General Scheme of the Defence (Amendment) Bill 2025 : Discussion (Resumed)
Witnesses examined the Bill’s removal of the triple lock, which would end the need for UN Security Council authorisation before Irish troops can be deployed overseas. Professor Tonra and Mr. Murphy argued the change reflects a changed security environment and gives Dáil and Government greater flexibility, but both said stronger safeguards, such as legal review or wider parliamentary oversight, may be needed. Mr. Noonan strongly opposed the Bill as too open-ended and lacking clear guardrails, warning that it could erode the trust given to earlier treaty commitments on neutrality. Members divided sharply over whether the change is a practical update or a fundamental shift that should go to referendum.
Contributions 1–155 of 322. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
The joint committee is meeting today in public session to continue with its pre-legislative scrutiny of the Defence (Amendment) Bill 2025. On behalf of the committee I welcome Professor Ben Tonra from University College Dublin, Mr. Joe Noonan, solicitor, and Mr. Ciarán Murphy, former assistant secretary of the Department of Defence. The witnesses are with us today to discuss the general scheme of the Bill. I will invite each witness to make an opening statement to be followed by questions from members of the committee. Each member has a five minute slot to ask questions and for witnesses to respond.
I advise members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the Leinster House complex in order to participate in public meetings. I will not permit a member to participate where he or she is not adhering to this constitutional requirement. Any member who attempts to participate from outside of the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting. In this regard, I ask members participating via Microsoft Teams to formally confirm that they are on the grounds of the Leinster House campus prior to contributing to the meeting. Members and witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity either by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks and it is imperative that they comply with any such direction. As the witnesses will probably be aware, the committee will publish their opening statements on its website following the meeting. I now invite Professor Tonra to make his opening statement, to be followed by Mr. Noonan and then Mr. Murphy.
Comment on this
I thank the committee for the opportunity to contribute to its deliberations on the Defence (Amendment) Bill 2025. This legislation needs to be understood in the context of a profoundly altered European security landscape. European states are scrambling to strengthen national defence and security in the face of new and immediate threats, sometimes reversing decades, even centuries-long national defence traditions and postures. Significantly, the credibility of the NATO alliance has been undermined, perhaps fatally, by the current US administration which places little or no value on allies, partners or indeed on international law. The European Union, like Ireland, is itself struggling to determine how best to defend the values of peace, sovereignty, and multilateralism in a world where brute force is increasingly a defining feature of international affairs.
In this light, the Bill’s proposal to remove the requirement for UN Security Council authorisation, the so-called triple lock, marks a significant evolution in Irish policy. It reflects new circumstances in which the UN system is effectively paralysed by great power rivalry, arguably to an even greater extent than during the Cold War itself. More broadly, the Bill proposes granting the Executive greater latitude in the deployment of Irish military forces overseas and does so in several ways. First, it raises the threshold for Dáil authorisation of overseas deployments from 12 to 50 personnel. Second, it specifies a broadened range of potential deployment scenarios to include counter-narcotics, embassy security, hostage rescue, close protection, training, or even sports events. Third, it removes the precondition for UN Security Council authorisation and finally, it specifies the kind of multilateral forces with which such deployments might serve to include UN, EU, OSCE, or “any other regional body” which operates in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and international law.
However, with greater flexibility comes greater responsibility. If we are no longer to rely on the Security Council as the gatekeeper of legitimacy, if we are finally to remove the veto given to the five permanent members of the Security Council over Ireland’s overseas military deployment, we must establish robust mechanisms of our own. The suggestion that I make in my formal submission to the committee is that first, a formal legal review should be undertaken as part of each proposed overseas deployment, perhaps conducted by the Attorney General or alternatively by independent counsel, which would attest that the proposed mission does in fact align with the UN Charter and international law. Such a review might then be presented to the Oireachtas alongside any motion for deployment and appropriate hearings undertaken with that evidence presented. Second, it should be considered whether democratic oversight ends with any initial approval. For most states which require parliamentary authorisation of overseas military deployment, parliament retains rights and responsibilities of oversight. An annual review mechanism could empower the Dáil to monitor ongoing missions so as to ensure that our engagement remains within the scope of peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and support for international security.
This Bill is evidence of the fact that Ireland’s defence policy cannot stand still in a world that has changed so dramatically and so very dangerously. This evolution must also occur with constitutional care, legal clarity, and democratic accountability, ensuring that our actions abroad continue to reflect the core values and interests that have long defined Irish foreign policy.
Comment on this
I thank the Cathaoirleach and members very much for the invitation to speak. The process the committee members are collectively involved in and contributing to is probably the most important and certainly one of the most important processes they could participate in as legislators. It is important that I begin by acknowledging that and by wishing the committee well in its task. There are not many legislative or policy matters more grave or profound for any state than those that may put young people in harm's way or in a position overseas where they may feel threatening another person with violence in that person's homeland is appropriate in the pursuit of a military objective. That is my sense of the context within which this discussion is taking place and I am very honoured to have the opportunity to contribute a little bit to it.
The committee has received my presentation. I am looking at this from the point of view of a legal practitioner because it is legislation that is before the committee. As far as I can see from the list, I may be the only legal practitioner to speak as a witness. I take that responsibility very seriously. I have been practising as a lawyer for a scary number of years now, beyond four decades. It has been a particular interest of mine to look at this topic of how we stand in the world, how we look out to the world and how we engage with the world.
This proposed legislation is alarming to me as a lawyer because of what it does not say. As a lawyer, it is the absence at its heart that strikes me. Lawyers love absences because we can dance through them and bring people to unexpected destinations. I will refer back to something Professor Ray Murphy of the University of Galway, a former Irish Army captain, said when he spoke to the committee. He said:
Allowing Irish forces to go to non-UN-approved forces is opening a carte blanche for major operations of a nature which we cannot predict. If we send forces on the ground, as part of an EU or NATO force, we cannot be sure what will happen or how the situation will evolve. Will we become embroiled in an actual armed conflict and be a party to a conflict? So much, then, for our policy of military neutrality and all of the other principles that we have stood for over many decades.
I will move quickly to a profoundly important statement made by the Tánaiste, Deputy Simon Harris, yesterday. It was reported widely and I believe it will be the subject of consideration by this committee. The Tánaiste said he did not believe the European Union had brought itself into compliance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice issued in July of last year in respect of the occupied Palestinian territories. That is a profoundly important statement especially in the light of the repeated assurances officials gave the committee in the early part of its deliberations that the European Union always abides by international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. For the reasons I set out in my main presentation, that is simply not the case. Frankly, I am relieved to have had the backing of the Tánaiste yesterday with regard to that fundamental point.
