Apologies have been received from Deputy John Clendennen.

This is our first session of pre-legislative scrutiny of the general scheme of the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill 2025. The committee has previously agreed to undertake pre-legislative scrutiny of the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill 2025. The Government has indicated that this will be the first of two Bills in this area. The Bill before us focuses on planning, permitting and consent matters, while a second Bill will address operational matters relating to the reserve.

Over the course of our next two meetings, comprising four sessions, the committee will engage with a range of stakeholders and interested parties. The purpose of today’s session is to engage with officials from the Department of Climate, Energy and the Environment. At the next session, we will meet with representatives from An Taisce.

I welcome the following officials from the Department: Mr. Matt Collins, assistant secretary general; Ms Cristina Hurson, assistant principal officer; and Mr. Adam Houlihan, administrative officer. They are all very welcome.

I would like to remind all those in attendance to ensure their phones are on silent mode or switched off. I will now just give a note on privilege. Witnesses and members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable, or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

In regard to the format of this session, I will invite the witnesses to make an opening statement to a maximum of five minutes. Once it has been delivered, I will then call on the members of the committee, in the order they indicate to me, to put their questions. Non-members will be called at the end of that. The committee operates a rota system, which provides each member with an initial five minutes to engage with witnesses, as normal. As those five minutes are for both questions and answers, it is essential for members to put their questions succinctly and for witnesses to be succinct in their responses. Please note the duration of the meeting is limited and, therefore, times must be strictly adhered to. We have a second session afterwards, so I ask everybody to be focused on their contributions.

I invite Mr. Collins to give his opening statement.

I thank the committee for the invitation to this meeting on the pre-legislative scrutiny of the general scheme on the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill 2025.

The Department’s role, as the committee is aware, is to support the realisation of Ireland’s long-term objective of creating a climate-neutral, sustainable and economically prosperous Ireland by collaboratively delivering policies and programmes to empower people, communities and businesses to continue the transition to a better quality of life for our current and future generations.

In March 2025, the Government approved a State-led strategic gas emergency reserve. This is critical to securing Ireland’s energy systems as we continue to transition to indigenous, clean, renewable energy. Crucially, the strategic gas emergency reserve will also ensure Ireland’s compliance with EU standards and regulations. A strategic gas emergency reserve is a State-owned gas storage facility that will provide the resilience required to support our energy transition. This State-led strategic reserve will store liquefied natural gas, LNG, for use only in the event of a disruption to gas supplies to protect Ireland’s citizens, economy and reputation from the possibility of energy curtailments. It is not intended for commercial use and will not act as a new entry point for gas into the system. The final design will be scoped to provide sufficient supply to protect household and business customers in the event of a major disruption to subsea gas pipelines. Gas Networks Ireland, GNI, will ensure appropriate contractual arrangements are in place to refill the floating storage and regasification unit, FSRU, throughout an emergency situation to provide consistent gas supplies via the FSRU for the duration required.

The introduction of bespoke legislation was agreed following advice from the Attorney General’s office to reduce the uncertainty of the timelines for planning decisions to facilitate the request from Government to expedite delivery of the project. The required development consent options for accelerated delivery of the project have been given consideration. The ongoing phased commencement of the Planning and Development Act 2024, at this time, prevents the project benefiting from the required expedited decision timeframe to deliver this project. The conventional planning route under the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended, has been fully considered and it is proposed to disapply it, given the need for an expedited decision timeframe necessary to deliver this project. The legislation will allow for the next stage of development of the strategic gas emergency reserve. It is intended to submit the consent application by the end of 2026 to achieve an accelerated project delivery timeline. It is intended also to bring forward a memo to Government later this year requesting permission to draft the strategic gas emergency reserve (operational) Bill to provide for the operation of the strategic gas emergency reserve. This will be the substantive Bill setting out the operation, use and cost of the reserve and will deal with policy matters previously raised by committee members.

This is a relatively short Bill, with 29 heads in total, and is largely technical in nature. Some of the main elements of the Bill include the following. It provides for a direct application process for permission for this designated development to be carried out, with specified timelines for each stage of the process. The designated development encompasses the installation and operation of the floating storage and regasification unit, jetty, associated onshore facilities, pipeline, site development, and all works ancillary to the development.

The application will be made by Gas Networks Ireland to the Minister. On receipt of an application, the Minister will direct An Coimisiún Pleanála to carry out an environmental impact assessment and appropriate assessment, where applicable, with An Coimisiún Pleanála to provide conclusions on these assessments to the Minister in response within a specified period. Notice of an application is required to be published in advance of an application being lodged, with a specified period during which submissions or observations on the application for designated development may be made. The legislation is taking a single consent approach in lieu of separate applications for planning permission, maritime area consent and pipeline consent, as well as for an application for a compulsory purchase order to be considered alongside it, should it be required. Once the Minister has considered the application, a decision in respect of the application and a decision to approve or reject the application will issue, accompanied by any conditions that may be determined as necessary based on the information provided.

This legislation is taking a balanced and measured approach to expediting a consenting pathway for this specific project, while retaining key aspects of planning and EU environment legislation, and reflects the Government’s policy set out in the Accelerating Infrastructure Report and Action Plan. The accelerated timeline relates to the Government’s desire to mitigate the major consequences for our society and our economy that would arise from the realisation of this risk.

I thank the members. My colleagues Ms Hurson and Mr. Houlihan and I are very happy to take questions.

I thank Mr. Collins. We will strictly enforce five minutes across the board because we have a second session. I ask members to work with me to keep to the times.

I see from the heads of the Bill that it is urgent and compelling, and it is being done as soon as practicable. There is a huge urgency and a great rush to deal with this as soon as possible. Is that right?

Yes.

The Communities & Environmental Protection Alliance, CEPA, review, however, was carried out over three years ago now. I think Mr. Collins would accept that the emphasis there was that consumers must have confidence in the transition to net zero, that there must be a pathway to decarbonisation and that we must maintain security of the energy supply. He also referred to reputational damage to the country if all of those are not in place. He accepts that is the case. I think we would accept that we are way behind on the climate targets, climate action plan and carbon budgets. In advance of further legislation to be introduced, would Mr. Collins give us an update in writing as to where we are in regard to compliance with those? We do not have time to get into it today. I think it is accepted that we are not quite there. One Minister even said as regards offshore wind that the country has been sitting on its hands and navel-gazing over recent years.

Just to be clear, the Deputy has requested us to supply a note to the committee on the current position on climate targets.

Yes, on climate targets, the climate action plan and carbon budgets.

We are happy to do that.

