The Changing International Geopolitical Environment: Discussion
Witnesses described a rapidly shifting order marked by Russian aggression, reduced US commitment to Europe, pressure on multilateral institutions and growing risks to democracy from tech platforms. They disagreed on the response: Rowan urged Ireland to defend the UN, neutrality and diplomacy, warning against greater military spending and dependence on the US; O’Brennan argued Europe must strengthen its own defence, while Drea stressed the EU’s economic and security realignment and Ireland’s weak defence capacity and contested standing in Brussels. Members examined how Ireland could support peace and international law while preparing for threats, and raised the importance of stronger regulation of technology companies.
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Our witnesses are joining us today to help inform our knowledge on and to discuss the changing international geopolitical environment encompassing the United Nations, the United States and the European Union.
We are joined by Dr. Rory Rowan, Trinity College Dublin, Dr. Eoin Drea, senior researcher at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, and Professor John O'Brennan from Maynooth University. They are all very welcome today to discuss this important topic. We will hear their opening statements followed by a question and answer session with the members of the committee. These slots for questions and answers usually last seven minutes and the witnesses will be able to see how much time is left for their answer. That way we will potentially get to a second round. I ask everyone to be concise with their questions to allow all members the opportunity to participate.
I will now give the floor to Dr. Rowan to make his opening statement, followed by Dr. Drea and Professor O'Brennan.
Comment on this
I thank the committee for having me here today. One of the defining features of the contemporary geopolitical environment is the extreme pressure that the institutions of international law and multilateral diplomacy, including the United Nations, are being subjected to. I will focus my comments on this.
The United States is the world's most powerful state and has the most determining influence on international affairs and the global geopolitical environment. It is by no means the only powerful or determining actor but it is by far the most important. It is also the most important to discuss in this House given the enormous economic dependency this State has on US foreign direct investment, the growing presence of US-owned infrastructure and the State's active and increasing collaboration with NATO and the US military use of Irish transport infrastructure, including Shannon Airport.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US enjoyed two decades of virtually unchallenged global hegemony but the emergence of China as a peer competitor challenged this dominance. A deep bipartisan consensus has emerged among US policymakers about the need to contain China to maintain the economic and geopolitical power of the US. This new US geopolitical focus was first announced in 2012 with Barack Obama's pivot to Asia and has been pursued by every administration since, Democrat and Republican. Central to US geopolitical concerns has been competition over supply chains, upon which next generation technologies depend such as AI, robotics, green energy, advanced manufacturing.
While Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a proximate cause of the European militarisation currently under way, there is very little frank discussion of the fundamental impact of changing US strategic priorities upon the geopolitical environment in Europe. At the most basic level, Europe's security has been deprioritised as part of this broader shift in US policy towards containing China. As a consequence, European states in the EU must now take a greater responsibility for their own security and bear a greater share of the financial cost. There is currently a high risk of a major war in Europe. It is the moral duty of our political leaders to do everything they can to prevent such a conflict occurring and to ensure the conditions for peace. It is a source of grave concern to me, and to many others across this country and Europe, that a substantial portion of Europe's political leadership, including in this country, are not simply resigned to the inevitability of such a war but are actively creating the conditions for that war.
Robust institutions of international law and multilateral diplomacy are key protections against a world of war. The United States is today attempting to systematically undermine the existing institutions. The US is not alone in acting outside the constraints of international law – Russia and Israel are obvious examples - but it is actively attacking the very institutions of international law and multilateral diplomacy through which international peace and security are guaranteed. In my written submission, I listed numerous examples which I invite members to read. I will simply note here that just this month, the US imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court.
The US has a long history of claiming to defend international law while breaching it when it suits its foreign policy objectives. However, it seems that now we have entered a period when appeals to law and diplomacy have been replaced with base self-interest. The US is now explicitly practising and promoting a "might is right" policy. This is a vision of world order that all those committed to international law must resist by defending its institutional architectures, starting with the UN.
The United Nations institutions were born out of the experience of two world wars. For 80 years, they have served as the key institutions guaranteeing international peace and security, however imperfectly. Doubtless these institutions do not always function as they were designed or as we may wish them to; however, the answer to these problems lies in reform rather than rejection. Indeed, Ireland has a proud history within the UN, not least under the leadership of Fianna Fáil's Frank Aiken who successfully negotiated the first Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Further, our Defence Forces are renowned across the world for their service to UN "blue helmet" peacekeeping operations and enjoy the distinction of having the longest unbroken continuous service as part of UN peacekeeping since 1958.
Ireland’s record is justly recognised around the world and ensures that the State enjoys diplomatic influence beyond its size. A sign of this respect came last week with the announcement that Ireland had been elected to the UN Human Rights Council for the second time.
We are at a moment of profound geopolitical volatility that is rife with danger. This moment is defined by a struggle between a world of law and diplomacy and a world of might is right. We have a choice between co-operation and competition, not simply a choice within competition on terms set by others.
The values of the Irish public are clear in poll after poll, which show they are deeply committed to neutrality, staying outside military alliances, UN peacekeeping, multilateral diplomacy and international law. Ireland's long-term interests lie in pursuing foreign policy choices grounded in our values, even if those choices may have a cost in the short term. We need to have an honest and open conversation about these costs. However, the Government seems determined to pursue a narrow and short-term view of our interests at the cost of our values and our longer term interests, and to do so without democratic debate or participation. This should be concern for us all.
Comment on this
I am grateful for the invitation to appear today and I apologise for not being there in person. I want to make one central point. The European Union is changing fast and I am not sure that Ireland is fully keeping pace. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the return of President Trump, US actions in Iran and the weakening of the multilateral system, which the previous speaker alluded to, have fundamentally reordered priorities in Brussels for the European Union. Economic security, growth, industrial policy and defence are now the key priorities.
However, and this is often misunderstood, this pressure is not only external. The EU is also driven by fear at home - fear of what upcoming elections in France, Spain, Poland and other countries might deliver. The result is that here in Brussels we are in a series of battles, being fought right now, that will settle the shape, powers and priorities of the European Union for decades, and with them the future of EU relations with the UK and the US, and even with the UN and the World Trade Organization. For Ireland, these battles matter.
Let me highlight two instances that show how this is so important. The first is the turn towards a more protectionist Europe. This is a Europe that is tougher on Chinese trade abuses, as we see now with electric and hybrid vehicles. It is also a Europe intent on reducing its dependence on both China and the United States across key economic sectors. The test case is the Industrial Accelerator Act, commonly known as the made-in-Europe Act. This is now being negotiated in Brussels and aims to raise manufacturing from around 14% of EU GDP to 20% by the middle of the next decade. Why should an island with little heavy manufacturing care about this? It is because how "made in Europe" is defined will shape the EU's relations with its closest partners, namely, the US, Britain, Canada, Turkey, South Korea and Japan. If France and other protectionist member states succeed in restricting it to EU members only, the consequences for supply chains and for politics will be significant, not least for our relationship with Britain, the US and even China.
I highlight one specific element of this. The recently agreed Franco-German position on the car industry highlights how the EU position will in effect be driven by Paris and Berlin. This made-in-Europe proposal limits made-in-Europe provisions to members of the EU, members of the European Economic Area and Britain, but only if Britain agrees a joint tariff and investment screening position in relation to China. This has obvious implications for Ireland and its relationship with the UK.
The second issue I would like to highlight, and I am sure all members of the committee are aware of this, is the ongoing debate over the EU budget over the next multi-annual financial framework, MFF.
Two camps are formed: the net contributor frugals who want to pay less than the friends of cohesion who want more. Again, the rush to reach an EU budget deal is driven by fear. There is a fear of the next French presidential election next April and a potential President Le Pen who wants to slash her country's contributions to the EU budget. Unfortunately, Ireland's Presidency of the European Council is a role that is not conducive to putting forward one's own policy priorities. Yet for us, for Ireland, the stakes are huge. Thanks to our artificially inflated economic data, due to the actions of the multinationals, Ireland is already one of the highest and largest per capita contributors to the EU budget. Yet, for all our rhetoric about free trade, globalisation and innovation, we still seem to fight hardest for CAP. I do understand the political pressures, having grown up on a farm myself, but the reality is that we have a net contributor's reality but a net beneficiary's mindset. That contradiction is one more reason we sit uneasily on the edge of the EU's mainstream. Enlargement, Ukraine, trade and security, among other issues, will also define Europe's place in the multilateral order and in the world. I am happy to discuss this if we have the opportunity today. My message is simple. The EU is being remade now and if Ireland does not decide what it wants, others will decide for us. Thank you.
Comment on this
I thank the Chairman and his colleagues for the invitation to address the committee. I am a specialist in European integration and, within that sphere, in enlargement policy. I have spent a lot of my career in central and eastern Europe, most of the last 30 years, in fact, and this has informed the way I look at the European Union as a whole. I want to mention three particular geopolitical challenges, some of which have been supported by what Dr. Rowan is saying and, in other respects, by what Dr. Drea has said.