Where does that leave us in this process? Where does it leave the members, as legislators, when they are being asked to take away the one protection we have? It may be a crock of a protection and it may be stupid to allow the Russians a say - I agree that all of those things are very superficially attractive - but the fundamental change the committee is being asked to engineer or facilitate does not end with this Bill. I respectfully submit that the task of the members is to be very satisfied in their own hearts that they know where exactly the destination of this will be. I submit that, because of the absence of clarity in the Bill, members cannot be sure of that.
Comment on this
By way of an opening statement, I will introduce myself and my background. I will then offer some comments and context regarding the legislation. I served as assistant secretary and defence policy director in the Department of Defence for about 15 years from 2007 to 2022. In that role, I was responsible for all aspects of defence policy on Ireland’s engagement with the UN, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, the OSCE and NATO PfP, including policy on all defence operations overseas and related legislation. My work on the EU CSDP included the defence aspects of Lisbon treaty protocols. It also included Ireland’s policy engagement with the European Defence Agency, PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility and negotiations on their founding statutes.
I was responsible for the Defence (Amendment) Act 2006, which the current Bill updates. It is a common feature of public administration that nothing can remain static. Legislation across all aspects of public policy and administration changes and evolves. The Defence Acts are no different. They have been amended in respect of overseas service on a number of occasions to reflect changes in UN missions and Ireland’s policy on international security, conflict resolution and peacekeeping.
The original 1960 Act limited peacekeeping activities to the “performance of duties of a police character”, which has been mentioned a number of times during these committee hearings. However, this limitation was deleted from the legislation through the 1993 Act as UN missions were increasingly being authorised as peace enforcement missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The missions in which we were involved in Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Balkans, Liberia and Chad were all Chapter VII or peace enforcement missions.
Over the 1990s, the wording of UN Security Council resolutions expanded substantively from the UN establishing what are referred to as "blue hat" peacekeeping forces to the UN supporting members states “acting together or through regional organisations” - a phrase I have taken from UN Security Council resolutions - to deploy forces to maintain international peace and security. For Ireland, this raised legal interpretation issues as regards the 1960 Act, even as it was amended in 1993. The wording no longer reflected the evolution of UN mandates. The scope of the term "International United Nations Force" was expanded again in the 2006 Act to better reflect the fact that many UN missions were not blue hat missions. The Act also contained provisions relating to the rapid deployment of forces as part of an EU battle group, a development which was welcomed by successive UN Secretaries General.
As we have seen, defence legislation has been amended several times to reflect changes in the UN, changes in the international security environment and the need for rapid response capabilities in the face of emerging conflicts to maintain Ireland's capacity to provide forces for these missions. In my opinion, the current Bill reflects further changes within the UN system and Ireland's ongoing commitment to peacekeeping.
Gridlock within the Security Council can preclude Ireland from acting to support international peace and security through the provision of forces for international peacekeeping. The current triple lock has enforced both mission non-participation, as with the mission in Macedonia from which we were excluded, and planned and actual mission exit, not least Ireland's enforced withdrawal from the UN mission in Chad. We did not want to leave but had to because of uncertainties around the UN mandate. The Bill also expands on section 3 of the 2006 Act to recognise that there will be circumstances where we wish to deploy the Defence Forces where there will never be a UN mandate. For example, the UN Security Council is not going to get involved with security issues or the evacuation of civilians. Without a resolution, even if we want to deploy to protect our citizens, we will not have a UN mandate to do so.
The main element of the current Bill is to revise the exclusive requirement for a UN Security Council mandate for Defence Forces operations overseas and to include additional potential mandates for deployment to international forces that will, to quote the general scheme, "operate for the purposes of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter." This language is consistent with the assurance that was given to the people in Article 3 of the Lisbon treaty protocol and which was approved by the Irish people in the second Lisbon treaty referendum. The language in the Act is actually taken directly from the Lisbon treaty protocols.
There has been significant discourse to the effect that Ireland’s UN membership and the triple lock are inextricably linked to our policy on military neutrality. That discourse also suggests that Ireland’s UN membership and the subsequent triple lock represented a fundamental affirmation and reinforcement of Ireland’s neutrality policy. However, as shown in a recent paper I have circulated to the committee, the Oireachtas record of the debates on both UN membership and the 1960 Act demonstrates the polar opposite. At that time, membership of the UN was seen as substantively undermining and obviating Ireland’s neutrality.
It was considered that Ireland would be forced to exit the UN to maintain its policy of neutrality in the face of a UN Security Council resolution that required it to go to war with another state. That 1946 debate also included discussion on the constitutional provisions in Bunreacht na hÉireann regarding a declaration of war, where the State may have had to go to war pursuant to a UN mandate, and the role of Dail Éireann in that regard, as provided for in the Bunreacht. The view of the then Government, and the Opposition, was that membership of the UN would substantively undermine this constitutional provision, that is, the precedence of Dáil Éireann on such matters would be moot by virtue of UN Charter obligations.
In 1946 and again in 1960 when the initial Act was introduced, the obligations of UN membership were seen as a threat to Ireland's foreign, security and neutrality policy and its sovereignty in this regard. To address that, the third element of the triple lock was to cement, in legislation, the primacy of Dáil Éireann in protecting Ireland’s policy on neutrality, Ireland’s independence and sovereignty on foreign policy. The key element of the 1960 triple lock is not the UN Security Council resolution. That was a given, by virtue of our obligations of membership of the UN. This had already been accepted by Ireland as such an obligation. They key objective of that was to protect and enshrine in law the requirement for Dáil approval for any such decision to deploy forces. Dáil Éireann, not the UN, was the bulwark to protect Ireland’s neutrality, independence in foreign policy and sovereignty.
Comment on this
I will try to keep my questions direct. I do not want to be abrupt with the witnesses but it would be good if the answers could be kept short because time is very short. Professor Tonra set out the four changes this will bring about in a very clear way. On the last one, he said the Bill specifies "the kind of multilateral force with which such deployments might serve, including the UN, EU, OSCE or "any other regional body", does that include NATO? "Yes" or "No"?
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In the first paragraph of his statement, he says "Significantly, the credibility of the NATO alliance has been - perhaps fatally - undermined". Does he stand by that statement?
