Judicial Appointments Commission Bill 2017: Committee Stage (Resumed)
Contributions 1–137 of 280. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
No. 71 of 2017 ›
To clarify, amendments Nos. 72 to 77, inclusive, are related. Amendment No. 75 is a physical alternative to No. 74. Amendments Nos. 72 to 77, inclusive, are being discussed together and that has been agreed. Senator McDowell was in possession.
Comment on this
When I reported progress, I had asked the Minister to set out some of the thinking in regard to Senator Bacik's amendment No. 72 and to set out his own attitude to that amendment.
Comment on this
I welcome the Minister. I thank Senators Norris and McDowell for speaking on the Labour Party group of amendments and, in particular, Senator Norris for proposing the amendment. These amendments are somewhat self-explanatory and I will wait to hear the Minister's response. Essentially, they seek to adjust or tweak some of the provisions in section 33 of the Bill around eligibility and qualifications for office, specifically to deal with issues around District Court judges and promotion to the High Court, and whether the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court should be included in section 33(1)(b). Similarly, with regard to the appointment of legal academics to judicial office, they seek a certain tweaking of those provisions.
I propose to adjust these amendments somewhat for Report Stage so I may withdraw them from the House on Committee Stage today. I will also be bringing forward on Report Stage further amendments to section 33 relating to a separate issue. While I will speak on it further when we come to section 33 itself, the separate issue I want to deal with is around the eligibility of in-house counsel to judicial appointment, an issue that was raised with me but too late for me to get amendments in on Committee Stage. It is around the expression "practising barrister" and whether that is aligned with the understanding or definition of "practising barrister" in the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. It is a serious issue and a particular issue in the context of gender balance and judicial appointments, given we in the Labour Party have put forward amendments later in the Bill on the need to ensure gender diversity or, more properly, gender balance in judicial appointments.
I am conscious, from research I and others have done, that many women gravitate towards in-house counsel roles where there are more protections in regard to maternity leave, greater entitlement to leave for childcare purposes and so on. Therefore, it is for traditional reasons and reasons around culture at the Bar and among self-employed persons. I can go into this in more detail when we come to discuss section 33, although it is perhaps not appropriate to speak about it on these amendments.
I will not speak at length on amendments Nos. 72 to 77, inclusive. They are self-explanatory and seek to adjust or make various tweaks to the arrangements currently set out in section 33. I will await the Minister's response.
Comment on this
I acknowledge what Senator Bacik has said. I would be interested in hearing from her on the matter in the discussion on the section or in the course of the amendments, whichever she deems most appropriate.
On the matter of amendment No. 72, which was moved last night in the absence of Senator Bacik and to which she made brief reference, the amendment seeks to delete part of the amendment to section 5 of the 1961 Act which is contained in section 33 of this Bill. I point out that the qualifications and eligibility framework laid down in the statute contain important safeguards to ensure that only appropriately-qualified persons compliant with the appropriate and relevant statutory provisions may be considered for appointment to the Bench and subsequently appointed.
The changes proposed under section 33 make two adjustments to what is the current and existing framework. First, it provides that a judge of the District Court with two years service can be eligible for appointment to the High Court. I emphasise "eligible for" because, listening to some of the debate last night, one would think it was mandatory. This is about eligibility and enabling.
Second, it provides that a legal academic of 12 years standing, with four years practice as a barrister or solicitor, will be eligible for appointment as a judge. Again, we are dealing here with enabling or eligibility factors, rather than the type of mandatory doomsday scenario to which we were feted last evening. While these are reasonably significant changes, I would not regard them as being particularly radical. Section 33 enables the commission to consider applications from persons in those categories and to make recommendations in respect of such persons as it deems appropriate and fit.
The amendment would remove from the Bill the new provision whereby a judge of the District Court who has served for not less than a period of two years will qualify for appointment as a judge of the High Court. I do not accept the amendment. I believe that to do so would be a regressive step and an unfortunate one on the basis that what we are doing is broadening the scope of eligibility rather than introducing any mandatory entitlement.
Section 33(1) amends the 1961 Act so as to address the anomalous situation whereby a judge of the District Court is precluded from being eligible for appointment to the High Court. Specifically, a new paragraph (d) to be inserted in section 5(2) of the 1961 Act will extend that eligibility for appointment to a judge of the District Court with a period of service of two years. As of now, to qualify for appointment to the High Court and, indeed, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, practising barristers and solicitors of not less than 12 years standing may be eligible. Of course, Circuit Court judges of not less than two years standing are also eligible for appointment to the High Court. Practising solicitors and barristers must have practised for a continuous period of two years immediately prior to first-time appointment as a member of the Judiciary.
Sitting District Court judges, however, no matter how long they have sat on the Bench, cannot even be considered as potential appointees to the High Court. Senator McDowell in many respects predicted the reasons for these amendments when he said he was not motivated by intellectual snobbery and that this was not a cause in defence of members of the Bar. We are merely adjusting what I and members of the Judiciary perceive to be an anomalous situation, that is, where sitting district justices, many of whom have long-standing service and expertise, cannot even be considered as potential appointees to the High Court.
I am reminded of a debate in the Oireachtas 20 years ago, about which I would hazard a guess Senator McDowell, then a Deputy, is on the record, if he was not then engaged full time in the Four Courts. There was an active campaign by the Bar to ensure solicitors would not be eligible for membership of the High Court. That law changed many years ago and the prophets of doom were wrong. A number of former solicitors sit on the Bench of the High Court, and many of them are exemplary in the conduct of their work on the Bench.