First is the challenge posed by Russian aggression. Sometimes I wonder whether in Ireland we really grasp the nature of this. As Putin has become more bogged down in Ukraine, his regime has doubled down on attacking almost overwhelmingly civilian targets, which we see day after day after day, as well as critical infrastructure in Kyiv and in a wide range of other Ukrainian cities. It has also simultaneously increased its attacks, both kinetic and hybrid, against European Union member states and commercial shipping in the Black Sea. We have seen attacks against vessels in Romania's exclusive economic zone, EEZ, and in Bulgaria's EEZ in recent weeks. I was in Sofia exactly a week ago when two vessels were attacked overnight with the loss of 11 sailors. This is just the latest in a long string of those attacks, as well as continuous drone incursions into the Baltic states, Poland and Romania. There has been malicious, repeated and overt interference in elections. Think about the last Romanian presidential election that had to be rerun because of the extent of Russian interference. The same is true in Moldova and in many other European states. There is also manipulation more broadly of the information ecosystem throughout Europe through the use of swarms of bots in particular jurisdictions.
My argument is that Ukraine is to today's Europe what Poland was in 1939 and is the site of an audacious attack on a sovereign European country, our ally, our partner and our friend that gave us unquestioned support on Brexit when we really needed it during the whole Brexit debacle. That attack was from a predatory, imperialist neighbour, which has been bent on suborning Kyiv to its will. After its earlier coercive tactics failed, it launched this full-scale invasion against Ukraine in 2022. Ukraine is also the place where the values that are enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union - democracy, pluralism, the need for competitive elections, protection of human rights and minority rights - meet the values of what is called Ruskiy Mir, the Russian world.
That is a world characterised by arbitrary power, ruthless elites behaving in the most lawless fashions, extreme human rights abuses, including very well-documented torture and brutality, and this will to power. It is something fundamentally at odds with the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, TEU. To argue that Ukraine's fight for survival is also a fight for European values is not a throwaway trope. This is something real that is happening every day in Ukraine. It is literally what is at stake in this confrontation between Russia and Europe. I make no apologies for comparing fascist Russia to fascist Germany in 1939. The similarities are extraordinary.
The threat to the EU presented by Russian aggression is compounded by the second grave threat that we face, which is the withdrawal of the United States from Europe as a security actor and partner. I absolutely concur with Professor Rowan that that withdrawal from and attempted destruction of international institutions and multilateralism is not just regrettable; it is a terrible blow. There is also the latent hostility of the United States towards its ostensible allies in our part of the world. This threat has grown more serious and existential. Recent weeks have seen the Trump regime emphatically and unequivocally throw its lot in with Russia, and Vladimir Putin's regime. It constantly berates Ukraine for refusing to surrender to Moscow, and Trump takes every opportunity to belittle and insult President Zelenskyy. Remember that infamous scene in the White House in the early part of Trump's second term. I have never seen anything like it in my lifetime. This sinister alliance between Washington D.C. and Moscow has taken on a more definite and recognisable shape, and for Europe, this betrayal of the transatlantic relationship is shocking and profound. An alliance which was built on the ashes of the Second World War and which has survived now almost eight decades is under tremendous pressure.
Trump hates everything about Europe. He hates our competitive elections and the regulatory power of the European Union, which is what he has in common with people like Elon Musk and the other tech oligarchs. He wishes to subordinate Europe and is quite prepared to engage in a new Yalta conference. Members may have seen in the last few days that the Americans have been proposing a three-way conference for Russia, China, and the United States. The intention is to divide up Ukraine and literally give it over to Putin. That is not just a threat to Ukraine; it is a threat to the whole of Europe.
European leaders have consistently underestimated the bile with which Trump and his acolytes view us. They have repeatedly humiliated themselves before Trump in an effort to guarantee stability. The grubby trade deal that the European Union signed in Scotland in the summer of last year is perhaps the best example of this. Did it bring stability to the trade relationship? Of course not, because every couple of months he is back to threatening either individual member states of the EU or the EU itself with material sanctions of one kind or another. At the moment, the focus is on European pressure on tech regulation and, again and again, Trump goes in to bat for Musk and others when the European Union seeks to properly regulate the activities of these companies.
Europeans have, to some extent, learned lessons from the last 20 months. Rearmament is happening across the Continent, however regrettable, and here I suspect I disagree with my colleague, Professor Rowan. In some jurisdictions, it is happening at scale. Efforts to make the EU more independent of both China and the United States, as Dr. Drea alluded to, can be seen in the Made in Europe initiative and in other measures to increase competitiveness and geopolitical independence.
These defensive measures, and they should be viewed as entirely defensive in this new hostile international landscape, will need, in some cases, to go much further in the years ahead if Europe is to properly insulate itself from these externalities presented by this reordering of our geopolitical system. In many ways we could argue that we are now living in a late 19th century world, a world of hard power where great powers think they should have the right to trample on their neighbours at will with no consequences of any kind from the international and multinational order. This is a world of strong men authoritarianism. It is a world that is deeply threatening to everything the European Union stands for.
For much of the period after the 1989 revolutions when the Berlin Wall came down, the EU was really comfortable in the world of international affairs, and increasingly so. However, that has changed very dramatically. My sense of this, however controversial it might be, is that we are heading for something like a European defence union in the years ahead. This will not be a coercive project. It will be entirely up to the member states whether they participate and the degree to which they participate. This is coming. The collapse of NATO is happening literally as we speak. One consequence of that, which we have to think about carefully, is what this new European defence union looks like and the extent to which Ireland might participate in this, if at all.
The final threat is one that we are all deeply aware of. It is about the information landscape and the relationship of that to politics. This is a threat that has been growing exponentially in Europe, as everywhere, over the past 15 years or so. It is brilliantly described in a book titled The Hour of the Predator by an Italian-Swiss author called Giuliano da Empoli. It describes the development of these mutually beneficial relationships between strong men authoritarians like Trump and the big tech behemoths. I ask members to think about that image of his inauguration with all the tech oligarchs lined up behind him. One of them-----
Comment on this
I am going to have to stop Professor O'Brennan because Deputies have a vote in the Dáil. We will recommence with that final section on our return. It is going to take about ten minutes.
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We will resume. I will ask Professor O'Brennan to start with his third argument again. I am sorry to make him rehearse this again but there are no further votes.
Comment on this
What unites many of these tech leaders and politicians is a complete aversion to regulation, as well as the belief that some form of authoritarian government is always and everywhere preferable to democracy, pluralism and the rule of law. The products designed by some tech companies have already wrought enormous destruction in our societies, and it is getting worse, from the deliberately designed addictive algorithms to the poisoning of politics and democratic debate.
My argument is the European Union is the most powerful force standing between these tech oligarchs and a truly dystopian level of control of our societies, which is what I think many of them are after. The Digital Services Act and AI Act are very recent but important pieces of EU legislation. They reflect the collective will in Europe to exercise some oversight over the tech barons. However, the EU needs to go much further if it is to protect its democratic structures from these predatory forces. There is a real fragility about politics in many European jurisdictions. Events in Italy, France, Belgium and Albania in recent days amply demonstrate the point. Next year, 2027, is emerging as a pivotal year for democracy in Europe. There is no guarantee the EU will survive the threats I have just outlined from these external actors. It is interesting to note that, at the same stage of its history, the United States became embroiled in civil war. I deeply hope we get no version of that either in the US or in Europe in the years ahead but these are really significant challenges. For me, the logical implications of all this is that the EU becomes significantly more independent of or less dependent on the US economically and politically, that it continues to increase its capacity for self-defence, that it takes robust action against bad actors in the information landscape, and that it makes a renewed case for international co-operation, international institutions and multilateralism and draws closer to like-minded actors such as Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan.
Comment on this
Those were wide-ranging contributions from our three witnesses. I thank them for those. We will start with committee members.
Comment on this
I thank the three witnesses. As the Chair said, there is a huge amount there in the changing landscape.
I will home in a little on multilateralism. Dr. Rowan spoke eloquently about what the UN brought to us, why, in the post-Second World War context, we got involved in the UN, and what it has meant pulling back from that. Professor O’Brennan also pointed quite well to what that means for stability in Europe and globally. It is quite terrifying. We have seen the recent attacks on the International Criminal Court, with US sanctions on the institution itself as well as on individuals in the ICC. There are more attacks on multilateral institutions and our accountability mechanisms. Will the witnesses speak about the importance of that? A lot of people will look at the UN and think it is not effective. It has not been effective on Gaza, for example, and has not found cohesion on that. How do we rebuild and strengthen it so that it can offer the things it offered after the Second World War and the things we got from it, like protection? That is also how the EU started. It was as a peace body which has morphed into much wider co-operation. How do we bring it back to that?
I really appreciated Professor O’Brennan’s remarks on the digital threats and foreign influence from tech actors, tech bro oligarchs, or whatever they want to style themselves as, which on European elections has been insidious, pervasive and is a real risk to our democratic norms.
