Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013: Committee Stage
Contributions 327–483 of 483. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 3 parts.
No. 83 of 2013 ›
Manners will now be put on me by the Acting Chairman.
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I just think the debate has gone on for some time and, in fairness to Senator Gerard P. Craughwell and others, we must move on with the Bill because of the number of amendments tabled.
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I am not in any way inhibiting the debate; I am just making a suggestion that the Minister of State has spoken and responded.
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May I make a very brief contribution?
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I will be very brief. Having listened to Senator Marie-Louise O'Donnell, I support her position because I recall seeing one elderly lady in a nursing home who did not want to be there, who was perfectly capable of looking after herself and who cried every day.
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It is called passive suicide.
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As I advance in years, this measure would give me some degree of security that I might not be dumped at some stage, although why they would do it, I do not know.
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Amendments Nos. 239 and 244 are related to amendment No. 27 and may be discussed together. Is that agreed? Agreed.
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I move amendment No. 27:
In page 17, between lines 34 and 35, to insert the following:
“(7) In respect of financial affairs managed by the court, particular consideration of management and oversight in accord with the principles herein are stated in section 121.”.
Amendment No. 27 deals with the question of the special visitor to be appointed to supervise the affairs of a ward of court. One of the items that gives particular difficulty is the question of financial management. This has been a real thorn in the past. I know that it has been said that, taken overall, the results have not been as bad as might have been expected but in some cases they have been spectacularly horrible and we want to ensure that the financial interests of somebody who is not capable of directing those financial interests themselves is properly addressed.
Amendment No. 239 also deals with the qualifications of this particular person. The suggested wording is: "is a person who, although not a registered medical practitioner, is, in the opinion of the Director, a person who has particular knowledge, expertise and experience of financial matters,". In other words, we want somebody who is actually qualified, who has a knowledge of the markets and who will be able to give advice. There is no point in having a medical quack there. They may very well know what to prescribe in terms of medication, but they do not know what to prescribe in terms of investments in stocks, shares and bonds. What is required is a person who has financial expertise. The amendment includes a reference to "selected under paragraph (c), will be a representative of the NTMA,". The National Treasury Management Agency has a terrific record, a superb record in safeguarding the interests of the country. It is one group on which we can rely. The amendment also makes reference to the ability to "provide expert guidance on reinvestment of the financial portfolio to sustain costs necessary to the relevant person,". That is the whole point. One invests in order to get the money to provide for the sustenance, well-being and financial security of the person who is a ward of court. In addition, there is a requirement to "provide annual reports to the relevant person".
There was a period of many years during which no reports were provided, which meant there was no account whatsoever of stewardship. It is necessary that annual reports be provided in order that trustees or families can urge that a decision be made.
Amendment No. 244 deals with financial powers of oversight and management by the court and provides for what would happen in the absence of a suitable person to act as co-decision maker, or any other condition under which the court retains or assumes responsibility for the relevant person’s funds. In other words, where a question arises about the investment of the funds of a ward of court, the primary purpose of court management of the relevant person’s funds would be the provision of adequate financial support to provide for medical and sundry expenses, which is more or less what I have said. We need to ensure the correct personnel are put in place, which is the purpose of the first two amendments. We then need to set out what they will be required to do, which is the purpose of the third amendment, in ensuring the provision of adequate financial support in the investment of funds.
Subsection (3)(a) of amendment No. 244 is extremely important. It reads, "Assets must be invested in a manner designed to ensure the security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole, so far as is appropriate, having regard to the nature and duration of the expected liabilities". In other words, there would be a requirement for prudent investment. In the past this was not done and investment portfolios collapsed. There was an almost arbitrary and care-free approach to investment of the funds of persons who were not in a position to do it themselves.
Subsection (3)(b) provides that assets would have to be invested predominantly in regulated markets and so on. In other words, they would have to invested in safe areas. It would also provide that "investment in assets which are not admitted to trading on a regulated market must in any event be kept to a prudent level". I do not know to what exactly this refers. Perhaps it might relate to property folio investments such as investment in a block of apartments and so on. However, such investments would have to be kept to a prudent level. In other words, all of the eggs should not be put in the one basket.
Subsection (3)(c) reads, "Assets must be properly diversified in such a way as to avoid excessive reliance on any particular asset, issuer or group of undertakings and so as to avoid accumulations of risk in the portfolio as a whole. Investments in assets issued by the same issuer or by issuers belonging to the same group must not expose the scheme to excessive risk concentration". In other words, where possible, risk would have to be avoided. The average person in the street can be as careful as he or she likes and invest on speculative grounds, in which case he or she may make a killing or lose everything. That is his or her decision, but a person who is incapable of making these decisions is reliant on another person to invest prudently and diversify in such a way as to avoid excessive reliance on a particular asset.
Subsection (3)(d) would constrain those making investments, in most circumstances, from investing in derivative instruments. It was derivatives that caused the collapse of western European economies and the collapse started in the United States. The toxic bundles were put together by the clever stockbrokers and financial advisers who are still being consulted by the Government and appointed as advisers. Nobody knew what was in the bundles: they were just derivatives. The amendment would provide for constraint against excessive investment in such instruments which could only be made in so far as they would contribute to a reduction of investment risks or facilitate efficient portfolio management.
Subsection (4) reads, "Annual financial reports on the condition, progress, and management of relevant person’s funds; both liquid funds and investments; will be made available to (a) the court, and (b) relevant persons". Accountability is important.
Subsection (5) reads, "If an endowment as individual principal value falls by 10%, or more, within one financial quarter, the portfolio will be liquidised into cash...". I would like to give an example of where this would come into play, but I will, first, make some general remarks on the question of wardship. Where the High Court approves an award for personal injuries suffered and a plaintiff who is deemed to have a capacity deficit is made a ward of court because he or she does not have the capacity to make appropriate decisions for himself or herself, in respect of which he or she has no choice, funds are not released to meet his or her needs until such time as the process has been completed.
There have been many difficulties with ward of court funds which are held in investments by the Courts Service. Following a Committee of Public Accounts review in 2000, it was determined that no audits had been carried out for two decades. The Bill seeks to address that issue. The amendments to which I am speaking seek to strengthen and reinforce what is provided for in the Bill in that regard. Even after it was discovered that there had been no audits for 20 years, there was no look-back or review carried out. The Courts Service was then established and the accounts of the courts were computerised. The management of funds was put out to tender. The new structure provided for four strands of investment, some of which involved greater exposure to equities and bonds than others. Those that were heavily exposed fared poorly during the financial crisis and some wards' funds suffered serious losses. The Courts Service states the funds have performed well overall compared to similar funds. In this regard, key is the word "overall" because not all funds performed well and there are no similar funds. We are speaking not about regular investors but about vulnerable people under the protection of the State. There were no cash reserves held for wards of court to meet emergencies. It is extraordinary that a person would gamble on the Stock Exchange and not hold back a little to look after people in this position. There is a concern about the management, investment, auditing and accountability of funds. Funds were audited internally, but errors were not always picked up. An audit is instigated by the Courts Service, but as funds are not audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General, there is no accountability. There is a sum of €1.5 billion in the funds.