On the heads of the Bill, is there anything in the EU climate architecture and legal framework that allows an exemption for something like this as regards emissions targets from an LNG project?

There is a possibility for an exemption, yes, for an emergency facility.

Where is that?

Within the environmental impact assessment, EIA, directives.

Will the officials include that with the update to the committee?

Of course.

Has the Department assessed the legal risk of any EU infringement proceedings as regards the habitats directive and transnational boundaries in preparing this Bill?

Mr. Houlihan will fill the Deputy in, but I think we are proposing to incorporate all necessary elements that are required under European law in the legislation so that it will be compatible with European legislation.

Has that been assessed already, before presenting the heads of the Bill?

We have decided to incorporate the European elements as needed. By doing that, we will meet the new requirements.

Maybe just to clarify, when the Deputy asks about European requirements, we are currently in breach of a regulation, the N -1 standard, which is the ability to meet peak day gas demand in the event of significant disruptions to supply to our main pipeline coming in. That is one we are currently in breach of and we are working to address it in our compliance. That is critical, as well as addressing the risk we are mitigating. In terms of the assessment of the EIA directives, that is what this legislation is trying to do. We are trying to keep the best practice elements of sustainable development and we will direct an coimisiún to carry out the appropriate assessments. We are at drafting stage now. We have not specifically set out the provisions required.

Ms Hurson is talking about the environmental impact assessments. Will there be an EIA of the whole project? I know the Department is proposing to do it in bits and pieces. Will it be done on the overall project also?

I thank the Deputy for letting me clarify that point. Yes, it is the entire project. We are defining the specifics of the development consent set out in the heads of the Bill but the draft heads, which the committee has, set out the intention, namely, that it is both the FSRU, the ancillary works required, the jetty and the pipeline.

The heads are simply stating that it is giving the Minister the power to say that it is in line with the climate Act, just because he says so. Is that it?

It is a matter for the Oireachtas because it will be a piece of legislation. One of the principles behind the assessment that CEPA did and the studies the Department did was to be aligned with our climate objectives. That is why it is not going to be a commercial operation. It is only used in an emergency where gas supply has been interrupted. It is only meeting existing demand; it is not meant to be a new input point into the Irish gas system.

The Minister is given the power also in the sense that the applications are going into the Minister, whoever that may be at the time but let us presume it is Deputy Darragh O'Brien, and he will be able to make all the decisions on it. I met a nun from the Presentation convent in Tralee at the weekend, Sr. Maureen, who said it seems very strange to her given that the Minister is hardly going to make a decision to the contrary or refuse it. Is this not in effect a rubber-stamping exercise by the Minister?

There will be a process that the Minister has to go through with specific timeframes. He will have to apply the European legislation, environmental impact assessment and appropriate assessment process. They will be carried out by An Coimisiún Pleanála. Taking on board those positions, the Minister will make a draft recommendation and then there will be a public consultation process and notification as well.

Going back to the N -1 standard, it is a safety standard, as I understand it. It is not a requirement, in my view, to build LNG. A number of other measures could be brought into effect to meet that standard and that should not override the climate obligation under the climate Act.

To clarify, N -1 is a supply standard. The regulation states that in the event of a significant disruption, we must be able to meet peak day demand if there is significant curtailment to that. That is the standard I was referring to.

Will the officials outline what happens at the moment if there is an interruption to gas supply to a power plant?

Is this if there was an interruption and an N -1 event was to occur?

Yes.

There is a process for order of demand reduction set out in the natural gas emergency plan, which takes off gas users based on the largest gas users first and works down until gas demand is balanced versus supply.

Would I be correct in saying the turbines can run on gas oil, diesel or kerosene?

There is a secondary fuelling obligation that allows for running of the power plants for three to five days, I think, at present, but the particular risk we are trying to mitigate is of a prolonged gas outage of up to six months, where that would not necessarily be sufficient to meet demand.

What licence conditions do Irish gas power plant operators have in terms of using secondary fuel?

Could the Senator repeat that, please?

What licence conditions do Irish gas power plant operators have to use secondary fuel, such as kerosene or gas oil?

As I understand, the requirement is to have three to five days' supply of distillate available.

Is that three to five days for open or closed cycle? Is it five days for closed?

I would have to come back to the Senator on that.

Okay. How much fuel or kerosene is stored in the State's emergency reserves that would be capable of being used as a secondary fuel at gas-fired plants?

I think 90 days' oil supply is the current requirement under National Oil Reserves Agency, NORA, legislation.

Okay. Why did the Department ask CEPA to disregard secondary fuel use as part of the energy security analysis? Why was this changed, given that it was included in the analysis in CEPA's previous version?

There are two separate pieces. CEPA produced and published its updated analysis last year.

We asked it to look at the current requirements for renewable penetration into the system with additional interconnectors and technologies into the 2030s and 2040s using the best available data. In doing so, in terms of what would be considered for the N -1 standard, there are certain matters that cannot be taken into account when calculating whether that standard is met. The recommendation of the report used to inform the recommendation to the Government to proceed with this is that, as Mr. Houlihan spoke about, the secondary fuelling obligations are short term and largely untested. In the event of a significant curtailment to gas users, which is what we are trying to mitigate, we were not comfortable that it would be sufficient to address the risk it would leave us with.

Is this the reason the Department asked CEPA to disregard the use of secondary fuel?

For both reasons it cannot be used in the calculation of the N -1 standard.

At that stage had CEPA done analysis including the use of secondary fuel? In order to come to that decision, had CEPA carried out analysis on the potential use of secondary fuel? I am asking these questions because if there is not a reserve it justifies the case for building a terminal. If it was disregarded, and the Department asked for it to be disregarded, then it strengthened the case. I am not saying it was a predetermined outcome but it strengthened the case for a gas terminal to be built.

On the secondary fuelling obligation, CEPA referred to it in the 2022 study and spoke to it in the updated analysis in 2025. Whereas the 2022 study stated it could address the security of supply, it was discounted for the up-to-date analysis because onshore sources cannot be used as part of the calculation method. Regardless, it said that with all the different technologies we would still need additional mitigation measures to meet the risk.

Even with the distillate available to the power plants, 250 of the 300 top large gas users in the country, which are the main pharmaceutical, IT, dairy and agrifood plants, would be taken offline and it would not necessarily be available to them.

Head 20 effectively deems the project compliant with the climate Act. Will the witnesses explain what analytical work was undertaken to substantiate that the project can operate within carbon budget limits rather than relying solely on it being deemed in legislation?