Section 33 merely corrects an unfairness. It opens up eligibility arrangements for the appointment of district judges to the High Court. It is appropriate, even overdue, and I do not agree it should be undone by way of amendment.
Comment on this
If the Minister is trying to introduce an irrelevant and slightly offensive tone to this debate, he started off on the right foot. He informed the House that I was probably involved in the campaign to prevent solicitors from becoming judges of the High Court, or else that I was too busy in the Law Library to participate in the debate while I was a barrister. If he checks the record, however, he will find I supported the amendment to the law to make solicitors eligible to be members of the High Court. He will also find I was involved in the drafting of the legislation that made solicitors eligible to be members of the High Court, and that I was either Attorney General or Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform when the first solicitors were appointed members of the High Court. If he carefully checks the record, he will find I encouraged solicitors to become members of the High Court. Far be it from how he portrays or imagines it to be, it is the diametric opposite. I was always happy with the idea that solicitors would become members of the High Court.
Although the Minister's memory appears to be fading slightly in this respect, he may recall the only precondition that was set for solicitors to become members of the High Court was that they should have experience of the workings of that court. It might be a strange precondition to apply, but it would be impossible for a barrister to practise for ten or 12 years yet never to have seen the inside of the High Court. He or she would be a very strange barrister.
In the case of the solicitors' profession, on the other hand, of which the Minister was then a member, it would be entirely possible, especially if operating in one of the larger firms in Dublin, to be an eminent solicitor yet never to have seen the inside of the High Court nor to have participated in any High Court litigation in one's life. I have been in the Four Courts in the company of solicitors who had never seen a jury sit in their lives. That is how closeted some solicitors are. I have seen solicitors who, while waiting for another case, attend a jury trial for the first time in their lives, even though they were ten or 20 years in practice.
The law was changed, I was there, I stood over it and I implemented it. I am proud of the people who were appointed on my watch and with my active encouragement to the High Court from the solicitors' profession. I am proud of them not merely because they were pioneers at the time, seeking appointment with the active encouragement of the Minister of the day, but also because they turned out to be exemplary members of the High Court and have served this country well. The implication of the Minister's barbed remarks that I was an opponent of solicitors becoming eligible to be a High Court judge is entirely incorrect. I played a significant role in making it possible and encouraging it to happen.
The Minister also said that based on my remarks yesterday he thought it was somehow mandatory for District Court judges to become High Court appointees. I said nothing of the kind and only wishful thinking could lead the Minister to think I somehow implied it would be mandatory for district judges to become High Court judges. I am capable of reading a section, and I know the distinction between eligibility and the fact that one might or might not be selected. I made it clear, and I reiterate, that I cannot imagine circumstances in which a District Court judge would seek appointment to the District Court Bench.
Comment on this
No, a lawyer. I cannot imagine that a lawyer would seek appointment to the District Court Bench and, within two years, say he or she is in the wrong court and should be in the High Court. A person so philosophically and professionally confused about where his or her forte in law lay would need a great deal of counselling.
If one applies to be a District Court judge, one is applying for a particular form of judicial office. It is an office in which one will exercise local and limited jurisdiction, largely of a summary kind although some complex cases in the family law sector, in particular, are heard and disposed of in the District Court nowadays. I do not accept for one minute, however, that the qualities that would make someone a good District Court judge would make him or her a good High Court judge. I am not saying one could not have those qualities, but if someone opts to be on the District Court, he or she is making an application to the Government for appointment which is based on the proposition that he or she is expressing a preference to be appointed as a judge of the District Court. As we know, a District Court judge is eligible to be promoted to be a Circuit Court judge, who in turn is eligible to be appointed to be a High Court judge.
What this measure is supposed to do is provide for a leapfrog exercise from the District Court to the High Court and I cannot conceive in what circumstances that would be done. It is not a matter of snobbery or anything else; it is a matter of plain common sense. It is extremely unlikely and questionable whether it would be appropriate for such a person after two years in the District Court to say, "I have had enough of this I am going to apply to be appointed to the High Court". I cannot imagine a reasonable person pursuing that career path. However, I can well imagine a judge of the District Court saying he or she would like to be a member of the Circuit Court and serving some time as a member of that court, conducting trials on indictment, jury trials, and being successful in so doing, functioning on a different level from that of the District Court. Eventually he or she would be entitled to say he or she has done several years on the Bench of the Circuit Court and has conducted complicated trials, and if there is to be an appointment to the High Court, particularly on the criminal side or whatever, his or her experience now makes him or her eligible and suitable for that position. That could very easily happen but I cannot see any circumstance in which a District Court judge would want to leapfrog directly from the District Court to the High Court because their years of experience in the District Court would not prepare them for practice in the High Court. They would be cut off from the kind of law which is practised in the High Court to a large extent and would be doing different duties as judges.
I should say also, and it is a prejudice of mine, that I do not believe in too much promotional movement of judges from one court to the other as a defined career path. I do not believe that the way to become Chief Justice is to start off as a District Court judge. That is not correct because it would seriously compromise the independence of the Judiciary if one was effectively to start in the District Court, be promoted to the Circuit Court, have the ambition of going to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and on to the Supreme Court. That is an unnatural progression and is not readily amenable to notions of judicial independence because people would accuse judges of looking over their shoulder on such a promotional career path in respect of the judgments they gave.