I would like to outline a specific case which was brought to my attention by parents whose son, as far as I can recollect, had been injured, in respect of which he received compensation. In a two year period between May 2007 and April 2009 the fund diminished from €510,685.02 to €280,145.71; in other words, it was halved, but that is not the end of it. The last statement the parents received showed that the value of the fund at the end of 2014 was €186,490.85. This means that the fund had decreased from almost €511,000 to €186,000, which was an astonishing collapse and worse than the cut in my income as a Member of Seanad Éireann. According to the parents, a further €40,000 can be deducted from this amount for expenses in 2015. With little earnings, the fund will be down to almost €150,000 by the end of the year. The officials say the ward's fund will only last a few years. If it had been managed appropriately. he would not be in this position. In other words, the fund will have reduced from €510,000 to €150,000. In view of what it costs per year to care for this young man, €46,000, the money will be gone in less than four years. What is he to do then?
Quite apart from understanding the complex nature of these investments in unitised funds which have a strong exposure to equities, if one does simple maths, one will see that these funds have not recovered. When one takes the figure of €510,685, the value of the fund in May 2007, and deducts from it €186,490, the amount at the date of the last statement, one is left with a figure of €324,194.17. When this figure is divided by seven, the seven year period 2007 to 2004, one gets a figure of €46,313 per annum. The moneys drawn down during these years would not have reached this amount every year, but the point the parents of this young man make is that if they had kept the money in a drawer and drawn down only what was needed, their son would not be any worse off, yet the funds are in the Courts Service for their protection. In other words, had they kept the money under a mattress, they would be in at least as good, if not a better, position than they are having had the money invested. For this reason, the safeguards contained in the three amendments are vitally necessary to protect the welfare and interests of wards of court.
Our contention is that the Courts Service has failed in its duty of care to those vulnerable people and has been covering this up by saying overall funds have performed well. It is no excuse and it is not good enough. We need good governance for these funds. I am sorry if I have taken a while, but it is a complex matter and is at the kernel of the welfare of wards of courts because they are financially vulnerable. If we do not ensure best practice is followed for the people concerned, we are abandoning them to their fate. I urge the Minister of State to take on board the content of the amendments.
Comment on this
I wish to speak to amendment Nos. 27, 239 and 244. I support amendment No. 27 and the rest of the amendments. We have discussed the matter in detail for the past three weeks. I contacted the Minister of State's office about it when I saw this amendment. As Senator David Norris noted, the current situation has allowed the funds to dwindle. I have a graph showing how funds dwindled for one ward of court. The people around this individual knew nothing about it. It was all gone. They woke up in the morning and asked where it had gone. That is not good enough. We must ensure we do not let that happen. The funds are not nice collections of money. They are needed for the care of vulnerable citizens. As the economy changes - I grant we must be open - the funds invested will change. The least we are asking is that when they are dwindling, the people around wards of court are informed annually. As Senator David Norris noted, two decades passed without any audit of funds. That is not right. The amendments would change that and make the investment of funds transparent in respect of oversight and management.
In other areas, the Bill introduces a lot of transparency to the protection of the most vulnerable. In respect of managing money, we all know money sometimes attracts people who may not have the best interests of the person at heart. At least, everybody needs to know what is going on when the funds are managed by the courts. Amendments Nos. 27, 239 and 244 aim to bring about three changes that are crucial to making the Bill one that will work for the vulnerable person. They assert that the purpose of court management of funds is the support of the welfare of the relevant person, provide for annual reports on the funds for the court and the relevant person and establish a safeguard against the freefall of funds. Having spoken to people who speak for very vulnerable people, I know that the changes proposed in these three amendments are necessary and I ask the Minister of State to support them.
When we look at amendment No. 244, are we looking for something that is too certain? I would be prepared to reintroduce this amendment on Report Stage with sections 121(1)(a), 121(1)(b), 121(4)(a), 121(4)(b) and section 121(5) retained and sections 121(2), 121(3)(a), 121(3)(b), 121(3)(c) and 121(3)(d) removed. Section 3(a) states:
Assets must be invested in a manner designed to ensure the security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole, so far as is appropriate, having regard to the nature and duration of the expected liabilities.
This section might be looking for too much security. How does one ensure security? We would all love to know that in respect of every share we invest. I urge the Minister of State to accept amendments Nos. 27 and 239. We will be pressing the matter because we have discussed it previously. If Senator David Norris is in agreement, I would be prepared on Report Stage to look at retaining sections 121(1)(a), 121(1)(b), 121(4)(a), 121(4)(b) and 121(5) and removing 121(2),121(3)(a), 121(3)(b), 121(3)(c) and 121(3)(d) in respect of amendment No. 244. I am being more realistic in making a bit of a deal with the Minister of State in this regard. Senators Martin Conway and Maurice Cummins and I would like to support Senator David Norris in this regard. I thank Senator David Norris for carrying out a lot of research on it. I also thank the groups we met.
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I probably came in a little too early when I raised this issue earlier. I also support what I referred to at the beginning of the debate. I support Senator David Norris. As Senator Cáit Keane so eloquently put it, it is important we ensure the most vulnerable people have money that is being invested. I add my support in that regard. I also ask the Minister of State to accept the amendment.
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As the Fine Gael spokesperson on justice and equality, I commend Senators Cáit Keane and David Norris because this is the type of constructive-----
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This type of collaboration and discourse is what Seanad Éireann should be about. It is our responsibility to challenge the Government and this means Members on the Government side also. I am criticised because I probably do it too much. The money of the most vulnerable should not be subject to boom and bust, from which the rest of society suffers enough. I would probably have gone a step further than Senator David Norris and insisted that the investment be in blue chip Government bonds because I certainly would not trust the banks. We saw what happened to the banks and all that went with it.
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I agree with the Senator. I would have excluded the diversified funds or whatever they call them - the derivatives. I would have kept them out altogether.
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Perhaps there is justification for insisting on Report Stage that any new moneys that come in for any new people who find themselves in this situation be invested in guaranteed Government bonds and products. The only way we as citizens can offer blue chip assurance is by investing in Government bonds and products. We have a duty to do everything we can and to make sure this legislation underpins that to ensure it is guaranteed because, ultimately, we do not have the right to gamble with this set of resources.
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I will not repeat what has been said, but I commend Senator David Norris for tabling these very important amendments. I mean no disrespect to the Parliamentary Counsel, but the amendments are very well drafted. I agree with colleagues on the opposite side that they should be accepted. The case outlined by Senator David Norris concerned an unfortunate individual who ended up in dire financial straits because of the manner in which his money had been invested by the Courts Service.
I would go further and suggest he might have a legal case against the Courts Service because I consider it to have been completely irresponsible in the manner in which it invested that money. Moreover, as Senators David Norris and Cáit Keane have pointed out, it is totally unbelievable that in respect of an arm of the State, no audit has been conducted for more than two decades. I urge the Minister of State to accept the amendments. Perhaps, as Senator Cáit Keane suggested, too much financial security is being sought, but when one is dealing with wards of court and vulnerable people, I do not think one can have too much security. Consequently, if the Minister of State cannot accept the amendments now, I urge her to agree to consider them again on Report Stage.
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I listened with interest because as public representatives, this issue has come to the attention of all Members, namely, the awful devastation when people receive a statement and make a discovery about money they believed to be absolutely secure and people will ask how much more secure can it be than when the courts are minding it for them. However, we are moving away from a courts system, which is why the amendments are not relevant. While I understand perfectly what the Senator is saying, as soon as the Bill is enacted everyone will be out of wardship within a three-year period. Their funds will be returned to them to manage as they please, in some cases with co-decision-makers, and with the advice of people such as their bank manager, a financial adviser, their parents or perhaps a friend who has knowledge of these matters.