The direct head as we have it is that the Minister must take regard of section 15 of the climate Act in carrying out its functions. As we mentioned previously, the strategic gas emergency reserve best fits with this obligation, in that it is a temporary resilience measure. It would not lock us into long-term fossil fuels. It would only be used in the event of an emergency, which is a significant curtailment to supply, and would not be a new entry point.

I am still struggling with this. Has analysis been done on the impact the strategic reserve being used would have on our climate targets?

We are at the stage of proceeding with the development of it. The final design still has to be finalised. The specifics of what it would use and its operation have yet to be determined and yet to be provided for in legislation.

That will be the legislation that comes before us before the end of 2026 that was mentioned in the opening statement.

That is correct.

My next question is on CEPA's 2025 study. It sets out several credible security of supply alternatives. What comparative evaluation did the Department undertake to conclude that an LNG emergency reserve was the most effective in terms of resilience, cost and deliverability? Is it solely down to this N -1 standard or are there other elements at play here?

The Department has published all reports that informed the outcome of the energy security package published in 2023. With regard to securing Ireland's gas supplies specifically, CEPA looked at all possible mitigation options under the particular criteria that I set out. It identified a range of possible technologies in determining what would best meet our energy security requirements as well as meeting the N -1 standard.

What would have been the closest alternative in CEPA's report?

Basically it said an FSRU would best meet the standards given the criteria it was given, and it would best comply with the Act in that it would not be a new entry point into the system, it is the fastest available option, it is possibly the option with the least cost impact and it would least impact on our emissions.

This is a very technical Bill. On the N -1 formula, will the witnesses go through exactly what the standard is again?

It is the ability to meet peak day annual gas demand during an outage of the largest piece of gas infrastructure.

For how long?

For seven days, I think.

I am looking at article 5 and I think it is for one day. In order to be compliant with N -1 we would need to be able to meet peak day storage for one day. When the witnesses were responding to Senator Noonan earlier, what did they say we would have the capacity to deal with now, if there was an outage?

Currently there would be up to 35% unmet demand for gas with the loss of the largest piece of infrastructure.

On a particular day?

Yes.

We would be down 35%. If we were to look at gas demand, will Mr. Houlihan divvy it up? How much of this gas demand goes to residential homes, to strategic infrastructure and to large energy users? What does 35% represent?

In an N -1 event the way it works would be an order of demand reduction. It goes from the largest gas users down. There are 300 large gas users and approximately 50 of them are protected for essential social services, including hospitals, prisons and oil refineries. It would look like approximately 250 large companies being taken offline to balance the system.

If I am hearing this correctly, we are being told that this has to be rushed through, that it will be expedited and that it will cost us €1 billion a year. It could, and I believe it will, lock us into fossil fuel usage. The reason we are doing it is to ensure these 250 businesses receive gas over that one day. Is this correct?

If I could come in, it is not about addressing that one-day disruption period. What we now know, because this has happened in other jurisdictions, is the average length of time it would take to repair that piece of infrastructure, and this is the timeline we are trying to mitigate because it would not be for just one day.

The whole premise of the legislation, and the reason for speeding it through, is because the witnesses said we are not in compliance with the directive. In order to be compliant with the directive we just need to be able to maintain gas for a one-day period in the event there is an issue with the infrastructure. Is this correct?

That is what the standard is based on but there would be unmet demand for the full six months if there was an outage of the interconnectors.

The difficulty I have is that there is this rush to get this in place. We have had a situation where successive governments have not managed demand. The reason we are not going to be able to meet peak demand if there is an outage is because demand has not been managed. Now we are expected to provide this safety net, when the safety net is being provided primarily for those large companies that are causing the energy security problems for us anyway.

It is just not making sense to me. Actually, it is making sense to me now, to be honest.

On the statement on head 20, about section 15, I find it extraordinary that the Department is proceeding on the basis that what is being done will be deemed to be in compliance with the provisions. It was said that the Minister “shall have regard”. We should note that “shall have regard” could essentially mean the Minister just sitting there, reading the measure and saying it is fine. One of the underpinning principles of this legislation is that the Minister will be in compliance with the climate Act. That sets an incredible precedent, assuming this is all going to be okay. Therefore, I have serious concerns. Has this ever been done in any other legislation?

The Deputy raised a couple of issues, on which I have a couple of points. The Deputy has questions about demand, but the geopolitics of the risks has changed dramatically in the past five years. There have been incidents of damage to seabed infrastructure. Sometimes it can be accidental and sometimes malicious. If there were an incident that affected our gas interconnector, we would face a six-month repair period. That is the risk we are all living with today. The Government has said this needs to be addressed in the most expeditious manner possible. That is what we are doing now.

On that specific point, within the six-month repair period would there be options for us to get gas from elsewhere, through other interconnectors or through other processes?

No. The interconnectors are just one-way, so it would not be possible to have reverse flows.

Would we not be able to get alternative fuels?

As we mentioned, the obligations are short-term and largely untested. While there might be distillate oil in certain areas, how the arrangement would apply to the gas system is largely untested to date. We could not rely on that definitively today.

I want to ask about the costings. Is the estimated cost €900 million per year or €900 million over the whole project?

Usually, cost recovery in such projects is over the lifetime of the asset. The €900 million figure comes from a combination of both the upfront capital expenditure cost to build it and the ongoing maintenance cost over a ten-year period.

So the €900 million is over a ten-year period.

Over a ten-year period. Again, we have not got the final cost. That has to come back for a final investment decision.

Has a full cost-benefit analysis been conducted comparing LNG infrastructure to alternatives such as battery storage, and accounting for demand response?

GNI, in carrying out its preliminary business case, carried out an initial cost-benefit analysis for the proposal. As mentioned, the specific solution has still not been finalised. The final costs have yet to be determined.

Initially, we were talking €300 million. Is it expected that it will be much more than that?

At the time of the preliminary business case, and using the figures in question to estimate, there was contingency built in. We did not have the site selected and did not know the extent of the final engineering design. These are all very significant factors that have an influence and impact on the cost. Cost minimisation is a key workstream across the project. That aspect is being taken into account as we proceed to the final design. We do not know the final cost yet. Certainly, we will be able to narrow down the specifics as the project develops.

Ultimately, households will be paying for this. It is going to be a levy on their bills. The cost of energy, not only for households but also for businesses, arises constantly at my clinics on Mondays and Fridays. It frightens people that there is going to be another increase on the way.

As mentioned, that is a high-priority key workstream that is taken into account as this project progresses.

I also want to ask about the six shipments. On the pressure build-up, there is a thing called the gas boil-off. This means multiple shipments of LNG every year. I read somewhere that six shipments per year are expected. What impact will the gas boil-off have on our emissions targets, which we are not reaching at the moment? What is the estimated cost of the shipments?