I do not think it is wrong to say that we are coming back to might is right, 19th century style imperialistic war. We might disagree on this, but I do not think the answer to that is necessarily leaning into defence.
It is important that we have cybersecurity and that we can monitor and defend our own borders, but at the same time if we spend €800 billion as the EU has planned on defence, are we not spending sufficient money on peace initiatives, social cohesion initiatives, pro-democracy measures and the things that bring us stability and insulate ourselves from the influence of foreign services such as digital services and the like? I will stop there to allow the witnesses time to reply.
Comment on this
We need to be very clear about the centrality of the United Nations. While I agree with Professor O'Brennan about the importance of multilateralism, his emphasis fell on the EU and strengthening alliances with like-minded partners such as Canada, South Korea and the UK, but he did not mention the United Nations. The United Nations needs to be absolutely central here. We should be clear that the United Nations - that is what I was trying to express in my comments - is under sustained, targeted attack, principally by the United States, but not only from it, as we have talked a lot about Russia and we should also be concerned in this regard. The US is targeting the UN to do this.
This kind of washes up on Irish shores in the debate around the triple lock, which will be voted on in the Dáil tomorrow in the Defence (Amendment) Bill, which seeks to remove the triple lock. Essentially, the triple lock is - behind a lot of misinformation around it - the core of Irish neutrality, but also it does so by putting the United Nations at the core of Ireland's foreign and defence policy. The Irish Government, by seeking to remove the role of the UN in Ireland's defence and foreign policy, will not protect our sovereignty or peacekeeping; it will actually take part, perhaps unintentionally, in the undermining of the UN in international affairs. I am very strongly opposed to this, as members may know. I have spoken publicly about it many times. Ireland should be very careful not to partake in this attempt to undermine the United Nations and should seek to strengthen it. At the level of the EU, Ireland should urge the EU to become a voice that would strengthen the United Nations and become a key player in that. Of course there is multilateralism at different levels; but at the EU level, the EU should be trying to strengthen and make robust the United Nations in response to both the US and to Russia.
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I thank Dr. Rowan. I might just let Professor O'Brennan answer as well.
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Who is not in favour of peace? I would start by pointing to Stalin's argument among enthusiastic socialists that their mission in the 1920s should be to promulgate the revolution globally and spread the revolution but he said, first, you have to exist as a state. That was the implication. I think the truth of that has dissolved over the years.
We are sadly and regrettably living now in an international order that is entirely different from the one that I grew up with. Even in the worst days of the Cold War, there was a kind of perverse stability that came out of the confrontation between the USSR and the United States but that is not the world we are living in any more. We have to deal with the world as it is rather than the way we would like it to be. The simple fact is that the United Nations is dominated, and has been from the beginning, by the Security Council. However much we might like to invest in and boost the capacity of the UN to engage and to matter, the simple truth is that three of those five states are authoritarian and in Russia's case, totalitarian. I have no doubt in my mind that Xi Jinping wants to attack Taiwan and will do it before the end of the Trump Presidency, so we are dealing with birds of a feather-----
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I take Professor O'Brennan's point.
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-----and they have no interest whatsoever in doing anything that would damage their power. Unfortunately, they see the UN as an encumbrance.
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That is true but we have a uniting for peace resolution and there are mechanisms built into the UN founding documents that allow for peacekeeping missions that are deployed through the General Assembly and all of that. I suppose we have not drawn down on those different mechanisms yet. I would love to see us pushing that forward. Before we turn our backs on the UN and say the Security Council is compromised because of the totalitarian and authoritarian parties on it, we should look at the other mechanisms within it.
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I do not think there is a contradiction between the two. You can be absolutely in favour of and support the United Nations and all of its associated entities, but also prepare for the worst. That is what our European colleagues are doing. If you go to Vilnius or Riga, you get this palpable sense of fear because people know that Russian troops are just over the border. They also have this collective memory, and memories within families, of what Russian occupation feels like and what it results in. We do not really share that. I understand why there are differences of opinion here, but the reason our European partners are rearming is because they know how this script goes. They know that if they leave themselves defenceless, a ruthless totalitarian mob of the kind that Putin leads in Russia will not hesitate to attack and occupy them. By the way, he has said this very openly and repeatedly. He does not think the Baltic states have a right to exist. He does not think Poland has a right to exist. We need to think more about and maybe empathise with the situation that many of our peers and partners in Europe face when they confront Russian aggression. I do not think there is any contradiction in preparing for the worst and simultaneously arguing for investing in the United Nations and its constituent bodies. When the world around us has become much more predatory, we have to face up to that and the consequences of it.
Comment on this
I thank all the witnesses for coming in and joining us. I thank Professor O'Brennan who went on quite extensively about his perspective on that. The relationship between the United States and Irish foreign policy has been a fixed one for many years. I suppose we have depended on it for European security as well. According to him, there is evidence to back it up. He went into it quite a bit but I would like to hear more of his thoughts on the transatlantic agreement and the dependency we have on the relationship we have today. How do we combat that? What is the commitment from the United States - or his belief on the commitment of the United States - to that? What should happen if the United States changes its commitment to us, in particular when it comes to the economic commitment between us? I refer to the dependency of 300,000 jobs plus the other 200,000 jobs connected to them as well.
Professor O'Brennan mentioned Canada, the United Kingdom and South Korea. How plausible is that, given the size of the foreign direct investment that comes into this country and the amount that comes into this country and how dependent we are on them? If the commitment changes, what should we be doing and how should we be preparing for that?
Comment on this
I thank Deputy O'Flynn very much for the question. I have opposed American militarism all my life. If I had been around at the time of the Vietnam War, I would have opposed it. The Iraq War in 2003 was a sort of taste of the kind of world we are living in now. The American Administration at the time was deeply hostile to Europe. We remember George W. Bush and his cabinet Ministers. There is a tendency to conflate the United States with NATO. NATO has fought one war in its existence since 1949, and that was in Kosovo in 1999 because Serbian troops were going around the countryside randomly murdering people because they were Albanian and not Serb. In the previous period after the founding of NATO, the Soviet Union invaded its allies numerous times: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. All of those things were about quashing democracy. We have to be clear here about the difference between the foreign policy pursued by the United States and the collective policies pursued by NATO. I would like to see a European Union that is completely free of NATO.
I would like to see a European Union that provides only for its own defence and security. People worry about the emergence then of a military-industrial complex, and I do too. That is not something I want to see. For example, if we have defence-industrial companies producing arms for Europe, my view is that they should be used only for the defence of members of the European Union, and there should be an absolute ban on arms exports outside of the Union. Lots of things can be done, but there is very often a set of assumptions about the relationship between the United States and the EU that does not quite hold true. Irrespective of that, we are now on a trajectory where, irrespective of who replaces Trump in 2028, this dynamic is not going back to the way it was pre-2025. We are going to see a more independent and assertive European Union that invests in its own security.
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The question really is this: what should Ireland be doing? We have talked about commitments, the changing of commitments, the possible non-existence of commitments and the transatlantic agreements. Where should Ireland be going? How should it be preparing itself, considering the heavy reliance we have on foreign direct investment from the United States?
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I do not think this is an either-or situation. US multinational corporations are ruthless in the way they take decisions about investment. They will simply not be swayed by the White House. They are completely independent of politics, and they act in the way that they act. I have been listening to arguments about the imminent withdrawal of US companies since the early 1990s. It has never happened, even after 2008, irrespective of what kind of President is in office or who controls Congress. On Ireland specifically, yes, I have always believed that we should contribute to a European defence union. All of those states gave us their unalloyed support on Brexit. It is inconceivable to me that if Latvia were attacked tomorrow, we would not opt to help them out, and that includes sending our troops to help them to defend their country. That is part of the bargain of being in a European Union. I know it is still a minority view in Ireland, and I understand the concerns that people-----
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Does Professor O'Brennan believe Ireland should give up its neutrality?
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Yes, I have always thought that neutrality has a kind of mythical thing about it. Conor Gallagher of The Irish Times has written a fantastic book on neutrality, which came out about three years ago. He proves on every single page of the book that Ireland was not neutral from the moment we became an independent country in 1921; not once. This is about recognising reality and dealing with it, but I should emphasise that there will be no coercion here. If we see a European defence union emerge, as I think we will, Ireland will have the right to decide for itself the degree to which it participates or decides not to participate at all. I do not think that is very controversial. If we get to that point, there will almost certainly need to be a referendum on this.
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I thank Professor O'Brennan for his contribution. I am conscious of time and I want to come to Dr. Drea as well. For many years there has been local, national and international criticism about us lagging behind on our Defence Forces. For nearly the past 20 years, the Department of Defence has always been coupled with some other Department. Is it time we had a stand-alone Department of Defence, run by one Minister and standing on its own?
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I understand. It was not to be nasty or anything like that.
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While Dr. Drea was here, I thought he was an excellent witness to give his thoughts on that.