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To clarify, he sets out here that NATO could be one of those regional bodies and he clearly sets out the credibility of it is possibly fatally undermined.
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As a collective security organisation, certainly.
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I thank Professor Tonra. I am in favour of military neutrality. I do not have a big issue with the change from 12 soldiers to 50. I understand the logic of that, whether it is 12 to 30 or 40 or whatever for rescue missions and the other areas set out. It seems like a practical measure. On page four of the document Professor Tonra submitted, he states peacekeeping needs have changed further, legislation was again amended in the 2006 Act and what that provided for, such as an international force or body approved or otherwise sanctioned by a resolution of the Security Council or General Assembly. He then refers to the triple lock. That is a phrase devised during the 2001 Nice treaty referendum campaign, which I remember and was involved in. A national declaration was made. As he set out, it was appended to the Lisbon treaty. People will admit that it is what got the Lisbon and Nice treaties over the line. My problem with it as a politician is that here is a solemn commitment and national declaration appended to treaties and all of a sudden, it will be changed without a referendum. Does Professor Tonra think there should be a referendum to give people a say in this fundamental change?
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-----because I do not think it is that fundamental a change.
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He does not think it is a fundamental change.
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I think it is a major change but it is not a fundamental change. It is not a constitutional level change at all.
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The Irish people who took that at face value, twice, which took the referendums from one third in favour to two thirds in favour and actually flipped over twice on it and got them through. Does Professor Tonra think it is okay to disregard that from a democratic point of view?
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It is not fundamental; it is a major change.
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When situations change, it requires governments to change and legislation to change. I recall the triple lock was introduced by a Fianna Fáil-led coalition Government that said it was a cast iron guarantee on neutrality. Many people who opposed the Nice treaty said the triple lock was nonsense, an empty formula and smoke and mirrors. People change their positions in terms of the circumstances.
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On circumstances, when I was growing up, there was the threat from the Cold War. It was not long after the Cuban missile crisis. There were a whole lot of very dangerous things happening. I know there are a lot of nutters in positions of power at the moment but there has never been a time in my lifetime when there has not been danger. Whether it was the illegal invasion of Iraq, the illegal bombing of Iran or the slaughter of children, women and men in Palestine, etc., there has always been conflict. Does Professor Tonra agree?
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Yes but we are in a much more dangerous situation now. This is an argument we can have about the stability of the Cold War versus the instability of the post-Cold War era but it is a very different world.
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I would like a yes-no answer. Does Professor Tonra agree the trust of the people would be broken if we do this without giving them a say? Would the trust of every citizen of this State, me included, be broken after those two treaties if this major change, to use his term, is pushed through without a referendum?
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I welcome all three gentlemen here this morning and thank them for taking time out to be here with us. I will start with Mr. Noonan. Some people are of the opinion that the current UN mandate system is broken. There has not been an agreed deployment since 2014. Does he feel that it is worth persevering with or has time moved on, have events moved on and has it gone beyond the beyond for future missions to be rubber-stamped by the UN?
Comment on this
That is the core question. It was of its time. At the time, it was known it had in-built imperfections. The current debate gets two different things tangled up. It would be maybe helpful to ask the committee to disentangle the two things. The two things are what we have at the moment, with all its imperfections plain with, as it is accurately said, the idea that Russia, China, the US, Britain and France can veto the mandate, which seems bizarre now. That is one thing.
The other thing is the bigger question in a way of how Ireland makes decisions about and sets guardrails around the deployment of members of the Permanent Defence Force. It may be helpful to separate those two things. If someone comes to the view that the first arrangement from 1960 is no longer suitable, that is fine, and it is a perfectly respectable position to hold.
However, that does not predetermine the decision as to how to respond to that. It seems to me this Bill has in it a core belief that that day is over and so we will get rid of it. I look for safeguards in the Bill and candidly, beyond what I will call soft language, which is not reliable, I do not find any guardrails. For example, we shudder involuntarily when we think about what is happening in Gaza. Every one of us in this room does. That is fine by the European Union. The European Union has decided to stay hands-off and that Israel can do what it likes. That is the European Union of our common values, expressed repeatedly in solemn documents signed by people with fine titles. When it comes to Gaza, it does not want to know. How do we, as a small country, learn from that posture of a large assembly, dominated by big countries with very different histories from ours?
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I do not mean to cut across Mr. Noonan-----
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That is fine. I will leave that question there. It is answering the Senator's question with a question.
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Mr. Noonan has outlined with great clarity and passion his belief on this. I am not trying to pit one witness against another, but how would Professor Tonra and Mr. Murphy respond to Mr. Noonan's comments now and earlier?
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He is right in saying we are simply removing the UN Security Council requirement and not replacing it with anything else. That comes down, as Deputy Stanley referenced, to the issue of trust. Most governments will deploy military forces overseas on the decision of a government and parliament. If we do not deem that to be enough, then we have to think of other controls and other guardrails, as Mr. Noonan spoke about, that can be put in place. I make a couple of suggestions in that regard in my paper. That is a question the committee needs to grapple with. Again, most countries will deploy military personnel overseas because their government decides it and their parliament authorises it. If that is not enough for us, then we need to think of something in addition. I do not think, and this is where Mr. Noonan and I differ, that the UN Security Council fits that role any longer.
Comment on this
I tend to agree with Professor Tonra. As I said in my opening statement, when the originators of the triple lock drafted the legislation and introduced it to the Oireachtas and it was debated and passed by the Oireachtas, the view was that it was the role of Dáil Éireann to protect Ireland's neutrality and make sure any overseas deployment was consistent with national foreign and security policy and Irish interests. The UN Security Council resolution was seen as a threat that could drag Ireland into wars it did not want to participate in by virtue of the obligations of membership. We need to put the trust back in this House. There is a significant role for this committee in interrogating defence officials, defence Ministers and defence policy. That has not been a role. In my 15 years as policy director, I appeared once before the defence committee on matters of defence policy. The Minister had been waiting three years to get an invite to the committee, despite lobbying the committee, which Ministers never do, to appear before it.
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It has come full circle since that.
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He walked in and the first question was on Defence Forces pay and terms and conditions and that is what the whole debate was about. The paper he had presented to the committee was not discussed at all.