I thank the Deputy. GNI is progressing its procurement strategy and progressing with its front-end engineering design that will determine the final specification of the optimum technology. That is an important part of the process. Determining the technology that will be used in the strategic gas emergency reserve will answer specifically on the quantity of LNG that will be used. The figure of six shipments was a figure picked in the initial assessment. It is illustrative. The final figure has yet to be determined as we consider the optimal solution. To put this into context – I am not evading the question at all – it is about a State-led strategic reserve that is quite minimal compared with a commercial operation that needs to make money and be viable and that would require multiples of what is involved in the shipments. The project would be impactless compared with a commercial operation.

Does Ms Hurson expect there will not be more than six shipments?

Right now, I imagine the number will be minimal by comparison with the number for a commercial operator. It is not a commercial operation; it will consider the impacts.

What impact will the gas boil-off have on our emissions?

There is a possibility, with technology that has yet to be determined, that it can be used as part of the functioning of a TSO and used back through its own-----

I hate when people talk about technologies that have not been determined yet.

Ms Hurson stated it is in the design stage. We still need to see the technical designs that come back from GNI. When we have them, we will have an understanding of the implications. GNI will be providing all the information as part of the information in the application pack because it will be needed for the EIA and AA.

We have committed to reverting to the members later this year. We are working on the policy that will set out the details that address their questions, the cost, the final technology and the enabling legislation to allow the project to proceed. That will be before the Oireachtas.

I thank the guests very much for all the work that has gone into this.

The committee was told that the cost-benefit analysis would be issued to us and that there were previous analyses. Has the analysis been issued to the committee members? I apologise for asking if it already has been.

Following the last briefing, we would have circulated the link. We have published all reports.

Ms Hurson said GNI has not fully finalised its cost-benefit analysis. Is that for after installation or does it relate to the alternative energy sources analysed for solutions?

To clarify, that cost-benefit analysis was part of the preliminary business case. Again, that is published on the webpage on energy security in Ireland. The final engineering design is now being proceeded with, and that will inform the final investment decision and business case that will come back.

I appreciate that.

Everyone has already mentioned the distillate backup. With the inclusion of the MaresConnect and LirIC interconnectors, the gas interconnector and distillate backup, can the Department confirm whether any scenario would still require the LNG terminal?

Deputy Heneghan asked if it was a backup and whether interconnection would provide an alternative that would cover the requirements. In a scenario where there was a loss of an N-1 of the interconnectors for example and there was a six-month outage, it would not provide additional backup. Interconnection does not provide security of supply. It is a market measure that provides availability that can mitigate some of the impacts of variable renewables on the system but-----

Has that modelling been conducted?

That was included as part of the CEPA analysis in terms of whether interconnection would be adequate to offset.

I apologise if that was circulated to the members. I could not find it over the last week and was trying to follow up on it. The documents I could find indicate that the LNG terminal would take four to five years. We have heard other Deputies and Senators mention that. What other specific security risk between now and 2030 does LNG address that existing backup, interconnection and storage options do not, given we are saying it will not be ready for four or five years as an interim measure?

The reason we have particular need for the early 2030s is because at present we have Corrib, which provides 20% of indigenous gas supply and obviously that is depleting as we go into the early 2030s, which is when the facility should be coming online to mitigate that risk.

Would Mr. Houlihan not think it would be better for us to decentralise our grid and have better alternatives for it?

Absolutely, that is the plan overall. Mr. Collins might speak to that as well. It is just that while the transitioning is happening there is a risk to the energy system which is quite acute that we want to address as soon as possible. That is, of course, the longer term strategy.

That is perfect, yes. To follow up on that, given CEPA's findings of no loss of load in 2030 to 2035, can the witnesses explain to the public and to the committee how a facility that comes online near the end of the decade will improve near term energy security?

As it does not come online for five years, it will not provide immediate security of supply. Thankfully, however, because we have Corrib and that additional gas in the background it is not an immediate risk. It is a risk that increases with the additional variable renewables coming onto the system, whereas at present there is significant gas fired generation to back up the system.

Perfect, yes. For us, as the Oireachtas committee, we are expected to accept the accelerated consent for a near-billion euro project. The modelling that I was examining, and apologies if there is more recent modelling, was based on excluding existing backup capacity and zero-carbon alternatives. Before that happens, the GNI analysis should have been completed. Would witnesses not agree with that, in the sense that we, as public representatives, would be able to argue the case for the need for this? One billion euro is a lot of money. The witnesses have explained that there was analysis done for the preliminary design but GNI still has not completed the full analysis of modelling of the whole system.

I might just come in to clarify that. We can endeavour to send forward the extensive research and reports that have been carried out that inform the energy security package. That includes the McCarthy report and multiple CEPA reports that all led to the publication of the energy security package. To clarify, this particular project is one action out of the 28 actions in the energy security package and on foot of the publication of that, the Minister wrote to GNI asking it to proceed with a preliminary business case. GNI could not go ahead of that. GNI was never tasked in carrying out forecasting. It was the Department that commissioned CEPA to do that. We did that and we have three published reports as part of that package. They are now proceeding to look at the detailed design to inform the final business case. So, today nobody is deciding on that final investment decision, that final cost or what that final design looks like. Right now is just to allow the next stage of the project so that they can proceed to delivering this project in an accelerated timeframe, which is what we were tasked to do.

We have the Scottish pipeline coming in and giving energy to us. There is a risk that could be attacked and we would be completely left with nothing there. Do the witnesses not think if we had an LNG terminal it would be just as easy to target that if there was -please God it never happens- a targeted attack on our energy security? Do witnesses not agree that a decentralised grid with multiple backups rather than a single LNG terminal would be a better alternative in the worst-case scenario?

I do not know whether Mr. Houlihan wants to come in on that. This is a very targeted approach to addressing a specific risk, which is part of our ambition to a renewable-led system. I think the risk the Deputy is talking about would put us in a completely different conversation. This is about mitigating an energy supply risk. GNI would ensure the appropriate contractual arrangements are in place to refill at scale any curtailment to supply in that event.

I thank the representatives from the Department for coming in. When did the Department start looking at this project initially? When was the concept incepted?

The energy security review commenced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which started a process of multiple reports and analysis looking at our energy security requirements.

That would be 2022 or so.

The overall energy security review began then.

What prompted the need for this urgent or expedited planning process after that? Can witnesses give us some insight into that?

Yes. The risk is pretty acute coming towards the early 2030s that we are working towards. The Government decision was taken in March of last year. The last few months have been working towards scoping out the project. Looking at a business-as-usual approach it could see delivery of the reserve as early as 2031 but as part of the Government decision, one of the requirements to look at alternative methods was to look at an accelerated delivery option. One of the paths looked at was if there was expedited consenting for the project, which could see it delivered as early as 2029. That is what brought us with this Bill to the committee.