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Of course. The feeling in the EU in Brussels about Ireland is one of disbelief. Most Europeans are incredulous that Ireland spends 0.2% of GDP on defence and that we cannot protect our own airspace or our own waters.
I would like to allude back to what Professor O'Brennan said. Being part of the European Union is about being a member of an organisation which brings significant benefits for Ireland. We know them all and we do not have to get into them, but it also brings obligations. It would be very useful for every Irish policy maker to perhaps take a study trip to the Baltic states, Warsaw and Sofia. They would get a fundamentally differing perspective on the threat of Russia and how Europe stands in the geopolitical process. On defence, Ireland now is very much an outlier in the European Union. How could it not be when we depend on other member states to protect our meetings of the European Council or protect us from potentially hostile aircraft that the RAF is forced to intercept? Neutrality does not mean defencelessness. Austria is neutral but it has a small squadron of F-16s that can intercept potentially hostile aircraft. I am generally wary of speaking on these issues in the Irish discourse but it is very important to highlight that there is a lot of disbelief in Brussels at Ireland's position on defence and even more disbelief that the ongoing war in Ukraine does not seem to have changed Irish perspectives about what it means to be European.
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I am next, as a few of my colleagues are at other committee meetings. I will open this to the three of you, beginning with Dr. Rowan. I would like to quote the famous Churchillian - I was going to say Shakespearean - comment that you cannot reason with a tiger when your head is in its mouth. I am just throwing this out as a topic for discussion. How would Dr. Rowan respond to that from his perspective? Then I will go to Dr. Drea and Professor O'Brennan. You have about two and a half minutes each.
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We have had Stalin and Churchill today on record. It is all throwing back. It is probably not incidental to raise the spectre that we are in the context of a world war which is threatening. I would not agree with Churchill on this. We have already had mention of the Yalta conference, where Churchill and the American President met Stalin. There are various interpretations of that as the carve-up of Europe, but it was also a carve-up for stability that worked for some time. This was an instance that showed the possibilities of dialogue to bring peace and stability. Since the time of the Yalta conference, we have established a set of international institutions, based around the UN, the EU and other bodies, which provide forums for us to be able to pursue dialogue and discussion. Dialogue, discussion and diplomacy will always inevitably be the case. It is a truism to say that the solution to conflict at the end of the day will be a political solution. We have heard Professor O'Brennan and Dr. Drea cite the concerns and the experiences of people in the Baltic states and other EU member states. Like a member of this committee, I am from Belfast. I grew up in another conflict. I clearly remember both the period of conflict and the role of the British state in it, but I also remember the peace-building process during my teenage years. This was a very formative experience in learning the importance of dialogue and its success in a situation where we thought it was impossible. This State and our broader country have the experience of having dialogue with the tiger's mouth, so to speak, and its importance. If we take ourselves out of-----
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Could I ask Dr. Rowan specifically a rider to my first question? I think you have something to contribute on this, as perhaps the other two speakers do. That is not pre-empting what you will say. Where do you see grounds for hope?
This committee is doing work on trying to harness what we know from the process in Northern Ireland in terms of the Middle East.
I raise as Chair with any diplomats we meet the point that we cannot give up. We never use the word "peace" in any of these discussions; it is dropped. I do not mean that in a naive sense. Two things can be true at the same time, as someone said to me recently. The peace aspect just seems to have disappeared. Where is the context for hope there? Where is the room for manoeuvre?
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As I mentioned already, it is not engaging in the withdrawal from the United Nations; it is important we lean into the United Nations as a sovereign state and pushing that within the EU. There are other structures, such as the OSCE, that have been put on the back burner and neglected, which provide a forum-----
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I am very happy to hear that. There is huge expertise from our own peace process but also from the Irish diplomatic corps to provide leadership on this. To come back to the point of neutrality, part of the reason Ireland has so long enjoyed - The Economist referred to Ireland as a "diplomatic superpower" some years ago - what is in many ways outsize diplomatic weight is precisely because neutrality has provided Ireland with this vision as an honest broker.
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I think it does and Sweden also had a very fine history of peace-----
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I am not saying Ireland is exceptional or the only state in the world but Sweden has squandered its diplomatic reputation and the clout it had. It is now part of NATO. It is an aligned body. It cannot play itself as an honest broker in any discussion about peace in Europe, whether between Russia and Ukraine or otherwise. Ireland, if it maintains neutrality, can potentially play this role of brokering this peace, whether in the United Nations through pressuring that in the EU or through the OSCE. There is a separate question - others have raised it - as regards peace and defence. We will come to that in time but we need to make peace, not preparing for war, central.
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It is interesting. The saying is you cannot negotiate with a tiger. In Brussels, the view is how can you negotiate with a tiger when you are also being chased simultaneously by a pair of lions. That is how the EU views itself at the moment. It is Russia, the US and China and which exactly is the tiger and which are the lions. The EU is being squeezed within these three powers, which makes the need for some source of independent ability to act so important.
I want to clarify one thing, which is really important. I have heard a lot about how well we are regarded because of our foreign policy, etc., but let us be clear about this. Ireland is not viewed as an independent actor in Brussels. We are viewed as the economic mouthpiece of the United States due to our financial dependence and links with US foreign multinationals. To give the committee a very specific example of the reality here in Brussels and not the rhetoric we usually hear, a couple of weeks ago the Irish Presidency of the EU ran an official Presidency event in Brussels on digital policy in association with Google. This is at the same time that the EU is trying desperately to regulate the US digital tech giants, as Professor O'Brennan mentioned. Nobody in Ireland seemed to understand how this is viewed in Brussels.
Considering our economic ties to the US and the reality of our relationship with US tech companies, I was recently in the European Parliament where a policymaker said to me, "Eoin, it is amazing how Ireland just let Google write its amendments to the Digital Services Act."
That is the perception. When I hear then about a values-based foreign policy and how we have so much standing, that is increasingly viewed as hypocrisy in Brussels because our record in regulating and holding US tech companies to account is shameful. That is not just me speaking; that is the view of all mainstream parties in the European Parliament. We have to be very careful that we do not just hive off foreign policy into its own little box, go home and we all feel great about ourselves. Foreign policy is very much tied in to how we behave economically and regarding our responsibilities as members of the European Union. One of our key responsibilities, because we the headquarters of all these US companies, is to regulate and enforce EU regulations on these companies. Let us be very clear about this - foreign policy is tied in with all of these issues.
On Ireland becoming a diplomatic superpower, I know the author who wrote the piece in The Economist personally. He deeply regrets that attribution considering how the past couple of years have gone, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine.
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We have never lived in such a geopolitical climate. That really hit home when I visited Denmark to see how it was being played out. As Dr. Drea said, we should go there, see and feel it. They are looking over the mountain at Russia. The colleague Denmark always depended on to help it out was America but America is challenging it on Greenland. Denmark is a beautiful place but there is a fear in the country underneath when you start talking to people. The fear is where it is going to go. One could not have predicted this 20 years ago. My fear is where it will be for the young people. As legislators and politicians, we are here to try to protect those coming behind us.
Are we in race to the bottom? The witnesses mentioned the international order. We do not know where we stand with the key players now - China, Russia and America. We can say we have strong ties or our ties with the UK are getting stronger again and we have excellent ties with Canada but that is not in the same league. We are picking division 4 teams against Premier League teams. Where does Professor O'Brennan feel it is going in the next 20 years?
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The Deputy is right; I agree with him. We are in a really perilous moment and I think people just do not get it. They do not realise how serious the situation that Europe in particular is in is. The European Union was not built for this world of hard power clashes. It was built as a soft power and developed like that over generations. I read a lot about the 1920s and 1930s. When you do so, you get the sense that however alarming the situation may seem to many people, they never believe it is going to get much worse until it does. Sometimes it gets worse very quickly. There was a hopeless naivety among many leaders in the 1930s about what they were facing with Germany.
It is also hopelessly naive to talk about dialogue and diplomacy with people like Putin. I have been studying Putin's regime for a quarter of a century. It was what it is now as early as 2000, except people did not want to see how brutal, threatening and aggressive it was. Fascism cannot be talked around, in my view. It has to be defeated and we may well have to confront that very explicitly within the next few years because the three authoritarian monsters - I have no hesitation about using that phrase about Trump, Putin and Xi - all have very significant allies in Europe now. In the recent regional election in Saxony-Anhalt in Germany, the AfD won a very clear majority, the first time a fascist party has done that in Germany since 1945. The party is leading the CDU in national opinion polls in Germany. We may well have a far right president of France next year. It should concentrate our minds that we have these external authoritarians and their internal allies, as well as the tech leaders who are either deliberately or inadvertently boosting these far right parties. Musk does it very openly. We have to understand that this is an existential threat to our very existence.
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Just before Professor O'Brennan finishes, I want to pull him up on something. He is saying that it cannot be addressed with dialogue. That statement in itself should set off alarm bells. How can it be addressed? Not by wars, surely.
