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Dáil

Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs.

Contributions 85–168 of 168. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.

It was largely a Hausa government.

Comment on this

It was a coalition government, including Ibos, Hausas and the northern tribes as well.

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But the Ibos had fled at the time when the Hausas were murdered.

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If 3,000 Fianna Fáil people were massacred the rest would probably flee as well.

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Out of the government?

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Yes. They fled out of the government and armed to defend themselves. Numerically, they were not in full strength in the overall position. The Biafrans were never consulted one way or the other.

Comment on this

That is true.

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When the former Minister says we are not following on the lines of the United Kingdom I say that we are. The United Kingdom is supporting the existing Nigerian state, which has no meaning whatsoever from the point of view of population, tribes, or anything else. There are 8,000,000 Ibos and surely they are entitled to their independence? If the present Minister and his predecessor knew anything about Africa they would know that nearly all the states there are small and a population of 8,000,000 in an independent African state is the exception rather than the rule. There are many African states with populations of only 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 people.

Nigeria is, as the former Minister said, the key to peace in Africa. They were a most stable people there. I was there many years ago and I met many of them. I have met many of them since on the political level. These people were forced into insurrection by the stupidity of the colonial power. I have listened to two debates in the House of Commons and the story is always the same: the argument is that Britain must keep supplying arms because supplying arms will put an end to the war. There will be no end to this war. The only solution is a "cease fire". If Ireland had played her proper part we would at least have had the opportunity of taking pride in having done so. We have done absolutely nothing from the word "go".

The Minister dealt fairly considerably with the problem in his speech today. There is no change in either his attitude or his outlook. The idea seems to be that this war must end soon; we have done all we can to supply help and consolation and so on. We are the only European people who have a direct interest in Nigeria on both sides of the existing frontier. We have contacts with both sides. We are not a political power. The policy of the Minister is a continuation of the policy of his predecessor: leave it to the Organisation for African Unity to settle the matter. If the Minister and his predecessor knew anything about Africa and Africans they would know that there is a greater chance of settlement if that settlement is brought about by someone completely outside Africa. There is no country in Europe which has the standing there that we have. For no other country have the African people such a high regard as they have for us. That is due to the fact that we have so many missionaries and other devoted people in Africa.

I regret, as do my colleagues, that so little action was taken when two of our nationals, nursing sisters, were killed in Africa recently. The Minister referred to this in his speech today but he did not tell us what pressure was put on; neither did he give us any indication of what our representative there actually did. Our Parliament has a right to be informed in a matter of this kind. He did not give us any information as to what the reply from the Nigerian Government was. I have in my pocket a letter, which I will show the Minister, written to me by a missionary describing what happened. An aeroplane came over, flying low; the occupants of the plane could see who the people were and what they were doing. The plane went away, came back again, and bombed them; it went away again and came back a third time, again bombing the people and killing this unfortunate Irish sister.

I have always pressed that we should take an active part in trying to end this war in Africa. We send ambassadoes to different countries. We send people on trade missions and so forth. Inevitably and inexorably Biafra will become an independent state.

Comment on this

Hear, hear.

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It will be a solvent state. It will not be dependent on subsidies from any other country because, say what one likes about the Ibos, they are an intelligent and hardworking people. They occupied most of the important jobs in the state of Nigeria when it was one because of their ability and application. Biafra will be an independent state. I believe it is our duty to support Biafra in her hour of trial and tribulation but, quite apart from that, from a material point of view surely we ought to have enough common sense to appreciate that ultimately this state will be an independent state and we will want to trade with it? I hope the present Minister will send an Irish Parliamentary delegation—this is something practically every other European country has done —to Biafra at the earliest possible moment and then to Nigeria to use there the influence we command, an influence the Minister's predecessor would know we command if he had ever gone to Africa. This delegation should be despatched as soon as possible.

The Minister spoke pretty extensively about our entry to the European Economic Community. He spoke with some optimism on the subject. I recall the stock-in-trade answer of the former Taoiseach Mr. Seán Lemass, who is no longer with us in Dáil Éireann, that we would be in the EEC in 1970. Of course, the advent of General de Gaulle ended that. Now the situation has changed somewhat politically. The de Gaulle era is over and Monsieur Pompidou is now President of France and hopes have been raised that there will be an early response to the applications of the United Kingdom and the other three countries for membership of the Common Market.

The Minister for External Affairs brushed aside as practically non-existent the Monet proposals. The Monet proposals are something that many of us have dreaded for a long time, that is, that negotiations with the United Kingdom should take place first and that the other countries should open their negotiations afterwards. May I say that the benefits that we Irish people hope to get from the Common Market are totally different from what the British would expect? The British look for large industrial expansion, as undoubtedly they will get with their long tradition of industry and their up-to-date methods of manufacture. We are comparative newcomers to industrial life and must expect to face severe competition in the industrial arena. In any negotiations we have we must ask for that fact to be taken into full consideration. Nobody seems to have thought about that. The benefits that will accrue to us will be largely agricultural. At present the agricultural position in Europe is again in a state of flux. Originally there was the rather ingenious arrangement of a common agricultural policy beneficial to all the member states. We would be very interested in securing for ourselves agricultural markets as early as possible and for that reason we should negotiate as soon as possible.

I do not like the tone of the speech of the Minister for External Affairs today. I do not like the implication in it that everything is all right, that the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Ireland will negotiate, that the door will be opened and that we will walk into the Common Market. We do not want to be walked up that path again.

I have stressed time and time again that we should open our negotiations just as soon as the British start to negotiate and, if possible, we should open our negotiations before the British do. I do not see any great problem in that. From my experience in Europe, which is considerable—I spent 12 years on the Council of Europe and took a very active part in its debates and in its committees generally—I know that the tendency in international circles is to consider the big fellow first and to leave others aside. It is only by pushing yourself and forcing your opinion and your aims and ambitions at every corner of the street day in and day out that you will have an opportunity of being heard in the councils of the European nations.

I envisage—and this is what I fear— that we will be told in this House that our application stands on the statute book—or whatever is the official description—and that negotiations are starting on behalf of the four countries. That is not what I want to see happening because I know that negotiating on behalf of the four countries will mean that we will be talking to junior officials who have no say or very little say, who can discuss matters with us but cannot take vital decisions, whereas the United Kingdom will be negotiating her entry into the Common Market. It is only wishful thinking to think that the United Kingdom—and British parliamentarians will tell you this; they have said it to me often—are going to ensure that we get into the Common Market. The only people who can fight for us are ourselves. We must fight and must fight alone. The sooner the Minister realises that, the better.

There is one thing that strikes me about the situation relative to the European Economic Community at the moment. There is a general consensus of opinion that negotiations will start immediately. That, to my mind, is untrue. Very long and difficult discussions took place some 12 months back at which the agricultural policy of the EEC was hammered out and finalised. Since then we have had the devaluation of the franc and the upgrading of the German mark. The up grading of the German mark, perhaps, more than anything else has made nonsense of the European Economic Community's agricultural policy. It is for that reason that the line of thought has been growing not only in Europe but throughout the world that there should be a stabilised international monetary currency instead of having the sterling, hard sterling and the dollar competing with each other and repeatedly getting into trouble, which would be bound to destroy the very basis of agreement on the EEC. If the members of the EEC wish to put their house in order as I am sure they do, it is likely that there will be a stabilised monetary unit so that they can all co-operate and avoid what has happened so recently within their sphere. Not alone has it happened to them, it is happening all over the world. Our trade suffers the economic repercussions as soon as currencies run into trouble. Therefore, I do not think negotiations for our entry are likely to take place immediately. I do not place very much credence on what the new German Chancellor more or less indicated, that the United Europe that we are all thinking about is just around the corner. Herr Willy Brandt has always been in favour of United Kingdom entry, has always felt that Britain should get in, that there was nothing to stop her getting in. I think there still would be a great deal of resistance against that. Even with the best will in the world, I do not think the EEC is in a position to take Britain in.

With reference to our aid to underdeveloped countries, in my view the most important factor for world peace today is for the wealthier countries to ensure that hunger is dealt with efficiently. We are not a very big State but we would rank as one of the wealthier countries because we are better fed than the average nation. It is said that we eat more. Perhaps, we drink more. I am not sure whether we do or not. It is necessary that all the wealthy countries of the world should ensure that the greatest problem in bringing about world peace, namely, hunger, is dealt with efficiently.

That brings us back to the question of unification of effort in the world. It is somewhat disastrous that so many philanthropic organisations and so many states are operating separately with the result that food and other requirements cannot be brought with the greatest efficiency to famine areas. Unfortunately, sufficient notice is not taken of the fact that there are people who hardly have one decent meal in their life. About one-third of the world's population is on the verge of starvation and another one-third is underfed. We do not stop to think of these things until some crisis descends on us.

In international conferences that I have had the privilege to attend it has always been brought to notice that the greatest problem in the world today is hunger. A great deal of time is devoted to discussion of nuclear disarmament and similar problems and of the Vietnam war and so on, which is disastrous in itself but there is no greater disaster than world hunger. We would all be well advised to bear that in mind whether we represent the Right or the Left. I am told I represent the Right: I do not know whether or not I do.

I went pretty thoroughly through his speech and, so far as I am aware, the Minister did not mention that, some years ago, the British Government— I think the Labour Government—imposed those levies and kicked us in the teeth shortly after the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. I was in Europe at the time and I read all the European papers on the matter. They all acknowledged that, in view of our close economic association with Britain, we had been kicked in the teeth harder than anyone else by the imposition of those levies. In fact, they made nonsense of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. It was just another trade agreement that went down the drain inside four or five months.

The other day, the levies were reimposed. I am told that our financial situation—our trade balance, and so on—is not so good today. To offset the levies imposed by the British Government last year, the Irish Government generously provided £3 or £4 million to pay the rate of interest. In other words, they gave the British side to the agreement a donation of that sum to ensure that the trade was continued between the two countries. When replying to the debate, I trust the Minister will tell us if the Irish Exchequer will be called upon again to provide a similar sum of money to offset the destruction to our trade which the further continuation of this levy will otherwise impose: he is responsible for trade agreements.

Comment on this

I propose initially to refer to the contribution of the former Minister for External Affairs, Deputy Aiken. We should not accept some of his sweeping partisan and biased assumptions. I think the 2,500 Irish nationals in Nigeria-Biafra today certainly must view and can only view with some disbelief and with some general dismay the contribution of the former Minister for External Affairs. If these are really his views, which he has finally conveyed to the House, most certainly I think they would not regard him as having very much perception on the affairs of that tragic nation. Certainly, he has used repeatedly the term "secession"; he has used repeatedly the term "Balkanisation". Then, there is the general favourite cliché of what I would call Jacobin politicians trying to justify deliberate suppression—there is no other word for it at this point of time—with the support of the Soviet Union, with the support of Britain, in Lagos, of some 14,000,000 Biafrans. It is because of the very dimensions of this problem, and because of the fact that 2,500 Irish nationals are involved, that we in Ireland would expect that Deputy Dr. Hillery should at least have proposed some elementary initiative in his contribution in this House today. Secondly, I think he could take up, and must take up, the call made by the Labour Party spokesman in this House, on this vote, Deputy Dr. Cruise-O'Brien, for a cease-fire without political preconditions. The Minister should take at least that elementary initiative in respect of Irish foreign policy rather than subject the House to vague pious aspirations for peace which have been trotted out here over the past 18 months in relation to that tragic situation in Biafra.

One of the quite remarkable aspects of the contribution of Deputy Aiken before his departure for his tea this evening was his total failure to refer to the fact that Britain repeatedly has given arms, that the Soviet Union, as the second major world power involved in this conflict, has given arms, through Lagos, directly to help the Nigerian Government—vastly more than any aid or assistance given through Lisbon or, indeed, through the belated entry of the French into this particular tragic strife in Biafra itself.

There is also, I think, the fact that we must place on record in this House our non-acceptance of Deputy Aiken's assumption that Biafra is, as such, the Ibo tribe, and, as such, that 14,000,000 people are being dominated by a few immature Army people from the Ibo group in that particular State. Frankly, I do not accept this. I think that, in the first place, Biafra is not a tribe as glibly suggested by Deputy Aiken. It is now, whether we like it or not, a multination State of some five main ethnic groups who have in common a unity of co-existence and, by and large, a common culture; by and large a Christian culture and, by and large, a visible solidarity in a State which certainly I have no doubt could emerge as a separate viable entity on that continent.