Will the Minister explain something that I cannot follow in the text of the Bill? A 'legal academic" suddenly appears in section 45A to be inserted by this amendment. It is defined in subsection (4) as:
a permanent member of the academic staff of an educational establishment who—
(a) teaches one or more subjects in the field of law, or
(b) carries out, or supervises the carrying out, of research in one or more such subjects,
whether or not in conjunction with the carrying on by him or her of administrative duties relevant to that teaching, research or supervision.
A person could, for instance, be teaching business law in a university as a member of permanent staff, or some other form of law, medical law, in the faculty of medicine or whatever, or else could be researching those topics. That is the definition of a legal academic, whether or not the person is also carrying on "administrative duties relevant to that teaching, research or supervision".
Subsection (5) states:
In the case of a person who—
(a) is the head of a faculty immediately before the appointment referred to in subsection (1), the requirements of that subsection and subsection (2) shall be deemed to be satisfied if, within the period of 12 months before the person's becoming the head of that faculty, he or she was either a legal academic of not less than 12 years’ standing (2 of which years shall have been continuous) or the head of another faculty of not less than 4 years' standing (2 of which years shall have been continuous), or
(b) was the head of a faculty at a time other than immediately before the appointment referred to in subsection (1), any period served by him or her as the head of a faculty shall, for the purposes of that subsection and subsection (2), be deemed to be a period served by him or her as a legal academic.
The word "faculty" does not seem to be defined at all and I do not see where the phrase "head of faculty" is coming from or what exactly it means because, for instance, educational establishment is defined as a university to which the 1997 Act applies or the Honorable Society of King's Inns or the Law Society of Ireland. Are there faculties in the Law Society of Ireland and the King's Inns? I am not aware that there are. We are presumably talking about university faculties. I find it difficult to understand why a special provision is being made for somebody who used to be a lecturer or researcher but has gone on to greater things, to be the administrator of a faculty of other people who do that work but who does not do it him or herself. I have deep concerns about that. I do not know why precisely these special provisions are being made for the head of a faculty as distinct from a legal academic. Perhaps somebody would explain that to me. There are faculties in universities. In University College Dublin, UCD, where I am an adjunct professor, believe it or not, the law school is not a faculty. It is located in the faculty of arts. It has some other name now.
Comment on this
Humanities or something like that. Some other phrase is used now. The head of the law school is the dean but the dean is not the head of a faculty. In King's Inns, the dean is not the head of a faculty. I would have to check the rules. As far as I know in TCD, which is a major law school, it is a school.
Comment on this
There is no faculty involved at all. I am bit mystified as to why we are using these terms without definition and why we are making special provision for people who have done that. I can well imagine the head of the law school in Trinity going on if they have faculties in Trinity – I presume they do-----
Comment on this
The Senator is not losing them.
Comment on this
The Senator is not losing them yet.
Comment on this
I am very lenient with Senator Norris. He has made several interruptions. I am just asking him-----
Comment on this
Senator Norris is not at risk of losing his faculties.
Comment on this
This legislation appears to have a governance picture of the law schools in Ireland which is not what happens on the ground. There is a dean of the law school in UCD, an immensely talented woman-----
Comment on this
There is a law school in TCD but I am not clear whether its head is called a dean, and the head of the law school in the college is not the head of the faculty as far as I am aware. Can I have an explanation for this elaborate provision for a job that does not exist in the Law Society of Ireland or in the King's Inns? One might be the head of the humanities faculty or whatever the old arts faculty in UCD is called but I do not know how that is relevant to this Bill. Likewise, I do not know what the position is regarding TCD. Can I have an explanation?
Comment on this
Is it appropriate for me to move my amendment now?
Comment on this
I will discuss it briefly and the Chair can advise me on the right time to move it. Amendment No. 74 relates to the requirement that a legal academic must have continuous practice of four years before being considered for appointment. While we all acknowledge it is important to ensure there is considerable legal experience involved, the requirement is too restrictive. Somebody might be qualified but he or she might not have practised for four continuous years. This raises a number of considerations for the future. Generally, we should be more open to considering the appointment of legal academics, in particular to some of the superior courts where issues might be of a more technical, abstract or academic nature. Experience in that realm could be of great benefit.
People with academic experience are considered for appointment in other jurisdictions and the evidence proves that it works well. Provided the person has qualified as a barrister or solicitor, that he or she qualifies in every other respect and that he or she is a fit and proper person with good experience and knowledge of the law to serve in such a position, it makes sense that he or she would be considered for appointment. I am also taking into account that the current provision might have implications for those who have left practice for a period such as female barristers who have taken a leave of absence at various points for personal reasons. That is the general approach in other jurisdictions and it makes sense. It could be taken into account as we move forward with this legislation. That is what amendment No. 74 seeks to do.
Comment on this
That is a good effort. I appreciate that.
Comment on this
Tá Gaeilge go flúirseach agus blas álainn dílis Protastúnach agam agus ba mhaith liom an Ghaeilge a labhairt go minic i Seanad Éireann. Nuair a bhím ag caint as Gaeilge bíonn eagla mhór ar Fhianna Fáil.
Comment on this
Following that brief excursion into the first national language, which carries supremacy when ruling on constitutional matters, I wish to comment on amendment No. 74. It states, "Subsection (1) shall only apply to a legal academic who has qualified as a barrister or solicitor..." and rules out the four consecutive years of practice. That does not go far enough. I do not see why they must have any experience as either barristers or solicitors. After all, these academics are teaching the barristers and solicitors so presumably they know more about it than the barristers and solicitors. Why not let them at it? There is no reason, other than the closed shop professional school nonsense one gets from both barristers and solicitors from time to time, that they should have to qualify as barristers or solicitors. I reiterate that they are teaching the barristers and solicitors. Is the teacher not as good as the pupil? Of course the teacher is. It is absolute nonsense.
