We have received no apologies for this session.

The first item on the agenda is pre-legislative scrutiny of the general scheme of the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill, resumed. The Government has indicated that this will be the first of two Bills in this area. The Bill before us focuses on planning, permitting and consent matters, while the second Bill will address operational issues. We will have two sessions today. The purpose of this session is to have an engagement with representatives from Friends of the Earth, Trócaire and Ms Attracta Uí Bhroin from Environmental Law Ireland. I welcome the following witnesses to the meeting: from Friends of the Earth Ms Deirdre Duffy, CEO, and Mr. Jerry McEvilly, campaigns director; from Trócaire Ms Sinéad Loughran, policy and advocacy adviser; and from Environmental Law Ireland Ms Attracta Uí Bhroin. You are all very welcome.

I remind all those in attendance to make sure their phones are either on silent or switched off.

In relation to privilege, witnesses and members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make any charges against any person or entity by name or in any such way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

In terms of the format of the meeting, I will invite witnesses to make an opening statement to a maximum of five minutes. Once those statements have been delivered, I will call on members to put their questions in the order in which they have indicated to me. We operate a rota system, with every member getting an initial five minutes for engagement. The five minutes are for both questions and answers and, therefore, it is essential for members to put their questions succinctly and witnesses to be succinct in their responses. Please note that the duration of this meeting is limited. It is the first of two sessions today, so times must be strictly adhered to. I ask everybody to be focused in their contributions.

I now call on each organisation to deliver its opening statement as follows: Ms Deirdre Duffy, Friends of the Earth, followed by Ms Sinéad Loughran, Trócaire, and Ms Attracta Uí Bhroin, Environmental Law Ireland.

I will share my time with Mr. McEvilly and just hand over directly to him. I thank you, a Chathaoirligh, and committee members for the invitation to present here today. Many of them will know Friends of the Earth, which is a global movement in over 70 countries. We campaign for a healthy, pollution-free world and for a fast and fair transition away from fossil fuels.

We have consistently called for Ireland to shift its energy system away from fossil fuels as quickly as possible to avoid locking future generations into fossil-fuel dependence.

At the outset, as an environmental and social justice organisation for the affected local communities in the vicinity of the proposed liquefied natural gas, LNG site, we recommend that all steps are taken to ensure meaningful dialogue with them at all times by the Government and by legislators. We recognise that security of energy supply is a legitimate and important public interest, particularly in this time of geopolitical instability and infrastructure vulnerability. However, it is our view that the approach set out in this scheme is not the answer.

Energy security that weakens climate law and democratic safeguards, as this scheme does, is not security. It is in fact a liability. Right now, at a time when democratic norms are under strain – they are under strain here too - it is deeply concerning that this scheme sidelines democratic legitimacy by concentrating ministerial power and bypassing established planning processes. These are essential to public trust.

We wish to be clear at the outset. Friends of the Earth does not believe that an LNG terminal, State-owned or commercial, is an appropriate, sustainable or effective solution to Ireland’s energy security or our national climate objectives as set out in law. Our opening statement will focus on three issues: security, climate law and governance, and EU law.

A false choice is being constructed between climate responsibility and energy security. We believe the committee does not face this choice. Energy security must be delivered in compliance with climate and environmental law. In 2026, security cannot mean deeper dependence on imported fossil fuels. It has to mean resilience, and that resilience will beget security. We now live in a world where energy dependence is a strategic weakness. Markets are volatile, infrastructure is exposed and imported fuel carries additional geopolitical risk. Accelerating LNG infrastructure does not reduce that risk, it concentrates it. It is tying Ireland more tightly to global gas markets and long-lived fossil fuel assets for future generations. Those consequences extend far beyond any short-term emergency.

Instead, we believe an electricity-led system based on renewables; demand reduction, crucially; storage; and interconnection does the opposite. It spreads risk. It is harder to disrupt, and it is more resilient because that is embedded in its design. Strategic autonomy is now central to security. Renewables expand Ireland’s choices, whereas LNG narrows them.

The gas security context has also changed fundamentally, and I know the committee heard quite a bit about that from An Taisce yesterday. As committee members will know, since the invasion of Ukraine, both the EU and UK have become more reliant on US LNG. This is exposing us to new risks, including supply disruption, geopolitical leverage and the US domestic political volatility. A floating LNG terminal is not immune to these risks and may be even more vulnerable than the existing interconnectors.

The scheme conflicts with repeated parliamentary statements from the Minister, Deputy O'Brien, supporting only temporary, climate law-compliant measures that do not increase gas demand. It also runs counter to the programme for Government, as the committee well knows, which promises to reduce reliance on polluting and expensive fossil fuels and uses the terms "decisive" and "radically". It appears to disregard the Government’s own energy security review, which makes clear that reducing gas consumption and dependency is essential to meeting our obligations.

I wish to point out that climate law is not an option. As my time is running out, I will quickly hand over to Mr. McEvilly to make a few points on that.

I thank the Chair and the committee. I have a few points on climate law, particularly head 20.

First, the scheme elevates gas security of supply as an over-riding consideration without requiring proper consideration of climate limits, household energy costs, public health or community safety. Second, it weakens the climate Act’s consistency obligation by referring to plans and strategies rather than binding carbon budgets, creating a real risk of long-term emissions lock-in. Third, extending weaker obligations under this scheme to An Coimisiún Pleanála fragments climate governance, leaving some public bodies bound by climate law while others – the Minister and An Coimisiún Pleanála - are effectively exempt. Fourth, which is most concerning and most important to the committee, is the proposal to deem the development to be compliant with the Climate Act. Compliance cannot be legislated into existence. The courts are very clear that it must arise from evidence-based assessment. Deeming compliance in advance undermines environmental law, the Aarhus Convention and EU law, and raises serious constitutional concerns around separation of powers and access to justice. By establishing planning safeguards, the Government’s approach also undermines transparency and accountability.

Very briefly, on EU law, the scheme also misapplies Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. That is the one which contains the N -1 standard. This standard is a resilience metric, not a mandate to build LNG. EU law requires security of supply to be achieved through the least distortive and most proportionate measures, which can be achieved through including demand-side measures.

Emergency measures under EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights must be necessary, proportionate and temporary. That test is not met here. If the Government genuinely viewed N -1 non-compliance as an emergency, it would have prioritised stopping the problem from worsening. Instead, Government policy has continuously facilitated the rapid expansion of data centres. N -1 is being treated as a supply problem, when in reality it is being driven by unmanaged demand growth. Regarding Government policy, renewables matching does not simply solve this. Data centres remain reliant on gas-fired generation for balancing and backup, shifting security risks onto the gas network. Gas Networks Ireland’s own projections confirm that industrial demand, driven primarily by data centres, is now the main driver of sustained structural gas reliance.

The European Commission is now reviewing N -1 because it is such a blunt instrument and no longer reflects modern supply-chain risks. The heads suggest material climate law cannot obstruct N -1 compliance. However, EU energy security law does not override EU climate law. The State must comply with both. The scheme poses a serious risk that an LNG facility funded by all consumers will function as an insurance policy for high-demand industrial users, rather than a genuine emergency reserve.

In conclusion, legal risks arise directly from bypassing the ordinary planning system and climate law without proper safeguards. If not addressed, the Oireachtas risks enacting legislation that is foreseeably incompatible with EU law and human rights obligations, exposing the State and the taxpayer to avoidable legal challenges.

The committee has a critical role at this stage. This is the point in the process where these defects can and must be addressed. We therefore urge the committee to recommend that Government not proceed with this Bill. Instead, the Government should undertake an updated energy security assessment that properly considers costs, demand-side measures and the risks of increased LNG dependence. The choice before the committee is whether energy security is pursued in a way that strengthens climate law and public trust or undermines both.

Gabhaim buíochas leis an gCathaoirleach agus le comhaltaí an choiste go léir as an gcuireadh chuig an gcruinniú inniu. Agus muid i lár éigeandáil aeráide, is ábhar an-tábhachtach é seo.

Trócaire is deeply concerned about plans to introduce a State-led LNG facility in Ireland because of its global justice implications. The incoherence of introducing new fossil fuel infrastructure in the midst of a climate emergency cannot be understated. The climate crisis is a deep human rights crisis and a crisis of injustice and inequality. Progressing with this facility would further entrench climate injustice in Ireland’s policies.

Wealthy and historically high-polluting countries have continuously failed to reduce emissions at the pace and scale that is needed. Ireland is no exception to this and is disproportionately contributing to climate change, actively contributing to a world beyond 1.5°C. The impacts are being felt worst by those who have done nothing to cause this crisis. In Guatemala, indigenous Mayan communities, who have lived sustainably and protected the earth for countless generations, are facing food insecurity and displacement as droughts and floods hit. This same picture is repeating across the global south, with billions of people experiencing loss of lives and livelihoods, water stress, crop failures, displacement and escalating debt in the midst of climate breakdown.

Emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure alone would push the world beyond the 1.5°C limit. Global temperatures are projected to reach between 2.3°C and 2.8°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of this century. However, if the rest of the world had polluted to the same extent as Ireland, we would already be at 3.6°C in warming. There is quite simply no room for new fossil fuel facilities of any kind, particularly in Ireland and other historically high-emitting states.

New fossil fuel infrastructure is therefore at odds with our climate and human rights obligations.

The UN special rapporteur on human rights in the context of climate change, Elisa Morgera, has clarified that the highest-emitting states, according to their historical responsibility, current contributions and respective capabilities, should phase out fossil fuels by 2030 and has urged that no country should be pursuing new fossil fuel-burning plants.

LNG is mostly made up of methane, a highly potent greenhouse gas that is dangerous even in small quantities and has a significant impact on climate change. Experts have highlighted that any new source of methane is liable to compromise compliance with Ireland’s climate Act. Reducing methane emissions significantly in the next decade will already be challenging in Ireland and our legally binding carbon budgets are already at risk. The Climate Change Advisory Council has warned that the further expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure through an LNG terminal will commit Ireland to further fossil fuel lock-in with serious concerns over the total emissions associated with LNG production including the upstream release of methane where LNG is sourced via fracking. Fracking was banned in Ireland in 2017 due to its devastating environmental and health impacts. UN human rights experts have long called on rich and historically high-emitting countries to reject the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure and the use of fracking. LNG imported to Ireland will most likely be sourced from the US, where most gas is extracted via fracking, which means Ireland would play a direct role in driving demand for fracked gas. The recent landmark ruling from the International Court of Justice clarifies that where a government fails to take appropriate action to limit emissions including through fossil fuel production and use, this could amount to a breach of international obligations and is attributable to the relevant state. Failure to exercise due diligence to prevent significant harm to the climate system also commits an internationally wrongful act.

Ignoring our existing climate obligations and proceeding with this development and legislation would stand at odds with this ruling and Ireland’s own Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act by bypassing key elements of that Act. The approval of a state-led LNG facility does not reflect Ireland’s energy reduction obligations necessary to stay within the EU's energy reduction targets under the energy-efficiency directive nor does it comply with our obligation to stay within the warming limit set by the Paris agreement. It is clear from international guidance and obligations that we must phase out fossil fuels, including gas use, urgently. Compliance with our own legally binding carbon budgets to 2030 demands a significant reduction in gas use by 2030. Furthermore, the assumptions underpinning the approval of a strategic gas emergency reserve are inadequate to meet our energy reduction obligations under the EU’s energy-efficiency directive and fail to align with our fair share of action under the 1.5°C limit set by the Paris agreement. If, at minimum - the EU standards are the bare minimum because they do not reach the 1.5°C limit required action - EU energy demand reduction targets were met, all instances of gas supply gaps in 2035 and 2040 that have been used to justify the approval of a state-led FSRU would be simultaneously addressed. In recent years, alternatives to a state-led FSRU have advanced significantly. The continued prioritisation of such alternatives is required urgently and in the long term to meet our emissions reduction obligations and energy transition needs. Any attempts to address energy security concerns must also reflect this changed landscape on alternatives and Ireland’s obligations to climate and energy demand reduction. Meanwhile, relying on LNG means creating more reliance on imported, expensive and polluting fossil fuels with significant human rights implications. It will not mean energy security for all. The costs of LNG infrastructure and the instability of price hikes and geopolitical rifts will be passed on to consumers and households. LNG does not provide a solution for energy security. This is a particular concern when LNG is sourced from the US and the geopolitical context of that.