Certainly, the separation of Biafra from Nigeria in May, 1967, far from being the potential cause of the strife, which Deputy Aiken referred to, I would have thought was a continuing process of the general de-colonialisation of that particular continent because this, in fact, is what I think one can generally say it was. The colonial lines were drawn by the imperialists in that area. It is only right up to the nine years coming up to 1967 that that particular process of frontier dismantling, of frontier de-colonialisation, began in that area. I think Biafra is an elementary symptom and development of that approach. We had the break-up in French West Africa. We had the secession of Zambia and Malawi from the Rhodesian Federation; we had Ruanda from Urundi and so on. These were general developments which can be said to be developments which could be approved of and which certainly were a development of de-colonialisation in the area.

I think the tragedy has been that Deputy Aiken, in his long years of fraternisation at the United Nations, seeing that he was not preoccupied with EEC, seeing that he had dismantled any interest he ever had in Vietnam and seeing that he had no conception of civil rights for Northern Ireland, could at least have preoccupied himself with a finer and a more elementary understanding of the situation in Biafra generally and particularly South West Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa itself, to which I shall refer at a later stage. Therefore, I would reiterate the Labour Party view that it is high time the Irish Government called with all their strength at international level for a ceasefire without political pre-conditions. The Minister for External Affairs should certainly take the initiative in that regard. Likewise, he should approach the British Labour Government and urge them not to continue to supply arms to the Nigerian Government. This should be done in an effort to deescalate the situation. There are two elementary topics which I would have expected to be dealt with in the Minister's speech today but in regard to which I am afraid we were sadly disappointed.

I do not want to sound carping or unduly critical. I know it is the role of Opposition Parties generally to find fault with Ministerial speeches but frankly I commend the Minister on this occasion. Certainly, he was more discursive in his 30-page document than Deputy Aiken was when he was Minister. Indeed I think this debate is generally better than what we were wont to hear when the former Deputy James Dillon gave us his annual diatribe on the terrors of atheistic Communism. We are also relieved to note that Deputy Burke is carrying the Government's foreign policy to the avid audience in New Delhi. At least we are spared those interventions in this debate, but we must say that the Minister's speech has been in many respects rather disappointing. He confined his comments as he said, to the EEC developments, to Nigeria and Biafra—important as these matters are—to disarmament generally and to the Irish involvement in the UN peace keeping operations. I feel that these four aspects, crucial and important as they are, pale into insignificance beside what we might have expected from the Minister. We saw no remorse, no comment, no observation, not one iota in relation to the situation in Vietnam where 450,000 American troops are involved, where there are many Irish people and people of Irish extraction in the American armed forces. Forty thousand Americans have died; billions of American dollars have been spent; there is Irish contribution in blood and yet no comment from an Irish Government on what America has done in the past three or four years. This frankly is a matter of regret.

In relation to South-West Africa we have seen the continued escalation of racial conflict in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa itself. Again, apart from a general expression of regret about the running sore, as the Minister says, of colonial oppression and apartheid in South Africa and vague references, acceptable as they are, there is no general analysis of the situation. There is nothing in relation to the tremendous development now in progress in the Portuguese colonial territories involving seven million Africans. Whether we like it or not, this again is a major area of international conflict. In Guinea, Angola and Mozambique the Portuguese Government practise repression of the highest order in a completely colonial context. This situation, apart from the Minister's welcome comment of general disapproval this afternoon during Question Time, is not dealt with. There is no mention of the repression which has revolted the world currently in operation in Greece. There is no comment on the role of China in the United Nations apart from the general aberration we got from Deputy Frank Aiken, who still cannot make up his mind whether there are Chinese on Formosa Island or not, notwithstanding the fact that some 95 per cent of the population of Formosa are Chinese, and when Chiang-Kai-Shek came there some decades ago he got rid of remaining Formosans there, who did not particularly agree with him anyway. The Irish Government can produce an estimate speech which does not even refer to 25 per cent of the population of this earth, some 600 million Chinese who are a major international problem, requiring the most delicate attention on the part of an Irish Government, on the part of every government, requiring approaches which should be of major concern to all of us.

Likewise, there is no reference made in the Minister's speech, if I may make a general mention of the situation in Northern Ireland, to the fact that we seem to have had two Departments of External Affairs in operation in the past few months. I do not propose to develop this point but we have had the operations of six seconded public relations officers involved in Irish foreign policy and no reference to it in relation to the staff of a major Government Department here, namely, the Department of External Affairs.

Comment on this

There will be a Supplementary Estimate on which that can be discussed.

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One would hope to hear the drama and the general saga of the Government's developments in that respect clarified at that point in time.

These, then, are some of the general aspects which one would have expected to see included in this contribution from the Government. One must first of all take the omissions from the speech itself. The first omission I would take is the question of South Africa. This is a question of major importance, one in which admittedly there may be involved a very considerable amount of repetition on the part of Irish Governments but one on which we have been very loath to comment extensively or as we might do at the United Nations. In South Africa we have a multi-racial state composed of about 12¾ million Africans, about 3½ million whites, 1.8 million coloured people—that is people of mixed racial origins—and over half a million Asians. Where is there an Irish policy in relation to that subcontinent?

It is a matter of regret that the Department of External Affairs did not seem to take any initiative nor did they seem to show any reaction to the promotion of trade with that country or to the promotion of advertising for jobs in that country by South Africa House. I have not seen any effort on the part of the Minister to point out certain things to Irish emigrants, who are being offered jobs, particularly in the Sunday Independent, a newspaper which has repeatedly given extensive coverage to South African advertisements of a quite misleading nature. I understand there is a general arrangement between that newspaper and the South African Government for such advertisements. It is high time the Irish Government pointed out to Irish emigrants who accept such jobs that if they go to South Africa, being white, most likely they will be joining on the white side in the general oppression of the people of that country. There is an obligation on the Minister to point out these things to our people.

Let us have no illusions about this. Irish people exposed to racialism are as easily contaminated and are as subject to the pressures of it as are the people of any other nation. We should, therefore, undertake this elementary act of foreign policy, political hygiene, in relation to Irish emigrants, such as has been undertaken in many other parts of the world. If an Irishman goes and works, say, in the mining industry in South Africa he gets an average wage of about £32 a week. This must be told to an Irish emigrant. He will of course have the right to vote in South Africa and the right to join a trade union. If he is typical, he will soon believe that South Africa, despite the fact that the non-white population—to use that terribly offensive term—comprises four-fifths of the population, is purely a white man's land.

While I appreciate that the Minister fully sympathises with our rejection of South African policy, nevertheless I feel that there should be much more publication of these facts by the Department. Everybody applying for an Irish passport to go to South Africa should be told the facts of life there by an Irish Government as an elementary development of Christian morality. The Minister should point out that any Irish person emigrating there will be demanded to enthusiastically respect and develop racialist policies in that country. He will have to give nine months of military training in that country—a fact often unknown to Irish emigrants to South Africa—and indeed that he may have to fight during that period of military training against those who are currently fighting for their freedom. It is like wise important to point out that an Irish Government should tell Irish emigrants that in the country to which they are going they will meet black people whose wages will be something in the region of about £8 per month whereas a white person gets £32 a week generally. These are facts of life which are not fully appreciated by Irish emigrants to South Africa.

The Government should point out that an emigrant will meet in South Africa black people who have no right to vote and cannot elect a parliament under any circumstances, who are not legally in a position to join a trade union or to live with them on a normal, common basis. Therefore, there devolves on the Minister a very definite obligation to have prepared in the Department a general exposition of this problem for Irish emigrants. The material is already available without any difficulty to the Irish Government from the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation and from the African National Congress there is open to the Government a vast literature on apartheid which should be availed of.

Likewise, there should be some general prohibition on bringing diplomats from South Africa to this country for the sponsoring of trade affairs and meeting Irish business people here because their exports to Ireland, whether we are prepared to accept it or not, come from employment which is exploited, which suffers the most rigorous repression and the goods concerned are produced mostly by the sweat of an exploited black labour force in South Africa. This is something of which we should be fully conscious and I deplore the fact that we had to employ members of the Special Branch of the Garda Síochána, to make sure that the stay of such trade delegates, so-called, would be most pleasant at the expense of Córas Tráchtála. These are aspects that must be emphasised and which I think have been ignored here. In Ireland we seem to think that because we live in a distant land with no particular colour problem automatically we are totally immune from pressures and that we cannot become deeply immersed in the relationship between the different races and so we take no further interest in such developments. These are some points I would ask the Minister to consider. He should do something about them before we come to the next Estimate in 1970.

As regards Portugal, the other omission from the Minister's speech, I would repeat what I already conveved to the Minister during Question Time this afternoon, that there is a good case for the general ending of diplomatic relations with that country. In his reply, the Minister said he wished to keep open liaison on diplomatic matters with that country mainly for communication purposes. I hope it is not the kind of communication envisaged by Deputy Aiken in the past few minutes.

Comment on this

Keeping communication open as distinct from expressing approval of their policies.

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It is difficult to express approval or disapproval——

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I expressed disapproval, but I want to keep open communication.

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As I said this afternoon, I regard that approach as something of a legalism. I cannot see how it will contribute to the overall situation. The seven million Africans in these states—Angola, Guinea and Mozambique—regard the continuing presence of an Irish Ambassador in Portugal as something which overtly gives approval, perhaps unintended, by the Irish Government for the policies of that Government. I do not propose to refer to the internal affairs of Portugal or the farcical recent general election there, but I still think there is an opportunity open to the Irish Government, which has never in our history been availed of, of at least bringing pressure on the Portuguese Government and perhaps using our diplomatic presence and the possibility of its withdrawal in such a way that they might react in a more humanitarian and normal manner than heretofore. The Minister has an opportunity open to him to undertake action in that regard.

I also wish to refer briefly to the question of the Irish approach in Vietnam. It is significant that the American Government have now decided after internal traumatic upheaval to consider plans to withdraw some 300,000 troops from Vietnam by the end of 1971. There is also a possibility of a general unilateral cease-fire and I would hope that the US President, Mr. Nixon, is genuine in his statement that he would try to broaden the regime in Saigon itself on a slightly more democratic basis although, as we know, its current formation is very much open to question. This House I think must go on record very strongly against what one might almost call the conspiracy of silence by the Irish Government in relation to Vietnam right through the history of the war there, which is still very much in progress. I think the performance of Deputy Aiken—admittedly now in the twilight of his political career when it is easy for Deputies on this side to be critical— must go on record as one of massive equivocation, massive deafening silence, when the occasion demanded otherwise. When the Pope, for example, denounced American policy in many respects we still had reluctance on the part of the Irish Government to bring all pressures to bear, as they had every opportunity of doing, in the United Nations, so that that tragic country would be given its independence.

Hundreds of thousands of acres in Vietnam have been completely defoliated. Thousands of villages have been utterly razed to the ground. The country is literally pock-marked at this point of time with bomb craters from B 52 raids. These are filled with water and serve as nothing more than breeding grounds for malaria and other after-effects of international warfare. More tons of explosives have been dropped on that tiny country than were dropped by all the Allied powers during World War II. Yet, the Irish Government, apart from calling for peace in the most vacuous terms, never called a halt notwithstanding that Irish people were involved in America through the American armed forces. That can only be regarded as an indication of the lack of humanitarian concern on the part of the Government, that staggered most of us here.

Indeed, on occasions, the Irish Government, if anything, gave overt support for American policy which we certainly can only regard as being nothing short of reprehensible. I hope that in the future Vietnam will emerge unpartitioned as a free and independent country. It may be unpopular to place on record in this House the regard and respect which internationally was won for the leader of the North Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh, who is no longer in a position to lead his country. Now that it is fashionable and safe to do so in international circles, one, perhaps, may pay tribute to the leadership which he gave to the Vietnamese people down through the decades when they were being oppressed by the French and by the Americans in turn. I have no doubt that in time the Vietnamese will achieve the national independence which they have so long sought. This is something which, perhaps, we have failed to appreciate fully.

We could equally condemn, as has been done by Deputy Dr. O'Brien in his comments here this afternoon, the reaction of the Department of External Affairs and, more particularly, the Minister's—one must always segregate the permanent staff from the Ministers; they have my sympathy on many occasions——

Comment on this

Which has the Deputy's sympathy?