I do not believe the Minister answered Senator McDowell's point regarding a high-flying academic. Why on earth would a high-flying academic want to go to the District Court and deal with people cycling on the pavement? It is an absurdity. I cannot envisage a situation where such an academic would demean himself or herself to seek appointment to the District Court.
Amendment No. 76 deals with section 33(4)(a) and (b) which states: "... (a) teaches one or more subjects in the field of law, or (b) carries out, or supervises the carrying out, of research in one or more such subjects, ...". One or more subjects means the person could teach one subject. That subject could be Roman law, which is not of great use in the courts of Ireland aside from an occasional casual reference. With regard to paragraph (b), "...carries out, or supervises the carrying out, of research in one or more such subjects, ...", supervising research is very different from carrying it out. The amendment differs by stating: "In page 24, to delete lines 15 to 17 and substitute the following: "(a) teaches one or more subjects in the field of law, and ...". The word "and" replaces the word "or". It has the two requirements, including "(b) carries out research, or supervises the carrying out of post-graduate research, ...". It requires a higher stage of academic development. It is a change from any kind of research to postgraduate research.
I support Senator Bacik's amendment, which proposes to delete "continuous" regarding the four years required and insert "cumulative". However, I would be much happier to get rid of the whole thing. What is wrong with teachers? Surely to God a professor of law is good enough to be a judge. A professor of law at a reputable academic institution is teaching people and is the instructor of the judges. Surely the instructors are as good as the "instructees".
Comment on this
I thank the Minister and my colleagues for elaborating on the amendments and raising so many points. I am grateful for the opportunity to have this debate and, as I said, I hope to adjust some of these amendments between now and Report Stage. Listening to the debate helped to clarify my mind on this. I accept the Minister's point about sitting District Court judges, to address amendment No. 72 first. His response was almost entirely directed to that amendment. The calibre of District Court judges has improved enormously, and those judges are currently being promoted to the Circuit Court and from there to the High Court. However, I am also conscious of the motivation for our amendment which is, as Senator McDowell said, that there is a concern about undue emphasis on promotional opportunities within the Judiciary and the compromising effect that can have on judicial independence. That is not to say it has that effect-----
Comment on this
I accept that, which is why I must re-examine the amendment. Perhaps it is too much to remove that provision, as we propose to do in amendment No. 72, but two years may be simply too short. It might be preferable to reformulate the amendment to state four years or the like. I will consider it. Senator McDowell has pointed to the leapfrog issue. Somebody could be a serving District Court judge for five years. I practised in the District Court for years as a junior barrister when I was in practice and some of the most difficult, tricky cases are tried in the District Court and they get little publicity.
There are some quite technical issues, making it quite difficult to practice in the District Court in many ways. I would never underestimate that. If somebody-----
Comment on this
The Senator could have been Chief Justice.
Comment on this
There is an excellent Trinity woman in the form of Chief Justice Susan Denham, I am glad to say.
It is worth reflecting on whether it is sufficient to refer to a five-year period spent as a District Court judge. One might have been President of the District Court, for example, and such an individual certainly should be eligible to go to the High Court. Therefore, I do not believe the leapfrog point is necessarily a good one in all cases. My original purpose in the amendment, to delete all the wording, was too much. We should leave open the possibility, as at present, and tweak it a little further. I am glad to have had the opportunity to debate amendment No. 72.
Amendment No. 73 concerns the eligibility of legal academics. As a legal academic, I have a certain interest in it. What we were really trying to do was tweak the provisions. In amendments Nos. 73 and 75 to 77, inclusive, our intention is to adjust somewhat the requirements on academics' eligibility for appointment to judicial office. I will withdraw the amendments and reconsider them for Report Stage.
Comment on this
Once we have considered them a little more, perhaps.
I wonder about eligibility for the appointment of academics to the District Court and Circuit Court. It seems to be a more appropriate route to the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. I am not, however, wedded to the idea and that is why I am not going to push amendment No. 73 at this stage. I will withdraw it and I may resubmit it for Report Stage.
On amendment No. 75, on substituting "cumulative" for "continuous", the point is important but it could be made in respect of other passages in section 33 as well as line 10 on page 24. I am conscious that "continuous" also appears at line 3 and in subsection (5), at lines 26 and 28. I ask the Minister to consider whether "cumulative" would be preferable to "continuous" in all these cases. I press the point in amendment No. 75 but I am conscious I did not submit amendments in respect of all the references to "continuous" throughout section 33. Therefore, I will come back to this on Report Stage to remedy it if the Minister is not willing to accept the point.
With regard to the substantive point in amendment No. 75, we are suggesting that somebody who has practised as a legal academic for a cumulative period of four years should be eligible. It should not necessarily be a "continuous" period. I am conscious that there may be all sorts of reasons a period of practice might be interrupted — for example, for sabbatical leave spent teaching at an institution abroad, which is very routine and which can be very prestigious and greatly benefit academic research and teaching. It would also benefit the Judiciary. There may be an interruption for reasons associated with childcare and maternity leave, for example. Therefore, the reference to a "continuous" period might be problematic. It would be preferable where the word appears throughout the section to refer instead to "cumulative". That is the substantive point in amendment No. 75.
