the United Nations, that is, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Great Britain was recognised before we got in. Neither the previous Government nor ourselves had an opportunity of objecting to its inscription under that particular nomenclature. However, as I say, I am in favour of seating China in the United Nations.

Comment on this

Why did you not vote for it?

Comment on this

I spoke about it. I am not in favour of admitting China with sovereign power over a people who are as much entitled to their independence as we are ourselves.

Comment on this

The existing representation?

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Please do not interrupt me. There are certain things Deputy O'Brien has said which I think require to be answered. I have not answered them because I did not want to and I did not think it a wise thing, because some individual who has his role to play tries to make controversy on certain items of foreign policy on which we are all agreed or largely agreed except himself. I do not believe in facilitating him by always answering every statement he makes. However, I answer, first of all, this charge about China and I want to say this. When I became Minister for External Affairs leading the Irish delegation in the United Nations I voted for the discussion on China in the United Nations much against the will of the Americans. A lot of song and dance was made about it. It was the only time we had a real debate or a division in relation to External Affairs in the Dáil. We voted for a debate on the representation of China. We continued to vote for a debate on it, and against the Americans, until the Americans came around and voted with us for the debate. What do you expect us to do? When the Americans came along and voted for the debate were we to turn around and vote against them and say there would be no debate?

Every year, while I was there, we spoke about Formosa and we spoke about China. We had no hesitation in stating what was our view on the matter. It was that the Formosan people had as much right to their independence as any of the nations which had got their freedom since the war and that if they respected their own freedom and wanted to maintain it for their children they had a right to vote for the admission of China but only representing China and admitting Formosa as an independent state.

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They are Chinese.

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Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Will Deputy Desmond cease interrupting and allow Deputy Aiken to speak?

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He should be interrupted because we have not heard from him in years. It is years since we heard him speaking.

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You may say that because it suits your book at the moment. The Formosan people do not think they are Chinese any more than we think we are British. They fought very gallantly and lost tens of thousands of their population when Chiang Kai-Shek came along in 1949. It is also amusing to hear Deputy O'Brien assert that the Chinese should be permitted to grab Formosa——

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The present Chinese.

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——and at the same time he claims for the Congolese that they should have had Katanga, with which I agree, and he denies that the Nigerians should have the eastern province. There is no doubt but that the Federal Government of Nigeria had as much moral and legal right to prevent the hiving off of the eastern province as had the central government of the Congo to prevent the hiving off of the eastern province——

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Or the Chinese to prevent the hiving off of Formosa.

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——of Katanga. If the Deputy wishes to take the line of being pro-Chinese to the extent of wanting to give them Formosa, he is entitled to take that line but he will not have me with him.

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They have Formosa.

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The British had Ireland for many years and we objected to it. The British had Ireland for centuries longer than the Chinese had Formosa. And for hundreds of years before they overran the country the British Pale in Ireland was much wider than the width of the Pale when the Japanese took Formosa from the Chinese a few decades ago. The only foreigners who ever went through the whole of the country of Formosa were the Japs.

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Japanese.

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I wish to say something now about the problem of Nigeria. The Irish people were very much aroused by the slaughter and the frightful suffering that went on there. They responded very generously by raising funds for the purchase of supplies for people in need in that part of the world. We were the first Government in the world to allot money to help the people in distress in Nigeria. Within a few months of the start of the war I approached certain university authorities regarding the few hundred Ibo students from the Eastern Province who were studying here and I told the authorities that the Government had undertaken to grubsteak these students and see them through their courses at the university. The university authorities, too, were very generous in their treatment of these students.

We were one of the first Governments in the world to have made available a reasonably large sum of money to the Red Cross with which to purchase relief supplies. The sum made available was £100,000. To Deputy Cruise-O'Brien I wish to say that the Red Cross is a very respectable and highly respected international organisation that has done a lot of good work during this war to calm rancour, to stop fighting and to aid those people suffering from disease and hunger. I am aware that Deputy Cruise-O'Brien is very enthusiastic about joint churches of all descriptions but, perhaps, he might agree with me when I say that in this particular case the Joint Churches Organisation was not quite as acceptable to the people of Nigeria——

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Acceptable where the need is greatest.