Comment on this

In relation to Vietnam I would certainly deplore the intervention of the former Minister for External Affairs in preventing an Irish RTE team from going there. In effect, he succeeded for once in literally suppressing an opportunity to obtain the truth in relation to that country. We must equally point out that no matter how humiliating it will be for America —and that humiliation must in many respects be very great—they have no option open to them now but a unilateral cease-fire and a withdrawal in toto from that country. This is a painful operation for America. I do not particularly propose to add to it, but there is an obligation on the part of the Irish Government to make sure that that operation is done as speedily, as effectively and as urgently as we can possibly demand from them.

There are now 40,000 American dead. There are some 300,000 American people wounded or maimed for the rest of their lives as a result of that conflict. America has built up armed forces of some 5,000,000 Americans with all the interdependent facets of militarism, a society in which government is the operative word in almost any activity between any group of people. You have therefore a situation in American in which 50 billion dollars is spent on a war which this Dáil overtly approved of because we had not got the common courage to oppose it when the occasion was presented in this House. I should like to pay tribute to Deputies on my side of the House, such as Deputy O'Leary who raised it on occasions when the backbenchers of Fianna Fáil poured forth a cascade of reaction simply because somebody dared to talk about a withdrawal from Vietnam. Therefore I have the opportunity of paying that tribute to him.

There is also an opportunity open to the Irish Government for a reapproach to the involvement of the Chinese people in the affairs of the world. I know this will be a delicate operation but, now that we have shed the distinguished Deputy Aiken from the affairs of Formosa and Vietnam, now that this is no longer a matter of any great international importance, and particularly to the Americans, I have no doubt that there is an opportunity open to China to make a major contribution in the United Nations. When they get through their current ideological clashes with the Soviet Union, when the border clashes cool off and when Ho Chi Minh departs— and I do not think his continued presence in China in many respects can by and large——

Comment on this
Mr. J. Lenehan

I thought he was gone.

Comment on this

When he departs I have no doubt that there will be a glorious opportunity for the Irish Government to back the entry of China into the United Nations. You cannot have a situation in which 600 million people in that country are debarred from fruitful participation in the United Nations. I do not think we need worry ourselves unduly about Formosa or, indeed, their presence in the Security Council itself. I do not think that is an aspect about which we should be unduly worried.

In his speech this afternoon the Minister congratulated the former Minister on being the general innovator in respect of Ireland being the first member of the United Nations to propose in 1958 a draft resolution in the General Assembly on the prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weapons. I do not want to be unduly partisan but the Deputy sitting next to me and Deputy Aiken, I think, can jointly claim to have been responsible for that and I do not think this remark is amiss or unduly inappropriate in this House — and I include the staff involved on that occasion. These are aspects which are of major importance.

Another area about which one can express concern is the lack of involvement on the part of the Minister, admittedly new to his position, in relation to the Middle East. The Minister stated that as a first step it is urgently necessary that both sides should desist from all provocative acts of any sort. Well, we said that in relation to Vietnam originally. We said it in relation to Nigeria and Biafra. We are now saying it in relation to the Arabs and israelis. I am afraid we will continue on with this kind of pious platitude. There is an opportunity open to the Irish Government to state as must be stated no matter how much it may pain the Israeli Government, that the settlement based on the November, 1967, Resolution involving an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-May, 1967, borders—with UN troops, I would hope, on both sides—certainly is an equitable solution, and it must be brought about with a general recognition of Palestinian rights. Frankly I think there is an opportunity open to the Irish Government to make approaches along the lines of the United Nations Resolution.

Comment on this

If the Deputy will forgive me for interrupting, I said that our policy is well known but what we want now is to stop provocative acts. The things the Deputy mentioned have been published by my predecessor.

Comment on this

In relation to the current Middle East situation I would not regard the Irish Government as having any position. I would regard our statement on the reduction of provocative acts as being a non-comment in the context of foreign policy.

Comment on this

I was assuming the Deputy knew the policy as published by my predecessor.

Comment on this

Deputy Aiken did not publish very much when he was Minister. I think we have to appreciate that there is a serious situation there and that if one takes any area running from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, if one goes from Tel Aviv down to Capetown, one will find there a government that supports the current policy of the Israeli Government. I am afraid there is an obligation——

Comment on this
Mr. J. Lenehan

Hitler did not support them either.

Comment on this

——on the Irish Government to indicate to that government that it should in fact live up to the spirit and the intent of the UN Resolution. This opportunity is open to the Minister in the year ahead in the United Nations. I have no doubt that with the concurrence of the Israeli Government a lasting peace can be brought about.

I must confess that when I hear General Dayan in some of his statements on the general extension of Israeli policy I begin to doubt that, but I have no doubt whatever that President Nasser and Mrs. Meir and many other of the Israeli spokesmen who claim to be socialists—in many respects that is rather ironical—can reach a solution if there is a reduction of provocative action particularly on the part of Israeli. I think this must be stated in this House because, while nobody is under any illusion about the aspirations in that part of the world, nevertheless, at this point of time the balance of advantage does not lie with them.

In relation to the Common Market, the Minister indicated in his speech that the hopes of the applicant countries are now fixed on the summit conference of the EEC member states which is to take place at The Hague on 17th and 18th November, and that this occasion would be of historical significance in relation to EEC developments. It would be appropriate for the Irish Government, if possible, to have top-level representatives present as observers at that summit conference. The Minister would then be in a position to convey to this House a more coherent and informative report on that conference.

There is also a case to be made for consideration by the Government of the revision of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement. We have had the rather amazing spectacle of the British Government deciding to continue the 50 per cent import levy, now reduced to 40 per cent, and no response from the Irish Government apart from the vague expression of regret by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. That is just not good enough. It means another £2 million of the Irish taxpayers' money must subsidise this decision on the part of the British Government. It means a continuation of the alleged breach of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement. There is a good case to be made for a White Paper from the Government on EEC developments related to our trading relations with the United Kingdom. This is overdue, and the Minister could usefully join with the Minister for Industry and Commerce in circulating to Deputies an up-to-date analysis of the position in the Common Market itself.

There exists on all sides of the House a very common desire to ensure that Irish foreign policy is a true reflection of what all Irish people think in relation to foreign policy. Unfortunately, in the Northern Ireland debate the Taoiseach made one of those typical Fianna Fáil—if I may use the term: I have not mentioned "Fianna Fáil" this evening—allusions, namely, that "we are the party of national reunification and the other parties are welcome to join in with us in advancing that policy", again this assumptive concept of their being the repository of all the political wisdom in a nation of over two and a half million people. Now that we have had a breath of fresh air brought into the Department and presuming that the Minister will be resident in Ireland for the greater duration of his tenure of office, I think we can certainly ask him to consider the proposition that there should be established an all-party committee on foreign affairs. While I would be loath to suggest that Deputy Cruise-O'Brien would be his permanent adviser, nevertheless, from all sides of the House, from Fine Gael, from Labour and Fianna Fáil there is to be expected a contribution in depth and in public. I would hope our committees would meet in public, not like the notorious shambles of the Government's committee on health before which I remember appearing, with the former Deputy MacEntee acting very much like Chiang Kai Chek in the Formosan situation; we were banished every ten minutes. One would hope that there would emerge working papers on various aspects of Irish foreign policy with the assistance of the permanent secretariat in the Department of External Affairs. This would be a valuable and useful innovation. I think it can be said that in many respects there is unanimity of attitude among Irish people and this could be expressed more coherently in future.

It is with that in mind that I express some disappointment with the Minister's contribution here, not in any patronising sense. We had references to Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Middle East situation deteriorating, a critical situation in south-east Asia, the Vietnam war dragging on interminably, Communist China continuing to be segregated from the international community, the running sore of South Africa and so on. None of these were dealt with adequately in the Minister's contribution here this afternoon and I would certainly hope to see them elaborated on at greater length in the future.

I can assure the Minister that our criticisms are made in the expectation of the long-awaited evolution in this country of a foreign policy which up to now has been deposited in the files of this country at the United Nations in the personal command almost exclusively of Deputy Aiken from whence he occasionally came to this House to pronounce on various aspects and from which he went again and nobody was one bit the wiser as regards Irish foreign policy.

As the only ex-colonial country in Europe we can, I am convinced, with a greater discussion of foreign affairs in this House, make the kind of contribution we certainly made during the early fifties when we emerged as one of the most highly respected members of the United Nations. I look forward to learning from the supplementary Estimate the extramural activities of the public relation officers employed during the recent Northern Ireland situation. I would have wished this afternoon to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland but in deference to your ruling Sir, I have not done so. Conscious that this House is in urgent need of Parliamentary reform, I certainly hope we shall have an opportunity of discussing it on the next Estimate.

Comment on this

I should like to congratulate the Minister, who is only in office a few months, on his handling of the Northern Ireland situation at the United Nations in the past month. I think few will cavil at or genuinely criticise the way the Government and the Minister carried out a most difficult task in New York and conveyed to the world that we were genuine in this part of the country in our concern for our fellowmen in the north being subjected to absolute persecution.

Things will never be the same again, I am sure, in the Six Counties, that part of Ulster, and thanks to the Miniter's handling of the situation the world has been made aware of the real problem. While many solutions were put forward here for the ending of this misery in the Six Counties, we should not be over-optimistic or naive about the effects this will have. It has been said here that Partition started 300 years ago.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

Discussion on the subject matter of last week's debate would not be in order on this Estimate. We had a two-day debate on this matter previously and already this evening the Chair has deprecated any reference back to it.

Comment on this

With all due respect to the Chair, I submit the Minister, in his brief, said he would not refer to the north, thereby establishing the fact, that if he wanted to, he could refer to it. I thought that would apply to other Deputies in the House.

Comment on this
Denis F. Jones An Leas-Cheann Comhairle Fine Gael

The Chair has repeatedly pointed out this evening that Deputies should refrain from discussing what was the subject matter of last week's debate and should keep to the debate on External Affairs as it is in the Minister's brief.

Comment on this

I bow to the Chair's ruling, but I do not accept it fully.

The Minister in his speech covered more than the Six Counties. Listening to the criticisms of Deputies on the Opposition benches one finds it hard to think they were genuine.

The Labour Party speakers slated the United States as though they were the only country in the world who had interfered in the affairs of another country. We never hear any of them criticise China for the rape of Tibet and for the attempted rape of India; or Russia for the rape of Czechoslovakia. Apparently, if it is American it is bad and if it is Chinese or Russian it is good.

Deputy Desmond referred to a former Member of this House, Mr. MacEntee. I think it should be part of our attitude and conduct here not to criticise former Members of this House. However, I would like to assure Deputy Desmond that if Deputy MacEntee were here he would take the pants off Deputy Desmond in no uncertain fashion.

Reference has been made from all sides of the House to the Nigeria-Biafra conflict. The children of this country, by their penny and shilling collections, have helped to send £420,000 worth of aid to Biafra. If Deputies were to follow the example of the children we would, perhaps, have some more definite action taken to relieve the terrible misery in both Nigeria and Biafra. It is not for us to say whether the powers behind this conflict are the Russian or the British armament maunfacturers, who make money from war, or the American oil companies but the fact is that thousands, if not millions, of human beings are suffering there. Anything we can do to alleviate that suffering should be done. The most effective attitude for us to take is not to ask why they fight but to do what we can to bring about an end to the fighting. There are between 2,500 and 3,000 of our people, lay and missionary, working out there, and in anything we might say about the conflict we should be careful not to jeopardise the lives of our fellow countrymen out there. Recently an Irish nun was killed in an air raid. The Government took up this matter and although it will not bring the nun back it may show that we regard the death of anyone there with grave concern, particularly the death of a lady who went put there simply to carry on the tradition of this country over the centuries of bringing faith and education to these people and showing them that Christianity when practised is the real thing for this life.

Criticism has been made in the past of the amount of money spent on the Department of External Affairs. When one looks at a sum of a little over £1 million one wonders how this Department carries on as well as it does. I should like to see an embassy or consul in every country with which we have any connection. Apart from the many trade benefits we would get, it would also mean we would be better informed of what is happening in every country. We have to realise we are a small country and that our influence is not great; whether we vote one way or the other at the UN it seldom makes much difference. We can show as a people who had to fight for freedom that we are conscious of the sufferings and the needs of the people whether they be in Vietnam, Biafra, Nigeria or the Middle East. I know we cannot end the wars but we can show our goodwill towards these people and in that way play our greatest role in trying to achieve world peace.

The last speaker criticised the recent elections in Portugal. I am always puzzled by the attitude of the Labour Party on this point. Perhaps, next year, an excursion might be made to Russia or China and there they will see a democratic election.