I commend the Senator's foresight because the Government is moving away from a court-based system. While the Bill was being debated in the Dáil, one amendment proposed the extension of wardship should be done within six months and the argument was put to the Government that this could not be done because some people are ready right now to exit wardship. Some people will not be ready even at the end of the three-year period. I refer to the need to put together the security package that gives them the freedom to make those decisions for themselves, but on exiting wardship, their funds will be returned to them. The Government has asked for advice on the three amendments and, in particular, sought advice from the National Treasury Management Agency, NTMA, because its staff, as Senator DAvid Norris rightly observed, have more expansive knowledge in this regard and they worry that perhaps it might not be beneficial to the individuals involved, except for people who receive enormous sums. Moreover, even this will change in the future, in terms of how payments will be made.
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In the case of such repayments, for instance, where a child is damaged at birth, the Government is changing to a more progressive funding model whereby people will be paid through their lives rather than expecting to invest. Even though it is an enormous sum, as the Senator noted, one has no indication as to what can happen in respect of stocks, bonds and all those things unless one puts it into the drawer at the bottom of the bed and does nothing with it. That is the only protection, but I am not certain it would last very long. However, the Government is moving away from wardship and moving away entirely from a court-protected system and people then will be empowered, with protections and advice from whomsoever they choose in respect of those matters. Everyone then must trust that the right decisions will be made; people sometimes do not but then again, that is what the Bill is about, namely, the right to make the wrong decision for oneself, because we all make wrong decisions. While I commend the Senator's foresight, the Government is moving away from what she is proposing and I know that she will appreciate that.
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While I recognise we are moving away from it, in so doing provisions are being inserted in Chapter 3 of Part 9 regarding special visitors and general visitors.
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That is what amendment No. 239 is about, namely, a person who is a special visitor and designated to advise is a person who has financial expertise. As Senator David Norris noted, there is no point in such a person having medical expertise. It will be necessary to have financial "expertise and experience of financial matters, as respects the capacity of persons", even though that person might not be a medical practitioner. While I grant to the Minister of State that we are moving away from the courts, this is why such a provision is still needed. However, in moving away from the courts, I note the Bill contains absolutely nothing in respect of the special visitor or the person put in care to specify there should be an annual report or financial statement to that person. This is absolutely relevant for transparency and is necessary.
Comment on this
I was about to raise that point mentioned by Senator Cáit Keane on the special visitor and advice for a person when he or she comes out of wardship of court. This must be specific and, as Senator Cáit Keane stated, it must be someone with financial expertise. In addition, adequate advice ought to be on hand for the relevant family members who perhaps are not au fait with the worlds of banking, finance or investment. It can be daunting for such people to be obliged to manage money also.
Comment on this
The Minister of State is inclined to be helpful, albeit only up to a limited point. She has stated we are moving away from wards of court and while that may be true, the Bill addresses wards of court. That is what it is about and its central plank pertains to wards of court.
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Yes, but it still deals with it and makes provision for it as it stands. As for the period of three years or whatever it is, what about a person who is severely disabled mentally and has no relations? What happens to him or her?
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Wait one minute. The Minister of State has stated the funds will be given back to the people.
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She then went on to say they should be allowed to make mistakes like everybody else. Is it responsible on the part of society to hand somebody who is brain-damaged a huge bunch of money and tell him or her to go off and make mistakes? That is Reaganomics; it really is western capitalism at its worst to let people have their pensions and then to allow them rot in the gutter. I do not believe in letting people who are so disadvantaged make mistakes. Proper safeguards are needed to ensure they do not make mistakes. One cannot project what will happen three years into the future. There always will be people who will be reliant on guidance of whatever kind and to include this amendment, even if it is guidance for future legislation, is absolutely necessary. I am proposing an annual report in the light of the fact that there were no audits of any kind and no account given for two decades. This appears blindingly obvious to me and even were it only for the next three years, it would be absolutely necessary in the light of the history of these funds.
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I support Senator David Norris's comments on cases in which there is nobody-----
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We are not throwing people into the gutter.
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No, no one is throwing anybody into the gutter.
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No, there will be circumstances in which nobody will be there to take care. The court then will appoint and the court will be responsible. That is what this is about, that is, in any situation in which a person is not available or deemed unsuitable to act as a decision-maker, the court retains this responsibility. While the court retains responsibility, Members are trying to ensure that within that responsibility, there must be safeguards for the people themselves. Such responsibility will come out through an annual report to the court and the person appointed, to make that quite clear. While a court may appoint a person, I refer to the elapse of two decades without an audit and it is to be hoped this kind of thing would not happen again. The purpose of the amendment is to try to bring greater transparency to the process.
Comment on this
There will be enough concern in respect of this legislation among families who have somebody with a disability. I now am speaking directly to the people with that experience because I acknowledge there is concern that this somehow is going too far or that it is giving a level of discretion to certain people who do not have capacity. While I accept this, the type of language expressed by the Senator really is not helpful.
Clearly, if someone does not have capacity, which is very rare, and does not have relations or a circle of friends to call on, the court will appoint. It will do so on the basis that the person it is appointing will have responsibility for the well-being of the person concerned, including his or her financial property and welfare. That is essential.
Everyone has the right to make a wrong decision. We hope to have people around us who love and respect us, who will be charged with caring for us and directing us. This is something we need to get our heads around. The director of the decision support service will be obliged to give financial information. It would not be appropriate for a special visitor to give that advice. For instance, what would happen if it did not work out? Would the person concerned be held liable? The director can give advice on financial matters and the possibilities in that regard rather than directing someone to invest. We all make these decisions every day. With enough support and decision makers around us, even people with limited capacity will be able to make them.
The courts will appoint a suitable person and the director will accommodate this by ensuring it is someone from a panel who will be an accountant or a fund manager and will have the expertise required to manage extensive funds. It is important that Senators realise we have made provision to cover all possibilities. We have been formulating the Bill for three years and there is not a single issue we have not come across or addressed. It is not the first time we have come across this issue. We all have. The special visitor would not be the appropriate person to do this as his or her remit is entirely different; it is to ensure the person concerned is properly looked after and, where there is an investigation to be held, that it takes place. The co-decision maker or person appointed to support the person who lacks capacity has to make a statement every single year, not to the courts but to the director. If he or she is appointed to advise on financial issues, he or she will have to make a statement to the director on those financial affairs. If the issue concerns health, welfare or other aspects, that is different. He or she has to make a return every single year to the director and, if the director finds that this has not happened, he or she will have the power to either remove the person or investigate the matter. There are extensive powers for the director and extensive safeguards for the relevant person. This needs to be understood.
There is not a single element in terms of amendments, suggestions or contributions of which we have not thought. Where we had not thought of something and where it was new and possible, we brought it forward by way of an amendment.
Comment on this
The Minister of State says it is the responsibility of the visitor to ensure the ward of court is properly looked after. How can the visitor do this if he or she does not have the money to do so? I cited the case of somebody whose principal asset had been reduced in value from €510,000 to €150,000.
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The Senator and I both know that that has absolutely nothing to do with the Bill.
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No. I was only allowing the Minister of State to interrupt me because I am very courteous. There has to be some engagement on financial matters on the part of the visitor. It is very difficult for people with limited mental capacity. There are lots of people of complete sound mind who are useless in dealing with stocks and shares. What hope does somebody with reduced capacity have? I simply do not know the answer. I am in direct contact with people who are not happy and will not be happy with the Minister of State's response either. Is she is prepared to give any consideration to the amendments?