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It can and should be addressed by being as strong as possible on the home front. I am sorry to say, however regrettable people might find it, that does mean a majority of European states rearming. Putin cannot be talked around. He just cannot and we have to recognise that. We can invest in all kinds of bodies and we can do our very best but, ultimately, the only thing authoritarian dictators respect is strength and purpose. That is what has been coming back to Europe, slowly and incrementally over the last few years.
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A simple point I was trying to make in my comments was that the Irish State is dependent on the US and the latter is the primary actor causing geopolitical instability in the world and actively destroying the international order of international law and multilateral diplomacy. That is not to say that Russia is not a problem or not a threat but the US is the primary one. It is a primary concern for us because Ireland, as Dr. Drea mentioned, is dependent on the US and, not only that, we are dependent on the US precisely through the tech companies that both he and Professor O'Brennan mentioned. The response of the Irish Government to the instability that the US is creating is to double down on dependency through data centres, AI, subsea cables, LNG, and building out the infrastructure of dependency by embedding it into our State. This is a very unwise thing to do. When I was talking about Ireland's foreign policy reputation, that was in the forum of the United Nations, not the EU. It is important to remember that we cannot rely only on the EU. We also need to work with these broader institutional frameworks, centrally the United Nations, because the EU governs the EU. It does not govern the United Nations. It can have a role to play in it but we also need those other institutions.
We are talking about various monstrosities, to which Professor O'Brennan has referred. I would also raise the fact of Israel. Many people around the world have watched for three years the genocide, livestreamed on their phones and televisions, the daily massacring of the people in Gaza. This is a monstrosity but the EU seems to have no trouble whatsoever working with Israel and doing trade deals with it. Indeed, many member states are funding, supplying and provisioning arms. I assure the committee that I lose sleep and all the people I know are very clear on what is happening and are very concerned about it. We are very worried. We are not sleepwalking through this. At this very moment we are told that Europe has to arm itself to the teeth with conventional weapons like tanks, armoured vehicles and so on, by turning car factories into tank factories and ammunition factories.
Obviously cyber is a serious area of threat but the ways in which cyber threats are being framed, through discussions of hybrid warfare, in themselves pose a threat to our civil liberties. They pose a threat to our democracy. The poison is being answered in a way which is very dangerous. Then we have the possibility that in the next two or three years we will have fascist or far right governments in Europe. Why would we want to provision those people with all of those tools of war and repression, both in the cyber and the conventional domains? This is a very serious question. I agree with many of the things Professor O'Brennan is saying but I disagree with the way the pieces are arranged together.
To come back very briefly to the point about NATO, I understand that there are tensions within NATO between the European powers, Canada and the US because the latter is behaving in a way that it never did before. NATO is led by the US. It is European and other bodies underneath the US. It was to provide security for the North Atlantic, principally Europe, but also to provide security in the interests of the US. There has been a divergence of interests. The US is less concerned about European security. It is more concerned about China and containing the Chinese and so it is has shifted its emphasis. That creates all sorts of questions for the Europeans. What has been happening is not that there has been a massive divide but, rather, Europe is being disciplined under NATO. We see these meetings, like the Munich security conference or the Davos meeting, where there are all of these people - Canadian and European leaders - lining up to make speeches against the US. Then there is a meeting in a hotel room between the head of NATO, Mark Rutte, the former Dutch Prime Minister, and everyone is herded in behind NATO and the 5%. The aim is to raise it up, to shift money from public services, welfare, health and, crucially, climate. We are talking about world changing, existential challenges but no one has mentioned climate yet. These are the real challenges that we face. Europe is being herded into increasing spending, into shifting public money from real crises to phantom menaces to keep the United States happy. This is not to say that there is no serious threat posed by Russia. However, I believe the threat is being exaggerated for the Irish. We are being told by both of the other witnesses that we need to talk to our friends in the Baltic States. If we look at our newspapers or the speeches of Ministers in the Government, we do not hear about the Baltics. We hear about subsea cables. We hear about the exposed flank that Ireland represents in the Atlantic. I do not see the Russian submarines coming to knock on the door. They are not under the bed. Maybe there is sense in talking about the threats in eastern Europe and what role Ireland can play but that is very different from us having to arm ourselves to the teeth and drop neutrality in order to prevent an invasion or the cutting of US corporate-owned infrastructure, which the Government is building out and increasing in order to trap us in economic dependency on an authoritarian, volatile actor.
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We had representatives of the Baltic states here last week, just as a matter of interest. They gave quite compelling evidence. I am not going to comment on it one way or the other but I just want to say that it is there, on the record.
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I thank all of the speakers. I find the disbelief of European actors about Ireland a little surprising in the context of the United Nations and the international piece. I want to go back to the things that Ireland should be quite proud of and the role that Ireland has played, not just in the United Nations, but as one of the countries within the EU that has been able to facilitate and connect with other countries across the world. It is no coincidence, for example, that in peace talks in Colombia it was an Irish person that was sent as the EU envoy because we have been regarded as being credible actors as a result of our neutrality and lack of involvement in rearmament. That has also done a service to the European Union. That is what a neutral country can do.
If we are really serious about this whole pulling our weight narrative, then in terms of pulling our weight, the one that comes most easily to hand and is most significant is exactly in this area of strengthened regulation.
At a EU disinformation conference just a couple of weeks ago, under pressure from the Trump Administration, the European External Action Service, Global Affairs Canada and the Lithuanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs withdrew their support from a conference on disinformation simply because US officials took issue with the fact that the USA as a potential source of disinformation was one of the topics to be discussed. On holding the line at European and EU level and in terms of our national regulation, it seems to be the point where if we are serious about contributing - I hear about cyber threats - this the area on which we need to concentrate. It is in plain sight. I ask Dr. Rowan to concentrate on the regulatory piece.
On the view that these people only understand that might is right. they hate regulation for a reason. Right now, Ireland is overseeing the discussion of an AI omnibus which will dilute regulation by, for example, allowing personal data to be used to train AI algorithms. How important is that? These are the little measures, not the showpiece measures concerning tanks or whatever, that I believe a very serious country should contribute to. I ask Dr. Rowan to comment on that.
On the arms piece, I share the concern in terms of the rise of fascism. If we are seeing a rise in fascism, having a huge escalation in the availability of arms and a lowering of regulatory standards regarding arms seems to be dangerous. Sadly, that is what we are seeing with the EU disarmament measures. In the finance committee we heard about the SAFE regulation. It was confirmed that cluster munitions are part of the new package. In terms of right-wing governments, Orbán's Government was allocated €16 billion in funding from the EU. How does it fit with arming the EU to protect against a Russian threat if Orbán, who was very open in his support at that time for Putin, was being offered €16 billion in arms funding? There is a disjoint. I am also concerned about automated weapons. I would like to hear the thoughts of Dr. Rowan on that.
I refer to disarmament work. Could Dr. Rowan comment on the importance of disarmament, regardless of the differing opinions he might have on the need for armament, and the importance of neutral actors being credible in the area of disarmament, in particular regarding things like automated weapons, cluster munitions and that as a counter threat? In fighting fascism, there is a danger in shifting money from the social cohesion and regulatory areas.
My last question is on climate and colonialism, which was mentioned and should be. Climate is the known threat; it is not a hypothetical. It is a fully known crisis on the way. We talk about learning from the Second World War, and that is from where the UN institutions came. The UN institutions were not just a response to the Second World War; they were also a response to centuries of colonialism. How can Ireland, as a country with a history of colonialism which is also part of the EU, challenge our colleagues in Europe on avoiding the double standard in supremacy or hierarchies which we saw under colonialism?
I come back to the question on Gaza. I will not take disbelief from anybody who is not speaking up on Gaza and speaking up for consistency in international law and its application. That is the challenge we can bring to the European Union. How important is that to us being strong in the world?
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There are only about 90 seconds left in this session. There are about 45 minutes or 50 minutes left and we will not have a second session because there are five, possibly six, speakers left. You have a maximum of a minute each on that.
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That was a lot. I will try to squeeze it in.
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Militarisation is seeing a shift of money, as I mentioned, from welfare to warfare in Europe. Principally, it means a shift of money from climate to warfare. We have already seen this. The twin transition, that is, digitisation and decarbonisation, was the big EU plan. This is now being wrapped into the militarisation under the terms of the Draghi competitiveness drive, which is essentially deregulation and militarisation as industrial policy.
I will touch briefly on the question on tech regulation. It is not just Ireland which is specifically dependent on US tech companies; it is also a problem at an EU level. The EU can do great work in continuing and enhancing the work it is doing on trying to regulate this. It is also a matter of taking ourselves out of the physical material dependency and not building a system of private data centres owned by US companies.
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I agree with everything Senator Higgins has said about arms companies, most of which we are right to be very suspicious of, climate and other things. I disagree with her on the reputation of Ireland. I agree with Dr. Drea. We think we have been among the world's greatest citizens since Independence. There are elements of truth to this. However, the figures for international development aid show that we do not give more money than many of our partner states who happen to be members of NATO. The record on international peacekeeping shows that many of our peer states, who also happen to be members of NATO, have contributed just as much as we have. We have convinced ourselves over the years that somehow we are one of the world's great humanitarians. Dr. Drea is exactly right. We speak out of both sides of our mouths on so many of these things.