Deputy Aiken, in a very fine speech, stated our attitude towards the admission of Communist China to the UN. I recall ten years ago, when Deputy Aiken voted at the UN for the question of the admission of China to be raised, he was severely criticised here for doing so. The fact that he had done so was used against his Party at a bye-election which took place at the time. It is better to have Communist China in the UN than outside it but we would be unworthy of our past if we were to attempt to vote to admit Communist China and sacrifice the admittance of Formosa. It is like the people of our own history who, on being driven to Connacht were then abandoned because they had not stayed in the main part of the country. We may criticise their leader——

Comment on this

Who is their leader?

Comment on this

The Deputy is an expert, he can answer that.

Comment on this

I do not think they have one. They are all Chinese. There are not any Formosans.

Comment on this

We must never throw over those people who suffered first at the hands of the Japanese and are now suffering at the hands of the Chinese mainland.

This country in its short history at the UN—except for a few lapses in the beginning—has shown that we have an independent attitude and that we value the things that should be valued. We do not shut our eyes to the sins of Russia or China, while we berate the United States. The mother in Nigeria whose child has been slaughtered does not care what make of plane was responsible, whether it was a British plane dropping Russian bombs or a Russian plane with British bombs. That does not matter, the fact is that the child has been killed. We have not a great influence, but by our attitude in the UN and by sending help to the unfortunate people in Africa, we can help to ease the terrible suffering there.

I wish to pay tribute to a body in the city called Africa Concern which has been the main fund-raiser for Biafra, and I hope that the Government will see their way to increase the contribution towards international relief. As a small nation we cannot do very much, but we can show that as a country which suffered at the hands of an imperialistic power we realise what suffering is and perhaps other countries would follow our example. We rank eleventh in the list of contributor countries, but on a per capita basis we are much higher and this is indeed a tribute to our people who are ever generous in a good cause. Perhaps in the coming session of the UN the Minister would make known our disgust at, for example, the Russian treatment of Czechoslovakia. This is something that we must not forget and we must not hesitate to drive it home, that the hypocrisy which is being preached that socialism is synonymous with mercy is altogether wrong.

Comment on this

The election is over.

Comment on this

What election?

Comment on this

The recent general election in which Labour policy was totally distorted.

Comment on this

On Russia?

Comment on this

I was speaking of the attitude of people who suggested to this House that our party had not condemned Russia.

Comment on this

I have not mentioned the Deputy's party. The point is I have appealed to the Government—and I know with the present Minister, Dr. Hillery, there is no need to appeal— for greater help for those in need. This could be our greatest role in international affairs; we are too small to influence people militarily but we can influence them by showing them our genuine desire to help by providing assistance in food and clothing. At the moment nearly all of the food going into Biafra is transported by air. There is one small Irish ship which goes there very frequently and the best thing the Minister could do would be to ensure that this ship could go directly into Port Harcourt so that much more food could be carried.

The fact that we are not allowed to discuss the north has been a disappointment but I must abide by the ruling. In conclusion, I wish to congratulate the Minister on his very fine effort at the United Nations recently. It augurs well for the future of our place in the international sphere.

Comment on this

When the nineteenth Dáil convened on 3rd July last, I complimented the Taoiseach on his appointment of Deputy Hillery as Minister for External Affairs, pointing out that Deputy Hillery, as a medical man, might view the Nigerian conflict with a little more sympathy than his predecessor. However, since 3rd July, we have had absolutely no action whatsoever from the Minister——

Comment on this

I made an appointment with the Deputy and he did not turn up. In the lobby he asked me for an appointment and he did not turn up. He was worried about them. He asked me to meet a delegation and he did not turn up.

Comment on this

In his speech, the Minister stated that the war in Nigeria has gone on for a little more than two years. It has gone on for two and a half years.

Comment on this

What has the Deputy done since then? He asked me for an appointment but he did not turn up.

Comment on this

The Minister has done absolutely nothing in the past two and a half years. During that time there has been tremendous loss of life in Biafra, not due to war wounds or to gun fighting but due almost entirely to starvation. The situation there can be compared with the ancient siege of Jerusalem where mothers and children had to eat rats in the city. I visited Biafra with a team of Irish doctors who went there voluntarily more than a year ago and I saw people eating lizards and selling rats. Despite the massive interest being shown in this tragedy by the Irish people, the Department of External Affairs have done absolutely nothing to alleviate the situation. We may have sent a few hundred pounds, only a drop in the ocean.

Comment on this

£100,000.

Comment on this

It is completely inadequate to make any impact on the situation there.

Comment on this

Will the Deputy tell us how long he spent there?

Comment on this
Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Order.

Comment on this
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick Mr. T.J. Fitzpatrick Fine Gael

(Cavan): There is a lot of cackling from the backbenchers.

Comment on this

The ignorance of the Fianna Fáil backbenchers——

Comment on this

I will deal with the Deputy.

Comment on this

He thinks £100,000 could make the slightest impact on the situation there. There is a procedure in this House and there is no need for the Deputy to show his ignorance here. He will have an opportunity to speak later. If the Deputy wants to speak let him do so.

Comment on this

I know the rules of the House.

Comment on this
Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Deputy Andrews may not admonish the Deputy who is speaking. He should allow him to make his speech without interruption.

Comment on this

It is misrepresentation.

Comment on this

I think Deputy Andrews should not try so hard to follow in his father's footsteps. If I may continue, I would suggest to the Minister that he send a parliamentary delegation out to both sides. I hope the Minister does not take me up wrong. I do not mean to rib him on this. I certainly agree that an appointment was made at one stage. Unfortunately, I became ill and was in hospital afterwards and could not keep the appointment. The situation as it is now is very much more serious than it was when the Minister was appointed Minister for External Affairs of the Irish Government. I would request, in fact I would implore, that you send a delegation to Biafra, that you travel with the delegation——

Comment on this
Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Minister.

Comment on this

Not the Ceann Comhairle.

Comment on this

——and see exactly what the circumstances are like for himself. Referring to last week's Order Paper, when a question was tabled regarding the circumstances under which an Irish nun was killed in Biafra your reply said——

Comment on this
Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Will the Deputy use the third person? The Deputy I take it is addressing the Chair.

Comment on this

The Minister stated that inquiries were made into that. I should very much like to know what the result of those inquiries were, and who the inquiries were made to. Last October we had a visit from a person called Chief Enahoro who represented the Nigerian Government. During the course of his press conference he stated that four Holy Ghost Fathers, the names of whom had been given to him by the Minister for External Affairs, then Deputy Aiken, were running guns into Biafra and that this Government had supplied him with the names of the four Irish priests. This is a dreadful situation.

I suggest the Government try as best they can to send in food and also to provide aircraft for the relief organisations at work there. I know the aircraft can be provided if the Government agree to underwrite the loss of those aircraft and that pilots are more than willing to fly those aircraft into Biafra if they have sufficient life insurance on them. I know also that there are many doctors in the Republic who would willingly give months of their time out there serving in the refugee camps but, unfortunately, there is no permission or no sanction from the Government to do this.

Increasing this contribution to £100,000 is only an insult to anyone who wants to do anything. This sum should be substantially increased. Financial aid, material aid, every effort to underwrite the planes offered and condoning the entry of doctors into the Biafran war zone should be undertaken without delay.

Comment on this

I think that was a maiden speech and I should not have interrupted.

Comment on this

I propose to address myself briefly to what I regard as the most important aspect of our external affairs, that is, the question of our accession to the European Economic Community. I must confess that I am somewhat disappointed that the references to the EEC in this debate were rather fewer than one would have expected. It is opportune for us I think in this Assembly to use an occasion such as this to bring home to the people in the Six and the four applicant countries that we are in earnest about our application and that our lack of interest in it, as evidenced, perhaps, by the sparsity of reference to it, should not be taken as a lack of determination on our part to succeed with our entry. I am not referring to the Minister's speech because a section of it did deal with the EEC.

It is important that we newly elected Deputies in this House, as well as others, should give a lead to public opinion in this matter. It is true that our application for accession to the community was made in the early 1960s and was reactivated later on in 1966 or 1967. It is also true that a debate was held in this House on the 25th July, 1967 and earlier than that in the Seanad but I think we must avail ourselves of every opportunity to lead public opinion on this question of the desirability of accession to the EEC. I am glad of the opportunity to make my first remarks in Dáil Éireann and to place on record that I, speaking in my personal capacity, am thoroughly in favour of and willing to do everything in my power to see that our application succeeds.

It is important for us to try to get the background to this situation clearly in our minds. The background to the European question dates back to the last war when Europeans could still believe that they belonged to an important continent, perhaps, the world's principal continent. This view was an illusion, an illusion which was largely shattered by the war which ended in 1945. Socially and economically Europe was devastated and enfeebled. Politically and militarily Europe was overshadowed by two giants, the USA and the USSR who met symbolically in the centre of Europe in 1945.

The post-war extension of the Communist world, the desire of the USSR to separate from the rest of Europe by what Churchill called in his Fulton speech of 1946 "the Iron Curtain" could be explained away by Stalin's fears, traditional to Russia, fears that his position might be weakened by the attraction of the western democracies apart altogether from his traditional reasons of territorial expansion. The upshot of the situation was that he formed a series of buffer states stretching from the Mediterranean to the Baltic which in turn brought about a reaction resulting in the fall of Czechoslovakia, the formation of the Brussels powers, the Brussels Treaty, the Berlin blockade of 1948 and the formation of NATO.

The European situation divided into two camps and those who now find it convenient, perhaps, to refer to NATO in derogatory terms might do well to remember that at one time we in this country and in other western democracies were very glad of its umbrella of protection. I realise that times have changed but it would be well to recall those facts. The political changes in Europe were brought about by devastation in a kind of war unknown in Europe since The 30 Years War in the 17th century. Seventeen million soliders were killed, 35 million wounded and six million Jews exterminated in what was regarded as the final solution, apart altogether from nine million refugees. The material loss resulting from this war was daunting. Capital investment in roads, bridges and so on was minimal except where they served a military purpose.

Peace did not bring prosperity and it was in this situation that a far-seeing statesman, Marshall, launched his plan. The organisation of this plan, which resulted in the OEEC, was the first practical step towards organisation in Europe. Within Europe the reactions to the war released a force of idealism which Churchill gave voice to when he spoke at the University of Zurich in 1946. I think it important, too, that we should recollect some of these things if only to fan the flame of European idealism which, to some extent, is now dormant in most of the countries of Europe. Churchill said:

If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance there would be no limit to the happiness, the prosperity and glory which its 300 or 400 million people would enjoy. We must create a united states of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living.

At this time in Europe there emerged a divergence between those people on the Continent of Europe who wanted to move towards a federal solution and those Scandinavian and northern countries which preferred a kind of intergovernmental organisation in which assemblies of delegates from national parliaments would meet to discuss matters. The Council of Europe which resulted was too weak to achieve the success that its founders had hoped for, although it did some useful work in such fields as culture, education and human rights with results like the European Cultural Foundation.

By the late 1940s a divergence of views on the achievement of unity in Europe was becoming evident and, unfortunately, whether it was our own fault or not, we were placed in the position of being with the northern Europeans outside the main stream of movements towards European unity. This divergence was later institutionalised in the form of the EEC and the EFTA. The historic pronouncement of Schumann on May 9th, 1950, was a very important step towards European unity. I do not intend to go into the details of that but by pooling the coal and steel resources of the major powers he tried to set up a situation where these powers would not again go to war.

The success of the ECSC and the emergence of the super powers made it seem that only through a pooling of economic resources could Europe regain a position of influence in the world. The success of this scheme led to the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Messina in 1955. This resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

Britain remained outside these various bodies partly because of loyalty to the Common wealth, attachment to her own special relationship with the United States and partly through a sense of peculiar detachment, political and economic as well as geographic from the Continent. Perhaps Britain had not—as the Six had—a faith in her institutions shattered by the experience of war. However, British public opinion in the late 1950s began to indicate a realisation of the mistake of being excluded from the economic advantages of a large trading community and a lack of political interest which resulted therefrom. This was instrumental in the setting up of EFTA which, if not as successful as the EEC, has been more successful than many predicted. Perhaps this was because of the fact that the standard of living at the time in the EFTA countries was higher than that enjoyed by the rest of Europe. Nor does EFTA contain the political objectives inherent in the EEC which successive British Governments came to accept.