Comment on this
The Minister of State has spoken about the annual financial reports going to the director. Amendment No. 244 reads:
Annual financial reports on the condition, progress, and management of relevant person’s funds; both liquid funds and investments; will be made available to—
(a) the court, and
(b) relevant persons.
The Minister of State has said there will be a report to the court, which is fine. She is saying subsection (a) is satisfied by the report going to the director, while subsection (b) refers to relevant persons. Perhaps I might be helpful by suggesting we all put our heads together and look at the matter again before Report Stage. I want to see openness, transparency and responsibility in dealing with funds.
Comment on this
I would be quite prepared to look at the issue before Report Stage if that would be helpful.
Comment on this
I propose that the sitting be suspended until 8.45 p.m.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 30 to 42, inclusive, and amendments Nos. 44 and 45 are related and may be discussed together.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 30 to 42, inclusive, and amendments Nos. 44 and 45 propose to align the provisions relating to decision-making assistants with those already agreed for co-decision makers. Amendment No. 30 is intended to clarify that a person must be 18 years or over to be appointed as a decision-making assistant, reflecting the responsibility involved in supporting decision-making by a vulnerable person. I propose amendment No. 31 arising from the consultations held with disability groups last month. A request was made that a relevant person should be able to have more than one decision-making assistant. I explored the feasibility of the request and I am pleased to propose an amendment which will allow a person to appoint more than one decision-making assistant. This will enable an elderly mother to appoint all of her children to act as decision-making assistants and to have the right to source information on her behalf.
Amendment No. 32 proposes to delete subsections (6) to (12), inclusive. This is to align the provisions on assisted decision-making with those already agreed for co-decision-making. Amendment No. 33 proposes to align the categories of persons who will not be eligible to be decision-making assistants with those agreed for co-decision-makers. The provisions are largely similar to those already in place in regard to decision-making assistants.
Amendment No. 34 proposes that a decision-making assistant's agreement will be null and void if there is a decision-making order, decision-making representation order, advanced health care directive or a registered enduring power of attorney already in place in respect of the decisions encompassed by the decision-making assistant agreement. The reason for this amendment is if a person has a decision-making representative to take decisions on these matters it confirms that the relevant person lacks capacity to make these decisions.
Amendment No. 35 proposes to insert a new section 13 to align the categories of persons disqualified from being decision-making assistants with those already agreed for co-decision-makers; for example, a spouse or civil partner will be disqualified if they separate from the relevant person and if the marriage or civil partnership is dissolved. Similarly, a cohabitant will be disqualified if they separate from the relevant person. These provisions are intended to protect the relevant person against a former partner seeking to use the person's incapacity to gain control over the person's property and affairs. The provisions are largely similar to those already set out in the Bill in regard to decision-making assistants. As a new provision they provide for the situation in which a civil partnership is annulled or dissolved in a State other than Ireland. The ex-civil partner would be disqualified from acting as a decision-making assistant in these circumstances.
Section 13 retains the provision which disqualifies persons from being decision-making assistants if they have had, for example, safety or barring orders issued against them in respect of the relevant person. The existing provisions preventing a person from acting as a decision-making assistant on property and affairs, if convicted of fraud, etc., is also retained.
Amendment No. 35 seeks to make clear that the functions of a decision-making assistant will be as specified in the decision-making agreement. It is intended to underline the control that will continue to be exercised by the relevant person over the agreement. As previously indicated, he or she will be free to revoke the agreement at any time.
Amendment No. 36 is intended to make clear that the decision-making assistant’s role will be to assist the appointer in accessing relevant information. Relevant information is defined as information to which the appointer is entitled and that is needed for the purposes of the decision. The objective is to ensure a decision-making assistant does not seek to use the role to source other information that is not relevant to the decision. Amendment No. 37 is a technical amendment to clarify the intent of the provision. Amendments Nos. 38 to 42, inclusive, are drafting amendments to make the provisions clearer. Amendment No. 44 inserts a new provision to clarify that a relevant decision is the appointer’s decision, even if taken with a decision-making assistant.
Amendment No. 45 proposes to insert a new section 12 dealing with complaints in relation to decision-making assistants. The new section mirrors section 27 of the Bill which deals with complaints against co-decision-makers. The proposed new section sets out new provisions enabling complaints to be made about the suitability or conduct of decision-making assistants. Provision is made for the director, having been satisfied that a complaint is well founded, to apply to court for a determination. An additional safeguard is provided by allowing the director to investigate a matter and bring it to court notwithstanding that no complaint has been received.
Comment on this
I welcome amendment No. 31, in particular, which provides for flexibility in the terms and number of decision-making assistants that an individual can choose. I welcome also amendment No. 45. We will get to amendment No. 162. These amendments provide for safeguards in the form of clarifying how complaints can be made about co-decision-makers and decision-making representatives, especially those who may be acting beyond the scope of their authority or failing to respect the individual's will and preferences. They are welcome additions to the Bill.
Comment on this
I, too, welcome amendment No. 31. It is important that decision-making can be shared among siblings, relations, friends or whoever and that it is not all placed on one person. That one can appoint more than one person is welcome.
Comment on this
In respect of people with an intellectual disability, in particular, the advice when appointing people to various committees has always been that one should appoint two people in order that the person with the intellectual disability would have somebody to rely on, somebody to act as a friend and adviser because he or she can feel isolated, as we heard.
Amendment agreed to.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 47, 51, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71, 81, 92, 93, 105, 108, 117, 118 and 132 are related and may be discussed together. Is that agreed? Agreed.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 47, 51, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71, 81, 92, 93, 105, 108, 117, 118 and 132 are essentially technical points to address some issues needing to be resolved in the provisions on co-decision-making.
Amendment No. 47 proposes to amend the text that defines how a person may be considered suitable for appointment as a co-decision-maker. The person has to be "capable" of performing the role.
Amendment No. 71 proposes to amend the provisions relating to dissolution of civil partnership to encompass dissolutions occurring in other states. The former civil partner will be ineligible to act as a decision-making assistant or co-decision-maker.
Amendment No. 81 is intended to make clearer the remedies available to a third person if he or she unknowingly relies on a co-decision-making agreement which is later found to be null and void. My amendment proposes that the third party would not be prevented from recovering damages for any loss incurred as a result of unknowingly relying on a null and void co-decision-making agreement.
Amendment No. 92 proposes an additional ground for objection to the registration of a co-decision-making agreement, namely, that a false statement is included in the application to register the agreement. Amendment No. 93 is intended to specify more clearly that the director can take action only if an objection has been received within the time period of five weeks specified in subsection (1).
Amendment No. 105 proposes an additional provision that would allow the director to make inquiries where an incomplete report has been submitted and to be satisfied that the report is in order. This provision allows the director the flexibility to accept an incomplete report where the circumstances warrant it. The provision would benefit co-decision-makers who are caring for the relevant person and who may not have the time, because of that caring responsibility, to submit a report that is absolutely in line with the regulations but where the information submitted confirms that there are no issues arising with the operation of the co-decision-making agreement.
Amendment No. 108 clarifies that the basis for complaint against a co-decision-maker is that he or she is acting outside the scope of his or her functions. Senator Jillian van Turnhout clearly expressed her views in this regard.
Amendment No. 117 is intended to specify more precisely that the court can make a determination when an appeal has been made under the new subsection (3) and within the time limit of 21 days specified in that subsection.
Amendment No. 118 is a technical amendment to delete the phrase "which was the subject of a complaint to the Director". The reason for the amendment is that the court may make a determination both on an issue which was the subject of a complaint to the director and on an application made by the director where no complaint has been received. In the latter case, the director will make an application where he or she believes a serious issue has arisen in relation to the operation of the co-decision-making agreement which warrants consideration by the court.