On amendment No. 76, we are just tightening up the requirement, as Senator Norris pointed out. The amendment seeks the insertion of, "teaches one or more subjects in the field of law", and, "carries out research, or supervises the carrying out of post-graduate research". We are pointing out that it should be postgraduate research. I do not necessarily believe this is the best formulation but we are just trying to put in a reference to postgraduate research.
Amendment No. 77 proposes to change the definition of "university" to which the phrase "educational establishment" applies. Again, I will consider this for Report Stage.
Let me refer to Senators' point on the head of faculty. Senator Ó Domhnaill addresses this in amendment No. 74. As others have said, the language in the legislation is somewhat problematic. In Trinity, for example, we have a law school and a faculty of arts, humanities and social sciences. The head of law is the head of law and not a dean of a faculty or anything like that. I am conscious that the proposed subsection (7) states any reference to the head of faculty shall be construed as a reference to the dean, etc. That deals with the point. I am not quite sure why section 33 refers so much to "head of faculty" in any case. That is the more substantive point. The reference seems quite specific. There are so few law schools in Ireland and so few heads of faculty that it almost sounds somewhat personalised. That is why there is a slight concern.
Comment on this
No, because the proposed subsection (7) implies that "head of faculty", where it appears in the section, shall be construed as a reference to the head of the law school in Trinity's case. In UCD, it is also the head of a school. It is just a global term used to cover all heads of schools. I am just not quite sure why there are so many references in the section. It seems a little clumsy to me. Overall the section could be tightened up and improved.
The Minister kindly said he might accept my points on in-house counsel at this point. I am happy to wait and address them when addressing section 33. The points are also relevant to section 35. Could I make these points because, as I said, I want to reserve the opportunity to submit amendments on Report Stage?
Comment on this
I invite the Senator to make the point.
Comment on this
In the interest of time, I will. These are important points but they were raised with me subsequent to the Bill commencing Committee Stage. Therefore, I could not table amendments on the matter for Committee Stage.
The issue raised appears to involve a somewhat technical oversight, but with potentially serious consequences. It concerns the relationship between this Bill and the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, which precedes this Bill. The serious consequence is that there may be discrimination against practising barristers currently employed as in-house lawyers because the legislation may treat them differently and put them at something of a disadvantage by comparison with solicitors doing exactly the same work in-house.
Let me explain why the issue arises. The expression "practising barrister" in the legislation that governs eligibility for judicial appointment — principally the Courts and Court Officers Act 1961, referred to in section 33, and also the Legal Services Regulation Act — is not defined and is not aligned with the new definition of "practising barrister" contained in the 2015 Act. As a result — the point has been made to me and I am still working through it — barristers employed as lawyers in an in-house capacity may not be regarded as being in practice for the purpose of eligibility for judicial appointment while solicitors working side by side with them may be eligible to apply provided they retain their certificates of practice.
I have canvassed a number of in-house lawyers on this. It is certainly a matter of real concern to many. It is a serious issue, particularly for many women who in order to achieve a work–life balance or for another reason left the Bar, in particular, because it is more precarious and involves more self-employment, to practise law in-house or in the State sector. The view that they should be eligible to apply for a judicial appointment is very much welcomed. That is one reform that is very welcome in the Bill.
Let me examine the technical point. Section 2 of the Legal Services Regulation Act has a broad definition of "practising barrister". I believe that section has been commenced, with the role of practising barrister now established under the Legal Services Regulation Act. This means barristers practising in-house will be legally recognised as practising their profession. That should deal with the point but it seems the section 2 definition is applicable only for the purposes of the 2015 Act.
I seek clarification on whether that definition can apply within this Bill given that it seems to be the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, as amended, that sets out the eligibility criteria for judicial appointment. The 1961 Act does not define "practising barrister" as an expression. In a 1981 case, Walshe v. Murphy, Irish Reports. Vol. 275, the Supreme Court held that a practising barrister is a person who has been called to the Bar and offers himself or herself at hazard to take work. It does not include a barrister employed in-house. That is clearly superseded by the 2015 Act. Unless, however, this Bill specifically adopts the new definition of "practising barrister"-----
Comment on this
Has the Senator the definition from the 2015 Act?
Comment on this
I should have brought the definition. I am sorry. I am reading from the note I have been given. It is from a constituent.
Comment on this
I can get it anyway before we have considered these sections.
Comment on this
I am told the section 2 definition from the 2015 Act has a broad definition of "practising barrister", to include employed barristers engaged in the provision of legal services. I understand the Act has now been commenced, but only very recently because the Legal Services Regulatory Authority has had to establish a roll of practising barristers. It is only as a result of this that the section 2 definition applies.
I understand barristers practising in-house will become legally recognised as practising their profession. Again, I apologise for not having all the detail. I can certainly check whether the provision has been commenced. The definition is the preferable one. The question is whether it applies specifically within sections 33 and 35 of this Bill.
If we do not adopt the 2015 Act definition, it is arguable that only practising barristers within the meaning of the 1961 Act, as interpreted in the Walshe v. Murphy case would apply, the effect being that barristers working in-house would have less eligibility or would appear to be ineligible compared with solicitors doing exactly the same job in the same place. Clearly, that is not the intention of this Bill.