As a result of the Irish lining up with Britain and the Scandinavians, the Council of Europe failed to evolve into an integrated community. Our subsequent negotiations on the Maudling Plan were so successful that we succeeded in convincing the other countries that our economy was so weak that we should be given special treatment and if negotiations had succeeded we would have become associate members. We did not participate in the discussions towards EFTA because of the agricultural situation in this country.

The Minister, in his speech, referred to the fact that the coming "summit meeting" which will take place at The Hague on the 17th and 18th November will be a historic moment. It is opportune for us to reflect that this meeting will take place in the very hall in which, in 1948, Churchill, Speak and others met to launch the European idea. In less than three weeks from now the Prime Ministers of France and the other five countries will meet to discuss what line can be taken regarding the present impasse in which Europe finds itself. Beyond the summit meeting there lies the fact that at the end of this year the EEC transitional period will be over. Beyond this point there is no chart by which the ship of Europe can find its way in the future and when we view Europe from this point of time we find that the political tide has ebbed away from Brussels. There are no more signposts to unity of the kind that made the Six compose their differences and there is little left of the will to work together. The EEC bureaucracy continues to turn out proposals. Ministers now come to Brussels more in the spirit of horsetrading than of trying to achieve unity. No one now seems to have the vision of a United Europe that inspired the founding fathers of the Community—Monnet, Schumann and Adenauer.

Three times since July of this year and once more on November the 10th, the Foreign Ministers will have lunched to hear French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, spell out his views. Before the end of this year and before they can talk to Britain, France wants a new and binding agreement from the partners on the financing of the Common farm policy. This means that they want the Five to agree to an open-ended commitment to pay their share of the support and subsidies bill now running at 3,000 million dollars a year. With that in the bag they say that they could work out their plans for the future of the Community and that only then would they be ready for negotiations with Britain.

It might be said that this meeting in three weeks' time is the last chance that the Five will have to refuse the French and squeeze out a date for negotiations from the French Prime Minister. If not, Britain's membership and ours could be postponed indefinitely because the French plans contain a series of traps along the way.

To the French, completing the community means financing the new farm finance package. They conveniently ignore the fact that by the end of the year a new atomic research programme, blocked by the French and Germans, and the right of free settlement throughout the Community for a long list of the professions, should have been completed. They conveniently gloss over the fact that they have been given a two-year moratorium on the common farm policy granted to them because of their recent devaluation—and recent events show that the Germans may receive the same thing. The invidious position here is that the French can say that anyone who refuses to agree to the farm finance commitment will be accused of blocking the application of Britain for membership. If the Five agree, France will then list the things on which they want agreement before the talks begin—agreement on monetary policy, industrial policy, regional policy and social policy. The list can be endless. We can ask what they have done over the 12 years in which the community was in existence? Perhaps we may look at the Dutch to see whether something can be salvaged from this and we hope to see that they will call for an extension of the powers of the European Parliament.

France's partners are, I hope, in no mood to accept dictates in order to arrive at the negotiating table with no guarantee that even then negotiations would succeed.

In view of the magnitude of the problems yet to be resolved after 12 years, we can find only negative integration—the removal of trade barriers and things like that. The achievements of the Common Market to date pale into relative insignificance. The only real step forward towards the federal system has been the common farm policy with its central budget and the decisions taken jointly in Brussels, and even this is in crisis, as we see when we look at the problems about surplus butter and so on. The only long-term solution would be to move from the small, heavily subsidised farms to bigger, economic units. This seems to be running into political difficulties in the European countries although Dr. Mansholt is aware of this and is trying to force the Six to accept his ten-year structural reform plan.

Since the summer the Six have faced a more pressing problem and that is the connection between Bonn finance and monetary policy. The people at Brussels for a long time thought that common farm prices, set in dollars, would make parity changes impossible and that countries would not risk shifting the ratio of agricultural to industrial prices. The French and the Germans have both proved this to be the contrary. When France was forced to devalue she was allowed to break away for two years from the EEC price level. German revaluation may bring about the same problem. It will take two years to phase German and French prices back into line. Monetary union will have to come first, after all. Will the Six accept the modest monetary plan put forward by the Vice-President of the Commission which is a commitment to give one another automatic aid in balance of payment crises? The Six have had short term coordination which has proved insufficient without close and steady coordination of economic policies. Medium-term coordination has been going on for several years. It was not enough to prevent the divergence which made French and German parity changes necessary. We can have no farm policy without a monetary policy and no monetary policy without a coordinated economic policy but this latter means a policy on industrial development, on the supply and price of energy, on the rates and infrastructure of transport and on regional development.

Do we realise the extent to which the Community has lost its impetus? There has been no move on the proposals for housing grants for migrant workers, on tax harmonisation, or on European company law. The countries of Europe have allowed themselves to be driven back from the original idealism to a kind of retrogressive nationalism. Some of the blame for this should lie with the Commission. The new Commission of 14 members under Monsieur Rey has worked out longterm plans for the community.

Each one is going his own way as, for instance, Dr. Mansholt, on agriculture, Von de Groeben on regional development and there is a lack of overall strategy. The governments' interest in the community is declining. The French have been allowed to get away with their devaluation leaving the Commission to find a way to gloss over the rules. The Germans adopted a floating exchange rate and snubbed the Commission by refusing to accept its recommendations. Few are willing to make the sacrifices of going on to a more common policy worked out and decided on in Brussels. The solution might be to extend the transitional deadline at the end of this year but to do so the EEC Commission must take the initiative. Up to the present it seems reluctant to do so. It was true then when the Minister said in his speech that the Common Market were faced with a number of formidable internal problems on some of which at least progress will have to be made before negotiations can start. We would all agree with that.

Coming back to our own situation, can we in this country say we have used the last eight years since our application in 1961 to stir up a truly European feeling in this country? I do not think our country is as European as it could be. This may be due to the fact that we are placed between two large English-speaking groups and most of our news comes to us from the English and American press.

I am sorry the Minister is not here to listen to this point but I think it is time Dáil Éireann took a more systematic and continuing interest in the whole question of our accession to Europe. I would suggest that the time has come to set up a Select Committee of this House, drawn from the various parties, to be helped by the interdepartmental committees of experts which I am sure are working on this question. Such a Select Committee would help to keep all Members of this House in touch from day to day with the changing aspects of Europe's economic and commercial integration. Further, we must pay more attention to the small things that lead to a truly European climate in this country. For example, in the Estimate for Education, to which I will only refer to in passing in this context, for the purpose of running the European Schools Day we vote £800. This is an infinitesimal sum. If we were serious about it I am sure we could increase this money to enable a better job to be done. Have we proceeded with the various taxharmonising procedures necessary? Do we discuss the VAT and other matters? I do not think so. There is much to be done to convince our own people of the desirability of European unity.

I will end with the point I made at the beginning by saying that it is a disappointment to me that so little reference was made in this debate to the European ideal and to the question of European integration.

Comment on this

Níl sé ar intinn agam labhairt i bhfad. Is é seo an chéad uaim domsa ar mo chosa. Bíonn faitíos ar dhaoine áirithe labhairt ar an meastachán seo i nGaeilge. Tá sé ar intinn agam labhairt i nGaeilge mar feicim go bhfuil dlú-bhaint ag an nGaeilge leis an meastachán seo. Ba mhaith liom, ar an gcéad dul síos, a chur in iúl go raibh áthas orm an cainteoir deireanach, an Teachta Risteárd de Búrca, a chloisint. Bhí sé ábalta labhairt ar feadh leath-uair an chlog agus a chuid pointí a chur trasna gan droch-mheas a chaitheamh ar mhuintir na tire seo ná ar rudaí a bhaineas leis an tír seo agus d'éirigh leis sinn a chur ag smaoineamh ar an gcuma ceart.

Presently, Sir, I expect that you may be called upon to remind me that references to the North of Ireland are not appropriate to this Estimate but may I say that I intend confining myself to references made by previous speakers to the situation vis-à-vis the North of Ireland and the United Nations? Perhaps you will allow me to express what might be termed the other side of the story in so far as the Minister's activities there may be interpreted. On the day the Minister returned from the United Nations I went, not as a representative of this House but motivated by the ideas and the ideals that I have, to Dublin Airport to compliment the Minister on my own behalf, for speaking in such an admirable fashion before the United Nations about the situation in the north. What I say will not perhaps stand up to the analysis and the technical dissection which we get of freedom from other speakers in this House; they are as much entitled to their ideas and ideals as I am but I am speaking about mine and I shall cherish them until somebody convinces me that there are better ones. As far as I am concerned Ireland is a 32 County Republic; Ireland is one nation surrounded by the seas. Other people may see is in a different light——

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Including the Taoiseach.

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Including the Taoiseach, and Craig agrees with him.

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Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

Order.

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Presently Deputy L'Estrange can tell us how he sees Ireland. When I say that I see Ireland in that way I am not being so foolish as to say that that is the present position but——

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This is the spiritual idea.

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Yes, and perhaps if the Deputy and his Party were a little more concerned about things of the spirit——

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Oh, we are.

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——and less concerned with material things we might, I suggest, be a better nation.

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Deputy O'Leary will have the opportunity of demonstrating to me how things which are materialistic, and only materialistic, lead to the situation where his party and the Fine Gael Party, and indeed every party in this House, speak of the Ireland of which they dream as being one eulogised——

Comment on this
Edward Collins Mr. E. Collins Fine Gael

On a point of order, Sir, both yourself and the Leas-Cheann Comhairle ruled Deputy Cruise-O'Brien out of order earlier this evening when he began to discuss Northern Ireland. Are you now favouring one side of the House?

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Cormac Breslin An Ceann Comhairle Fianna Fáil

The Deputy is not discussing the North of Ireland.

Comment on this

I am making the point that I am entitled to praise the stand of the Minister for External Affairs, Deputy Dr. Hillery, at the United Nations and to be proud of that stand, as much as other Deputies are entitled to deride it. If I am not in order I shall bow to your direction, Sir, but not to a direction from some Deputy on the other benches who was not here when Deputy Cruise-O'Brien was speaking. I am speaking as one who sees, in the times that lie ahead, this spirit of Ireland as being a very useful factor. Some Deputies seemed to sneer at the situation in which a publication recently referred to British troops being on Irish soil. Was that not a true statement of fact? I am not suggesting that it was desirable, or that in the circumstances it could be regarded as the best that could happen, but as far as the statement itself is concerned it was a true statement of fact. The Minister, Deputy Dr. Hillery, spoke about the feelings of the Irish people and about their not being too anxious to wait in the present circumstances. The Minister, perhaps, is not speaking on behalf of the technical men or the people who will dissect and analyse freedom, but he is certainly speaking on behalf of the majority of the people in Ireland.

I do not pretend to make any capital out of that statement but it is a true statement of fact. There is no doubt that the feeling of the people is that British soldiers are on Irish soil. There is no doubt about that and they were anxious that the Minister should go to the United Nations. Again I am not concerned with the backroom boys of the United Nations. Perhaps Deputy Cruise-O'Brien was experiencing a certain nostalgia and perhaps he had a feeling that he might have been able to handle the position better than those who were handling it; I am not saying whether he could or could not, but he seemed to make little of the attempts that were made. He referred to a phrase used in another context where we were told "Go in and fight and make sure you lose." I should be very unhappy to think that that was the attitude of our Minister. I admit readily that we are not in a position to take, nor do we yearn to take, issue with the British Army, or any other army, but the people of Ireland are not happy with this situation and they will continue to gnaw at the problem until the time is reached when the ideals cherished by the people of Ireland, the ideals expressed by the patriots and soldiers whose busts are in this Chamber, are realised. Only then will we stop talking about it. That does not mean that meanwhile we should not be prepared to understand the problem that exists. I am prepared to listen to any recommendation regarding how we can live in harmony.

Finally, I should say that the purpose of my speaking here tonight was to compliment the Minister for External Affairs. On the one hand, the accusation was made that over the years the Department did nothing. On the other hand, in a situation in which a stand was taken and a statement made, it was inferred at least that it was a foolish and stupid exercise and that from the beginning—or ab initio, as our intellectual friends would say—it was doomed to failure. Now one cannot have it both ways; either we were wise in saying nothing over the years or we are foolish in saying anything now.

I apologise for going beyond my 15 minutes. I hope I have not said anything which would tend to inflame. It is not my desire to inflame any situation. The occasion has presented me with an opportunity of reminding those who need reminding that there are other things in Ireland besides material things. I hope that the Department of External Affairs in dealing with this and other situations will make at least some use of the Irish language and help to keep this distinctive image abroad, an image which will be important not only in the European situation but in the world situation.