The witnesses have spoken about the risks of the damage. Obviously there is a geopolitical risk that has arisen as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We are aware of the risk of damage to the interconnector. Witnesses have also said that part of the issue is that the Corrib gas field is going to run out in the early 2030s or the end of this decade, which is a very different type of risk. It is a risk that results from us not having decarbonised our grid sufficiently to reduce our reliance on gas. Has anyone in the Department brought this sense of urgency to any other aspect of our climate policy? It strikes me as incredible that in the midst of a climate crisis and a situation where we are missing our legally binding climate emissions reductions by such a great extent that the first hint of some form of urgency from the Department of climate change is in relation to building new fossil fuel infrastructure. Where was this urgency when it came to developing offshore wind energy? Is there any response to that? We have been told at this committee that we are not going to get any offshore wind before 2030. People have been trying to build these things for ten or 15 years with nothing coming. I am just baffled.

Just to give the Deputy an impression of the urgency, we have run seven auctions for renewable electricity power in this decade. That is the level of attention. Every year we have been running onshore solar and wind auctions and we have already run two offshore wind auctions. We are still working towards the delivery of the targets that have been set. They are very ambitious and are proving difficult. Like a lot of infrastructure, it is proving difficult to get them implemented. However, since just recently, 0.5 GW of wind power is in construction today. That is this year. That is 0.5 GW of wind power. That gives an example of the level of investment and time the Government has put into delivering the onshore wind and solar auctions. As the Deputy is probably very aware, solar has gone from nothing to about 1.5 GW of active solar power and there is more in construction and in future auctions. The offshore is very challenging. We know that it is challenging. We still have an attractive offering, as the Deputy can see from the recent Tonn Nua auction.

There are a number of projects with An Coimisiún Pleanála. We are waiting either for a decision or a request for further information, RFI, to be provided. Three of the phase 1 projects have a support scheme, which is backed up by the Government. They all have grid offers and maximum power outputs. All of this was brought about since 2020, so I think we have made a huge amount of effort. It is not moving as quickly in terms of transition as we would like.

To be clear, we are all supportive of that but it is just this sense of urgency. One related issue that came to us at the climate committee from the developers of wind farms was the lack of expertise in our planning authorities to deal with the applications coming in and the time it took to upskill our authorities, An Coimisiún Pleanála, etc., to deal with these. This Bill is proposing to give the Minister and the Department new powers to decide on these kinds of applications. Is that really going to work? How will the Department be upskilled to ensure that it has the requisite knowledge and expertise to be able to actually make a decision on this thing that would stand up to legal scrutiny, be robust and in compliance with all of the various Acts, regulations and European directives that others have outlined here today?

We will ensure that it stands up to legal scrutiny because it will follow the process set out in this Bill if and when it becomes an Act. We will follow the procedure set out there. We will also use An Coimisiún Pleanála for the advice on the International Energy Agency, IEA, and the European Environment Agency, EAA, and they will inform the Minister on those decisions as well. Representatives from An Coimisiún Pleanála were here and they explained the investments they have made in resources and that they are making decisions at the moment. We have seen more rapid decision making by An Coimisiún Pleanála in recent times and that RFIs have gone out. One RFI has been submitted, and another one will be issued, so the commission is making the investment decision. We will also be using the expertise of An Coimisiún Pleanála as part of this statutory process but we will make the decisions in accordance with the legislation passed by the Oireachtas.

I am looking at Part 4 of Annex II of the N-1 regulation, and it is quite clear that demand-side measures are sufficient. We are hearing about the N-1 obligation but as Deputy Whitmore pointed out, all that N-1 requires is to show that we can meet measures on the day and it explicitly allows for demand measures to meet it. Is it not the case that demand-side measures are considered an acceptable meeting of the N-1 standard and provided for in Annex II?

We are not saying that this proposal is just going to address one issue. It has to address a major interruption to supply.

I think it is important, because the language we are hearing is about our obligations, etc. I think we can actually bracket aside N-1. Mr. Collins is saying there are other issues but in terms of N-1 and our obligations under that, we actually have a mechanism in place. We also have the 90 days of oil reserves, the kerosene reserves and all of those other things that seem to have been discounted somewhat inexplicably, from the new energy reserve. However, bracketing that aside, we also have our obligations on climate and those are laws as well and ones that come with very hefty fines. Will Mr. Collins confirm the energy emissions that arise from this project with the burn off? I do not want to hear a response of, "We'll figure out how much it is and we hope it is not much and maybe something will come from the sky to take it, it will be the sky that takes it." Are those energy emissions not going to be factored into Ireland's emissions? I have checked and I do not think there is a carve-out that allows for them to be excluded. Will Ms Hurson confirm that?

As the Senator pointed out, we are currently not in compliance with the N-1 standard and the programme for Government commitment restates the need to take all measures to address our energy security needs.

But-----

Just one second; let her finish please.

So it is not just about the one that we are currently not in compliance with in addressing the security risk. I have spoken about the extensive research that led to Government approval last year to proceed with the development. We also know that it would take an average of six months to repair that subsea pipeline right now, given other member states' experience. There has been an increase in infrastructure damage, malicious or not.

Before we go to the danger of the subsea cables being bombed let us go back to where we are in terms of the legislation and N-1. Actually, we can be in compliance by deploying demand-side measures, which were outlined by Mr. Houlihan. Two hundred and fifty of the largest companies would be going off-board and that will meet the requirement of N-1. We cannot be in a permanent state of non-compliance. We have a mechanism for compliance. There is a reluctance to use that mechanism, and there seems to be a reluctance to rely on some of the other forms of reserve we have heard about. In terms of the non-compliance, there is a reason that Ireland, for example, was excluded from the EU requirements in terms of strategic gas reserves previously. We had an exemption because we were deemed to have sufficient other mechanisms, to have our interconnection and so forth.

The question on the emissions piece was asked earlier but it was not answered. It is important for the public to know that LNG requires burn-off. It is not a case of buying some LNG and leaving it there for 20 years. This is continually renewing that LNG and being a continual client for LNG. If we burn that off, is it not the case that the emissions will be counted towards Ireland's emissions?

On the demand-----

Can I just have a "Yes" or "No" on that question, because I have heard it asked by others and not answered. Is it not the case?

The emissions considerations have not been legislated for yet.

Are they not counted as part of-----

Just let her finish.

Okay.

We have not come before the committee with the specific impacts of that because we are not at final design content.