It may be dealt with elsewhere in the Bill but it has certainly been suggested to me that it is an oversight that could easily be fixed to ensure that the term "practising barrister" is simply defined consistently across the legislation. The issue raised with me by an individual certainly shows the difficulty with this Bill and this body of legislation, and the need to ensure consistency across them. Will the issue fix itself once the authority is fully operational and the role of practising barrister is up and running? Possibly but, in the interests of certainty, it would be preferable to have a clear consistency and a clear adoption of the 2015 Act definition.
In the interests of saving time, this point is also relevant when we will come to debate section 35. In particular, subsection (5), which is very much related to section 33, states: "the Commission shall have regard [...] to the nature and extent of the practice of the person concerned in so far as it relates to his or her personal conduct of proceedings in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court whether as an advocate or as a solicitor instructing counsel in such proceedings or both". This section 35(5) provision appears firmly based on a traditional division of the professions. Again, the question is how does it affect in-house lawyers, whether originally barristers or solicitors, or either continuing with practising certificates as solicitors or continuing on the role of practising barristers. Again, we need to future-proof sections 33 and 35 to ensure that both provisions take account of in-house lawyers and to ensure there is no disparity of treatment as between those in-house lawyers who are trained as barristers or who are trained as solicitors.
That is the specific issue that has been raised with me. I am conscious it has been a matter of concern for quite a number of people and that it may have an impact more particularly upon women. However, clearly it is a more general issue about in-house lawyers, both barristers and solicitors, the need to ensure that the legislation applies consistently to both and that there is consistency across this Bill, the 2015 Act and the earlier 1961 Act. I am grateful to the Minister for dealing with this point now. I will not have to repeat it when we come to deal with section 35 but, clearly, it is relevant to both sections.
Comment on this
I want to refer to the District Court on foot of some comments that were made. I concur with Senator Bacik regarding the work that is done in the District Court. I practised as a solicitor for many years in the District Court and far from being demeaning to high-flying academics, some of the most complex and difficult family law matters, of which I have had experience, are dealt with at District Court level. Many legal academics would like to practise in the District Court. The fact that complex family law matters are dealt with in the District Court is another issue and perhaps they could be dealt with in dedicated family law courts-----
Comment on this
-----but that is a completely separate issue. Currently, District Court practice can be very complex, and very valuable work is being done there. Therefore, I do not believe any high-flying legal academics would be demeaning themselves by applying to be a judge in the District Court. Some complex and very difficult issues such as guardianship, domestic violence and access are dealt with in the District Court. I just wanted to put that on the record.
Comment on this
I am conscious when I speak on this Bill that I am among some particularly eminent legal minds. I am genuinely appreciative and in listening mode when it comes to what those Members have said about my amendment.
Comment on this
The Senator is not too bad himself.
Comment on this
I do not know about that but go raibh maith agat. I am listening and it is worthwhile hearing those Senators' views on it. I am not at a great divergence from Senator Norris's thinking on it. I heard what he said about amendment No. 74 and having four years experience in practice. I agree with everything he said about the wherewithal and ability of legal academics, and in this amendment I was seeking to bolster that with a degree of practical experience. That is all it seeks to do. It does not seek to take from anyone's ability.
I hope I did not come across as being facetious because I appreciate Senator Norris's intervention, as Gaeilge, in the mother tongue. I had a cheeky thought, which is something I am sure the Minister would dread, that if Senators Norris and McDowell had made all their contributions in both English and Irish, what point would we be at in dealing with the Bill?
Comment on this
The late former Senator Pól Ó Foighil made a submission in English and the next morning he came in and made the same submission, as Gaeilge, for two hours. That was a filibuster and a half.
Comment on this
I agree regarding academics and the important role they play. It is hard to get an absolute fix in that regard. I am sure Senator Norris would consider what he said was an oversight and that he would want to withdraw his comments regarding the work of the District Court being demeaning. Its work is extremely important. I am sure the President of the District Court would be very upset if he does not withdraw those comments.
Comment on this
In the first instance, I acknowledge and welcome what Senator McDowell said and his placing on the record his acknowledgement of the importance of the eligibility of solicitors for consideration for the High Court. I accept, without equivocation, what he said. Mind you, I was minded to commence my contribution today in view of the Senator's comments last night when he stated at length, and has continued to state today, his very strong view of the unsuitability of a judge of the District Court for eligibility for elevation to the High Court, having regard to the fact that most members of the District Court Bench have formerly practised as solicitors. I felt that Senator McDowell was being consistent but he was not. I am pleased now that he has placed on record his work of almost 20 years ago and I acknowledge it.
Comment on this
Senator Norris, we are trying to get through this as speedily as possible. The Senator is not helping matters by interrupting the Minister.
Comment on this
The Senator is not exclusively interrupting the Minister. He seems to be interrupting everybody.
Comment on this
Senator McDowell spoke at length about section 33(5), the purpose of which is to consider the fact that a head of faculty may not at the time of appointment meet what would be the precise definition of a legal academic. Subsection (5) ensures that this person who may, in effect, be the most suitable person for appointment is not ruled out of consideration.
I note the Senator did not mention subsection (7). Senator Bacik was right in her remarks on that subsection, which seems to deal with Senator McDowell's query regarding the apparent different arrangements in different colleges, with having a faculty, being a department or a group of teachers or a group of academics in one college, a faculty being a department in another, and a reference to a head of faculty, director or dean, which was mentioned. These have been included in subsection (7), which I believe will meet the Senators' concern regarding eligibility.