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I thank Professor Tonra, Mr. Noonan and Mr. Murphy for joining us and for the clarity of their presentations and interpretations of the issues. It has been very helpful for us all. I might come back to a contribution made by Mr. Noonan. He said that if we make this change and remove the requirement for the Security Council to give approval before we deploy, we will not know our direction of travel or what the outcomes could be. My question for all three witnesses is whether, if we do not make the change and we keep things the way they are, we know the direction of travel. We are effectively giving the power to Russia, China, France, the UK and the US to prevent us from deploying.
Comment on this
That is a great question. The approach to it might be to look at what the EU's most senior people say about the direction of travel right now. Kaja Kallas, the High Representative for foreign affairs and a vice-president of the Commission, said this a couple of days ago:
And what I want to stress to all of those representatives coming from countries that are much further from Russia, look at the world map. Europe is a very small continent. Whatever happens in one part of Europe has an effect on us all, and we are only strong when we act together, when we act together in NATO, when we act together, in Europe, a stronger European Union is also stronger NATO.
I think that is the direction of travel. She said it and I am not going to disagree with her.
Sometimes we do not respect ourselves enough. We have devised over centuries a brilliant form of government and control. We have President Michael D. Higgins in the park. I have the privilege of going to a garden party after this. Uniquely from a lawyer's point of view, I will hit three Houses of the Oireachtas in one day. It is something I feel quietly proud about. At times there is a tension about views the President expresses, which some in the political sphere may feel uncomfortable about. I think that is great and you would not get it in many other places. We should respect the development of our worldview over centuries and be slow to listen to people with a very different agenda who suggest we change it. I agree with the Deputy that change has to be looked at but this involves people with strong feelings. Senator Gallagher used the word "passion". Ms Kallas is a passionate woman. There has been criticism of her comments about Ireland in the past and I am staying away from that, but I go by what she says about the future she sees. Is that the future we want?
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Looking at where the United Nations is and is foreseeably going, the potential direction of travel is the end of Irish contributions to international peacekeeping.
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Our major mission at the moment is in Lebanon. It is currently under threat. If that UN Security Council resolution does not go through, we will be withdrawing everybody. It is not the first time that has happened. When we were deployed to Chad, it was coming into the wet season and there was a question over the Security Council resolution. There were many engagements at Taoiseach level and ministerial level with the under-secretary general for UN peacekeeping to find out whether the resolution would go through. We could not get an assurance it would go through and we could not stay. If the resolution had not gone through, the forces would have had to leave but ew would not have been able to get the equipment out. All our armoured personnel carriers, kit, mortars, ammunition and so on would have been left in Chad when we withdrew. On many occasions, we have had to issue warning orders to forces on the ground that they may have to withdraw to the base and cease operations in Lebanon or Liberia because we did not have certainty around the Security Council resolution. Eventually, they came through but in the case of Chad we withdrew all our forces in advance of the resolution because we could not be there with all our kit at risk of being left behind.
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Potentially, we will not be involved in peacekeeping activities in future.
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If the Lebanon resolution is not renewed, that is the end of Lebanon. It will be the end of UNIFIL, which has existed since 1978. It is catastrophic and it has been consistent over quite a long period.
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Cuirim fáilte roimh na finnéithe. I thank them for their presentations. Professor Tonra and I have spoken at conferences together.
I am a great admirer of his work. We agree on most things but there are some areas we disagree on. He framed his statement in the opening paragraph by stating that the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has profoundly reshaped Europe’s strategic calculus. I agree this is the case and Mr. Noonan earlier quoted Kaja Kallas. There are a number of domain assumptions around that. This is being used to frame our decision to drop the triple lock. I have heard it repeatedly said that times have changed. Things are different now. We have to join the grown-ups and get with programme. We have to wake up and smell the coffee. This is the kind of sentiment around the threat posed by Vladamir Putin. Is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the threat that Putin’s criminal regime poses the primary lens through which Professor Tonra views European security?
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That is great. I share that view because for me it certainly is not. It has been asserted repeatedly that Russia could successively mount a ground invasion of a NATO state by 2029. Does Professor Tonra share that view?
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I am not an expert on Russia’s military development. I do know the kind of scenario that Russia employed with the respect to Crimea and Ukraine would be easily applied to many of the Baltic states.
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Does Professor Tonra think that the Russians could mount a successful ground invasion of a NATO state by 2029?
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I do not know,. They certainly might try.
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Our friend and colleague Ed Burke wrote in The Irish Times last week that Russia can produce 1,500 main battle tanks every year. Does Professor Tonra share that view?
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Again, that is not my area of specialisation. I am sorry.
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For the record, the Russians certainly cannot. They can only produce a small fraction of that. Russia has a gross domestic product that is roughly similar to Spain’s. The European Union has a GDP 20 times that of Russia. Even without the US financial commitment to NATO in Europe, we dwarf Russia in terms of our military. I share Deputy Stanley’s view. I grew up in the 1960s and 1970s when we had Warsaw Pact forces in almost every capital in central and eastern Europe. We had nuclear missiles pointed at every European city and we did not panic. That ever-present threat, which was much more acute than the current appalling circumstances in Ukraine, which is a criminal invasion and violation of human rights, did not frame our concept of ourselves and our neutrality. Professor Tora mentioned the United States. I attended briefings in the Pentagon with the CIA recently. I attended briefings at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe at Mons quite recently, which were hosted by the United States. Their permanent representation to NATO in Brussels is still there. Does Professor Tonra believe the United States would relinquish their domination of NATO in Europe and their control and influence there?
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Does Professor Tonra not believe, bearing in mind the text Mark Rutte just sent to Trump, that the United States is the dominant partner or that it would easily relinquish its dominant control of NATO-----
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There is no credibility of the US’s security guarantee to NATO in Europe; None.
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Professor Tora is asserting that but what evidence does he have?
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Everything that President Trump has said and done.
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What President Trump says and what the United States does are two different things as we all know.
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If we look at the US's de facto commitment to NATO in terms of its permanent representation in Brussels and its constant participation in European collective security exercises in the Baltic states in the past couple of months; where is the evidence to suggest the US is going to leave and therefore, we somehow have to wake up and smell the coffee because things have changed?
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Again, everything that Trump has said, and the US Administration is doing, up to and including relinquishing the post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe post.
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-----which is an incredible volte-face and turnaround over 80 years of history.
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: Not yet, but they have put it on the table. It is up for discussion.
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The answer is it is on the table for discussion.
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I just have a quick question for Mr. Noonan. He said, and this was confirmed by the officials from the Department, that the Bill does not modify the triple lock; it simply removes it. Based on what he is saying that we need to consider, and I thank Professor Tonra for the safeguards that he suggested on page 8 in his document, which is excellent-----
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Does this mean that any future government can send any number of Irish troops anywhere in the world to any conflict at any time in the future just by a simple government majority.