I am not asking for the exact amount of emissions now. I am asking for confirmation that those emissions count towards Ireland's collective emissions, which are currently way out of step with our climate targets. Is that not the case?

This project has considered all the requirements for meeting legal obligations and regulations and this best states-----

Literally, does it not count? I will go to someone else. Maybe we will have a legal expert.

The question is, will they be counted?

Absolutely, they will be counted-----

Okay, thanks.

----- but I am not able to say how they will be counted, either a scale of-----

That is fair enough.

That is fine. Going then to head 20, the deeming-----

Last question Senator.

I have two questions, Chair.

Just one and we will do a second round briefly.

I will skip the question on head 20 and the deeming and go to a different question in that context, which is transboundary impacts. Again, we are burning off liquefied gas. The question of where it is coming from is another question. Is it coming from the United States, which is outside the Paris Agreement, which has significant issues in itself? The witnesses might address if that has been screened for. Yet, it states in head 4 that in a formal screening, that is, what gets sent to the Minister for the Minister to deem everything to be okay, it should state that the designated development is a project not likely to have significant transboundary, environmental effects, and that a formal screening to confirm this may be required in advance of enactment. Is it not the case that this will have transboundary impacts? We are burning fossil fuels, one of which, methane, is a high-density fossil fuel that has far greater impacts than most other fuels. Why are the witnesses anticipating that what the Minister is going to sign off on is going to say that it does not have transboundary impacts and saying that there only may need to be a screening on that?

This provision was carried over from when we were developing this legislation. It was based on the Development (Emergency Electricity Generation) Act 2022, and this provision was included, so that was in the initial draft. While we included this in the explanatory note, we are discussing this with colleagues internally, and we are going to look at that again, because we do appreciate that, given this project is quite different to what was done for the temporary emergency generation, TEG, projects, we will reconsider it, but it has been flagged. This was a weakness in-----

I have a single one-liner.

Go ahead.

Has there been a risk analysis on proceeding with this facility making it more difficult to have a ban in relation to commercial facilities? We know that the entry of commercial LNG was facilitated by the Planning and Development Act 2024.

Has there been an examination of whether it would make a ban or prohibition on commercial LNG more difficult? Has that been looked at in terms of the risk of locking in to fossil fuel infrastructure?

No other LNG facility is covered by this legislation. This legislation is exclusive to this particular project.

The impacts of it-----

I am sorry, but the Senator has gone way-----

I am just wondering if we will-----

That is fine. We will do a brief second round. There are other speakers. I call an Teachta O'Gorman.

I thank our witnesses for the presentation today. Obviously, head 20 has a big impact on one of the key provisions of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act, the existing law in the country. Head 20 restricts section 15 of that, which is the duty on public bodies to have regard to the law and policy on emissions, the duty to have regard to the national transition objective, and the duty to have regard to the mitigation of greenhouse gases. Head 20 says that this proposal will be deemed to be in compliance with the provisions of section 15 of the existing law. Will the witnesses explain why this provision was inserted?

With an increasing number of renewables in the power system, the energy system increasingly relies on gas-fired generation as a back-up on days of peak demand. What if there were an interruption to gas supplies? We are dependent on gas and that will not be an issue that goes away until at least the late 2030s or early 2040s. As a result, the project is essential for decarbonisation to take place. That is the view the Minister has taken and he has approached the matter by including that head.

As the Deputy knows, additional flexible gas generation is part of the climate action plan, so there is a requirement for gas.

Why does this specific exception to section 15 of the existing law have to be legislated for? Could the development not proceed without head 20?

There was an element of uncertainty around it, so we included an express provision that it had been taken into account in this context. I am aware of the Coolglass decision issued this morning, so we will be looking at that to see-----

What uncertainty is head 20 trying to resolve?

It was inserted in case there was a belief that this project was contrary to the climate Act. It makes express provision that the Legislature had considered the issue when passing the Bill.

Head 20 specifically precludes the analysis that this development may be contrary to the climate Act?

As currently drafted, it expressly provides that the project is in line with the Act.

Is that because carrying out that analysis would take so long that it would lengthen the time period - this has been cast as emergency legislation - or that the actual substantiative outcome would be but for head 20, this particular project was in breach of the climate action law?

I think it is just to expressly provide for the fact that decarbonisation cannot take place unless there is sufficient gas-fired generation to back up the system for the next 15 years or so. We know that to be a fact based on the energy security review that took place. We wanted to expressly provide that to de-risk the project when it was going through the application process.

Section 15 is really central to the climate action Act and we are setting quite a significant precedent here in terms of the exclusion of one project. If one project can be excluded, the same case can be made later. Suddenly, there is the potential of significant growth in exceptions. We need to give real analysis to head 20. It has been put here as a "just in case" provision. Generally, we do not put provisions in legislation unless we feel they are dealing with a real problem. I really am not sure how essential heading 20 is to the delivery of this particular project.

The question is probably about timeframe for delivery. If there is legal uncertainty, it will lead to delays in the process. If we want to meet the Government's objective of expediting the delivery of this project so that it is delivered by 2031 at the latest - we are aiming for 2029 - then removal of legal doubt increases the likelihood of the project being delivered in accordance with that timeframe.

I thank Mr. Collins. Earlier, he said that various consent options had been reviewed and it had been decided to go with this consent option. Obviously, we are creating something completely bespoke here. Why was the option of creating a bespoke route to An Coimisiún Pleanála as the final consenting decision maker not chosen rather than the route to the Minister?

There was a lack of clarity. Is the Deputy asking why it does not go through-----

There was a lack of clarity on the decision-making timelines under An Coimisiún Pleanála, so it was to remove that aspect.

I did not answer Deputy Daly's question earlier about the environmental impact-----

Mr. Houlihan might answer my question rather than Deputy Daly's.

Of course. That is fair enough.

On that, if we are creating bespoke legislation, which we are, that goes completely outside of existing consenting processes, could we not have done something that said An Coimisiún Pleanála needed to make a decision on this particular development in this particular time? If we are going bespoke, could we not have gone bespoke with timelines as well?

In identifying all of those possible accelerated delivery timelines, we also sought legal advice and consulted with the Attorney General's office as to what tools were available to us at the point in time when we drafted the head seeking Government approval to proceed to drafting of the Bill. As a result of the commencement programme of the new Planning and Development Act and other progressing strategies being proposed, we were not able to avail or benefit from some of the possibilities we could have during the lifetime of this.

It is about the point in time piece right now and getting the legal opinion as to how best to ensure an expedited delivery timeframe. It was felt that this bespoke mechanism was required. As Mr. Collins said, it was project specific and would not interfere with any other process under way through the legislation.