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I will be brief. On the Senator's comments on the regulatory side, I agree 100%. We are the EU regulator of all these tech companies because their headquarters are located in Dublin. If we were to properly regulate them and enforce existing rules on GDPR, etc. that would do more for our credibility than any other action. On disarmament, colonialism, climate, Gaza-----
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I thank the witnesses. My questions are primarily for Dr. Rowan and will be reasonably short in order to give him a chance to expand on an answer if he needs to do so. On costs, Dr. Rowan said that "Ireland's long-term interests lie in pursuing foreign policy choices grounded in our values, even if those choices may have a cost in the short term." Earlier, Dr. Rowan referred indirectly to those costs as enormous. Is that purely black and white? Is there an off-ramp whereby we have an opportunity to build and diversify our trade and economy, build that resilience in and take a medium-term view rather than a short-term one?
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Yes, that is exactly what I mean. I have spoken about costs principally in respect of the discussion on dependence on US foreign direct investment, especially the tech sector, when we are talking about trying to regulate and move away from that. That will have a serious financial cost and we are all aware of that. It is not possible, plausible or desirable to suddenly say that we are going to cut trade with the United States. This is not the policy that should be in place. Rather, it is about trying to move slowly towards a more responsible and rational policy.
I finished an article that will be published in a few months' time on the idea of poly-alignment. In international relations and political economy, there are many middle powers, principally in the global south but also, increasingly, in the global north, which have refused the idea that they cannot work with the United States or China. People can do trade to a limited extent under conditions with all countries. I was happy to see the Taoiseach, Deputy Martin, travel to China in January. It was very positive. It is very positive to see some of the Global Ireland initiatives under the Department of foreign affairs, the expansion of diplomatic envoys and the Ireland House initiatives. We are taking those initiatives not just to our conventional allies in Europe, the United States and Canada, but are moving into South Korea, Tokyo, Singapore, India, Brazil and expanding that. Such policies try to strengthen and diversify our trade.
That is exactly what we should be trying to do. It is not about the US being the big enemy and cutting everything tomorrow. The economy would collapse. We cannot do that. It would not be responsible or rational. Of course, the Government has a responsibility to the people.
There is a question of timelines in respect of how we do that, as I said in the closing sentences of my opening statement. We need a rational discussion about the possible need for a discussion of the costs that would come with keeping our neutrality, not being dependent on the United States and pushing towards digital regulation, as Dr. Drea and Professor O'Brennan have talked about, in the EU. Those will have costs and we have to be serious about them.
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I appreciate that. Dr. Rowan talked about the "high risk of a major war in Europe". He said that "a substantial portion of Europe's political leadership - including in this country - are not simply resigned to the inevitability of such a war but are actively creating the conditions for it". Would Dr. Rowan expand on that in an Irish context?
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Principally, what I am thinking about in that regard is the development of the so-called "coalition of the willing" and the Irish Government's pledge to take part in that in some way although it has not pledged to have boots on the ground if it comes to a boots-on-the-ground situation. This is tied, as is evoked frequently by the Government and other commentators and so on, to the great peacekeeping work we will be able to do if we cut the triple lock. The idea is that departing from the triple lock will allow us to continue our tradition of peacekeeping. To be clear, this will not be peacekeeping without a UN resolution. It will, at best, be peace enforcement which does not have the agreement of all sides. It would essentially mean a frozen border with Russia, and EU or Irish troops could be there. This is a very dangerous situation. There may not be open conflict, but this is a war. It is not the type of peacekeeping mission in which Ireland has traditionally taken part outside the UN mandate.
This is one instance of the broader drive within Europe. We see every single day the drip-feed of discussions, as Professor O'Brennan has mentioned, of Russia pushing at the boundaries of the EU or NATO through hybrid attacks, kinetic attacks and so on. Such events are doubtless happening and I do not say they are not happening because they are not all mythical. However, there is sometimes a serious lack of evidence, including in relation to some of the drone attacks in Ireland. Someone reported seeing a drone attack and it was called in from an aeroplane but there was no verification. To his credit, on the day of that supposed attack the Taoiseach said it was not verified, we were not sure and we were looking into it. Suddenly, it slips into Government and media discourse that this happened. It may have happened and I am not saying it did not happen because I do not know. However, no evidence is being presented. There is a process whereby the standards of evidence for the threat that Russia poses to Ireland is being undermined because no evidence is being presented. If people want to bring us along to meet our responsibilities and so on as we are told, there needs to be evidence for it. We need to be brought along.
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That is noted. I thank Dr. Rowan. He closed his account by saying that "the Government seems determined to pursue a narrow and short-term view of our interests at the cost of our values and our longer term interests, and to do so without democratic debate or participation." It has always been my view that Ireland is consistently in the top ten of any global democratic index. Where does Dr. Rowan see shortcomings in our democratic system? What are they?
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I thank the Deputy for the question. I see shortcomings at the level of governmental practice and in the broader discussion in the media and public realm, which, of course, is not the Government's responsibility. In 2023, the Taoiseach led a consultative forum which was to talk about revising and revisiting Ireland's foreign defence policies. That was limited. It was consultative in the sense that people were invited to hear speakers. The speakers were cherry-picked, as the then President Michael D. Higgins noted, to be those who supported militarisation and the dropping or reducing of neutrality, including representatives of the Swedish Government, which at that point had recently joined NATO, to talk about what a great idea it was. It was a one-way conversation. There was no balanced participation involved.
I note that the discussion on the Defence (Amendment) Bill will be the longest section of tomorrow's Dáil proceedings but there are only 200 minutes being given to talk about the most fundamental change to Ireland's foreign policy since joining the EU. It is a very significant piece of legislation. It is not just about this technical point about the triple lock. It changes the nature of Ireland's position in the world and its relationship to all other states, including our EU partners. It deserves proper democratic discussion.
There has been massive clamour from Opposition parties and public and civil society groups, and I am involved in that regard and have spoken at a number of events, including with Senator Higgins. There is huge public demand for the legislation to come under democratic decision. A referendum would be the appropriate measure, as Professor O'Brennan mentioned.
The second part is beyond the Government and relates to the media discussion. Our media is-----
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I am sorry to interrupt. I do not want to be accused of trying to circumscribe Dr. Rowan. I will give him another 30 seconds.
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Censorship again; I joke. The media is absolutely chock-a-block with academics who have hawkish positions on these matters, present company included, think-tank-----
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It is much harder for me to get published. There are also arms lobbyists. The Irish Defence and Security Association, IDSA, is connected to the Azure Forum. The Azure Forum, to be clear, is not composed of arms lobbyists but it shares directors with the IDSA. The airwaves are flooded with this. You can hear it every day. It is hard for those of us who have oppositional voices. We can get published but it is very hard. We are not invited to RTÉ or Virgin Media to talk about these matters. This is producing a conversation where there is a discrepancy between the views of the Government and those commentators who broadly support its position and the vast majority of the public. To my mind, that is dangerous for our democracy at a moment when trust in democratic institutions is being eroded in this country. Certainly when we look at the EU figures, trust in our democracy is still quite high and we should be happy with that. It is good. That should be cultivated. One of the ways in which that needs to be cultivated and maintained is by having real, public debate about these issues, both within our Chambers and in public.
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There are two points on which I am happy to come back in response to some of the issues Dr. Rowan has mentioned. I want to give him an idea of some of the work the committee does. It often is not widely promulgated. The Baltic ambassadors were here and the Nordic ambassador was here last week. It is worth reading our debate. I recommend that Dr. Rowan have a read of it. It was a full and frank discussion and the ambassadors were asked the same kinds of questions that have been asked today.
We strategically selected Deputy Shay Brennan to go as part of a recent trade delegation to South Korea. We are looking forward to his report on that. We were very specific. He has already made some comments to us about the needs out there and how keen South Korea is for further trade development between the two countries.
We are now two and a half hours into a free and frank debate in a committee of Parliament that has not been circumscribed in any way. I hope I have chaired the meeting fairly. There are time constraints on us.
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I have to travel to Trim for the RACO conference. May I have the Cathaoirleach's indulgence to take Deputy Bennett's slot?
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Yes. May I have the agreement of the committee that the Vice Chair will take the Chair? I must attend another meeting at 5 p.m. Is that agreed? Agreed.
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I thank all the speakers for coming in. I will keep my questions as brief as I can. It has been an interesting and wide-ranging discussion. I am going to have to depart in a moment because, as I say, I am going to the RACO conference. I put on record that there has been some commentary to the effect that neutrality does not have to mean defencelessness. It is not, I would say, a particularly controversial view in these Houses. At this moment, there is an appetite for investment in our Defence Forces. There is significant concern at the slow pace of the implementation of the Commission on the Defence Forces document. It is perfectly consistent to have that view while being of the view that the triple lock should remain in place.