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I thank the witnesses for their presentations, which were excellent. Summarising Mr. Noonan’s contribution, he said this Bill is for us to make a decision on whether to put our young people in harm’s way. I assure him, I, like all of my colleagues, are taking this seriously. A member of my family is a member of the Defence Forces. I assure Mr. Noonan and his colleagues that any decision I make will be based on how I would like to see him or any other person involved in our Defence Forces to be deployed anywhere.
I have a number of questions on what Deputy Stanley said. The United Nations was formed to prevent future global conflicts and promote international co-operation. Is it still fit for purpose? NATO was established to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down, to paraphrase Baron Ismay. Should we ever consider joining NATO? Can we really be militarily neutral if we cannot defend ourselves? If we get rid of the triple lock, do the witnesses see a role for the Seanad and the President in ensuring the safety our armed forces into the future?
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Is the UN fit for purpose? No. Is it therefore to be sidelined completely? No, it has a value. There are things that happen there that need to happen and would not otherwise happen so well. That is a mixed answer. Should we ever contemplate joining NATO, a nuclear-armed treaty organisation that has declared it is willing to use nuclear weapons? For very good reasons Ireland has historically always been completely opposed to that philosophy and outlook. That informs my answer to the Senator’s question about NATO. That is why I highlighted the direction of travel from Kallas.
In relation to neutrality and defending ourselves, successive Governments should have had a far more professional approach to how we developed, managed, trained and remunerated the members of our Defence Forces and the Reserve. That has been terribly lacking. Everyone knows that. I am not quite sure how that has happened. That has to be addressed. That is hugely important. I will say no more. All the members knows the importance of that.
Do we have to defend ourselves to be neutral? That is a quasi-legal point that is bound in the historical rules around neutrality. Irish neutrality is a thing of its own. We have to sort out our Defence Forces and our view on how we engage with the world. We use the word "neutrality", but it has a different meaning when we use it as opposed to the conventions.
Is there a role for the Seanad and President? There certainly is. There is a role for the people. This, the Constitution of Ireland, is the little book that was composed a few hundred yards up the road in the Shelbourne Hotel.
It devotes itself to explaining where sovereignty comes from - it comes from the people. That is a radical statement. You will not find it in many other constitutions in our Continent. It has meaning.
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I thank Mr. Noonan. We are running out of time. Will Mr. Murphy respond?
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The change is not due to the Russian threat, it is due to the veto wielded by China, Russia and the US in relation to overseas UN peacekeeping operations. Let us park the Russian threat on that issue. In relation to whether the UN is fit for purpose, no, it is no longer fit for purpose because it has not made a decision on a UN mandate since 2014. On being militarily neutral and whether we should have forces to defend that neutrality, Irish neutrality has never been defined in that particular way. It has been defined on the basis that we are not a member of a mutual alliance and we do not enter into mutual defence alliances. They are the two elements. It has been stated in the defence White Paper and the foreign affairs White Paper over many years. On the role of the Seanad and the President, I am not a constitutional lawyer but understanding is that it would be repugnant to the Constitution. The Constitution imbues in Dáil Éireann alone the right to declare war. Therefore, anything else below that threshold would not require additional approval. On the comments of Ms Kallas, when I was policy director-----
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It is just a quick point. Mr. Juncker regularly spoke about a European army. There is no provision in the European Union's legislation or treaties for a European army. Ms Kallas makes statements many times; it is just her opinion.
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The UN is fit for purpose but not here in respect of neutrality and defence. That is a policy decision. We can defend ourselves independently, through an alliance or in co-operation with others. It is up to this body and others to decide where they go. In respect of joining NATO, Ireland has benefited from its geographical position over the past 80 years. It suffered for the previous 800 so I have no problem whatsoever in Ireland continuing to take full advantage of its geographic situation and not joining an alliance like NATO.
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I thank Professor Tonra. I call Deputy Duncan Smith, followed Deputy Ó Laoghaire. I remind witnesses that this is the members' time. How they allocate it and where they direct it is up to them, not the Chair.
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I thank the Cathaoirleach. There is no doubt the UN is in a weakened position and the UN Security Council is paralysed. For those of us who want to see the UN restrengthened, commit to it and value Ireland's history and tradition with the United Nations, I will posit a theory. I will direct the question to Mr. Murphy first. Setting aside operational practicalities, at least in theory, if UNIFIL in Lebanon is not renewed at the Security Council but each contributing country wants to continue a mission there, could a motion be brought to the UN General Assembly to be agreed by a majority? It would not have a legal basis as a UN mission but it could give assent to a country like Ireland and appease the triple lock provision in our foreign policy. If we are to make proposals to the Minister that could keep the triple lock or some kind of guardrail on our deployment, is it a potential option that a UN General Assembly resolution could at least give an assent to some composition of a peacekeeping mission?
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Hypothetically, yes, but that requires getting 192 nations on board. What is the interregnum between the end of one mandate and the start of a new mandate? We cannot stay if we do not have mandate. The UN does not act quickly, and the certainly the General Assembly is not going to act within 24 hours to suddenly come up with a mandate for a renewed mission. The legality of the mission is open to question. Generally, the assembly makes recommendations to the Security Council. It is only the UN Security Council that can legally authorise a UN blue hat mission. It is effectively no longer a UN blue hat mission.
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I understand that. We are talking about the direction of travel in the EU, which I do not dispute, that Kaja Kallas and others want to bring EU nations towards. I have huge worries about that direction, the militarisation of Europe and Ireland being caught up in that. I have a massive concern about us simply removing the triple lock without at least examining other methods for a potential guardrail. The UN Security Council does not move particularly quickly. If we are going to give up to missions that are in line with the UN Charter, the United States and others would contest that the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 was in line with the UN Charter because the resolutions for the original Gulf War were violated. The UN Charter can be manipulated by whoever is promoting a particular action. I generally trust Irish politics and our political class to protect our peacekeepers and bring them to genuine peacekeeping missions. If the Security Council is paralysed, is there another channel? Mr. Murphy said hypothetically there could be through the UN General Assembly.