Amendment No. 132 is a technical amendment to specify the cross-reference between the obligation in section 17(8) for an appointer or a co-decision-maker to notify the director of the nullity of a co-decision-making agreement and the corresponding provision in section 30 setting out the director’s role when this notice has been received.
Comment on this
I have a concern about amendment No. 65. I ask the Minister of State to listen to what I have to say and perhaps consider revising it and coming back to it on Report Stage. Amendment No. 65 provides that a co-decision-maker may refuse to acquiesce with an appointer's decision where it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision will result in harm to the appointer or another person. This is too restrictive in terms of the autonomy of the appointer. We all enjoy the dignity of risk to take decisions that can carry a risk of harm to ourselves. For example, if the appointer wishes to consent to a new surgery which she believes will benefit her condition but the surgery has a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm, would we really want a co-decision-maker to be able to prevent her from taking that decision? The amendment should be revised to ensure the harm, in addition to being reasonably foreseeable, should be imminent and of a grave nature.
That would bring the Bill closer to its goal of respecting the will and preferences of the person concerned. I ask the Minister of State to take another look at the amendment because I have a concern about offering choice. I argue all the time for what is in the best interests of the child. I realise we are all allowed to make decisions as adults that may not necessarily be in our best interests. That is what we want to do and we should be allowed to do so. This amendment is not in keeping with the spirit of the Bill. We should, therefore, consider inserting the words "imminent and of a grave nature". Who will have the power to make a decision about undergoing new surgery?
Comment on this
I thank the Minister of State.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 52 and 109 are cognate and may be discussed together, by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 52 and 109 are technical amendments to remove the reference to "step-child" in the definition of "immediate family" that will apply under the Bill. That is because a step-child is considered to be a child of the family and does not need to be referenced separately in the definition.
Comment on this
Is the Minister of State willing to reconsider moving the amendment?
Comment on this
The amendment can be moved on the basis that it can be recommitted on Report Stage, if needs be.
Comment on this
I appreciate that fact. I had suggested the matter be looked at again.
Comment on this
There is no need as she has agreed to look at it again.
Comment on this
I will take another look at the matter and we will come back-----
Comment on this
Is the Minister of State withdrawing the amendment, or does she want to have it agreed to?
Comment on this
No, I want it to be agreed to, but I will come back on it on Report Stage.
Comment on this
I wish to inform the House that I plan to bring amendments to this section on Report Stage. The amendments will involve the transfer of responsibility for legal representation, for those appearing before mental health tribunals, from the Mental Health Commission to the Legal Aid Board. This is something that we have been considering and were asked to do.
I also plan to bring forward amendments to provide for access to legal representation for persons facing capacity hearings under section 34 of the Bill. Again, this is an issue that we were asked to address in order to make sure people had access to legal aid.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 135 to 142, inclusive, propose a series of amendments to the provisions regarding applications to court under Part 5. Amendments Nos. 135 to 137, inclusive, involve the deletion of the provision whereby the court can make a declaration in terms of a person’s capacity to marry. As the Bill is not altering the existing law in terms of marriage, it is not appropriate that the court should have a role in making a declaration regarding a person’s capacity to marry. The capacity to marry is governed by extensive statute law and common law which should more appropriately apply to it rather than this Bill.
Amendment No. 140 involves the deletion of provisions concerning costs for applications. It is appropriate that section 33(7)(a) should be deleted as the principle that the costs are borne by the parties who retain legal representation is a general one. There is no need to restate it in this legislation. It will apply to this Bill without having to be specifically referenced.
Similarly, with regard to section 33(7)(b), the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 will apply to proceedings under this Bill and there is no need to reference it specifically. I am removing a provision that might be detrimental to a relevant person in section 33(7)(c). As it stands, a person or an organisation can take an application to have a person declared as lacking capacity and can have the legal costs borne out of the person’s assets. That potentially creates the risk that a person might mischievously seek a declaration that another person lacks capacity to gain control of his or her assets. There would be no disincentive as the costs of the proceedings would be borne by the relevant person. I propose to remove this provision for this reason.
Amendment No. 142 is a technical amendment. As the Bill specifies the parties who are to be notified of applications, it is not appropriate for them to be determined by rules of court.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 149 to 162, inclusive, are related. Amendment No. 158 is a physical alternative to amendment No. 157. They will all be discussed together.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 149 to 162, inclusive, propose a series of amendments to align the provisions on decision-making representatives with those agreed for co-decision-makers. The intention is that the more robust safeguards agreed for co-decision-makers would be applied to decision-making representation.
Amendment No. 149 seeks to make clear that a person must be 18 years or over to be appointed as a decision-making representative in view of the level of responsibility potentially arising from this role. Amendment No. 150 seeks to clarify the boundaries that will apply between the functions of a decision-making representative and the terms of an advance health care directive or an enduring power of attorney. The court will be required to ensure the order appointing a decision-making representative is consistent with the terms of an advance health care directive and with the powers of a designated health care representative. The order will also have to be consistent with the terms of an enduring power of attorney and with the functions of an attorney. The reason they take precedence is because an advance health care directive and an enduring power of attorney are direct expressions of the will and preferences of the person.
Amendment No. 151 proposes to align the categories of person who will not be eligible to be decision-making representatives with those agreed for co-decision-makers. The provisions are largely similar to those in place in respect of decision-making representatives.
Amendment No. 152 inserts a new section 37. The section proposes to align the categories of person disqualified from being decision-making representatives with those agreed for co-decision-makers. A spouse or civil partner will be disqualified if he or she separates from the relevant person and if the marriage or civil partnership is dissolved. Similarly, a cohabitant will be disqualified if he or she separates from the person. These provisions are intended to protect the person against a former partner seeking to use the person’s incapacity to gain control over the person’s property and affairs. They are largely similar to those set out for decision-making representatives. One new provision is that they provide for a situation in which a civil partnership is annulled or dissolved in a state other than Ireland.
Amendment No. 153 proposes two new subsections which seek to respond to the concerns of Senators that the duty to ascertain the relevant person’s will and preferences be given priority. The first duty will be to ascertain, in so far as is possible, the person’s will and preferences. The second amendment proposes to move the provisions of subsection (4) to become subsection (2) of this section. The provisions are as agreed. The intention is to highlight the duty on the decision-making representative to act as the relevant person’s agent and in service to that person.
Amendment No. 154 moves the provisions, currently in section 38(5) into a new section. This is in the interests of clarity as the previous section 38 covered too many issues. No change is envisaged to the provisions as agreed.
Amendment No. 155 proposes to move the provision currently in section 36(8) into section 37 in the interests of structuring the Part more clearly. No change is envisaged to the provisions as agreed.
Amendment No. 158 proposes to modify the provisions of section 38(7) to specify that the scope available to a decision-making representative to make a decision on the carrying out or refusing of life-sustaining treatment is subject to the terms of an advance health care directive. Similarly, the amendment proposes that the decisions of a designated health care representative will take precedence over those of a decision-making representative on these matters. This is because the advance health care directive is the direct expression of the will and preferences of the relevant person on such matters. Equally, the designated health care representative will have been appointed specifically by the person to take these decisions if and when they arise.