I will provide a summary of recommendations. More information is in the opening statement briefing document we provided. The energy demand inputs used to approve a State-led strategic gas emergency reserve should be reassessed with meaningful consideration given to Ireland’s climate and energy obligations. The outcome of further analysis must take into account Ireland's obligations to the 1.5°C temperature limit and to phase out fossil fuels urgently. It must include energy demand reduction obligations under EU law and the necessary action required to comply with carbon budgets including the necessity of significantly reducing our gas use by 2030. Comprehensive environmental and human rights-based assessments of Ireland’s energy needs and energy demand projections are required per UN expert guidance including the full range of transboundary impacts arising from the proposed development. Ireland’s energy security concerns should be reassessed in line with the most recent information available on battery storage roll-out and alternative backup storage solutions including distillate oil. Overall, the provisions and requirements of the climate Act and all international, EU and national climate, environmental and human rights obligations must be upheld in any climate or energy-related policy and legislation including in relation to such energy security concerns.

I will deliver an abbreviated form of my opening statement to facilitate members' questions. I ask that my statement in full, particularly all of the detailed footnotes and references, be considered by the committee. I am the manager and law officer of the environmental law Ireland initiative, the primary focus of which is the protection of the environment through environmental law at national, EU and international level and the public interest of current and future generations in that respect. I have the most serious concerns around these heads and the Government's proposals while generally being agnostic in respect of development types. That is notwithstanding acknowledging concerns about continuity of energy supply in the event of serious disruption, given the unparalleled geopolitical context combined with the increasing direct and indirect impacts of what the IPCC and IPBES have described as interdependent, mutually reinforcing climate and biodiversity crises. It would be unacceptably ironic if, in reaching for a security solution here, we further fuel the environmental crises which put our very existence most at risk, eviscerate the architecture put in place to address that and fail to code for the energy vulnerabilities arising from the geopolitical crisis and the manipulative power plays du jour that are exploiting vulnerabilities. Such evisceration would also be incompatible with the core thrust of the Energy Security in Ireland to 2030 report, as outlined in more detail in my statement, which relies on both decarbonisation and adherence to our climate obligations.

What follows is without prejudice to those wider concerns on vulnerability. I will touch on elements of the legal architecture on climate change with which the Bill appears to fail to engage appropriately, particularly in head 20. I wish to also highlight related serious structural concerns, including but not limited to head 4 on designated development but also across the heads in respect of the risk of a novel, parallel and unjustified planning and permitting proposal centred around the Minister with specific issues highlighted in Annex II on heads 13, 17, 21, 22 and 28 in particular. There are concerns with basic legal environmental assessment obligations, in particular in head 7(2) and head 17(2); derogations under Article 16 of the habitats directive and alterations under head 27; risks on human rights obligations and environmental democracy requirements under head 9, notices, head 13(10), assessment, and head 17, decisions of the Minister; and head 24 on judicial review and access to justice. That list is not exhaustive.

These proposals put at serious risk the ability to deliver any such emergency reserve, leading invariably to delays, uncertainties and vulnerabilities to legal challenges in multiple forums and infringement proceedings with associated costs which need to be taken into account in the cost-benefit analysis. The essential requirement is that whatever approach is chosen, it is done in compliance with binding legal obligations not limited to climate or N -1 infrastructure. These issues also expose the State to significant claims for state liability, separate from other potential issues under investor-state dispute arrangements. It is imperative that these issues are addressed and not compounded by the tendency to ignore recommendations from diligently executed pre-legislative scrutiny, compromised Oireachtas scrutiny with guillotined debates and multiple last-minute Government amendments to legislation. It is imperative for the committee to engage on a cross-party basis to ensure that does not happen with this legislation.

Speaking plainly and relying on the links and footnotes on supporting case law in my more detailed opening statement, I wish to highlight that head 20 appears to impermissibly attempt to erode the section 15 obligation under the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 by imposing a further balancing requirement on the necessity of ensuring gas supply while not making clear how our legal and other environmental obligations will continue to be met. It goes further to deem the designated development to be compliant with the climate Act without necessitating that be demonstrated clearly as a prerequisite to this legislation or, alternatively, specifying how such compliance will be achieved.

At the most basic analysis, it seems to undermine the supremacy of EU law and be impermissibly regressive. There is an ever-increasing body of case law, much of which has already been cited, that clarifies an increasingly rigorous approach to fossil fuel consenting and climate obligations, as I have referenced, and it needs to be considered here. It also seems to imply, incorrectly, that the N -1 infrastructure standard is a requirement that can override or trump the state’s architecture for delivering on its climate obligations. I would be very happy to expand on this, particularly in light of the discussions yesterday with the Department.

There is a need for the Legislature to provide demonstrably for compliance with climate obligations as a prerequisite to proceeding with this legislation, or it has to be explicitly required within it, and not compromised. Head 4 and the explanatory text are inconsistent and problematic on transboundary impacts, as I had flagged previously. I note the Department acknowledged this to some extent yesterday. In sum, it is hard to see how not undertaking a transboundary screening could be legally justified, or how a negative conclusion on impacts could be arrived at. Head 4 needs to reflect that properly, and to allow for the scheme to provide for transboundary consultation in accordance with the Espoo Convention and Article 7 of the EIA directive.

The Government press release approving this initiative envisages the project providing for a reserve of 170,000 m³ of gas, which is sufficient for Ireland’s entire gas demand for seven days, with the storage needing to be recharged six times a year, given maintenance, including “boil off” requirements fed into the network. I note that those figures were highlighted yesterday as potentially subject to further design considerations. Ultimately, I would highlight that for there to be no increase in greenhouse gas emissions, our intake would need to be dropped for any amount fed into the network. We also need to allow for the downward trajectory in our gas consumption into the future.

The concern, of course, is that this will not happen, and we will end up with increased consumption. The general scheme needs to address that through the project’s strict adherence to the greenhouse gas management architecture approved by the Oireachtas under the climate Act, in line with its EU and international obligations, and with strict timelines. Sunset clauses will not suffice. Whatever the final design, balance needs to be achieved, and exceedance needs to be balanced by a haircut. I would be very happy to expand on that.

To comment further on head 4, while development may be advanced appropriately in phases, in plain English what is clearly envisaged is a whole-project solution, and what is functionally interdependent needs to be assessed as a whole across the full life cycle of construction, operation, recommissioning as appropriate and decommissioning, particularly given the purported temporary nature of this emergency facility, and not salami-sliced, risking distortion of impacts and non-compliance with environmental assessment obligations. Head 4 needs to reflect this clearly, and the obligations and case law cited are relied upon here. I would welcome expansion on this and on the need to assess the whole project, particularly given the design flexibilities provided for in head 20, the lack of clarity on what is proposed in the further amendment to this Bill by a further Bill, and the extent to which that touches on operational assessment or regulatory matters, any intersection with head 22, the CRU’s obligations in respect of pipelines and the risk of split assessment.

In Annex II, I have set out at a high level other serious matters of concern with the heads. It is by no means exhaustive but was subject to the time constraints pertaining in responding to the committee. I would be happy to expand on the above and answer any questions the committee may have, and-or revert later, where necessary.

I thank the committee for this opportunity and the secretariat for its assistance. I would like to highlight that the views expressed here are not necessarily the views of the parties to the project that I work on.

Thank you. We move to the members. I call Deputy Daly.

I will try to keep the questions brief. We might have to review the speaking time of five minutes. It is not a huge amount of time.

My first question is for Ms Loughran. We often hear that Ireland is a small player on the international market. In light of what Ms Loughran said about our breach of international obligations, the likelihood of not reaching our 2030 targets and the fines as a result of that, as well as the issues of energy security and demand being driven by data centres, would she like to comment on Ireland's record to date? Perhaps Ms Duffy could come in on that as well, particularly in the context of where the gas is going to come from. We all know that fracking destroys communities, particularly in the United States. I ask the witnesses to address that.

To home in on Ireland's record to date, I think the best illustration is that if the rest of the world had contributed to climate change to the same extent as Ireland, we would already have reached 3.6°C of warming. We can see how devastating the impacts already are at around 1.5°C of warming. While we are a small country, we are playing a massively disproportionate role with regard to global climate change.

I know Ms Loughran is in the middle of the reply, but she will have seen what was said yesterday about the transboundary issue having a negligible effect, or that it was not going to be taken into consideration. Perhaps she could address that also.

Anything that is being considered under our climate and energy obligations needs to take into consideration those transboundary impacts that occur from it. We are already actively contributing to a world beyond 1.5°C. The heads refer to the Espoo agreement, but that is simply not enough. The ICJ is very clear that all states have a common interest and that global climate change is of common concern, so all states are responsible to all other states in that regard.

The Climate Change Advisory Council also warns of the upstream impacts of fracking and the associated release of methane. Regarding transboundary impacts related to that, the EIA directive is not prescriptive in stating that transboundary impacts are solely within the EU. We should be taking into account the health, climate, environmental and other impacts that arise in a transboundary sense from any of our future energy demands, including fracked gas.

Would Ms Loughran say it is preposterous that there would not be transboundary effects on another jurisdiction on this island, say, or on communities in the United States, and that there would be no general increase in emissions?

Absolutely. There are the environmental impacts of fracked gas, or any kind of fossil fuel being extracted, and the ongoing high use of it. Also, given that Ireland has exceeded its fair share of the global carbon budget and is now using a very rapidly depleting carbon budget that is not ours to use, we have to consider that everything we do now is having a massive transboundary impact.

Thank you. Ms Duffy or Mr. McEvilly may wish to come in.

As this committee knows well, there is no doubt about the impact that fracked gas has had on communities in the United States. It is an issue of huge cognitive dissonance that we banned it here, yet we are willing to bring it in through the back door in schemes such as this.

In relation to data centres, committee members will know the demand they are taking from our electricity system. One of the core points that I would come back to in terms of environmental democracy is that if we are looking at energy security or gas supply, we need to look at what the alternatives are, including reducing demand. Right now, as Mr. McEvilly mentioned, data centres are the biggest drivers of growth. He may wish to comment on the emissions.

With regard to emissions, I particularly want to address head 20 in more detail. I fully agree with Ms Loughran on the Bill simply deeming compliance with the Espoo Convention as being very problematic legally. We also have concerns arising from the Department's explanation to the committee, as noted yesterday, that head 20 is required due to legal uncertainty regarding compliance with climate law. Its purpose, according to the Department, is to de-risk the project. This seems to acknowledge that the proposed development is likely to generate additional emissions and may not be compatible with existing climate obligations, and the legislative response is, therefore, simply to deem the project compliant as a matter of law.

This raises fundamental and fairly obvious rule of law concerns. Rather than introducing substantive safeguards or conditions designed to ensure and demonstrate actual compliance with the Act, the Bill is seeking to resolve uncertainty by legislating away compliance.

Ms Uí Bhroin mentioned the exemptions. She heard the Department’s view on the legal background yesterday, which is that there are exemptions within the EU climate framework.

Does Ms Uí Bhroin have any comment to make on that? She mentioned in her opening statement the downward trajectory which was mentioned yesterday and the need for a haircut, as she said. Will she expand on that please?

I thank the Deputy. It is very helpful to have this opportunity to clarify because there was a little confusion arising from his question yesterday about whether there is an exemption in the EU climate architecture for infrastructure of this type. The initial response from the Department was to indicate there was and reference was made to the environmental impact assessment directive. There is provision under Article 1.3 to exempt from the EIA directive. That is materially different to any exemption from climate obligations. I noted later in the session the Department corrected itself and withdrew that, saying there was no intention to leverage an EIA exemption. It would not have served for the purposes of the Deputy's question and if I recollect properly it was Senator Higgins who was able to finally ascertain from the Department that there was in fact no exemption under the climate architecture. Nobody is beating about the bush here. EU law supremacy and our international law obligations pertain here. Even if we go down this route the implication is if there is an exceedance we have to bear a haircut somewhere else and we need to know the scale of our emissions in order to balance our obligations.

What type of a haircut is Ms Uí Bhroin talking about? That is my last question.