I have two questions. There has been a certain overlap between the three contributions. There are different views on what direction the EU should go in, but I think there is a certain commonality in the assessment of the direction in which the EU is currently moving. Professor O'Brennan spoke about the potential for a defence union.
Dr. Drea did not use this language, but I discerned the reflection on that two-tier or two-speed kind of Europe. I am not sure if he might have even used that language but either way that was the upshot of it. Dr. Rowan also spoke about a lot of those issues.
I will let the witnesses answer my questions all together. It certainly seems to be a live possibility that the countries more invested in or keen on defence integration, security integration and so on will take a particular course and that other countries would be in an outside loop. I am sure the witnesses know that my own party's position would not be in favour of that level of defence integration and so on, but either way can each witness give a brief view of the pros and cons of being on the inside or the outside loop? That is probably the discussion that we are going to have.
On my second question, and we have not really touched on it, this is probably a debate that was maybe more prominent or visible ten years ago when people talked about the democratic deficit. It is a bit of an abstract thing. At times, the policies of the EU very often do not come from a popular clamour from the various electorates of Europe but from the assessment of the needs of Europe as defined by the people at the top of the European Union. That is, obviously, quite different from how the member states operate politically within their own particular discourse. The Irish public, for example, would not necessarily favour the direction in which defence policy is moving, but against that the support for being in the EU is very high in Ireland. The electorate is often more sophisticated than it is given credit for. I wish to get a comment from the witnesses about that issue of the democratic deficit, where that stands and the popular legitimacy of the propositions that the European Commission is proposing.
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On the issue of military neutrality, go ask Belgium how useful their neutrality was to them when the Germans attacked them. Something that people just do not understand is the notion that other actors will always and everywhere respect our position, and can be relied on to act in an appropriate way internationally, when that has not been the case historically. It is not the case today.
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To be fair, I certainly do not propose neutrality as a universal principle for every country in the world.
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It is a clear-eyed assessment. It is my and my party's assessment of how best Ireland's interests are served, but I absolutely respect the prerogative and the legitimacy of other countries not to adopt that position based on their interests and position.
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That points to the Deputy's excellent question about a two-speed Europe. This is one area. National sovereignty manifested itself most obviously in defence and security. That is the one area where sovereignty is supposed to be sacrosanct. That has remained the case over decades of European integration. That is why it is not going to change. If we see a defence union emerging, it will be a coalition of the willing. There are already lots of instruments there within the treaties to make this possible. I work on enlargement and, looking at what the Commission has published for the way future accessions might take place, it is a gradual model of integration. It is now accepted by the majority of member states.
Regarding pros and cons of being on the inside or the outside, some of that comes down to how the notion of rights and obligations is interpreted, what the rights of a member state are and how they might be balanced with what it perceives to be its obligations to other members of the collective.
I have always thought the issue of the democratic deficit was an illusion.
In some ways, the European Union is too democratic. What do I mean by that? If we look at the different layers of accountability and responsibility, citizens have different ways of having their rights protected and argued for in the European context. Governments bargain with each other in the Council of the European Union. They all have a direct mandate from their people. The European Parliament is the one institution that has boosted its position with every single constitutional change that we have. That is all for the good. The Parliament does important work. It represents citizens directly. I am glad that it is now playing a very robust role in EU legislation in most areas of policy, not yet in security and defence or areas like taxation. Those are the areas that are most sensitive in terms of national sovereignty. I do not think there is going to be a big change in these areas. There cannot be a change unless the member states collectively vote for this. All 27 member states would have to do that, according to their own constitutional prerogatives.
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I thank Professor O'Brennan. I will give an opportunity to Dr. Rowan and Dr. Drea to respond as well. I ask them to be as brief as possible.
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I will try to be brief. Regarding this question of the democratic deficit, it is interesting that immediately Professor O'Brennan goes to asking Belgium, which I have heard him say before. We have heard about asking the Balkans to see what the Balkans say. I am not saying that the Balkan states have no voice in the EU or we should not be concerned about them. It is good to hear that this committee has welcomed the visit recently but the first people we need ask are the Irish people. This is how democracy works in this country as a republic. What easily gets effaced in these debates about security is democracy. I am less concerned in this regard about the broader discussion on the democratic deficit of the EU, but this is certainly one area where we are seeing that deficit being advanced in the way things are being framed. As I mentioned already, neutrality in this country is a discussion that should not be decided by a simple Dáil vote but should go to a referendum. I recognise that neutrality is not inscribed in the Constitution although there are discussions in the Constitution about the nature of a foreign policy, which if the triple lock is taken away and the proposed advances are made would arguably run counter to those constitutional features.
We need to first think about Irish democracy in these discussions. This does not mean that overrides in every instance working with partners in institutions such as the EU and others. We need to balance these things but it is very easy that democracy is being taken out. We are constantly told that the Irish people need to grow up and see the real world and understand how it is. This is incredibly patronising. I agree with the Deputy that the Irish people are a bit more sophisticated than they are given credit for in this regard.
With regard to being outside, the position of being outside a defence integration but pushing things like the regulation of the tech sector would be very welcome. As Dr. Drea mentioned, that is something that would give us respect among our peers in the EU but to do that, we need to gain greater independence from the US and reduce our dependency. That is difficult but necessary.
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On where the EU is going and a multi-speed Europe, that is the only way it will function in the future but perhaps not in the way we think. The first two steps that will happen is we will see more coalitions of the willing on different issues. I would not put defence as the first issue among these. We will see coalitions of the willing on migration policy and the return hubs outside of the EU. We will see coalitions of the willing on certain aspects of economic policy when it comes to capital markets and further deepening, possibly even on taxation policy down the road. The other aspect in addition to coalitions of the willing, which we will see, is a push for more use of qualified majority voting instead of unanimity at the European Council. We have seen this through every ordeal in Brussels that it took to get a sanctions package against the Russians because unanimity was needed and the Hungarians were holding out for more money. That is what we will see.
In terms of the democratic deficit, there has always been this battle between the European Parliament and the European institutions but we should never forget that member states are the ultimate arbiters of where the EU goes through the European Council. The European Commission can only propose laws and make proposals but ultimately it is the European Council that has the power. What has undermined this belief in the democratic deficit in the EU has been how many national politicians, not just from Ireland but from every member state, go to Brussels, agree something in Brussels at the European Council, come back and immediately blame the EU for forcing them to agree. National politicians also need to take some responsibility and take a more active role in explaining what exactly goes on in Brussels.
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I thank our excellent guests. I agree with Deputy Ó Laoghaire that the quality of the discussion has been extraordinarily high, good and very informative.
I have two questions. I would appreciate if Dr. Drea could answer them in a way that would give me time to ask Professor O'Brennan a question. The European Industrial Accelerator Act is currently in the mix. American investment and American firms in Ireland, be they tech, pharmaceutical or whatever, are manufacturing in Ireland, employing Irish labour, investing in Ireland, investing into research and development in Ireland, and paying taxes that ultimately are into an EU member state. Should and will Ireland get a derogation for those in the context of the implementation of the Act?
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It is a hugely relevant issue. I would like to highlight that it just does not relate to American multinationals in Ireland. It also relates, for example, to the pharmaceutical sector and a very important part of the supply chain is in our trade with China. I think Ireland is the only country in the European Union that runs a trade surplus with China and that is because of our huge trade in services but also in goods sectors like medical devices, electronics, etc. I agree with the Senator that what is really needed is for the Irish Government to, first of all, understand how this Act could potentially impact on the Irish economy. I would argue that the impacts will be very significant. Second, that should be a key focus of Irish Government lobbying work in Brussels as the Act passes through the legislative process here.
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If I understood correctly, Dr. Drea has expressed the positive view that we can have those derogations although we can keep the investment when they are manufacturing here.
I have a second question for Dr. Drea. He and I share a family background in agriculture. Dr. Drea made the point that despite his background he questions our role in relation to CAP and believes that we are taking the eye off other forms of competitiveness, etc., with our total focus on CAP. Surely in terms of primary and secondary production and processing, and I come from the region of Cavan-Monaghan where food processing and food production are effectively the only shows in town, we must focus on CAP and, indeed, in the context of what I will ask Professor O'Brennan, for food security in Europe.
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Absolutely. I would highlight that there is a broader crisis in rural Europe, including in rural Ireland, and that agriculture is a very important part of that but not the only part. At the end of the day it will come down to what I mentioned in my opening statement, which is what the EU views as the priorities now and what the priorities were 20 years ago. If Ireland wants to maintain as much as possible of CAP and rural development funding, it will have to acknowledge that there is probably a trade-off to be had in how we approach tech policy, taxation policy or more EU-level taxes or whatever. The days where we can just view agriculture as being a separate issue that does not have knock-on effects to what other EU priorities are, I am afraid, over.
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That is quite enlightening and interesting in the context that I am meeting colleagues in the IFA tomorrow evening to discuss this topic.