Amendments Nos. 159 and 160 propose a new section 39 which set out the provisions that would apply in terms of the register of decision-making representatives. The provisions are in line with those agreed for co-decision-makers. It is proposed that the Minister would specify by regulation the bodies and classes of person entitled to access the register. In the interests of the person’s privacy, it is not appropriate that a register would be accessible to the public. However, it is intended that anyone needing to know if a person has a decision-making representative will be able to apply to the director for that information.
Amendment No. 161 proposes a new section 40 setting out the provisions relating to the reporting obligations to be imposed on the decision-making representative. These are in line with the provisions agreed for co-decision-makers. They retain the provisions in subsections (6) and (7) of section 36 but add a number of key protections. They set out the procedures that will apply if a decision-making representative fails to submit a report or submits an incomplete report. The director will contact the decision-making representative on this issue. If the decision-making representative continues to fail to submit a complete report, the director will have the power to apply to the court for a determination on whether the decision-making representative should continue in the role. It is important to add these provisions as a safeguard for the relevant person. Reporting is intended as the primary means by which the director will supervise the decision-making representative. The director will be unable to perform this supervisory function adequately if he or she does not have the possibility to engage with the decision-making representative on the reports or to seek the court’s determination where the representative fails to comply with the obligations.
Amendment No. 162 proposes a new section 41 which sets out the complaints mechanism that will apply where complaints are made against decision-making representatives. A person will be able to make a complaint where the representative is acting or proposing to act beyond the scope of the functions specified in the court order.
A person will be able to make a complaint where the representative is acting or proposing to act beyond the scope of the functions specified in the court order. A complaint will also be possible where the representative is not suitable such as where he or she is in conflict with the relevant person or not able to perform the role. It is proposed that the director will be able to investigate the complaint to see if it is well founded. If it is, he or she will be able to apply to the court for a determination. He or she will also be able to launch investigations on his or her own initiative. If a complaint is not well founded, the director will notify the complainant who will be able to appeal the decision to the court.
Comment on this
I have one concern about amendment No. 154 in this group. It provides that a decision making representative can not only be remunerated for expenses incurred in the performance of his or her duties but also if approved by the court. This payment will be made from the assets of the relevant person rather than by the State. I am concerned that this violates the constitutional right of the relevant person to private property. In addition to the human rights violation in having one's legal capacity to make decisions removed, the amendment ensures the person whose right to make decisions is being removed will also have to pay for the privilege of this violation through his or her own assets. I ask the Minister of State to reconsider the amendment.
Comment on this
If there is an issue with the amendment, we will definitely re-examine it.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 163 to 169, inclusive, relate to the process by which wards of court will be discharged from wardship. Amendments Nos. 163, 165 and 166 provide that the wardship court shall not review the capacity of a ward but rather make a declaration under section 46(1). The amendments are necessary because the existing provisions do not correctly describe what is envisaged. Where a person has been admitted to wardship without reference to his or her capacity such as in the case of many minor wards, he or she can be discharged from wardship without reference to his or her capacity. The wardship court will not look again at the ward's capacity, which is what the previous provisions implied. Instead, it will review the ward’s case and, where necessary, make a determination as to his or her capacity. No change of policy is envisaged by these provisions.
A new provision is proposed that will allow the wardship court to continue its jurisdiction, pending the discharge of a ward or the ward’s migration to the new options foreseen under the Bill. The amendments will allow payments, for instance, to continue to be made, pending the court hearing on a ward’s case. This is to ensure there will be continuity in the provisions in place for wards throughout the process of moving from wardship to discharge or the new options. The amendments do not change in any way the deadlines already set in the provisions. Wardship will be phased out for adults within three years of the commencement of Part 6. A minor ward will be entitled to a court hearing of his or her case no later than six months after his or her 18th birthday.
Amendment No. 169 proposes to replace section 47 with a new section. The provisions repealing the Marriage of Lunatics Act 1811 and the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 have been moved to section 7. Some saving provisions are needed to ensure orders of the wardship court made before this Part is commenced will remain valid, even if the 1871 Act is repealed. This is to provide certainty in terms of payments to third parties and so forth.
It is proposed to delete section 49. The provisions of the Bill are essentially for adults. Adult wardship will be abolished over a three year period. It is important that boundaries not be blurred between the current arrangements and the arrangements foreseen under the Bill. To make this clear, the role of the director of the decision support service will relate exclusively to adults. He or she will not have a role in the case of minor wards. Any matter relating to minor wards will continue to be handled by the Office of the Wards of Court. The amendment makes clear the separation that will apply between the Office of the Wards of Court and the decision support service.
Comment on this
Amendment No. 164 reads:
In page 56, between lines 13 and 14, to insert the following:
“(b) a relative of a friend of the appointer who has had such personal contact with the appointer over such period of time that a relationship of trust exists between them,”.
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has stated in general comment No.1 that under Article 12 of the convention, perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity must not be used as justification for denying legal capacity. Since the Bill is being developed as part of Ireland's preparations to ratify the UN convention, the functional assessment of mental capacity must be replaced with a process of interpreting the will and preferences of the individual. This will ensure that when people need help to make decisions, they will be supported in doing so, rather than have their legal rights to make decisions removed.
On a broader note, Inclusion Ireland has concerns about the review of the position of wards. I highlight these concerns and invite a response from the Minister of State. Inclusion Ireland argues that Part 6 of the Bill applies to people who are wards of court. The sections therein allow for a review by the ward or somebody who appears to the wardship court to have sufficient interest or expertise in the welfare of the ward. Inclusion Ireland has received communications from a number of concerned families in this regard. Many family members are concerned about the reference to the "welfare" of the ward and the broadness of the category, as preference in persons acting as co-decision makers and decision-making representatives is given to a relative or friend of the appointer who has had such personal contact with the appointer over a period of time that there is a relationship of trust between them. Inclusion Ireland is stating it would be preferable if this category was introduced before the aforementioned phrase "sufficient interest or expertise". I ask the Minister of State to comment on this suggestion.
Comment on this
I agree with the Senator that it is important to highlight in the Bill the fact that applications can be made by relatives or persons who have a relationship of trust with the ward. I am looking at the feasibility of the Senator's proposal and seeking legal advice on the matter. Given that the Bill is driven by consultation to ensure we get it right and subject to the legal advice being what we expect it to be, I will be tabling an amendment on Report Stage broadly along the lines of that proposed by the Senator. I hope that will satisfy him.
In terms of wardship, it is important that we be very clear in the Bill.
Quite recently I had a visit from a very caring and very young family. They wanted to talk to me about an adult relative who was awaiting a court hearing about wardship. The adult in question was very worried about it and did not necessarily want it. The family wanted to support him in his decision. I am very anxious to get this legislation through because so many people are waiting on it. What I found quite interesting was that the judge in the case who was very enlightened because he knew that this legislation was coming advised them to look for an adjournment until the legislation was brought forward in order that they would not have to be subject to wardship. In the circumstances, this was the wisdom of Solomon. Sometimes we do not realise that when we are developing legislation, so many people will be affected by it in such a fundamental way. Sometimes we think that, apart from what we publicise, nobody else takes any notice of or interest in what we do in here. In this case, they rang the ward of courts office and when they asked the woman at the other end about this legislation, she told them that if they had said that to her last year, she would have told them that she had been listening to it for seven years but that the legislation was actually on the way. We sometimes forget this. The ward of courts issue is a serious one for people and it is not always necessary. There are other ways of managing our affairs other than by the court and that paternalistic approach. We are looking at the amendment and I would appreciate it if it was not pressed as I promise to come back on it.