The difficulty with the haircut is what we are looking at in terms of the PR that was issued is 170,000 cu. m of gas, which it was indicated was to provide for either seven days of full gas demand or a six-month facility for the warming or supply of 200,000 homes. It was indicated yesterday that it was not clear whether in order to maintain that, six shipments would still be needed, because it is not like a packet of biscuits you can put in the cupboard to keep for when the visitors arrive. Due to the boil-off requirements you potentially have to draw the gas and feed it into the network. That may mean you are increasing supply or else you need to reduce your intake elsewhere. The problem with yesterday was we heard from the Department that the final design is not clear. We do not know the extent to which that draw-off will involve six shipments. It may be more or less depending on the final design. This is now emerging as a really key concern about how this project is going to be structured and how the legislation for it will be structured across two Bills. That will potentially compromise the ability to assess this, especially given the design flexibilities that are provided for in these heads. It could be down at one end of the equation or up at the other end. We need to be very careful we do not end up going so far down a road that we have committed to this, have our backs up against the wall, have spent a lot of money on it and then find out we are going to blow the ceiling off because of the final design specifications GNI or whatever body ultimately decides upon. It is a pig in a poke. I urge caution on what members are being asked to sign off on here.

Ms Uí Bhroin would be afraid the ten-year period that was mentioned yesterday would be expanded.

I am sorry, a Theachta, your colleague is next. You will get another round. An Teachta Cronin.

Ms Uí Bhroin would be afraid the ten-year period would be expanded

I am sorry but we have to keep to the time. An Teachta Cronin.

Thanks very much. I thank the witnesses for their opening statements and the information in those. I would like to speak about the implications of purchasing LNG from a country that is no longer signed up to the Paris Agreement and the effect of that on transboundary impacts.

This refers back to what Ms Duffy and I think also Ms Loughran said previously about the geopolitics having really changed in recent years. Yesterday the Department stated the geopolitics had changed in recent years in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine but more recently major think-tanks, researchers and analysts across the EU are pointing to the risks of increased reliance on US LNG, which for other EU member states has simply replaced Russian gas. That is the geopolitical risk. The emissions risk comes back to the fact that LNG shipments from the US generally involve, in terms of the companies that are relevant here, the fracked gas process. There may be a response that it cannot be guaranteed exactly what the source of LNG shipments to an Irish terminal would be, but as Ms Loughran has referred to, under the Espoo Convention there is a need to examine transboundary impacts and to assess that under international law. It is not sufficient the heads simply state that Ireland is deemed to be in compliance with it.

I ask Ms Uí Bhroin about head 13 in respect of vulnerabilities to accidents and disasters that might be relevant to this project.

I thank the Deputy. If I can highlight something I omitted in response to Deputy Daly, the gas storage regulation is explicit in Article 6b.4, which emphasises adherence to climate governance regulations as does recital 28. That was just for completeness.

It is very concerning head 13 refers to just one aspect of the Article 3 assessment obligations under the environmental impact assessment directive. There was an amendment to the directive in 2014 that introduced a further consideration reflected across the entirety of the directive that is concerned with the broader concerns about vulnerability to accidents and the relevance of these matters to the project and its assessment. It fails to consider the additionally highly relevant Article 3.2 obligations in respect of vulnerability to accidents and disasters relevant to the project concerned. One could take a very broad interpretation of what that means in terms of this being targeted as a piece of strategic infrastructure and the potential catastrophes that could result for local communities consequent on that, as well as the broader downstream impacts in relation to security but also the broader implications of climate change and disasters associated with that, which Ms Loughran has already very eloquently spoken about. It is also quite a concern in relation to head 22, the overlap with that and the role of the CRU in sanctioning the pipeline and the conditions it will impose around that, especially to do with safety considerations and how they seem to be left outside the environmental impact assessment charge to the board.

Could I ask about the environmental impact assessment? I asked about that yesterday and the proposed phased nature of it. Could Ms Uí Bhroin explain how the EIA is usually conducted and how the proposed EIA for this project is different?

That is a really interesting question because what we have moved to, particularly with large strategic infrastructure development, is that the competent body on these is an organisation like An Bord Pleanála or in some instances, such as with industrial emissions directives, the EPA. However, what is proposed here is a very unclear hybrid where certain aspects of the environmental impact assessment obligations are left with the board but ultimately the decision is going to be made by the Minister. What is particularly problematic with that is, firstly, the lack of rationale and justification for it and the risks it brings to bear in relation to an entirely new configuration of planning legislation. Where you introduce something new you potentially introduce the risk of errors, especially where you have a set of heads as vague and flawed as these are in so many respects. However, it seems the Minister is ultimately making decisions on the scope and adequacy of the application but the board is making decisions on whether it actually acquires additional information.

Ultimately, it passes a recommendation to the Minister. It is very hard to see, and I am with Sr. Maureen in the Presentation convent in Kerry on this, that the Minister will not just effectively be rubber-stamping this and, at the same time, leaving matters over for the CRU to make determinations on that could impact the assessment and leave us open to the same types of vulnerabilities as we had in a serious case against Ireland, C-50/09, where we had incompatible decision-making happening between the EPA and An Bord Pleanála. Independence in decision-making, therefore, is actually something really important, and it is very hard to see how this can be independent and that the Minister will not ultimately be conflicted in respect of what he is ultimately doing. This is a specific issue in the context of the EIA directive, particularly Article 9a, as amended.

I thank the witnesses for all the work they have put into this. A lot of thought and consideration has gone into it and it is very interesting. I just note that in her opening statement, Ms Uí Bhroin stated "It is imperative for the committee to engage on a cross-party basis", and I agree. I think it is really important. I have to say I am really surprised there are only Opposition members here today to hear these testimonies. The more I am hearing about this issue, the more I am actually worried this is going to get rubber-stamped through and there are serious flaws not just in the rationale for it but in how it is going to be applied.

Talking about what the rationale is, the Department has leaned very heavily into the N-1 standard and the need to be compliant with it. Obviously, we had a discussion on it yesterday. When we look at Gas Networks Ireland, it is similarly saying this is required because of this directive. In fact, Gas Networks Ireland says it is required but does not say it is for a one-day period, which is what we actually ascertained yesterday. It is only a one-day interruption we are talking about.

Yesterday, we also had the discussion that the fact it may only be one day, but that we would, essentially, have to repair the interconnector, which could take six months, and therefore this project is necessary because we would need to cover it for the six months. When I look at the Government website and the explanation of it, it says the FSRU would have the ability to supply the entire gas demand for Ireland for seven days and would be refilled to continue to supply national gas networks. I am not sure where this six-month period is actually coming from because it will only be able to cover that period for six or seven days, which I think completely undermines the argument.

Friends of the Earth and Trócaire have raised issues in their own submissions in relation to the N-1 aspect, so I ask them to expand on those. Ms Uí Bhroin said it does not override the climate obligations and that it is a resilience metric and not a mandate. I ask Mr. McEvilly or Ms Duffy to go into the EU law aspect, where it has to be achieved through the least distortive and most proportionate measures. I ask them to expand a bit on that too.

I will start. I would agree with the Deputy's point that there is a substantive risk a State LNG terminal, without any sort of guardrails included, could operate as a commercial facility. In terms of N-1, we and Ms Uí Bhroin have made the crucial point that even adherence to the N-1 principle does not preclude or negate compliance with EU climate law. In terms of the solutions put forward, there is an equal obligation on the Government to ensure that it aligns with climate law. Deputy Whitmore did not bring this up but in terms of some of the discussion yesterday around N-1 and secondary fuel obligations, the Department referred to the fact on a number of occasions that secondary fuel obligations are not specifically noted as a particular factor in the N-1 calculation. I appreciate that this is rather technical but it is important because it is as a result of the stated point around non-compliance that the justification for the facility comes from. What is important to note on this is that the regulation does not explicitly require member states to assume fuel switching by gas power plants but nor does it preclude treating demonstrable fuel switching as a market-based demand measure. Excluding such measures is not compelled by the N-1 methodology, and rather reflects a choice.

Very briefly on this as well, because it is important, this also relates to costs, which we might come back to later. Secondary fuel obligations are there and paid for, ultimately, by all energy consumers as an emergency measure. Where we are stating it is not only necessary to have secondary fuel obligations but also a long-term LNG terminal for insurance purposes, there is a real risk that consumers are paying twice here and that needs to be interrogated in much more detail.

Very briefly, I thank the Deputy for her question and I think it goes to the heart of the issue here in terms of the row-back on environmental democracy. Ms Uí Bhroin outlined it. This is very complicated and long term. If there was any time to not actually be changing agreed processes set out in legislation and climate law, it is this on LNG. I even refer to the point the Deputy made around confusion about what is on Gas Networks Ireland's website. We would say this particular scheme is moving the impact assessment and the risk and public trust and participation from this side of the process, which needs to happen now so we can all understand the complications of it, particularly the communities that are going to be affected, to the other end of a process. This is because it is inevitable there is arguability here and that this is not in compliance with EU law. The risk is being shifted to the end, rather than there being proper consideration, proper information, participation and due diligence and assessment right now.

I thank the Deputy. In relation to the seven days and six months, I think there was, shall we say, a very useful interrogation by the committee yesterday in terms of dispelling what the general scheme seemed to present as an imperative around N-1. It emerged that there is a broader agenda at stake in relation to facilitating a window to facilitate repair of key infrastructure if it was damaged. What is not clear is, in the context of the supply, then, who is going to benefit. Is it going to be 200 homes? Is it going to be the 250 large gas users? These are key issues. Ultimately, the committee really needs to keep asking "Cui bono?", why we are doing this and what we are exposing ourselves to as a consequence. Also very importantly, what expectations are we setting for those big corporate interests in relation to the security of the supply? If we change a policy position, will we then end up with significant potential liabilities and vulnerabilities to being sued over? These are really serious questions.

Ultimately, however, in relation to the implications for emissions and where the rubber hits the road in relation to head 20 is if the facility, in order to maintain it, pumps gas into the networks to reduce the boil-off and we then need to reduce our consumption or our inputs elsewhere. We need to be very clear in relation to the overall implications on emissions, particularly given the nature of LNG, which others have spoken to very eloquently here this morning, and how detrimental to the climate and, indeed, the wider environment that is in relation to our calculations and assessment. While the Bill may seek to exonerate the Minister in terms of a balancing requirement that there is a bigger picture needed here, that is all well and good - indeed, the Supreme Court judgment on Coolglass went some way along that route yesterday - but that does not negate the obligations to deliver on our climate obligations as legal and moral imperatives. That is the fundamental issue.

The language in the heads, the language used yesterday, means that, ultimately, the problem is where that obligation will be addressed. Will it be addressed as something that is done as an assessment and a prerequisite, in which we can safely say that it is fine, we can now pass this legislation, or will safeguards be put into the legislation to make sure the proper checks and balances are done in respect of the emissions?

That is absolutely not clear from what is presented, particularly in respect of head 20. Saying something, does not make it so.

My first question is to Ms Uí Bhroin and it is around head 11 on the consultation process and head 24 on judicial review, access to justice and the issues around the protection of plaintiffs from costs, which primarily talks about a truncated or an accelerated process for judicial review. Has Ms Uí Bhroin a view on that? When it comes to the consultation process, it appears to be a bare minimum and not, in my view, in compliance with the Aarhus Convention but Ms Uí Bhroin she is the expert on this.

These are really important questions. As Ms Duffy also highlighted, there has never been an area where we have needed environmental democracy and that oversight more.

In respect of the consultation and taking the process logically, the Aarhus Convention is international law but it has further effect with enforcement and impact consequent on the EU having also ratified the convention. It comes to us an integral part of the EU legal order. It effectively underpins the environmental impact assessment directive and its public consultation obligations. They require effective consultation and that is a loaded term in respect of reasonable timeframes, the complexities of the material, etc. I could go on all day on this.

It is concerning that the timeframes may not be reasonable but what is particularly concerning is what is going to happen with the consultation input. In head 13(10), there is a real concern about the time window which may be afforded to the board to consider the input that it has got, and the actual obligation is to give due consideration in the decision. That is a real problem. At the back end, you have a problem with judicial review where we have seen a really alarming trend in relation to regression on judicial review provisions. What is not clear in these heads is what is meant by "expedited timeframes"? Is that going to mean a narrower window? There are even basic flaws here with time running from the date of decision rather than the dates of notification. If I was to go through this like a teacher with a red pen, I would run out of ink.

Is it even made more complicated by the fact that we are talking two pieces of legislation? There is this Bill and then there is enabling legislation that the Government says will come down the line after.

I think that is a really key point because invariably there is always the dilemma of whether you act too soon, move too soon or move too late in relation to judicial review. We could have a lot of false starts with people trying to raise arguments and then it being said that this is a matter that will be dealt with in the second Bill or this will be decided later. This is going to cause an awful lot of confusion. My core recommendation is that this should be one Bill in its entirety.

This split is not even clear. The legislative programme speaks to regulation. The terminology yesterday and variously been around operation but if we are to assess this as a whole - as an interdependent project or interdependent functionality - we need to understand the beginning, middle and end of this and be able to assess it as a whole. We also need to be able to look at that then in terms of consultation and also access to justice requirements.