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——as the international Red Cross. The Red Cross has been continuing negotiations to get an arrangement whereby Colonel Ojukwu would allow the Red Cross to send in food to prevent the children form starving and, I think, they got an agreement from the Federal Government that would allow the food to be sent in provided that it was inspected by, among others, representatives of the Federal Government. After all, there is a certain legitimacy in their approach. This is a war; it is not child's play. Thousands of people are dying and the future, not only of Nigeria but also of Africa, is being decided by the outcome of this war. At any rate, the Federal Government insisted on being allowed to inspect the material on any plane that was stated to be carrying relief supplies. I heard an Oxfam representative boasting on a radio programme that they did not take ammunition with the food—that they only put food on the ammunition planes into Eastern Nigeria. He was not stating any secret. It was well known that double cargoes were going in and Colonel Ojukwu made no bones about the fact that he would not take in food if by doing so it would prevent him getting in arms. He is a soldier and he is trying to win the war that he started. Naturally, the other people do not want him to win it and if they did it would be the same sort of situation as if Katanga had won its independence.

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That is preposterous. It is wholly incorrect.

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The same sort of outside forces were working in the two countries. As I often said to my African friends during the years, we all recognise that Europe made a savage cutting up of Africa. They got together in Berlin and drew lines on the maps across rivers and across mountains while completely ignoring tribal considerations. I said to the Africans that these are the boundaries that were set up and I told them that if they were to agitate for the rectification of the boundaries then for goodness sake to do it peacefully and not to try to repeat the history of Europe for the past couple of thousand of years. If, as is my belief—and I persuaded the Government to go along with me on this—the Ibos succeeded in getting their independence by force of arms——

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Let us hope they do.

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——and with control over tribes that think they have as much right to be independent of the Ibos—the Tivs and the Ibidios and the Rivers people in the eastern region think they have as much right to be independent or at least not subject to domination by the Ibos——

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The Biafrans are not a tribe.

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——as the Ibos think they have to be free from the rest of Nigeria. There are 200 tribes in Nigeria. If one tribe got started on this, the other 199 would think that they had as much right to be independent as the Ibos had.

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The Biafrans are not a tribe.

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There are 2,200 tribes in Africa. Each one of them will make as good a case for independence as the Ibos. I am not against the independence of the Ibo people, or of any of these other tribes. I would advise them that if they want independence they should try to get it in some other way than by taking up arms, and that they might start a movement that would result in Africa's future history being as bad as Europe's past history has been from the point of view of wars, slaughter and famines.

I persuaded the Government that we should not, in our circumstances, be the first European country to recognise the independence of this African tribe which was breaking away from its federal state. I had several good reasons for this, not only for the sake of the Africans but for the sake of the Irish who are scattered all over it.

On our television here there was a repetition of the canard which appeared in one of our papers about my part in advising the Government not to recognise Ibo independence. The story was that the British had hundreds of millions of pounds invested in Nigeria and that they were naturally very keen to protect their investment. It was said that the reason we did not recognise Biafra, as it was called, was that we had an investment there, through Guinness's, in the federal country. That was hitting pretty low. The real fact was that we had 2,500 Irish men and women, lay people and clerical, scattered throughout the whole of Nigeria including Biafra, the Ibo country. I suppose one-third of our people were in Ibo-held country and the other two-thirds were in the federal-held country. We were naturally anxious about these people. If any motive we had could be held to be unworthy in the light of all the circumstances it was that one of the reasons we were not keen on recognising the Ibos was that two-thirds of our people in that part of the world were in the federal-held territory. It is not correct to say that we were cowardly in not recognising the Biafrans. Any motive can be put on our action. I resented very keenly when Irish television came out and repeated this canard.

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Irish television never went out.

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Irish television showed a programme. I can tell you how the story was got for the programme. It showed pictures of poor, starving children and of people dying, and it wound up by saying that Ireland did not recognise Biafra because Ireland had an investment in the federal territory, the investment being the Guinness (London) group. There was no mention on the television programme that we had any other interest than to protect this Guinness (London) company investment.

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Why did the Deputy not let RTE go to find out?

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I did not know that RTE were proposing to send a team to Biafra until I read in the papers that the team had been called home from Lisbon. Some people do not want to recognise Lisbon; they want to recognise Cuba. Lisbon was a very vital centre in all this business. This picture was used in order to incite people during the election. It was taken 18 months or two years before. Part of it was used in support of this canard. I did not know that it was proposed to send the RTE team to Nigeria, but I knew that certain gentlemen were using Lisbon as a centre. They had got the money from Americans and this was published because the men who got the money had to disclose it to Congress and the Government. They got one million dollars or so to help Colonel Ojukwu on the promise of future oil concessions. These dollars were used to buy a plane in America. I can tell the Deputy where the plane was bought and from whom but I am not going to tell him here. This plane was bought and they came to Britain and they hooked up as many television teams in Europe as they could and also nobbled our television team to go to Biafra. The assembly point was in Lisbon, Portugal. We know, of course, that there were certain people in Lisbon who were helping Ojukwa, not for the sake of his big brown eyes but because they, as well as certain people in South Africa, wanted to see, above all, that any African Government which threatened to become stable was broken up.