I thank Ms Hurson. I have two quick questions. On the N-1 issue, it has come up here a few times. I am hearing we can do demand management to meet N-1 but you could effectively be running that demand strategy for six months while you were trying to fix the pipeline. In layman's terms, is that what the witnesses are saying?

Yes. That would have catastrophic impacts on society. I appreciate that the N-1 is based on one day but even when it is below one day, the impacts would be massive in those six months.

What Mr. Houlihan is saying there is that there is no one-day event on an interconnector. We have a legal obligation under European law but we are also trying to address the specific risk that has emerged in the past five years.

Okay. On the recovery of costs, I do not need to understand the detail but I want to understand the model as to how this will work. There will be a capital cost to build the thing and there will then be an ongoing operational cost to run it. How will both of those costs be recovered?

That is something we are working on at the moment. It is not part of this legislation but it will be part of the subsequent legislation.

We will hear about that when we are looking at the operational Bill.

Yes. A Government decision on final investment will also need to understand not just the costs, but how the cost recovery will happen.

Understood. I will allow a quick second round. I ask members to be brief, please, and will give them a minute each to ask one question.

I will try to get a couple of questions in, if I can.

The Deputy has one minute.

Arising out of the Cathaoirleach's question on costs, has the risk of costs being added on to bills been ruled out or not?

We are in the early stages of looking at all of the options.

Has it been ruled out?

No. There are plenty of examples of regulatory recovery of those types of costs already in place.

How long do the witnesses think it will be in place once it is up and running from 2030?

There is a particular calculation method to determine that. Obviously, it will be when-----

Will it be ten years?

The analysis foresees it into the 2040s.

It will be more than ten years, then.

Yes.

It was mentioned that additional wind and solar renewable power would be in place by 2030. Has that been factored into the energy demands the witnesses are talking about? It has.

Deputy Daly got three questions in there.

Under head 8, it could be Gas Networks Ireland or any other entity that may be prescribed by the Minister. Does that mean a commercial operator could be designated by the Minister?

No, that was just left in in case-----

Mr. Houlihan wanted to answer my last question to do with-----

The Deputy asked me at the start about an exemption. We will not be exempting from the environmental impact assessment directive or the habitats directive.

Deputy Daly did well there. I call Deputy Whitmore.

In the 2040s, assuming this goes ahead, and with the idea of this being a transition facility, what conditions would need to be met for this to be switched off?

That will be determined by the Commission for Regulation of Utilities, CRU, which is the competent authority with responsibility for reporting when the N-1 standard is met. It will make a recommendation to the Government then.

Hang on. The N-1 standard can be met by demand management. This is a transitionary measure because Corrib is closing down and we do not have sufficient renewable energy. If this is transitionary and the Department is asking us to legislate for a transitionary facility, what are the conditions that will be met in 2040 before it can be switched off? The start of this process should be to be clear about that.

Maybe something we did not clearly highlight is that the policy and the enabling legislation that is coming back to the Oireachtas by the summer will include the end-of-life provisions. That will set out exactly what conditions will determine that this facility is no longer required.

The Department is asking us to change the legislative framework and not to take into account the Aarhus directive, which is another directive that we need to be in compliance with, yet the Department cannot tell us what the end-of-life conditions would be. I would have thought that would be simple information. If the Department is trying to convince us to do this, surely that information should be available?

That is absolutely coming before the Oireachtas. There is a lot of detailed analysis and we do not have the final engineering design and cost implications that are required to come back with that substantive operational build, setting out exactly the operation of it, when it will be used, what constitutes a supply emergency, what the maintenance requirements will be, and when it will no longer be used.

This is really important.

Thirty seconds. We have other speakers.

The Department can tell us what the energy risks are and why we need to have it in place but cannot tell us what would need to be in place not to have those energy risks. Is that correct?

What I have heard is that it will be in the next Bill. Is that correct?

That is it.

Touching back on it, would the witnesses accept that an actor capable of disabling two subsea pipelines would also be capable of targeting an LNG terminal?

The short answer is "Yes".

We need to be more independent as a State. Churchill reduced the supply of coal to Ireland to try to force us to remove our neutrality and put pressure on us then. It is important that we have our independence. In that sense, would the witnesses not think that the complete protection of us through private wire legislation would have been a better investment, or a change to the port marshalling laws, which I know there is something in the Department about, to allow infrastructural development in ports? The witnesses are definitely aware that Belfast is the only port big enough to create offshore renewable energy, ORE.

The witnesses mentioned the 500 MW under construction, as did Deputy Daly. We also have to be conscious of the 2.6 million MWh of electricity we are losing due to curtailment. Is the Department also fast-tracking long-duration energy storage and alternative solutions if, in the worst case scenario, an actor does this to us?

It is important to be clear that this is not seen as an alternative to the decarbonisation programme. We are committed to renewables, including wind, solar, and offshore wind. The largest ever investment programme into the electricity network has been approved by the CRU. The Government has made Exchequer equity injections into the network companies to enable them to borrow to do that. I would not see this legislation as a case of going down one route over another route. The Government and we are absolutely committed to the energy transition. While we are going through that transition and getting to the situation where we have fully independent clean energy that we can control in Ireland, we are reliant on importation. At the moment, we have Corrib. That will be gone or negligible by the end of the decade. There is a physical risk to an LNG facility, but there is a physical risk to one asset at the moment that would cut us off completely. An LNG facility could be attacked, but at least it gives an alternative access point in an emergency situation.

Is it not a single point of failure rather than multiple points of failure?

It is a single point of failure, but we have one point of failure at the moment. If we had this emergency reserve, we would have two access points, which are themselves a risk, but as I said, that will not deter us from the focus on moving away from the reliance on gas and increasing our energy independence. As I said, we are resourcing enormous programmes to enable that.

I have a question about head 4 and the environmental impact assessments, EIAs. The legislation allows for phased development and that is grand, but the environmental impact assessment cannot be carried out in phases. It really has to be done as a whole. It is not really an EIA unless it is done as a whole beforehand.

I also want to ask about head 7(2) on the derogation from Article 16 of the habitats directive. That is meant to be done after the EIA is carried out. Is it not important that the EIA be done first?

The Deputy is referring to the second subparagraph of head 4. That is included to say that if the development were to take place in two parts, both would be considered designated development, or if there was a subsequent development application under this legislation, they would all be considered designated development. It is not just the initial development.

But the EIA will be carried out in one part.

Which section is that?

The environmental impact assessment will be carried out in one part before that.

Yes.