My second question is to Ms Loughran. I am going back to the Climate Change Advisory Council's carbon budget proposal in 2024. On the climate justice piece, it deliberately speaks about a minimalist approach to it and moving from the Paris test to climate neutrality and that if there were more inclusion of equity and justice considerations, such as adopting burden-sharing principles or non-egalitarian distribution of justice patterns, it would almost certainly increase Ireland's responsibility and decrease its overall carbon budget.

It is ironic that we thankfully now have record ODA, budgets for less developed countries. However, by increasing that, are we also contributing to the problems that are being caused in these countries by not taking a burden-sharing approach?

I thank the Senator for his question. We are definitely increasing our responsibility for global climate change and then also the amount of climate finance we should be providing to global south communities and countries because of the harm we have caused.

The Climate Change Advisory Council's proposals are back for review and we are yet to hear where that process is. However, when we look at the modelling by the energy policy modelling group, EPMG, from UCC and what it recommended, it is still a lot more stringent in terms of our energy demand and where we need to get to than anything that is reflected in this decision to approve a State-led LNG facility and associated development. It talks about getting off fossil fuels between 2030 and 2040 and that is ultimately still later than our obligations per international law and the guidance from UN experts on human rights. If we were to actually take those into consideration, we would drastically reduce the burden we are putting ourselves under in terms of meeting our climate budgets but also the burden we are putting on communities around the world because we are using a carbon budget that is not ours to use.

It is really important that we do not lose sight of the fact that by simply accepting the basis on which this decision was made, the energy demand assumptions, we are essentially accepting that we will continue to fail our on climate obligations into the future. How can that be held up in terms of the ICJ's recent advisory opinion and clarifications of states' responsibilities with regard to climate change and due diligence obligations in that respect? The ICJ says that the compliance of parties with their obligations of conduct under the Paris Agreement is assessed on the basis on whether the party has exercised due diligence and employed best efforts by using all means at its disposal in their performance under the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C limit.

We know that it will go beyond the N-1 standard if the assessment does not take into consideration our climate and energy obligations but it also does not consider actual stores of energy that we have available right now under licensing agreements for gas power plants. Going head first down the road of more fossil fuel infrastructure in the midst of a climate emergency is simply unfathomable in my opinion.

It is striking and there is the reality check of remembering that we are talking about the common but differentiated responsibilities that are in the Paris Agreement. That is the obligation for states that have profited more and done more to do more.

There is a striking lack of ambition that we cannot envisage that in the next five years, these 250 very large companies and very large users could not possibly move towards a point where they are not gas dependent and that this is somehow something the State cannot imagine moving to or that investing in battery power is out of reach. The actual imaging and planning is to have the very largest industries in Ireland still dependent on gas in 2030 and going into the 2040s at a point when we are supposedly meant to be at zero fossil fuel usage by 2050. It feels like that in that very limited 15 years, surely those five years could be used in a very different way.

In terms of the alternative pieces, it was very striking, as was said, that it is seven days in terms of supply and at a minimum it seems there will be shipments. We are not going to have six months' worth of energy sitting in a tanker because it is going to need to be replenished every two months at an absolute minimum if it is six shipments a year.

What we are actually being asked to sign off on is the ongoing use of LNG every single month, every single year. There will be six shipments a year. We are being asked to use LNG and effectively make LNG part of our energy mix. It is interesting that we have that NORA 90-day reserve, which we know can be used and which is not dependent on the geopolitical uncertainty of whether or not a ship will arrive. It seems to me that we already had a back-up plan but it has been very intentionally discounted and moved off the table. We might come back to that in a minute with Mr. McEvilly.

I want to focus on the international piece again, not just about the injustice piece but also the danger this does in opening us to wider LNG. We are not really talking about a single terminal. If we are talking about permitting an LNG terminal, what does that do in creating additional vulnerability to commercial LNG entry into Ireland? Does it make it harder for us? We can take the Coolglass judgment as an example. We know the board of An Coimisiún Pleanála is meant to make decisions based on climate, etc., yet we are going to have a process that effectively exempts and removes an LNG facility from that process. We are going to have an environmental impact assessment effectively rubber-stamped by the Minister. Not only I am concerned that the environmental impact assessment may well be flawed and rubber-stamped by the Minister, but I am also concerned that it sets a precedent when it comes to environmental impact assessments and LNG, which then may be used or leaned on by the commercial LNG companies that are looking to it. By puncturing our climate Act and dismantling how the planning system engages with climate issues on LNG, what vulnerabilities do we create in the context of commercial LNG?

Ms Uí Bhroin mentioned the potential liabilities and court cases that can come in. I believe there was one such case in Germany involving commercial actors. If we end up with this LNG entering the system, there is question of whether a commercial activity, which does not seem to have been closed off, gets attached to that. Does it then get looked at as something where commercial actors can potentially take cases? I am very concerned about that piece. Will the witnesses comment on those vulnerabilities?

Of course, we know that under public policy rules in the EU, there is an option – we relied on this in the context of the occupied territories Bill - for a state to outlaw LNG, for example, on a public policy ground. With the ban on fracking, we had a good case for that. Do we undermine that case?

I thoroughly agree with the Senator’s opening comments. This puts in question effectively the trajectory to 2050 on the national climate objective, given what the Government has laid out. It is also concerning that this potentially opens it, notwithstanding the position of the Department and Government that this will be State-led. Something being Stat- led is very different from a State project or something being State-driven or State-owned, however. The concept of State-led is very different, and I will come back to that point in a second.

The practicalities for the board are going to be compounded in this regard. If we have indicated that LNG is potentially compatible with our climate obligations, how does this leave us when it comes to our duty to assess any commercial application that can come before the board? Anyone is entitled to bring an application to the board. We cannot stop that, basically. The only way we can do so is by making a clear policy in respect of LNG, which is what we had in the past but now the State is puncturing that.

Practicalities of the decision-making process for the board are further compounded with the puncturing of climate obligations and the disparate standard that is being applied to one type of developer versus another type of developer in relation to this. They are particularly compounded by the fact that Gas Networks Ireland, GNI, speaks to potentially engaging in joint ventures on this. There are multiple elements of liability in terms of the legitimate expectations that developers may have consequent on contractual obligations, joint partnerships and ventures around this and the periods over which it is used that will lock us in, either at a State level or in the expectation of the commercial value of engaging with Ireland. I am happy to come back to the Senator with more specifics because it is a complicated area, and I can touch on that German issue in particular. I agree with her; it makes it much more difficult for us to say “No” to commercial LNG.

I wish to come back on the commercial issue and the issue of the 250 to 300 large energy users. First, in response to questions by Deputy Ahern yesterday, the Department seemed to note at one stage that there is no rationale for a commercial facility from an energy security perspective. If that is the case, why is that not noted at any stage in any way in the Bill? Second, I agree with Ms Uí Bhroin about the possibility of joint ventures. We have major concerns with head 8, which seems to allow for an unspecified identity other than GNI to apply for development approval. While the explanatory note notes that this is a technicality to allow for a potential GNI subsidiary, this is contradicted by the inclusion of the phrase “or if the Minister deems it expedient for another public of private body to make the application”. There is a major risk around a commercial entity playing some sort of a role, which then bears major implications. Evidently, a commercial entity would only have commercial interests - profit-driven interests - as opposed to the State’s interest in terms of security. It is repeatedly noted to us that the entire purpose of this Bill and the development of LNG more generally is for security reasons.

I will briefly turn to this issue of demand resulting from the 250 to 350 large industrial users. This is raised in the context that if we did not have a facility like an LNG terminal, these industrial facilities would be exposed or they would potentially have to turn off. The implications seem to us that they are in reference to pharmaceuticals and data centres. This is significant for the committee because it opens up the fundamental question as to why all energy consumers should be required to bear the cost of a highly polluting and expensive insurance policy in terms of LNG when many large industrial users can or already have viable alternatives. It is essentially a socialisation of LNG costs across all households and small businesses when a significant share of the emergency risk arises from a relatively narrow cohort of large energy users.

To bring it back to the scheme itself, heads 2, 4 and 22 speak directly and indirectly to costs. That is why it is important that the committee does not simply accept costs as a secondary issue that can be addressed when this legislation is in place or taken up by the CRU. To be specific, head 2 addresses the issue of administrative costs. Head 4 notes the inclusion of pipeline development. Pipeline development consenting approval is the responsibility of the CRU, however. How will the Minister’s powers interact with the CRU’s duty to prevent disproportionate increases in energy costs, including from pipelines? Lastly, head 22, by allowing the Minister to set the timeline for section 39A approvals and preventing proper public consultation, the Bill removes the checks that the CRU would provide in protecting customers from high infrastructure costs.

On the risk of commercial LNG, I am sure everyone here is aware that the approval of the State-led facility has led to the removal of the policy statement on fracked gas, which was the grounds on which former cases or applications for commercial entities to build commercial LNG facilities here were refused and rejected through the planning systems and the courts. That being removed is already opening us to those applications being renewed and resubmitted to An Coimisiún Pleanála. Legal representatives from those same private entities that have opened applications with An Coimisiún Pleanála have already written and highlighted in their communications to An Coimisiún Pleanála that introducing State-led LNG but not allowing commercial LNG opens Ireland to a risk of discriminating against private entities because it cannot simply allow State-led LNG and not commercial LNG. This proposal poses a serious risk in opening the door to LNG wholesale.

I apologise for being late this afternoon. I thank all the witnesses for coming in.

At the outset it strikes me that building fossil fuel infrastructure like this is just a monument to our failure to transition to cleaner fuels. I find it quite ironic that the first sense of urgency we get from the Department of climate is in relation to building new fossil fuel infrastructure. It is a question for the witnesses, as they are watching this all the time. Have the witnesses seen a sense of urgency like this from the Department in relation to anything else other than this building of fossil fuel infrastructure?

The second question I have may be more appropriate for Ms Uí Bhroin as it may be more her area than the others. We are looking at a bespoke planning process here, with the view from the Government's perspective to speed up the process, but is there a chance that this might be counterproductive and that it actually may result in more delays to this thing for the Government by using this approach? I would be interested in the thoughts of all the witnesses on that as well.

The short answer is "Yes". Just this year we have seen a number of initiatives around the facilitation of hyperscale data centres in the State. That has been proceeding with quite a bit of urgency since the CRU decision in December. There is clear intent in terms of where the urgency and the prioritisation is going. At the same time, the Deputy will be aware that we have no climate action plan and the ministerial hearings have not taken place. We are now told that we will not meet our binding climate targets. There is a clear contradictory pathway there which has got us out of line with our EU binding climate targets. That would be our take on it in terms of where the urgency is right now. Consider Articles 5 and 6 of the Aarhus Convention on public consultation and assessment. They are there for a reason because there are ideas out there and there are alternatives out there. The committee has seen some of the experts coming in here and talking about energy security. This is why we are involved in environmental democracy. That is where the urgency needs to be, with the full impact assessment and the consultation.

I did not note the Deputy's second question-----

It was on the bespoke nature of the planning process. There is this whole new planning process just for this project. Could that be counterproductive?

I will pass over to colleagues now but of course it will be because there are all these unknowns. The reality is that if the intent of this legislation was strictly that it would be emergency, that it would be short lived and that there would be no commercial LNG, it would be drafted in a completely different way and it would be drafted in a way that is in compliance with EU law and the climate Act but it is not drafted in that way. That gives us a clear pathway in terms of intent. We are really concerned that when we talk about the erosion of democracy and about things changing and a transition, trust and public trust are the most important things in terms of this climate transition as well as a vision. If one is putting in place planning processes that are concentrating power and that are bespoke and if one is overriding the climate Act, it means, as the members well know, that there is a precedent set and it can happen elsewhere with other public bodies, notwithstanding the Coolglass ruling yesterday.