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I do not think the UN General Assembly is the route to go simply because it is unworkable and does not give the legal certainty. Going down that route would not be repeating a UN mission, to put it that way, in terms of the blue hat, etc. It is up to the House to determine the checks and balances it inserts in the legislation such as a more robust role for the committee or a free vote in the Dáil. A whole rake of criteria could be inserted. Twenty-seven members of the European Union do not decide overnight to go to war in Chad, for example, or to mount an operation. There are lots of discussions and negotiations running into the late hours of the night and early hours of the morning on the concept of operations, the strategic approach of the European Union to a particular issue - for example, Chad, an operation Ireland led - the strategic orientation, the operational concept and rules of engagement. All countries are concerned about sending their troops into harm's way and about the bona fides in terms of public perception of what they are doing. We have had situations in Ireland where we have not participated in missions, even when they were UN mandated, because we had concerns about whether it met our policy objectives and whether it was consistent with Ireland's national policy and foreign policy. We need to go back and put trust in the House which the originators of the 1960 Act put, which stated the role of Dáil Éireann is to protect Ireland's sovereignty and neutrality.
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I have a question for Professor Tonra. Does the triple lock stop us investing in our Defence Forces' capacity, protecting our undersea cables, engaging with PESCO, Partnership for Peace and similar which we have already done? Does it generally stop us increasing our capacity for national security?
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I thank the Chair. I thank our guests for their time and expertise. We have a serious issue in the neglect of our Defences Forces in personnel and equipment. That needs to be addressed. As answered by Professor Tonra, there is nothing to prevent that except political will. That has been an issue in recent times in the previous two or three governments. I direct my first question to Mr. Noonan. I think he is right in saying he is the only legal practitioner to come before us in relation to this matter. There were references in previous sessions and this session to the Lisbon and Nice treaties and the attached protocols. There is the issue of the confidence of the Irish people when they went to vote, and you can assess that morally. In legal and constitutional terms, do issues arise due to the fact that these were protocols attached to European treaties which were subject to referendums? I refer in particular the Nice treaty. The Seville declaration was perhaps more explicit than the commitments given regarding the Lisbon treaty. I am not a legal practitioner. Mr. Noonan can assess it better than me. It states very clearly that Ireland reiterates that the participation of the Irish Defence Forces, among other things, requires authorisation of the operation by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations.
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It does. As I was in my office yesterday and going out the door, my eye fell on the bookshelf on exactly what the Deputy is talking about - I had not been looking for them - which is the guide given to everybody at the time of the Nice treaty and the White Paper, and they say exactly as the Deputy describes.
Professor Tonra is correct that there were different views taken about the strength of that at the time. I took the view that it was not as strong as it was being sold to the people as. Funnily enough, the people who were selling it then are now saying to the people that it is not strong. It is an interesting dynamic in Irish political life over 20 years. That is both amusing and serious. Simon Harris, when he was introducing the general scheme of the occupied territories Bill yesterday, was calling on everybody, including Opposition Members, to call their counterparts in other countries to try to get them to instigate something similar. He used a phrase that really registered with me. He said it is very lonely out there. That is what Simon Harris is saying now. Imagine how lonely he or his successors would feel if the bargaining counter of the triple lock is gone and they are in those Council of the European Union chambers-----
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I apologise to Mr. Noonan but I am conscious of my time and I have another question. I will put it more directly. He does believe that potentially constitutional issues arise.
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I have to be candid with the Deputy and I am saying the trust of the people is in jeopardy and in balance. They were told a certain thing. Now, the Attorney General's advice to the Government, as I understand it, is that this was only a political commitment. Candidly, I agree with the Attorney General. I cannot see that this triggers a mandatory constitutional referendum.
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I thank Mr. Noonan for clarifying that.
I was very interested in the points made by Professor Tonra. He has made the point regarding safeguards and that is quite interesting. Does he agree that Irish neutrality is desirable?
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I do not put it as desirable or undesirable; it simply is, and it is a perfectly logical strategy. The only place we differ, perhaps, is that some people invest in neutrality as some sort of idea of being good, whereas I say neutrality is essentially a mé féin policy. That is perfectly reasonable and perfectly acceptable but I do not think it is either good or bad; it just is.
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A previous speaker, a similarly eminent academic, made a point about it being questionable whether it did exist or not. Whether it is or it is not, does Professor Tonra believe, speaking frankly, that Irish neutrality is respected in the EU? Senior politicians come in here frequently and say Irish neutrality is respected. I would question that. I know Mr. Murphy said that High Representative Kallas said various things. I do not think High Representative Kallas can be categorised as a semi-detached backbencher. She is a very senior representative of the European Commission. Between herself and others-----
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Speaking frankly, I am not dancing on the head of a pin but it depends on what we mean by respect. If respect means having knowledge of that reality, yes it is respected. If respect means it is something that other people think is a really good thing, I would say "No". It is seen as incredibly selfish.
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That is my sense of it as well. It comes back to what Mr. Noonan said regarding lawyers moving into absences. We are potentially removing the guardrails and entering into a very wide sphere using narrow exceptions to justify legislation that already the Department of Defence has told us that-----
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I will finish on that but I am minded to say that a very clear trend is that people right across the spectrum hold the view that the legislation does not currently contain enough safeguards. Does Professor Tonra think that is fair to say?
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I thank the witnesses for coming in and giving up their time. I have a number of short questions. First, to Mr. Noonan, if somehow we could cobble together some kind of constitutional wording to enshrine our neutrality and that amendment was passed by the people, would he be as concerned as he is now regarding the triple lock?
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With respect, there is a false premise in the question. In a sense, neutrality is in the Constitution already and that was clarified back in 1987 in the Supreme Court in the Crotty case where it said the people had given certain limited powers to the Oireachtas and the Oireachtas could not give those powers away to other bodies. For example, if one defines neutrality as joining a military alliance, we cannot join NATO without a constitutional referendum under the provisions of the Crotty judgment. The answer to the question, therefore, is "No".
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Based on Mr. Noonan's logic, we cannot become aligned with a military alliance.
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Alignment and membership are two different things.
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We cannot join as a member either.
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As I have watched this over the years, that gap has got narrower and narrower. We are now in at least three, if not four, NATO-organised endeavours to do with cybersecurity and other matters. We are not a member. We are now saying neutrality is simply not being a member. NATO is quite happy to have people who are not members as long as it is doing what it wants.
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We had a previous witness before the committee who painted a vista, albeit a stateable case, that in the light of the representations made by the then Government at the time of the Lisbon treaty, she could foresee the Lisbon treaty potentially unravelling before the European courts. What would Professor Tonra say to that?
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I do not understand the question at all.