One of the witnesses mentioned that the climate targets were ambitious. They are not ambitious. They are really just the bare minimum required to comply and keep within the 1.5 degrees.

There are questions around meeting the EU energy production targets. It seems we are not really addressing the demand side of the large energy users and they are already eating up the renewables we are putting on the grid. Is a definition coming in the operational Bill of the terms of an emergency?

Yes. It will explicitly set out the terms of use and who will be responsible for giving the go-ahead, which will come to the Oireachtas by the summer.

It was on the Department's advice that the ability to switch to secondary fuels on a large scale was untested. Could the witnesses provide the committee with some background in relation to that? CEPA is making it clear that the unreserved electricity demand is largely a result of excluding secondary fuel from the analysis. It would be really useful if the committee could have some background about why the Department deemed that the use of secondary fuel would-----

Maybe the witnesses could provide that.

We could absolutely add that to our other commitments.

It is extremely challenging to power power stations from a secondary fuel. When mitigating risk, if we do not have a technology that we know can do it, do we actually reduce the risk? Households and businesses would still have a significant risk of losing their power. It also does not address the issue of gas usage. A number of industries use gas in their industry processes, like agriculture and pharmaceuticals. A significant number of homes use gas for heating. None of those would be addressed by the issue of secondary fuel. At the same time, you are saying we are going to burn oil to generate electricity for a period of up to six months.

My question was on the risk analysis, not within the Bill, but of the implications for other fossil fuel and LNG facilities that may be built, which is provided for under the 2024 Act, as was fast-tracking.

Regarding the risk analysis in terms of the climate piece, I would say that the overall case has not been made for saying and doing it six or 18 months faster. Regarding the argument that we should effectively get rid of the climate change assessment and analysis, we are looking at a different balance out. Can the Department examine the risk in terms of our climate targets? Has that been systematically analysed? I am particularly concerned about the section that allows the Minister to simply deem this to be compliant. Could the witnesses address those two pieces of risk and the risk to the Aarhus Convention? Am I correct in saying that a five-day window is envisaged for public consultation or input?

Let us deal with all those together.

Regarding the question about the Aarhus Convention, public consultation takes a minimum of 30 days. A notice of application must be published two weeks before on the website and in a national paper.

What about the risk?

The risk is part of what informed the energy security package. This Bill is about reducing the uncertainty of timelines, retaining the best aspect of sustainable development, ensuring the appropriate assessments, environmental impact assessments and required consultations take place. This legislation is specific to this project. It is not a entry point. This is just to allow a State-led strategic gas emergency reserve-----

I was just asking about the impact when a decision is made to bring in a brand-new form of extremely intensive fossil fuel into a country where it has not been an active fuel. I am talking about a brand-new layer of fossil fuel that is 20 times as damaging. There have to be implications. I should clarify that I also meant that some of the sections that have been relied on in the Bill in terms of alterations are aspects that the Aarhus compliance committee has already said are not in compliance. These are aspects of the Planning and Development Act, which it found to be non-compliant and that are, again, being relied on here.

Do the witnesses have any comments to make?

We will be engaging with colleagues in the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage to make sure that whatever time periods for public consultations exist will be in compliance with the Aarhus Convention.

I reiterate that one of the specific requirements that CEPA undertook in its analysis was looking at the optimal solution that would least affect the climate Act obligations. That was why this was brought forward as the optimum solution.

Regarding the broad issue of gas security of supply, did the 2022 energy security review make recommendations with regard to restricting supply? Has the Department ever asked the CRU or Gas Networks Ireland to restrict new gas connections on the basis of security of supply? Has the Department ever asked Gas Networks Ireland to stop preparing business cases for gas grid expansion on the grounds of security of supply?

Current Government policy is not to create new gas connections in terms of supply. The Department tasked Gas Networks Ireland with looking at it from the point of view of energy security. There are no proposals to proceed with new connections. In terms of restricting, we will come back to the committee when we come back with the legislation before the summer setting out the specific conditions that will enable the use in the event of an emergency or supply curtailment.

Going back to Senator Higgins's point about the flood gates argument, can the witnesses confirm that if this State-led and operated project goes ahead, there is no need for and there should not be any commercial LNG importation into the country? It is not necessary from an energy security perspective.

I think the Deputy is referring to other projects in the planning system.

I am just generally referring to any commercial project. I am not referring to anything specific. I am referring to commercial importation.

This legislation provides for a bespoke State-owned entity. That is all it is providing for. It does not use the planning system so it does not create a precedent within the planning system that justifies any decision relating to An Coimisiún Pleanála.

So from the Department's perspective and the perspective of energy security, there is no need for any commercial importation of LNG if this goes ahead.

It would not meet an energy security perspective. We are only allowing for a non-commercial State-owned entity. A commercial entity will make its own decision and will have to go through the normal planning procedures if it seeks to do that but there is no rationale from a security perspective.

This is the first of two Bills being proposed by the Department. What will make each Bill distinct from the other?

The Bill we are working on right now is a specific bespoke consenting Bill that will just allow for the next stage of delivery. This is just to allow this project to be consented to to allow for an expedited delivery timeframe to reduce the uncertainty of planning decision timeframes. This is all this is going to do. The next Bill, which is coming later on this year, will set out what this development is, who will run it, how it will run, what constitutes an emergency or supply curtailment, how that works, who gets to use it, who triggers it, how a facility is maintained and the end-of-life policy.

The witnesses mentioned companies relying on gas and these large-scale businesses. Should we not be in a situation by 2030 where large-scale energy users in Ireland are not reliant on gas? What measures are there in terms of pushing for electrification? It goes to that demand point in terms of the harder levers. Has there been any consideration of a State-owned and State-run renewable energy provision in terms of not the auctions but something that would effectively be a State reserve with regard to wind or solar energy?

There is a Government programme to deliver renewable gas. That will displace natural gas. There are no plans for a State-owned wind farm company.

I thank the witnesses for taking part in this session today. We will publish their opening statements on the committee website.

We are now in our second session of the pre-legislative scrutiny on the general scheme of the Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill. In this session, we continue our pre-legislative scrutiny of that Bill. I welcome the representatives from An Taisce. From An Taisce's climate committee, I welcome Dr. Aideen O'Dochartaigh, associate professor in accounting, DCU business school, agus Barry McMullin, professor emeritus, Dublin City University. They are both very welcome.

I will read a note on privilege. Witnesses and members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable, or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative they comply with any such direction.

In terms of the format of this meeting, I will invite the witnesses to make an opening statement to a maximum of five minutes. Once that has been delivered, I will then call on the members in the order that they indicate to me to put their questions. Dr. O'Dochartaigh may read her opening statement.