I thank Senator Bacik. I am very interested in the point she makes. The Senator indicated that she is prepared to look further at the wording she has put forward in her amendments, with a view to addressing further some issues on Report Stage. I would also be very happy in seeing if we could reach a meeting of minds. The Senator made a number of important points and, while this probably will not lead me to accept her amendments, having regard to what she stated, she probably would not expect me to do so. She made a number of points that I would certainly be prepared to consider further.
On amendment No. 73 and the proposed new section 45A to be inserted into the 1961 Act, this provides for an initial basis for qualification for appointment as a judge, opening up eligibility for appointment to a legal academic of not less than 12 years' standing who, immediately before such appointment, has been employed as a legal academic for a continuous period of at least two years. In addition, under the terms of the new section 48A, such a legal academic must be a barrister or solicitor at the time of being appointed as a judge and must have practised as a barrister or solicitor for a continuous period of not less than four years. Similar requirements with some modification to take account of the role apply in the case of a person who is deemed to be a head of faculty. Amendment No. 73 removes reference to both the Circuit Court and the District Court. The proposed new section 45A(1) would confine the scope of qualification by a legal academic for appointment only to the three superior courts. I am not sure if Senator Bacik meant that but it is what we have in front of us. I do not see an immediate reason, provided the academic reaches the level of competence or experience that the section contains, that a legal academic might not wish to be considered for appointment to either of the lower courts. That is why I disagree with Senator McDowell. He makes very strident expressions as to the disposition of legal academia. Perhaps he is right but what we are doing here is merely broadening the eligibility. I am not sure Senator McDowell can speak for all academia in the manner in which he does.
Comment on this
There may well be legal academics who are especially suited to be appointed from time to time, particularly in the context of their experience or level of expertise. In any event, I would be prepared to come back to this issue with Senator Bacik.
I have an open mind on amendment No. 75. The proposed new section 45A, which deals with academics, relates to section 33(3) of the Bill, which provides for qualification in these cases only of a legal academic who at the time of appointment is a barrister or solicitor practising for a period of four years. Senator Bacik wishes to change the reference in the case of a barrister in practice from "continuous" to "cumulative". I think the Senator makes an important point. Let us see if we can reach agreement on Report Stage. It is an interesting point and I do not have an immediate disagreement with it. I do acknowledge what Senator Bacik has said to the effect that it may require further consideration. I would be happy to have people engage on that issue.
Senator Bacik has stated that amendment No. 76 may require tweaking on Report Stage. As it stands, the existing subsection provides that a legal academic means a permanent member of staff of an educational establishment, which is defined elsewhere, who teaches one or more subjects in the field of law or who carries out or supervises the carrying out of research in one or more such subjects. Senator Bacik wishes to replace "or" with "and" and add the term "postgraduate" so the reference is now to "postgraduate research". Having listened to the Senator, my feeling is that the overall effect here is probably to make it more difficult for a legal academic to get over the line. I am not really sure if that is what is intended by Senator Bacik but I would imagine not.
Comment on this
I am concerned that the tightening of the text might result in matters being somewhat more unduly restrictive and I am not sure that is the point the Senator makes. If that is the result, I would be concerned. If it is not the result, my inclination is to accept it but I would not wish there to be an unintended consequence of restriction.
In respect of amendment No. 77, Senator Bacik wishes to delete the reference to King's Inns and the Law Society from the meaning of "educational establishment", which would restrict the meaning to a university in the ordinary sense, if I may use the word "ordinary" in the presence of Senator Norris. In any event, I am not really certain that this is any advance at all. I have doubts about the necessity or desirability of limiting or restricting on the basis that I do not see a reason that membership of the academic staff of the King's Inns or the Law Society would not amount to a qualification of a person.
Comment on this
Provided, of course, that other conditions of application were met. I acknowledge what appears to be agreement on the part of Senator Norris. I am not inclined to accept the proposed change in this instance.
If I may return briefly to Senator Ó Donnghaile's amendment No. 74, it would have the effect of removing two important elements from the requirements for eligibility of legal academics. It would remove the requirement to be a solicitor or barrister at the time of appointment, and it would remove the requirement of a practical experience of the courts over a number of years, whether that be continuous or cumulative. The Bill stipulates a period of four years. I am not inclined to accept the amendment on the basis that I do acknowledge that the Bill has evolved somewhat from the general scheme published two years ago. In the general scheme, head 26(3) proposed to enable a legal academic of not less than 12 years' standing who qualified as a barrister or solicitor to be considered for appointment regardless of whether that person had practised at all as a solicitor or a barrister. In the proposed new section 45A we are opening up eligibility to a legal academic of not less than 12 years' standing, provided that such a legal academic is a barrister or solicitor upon their being appointed and has practised as a barrister or solicitor for a continuous period of not less than four years.
Similar requirements for the role apply in the case of a person who might be a head or dean of faculty. The reason for the departure from what was in the general scheme to what we have now was a feeling that it might have been more desirable to ensure legal academics appointed to the Bench had an appropriate level of experience of the practice and procedure of the court. Senator McDowell referred to this early in the debate in the context of the importance of having that practical experience and being knowledgeable of the procedure of the court. The practising qualifier is an important additional element with which I am not disposed to dispense. I do not see a wholly convincing argument for the amendment but I appreciate the intention behind it. I invite Senators McDowell and Bacik, both of whom have considerable practical experience, to go as far as to agree with me on the point I make in that regard.
Comment on this
I thank the Minister for his comprehensive response. He did not respond to me on the other point about in-house lawyers but I am happy to wait for that.
Comment on this
We can return to that.