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When the Lisbon treaty was being put before the Irish people, certain representations were made by the then Government about our neutrality. Based on that, the witness felt that if we changed the triple lock, that would undermine those representations and therefore undermine the validity of the decision made by the Irish people and could in theory, or at least on a stateable basis, be brought before the European courts and potentially unravel the treaties.
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I see no credibility in that at all, no.
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I thank Professor Tonra for that.
This is a question on practicality. Professor Tonra mentioned that one of things that could be done or suggested is that a formal legal review be undertaken as part of each proposed overseas deployment. I was thinking about that from a practical point of view. Let us say the Minister for Defence gets a phone call at 2 o'clock in the morning and the legal advisers are not available. From a practical point of view, how would that be dealt with?
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Mr. Murphy can correct me but that is not how it works. That is not how these things happen. Troops are never deployed in that kind of manner in the UN.
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Let us say there are Irish citizens on a runway in Kabul and the Army Ranger Wing is anxious to be deployed to rescue them but it cannot deploy because there is no legal review.
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Under this legislation, up to 50 troops could be sent without that necessity.
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What would happen if you wanted to send 51 troops?
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Then you would require the Government decision and you would have to have the Dáil approve it. The Dáil would still have to approve anything over 50.
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I welcome the witnesses and thank them for their submissions and statements. Mr. Murphy spoke about the enforced exit from Chad and the uncertainty at that time. That is where the rubber hits the road in all of this - the practicalities arising from decisions and waiting. He described the situation in graphic detail. He also expressed his concerns about what could happen in Lebanon if there were to be a decision made or issues raised as part of it. I wanted to put that on record.
A lot of people have spoken about guardrails. I absolutely agree with guardrails but is it not the case that one such guardrail we have under the present legislation is the consent or abstention of the five permanent members?
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That is the crux of the matter. Professor Tonra has given suggestions, which I welcome because we have had a number of witnesses over the course of the meetings and he is the first to have put in suggestions.
There is general acceptance that the P5 is the crux of the issue. There is general acceptance, as Mr. Noonan has stated, that the UN is not fit for purpose. Professor Tonra has also stated that there are issues with the veto. As that is clearly the crux of the matter as far as I am concerned, what kinds of guardrails are practical? Mr. Murphy has stated there are issues with the General Assembly in terms of the length of time it may take to make decisions with regard to the threshold. Are there practical guardrails that could be put in place in the absence of the P5? Mr. Noonan might also comment on Professor Tonra's suggestions.
Comment on this
First, I remind the members that I have made suggestions at the end of my paper. Maybe I did not expand on them, and I direct members’ attention to that. Part of my paper was identifying threats, how threats are identified, who identifies them and why. One of the issues in this discussion is the ever-present lobby. There are powerful interests promoting certain points of view and certain decisions to be taken. They are not always necessarily transparent about their presence in the room. If we are talking about the UN, yes, there are difficulties. If we are looking at guardrails, we have to recognise there is a second crux. There is not just one crux, there are two. The second is the pressure this country can be susceptible to from other countries. We have already seen that and, as I said, it has been voiced by the Tánaiste. The difficulty over the occupied territories Bill is an example of that, as he said eloquently as recently as yesterday that it is lonely out there. That is something you cannot simply glide past. These guys are ruthless. People in charge of big, former imperial powers can be ruthless. When their own interests are challenged, they do what is necessary to pursue those interests. We are not used to that in the same way. We are good at getting on with people. We have a genius expressed in culture, music, language and in other ways. We need to realise the terrain we are inviting our Government into. If we take away this and do not have-----
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What are the alternatives? What are the suggestions?
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More work needs to be done on the alternatives, but I will give the Senator some ideas immediately. The provisions in the Constitution that were decided by the High Court in the Horgan case in 2003 to be merely aspirational, could be written into the legislation and thereby made operative. That would be a good, concrete, constitutional and legislative thing to look at. We can do that sort of thing and cast a cold eye on the decision-making process we are already subject to within the EU, where the scope of the Union is expanding into military territory. It is interesting to hear the criticism of Kallas here that she is speaking in some way as an outlier when she is really just echoing what President von der Leyen says in different ways and at different times. We have to be careful about all of these factors that are sitting back waiting for us to remove that barrier, which is an impediment in their view. We look to our own Constitution and our own internal way of making decisions to find the guardrails the Senator is talking about. It is at the end of my document as well.
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How does Mr. Noonan feel about Professor Tonra's suggestions?
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They have to be taken into consideration. That is a fair way to deal with them.
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I thank the witnesses. I put on the record that my view of the function of this committee is to listen with an open mind and draw conclusions. We are not here to protect either neutrality or the triple lock. It was accepted by Ray Murphy that we do not qualify under customary international law as a neutral country. Professor Tonra has said that neutrality is Irish neutrality, whatever that is. Ireland is a sovereign state. That is my understanding. As a sovereign state, the argument against removing the triple lock is that we cannot be trusted to make decisions with our own troops. Is there any other state in the world that has a similar restriction placed on the government of that country with respect to the deployment of its troops? I ask that of all three witnesses.
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To the best of my knowledge, in terms of legislation, no. A number of member states would see a UN resolution as a political precondition and we have seen it in a number of other European states, but legislatively, not to my knowledge.
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The same. There is no other that I am aware of. There are countries that, for political purposes and for public presentation in their own states, would like to be able to say the UN Security Council has approved this.
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Would granting the yea or nay with respect to the deployment of troops by Ireland to a third party be repugnant to sovereignty?
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Sovereignty is shifting under our feet. There is a global context within which that 1960 legislation was passed and that global context in some sense changes and in some sense stays the same. Sovereignty has already been diluted significantly through our membership of the EU, which people voted for and have voted for further amendments. It is something that is not fixed and immutable. There are two impingements on sovereignty and on the right to say yes or no. One is a visible one like the P5 veto. The other is the invisible one, the hidden power. You will remember when Mr. Trichet told Brian Lenihan that he did not want a bomb to go off in Dublin. There are different ways of exerting pressure, which are not always visible. They may only become visible afterwards. We have to be alive to all of those.
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The Senator is correct. It does involve a surrender of sovereignty. In fact, de Valera mentioned it in the debates in 1946. When people were pushing back against him, he said that membership of any international organisation always involves a loss of sovereignty. The reference here is made to the European Union. He also lamented the fact that the P5 were setting up the rules, which everybody else would be bound by but by which they would not. That said, there is a fundamental flaw in the United Nations in that those who make the rules will not bind themselves by the rules.