Comment on this
I did not have a chance to say it, but I do recognise that there is a huge number of amendments. We were very critical of other pieces of legislation where amendments were being forward that had not been sought by an awful lot of people. It is important to acknowledge that a lot of the amendments have been sought by groups and I commend the fact that they are being taken on board. I am glad to hear the Minister of State say she is looking at this amendment. Therefore,I will withdraw it and reserve the right to bring it back on Report Stage if we do not see a suitable amendment that is to our liking.
Comment on this
I also welcome that fact. I know that Sarah and Fiona from Inclusion Ireland are here. I know that Sarah has been here from the beginning of the debate. As this is an issue she has raised with me, it is welcome that the Minister of State has said she is seeking legal advice.
SECTION 46
Section 48 agreed to.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment agreed to.
Comment on this
This goes back to an issue we discussed earlier. It is about advance health care directives. The Minister said she would come back to this issue. I understand sections 59 and 60 relate to it. I do not know if the Minister of State wishes to discuss it now or later, but I want to raise it because it is proposed to delete the section that deals with it. I wish to raise those concerns that I expressed earlier about the provisions among health service users who believe their human rights will not be respected on the same basis as others. I understand there are up to 400 individuals who are lobbying on this issue and specifically affected by it. My understanding is that ten groups met the Department. I have raised this issue, which is the source of very serious concern.
I understand the Minister of State has said she might not agree with the issue, but as she has done with previous issues, I have noted that she has listened to almost all the amendments so far and is at least willing to take it on board. Without going over what I said earlier, there is the same issue. There are very serious concerns about advance health care directives to the effect that if somebody puts something in an advance health care directive about treatments they do not wish to have, it will be recognised in the competencies. I ask the Minister of State to take another look at this issue also.
Comment on this
The Senator and I have known each other for very long and I am not in the habit of saying I will do something when I will not. In this instance, we have listened very carefully. I have read material and the officials have engaged in extensive listening exercises. This is specifically about people with mental health difficulties. I still continue to assert that this is not the right legislation for it. We can have the debate as to whether we should have mental health legislation, although it is a little late in the evening for it because that is a different argument. Should it be combined with general health legislation? That is an issue for another day.
I am not saying people with a mental health difficulty should not have advance health care directives. Far from it, I have always believed they should have them, but that is very specific in respect of a particular condition and that condition is dealt with under different legislation. That is really the point I am making. I am not convinced by the arguments otherwise. It is not because I have not listened because I have. I have read everything that has come to us. The officials have met for an extensive period of time. All of the advice is that the issue should be dealt with under the Mental Health Act. We will deal with it under the revised Mental Health legislation. Advance health care directives will be included also.
Comment on this
I welcome the Minister of State's response, but there are people who believe the Mental Health Act is being used as an excuse to exclude advance health care directives from the Bill. They believe the deletion of sections 59 and 60 should allow for that issue to be addressed. An election is pending and legislation has been coming through the Houses at a fast pace, but at the same time there are concerns that the change might not happen and this issue will not be addressed until further down the road. That is the reason I am being asked to raise the matter with the Minister of State. If sections 59 and 60 are being deleted, why can we not include the measure into this Bill to copperfasten it? If it is the Minister of State's belief that it needs to be addressed, it should be included in the Bill. I will not labour the point, but I have been asked to raise it.
Comment on this
I understand that. I know that there is an election coming. There is no avoiding it, but I do not think it is a good enough reason for doing something that I do not believe should happen. We have the general scheme of the new mental health Bill. There was a comprehensive review and the legislation will be introduced. I accept that it will not be done in this Government's term, but it will be addressed because it is being worked on. These things do move along. A change of Government does not change these things and they progress. I do not believe the measure should be included in the Bill. It could be more comprehensively dealt with in the mental health Bill. I might be wrong, but that is my belief.
Comment on this
We might consider this issue again. I reserve the right to table Report Stage amendments to that effect.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 194, 196 to 198, inclusive, 200, 204 to 210, inclusive, 212, 214 to 231, inclusive, 233 and 234 are related and may be discussed together.
Comment on this
Amendment No. 213 has already been discussed with the amendments in group 4.
Comment on this
In that case we will take amendment No. 213 out of the group. Is that agreed? Agreed.
Comment on this
God bless Senator Marie Moloney's eyesight.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 194, 196 to 198 inclusive, 200, 204 to 210 inclusive, 212, 214 to 231 inclusive, 233 and 234 are all related to the provisions on advance health care directives in Part 8. The proposed amendments do not involve any substantive change to the underlying policy of these provisions. Rather, they are all minor technical amendments to refine the language in the sections in question in order to clarify more precisely the intention of the relevant provisions on advance health care directives or to ensure greater consistency with similar provisions in other Parts of the Bill.
Comment on this
Amendments Nos. 195, 201 to 203, inclusive and 211 are related and may be discussed together.
Comment on this
I ask that amendment No. 211 be removed from the grouping. The other amendments cover constitutional matters, while amendment No. 211 deals with an issue of conscience. The amendments are in no way connected or related.
Comment on this
We will discuss amendments Nos. 195 and 201 to 203, inclusive. Is that agreed? Agreed.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 195:
In page 74, line 34, after “directive” to insert the following:
“other than a request for the provision or continuance of artificially delivered nutrition and hydration”.
I did not have an opportunity to welcome the Minister of State and I do so now. Perhaps the Cathaoirleach might assist me with a matter. Senator David Norris and I had intended to move Senator Feargal Quinn's amendment No. 23. We did not get to do that, but it does seem that the issues he raised are important in terms of the Irish Kidney Association or recognised donor registration bodies. Does my adverting to the issue at this point act in ease of his reintroducing the matter on Report Stage? I realise we did not move the amendment and I am anxious that it will not be impossible to move it on Report Stage for want of a discussion on Committee Stage. Do I understand the procedures of the House correctly? I am anxious that Senator Feargal Quinn not miss his opportunity to raise the issue on Report Stage.
Comment on this
Amendment No. 23. I had intended to move it on Senator Feargal Quinn's behalf, as had Senator David Norris.
Comment on this
I have been following the proceedings carefully.
Comment on this
It may be. My understanding is that if an issue arises from a discussion on Committee Stage, it can be raised on Report Stage. I hope what I have said will suffice as such a discussion because the issues Senator Feargal Quinn raised were very important and it is important that they be discussed. He raised the issues in the amendment and I raise them now.
Comment on this
What I am asking you is, whether by virtue of adverting to it now, it will be possible for Senator Feargal Quinn to move the amendment on Report Stage because I am now bringing it into discussion on Committee Stage?
Comment on this
I know that the section has been agreed to, but I am bringing forward the issue at this point and asking whether Senator Feargal Quinn will be in a position to table the amendment on Report Stage.
Comment on this
I am just asking the question whether, by virtue of raising it now and touching on the importance of the issue during Committee Stage, Senator Feargal Quinn will, therefore, be in a position to table the amendment on Report Stage.
Comment on this
He is not raising the amendment. He is referring back to it.
Comment on this
It was amendment No. 23 on page 3 of the amendment list. It was not moved. My query-----
Comment on this
The amendment was not discussed at any level and it was not even part of an adjacent discussion.
Comment on this
I do not suggest we debate it, except to the extent I have now discussed it. What I am wondering is whether that will suffice for the purpose of Senator Feargal Quinn bringing it up again on Report Stage.
Comment on this
I would like to go back to a Bill that was discussed four weeks ago. May I do that?
Comment on this
I thank all of the experts on Standing Orders present.