What I would have seen particularly over the last Government and this Government is a focus on consenting and fast-tracking consenting, but not ensuring delivery. We have seen that in the context of the ongoing failure in relation to housing and indeed renewable energy delivery. It is potentially in developers' interests to have consents because they realise investment potential and wealth. They build up wealth associated with that. The longer they sit on things and the longer they constrain, the more they can leverage the Government to give further incentives. Prices go up the more that supply is constrained. Technologies then emerge which basically can reduce the price point the longer you delay. We have seen endless amendments, and very controversial amendments by the Government, to facilitate the extension of durations of permissions to the extent where these have actually been highlighted by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee to be completely in breach of the Aarhus Convention. Chapter 5, Part 4 of the 2024 Act is relied upon in these heads to facilitate amendment and alterations of the permissions arising, notwithstanding the fact that this has been very clearly indicated to be not compliant with the convention. In the context of the Planning and Development Act we had seen new legislation, which most of us welcomed the idea of, but effectively we had an entire review of legislation but not one word of justification for that ever being published. We were just presented with the legislative changes. That was rushed through. Within six months of that we ended up having to have major changes to that legislation and just in the earlier part of this year we now have further changes to that legislation on the most basic elements to comply and align with the national planning framework and Part 3 of that Bill.

Where we are rushing through legislation we are making mistakes and we are tripping ourselves up. More haste, less speed. Now here we go again. We potentially have another entirely bespoke piece of legislation. The problem I highlighted earlier, before the Deputy was able to join us, is that there are multiple issues across multiple heads in relation to basic issues of compliance. There are multiple elements of compliance with the EIA directive, the habitats directive, the birds directive, etc., which arise in these heads. Going back to the Senator's earlier point on judicial reviews, the problem is that all of this is underpinned by a huge body of law and it lends itself then to the exercise of rights, particularly under the right to effective judicial remedies, which are set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Any impingement on those rights needs to be justified and proportionate and have appropriate safeguards. That is laid out very clearly in judgments of the Court of Justice such as in the Puškár case. What we are setting up is a recipe for problematic legislation on something that we are saying is desperately needed to be delivered for safety and security. The sensible thing to do would be to leverage what we have got as tried and trusted legislation, albeit not entirely perfect, and structures for decision-making while leveraging the expertise within the board, etc., to make proper decisions around this and not try to introduce what are clearly, on the face of even the most superficial analysis, deeply problematic heads that are non-compliant with multiple provisions, and which will be counterproductive, to use the Deputy's very words.

Does Ms Loughran want to come in very briefly?

One thing that has moved at a pace, and which I suppose has been not expected, is the roll-out and expansion of backup battery storage. It is becoming all the more cheaper as time goes on. In 2022 it was expected that Ireland would have 335 MW available in battery storage but already has now three times that amount and has surpassed the 2030 assumption made by the 2022 CEPA analysis as to the battery stores that would be available to us. That has not been taken into consideration with the other kinds of alternatives to LNG. That is in the most recent CEPA analysis.

I thank the witnesses. I will let members back in with strictly one minute for questions please for those who have indicated. Please stick to the time because we have a second session due to start shortly.

It has been raised with me by someone who is concerned about this that if this State-led infrastructure facility is designated as a gas entry point for Ireland then potentially, under EU legislation, commercial entities cannot be discriminated against and not have access to that entry point. I know this is very specific and Ms Loughran might have touched on it. Does anyone have any information on that or are they aware of that concern? It would be a huge concern to me that this is being sold as a State-led structure but it may be forced under EU laws to allow commercial access.

There is one element I really would like to highlight, which is that Ireland is party to the Energy Charter Treaty. Within that there are provisions for investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, where Ireland can be sued for policies and legislation that impact upon the profitability of countries. While we are expecting to withdraw from that, the simple fact of the matter is that effectively there is a zombie clause in it so even if we withdraw, exposure on matters that have been entered into can last for up to 20 years. We are also seeing pushes to ratify other agreements with similar clauses in them like the EU-Canada trade agreement. This raises very specific issues in relation to the types of vulnerabilities we may have where there may be joint ventures.

It is not just in the context of the heads. The business case GNI has speaks to joint ventures or different types of arrangement. The expectations of companies that get involved in the supply of construction, LNG, etc., leave us open to significant potential claims down the road, running into billions of euro. That is entirely separate to State liability, where expectation is consequent on the smooth operation of this and on consents granted, which may subsequently be challenged and found to be unlawful, giving rise to legitimate challenges under State liability - an entirely separate thing - for loss of expectations.

There are multiple issues apart from the broader policy things which, as I indicated in reply to Senator Higgins, I would be happy to revert on because they are complex and incredibly important. Exposure to commercial LNG is a serious concern in us dealing with certain operators in the context of one thing and dealing with them entirely differently on another, and forfeiting our ability to say, "No, this is not a technology that we are prepared to deal with, full stop."

The risk, as Ms Uí Bhroin said, is not solely in the context of this Bill. There is the communication I mentioned earlier. The risk is to do with the entire approval and decision to pursue State-led LNG. This communication from legal representation for private entities was sent last year to An Coimisiún Pleanála. I am happy to revert to the committee with further details.

We have to appreciate the risk of the perverse incentive. Where this facility is built, there will be a natural inclination or interest in government in ensuring it is used as much as possible and a disinclination to phase a facility out where there is large-scale investment. There is also the potential for mission creep, where the facility is not simply used for true emergency purposes but could be used where there is a need for additional balancing in the system. Lastly and most substantively, it is a major fundamental issue that this and the previous Government repeatedly stated the State-owned facility should only be put in place subject to certain court conditions, including not increasing gas demand and ensuring compliance with climate law. We simply do not see that in the scheme in front of us.

The Coolglass ruling was handed down yesterday by the Supreme Court. It partially upheld a High Court decision in favour of climate action in the case of a proposed wind farm in County Laois. Do the witnesses see this ruling having any impact on the proposed Bill?

It is a 94-page judgment and I confess to not having had a chance to digest it fully, particularly as I was trying to follow the committee meeting yesterday. It is profoundly important. To the best of my understanding at this point - I reserve my right to revert on this - it makes a nuanced interpretation of section 15. I find paragraph 118 of the judgment to be particularly pertinent. It interprets "as far as practicable" as envisaging a Minister or public body has the right to consider other factors. I spoke to this earlier. While one has the right to consider other factors, that does not negate the broader EU law obligations and the supremacy of those obligations. We need to be mindful of that. There is the right of the Minister to take other considerations into account in respect of section 15 and to balance things out, but he still has to balance the books in relation to climate, particularly in the context of this being a project and a Bill envisaged as State-driven. The responsibility and domain of control of that is within the capacity of the Government to address within its carbon budgets and climate action plans. It is the gatekeeper. It can manage the books in relation to the climate accounts and it would be an abrogation of responsibility for it to fail to do so.

In the context of what has emerged from the court, we have seen the Government move to adapt and respond. It is a bit like the borg. Somebody zones in with a successful missile and the Government moves to change the legislation. Notwithstanding what is in Coolglass, by the time I would expect to see a published Bill on this, the Government will probably have changed the nuance around section 15 to suit what it wants. We cannot necessarily take comfort from Coolglass because the Government plans, it would appear from what we have seen thus far, to try to write its obligations out. It cannot do that. That is the simple fact of the matter. It will be challenged and the project will be delayed. It will not be a secure supply. That is the fundamental thing we heard from the Department yesterday: the N-1 infrastructure has to be secure.

It is also worrying that we had to fight to get pre-legislative scrutiny on this. It is crazy.

I have read 20 to 30 pages of the Coolglass judgment. While the Supreme Court may have had different reasoning from the High Court's, and it may be less expansive, it has doubled down on the national climate objective and on the section 15 responsibility on public bodies. It has to be real and effective. As Ms Uí Bhroin said, it ultimately made very clear that it is justiciable and enforceable by the courts. The reality for any executive or legislator is that anything that happens can go to the courts: that is judicial review; that is the European Commission infringement; in relation to Aarhus, that is the European Court of Justice. That is the balance here. Either put the work in now in one Bill that is properly drafted with consultation and impact assessment, or risk that down the line. I think any taxpayer or policy person would say do the job now and put the resources there now, rather than incurring costs and wasted time down the line.

You cannot "deem" your way out of the climate science, the facts or, indeed, the climate law. Even if you put down on paper that you are deeming yourself compliant with something which is actually measurable and concrete, you certainly cannot "deem" yourself out of EU obligations or our obligations under Paris. Does Ms Uí Bhroin want to comment on the Namur-Est case? She mentioned it in her written submission.

The fundamental issue I want to come back to is fracked gas. It is clear it needs to be one Bill and that the climate laws come up against it. Is Ireland now an advocate for the continuation of fracking in the United States? Does it become a risk for us if the United States moves towards a ban on fracking and LNG? Can we go back for a minute to why LNG, fracked gas and methane are climate accelerants? They are worse than other fossil fuels.

There are two parts to that.

There is the technical one on Namur-Est and then that one on-----

On Namur-Est, heads 7(2) and 17 speak to a derogation licence in respect of obligations under Article 16 of the habitats directive. It is the strictest protection we have under EU law for species listed under annex 4, things like cetaceans and otters. It provides for a derogation but where information that a derogation is required comes to light before the environmental impact assessment, you need to have the derogation licence in place. Namur-Est is a case before the CJEU and is explicit on that.

What is gravely concerning is the heads refer to a case called Hellfire Massy, which refers to an entirely different situation where the information on the requirement for a derogation comes to light after the environmental impact assessment. The heads seem to be trying to create a never-never land wherein the board acknowledges the fact there is a derogation licence, gives its recommendation to the Minister and tells the Minister to make the decision on that licence, instead of the Minister with responsibility in the Department Housing, Local Government and Heritage, as Senator Noonan knows from his previous office.

This is one example of fundamental EU law issues that are really concerning throughout the heads.

What about fracking?

LNG is mostly methane, and fracking especially produces even higher levels of methane. The Climate Change Advisory Council, in its warning about LNG terminals being introduced to Ireland, did not specify whether they were to be commercial or State-led. The warning remains the same for both, particularly when the LNG will be sourced via fracking. The process of liquefying, transporting, storing and then regasifying the LNG and its boil-off effect when it is in storage is also a very energy intensive process. We mention that makes LNG far more polluting than coal throughout its life cycle. That is a quick summary of why it is so much worse. However, in terms of fracked gas and LNG from the US, plants in the Gulf area due to export LNG have been shut down for weeks because, ironically, massive weather events have put them out of operation. You have to consider the knock-on impacts of that on prices and the availability of this. There is simply no energy security in LNG.

I have a quick question for Mr. McEvilly and Ms Duffy on the work Friends of the Earth has done on energy poverty, connecting the data centres with the high cost of energy, particularly gas. We are also moving away from using the words "energy poverty" to using "energy resilience". That is unfortunate. What is the potential of these costs being levied on consumers' household energy bills and the audience being lost in terms of climate action, particularly if these costs are going to be levied on low-income households?

I will respond to that, but I will first briefly respond to Senator Higgins's question on the issue of security and potential US LNG coming into the State. An LNG facility only provides a security benefit when you can ensure those shipments of LNG will arrive. We are focusing on the US given the major political instability under the Trump Administration, but there are other exporters of LNG which are equally problematic from a geopolitical perspective and equally have major human rights abuses. On this security issue, it is important the committee does not lose sight of the fact that we are talking about a situation where both pipelines from Scotland are compromised in some way. The Government tends to focus on the potential for a single point of failure, but that needs to be interrogated in much more detail. I return to Senator Noonan's question on energy costs. This is why we are focusing on the need for the committee and the Oireachtas to address risks now. The Government has noted that there will be a levy introduced to provide for this facility. We do not know how much or what the impact on consumers will be. In addition, is it appropriate that households, including those at risk of energy poverty, which ideally should be most supported through retrofitting and heat pumps, should be expected to pay the same costs as other industrial customers for an LNG facility? The Oireachtas and this committee should be given the opportunity to address these issues now and not later.

To follow up on a point from Senator Higgins, should the 90-day oil reserve have been included in the energy security review carried out? Also, if the witnesses were to pick one head of this Bill to change, what would it be? That is a broad question. I know they have loads of issues with the Bill but, out of interest, what is the most problematic head in it?

We would say to reject head 20 in its entirety.

I mentioned before that there is nothing in the N-1 formula that explicitly precludes the inclusion of secondary fuel obligations. In other words, the Government should consider that should be included in the demand side element of the formula. In addition, what is important to the issue of costs and the need for the committee to address costs in more detail. The updated CEPA analysis, which came out in 2025, includes a remarkable table in 4.4.4 that essentially notes LNG is the least cost-effective solution by comparing its ability to meet a shortfall in the event of a scenario, purely in comparison with additional wind or storage, in other words treating them as mutually exclusive. Of course, in reality, if you are looking at alternatives to LNG to meet these risks in compliance with climate law, it would be a mix of elements. The analysis simply does not do that. In my view, it is almost written in a way so as to justify LNG from a cost perspective. It also fails to acknowledge the benefits of wind or storage in that cost analysis.