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We find ourselves in a situation where Mr. Noonan said that all power comes from the people under the Constitution. As the people voted to join the European Union, how does that in any way diminish our sovereignty? It was the people who made that decision. Add to that, the question has been raised by one or two of my colleagues with respect to putting neutrality into our Constitution. If we place neutrality in the Constitution, are we not tying the hands of future governments in what is a dynamic world that is changing all the time? We at no stage know when we are going to need to deploy troops. Kabul was a classic example of where we needed people on the ground urgently. We were not able to put them there ourselves because we did not have the transport, and when we did send people out, we sent a paltry 12.
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On the first point, the example I give is the inability of the Government to do anything with regard to the situation in Gaza without the permission of the European Union. The Senator says we are still sovereign because we decided to join the EU. Respectfully, that is a slight misunderstanding of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is where the power rests to say yes or no. We voluntarily undertook an arrangement where that power would no longer be exclusively with the Irish people. We now see the outworkings of that, in that respect.
As for deployment, this is touched on in another paper but perhaps not sufficiently. I may ask for permission to submit something further on this to the committee. The question is what the best use is of the Irish Permanent Defence Force. There are good reasons not to send soldiers into foreign wars. We all understand that. What, subject to that, can members of the Defence Forces do constructively? There is a huge need for informed, western-educated, military-trained people to work in support of the international institutions like the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court on confronting the evil of impunity. Irish people, including members of the Defence Forces, have huge potential skills untapped to assist those court bodies in investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators who currently enjoy impunity and who operate with impunity. That is unexplored territory that would be something hugely constructive. We have the skills, people and soft power to work within that territory and nobody else is doing it. That would be my last comment.
Comment on this
I thank the witnesses for their time this morning and for the genuinely informative submissions they have made. I will begin with Professor Tonra and the four points he set out, point No. 2 in particular - the "broadened range of potential deployment scenarios to include counter-narcotics, embassy security, hostage rescue" and so on. If the triple lock were to be retained, would we be able to do those as a country?
Comment on this
Not without an authorisation of all five of the permanent Security Council members.
Comment on this
I thank Professor Tonra. I have a question for Mr. Murphy. A couple of times he mentioned the phrase, "to put trust back in this House". I think that was the phrase he used. This is a question I asked a couple of sessions ago of others who were before the committee. For me, the argument for retaining the triple lock at the moment is that we would rather trust the likes of warmongers like Vladimir Putin, or individuals of current international standing or morals such as Donald Trump to veto where we send peacekeepers rather than trust the people who were elected to this House to stand up for our neutrality, as we always have. Would Mr. Murphy follow that line of logic in his statement, that we need to put trust back into these Houses?
Comment on this
I cannot go along with the Deputy's initial comments about warmongers, but in relation to the decisions around the deployment of forces overseas, that is the primary role and function of this House. It is not the role of anybody else. As I have said on numerous occasions, that the UN is the protector of our neutrality is a fallacy and it was never seen as the protector. This House was seen as the protector.
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Absolutely. It was these Houses that established our neutrality and these Houses that, I believe, still firmly stand by it today. I will turn to Mr. Noonan about the points in his paper about Palestine and, essentially, the EU's failings in regard to that. I have said that in the Chamber myself and history will judge that, regardless of the fact that Ireland has been at the forefront of the issue. The issue of Palestine is extremely important to the Irish people, but under the triple lock, if we were to retain it, would we be able to send peacekeepers to Palestine, which I think Irish people would really like to see, in the event of a ceasefire there?
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Clearly not, but we need to look a bit wider. Going back to the point about under what circumstances a country should send its troops to another country, that has to be very restricted. If it is the case that the international community, through the UN, has currently got itself into a logjam about taking that decision, then so be it. Maybe we should just recognise that as the reality of the world we now live in and not cast around or have it put in our way that this is an alternative because we are exchanging one set of masters, arguably, for another. If we are talking about dealing with people like, as the Deputy described, the EU with regard to its conduct, such as facilitating sending bullets - 335 of which went into a car being driven with a six-year-old, Hind Rajab, inside, who was killed along with her family members - which bullets were supplied from Czechia, and you will see pictures online of President von der Leyen receiving a bunch of flowers from the Czech arms industry lobby group, we have to not go for the easy solution because there is not one. This committee has within it the ability, skills and blend of experience to go deeper into this issue and that is what we need to do.
Comment on this
Some of the recommendations made by both witnesses and by Professor Tonra, in particular, are very welcome in regard to what else could be done. Following from Deputy Brabazon's questions about joining NATO, I guess the triple lock is seen as a safeguard. Is it Mr. Noonan's point about not being able to join NATO because of the constitutional requirements around that not a safeguard in itself, that if the triple lock were removed we have another safeguard in that Ireland could not join NATO without a referendum?
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At the risk of saying things again, which I do not want to do, we have drifted very close to the NATO orbit that now we are seen as troublemakers if we do not go along with whatever Kallas or von der Leyen want, and that is dangerous. That is a drift that has happened.
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Ireland could not join NATO without a referendum.
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No, but Deputy Brabazon's question was what difference that makes at this point. I am not saying there is no difference but it has got to be a cigarette paper at this point.
Comment on this
From Senator Craughwell's point about sovereignty, it was mentioned that Ireland perhaps lost some sovereignty or diminished our sovereignty when we joined the European Union but that was through a vote of the people. Is there not an argument that the creation of the triple lock to begin with should have been by a vote of the people also if that was going to diminish our sovereignty?
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The triple lock was certainly approved explicitly by the people when they were asked to vote on the Nice treaty.
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However, it was not a direct question in a referendum to the people.
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I am not sure about that. First, the triple lock was put into the legislation in 1960, was well understood and we had experience of living with it. When it came under question during the development of the EU to take on a greater military identity, which was being promoted by big powers, which was in conflict with the Irish position and which conflict had to be resolved initially, through the Crotty case and then the referendum amendments, and we could always see further language being stitched into the treaties continuing to bring the Union in that direction, it was against that backdrop that the solemn assurances were given in the Seville Declaration and the Nice treaty at the time upon which people relied when they cast their votes. The importance of that has to be underlined, understood and candidly accepted. We cannot just turn our eyes away from that. That was the basis on which people cast their votes, and similarly in the Lisbon treaty. Now we are being told, I think correctly, by the Attorney General that that does not carry weight but it carries political weight.