Comment on this

The speech by the Minister for External Affairs dwelt more extensively on foreign policy aspects of our external relations than, I think, was the custom of his predecessor. His predecessor, it always seemed to me, seemed to feel that foreign policy was something which was very much a function of government and something which, therefore, it was perhaps unwise to encourage the Dáil to discuss at great length. He confined himself generally to very technical interventions directly related to the Estimate and to the sums of money involved, and in so far as he dealt with foreign policy issues he was very selective in those areas with which he chose to deal. When he came to the Seanad about three years ago, dealing with the question of the EEC, I remarked that in four major speeches he had made in the four preceding years, totalling 20,000 words, he had succeeded in devoting only 58 of them to the European Economic Community. The present Minister spoke at greater length today on many of these issues and his speech was more balanced in that he covered a good deal of ground and did not confine himself to just one particular aspect of our foreign policy. We are grateful for this wider introduction to the debate.

Having said that, I must confess to a little disappointment because he is a new Minister, the first new Minister for External Affairs that we have had for quite a long time, and I would have thought that he would, perhaps, have given us some of his ideas on the function of a foreign policy, the purpose of a foreign policy and how he saw foreign policy, under his direction and guidance, serving this country in the years ahead. Our debates here, partly perhaps because of the encouragement of the former Minister and partly perhaps because of our own defects and our tendency to dwell on detail, have tended too much to keep to the details of particular issues. We did not stand back sufficiently from the whole question and consider what we are at.

What is a foreign policy for? It has two functions which I shall try to develop. First of all, its function is to promote the national interest. In that context we have to consider just how the national interest can be promoted in the external field. Secondly, because we cannot confine ourselves to that somewhat narrow and selfish view, a foreign policy must concern itself with playing a constructive role in world affairs.

What is our national interest? We ought, I think, to give more thought to this. Our national interest involves, in fact, many different strands and one can promote one strand at times at the expense of others. There is a danger, if one has not thought out one's priorities and considered what is most important and urgent, that one will pursue conflicting policies and contradictory policies and policies which may undermine each other. This problem of seeking for priorities in foreign policy did not confront us in the early decades of the State. It was quite clear from the moment the Treaty was signed that the prime purpose of foreign policy under the first Government and under the Government that in due course would succeed it, its successor, would be to seek, first within the Treaty and then by going outside it, complete and full independence for the country which the Treaty made possible for us, or, at least, for the part of the country which had secured limited independence at that time. The efforts of the first two Governments were devoted fairly single-mindedly to this task to the exclusion — not the total exclusion, but the partial exclusion—of other more varied and, perhaps, wider issues of international affairs, although, indeed, they never took a narrow view to the extent of damaging our interest. They concerned themselves with world affairs, recognising that if we performed effectively in the general field of world affairs this would enhance our prestige and increase our prospects of securing full and complete independence.

Although we on the two sides of this House tend to think in terms of different, or even opposite, foreign policies being pursued in the 'Twenties and the 'Thirties, I have a shrewd feeling that inside the Department of External Affairs at that time it did not necessarily appear that way. The first Government worked. as I have said, with in the Treaty and achieved the complete right to sovereign independence in the Statute of Westminster of 1931, but that still left, under the Treaty, various trappings of imperial power which were offensive to our national aspirations, and the second Government proceeded, using the rights which had been secured by the diplomatic efforts of the first Government, to remove those trappings; and a third Government took the official step of declaring a republic in 1949. This was a consistent foreign policy consistently pursued and, while politicians on both sides took different views, I suspect that in the Department of External Affairs they viewed themselves as doing a single task, of going as far as was possible within the Treaty, to which the first Government were in honour committed and, then beyond that, of completing the task by using the powers of independence secured by the first Government to remove the trappings that were objected to, and that was part of their task in the 'Thirties.

A later development of that was the position of neutrality in the Second World War, just when we had almost completed this process of securing not only the reality of independence in 1931 but many of the appearances and forms of independence in the Constitution of 1937: just at that stage, and before the final stage of actually declaring a republic was reached, the Second World War broke out and the energies and efforts of the statesmen of the country, in opposition and in government, during those years were directed towards the task of preserving our neutrality. I am not sure that we understand fully what was at stake at that time and that we always interpret correctly the reasons and motivations of those who pursued that policy. It seems to me that a determining factor in our policy—perhaps it would be well if this were understood outside Ireland as well as within it— was the need to avoid an involvement in the war that would not only endanger this country, but—because I do not think our policy was motivated solely by considerations of cowardice— which would also have threatened our internal unity.

The civil war seems a long away now, certainly to my generation born after it. But, to many people in 1939 the civil war had ended only 16 years previously. Where would that bring us back to? —1953 in terms of the present day. We know how recently 1953 seems to us. There was a fear, I think a valid fear, that the illegal organisation which had erupted into violent activities in Britain immediately before the war, might secure sufficient minority support for an armed attack on the Government here if this Government became involved in the war against Nazi Germany. I think that fear, the fear of reopening the wound of the civil war, of creating further civil strife, which must have motivated very strongly both Government and Opposition in those years, was the real reason that determined our neutrality. I mention this at this point because I have to come back to it later. It seems to me that the accident of our being neutral in the war for reasons that were then very relevant but which are not relevant today, has created a neutrality complex amongst some people, has become, in fact, almost something of a doctrine, even though the neutrality was at the time something accidental and something that was intended for a particular purpose. I think it is important that we should perhaps recognise this and recognise that there is a danger of elevating neutrality to the level of a doctrine when it was a practical expedient to save this country from grave evils at that time. However, that is a matter I shall return to.

Those were the two tasks then of our foreign policy in the first 25 years of the existence of the State: first, the achievement of full independence and the appearance of full independance and, secondly, the preservation of neutrality. Our Ministers in those years were served by an extraordinarily brilliant team who enabled this country to perform extraordinarily effectively in this task, men who served both Governments with total loyalty, men whom Mr. de Valera coming into power in 1932 found loyal to him, found no difficulty in working with, found to be men who although they had served a Government which had had to fight a civil war against his friend, and himself at later stages, nevertheless were people whom he could work with and who worked with him loyally. The names of these men should go down in Irish history because although civil servants are normally anonymous, there were men who played a role which was of great importance to this State—Joe Walsh, Seán Lester, John Dulanty and Seán Murphy. A tribute should be paid to them and that tribute should come from both sides of this House.

I emphasise this for another reason that I will come back to—because the work done by these men and by the Ministers they served in both those Governments showed that this country when it applies its mind to a task of this kind fairly singlemindedly is capable of making a very considerable diplomatic impact.

Any of you who have had occasion to read the book The Restless Domintion which recounts the diplomatic efforts of the first Government in transforming the British Commonwealth— the British Empire as it was when they started the job—will I think appreciate how much can be achieved by such a team. We have a tendency to fall into an inferiority complex condition in which we think of ourselves as very small, very powerless and think that perhaps it is better to stay on our own, away from everyone else, in case the big boys will in some way intimidate us or do us down. The fact is that in those years the first Irish Government worked to bring about a transformation of the Commonwealth and the second Government carried on the task in a different form. The first Government succeeded in transforming the Commonwealth, not of course singlehanded, but took the lead in transforming the British Commonwealth of Nations—and anyone reading that book could not be left in any doubt as to whether that task would have been accomplished in that time but for the presence of the Irish Free State and its Ministers and its distinguished public servants at the council tables of the Imperial conferences of those years. We were the diplomatic leaders of the Commonwealth then, perhaps partly by the accident of history that our first Government were young men who remained in office for ten years before the Government changed in 1932. Towards the end of that period, they were, in fact, the senior Ministers of the Crown, as they were then referred to—an appellation that they were not always happy to receive, especially when it appeared in the press here. They were, in fact, the most experienced Ministers of the entire Commonwealth and this, of course, helped them to carry great weight in the councils of the Commonwealth.

A country, which despite its small size and despite the fact that it was regarded with suspicion by the other members of the Commonwealth when it first came to the conference tables of the Commonwealth, a country which was able to lead such a diplomatic effort, to achieve its objective which it had clear-mindedly set out to achieve, to achieve it by diplomatic skill and by convincing the other members of the Commonwealth to come with it bit by bit, is a country which need not have too much fear about playing its full part in the councils of the world, as we do now in the United Nations or—and this is where I will come back to my theme again later—in the councils of an expanded European Economic Community. I fear we tend to think in terms of joining a Community in which we would be so small, so unimportant that everything would be decided over our heads, whereas in fact in that Community we would play a full part and I think a part disproportionate to our size, to our numbers and to our economic strength.

Let us come back to the question of what a foreign policy is for, and what kind of foreign policy we have in fact in operation. When those two tasks were completed there was no single clear-cut task for Irish foreign policy to achieve and at no stage did the Government, which in 1945 had reached the point of having got through the war and neutrality successfully, sit down and think out what their foreign policy should be in future. I am not aware that the successors of that Government, who have been in power for the last 13 years, have undertaken any such reconsideration of the fundamental basis of our foreign policy since then. Or, perhaps they have, and perhaps in pursuance of what appeared to be the view of Deputy Aiken as Minister for External Affairs, they feel it best to keep such a review locked up in their files and not to let the Irish people know what kind of foreign policy they are up to. If so, I think it is a mistake; I think this is something that we should discuss because in the years since 1945 we have pursued a number of different foreign policies, policies which are mutually conflicting, contradictory, and to some extent, therefore, self-defeating.

I mentioned in the other debate and shall not therefore dwell on it now the pursuit of conflicting policies with respect to Northern Ireland; the "sore thumb" policy of trying to get other countries to force Britain to hand over the north; the good-relations-with-Britain policy of persuading Britain to hand over the north without the north's views being consulted, and the policy of co-operation with the north, trying to secure its consent—three different and conflicting policies. We now have a new variant which is a mixture of Nos. 2 and 3—the federation policy, the failure to express which in clear terms has enabled our friend Mr. Craig to sow confusion temporarily in our midst by suggesting that what the Taoiseach had in mind was a federation of these two islands. I do not think that is what the Taoiseach had in mind. The Minister for External Affairs will no doubt reassure us on this point at the end of the debate.

It is not only in relation to Northern Ireland that we have pursued policies which were at any rate somewhat differently motivated and which were directed towards somewhat different and perhaps conflicting ends. One foreign policy pursued, under the leadership particularly of Mr. Lemass himself as Taoiseach, from about 1959 onwards, was a policy of working towards very close economic relations with Britain. It is a policy which seems to have the support of other members of the Cabinet such as, perhaps, the Minister for Finance, a policy which might also be said to be likely to have the support of that Minister who spoke about the merits of home rule and the disadvantage of independence last year and who is now, perhaps partly as a result, Minister for Transport and Power. That policy of the realist school—"let us face the fact that we are close to Britain and have to be tied up with Britain and there is no way out of it; let us make the most of it "—has, of course, the possibility of producing some immediate economic benefits. It is possible to justify it in the very short term if pursued successfully. If, however, pursued unsuccessfully, as in the totally unbalanced Free Trade Area Agreement, and not in the short term in that instance—because the agreement is one which is supposed to be permanent, one which would apply in the longer term—that it is a policy which carries great dangers for the country, but it has been, not our whole foreign policy, but part of our foreign policy, for the last ten years.

There are other motivations also. We have also been pursuing—and this as a more long-term aim and certainly a more desirable ultimate objective, the policy of securing membership of the European Economic Community—a policy dictated by considerations partly economic and partly political, considerations which I think have never been adequately explained to the Irish people, which have never been put in clear terms. I think this is a task that the present Minister perhaps could usefully perform, starting in the closing stages of this debate. That policy I will come back to. I shall not discuss its justification now because I will come back to it later.

There is another strand in Irish policy and Irish policy thinking and this is something which exists not simply at Government level but amongst our people. There are very close ties of friendship with the United States. We tend, many of us, to think in terms of a degree of friendship with the United States greater perhaps than that which we feel towards Britain or other European countries. This is partly because of the large number of our emigrants in the United States; partly because, when we were seeking our independence, we recieved great help from that country; and partly because, in the period since the last war, the United States has appeared as the champion of freedom against militaristic Communism, particularly in the first ten years after the Second World War. As a country which is deeply anti-Communist, we tended to see the United States, in the post-war period— perhaps less as time goes on—as the champion of our freedom which indeed, it must be said, the United States has been during much of that period. During the period of the Cold War, the United States did deter a Russian attack on Western Europe.