Does anyone else wish to address the concerns of the question briefly and just point it out or call it out?

On the question of what head we would want to change most, I am sorry, but I cannot pick just one. Ultimately, the basis on which this legislation has come forward and the decision to pursue State-led LNG is completely at odds with our climate and energy obligations. The whole thing needs to go.

I am adopting the answers of the other two. I would also add in head 5, disapplication of the Planning and Development Act, because I think there is security in what we have already established. Regarding the fundamentals of this proposal, Article 5 of the gas storage regulation speaks to demand management. What we are doing is effectively hijacking any renewables we manage to put into play for data centres and big energy consumption. What we need to do is use the renewables we are creating to decarbonise. That would facilitate an entirely different approach to demand management associated with this. There is a fundamental flaw, in principle, in relation to the trajectory and direction of travel of this Government, which is materially inconsistent with what it is committed to in its climate legislation. That needs to be tackled at source.

If we had the perfect storm of low winds, supply disruption and so on, and no alternative capacity, who is ultimately responsible if that situation were to occur? Second, in relation to LNG versus temporary emergency generation, TEG, if I picked Mr. McEvilly up correctly, he mentioned that it would almost become the norm rather than the exception. However, that has not happened with TEG, so why does he think it will happen with LNG?

I am not sure I fully understand the question.

Temporary energy generation, as in Shannonbridge in my constituency, was set up as a contingency and reserve. It has not been used at all yet apart from testing. Why does he see LNG as being different?

It might be useful to differentiate gas security of supply from electricity security of supply. The Government is putting forward in terms of N-1 compliance the need for an LNG facility, because in its view it could provide for that new supply entry point.

As a reserve.

Yes, but there are issues we have gone into with regard to whether it will amount to a reserve if it needs continuous flow and imports into the facility. As I understand the Deputy's question about emergency generation or emergency backup, that arises where there is a shortfall in electricity demand. Where that has not been brought online yet, as I understand it, that is because that there has not been a sufficient emergency or risk in terms of the electricity system yet as opposed to the gas system.

That problem is made fundamentally worse by increasing levels of data centre connections which are increasing demand and risk.

Gabhaim buíochas le gach duine.

You have 60 seconds, Deputy.

Yes, táim just ag iarraidh "Go raibh maith agat" a rá. Táim ag iarraidh díriú isteach ar rud amháin. Previously, Friends of the Earth was before the committee. We have to be frank about this - we need to make our grid better. It is about making gas redundant as quickly as possible, so it comes down to accelerating offshore wind and grid capacity, which everyone has been speaking about. I would like to clarify something the Friends of the Earth representatives said the last time in relation to the necessity for LNG, about how, I believe, private wires can help. Will they clarify their position? The last time they were in, they said it diverts renewable from public good. I disagree. It can unlock projects stuck in connection queues, and curtailment is the real economic loss. I understand there are worries. Is Friends of the Earth's position on private wires that they risk inequality and increased costs? What is the reasoning?

We will come to private wires.

It is in conjunction with how we will futureproof our grid and have-----

Are the witnesses happy to comment?

I will do my best. It is our position that it risks diverting renewables from public good. Ireland's electricity remains highly polluting and dependent on fossil fuel generators. Even where data centres are matched with renewables through corporate power purchase agreements or private wires, those renewables are not being used to decarbonise existing demand, they are reserved for new data centre demand, which is fundamentally problematic. The link to the Bill is that even where data centres use or are matched with more renewables, there is still a requirement for on-site backup generation, which is usually gas, and that increased electricity demand inevitably means more running of gas power plants. The risk via the electricity system is increased onto the gas system.

That is a regulatory design issue not a structural flaw of private wires.

Deputy, you are just about out of time.

It is just to show the benefit of it.

Senator Higgins wants to clarify something.

Is Mr. McEvilly telling us that the energy review this is all based on, the new one, never examined a scenario whereby we had a crisis and relied on a combination of renewable energy, storage and - we know it was excluded - the oil reserves we already have? There was no modelling of if we used all three of those versus LNG.

We are just about to wrap up. Briefly, please.

The energy security review the Government undertook examined from a security perspective the ability of different forms of generation or energy to meet those energy security risks. From a cost perspective, which I was referring to, it did not in our view undertake a proper analysis in terms of comparing what the costs would be of meeting this gap----

It did not look at a combined scenario.

It did not.

We are out of time.

It was the implications of non-compliance with our climate and its cost. It was one of the four criteria-----

I am sorry, we are out of time. We have a second session starting. I thank all of the witnesses for coming in and giving us their time today. I propose that we publish their opening statements on our committee website. Is that agreed? Agreed. We will now suspend the meeting to allow the next set of witnesses in.

We are in the second part of the session today on pre-legislative scrutiny of the general scheme of the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill 2025. We will continue our scrutiny of the Bill. I welcome the following witnesses to the meeting, from the European Heat Pump Association, Mr. Paul Kenny, director general, who is joining via Teams, and from the Kildysart Community Engagement Forum, Mr. Mike Murrihy, secretary, and Mr. Colin Garry, chairman. You are all very welcome.

In relation to parliamentary privilege, witnesses and members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make any charges against any person or entity by name or in any such way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction. In terms of the format of this session, I will invite witnesses to make an opening statement for a maximum of five minutes. Once those statements have been delivered, I will call on members to put their questions in the order in which they have indicated to me. I will call on each individual to deliver their opening statements starting with Mr. Kenny, followed by Mr. Garry.

I thank the committee for inviting me today. Apologies for not being there in person. I am coming in from Brussels. I will make some key points. The first is energy security across Europe is now being looked at very much through a lens of supply chain vulnerabilities, as Mark Carney mentioned.

The most senior civil servants and many Commissioners have said in recent weeks that dependence on US LNG is a significant weakness and vulnerability of Europe's energy market. In 2022, when he invaded Ukraine, Putin used the gas market as leverage to try to undermine European security. If we depend so much on US LNG right now and there is a conflict in geopolitics, as we saw in January, that leverage could be significant.

The second point I will make relates to Ireland's energy security review framework. It knows exactly what to do to make Ireland energy secure. It was built around renewables and energy efficiency to reduce gas usage on a permanent basis. Reduced demand for fossil gas permanently improves security. We know what to do but need to implement it.

The committee has discussed solutions over the past two days. I might highlight some of them again. We should fast-track the LirIC and Mares interconnectors. That would provide an additional 1.47 GW, on top of the 700 MW that the Celtic interconnector could provide. We need to make better use of the secondary fuel that we have at our power plants. While it is not as reliable as gas, it certainly has a significant part to play in Ireland's energy security. I note that between 2001 and 2005, we tested secondary fuel use in our power plants on an almost weekly basis. We do not do that any more. If we were truly concerned about energy security, we would need to do some of those things.

We need to accelerate the use of batteries and energy storage. The Silvermines pumped storage project could provide a lot of those things. If we could get batteries to a certain level, it would mean we would not need peak demand but average demand each day. We need to speed up planning and grid decisions for renewables and flexibility assets. Most importantly, if we are genuinely concerned about energy security from a gas perspective, we will stop digging. We have talked abut the need to phase out new gas connections. I do not understand how we can have a Bill about using the planning system for gas security without using the planning system to phase out new gas connections. We would obviously require some exceptions for system stability, such as back-up power plants and so on.

Most of the insufficient urgency comes from the lack of resource allocation in the State. I have spent much of the past five years thinking about the issue. I will share an example with the committee. Ireland was way out in front with EirGrid's DS3 programme, which was its system service that intended to get us to 75% renewables. The single electricity market made a decision in March 2017 to replace it with the future framework for system services. The operational plan for that was published in 2025, which was eight years later. It is almost a year late even though it was only published last year. We need to rapidly resource the ability of the State to implement these measures. They will, for example, provide significant energy security. I understand that the Commission for Regulation of Utilities asked two years ago for 200 additional staff, which would be paid for by electricity consumers, but that has not been consented to. Offshore wind will take many years to get through the planning system because we did not have any detailed planning assessments by the National Parks and Wildlife Service, NPWS. The resources were not available to An Coimisiún Pleanála. We are falling further and further behind in development because we are not putting early resources into making sure these things work. That is my substantial point.

If we were concerned about a boat dropping an anchor in a way similar to the Baltic interconnector hybrid attack, this is exactly the right solution. I am not necessarily arguing against this solution. If that single incident were to occur, it would be fairly catastrophic to Ireland and its energy system. We could probably survive with one interconnector and not two if all of the other things were to be accelerated, but only if that were to happen. This facility has merit only as a contingency and only in such a situation. If we are genuinely worried about broader energy security and conflict risks, this will not be of much use.

Having participated in many European dialogues on energy security in recent weeks, it has become very clear that cheap naval drones and modern techniques, such as the boat attack in the case of the Baltic interconnector, fundamentally undermine assumptions about security of supply being the only energy security vector we need to use. We need to reduce our reliance on imported gas and not necessarily just focus on where it comes from. This FSRU narrows risk and removes some risks but does not reduce systemic energy security risks outside of that one particular failure method.

Ireland's long-term resilience must come from what we have on our island, renewables, how we connect with our neighbours and multiple connections to many different states. Large amounts of energy storage would allow the average load to come down. All those things are very important.

My final point relates to a specific head of the Bill and the climate Act. I was heavily involved in the climate Act and worked with many of the members of the committee. Section 15 of the Act had overwhelming political support. We had a lot of discussion of it. The legislation passed the Dáil by 129 votes to ten. Bypassing it risks creating a precedent notwithstanding the fact that we used a similar head for temporary emergency generation, as Deputy Clendennen mentioned. If the facility is truly intended solely as an emergency reserve, we could use the legislation to state that any use of gas in an emergency situation would be outside the sectoral emissions ceilings and the national carbon budget, as opposed to disapplying the entire Act. Any legislation authorising the FSRU should include air-tight limitations on preventing commercial LNG importation, as many others have said. The expansion of gas dependence in Ireland by increasing our gas use would make Ireland even less energy secure than it is currently.

One of the things it is important for the committee to know is that many data centres and large energy users would like to use gas-powered power plants on site because we do not have the electricity interconnections. That is limited by the current gas interconnectors and the head room for supply on those interconnectors. Those would be islanded data centres, as such. This Bill must ensure that the increase in gas connections does not happen. That is a very important aspect and the committee must ensure that the scrutiny of this Bill does that.

I am happy to take questions and will answer as many as I can. I am not a planning law expert.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to address it. We represent the Kildysart Community Engagement Forum, a voluntary group formally established on 23 January 2026. The forum is made up of local residents, landowners, business owners and community members who came together in response to the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill 2025 and the proposed infrastructure associated with it.

We recognise the importance of national energy security. Ensuring continuity of gas supply is a legitimate objective of the Government, particularly in the context of geopolitical uncertainty and supply risk. Our purpose today is not to question the need for emergency planning but to highlight areas within the Bill where greater clarity and balance would strengthen its operation, particularly for communities that may host strategic infrastructure. The Bill provides a framework for the development of a strategic gas reserve, including the use of an FSRU. However, from a community perspective, there are several important matters that are not clearly addressed within the legislation.

First, while the Bill refers to environmental assessments such as environmental impact assessment and appropriate assessment processes, it does not explicitly require consideration of the broader economic impact on host communities. A project of this scale may affect tourism, local investment, property values, insurance, land use and the overall perception of an area. These economic factors are directly relevant to communities and should be considered alongside environmental assessments within the legislative framework.

Second, the Bill does not clearly define the duration of any proposed FSRU deployment.

It is not specified whether this is intended as a short-term contingency measure or a longer term installation with a defined operational timeline. Clarity on duration is essential for communities in order to make informed decisions about investment, planning and future development.

Third, the Bill contains no provision for statutory community benefit mechanisms. Where nationally significant infrastructure is located in rural areas, it is reasonable that the legislation would provide for structured and transparent community benefit arrangements. Including such a provision would recognise the role of host communities in facilitating national infrastructure.

Fourth, there is no formal requirement within the Bill for structured and ongoing engagement with host communities. Should planning permission be granted for infrastructure arising from this legislation, engagement should be required before decisions are finalised, during construction and throughout the operational lifetime of the project. A clear legislative basis for community engagement would provide transparency and certainty for all parties.