Amendment No. 195 amends section 67 on page 74 of the Bill which currently provides that an advance health care directive is legally binding only when it relates to the directive maker's refusal of treatment. Section 67(3)(b) states a request for a specific treatment is not legally binding. This means that every decision against life, so to speak, no matter how unwise or unsound - to use the terms employed in section 66(2) - is granted greater legal protection than every decision in favour of life, even where the directive maker simply seeks to have food and water provided through artificial means. Advance health care directives are inapplicable in the administration of basic care but, according to section 68, artificially-delivered nutrition and hydration do not constitute basic care.
Many Irish people very reasonably hold that the provision of food and water, regardless of how they are delivered, is part of basic care. No doubt at least some of those people would want their advance health care directives to reflect that very reasonable conviction on their part. While the decision in the 1996 ward of court case probably precludes basic care from being defined in the Bill as incorporating artificially-delivered nutrition and hydration, that is not really the point because it does not prevent the Oireachtas from treating advance health care directives which request the provision of food and water as legally binding.
The Bill, as it stands, clearly favours life-ending wishes over life saving wishes. Denying citizens the right to make a health care directive requiring the provision of food and water, whether delivered artificially or naturally, undermines their right to life and freedom of conscience. This is not a constitutional claim as such - one might argue that it is a moral claim - but constitutionally there must be a question mark over the Bill on this point, however speculative it is to argue. It seems odd that people are not supported by the legislation in seeking to vindicate their right to life by the provision artificially of food and hydration. I would not claim to be definitive, but I argue that this is constitutionally questionable.
Some might argue that to provide an advance health care directive which mandates the provision artificially of food and hydration in a certain situation could put huge pressure on medical resources, but I do not think we want to go down the road of medical resource arguments.
Comment on this
Then why is the Senator doing that?
Comment on this
The amendment I propose is restricted to requests for artificially delivered nutrition and hydration. With regard to any possible objection that this would involve unnecessary burdens for the patient towards the end of his or her life, it would be entirely possible to add necessary qualifiers to the provision I propose. For example, it could be indicated that the guarantee to continue or provide artificially delivered nutrition and hydration would be inapplicable in the final stages of a terminal illness. The proposal is to have restricted application, but I would be grateful if the Minister of State would consider it.
Comment on this
I wish to speak to amendment No. 203 which proposes to delete section 68(7). Advance health care directives are a welcome addition to the Bill and will provide a way for people to articulate their will and preference for a later date in which their views may become unclear or unknown. This can be useful for treatment decisions in end of life cases, mental health crises and dealing with age related disabilities. A coalition of organisations in the fields of mental health, disability and older people have consistently called for advance health care directives to apply equally in the general health and mental health contexts. Too often mental health issues are seen as separate and different and the same rights and protections are not extended to mental health service users as they are to others. The addition of section 68(7) to the Bill has, therefore, come as a surprise to me since it effectively excludes the use of advance health care directives when a person is involuntarily detained and treated under the Mental Health Act 2001. The provision is unfortunate because it is precisely when people-----
Comment on this
On a point of order, the Senator is not speaking to the amendment.
Comment on this
I am speaking to amendment No. 203.
Comment on this
The Senator is speaking to the section.
Comment on this
No, I am speaking to amendment No. 203.
Comment on this
This would cause it to be two sections.
Comment on this
Perhaps if Senator Jim Walsh was to check, he would see that I am talking about section 68(7). I am speaking to amendment No. 203.
The provision is unfortunate because it is precisely when people are treated under the Mental Health Act 2001 that they will wish to have an advance health care directive to take effect. The use of differential standards for treatment decisions during involuntary detention perpetuates stigma and limits the use of advance health care directives in mental health care settings. Stigma and discrimination have been identified as the greatest barriers to recovery. Even if advance health care directives are legally binding during voluntary admission, the threat of coercion limits the impact of decisions.
A national study by Irish mental health service users has found an urgent need for legally binding advance health care directives during involuntary detention to promote respect for treatment preferences. Many clinicians assume that if advance health care directives are made binding in the mental health context, hundreds of people will make blanket refusals of all medical treatment, yet there is no evidence to support this. Advance health care directives can actually increase treatment engagement rather than increase refusals. In an Irish national survey the majority of mental health service users stated they would be more willing to adhere to treatment if they had an advance health care directive, suggesting the measure may lead to an increase in treatment engagement rather than refusals. The international evidence also suggests this. The fear that individuals would refuse all treatment, or be left untreated, often results in limitations on advance health care directives during involuntary detention. The research suggests mental health service users are more interested in using advance health care directives to express a preference for a particular treatment over others, rather than using the directive to refuse all treatments. To make a blanket denial of these preferences and concerns when a person is involuntarily detained, at precisely the moment such directives become important, is unjust. That is why I suggest amendment No. 203.
I will now turn to amendment No. 201. I am very surprised and concerned that an informed and considered decision to end life-sustaining treatment should be viewed as equivalent to a suicide attempt. To put these issues together is unbelievable and, having worked on the Joint Committee on Health and Children's Report on End of Life and Palliative Care in Ireland and having looked at the issue extensively, I find it objectionable.
Comment on this
I support amendment No. 203 proposed by Senators Jillian van Turnhout and Katherine Zappone. I have outlined my reasons previously which are similar in vein to those in respect of advance health care directives. There are concerns that the impending legislative provisions on advance health care directives discriminate against anybody who may experience mental ill health. Given that one in four Irish people experiences some form of mental health difficulty during their his or her, this issue could apply to any of us. It is considered by a number of experts that the proposed legislation blatantly excludes the use of legally binding advance health care directives in the treatment choices of those subject to involuntary detention under the Mental Health Act 2001. These experts believe it is clearly discriminatory under the EU Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which the Government is planning to ratify in the near future.
The use of differential standards reinforces stigma and the notion that the preferences of individuals with mental health conditions are not respected on an equal basis with others. There were 80,457 admissions to Irish psychiatric units and hospitals in 2013, of which 11% were involuntary. Similar legislation in the United States was litigated as discriminatory under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the case of Hargrave v. Vermont in 2003. After filing a legal challenge against differential treatment in the United States Court of Appeals Ms Nancy Hargrave asserted:
It seems fundamentally unfair that I choose or refuse chemotherapy which is saving my life, but I do not have the same right to choose or refuse psychiatric medication.
The findings of a national study published in The Journal of Ethics on medicine and public health suggest there is an urgent need for legally binding advance health care directives for those who have been involuntarily detained under the mental health legislation in order to provide a sense of control over future treatment, tenhance recovery and promote trust and respect. There is a compelling argument. The Minister of State has said she has looked at the issue in great detail. There seems to be quite a body of evidence internationally that supports the call. There are many people in Ireland also making that call and it warrants further debate and thought before Report Stage. I support the call to have it looked at again.
Comment on this
Senator Jillian van Turnhout's amendment has definite merit. I have worked with the mental health services for nearly 30 years.
It is anomalous to preclude a person suffering from major mental illness from the safety of a health care directive. Major, enduring and relapsing mental illnesses are often accompanied by loss of insight by the person suffering from the condition and it is at that very moment pre-planning by that person is a human rights issue. In all other areas of the mental health services we try to encourage a collaborative and team approach which includes the patient in decision-making. At a time when the patient is least able to collaborate in his or her own treatment we preclude him or her from the protection of the directive. I am very interested in hearing the Minister of State's response to Senator Jillian van Turnhout's worthy amendment.
Comment on this
The Minister of State is in possession, but in keeping with the order of the day, we must report progress.