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I will come to Lagos. Do not take me away from beloved Biafra.

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I am glad to hear the Minister use that expression.

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Deputy Cruise-O'Brien does not care very much for the Portuguese but the Portuguese were the people who supplied Biafra with arms. They supplied them——

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The French.

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What did the Deputy say?

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I said the French, rather than the Portuguese.

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The French came into it very late in the day, not until 18 months after the war started, and they came in for their own purposes. The Portuguese were the first into it, the second were the American oil companies and the third were the South Africans, these wonderful South Africans fighting for the freedom of the poor blacks in Biafra.

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Very few of these people did anything.

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Wait a moment. Other great supporters of theirs were the Rhodesians. They were highly delighted to get an opportunity of supporting one black man to kill another black man. That was the situation. I do not want to go any further into this business. It is a great tragedy that these poor countries, which had been struggling for their freedom, had been suppressed over the centuries, and through the accident of a world war had run into a situation in which they found that their oppressors were not as strong as they used be and their oppressors discovered that for themselves and so they released them by the score, without any preparation and without having given them any training in handling the problems of modern Government.

The Deputy asked about Lagos. I knew most of the Ministers in the Lagos Government right from their independence and I knew some of them before that. They were doing as good a job as they could with the Constitution that the British left them. I remember discussing the Constitution with the British official who negotiated and set up the Constitution. I said I thought that he was very wrong to have made only three provinces and that if they had made 33 there would have been a better chance of stability. One province can defy two provinces but one province cannot defy 32 so successfully. Lagos was trying to make a reasonable job of creating a stable situation, of having a progressive Government, and giving everybody a fair crack of the whip.

The Ibos, although they represented only about one-tenth of the population, had three or four Cabinet Ministers in the Federal Government. One of these was a very famous man who attended Trinity College. He was their foreign Minister for many years. Unfortunately, the situation broke down with the murder of Sir Abubaka Belawa and his Cabinet. That was a tremendous tragedy because he was the man who had kept the Nigerians together, who was trying to make progress and trying to get the tribes to understand that they were in favour of creating one Nigeria for all its peoples who would be treated equally and in which the liberties of all would be respected. That revolution was led by four young Ibo officers and it had its repercussions with the attacks on Ibo civilians. That, again, was followed up——

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The Minister means the massacre of 30,000 people?

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One of the best authorities on that was an Irish priest who said he thought that it was about 300. Three hundred was too many. Even if there were only 300 or if there were 3,000 or 30,000 Ibo people who lost their lives——

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They were not all Ibos.

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But these were not the first killings. The first killings were by the four Ibo officers who slaughtered a Government and then, when they got control, proceeded to slaughter any officers who had come from the northern region. Then we had the war starting and all I can say is that I hope the people here will continue to support those who are suffering on both sides and that they will realise that the genesis of these troubles in Africa does not derive from any double dose of original sin that Africans have any more than the Europeans have, but from their history of colonial oppression and the fact that when the colonists were retreating they retreated in bad order and left the potential of civil disorder and chaos behind them.

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May I congratulate Deputy Aiken on one point? I have heard him on many occasions answering questions in this House and never before has he mentioned the word "Biafra". This evening he said it for the first time in his life. Perhaps, it was when he got carried away with interruptions that he referred to "Biafra". Heretofore, he always referred to the people fighting there for their existence as the "Eastern Province". I do not think I ever heard him refer to the Ibos before this evening. He recognises the fact that the Ibos exist and are a strong tribe in Africa.

I should like to say to Deputy Aiken, the former Minister, that it is becoming day by day ever more evident to me what a tragedy it was that he did not go to Africa himself. We were so closely and intimately connected with what was going on there that it should have been the first duty of the Minister to go there himself to see what was happening and, had he done so, a great many lives might have been saved and progress might have been made along the road to peace. I hope his successor will go to Nigeria and to Biafra as soon as possible so that he may fully inform himself of the conditions there.

Deputy Aiken's suggestion that one would have 199 tribes looking for independence if the Ibos, who are numerically 8,000,000 strong, achieved their independence is utterly ludicrous. I was glad he admitted at the end of his discourse that one of the motivating causes of the breakaway by the eastern provinces, as he called them—I prefer to call them Biafra—was due to the massacre of 3,000 people; he acknowledged that 3,000 were too many. He admitted that others were massacred, but this was the first wholesale massacre and it was the predisposing cause to the war in Nigeria today.

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But the murder of the Hausa government was preceded——

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The Hausa government?

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