There is precedent. The Government's offshore renewable electricity support scheme rulebook, entitled "ORESS 1 Community Benefit Funds Rulebook for Generators and Fund Administrators", contains the following:

Both the Generator's and the Fund Administrator's engagements in connection with the [community benefit funds] CBF must be aligned with best practice and international standards, including for example the OECD's due diligence for meaningful engagement [in the extractive sector] or AA1000's international stakeholder engagement standards.

We recommend this project, and all future community engagement should be guided by such international best practice standards.

Turning to a local context, Kildysart is a rural village in west County Clare along the Shannon Estuary. It is a long-established community with family homes, farms, family businesses and growing tourism activity. Many homes and agricultural holdings are located in close proximity to the proposed site.

Kildysart also faces long-standing wastewater and sewerage infrastructure challenges. If nationally significant industrial infrastructure is to be located in or near the area under this Bill, we believe the legislation should encourage linkage between such development and upgrades to essential local infrastructure. National investment should, where possible, address existing service deficits in host communities.

There is also a proposed hotel development in close proximity to the site. Local residents have been broadly supportive of that project and the employment and tourism benefits it may bring. Legislative clarity around duration, economic impact and infrastructure commitments would help ensure that strategic energy development and local economic development can proceed in a balanced and compatible way.

In summary, our submission is that the strategic gas emergency reserve Bill would be strengthened by: explicit recognition of economic impacts on host communities; clarity on the duration of FSRU deployment; provision for statutory community benefit mechanisms; and a formal requirement for structured community engagement.

We thank the committee for the opportunity to contribute and are happy to answer any questions.

I thank the witnesses, both online and in the committee room.

My first question is to Mr. Kenny. How does the State prioritise actions, for instance, on incorporating renewables, interconnectors, batteries and so on? Why are we so slow? Mr. Kenny outlined the matter in his opening statement. Is it a resource issue?

Broadly, it is. The allocation of significant increased capacity to the Department of Climate, Energy and the Environment over the past five years has allowed it catch up on many of those things and, as Mr. Matt Collins said yesterday, the Department has held six auctions for renewable electricity. Those projects then proceed to go outside of that Department and into the planning department. We have all seen over the last five years the former An Bord Pleanála being significantly under-resourced. It only put in place a legal department over the last number of years even though it was really clear for many years beforehand that it was required, and now we see the Commission for Regulation of Utilities being so far on the back foot that it is ten years late in doing what it needs to do.

I believe that the Department of Climate, Energy and the Environment is trying and doing reasonably well in all those things, but the rest of the State never took the same sort of approach to resourcing the State's individual parts. The Senator, in his previous role as Minister of State in charge of the NPWS, was clear about the mapping that needed to be done to enable offshore wind to be accelerated and he struggled as Minister of State to get the resources in place. It is clear that while some parts of the State have tooled up for the energy transition, other parts have not.

We heard that here from the renewable energy, RE, sector late last year as well, particularly in relation to the NPWS, where there was a really serious deficit of resources.

How many megawatts of generation, including interconnectors, would we have without gas on an all-island basis?

Right now, we have 1.5 GW of interconnectors. We will have 700 MW to France, which would bring us up to 2.2 GW. If LirIC and Mares went ahead, that would bring us up to just under 3.7 GW. If you added the strategic emergency reserve of Moneypoint, which is 850 MW, and the existing 400 MW of distillate gas turbines that we have in the State already, that would being you up to approximately 4.8 GW of generation. Our average demand is 4.9 GW, according to the last EirGrid capacity statement, and our peak demand is approximately 7.5 GW. What we would have then was 2.7 GW of peak demand to be met by renewables, gas, power plants, one of the interconnectors if it was still available, and secondary fuel obligations. When the CEPA report was done, and as Mr. McEvilly mentioned earlier on, it should have looked at the delivery of all of those being accelerated, and in that accelerated delivery of those batteries and renewables, could we meet that demand and get to an N-1 standard with all of those. Honestly, the answer is "Yes". However, are we going to do that? The answer, the Department feels very legitimately, is that it is unlikely and, therefore, we should progress the FSRU. Ultimately, the question is whether we would be able to do those as quickly as the FSRU.

Someone from the Department said yesterday that the LirIC and Mares interconnectors would not provide us with enough energy security. Does Mr. Kenny share that view?

What was unfortunate was the language used, namely, that they would not provide any energy security. That is not true. We use interconnectors. They are part of the capacity remuneration mechanism for the electricity system and they absolutely would provide energy security in the case of that particular strategic issue. However, they would also bring the cost of energy down for every citizen, they would allow renewables to be exported and they would allow renewables from around the rest of Europe to be imported as Europe decarbonises. What the CEPA review missed is what would happen if we accelerated those as quickly as this strategic emergency gas reserve.

I thank Mr. Kenny. I will come back to Kildysart in the second round.

Coming to Kildysart, we have talked about a lot of the economic impacts - there are some reasonable points in relation to that - and the social impacts, but one of the aspects of the Bill that has been highlighted as a concern is the diminished public consultation, in that the public consultation period is quite short. There is also at certain points a limit on the matters on which there is consultation. The observations are to be limited to specific matters relating to environmental impact assessments and do not seem to anticipate social, public health or any of the other aspects there may be. Are the witnesses concerned about the narrowness of the grounds for observation?

I would like to come to another bit. It seems to me that the period of time allocated in the Bill, under the current timelines, for considering all of these is five days to one week. The period of time for giving your input was 60 days, but it is now down to 30 days. It now seems that those inputs will only be considered and assessed for a week, even though they are meant to be given due consideration. There is also that limitation. Does Mr. Garry think it would be important that the wider range of factors, including things about public health and social impact etc., would be properly reflected in the consultations that take place under this system?

Does Mr. Garry want to take that question first?

We are neutral. We are not for or against any proposal. I understand the Senator's question. We only formed in the last week and a half. We know a broad range of what the sentiment is in the area. It lies in the unknown, really. People are undecided about everything. There is not a chance for people to give submissions and the timeline is reduced. We are concerned that local communities will not have a voice in that period. We are definitely concerned about that, yes.

I thank Mr. Garry.

Looking at the wider thing, Mr. Kenny has rightly said it is good to be constantly reminded that there are two interconnectors. We are talking about an incident for one versus the second. We have described scenarios in which we effectively scale up the tools we already have. It does not seem that the energy review modelled scenarios where we scale up, or modelled a scenario where we have much less gas dependence in five years. There did not seem to be that piece too. Mr. Kenny might comment on the lack of a demand reduction strategy that has been built in.

Is there not also a wider picture, in that if this opens up the possibility for commercial LNG, which we have heard it may well do, it creates a vulnerability in terms of how it is done for commercial LNG? Are we looking at a new, highly emission-intensive, fossil fuel coming into the mix at a time when renewables should be invested in? At a wider scale in Europe, we have seen British Petroleum scrapping its renewable projects, or some of its targets, and saying it will double down on fossil fuels. By inflating the demand for LNG and fracked gas and by building those timelines in, do we also contribute to that shift in focus away from renewables and investment in renewables?

We even saw that with the taxonomy at EU level. The taxonomy was meant to be the big new thing that would pour all of the investment into renewables. Somehow, gas sneaked in the back door and became part of the sustainability taxonomy. In terms of the bigger picture, it is not just that we are waiting for renewables to come on line. Are we in fact emboldening a competitor to renewables?

I will try to take the two questions separately. First of all, the CEPA report looked at the full implementation of Climate Action Plan 2023, which is a very ambitious decarbonisation plan. Notwithstanding that it is very difficult to get to a 51% emission reduction in 12 years, it is probably one of the most ambitious decreases in gas use of any country. The issue is implementation. We are doing really well in Ireland on things like building decarbonisation. Renewable energy auctions are better designed in Ireland than in many other countries. The extra and additional resources in the Department have led to a point where there are some really excellent pieces of energy policy, particularly on gas dependency decreasing. However, the big things that really matter like the 3 GW of phase 1 projects and the phase 2 projects will probably be three or four years later than that, which has a material impact on gas demand. It is not falling as quickly.

The second thing that is probably worth mentioning is that right now we get our gas from the UK. It is a mixture of UK and Norwegian indigenous gas, and LNG that probably is from the US although I am not aware of the origins. If this legislation goes through and robustly limits the amount of LNG that could be used, meaning it could be used only in the event of the interconnectors being damaged, it will literally displace gas that would otherwise go around the island of Ireland and get regasified in the UK.

From a climate impact perspective, if this terminal is built and, true to what the Department actually says, it stays as a strategic reserve; if gas is not used to accelerate the regasification; and if we literally stay on boil-off gas, it will not make a very large difference to the global climate. In such circumstances, the committee's scrutiny will be needed to make sure that the planning Bill and the operational Bill happen. I am not necessarily saying that the FSRU is a good idea or a bad idea. I am saying that if it goes ahead, there will be a need to make sure it is limited to a strategic reserve, which is what the Department has said it is.

My question is in relation to commercial-----

We have to move on to the next speaker.

I thank all of our attendees today. My first question is for Mr. Paul Kenny, if he does not mind. I was taken by his statement that the FSRU would not mitigate broader conflict risks. I wonder if he could speak a little more about the risks that are presented by this type of project.

In Europe, we currently get between 30% and 50% of our gas via LNG, now that we have switched off Russian pipeline gas. If there is a broader conflict - many people in Europe are worried about Russia invading a European country or someone else threatening to invade part of a European country, like Greenland - and there is a decrease in supply of LNG, that will impact Ireland via its existing interconnectors because there will be less LNG available. This solution does not help that. This solution helps if there is a hybrid attack on one of our interconnectors, like what happened in the Baltic Sea. If what I am led to believe is correct, in that case a medium-sized freighter dropped its anchor and dragged it on the seabed for 15 km or 20 km until it picked up the pipe and then it damaged it. This proposal addresses that risk in line with action 17 of a really good energy security review, which identified a significant risk. This is a solution to that risk, but it is not a solution to the European geopolitical risk of its dependence on LNG. The way to do that would be to increase the number of renewables we have and can interconnect to, and to decrease the overall amount of gas.

Recently, I heard at a session with some naval people that naval drones, which are basically speed boats and jetskis packed with explosives that are driven into the side of tankers, have effectively crippled the Russian navy from a Ukrainian point of view without Ukraine having a navy. The point is that if there is a conflict involving state actors that wish to cause mayhem in European energy markets, it would not take very much to do that. The solution we are outlining here would provide some cover for some possibilities, but not cover for any broader European conflict with a state like Russia, which is what people are worried about, or for the threat of someone either sanctioning or withholding exports of LNG so they can get their wish to annex some European territory.

I thank Mr. Kenny. He mentioned that what we need here are renewables. Mr. Kenny has worked in the Department and has been an adviser to a Minister, so he will be aware of how long things take.

I do not know whether during his time Mr. Kenny has ever experienced the same sense of urgency in the climate realm as we are seeing now from the Department when it comes to building this fossil fuel infrastructure. Is doing something on renewables doable in the same timescale as we are looking at for the development of this project? Is doing something on renewables as an alternative realistically doable in the same timeframe? If the same urgent approach was taken to it as seems to be taken here, would it be doable?

The question is more about the State and not just the Department of energy. This is the issue we have here. When the State mobilised for Covid, and when it mobilised between February and August 2022 to think about how to deal with the energy crisis, it was able to do many things quickly because the entire State got together to do them. Right now, we have the Department of energy trying to do the things it can do on its own because it cannot get the rest of the State to do the sorts of things we need, such as investing in the planning system, the NPWS, CRU and other State actors to ensure we deliver this. The question is whether we can build renewables and interconnectors as quickly as we can build an FRSU. The answer is "No" because it is one project versus 50 projects. The answer to the question in short is "No" but in the long term we should build all of them because they address way more risks than just one risk. This is why we need to ramp up our efforts on all of the other risk mitigations and not just this one.

Regarding Mr. Kenny's analysis of item No. 3 in his submission, which is single hybrid attack, does he see a better or alternative way? It is a catastrophic risk as he has set it out, albeit perhaps unlikely, but it is there and it has to be assessed. Given his experience, does Mr. Kenny see a better way of dealing with that risk for the two interconnectors than what is proposed in terms of an FSRU?

In short, "No". If we could go back in time and get those other interconnectors built and have even further interconnection with the UK and France, those things would make a much bigger material impact but in the timeframe we have, the answer is "No". To qualify this answer to the question, let us just say for the sake of argument that this takes until 2030 and we bring on our offshore wind in 2032 and 2033, deliver investment in heat pumps and industrial heat pumps and decrease gas use across the rest of the State, we will have spent €1 billion to mitigate a single risk for three to five years.