These factors have given our foreign policy a pro-American tinge in certain respects. This may be legitimate up to a point, but it can find itself very much in conflict with other elements in our foreign policy. I have in mind here the profession of our loyalty to the European ideal and our desire to participate in the creation of a Third Force between the Soviet Union and the United States. In that regard, some Irish attitudes to the United States seems a little odd and, indeed, are unfortunately too reminiscent of the "special relationship" attitude of Great Britain to the United States. Here, we have a possible conflict, if pushed too far, with one of the other strands in our foreign policy.

Another—it has been mislaid in recent times but it was an active element at one period: it has never completely dies—is the policy of orientation towards the Third World. This was particularly notable in our foreign policy in the latter part of the 1950's and in the early part of the 1960's. It responds to a rather deep feeling amongst many Irish people that we, who fought the first great battle against colonialism and imperialism in this country, and won it, and gave a lead and example to other countries in other continents, must have a natural sympathy with other countries in the Third World who have fought and may even still be fighting the same battle. This is natural and right. Indeed, I think there is something constructive here, something in this natural sympaty that enables us, and will enable us in the future, to play a useful role, perhaps even a considerable role, in improving relations between different countries in different parts of the world. But it is something that, nevertheless, involves a different orientation from the other orientations, something which could bring us into conflict at one point with the pro-American strand in our policy, with the pro-British strand in our policy or the pro-European strand in our policy. Each of these different strands has its reason, its raison d'étre, its justification, its role to play. But we have never thought them out. We have never sat down and considered which of these should take priority in any given set of circumstances.

What is our main motivation? What is our principal objective? What are we trying to secure through our foreign policy? We have been confused in this matter since we achieved the initial objectives of our foreign policy, that is, the achievement of complete independence politically and, subsequently, the maintenance of neutrality during the war. Since then, these conflicting stands have been woven in and out of our foreign policy, have led to incoherent and patchy self-contradictory—at times. I am afraid, self-defeating policies. There has been a dispersion of effort leading to ineffectiveness and confusion. The reason is that we have not sat down and thought out what is our national interest.

I should like to put forward a tentative definition of that national interest in terms relating to foreign policy. It seems to me that what we are at in our foreign policy, what we are seeking to achieve in our foreign policy, is to give effect to our belief in the value of maintaining the national identity of this country—our belief, which we asserted in arms 50 years ago, that Irish interests are best served by a separate, individual, Irish presence in the world, and not—as the Irish Party believed, in good faith—by sharing in a powerful British presence. We must recall that many Irish people believed, in the years before 1916, that a Home Rule Ireland could have sufficient independence under Home Rule to run its own affairs and could then enjoy the benefits of sharing in the great enterprise, as it appeared at that time to many people, of the British Empire—sharing not only in the jobs but in what many people genuinely saw as the services that that empire, as it was thought in those days—preanti-imperialist days—was conferring on the subject people of the earth. That view was widely held. That view was rejected in this country—rejected at a cost that we no longer have that role in the British Commonwealth —although, indeed, many individual Irish people succeed in continuing to play that role even 50 years after the achievement of Irish independence.

What we felt then was that whatever losses there might be would be compensated by the gain of an independent Irish presence in the world. Why did we feel that? We feel it and felt it then because our culture, our way of life, our standards, our priorities, are different from those of our near neighbour, Britain. Though they may seem to be obscured by the general mishmash of Anglo-American culture which submerges us, I think those differences, if we look deeply enough into the way we live and the way we think—not just the way we talk and the way we sing—are, perhaps, more evident today or more real today even than 50 years ago, because, in that period, Britain has moved in a direction which we have not followed, at any rate not followed at the same pace.

Britain has moved away from the —I shall describe them in these terms, I think fairly: I do not want to be in any way sectarian on the issue— Christian values of this country which are shared even by people in this country who may no longer be practising members of a Church but who share this system of values. Britain has moved away from that and has tried to set up, is working towards, some new post-Christian system of values which, to many of us, does not seem very attractive although many British people believe that their permissive society has some great merit which is, perhaps, obscure to us. As they move in that direction, and as we do not follow, at any rate at the same pace, the cultural differences between ourselves and Britain become profound —far more profound than they were 50 years ago.

I think this belief is there instinctively among us, the belief that we had then different values, different priorities, different standards, a different culture, and that this is still true and, perhaps, even more true today than then. What we want to do is to preserve that difference because it is of value to us, because most of us want to live that way—those who do not want to do so can and do go to Britain —and because these difference have something of value to give to the world. It is not simply something that we want this for our own sake, but it involves something individual and special which we can add to the variety of world culture.

It is, then, this belief that lies behind our determination to retain our national identity and the task of our foreign policy is to ensure that that aim is achieved.

There are other factors, too. I think it is fair to say, speaking as an economist for the moment, that the British economy is so different from ours that, were we to be today a part of the British economy, our interests could scarcely adequately be looked after. No doubt we should get massive subsidies. No doubt the tens of millions secured by Northern Ireland in agricultural subsidies would be two or three times greater for this part of the country. I am quite sure that there are many economic benefits to be derived from being in the United Kingdom but that does not mean that our interests would really be looked after. It is one thing to be given a dole; it is another thing to be allowed to live in circumstances of self-respect in the knowledge that one is earning one's living and has the feeling of doing so.

I think that national independence has an economic justification as well as a cultural one. I think this is relevant to the question of our foreign policy— to the form it should take and towards what particular ends it should be directed. In speaking of the different elements that go to make up our orientation towards an independence Irish nation I have spoken in terms largely related to Britain and, indeed, this is something which only struck me when I had written down my thoughts in a few notes before this debate. The fact is that our policy of 700 years, perhaps, that is an exaggeration but at any rate of 300 years or so, the policy of trying to secure political independence of Britain, is one a projection of which in modern conditions we still should be and are partially pursuing. The fact is that our geographical and historical relationships with Britain are so close that when an Irishman asserts the identity of this country he is making an assertion not only of an absolute kind in its own right but also of a relative kind because he is asserting this identity not just against the world as a whole but also against Britain. It is still in large measure Britain which threatens. I use the word "threaten" not in any bad sense but it is Britain which is the threat to our national identity. The threat comes in fact from British cultural values, British economic power, British agricultural policies and they must be stressed too, because they are a vital element in our whole economic position. They are vital to our foreign policy. Therefore, it is, in fact, these elements of our relationship with Britain which are crucial. In asserting our independence, in asserting that we want to run our own affairs and in orientating our foreign policy to achieve these ends we are orientating it or should be orientating it, necessarily in the direction of Britain, not in being anti-British in any old fashioned sense—and indeed, there should be no feeling of hostility to Britain in this country today—but towards Britain because it is an objective fact that the economic relationship between Ireland and Britain today is one of very great dependence of this country on another country.

In fact, some years ago I read in an economic journal an analysis of the economic relationship between different countries in the world and it was stated there—and it had the mark of a very authoritative article by a man who seemed to know a lot about it— that there was only one relationship in the world between two countries, not even independent countries, which at that time, was closer and involved a greater dependence than that between Ireland and Britain and that was the relationship between Britain and Mauritius of all places. The trade relationship there was more intense. Mauritian trade was even more dominated by Britain than Irish trade is dominated by Britain. Apart from that single example there are no two countries in the world with a closer economic relationship than ours with Britain. There is no country which is more dependent on another country than we are on Britain economically. That is a vital factor to be taken into account by any country seeking to retain its identity and its economic and political independence. Therefore, our foreign policy has to be orientated towards Britain, has to be orientated towards the problems posed for us by the existence of Britain, by the shape and form of the British economy, by the size of British economic power, by the similarity of language, by all these factors and our foreign policy has to be designed to face this situation. It is an objective situation and one for which the British are not responsible; it is not their fault that they exist and that they happen to be beside us. I am sure there were many times in the past when they wished they were not, but though we need not blame them the fact is that they do pose a problem for us and our foreign policy has to be related to that point. I have emphasised that there should be nothing anti-British in our thinking. That would be disastrous. It simply means recognising that the revolutionary struggle of 1916 to 1921 and the diplomatic struggle of the years after 1921, although each successful within its own limits, did not complete the task. Complete political independence of Britain is not enough if we remain, as we remain, economically dependent on her to the extent that we do. We have to accept the fact that however generous or enlightened Britain may be—and, indeed, there were many countries which were more oppressed politically in the colonial period or economically thereafter—to be so dependent on one country is a serious defect and a serious undermining of the true independence of a country like ours.

I shall give one simple example of how it affects us and I have been struck by the extent to which people accept this as a matter of course. We have been told frequently—and I do not know that I can demur from this argument—that we cannot join the EEC alone but only when Britain does. This is probably a sound economic statement, certainly unless we got quite extraordinary generous terms from the EEC entitling us to derogate from the common external tariff in order to permit extensive imports of British goods free of that duty, which is highly improbable, membership of the EEC would, because of reversing the preferential relationship which we have with Britain in trade, totally disrupt our economy and plunge us for a period in poverty. There are those, perhaps, who argue that we should take that risk but they do not constitute the majority of the Irish people who do know and care which side their bread is buttered on. Therefore, although we have a political right to join the EEC—and if we did so there is nothing that Britain could do to stop us in the sense of any kind of legal power or even the power of duress by arms—we know that if we did so its effect would be for us so disastrous that we are not prepared to do it. That is what I mean by economic dependence.

Here is an opportunity for us to join a community whose agricultural policies would be as favourable towards us as British agricultural policy is unfavourable, and it is hard to put that any stronger—a community within which the institutional structure protects the weak from the strong, a community which to me at least though, perhaps, not to everybody in this House, has great attractions. And yet though I believe it has great attractions I am not free to press that we should join it now. Why not? Because, although we won our political independence in 1921 to a large degree and brought it to fruition in 1931 and gave it formal status in 1949, nevertheless, we are not independent economically. We are not free to exercise the rights which we have got, and what use is political independence if, in fact, one cannot exercise the rights it gives one? I do not want to dismiss political independence as of no value; indeed, the whole tenor and purpose of my speech is its immense importance to us vis-á-vis Britain in view of our historical and geographical relationship. Nevertheless, without economic independence it is of limited value and that is why I feel that our foreign policy should be directed primarily towards this issue, towards freeing Ireland of its economic dependence on Britain.

There is a dilemma here because we have another objective of our foreign policy, another objective of our national interest which we discussed here last week. We want to reunite this country. It must be recognised as a fact that the further we move away from Britain, which may be in the economic and cultural interest of this part of the country, the more difficult this task of reunion becomes. That is a genuine dilemma. It is not a dilemma which disappears if you stop thinking about it. It is a genuine dilemma. When you have such a dilemma you must have priorities. You can, of course, avoid the dilemma by not looking at it and hoping it will disappear. We, of course, can go on indefinitely pursuing conflicting policies without ever consciously deciding which is more important but, in fact, no matter how we try to do so, no matter how we try to cod ourselves that we are not giving a priority to one rather than the other, in practice the things we do will represent a choice of priorities.

If a given course of action is likely on the one hand to secure the continuing cultural identity and the separate existence of this part of the country, and on the other hand, perhaps, to make a little more difficult the ending of Partition, I think the long-term interests of this country rest above all with retaining our identity, even if this means postponing the ending of Partition a little longer. I may be wrong in that. Others in this House may feel that the priority should be different, that in those circumstances we should be prepared for a much closer link with Britain, prepared to give up the struggle for true independence because we might bring nearer the day of political unity. That may be a valid point of view and, perhaps, they may consider that that is a more patriotic viewpoint. It is not mine.

The point I want to make is that in our foreign policy we are faced continually with dilemmas and choices. When faced with them, you may avoid them by not consciously taking a decision, by not giving priority to one rather than another, but the facts of the situation force you to take decisions. Even not taking a decision is in fact a decision in these circumstances. One does in fact set priorities and make choices and one develops a system of priorities in foreign policy without knowing one is doing it. This is a mistake. It is better that we should be clear on what we are doing. We should be conscious of the kind of policies we are evolving rather than letting them happen when we are not looking that way.