My next questions are for Professor O'Brennan. I have thought along his lines in recent months in terms of the dystopian future he set out, but I used to then say to myself that I just need a holiday and such a future cannot be right. Professor O'Brennan paints a very bleak picture. In the context the mid-term elections in America, if we saw a shift there might we get another view? I am looking for rays of hope. The Russian economy is also faltering and is greatly challenged. With the mid-terms in America, the faltering of the Russian economy, the existing level of rearmament, the protracted war in Ukraine and what a quagmire it has become, does Professor O'Brennan see any hope that his basic thesis is wrong?
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Yes, exactly, as Bill Clinton used to say.
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No, I am not going to do that because I do not think there are grounds for much hope.
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Will Professor O'Brennan respond then to my specific question?
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I do not know what is going to happen in the mid-term elections. I am deeply suspicious of the kind of gerrymandering practices that the US Republican Party have been doing in congressional districts. They cannot do it for US Senate races as it is structurally different. Then there is a question of what they do in January if there is a big Democratic Party majority in the House of Representatives and a probable majority in the Senate. I would not put anything past Trump and the people around him because they are utterly despicable in almost every possible way. They have shown repeatedly that they are prepared to destroy constitutional norms that have been around in the United States for 250 years. The Democratic Party should be ready for that and we should be ready for it on our side of the Atlantic.
There have been lots of things said and written about the alleged weaknesses of the Russian economy since the very beginning of the war and almost none of the predictions made have come true. The Russian economy has proved very resilient partly because it has had enormous help from China, most of it very understated, and increasingly from the United States as well. I often think of Reagan who members will remember christened the Soviet Union "the evil empire". He must be turning in his grave in Simi, California, at the thought that his Republican Party successor would ally himself so closely with an empire that is even more evil than the Soviet Union was and shares all of the same totalitarian impulses and dynamics.
I do not know what will happen in Ukraine. For Ukrainians, it is now a question of hanging on because despite all the lies Trump tells about American support for Ukraine, the US has not given them a single cent since Trump returned to office in 2025. Ukraine is more than ever reliant on Europe but Ukrainians have succeeded against all the odds in doing enormous damage to the Russian economy and that is why Trump has stepped in to help, whatever the nature of his relationship with Russia.
Even in the context where this war has now lasted longer than the First World War, I do not see any way towards a negotiated solution in the immediate future, mainly because the Russians do not want it and they are convinced that all the work they have put into cultivating the United States as an ally is going to pay off and that they will force the Ukrainians to surrender, because that is the peace project. It is surrender and subjugation. That is the only thing that is on offer to Ukraine but the Ukrainians are not going to give in because they have been through hell. Their sovereignty is everything to them.
Whatever happens in the United States, we have to prepare for it. I do not think the US we had previously is ever coming back, frankly, even under a Democrat President in 2028. That might be a very good thing for Europe. I would like us to be, in almost every sense, much more independent of the United States, economically and commercially, in the way that Dr. Rowan suggests, and in security terms. I think it would be a really good thing if we could stand on our feet in Europe. This means that we then have to think about what obligations might flow from that if we are to continue as a member of the EU.
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We were going to conclude, but if it is okay with the witnesses, I might let Senator Higgins come in for three minutes or so.
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I will be quick this time. There is one thing that strikes me as concerning in terms of the industrial accelerator piece. It is one thing if Ireland has an overdependence in relation to it, but if we were to become lobbyists against the regulatory agenda, this strikes me as a concern around the competitiveness frame. I am thinking, for example, of the digital area, the regulation of due diligence directive and the omnibus in relation to that. We know that it was ExxonMobil and other companies such as that. How important is it that we do not look for exceptions in respect of regulation and do not look for carve-outs that redirect funding, for example, out of things like the EU renewable path and into things like LNG? That is one question.
The other question comes back again to the international law piece. Within its wider piece, how important is the European Union having consistency in relation to international law and actually robustly standing up for it, be it the ICC or the idea of applying the same standards to Israel as they are applying to Russia? This is for the credibility of the European Union among its citizens and for its credibility with the wider international world where we want to diversify our relationships and connections. How damaging is it with those who have memories of colonialism and with those who have very urgent, real and palpable fears around climate change? If they do not see human rights being robustly defended by the European Union, what damage does that do to our future?
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This consistency piece is absolutely crucial. The EU can pass all the laws it wants but it needs legitimacy among its member states and among the European public, including in this country. The discrepancy that has emerged between the treatment of Russia in Ukraine and Israel in Gaza is absolutely shameful and has done profound damage to the EU among the EU public but also around the world because that has been exposed. That should be rectified and there are various measures that can be taken to bring the EU's relationship towards Israel into line, and I think Professor O'Brennan and I probably agree on this, such as taking them out of the trade deal and taking them out of Horizon Europe that affects our fields of academic funding. This is a matter of urgency.
With regard to the other question about lobbying, I am no expert on understanding lobbying in the EU, but certainly from what I have heard from others, and I think Dr. Drea mentioned it earlier, there is this sense and probably a reality that members of the Irish Government are acting in some sense on behalf of the EU interests. Again, this would be very shameful. It would undermine us and it would damage our credibility in the EU when we are trying to push things that are very important to us, whether it is CAP or regulation of other issues or in these matters of international affairs. Not falling into this trap is absolutely crucial and, again, this involves taking a step back from that dependency on the US.
More broadly, in the discussion on competitiveness in the EU, there are appeals to strategic autonomy. We have this in industrial policy but we also have it with defence. In both cases, in defence and industrial policy, that desire and drive for strategic economic autonomy is being undercut by the presence of US multinationals, particularly in the tech sector, and the crucial role they are playing in industrial development, whether it is green energy and AI applications and robotics, or in defence. I think we should be removing them from that position.
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I absolutely agree with Dr. Rowan on the failures on Israel. It has been absolutely appalling. I wrote a piece for the Irish Examiner in 2023 or 2024 arguing that Ireland, off its own bat, should impose a full trade embargo on Israel. I was told we could not do this and that it was the Commission's responsibility and so forth. My point was that we should test this before the Court of Justice of the EU. Article 2 of the trade and association agreement, which is almost 20 years old now, has never been tested in court. Reading through Article 2, it is very similar to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, with the same kind of things such as democracy, pluralism, human rights, minority rights and so forth. It has never been tested at all. I thought that if we got to the point where it could be tested, the court might have actually forced the EU collectively to deal with this. I also have to say, however, that foreign policy is a matter for individual member states and most of those states, regrettably, took a very different position from Ireland almost from the beginning. That does not excuse EU actors. When she went to Israel a week after the 7 October events, Ursula von der Leyen put the Israeli flag on the Berlaymont, associating the EU collectively with what Israel was already doing in Gaza by this point, and even by the time she got there, they were committing outrageous atrocities. It is a terrible failure and Dr. Rowan is right. We have lost young people all over Europe because of this. That lack of confidence that people have in politics broadly is reflected, or refracted, through the Israeli issue.
There are other failures as well, one of which I track very closely in my work, and that is rule of law within the EU. For many years Viktor Orbán's party was a member of the European People's Party that Dr. Drea is still proudly part of in Brussels. They did not kick Orbán out. He kicked himself out eventually, years after he had started abusing the rule of law. The Commission has exhibited serial failures to protect the rule of law within the Union itself. It has been the court again that has affirmed the importance of Article 2 and said that governments, in the way they act domestically, must pay attention to and substantiate everything that is in Article 2 of the treaties. There is a very broad set of failures around international law and EU law, and it will take years for us to recover reputationally from some of those failures.
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On the industrial accelerator Act, I will just emphasise that we need derogations or exceptions because we are an exceptional economy in an EU context in the sense that we are so dependent on so few economic areas that are dominated by US pharmaceuticals. I would not like to be the politician in Ireland who causes some of the 300,000 direct jobs to go missing in Ireland because of that.
On the tech sector, I think I can say that there is broad agreement among the speakers about the overwhelming dominance of the US tech companies but I want to put a realist note to say that this is not going to change anytime soon. Simply, we do not have any homegrown European alternatives yet. It extends far beyond just the social media or the internet companies. We are talking about payment systems where Visa and MasterCard, both US companies, dominate cloud computing and frontier AI.
Ireland and Europe are way behind the curve on these areas and European dependence on US tech is probably just as big as our dependence on the US for security and defence was until recently. That is very important.
With regard to consistency on EU foreign policy, the reality is that it is just not going to happen in the short to medium term. There are too many differing approaches and historical experiences. In Brussels at the moment, there is a huge debate ongoing about the role, powers and competence of the European External Action Service. Some member states want to roll that back into the Commission. Others want to strengthen its position. It is a very unsatisfactory position but I am afraid I do not think it is going to change anytime soon.
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I thank Dr. Drea. That concludes our meeting. I thank our witnesses for being here today for a very informative meeting, which was a session of almost two and a half hours. I thank the witnesses for their time. The meeting is now adjourned until Tuesday, 10 November when we will meet in private session at 12.30 p.m.