Something that came up yesterday was the Corrib gas field. It has been mentioned a couple of times that effectively it is running off or will cease to contribute capacity in the next number of years. How does this tie in? What is Mr. Kenny's view on this? Does it enter into the discussion at all? Is it another option in terms of risk that the State will no longer have once it is unavailable? How does it factor into it?

The expected production decrease in Corrib as the gas comes out of the field is well documented. It is physics as opposed to anything else. I do not think there is an energy security play around Corrib. I know there was some discussion about it but I do not think there is an energy security play around Corrib as it currently stands. It is just the reduction in gas use.

I would say the Department also has another plan to produce biogas. Biogas consistent with the renewable energy directive, and the right type of biogas in the right way, can provide an additional amount of indigenous gas, perhaps 10% of our current use. It will not supply the types of volumes that an LNG terminal could, of course, but in the long term, if demand can come down enough and the supply of biogas can come up enough, we can certainly get down to the need for one interconnector in the mid-2030s if we do not increase our gas usage, which is the big "if".

I have several questions for the Kildysart Community Engagement Forum, which was formed relatively recently. What sort of engagement, if any, has been carried out thus far in the community, presumably by GNI I would have thought? Has there been any engagement or anything substantive thus far? It has been mentioned that there is no timeframe for the duration of the facility and how long it will last. How important is this for the community in terms of understanding what timeframe we are speaking about for the facility?

There was an initial meeting with GNI. It was a local information evening.

Was it a public meeting?

Yes. It had representatives there on the day to give a brief outline of what it was planning to do. It had no real answers to our questions. There is another meeting planned for 27 February and we hope to find out an awful lot more at that meeting. This is the only engagement we have had so far.

On the timeframe and how important it is, communities just want to know whether it will be a permanent structure. It is strategic, obviously, for energy security but for what period? There is no definition of this any place in the Bill. Will it be there for the next 50 years? Communities want to know. If it is to be outside the front of someone's house for the next 50 years I am sure the people there would want to know this. There are houses within 800 m of the development. Geotechnical surveys are being done there at present so there is a bit of activity where the site is. We are quite aware of where it is going to be. There are concerns from locals and people in the group about how long it will be on the estuary. It is an area of natural beauty. If the FSRU is not there, there will not be a whole lot of infrastructure in place. It is only a pier at the end of the day. People have concerns about it. I am sure there is lighting and noise pollution associated with it and a visual impact on the estuary.

Mr. Kenny might be able to answer the question on how long it will be there. I assume if we ramp up renewables and battery storage it will reduce dependency. This is an assumption based on the fact it is for security of supply only. Would it be the case that, in answer to the question of the community in Kildysart, if we were to move to deploy renewables and battery storage very quickly we would be looking at a project that could be reduced in terms of dependency from 12 years to ten years to five years?

I think that is absolutely the case. May I recommend the introduction of some form of sunset clause for when N -1 is met, whereby gas demand in the State at peak is lower than one or other of the interconnectors and therefore the N -1 test is met? We could definitely reduce or eliminate the need to have the FSRU there at all. A sunset clause should be recommended by the committee and it should be on the basis of gas demand. Once the gas demand hits a certain amount, it should no longer be there.

We are formulating our report. It is telling that there has not been any significant level of engagement from GNI with the local community. This in itself causes people to ask questions and there is uncertainty. It would be vital that it engages in a meaningful way with the local community. This is something that I am sure the witnesses would welcome with regard to the uncertainty that is there.

I thank Mr. Kenny for his earlier response. There is the issue of the Department of energy versus the State here, and it is one project versus 50 projects. It is about convincing other arms of the State to comply with their climate obligations.

Could I get a bit more detail on that? In the witnesses' experience, where are the blockers elsewhere? They have mentioned planning and CRU. What needs to be done better? Who needs to be convinced? Who do we need to convince to get on board with this programme?

To talk about CRU in particular, it is not the people in CRU who do not want to achieve these things. It is the fact they have many things to do with insufficient resources. Who sanctions those resources? The Department of energy already asked for that sanction of resources two years ago, if I am not mistaken. That has to be sanctioned by the Department of public expenditure and reform. Again, I would argue that the Department of housing, An Coimisiún Pleanála and the National Parks and Wildlife Service, NPWS, are limited within the resources they get. Obviously, they have many challenges that are very important to the State, between housing, the new planning Bill and the national planning framework. Again, they need additional resources.

As an example, the REPowerEU provision to designate go-to areas for renewable development was passed by the Commission in 2022. It sought to identify places where the State would accelerate renewables, through the use of something called IROPI, around projects of overriding public interest, to try to encourage member states to designate particular projects of overriding public interest, that is, where it is very important something is built quickly. It allowed Germany to increase the volume of renewables it put on the grid very substantially within a year of that passing. I am not in Ireland and am not following planning law in great detail, but I think it was in the summer of 2025 that that was transposed effectively into Irish law and the Office of the Planning Regulator provided guidance for local authorities, I think, two weeks ago. This was an urgent REPowerEU 2022 thing and it took us four or five years to even pass the designation.

If we consider what needed to happen in that case, it was very clear and officials from the then Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications were pushing as hard as they could into the then Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, but they did not have the resources and scale to deal with the national planning framework, a new planning Bill and a pile of extra European legislation. That was difficult to implement, for sure, but it still took four years. It should have been done in six months. It was urgent. That would have meant that instead of, as Matt Collins said yesterday, having 0.5 GW of renewables in build at the moment, we could have had 1 GW or 1.5 GW. That would have got us much closer to our targets much earlier.

It is important to say that the resource allocation is the issue we have in Ireland. We are not resourcing the parts of the State that need to be resourced sufficiently to get the scale of development needed. To outline the scale of development, we are trying to create a multibillion euro biogas industry, a multibillion euro district heating industry, a multibillion euro renovation industry, which we are broadly doing very well on, a multibillion euro offshore wind industry and a mutibillion euro solar industry. While we do have a multibillion euro onshore wind industry, it could go a lot faster. The sort of work that needs to be done at every local authority, under the regional planning guidelines, to designate areas that are suitable for wind energy and do the sort of community engagement the Deputy mentioned with our friends from Kildysart needs to be done in every county and at every regional level. We are not resourcing the parts of the State to do that so we can ask a community, a county or a region where they want their renewables. We have to have some renewables, we have to reach the targets and we have to get rid of our gas and climate and energy security risks. We have to ask people where they think the best places are in their community to do that. Those are the sorts of tasks that are years late.

The EirGrid operational plan to get renewables from 75% to 100% was a decision made nine years ago. The operational plan was published eight years after that. We did not have enough resources in EirGrid or CRU to accelerate their future services, which are what will get us to 100% renewables, which in turn will allow us to use all of that renewable generation that is being curtailed. We are currently using gas, which is really expensive. That is important.

On the topic of resources, would Mr. Kenny be confident that the Department, which is going to be tasked with going through this bespoke planning process as per this Bill, would have the adequate resources, expertise and knowledge to get this done in the timeframe it sees? Is it going to have to retool, and if so, how long is that going to take? Will Mr. Kenny give us his view of that from his experience?

The Department would be well capable of doing that, as it did with the temporary emergency generation, but those resources will then not be working on the things we need for long-term energy security, like batteries, wind, renewable planning guidelines or noise planning guidelines. That is the issue. We have a certain level of resources and if they are put into an emergency like this or like we did for the temporary emergency generation, they will not be available for other things.

I want to elaborate on the point I asked about earlier. It was not really around what the impact of this particular terminal will be on emissions. We know it will have some impact and they will count. That is an issue for us in regard to how we are going to account for them on our balance sheets. What I am concerned about and what I would like comment on are the very real concerns we have heard, even by the removal, for example, of the policy statement on fracked gas and by the precedent we set, whereby this opens the door to commercial LNG operators. I would like to hear a comment on what the implications of opening ourselves to commercial LNG are in that move towards renewable that we want to have. At a time when we want to be moving away from gas, are we effectively introducing a large-scale competitor against renewables, namely, gas?

I have two other questions. The attacks on tankers were mentioned. One of the key things coming across here is that it is not the case that we can have six months' supply sitting there ready to be used, because there are at least six shipments a year. That means at least every two months it needs to be replenished. In a scenario where we have some kind of disaster, a shortage and one of the interconnectors goes, we will still be looking at that gas supply needing to be replenished every two months. That, of course, has its own vulnerabilities. Mr. Kenny described how if we are in the kind of scenario where people are intentionally breaking our interconnectors, they are probably perfectly capable of sabotaging new shipments of LNG that may come in. Maybe I am unclear on this. Mr. Kenny mentioned earlier that in terms of shipments of gas, some of it is Nordic and some is LNG. Is it not the case that if we are going to be relying on shipments of LNG coming in, in an emergency scenario that extended past a short period, we could be looking at shipments of gas? Is there potential, for example, for delaying the continued extraction from Corrib? I am trying to think of what the other scenarios would be. Will the witnesses comment on the dangers in relation to commercial LNG and what that could mean in terms of moving where we need to, especially in the context of the US having left the Paris Agreement? We have talked about the geopolitical insecurity, but what is the danger of accelerated use of LNG for our climate targets?

Turning to the representatives of Kildysart, head 13 of the Bill relates to where the Commission has to consider lots of different environmental factors. Something that was raised in one of the other submissions was that the Commission considers a variety of impacts such as soil and various others. However, it does not opt in for what is in Article 3.2 of the environmental assessment, which relates to vulnerabilities to accidents or disasters. Should that be part of the assessment? We know that LNG facilities, particularly at the point of extraction and potentially also in terms of storage, can be risks. Should that be part of an assessment of environmental risks associated with accidents or disasters, and the safeguards that might be needed? Should that be part of the Commission's assessment?

There are a couple of parts to that question. The biggest industrial and commercial customers for renewables right now, besides the State, are data centres. Those data centres are currently very large buyers of renewables.

In particular, there are some projects where the State has not needed to buy one of the offshore wind projects because it was not competitive. Also, there are areas of the country where we cannot build grid quickly enough and there is potential for using those renewables in a very good way to provide for data centres in Ireland, which is the Bord na Móna midlands plan. If you provide lots of gas and increase the amount of gas via commercial terminal, that imperative disappears. The biggest damage to Irish renewables would be lots of commercial LNG. That is an important point. However, commercial LNG is very expensive and renewables are not very expensive. Therefore, if we can build a renewables industry, I am sure most of those purchasers would be quite happy to purchase renewables either directly or via the State auctions. The Senator is absolutely right; it would divert investment but the challenge of investment is that we cannot build them because we are not resourcing the TSOs, EirGrid and the CRU to build those things more quickly.

On the Senator's second question, around tankers, attacks and so on, while it is very unlikely, it is concerning many people in Europe. The vulnerability of shipments of gas would be a strategic problem for all of Europe and this terminal would be the same as a terminal in the UK or elsewhere. If that comes to pass and those types of things are attacked, this will not help or hinder that either way. It will not make that much of a difference. If we end up with Europe at war with Russia or someone else, broadly, all of those LNG shipments and tankers will be susceptible to those attacks, just like in the Second World War. That is not what the State is trying to address here. The State is trying to address a hybrid attack like that which happened in the Baltic Sea in 2023, presumably by Russia. That is an attack that has happened already in the last three years, whereas the other one may be significantly less likely. Broadly, the State is correctly identifying one particular risk that is much more likely to happen than another and addressing that.

On the shipments of gas, are shipments of Nordic gas, natural gas and other gas an option? In a scenario where we went past a one-, two-, five-day emergency, could we be shipping non-LNG gas to replenish our gas supplier in a situation of an extended problem with an interconnector for whatever reason?

There are two ways to get gas. One is via pipeline, which is how we get it. Pipelines come from Norway into the UK and into us. The alternative is to liquefy and ship it, which is LNG. We could buy our LNG from Norway, for sure. I am not sure if there is any other way. Gas is not shipped as gas because it is not volumetrically dense enough to put in a ship without being liquefied.

In the event of an emergency situation, under that head we would definitely appreciate it if the risks associated in the area were outlined. We are a very small community. The village itself is only 3 km from the FSRU where it will be located and there are concerns locally. It has been mentioned. Obviously, there are many different scenarios that could happen but we would appreciate it if there was an addition to the Bill to take into account any emergency situation that may happen and what zones are taken into account in that as well.

Okay, thank you. I thank the witnesses for coming in today, both online and in person. With their agreement, we will publish their opening statements on the committee's website. Is that agreed? Agreed. The committee now stands adjourned.