There is a conflict here and it is one that has emerged in the last few days because of the rather dramatic form of Mr. Craig's clever misunderstanding of the Taoiseach's speech and one to which I think it is proper to refer at this stage. I believe—others may disagree and if they do they are as good Irishmen as I am; I am not challenging that—that there is no future in giving up any part of our independence for the sake of unity because if you give up independence you may never get it back, whereas unity will come in time. The aim of securing economic as well as political independence must, if there is a clash, take priority over the ending of Partition and not be subordinated to the aim of reunification. I do not wish to make any dogmatic suggestions that this is the only view that can be held. All I say is that in practice you must come down on one side or the other even if you like to pretend you are not making such a choice in your thinking or your action.

How can I state, in the light of what I have been saying, the aims of foreign policies because so far I have been speaking largely negatively in regard to what is wrong with our foreign policy. I shall now try to put forward some ideas as to what should be the aims of foreign policy in some kind of order. Logically, the first aim of foreign policy, the most important by its very nature but not necessary the one that will take up most of our time, is the preservation of peace. All we have and all our future depends on that. If at any moment there is something we can do that would contribute significantly to the preservation of peace, that action is more important, if we can contribute, than anything else we can do because if peace breaks down, if the world moves into war under present conditions, all else is futile and this country in those circumstances would no longer exist. That is, therefore, the first priority.

The second priority is the one about which I have been speaking, to seek to complete the task of securing economic independence from Britain by eliminating the exploitation of this country by British policy which is the crucial feature holding back the development, for example, of Irish agriculture today. Perhaps I should have said that it is one of the two crucial factors, the other being the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries.

The third aim, turning from the negative to the positive, is to create the conditions in our international relationships most favourable to the advancement of our economy, especially our rural economy, and I emphasise that point. As a consequence of that and flowing from it, we should create conditions which would secure the maintenance of people in Ireland with a separate cultural and prevent that culture from being swamped from outside. Some people may say that is the most important thing of all, but it is not, because if you do not preserve peace in the world, there will be no culture here. There is some sense in the order of priorities I am suggesting.

Next—I put it next but I should like to hear the views of others on this —we should seek to secure the voluntary reunification of Ireland. I regard this as useless without the other three. I see no value in a reunited Ireland, in fact, if it will not be in some way culturally different and economically independent and have some life of its own. There would be no point in it: we might as well as back in the United Kingdom. So, logically, I think this must come fourth.

Finally, because all I have mentioned so far are matters ultimately of selfinterest, we should try to make the maximum contribution to the world we live in.

I put those forward as some suggestions for guiding principles for foreign policy. They may seem, at this point in my remarks, to be unexceptional aphorisms. I do not believe that is so. I see them as principle which, when you examine our existing policies against them, show up some of our policies as being wrong and misguided and against our interest and which, if you apply them positively, lead you to a specific foreign policy and one which I think we should pursue wholeheartedly.

First, let us examine our present policies against the background of these principles. There has been the policy of closer links with Britain, taking the particular form of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. To may mind, in the light of the principles I have laid down, that is a move in the wrong direction, only dubiously justifiable as an interim measure pending participation in EEC. It is only justifiable as an interim measure if one were sure that one was going to be in the EEC and only if the agreement were well negotiated on equitable terms, and provided a reasonable balance of interest between the two partners to it, which, as I have shown previously in the other House and elsewhere, it did not do.

That is not the only way in which we have been moving towards Britain in a manner in which I think is unnecessary and undesirable. I have been struck in my four years in the others House by the number of measures coming up there from the Dáil harmonising us more closely with Britain. I recall an occasion when the Minister for Justice arrived in with a Bill for standard time and he informed the Seanad, very solemnly, that this was necessary because every country in Western Europe now had the same time and we could not be exceptions. I raised with him the question of Italy in which, in fact—I may have mentioned this in this House already—they have introduced double summer time for the past couple of years, from and to dates which are totally different from the normal dates at which time changes in Europe. The Minister was unaware of this fact. He remarked, giving himself away somewhat, that it was not in his brief. I suggested that the debate be adjourned for a week while he obtained a better brief. It was in fact adjourned though, perhaps, partly for a slightly different reason. I am a student of railway timetables in my spare time and it was the study of these that alerted me to the existence of double summer time in Italy. I am a student not only of current timetables but also of old timetables and I have a timetable of which I was given a present by a good friend last year, a reprint of the April, 1910 Bradshaw. I commend it to the House. The tables there about the Irish railways are a revelation and I have spent many happy hours browsing through them. What struck me most was that at that time when this country was part of the United Kingdom, crushed under British rule, the boats between Dún Laoghaire and Holyhead suffered from a slight complications. There was a difference of 25 minutes in the time between the two countries. Although we were one country legally we had different time in Ireland. It is only with independence that we abolished our own time. This is just an illustration of how we can thoughtlessly assume that it is necessary to harmonise everything.

I know I shall find myself speaking in this House in the years ahead in favour of harmonising many things, in the context of European policy. I am convinced there must be harmonisation of many policies for very good reasons but I am equally convinced that there is no point in harmonising where there is not good reason. Harmonising our time with Britain, harmonising our 10s piece and abolishing the 10s note with Britain and harmonising by getting rid of our half-crowns with the Britain and harmonising our £ with the British £, instead of having our own which would have suited us and would have avoided the mistake that Britain made in its currency decimalisation—these are all things we do not have to do. But I fear we have got into, or at least the Government have got into a mentality that when anything like this comes up we find out exactly what the British are doing, and copy it even to the number of sides on the 10s piece, virtually.

This is the negation of a national policy and is certainly a negation of any kind of foreign policy. We should think twice about it. I know I shall be challenged in this House in the years to come: people will say: "You are favouring the harmonisation of social policy, the harmonisation of cartel policy" and there are many policies I would be in favour of harmonising when that is to the benefit of this country. What I am against is harmonising things that do not have to be harmonised, the diversity of which, in fact, helps to establish our identity and keep us conscious of the fact that we are a different country. There are so many things we do not have to harmonise; let us keep different the things we do not have to harmonise. I would appeal to the Minister to bear that in mind as a principle of Government policy in the years ahead. So much for that.

Let us take another aspect of our foreign policy which I have mentioned already, our orientation towards the United States. It seems to me that this orientation ignores the common interest we have with the rest of Europe in the preservation of the cultural values of Europe which, as we all know, are in danger of being over-run from the culturally and much more powerful if much less diverse United States. I also think that this US orientation ignores our common interests with the rest of Europe in maintaining Europe free from economic dominance by the United States an element in the European economy which has worried many people and about which a famous book has been written in the past couple of years by Jean Servan-Schreiber, Le Défi American.

I think our interests lie with Europe rather than with America. Others may disagree but I think this tendency to orientate ourselves towards the United States is not necessarily in our interest, although the United States has performed in the immediate post-war years a most valiant role for which we shall always have to be grateful. Nevertheless, her interests and ours in Europe are different. The kind of foreign policy I have in mind, which is concerned with preserving our interest, is one which would not be served by continueing or expanding this American orientation.

There is then the "third world" strand in our foreign policy in which I see great merit, but there is a danger that, if pursued too far and too exclusively, it could obscure our common interest with the other countries of Europe and could cut across, if pursued too exclusively, our interests as they should be pursued through our foreign policy. I believe—and I shall come back to this later—that our contribution can best be made by bringing Europe and the third world together, by being, if you like, the third world's agent within Europe, within the fold, by putting the view of the third world to which we more than any other country in Europe can be sensitive because of our history of a struggle against colonial oppression.

How can we reconcile these conflicting interests? How can we produce a foreign policy that will, instead of following these different orientations which in varying ways cut across our true interest, serve our interests? Let me take in turn each of the five points I made. Let us consider how these can best be implemented. The preservation of peace is the first point. I think that in Europe we have a role to play here as we have, indeed, in the wider sphere of the United Nations. We have a role to play in Europe. We are, after all, of Western Europe. Nobody doubts that our heart lies with Western Europe against the, in varying degree, tyrannous regimes of Eastern Europe. Yet, at the same time, we are not a member of NATO. We have pursued, at some points in our diplomatic career, fairly independent policies. Therefore we have earned some respect, even if some of it has been dissipated latterly.

I should have thought, therefore, that in seeking to preserve peace we can play a role within Europe, seeking to achieve a détente in Europe, working as I am sure the Department under the present and the previous Minister have been doing through the United Nations, working towards a European détente in collaboration, perhaps, with some of the countries in Eastern Europe which have a common interest, like Poland with whom I believe we have good informal diplomatic relations in the United Nations. We could perhaps bring some of this United Nations effort into Europe and perhaps work, as I said in this House previously, towards a détente in Europe and do some of that work in Europe.

In seeking to preserve peace we should also be alive to the desirability of building up in Europe some kind of third power as a buffer between these two super powers, not a third power of the same kind, not an attempt to duplicate them, not an attempt to have another atomic power, but some kind of fairly solid buffer capable of looking after itself to a large degree and therefore not dependent upon the assistance of one side or the other but able to take an independent line in the cold war and therefore able, perhaps, to calm down the cold war. In fact, the cold war was fought in Europe because of the weakness and the divided state of Europe. If Europe could be strong and united ultimately through a détente between East and West, the cold war, if it were fought at all, would have to be fought somewhere other than in our territory.

It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to achieve the first aim of our foreign policy, the preservation of peace, while we have been working in the United Nations towards this end— and the Minister has given us some details of the work they have done there and some of the results that are coming from it and he and his predecessor can be congratulated on that work—we should not confine our efforts to the United Nations. We have a particular role to play in Europe because we belong to Western Europe and are not involved in the military alliance of the Western European countries. Therefore, we can be more of an honest broker, as Finland is on the other side of Europe.

That is why in July in this House I asked a series of questions seeking to elicit from the Minister information as to what response we had given to various diplomatic moves by Finland and Italy in seeking to secure a déterte in Europe. I did this because I feel this country has a role to play in Europe and not just in the United Nations. I must say I was disappointed at the response. I was, indeed, even surprised at the response because the response I got was that there was no diplomatic move by Italy. It transpired—I forget what word was used—that there was some semantic confussion, or at least so we were told, and that, in fact, because we had not had a letter from the Italian Government—they had merely made a speech which was published in the newspapers—we therefore had no formal knowledge of their move and it would not be polite of us to actually go and talk to them about it.

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The Deputy's memory is deceiving him.

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I am giving a very free interpretation.

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A very free interpretation of a supplementary interjection by the Taoiseach. The answer to the question was full and adequate.

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I am sure the Minister would not have given an answer which he did not believe to be accurate. I did not find it so, but such divergences of views are common between the two sides of the House. I shall not press that any further.

It seems to me that we should be pursuing a more active role in Europe because we could, perhaps, do something which other countries would not find it so easy to do. I am not entirely happy at being told by the Minister or his predecessor that it is all going on in the United Nations and we are playing our part there. I think—and I say this with deference not only to the former Minister but also to my fellow shadow Minister—that we tend at times to become unduly dominate by the United Nations. In fact, if there is one thing which the former Minister and my fellow shadow Minister have in common, as is evident from their speeches, it is this United Nations orientation. They both share this interesting concentration on the United Nations and this great distaste for talking about Europe, to which I do not recall my fellow shadow Minister making many references. This is something they have in common. I mention this because at times in the dialogue between them it might not be so clear that they have much in common.

So much then for the first aim of our foreign policy as I suggest it should be. The second is to try to complete the task of securing economic independence from Britain and, in particular, to eliminate the situation we are in of exploitation of our agriculture by Britain through her cheap food policy. How can this be achieved? There are two ways of achieving it. We can "join 'em" or "beat 'em". We can join then by rejoining the United Kingdom and getting the benefit of the subsidies and getting inside their scheme of things. This, clearly, I do not advocate and I hope no one else does in this House.

How else can one prevent this kind of exploitations? There is only one way that I know of—and, if anyone in this House has any other idea. I should be glad to hear it—and that is by encouraging the British to join, with us, some organisation whose laws do not permit the exploitation of the weak by the strong, an organisation with institutions strong enough and determined enough to prevent even a power as great as Britain from exploiting even a country as weak as Ireland. For that reason again I think our policy should be European orientated.

There is only one way in which this country will become free of British exploitation in this form and that is, as we have not the power to enforce it on Britain nor the will to rejoin Britain in the United Kingdom, by joining with them in the European Economic Community where we shall certainly lose some of our sovereignty—sovereignty which we have no effective power to exercise—but where Britain will also lose the sovereignty she exercises at our expense, and that will be the great gain to this country through Britain and ourselves joining the European Economic Community.

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