On the amendments, I welcome the widening of eligibility for appointments to judicial office to include legal academics, which is an important and positive reform. In putting amendments forward, Senator Ó Donnghaile and I are trying to ensure the section works, that it is not too cumbersome and so on. Specific criteria for eligibility generally are also welcome, and I note what Senator McDowell said about the appointment of solicitors and so forth.
On amendment No. 72, I am grateful to the Minister for indicating he is willing to re-examine this, as am I. I indicated I will withdraw that amendment and resubmit it on Report Stage to see whether a better approach can be taken. It is too hasty to delete the provision as I had suggested in the amendment and, therefore, I will withdraw it.
On amendment No. 73, I take Senator Clifford-Lee's point, which is similar to my point about District Court practice. She is quite right about family court practice. I did a good deal of childcare work in the District Courts, in what used to be known as the health board or HSE courts, where complex legal issues are raised routinely. I also did much criminal work in the District Courts, where significant decisions are made daily about locking people up and detaining them in custody for some time. On reflection, I was wrong to limit academic appointments and to rule out the Circuit and District Courts. I do not intend, therefore, to move the amendment.
On amendment No. 75, I am again grateful to the Minister for stating his open mind to the question of continuous versus cumulative practice. This issue is more relevant to practising solicitors as it is easier to take time out without losing practice if one is employed by a solicitors' firm. Where one is working on a self-employed basis as a barrister, it is clear that a continuous period may be necessary to build up a practice. It depends on the nature of the practice, however, and someone could be abroad on sabbatical for a year and still pick up practice on his or her return. I stand by my point, therefore, that continuous practice might be too cumbersome and cumulative might be preferable, but I will not move that amendment on the basis that the Minister indicated he will consider the matter. I will also have to reconsider it because we should have tabled amendments, which refer to all the places in the text of section 33 where the word "continuous" is used rather than only one.
I do not intend to move amendment No. 76, which would make the requirement unduly restrictive. Nonetheless, it might be worth tabling a different amendment on Report Stage with a reference to postgraduate research, which might be significant. I will not move it in its current format because the intention is not to make it unduly restrictive for legal academics to seek judicial appointment.
I also do not intend to move amendment No. 77. I was wrong to remove a reference to King's Inns and the Law Society, and I am grateful to the Minister for making that point.
It is clear this legislation must be read alongside the 2015 Act and the changes to legal education envisaged in that. We must be mindful of that, and by "we", I mean those of us in opposition who are tabling amendments as well as those engaged in formulating the legislation. I have indicated what I will do with the amendments but I am conscious we have not come to each of them and that I will have to deal with them formally. I reserve my right on Report Stage to return to them, and I await the Minister's response to the point about in-house lawyers, which is a separate point to these amendments but which arises out of sections 33 and 35.
Comment on this
I assume she has no intention of reintroducing it on Report Stage. It would be complete nonsense to exclude the Honorable Society of King's Inns and the Law Society, which are the two premier educational establishments for the legal profession. I was going to say I doubt the Senator read the amendment before she submitted it but I am sure she had. It is possible she did not realise the repercussions of it. It would be a nonsense and I am glad she will not move it.
Subsection (4) of the new section 45A, which will be inserted in the 1961 Act by section 33(4), on the definition of "legal academic", states:
Without prejudice to subsection (5), in this section ‘legal academic’ means a permanent member of the academic staff of an educational establishment who—
(a) teaches one or more subjects in the field of law, or
(b) carries out, or supervises the carrying out, of research in one or more such subjects,
whether or not in conjunction with the carrying on by him or her of administrative duties relevant to that teaching, research or supervision.
The lines (a) and (b) are separated by the word "or", which implies there is a natural division. It also implies one could carry out or supervise the carrying-out of research in one or more subjects without teaching. I have never come across this, and I taught in the University of Dublin, Trinity College, for 30 years. I never came across a situation where a permanent member of the academic staff simply carried out or supervised research. I put it to the Minister that the criteria are clearly separated, which suggests an academic could do nothing other than supervise research, but that is simply not the practical situation. I ask him, therefore, to reconsider that provision.
It also seems the final two lines are redundant because they state, "whether or not in conjunction with the carrying on by him or her of administrative duties relevant to that teaching, research or supervision". Who raised this? Why should it be there at all? Nobody is talking about it, and I do not see why the carrying-on of administrative duties should be referred to at all. It can just be left out. If it states "whether or not", that means we will ignore it and have nothing to do with this administrative stuff. Why then is it inserted at all? I do not see the reason for it.
Comment on this
I hope Senator Norris will not take offence at this, but I must agree that his claim that high-flying academics will demean themselves by becoming judges of the District Court is slightly unfortunate.
Comment on this
As he is not disposed to withdrawing that phrase, I must express my disagreement with it because the position of district judge is an important constitutional office in our judicial system. The District Courts and the Circuit Courts may be courts of local and limited jurisdiction, but nobody demeans oneself by becoming a judge in any of those courts. When the Senator used the phrase "high-flying academic", he probably had professors in mind who are unlikely to say at some stage of their career that they would give up being a professor and turn instead to being a judge in the District Court. It sounds unlikely but, as the Minister emphasised, it is purely a matter of eligibility. If someone was eligible to be a High Court judge, it seems remarkable he or she would be ineligible to be a District Court judge, but I accept the Minister's point.
I am not quite clear why someone would want to do that.
In early 2002, when I occupied the position of Attorney General, and John O’Donoghue was Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, legislation was passed to provide for solicitors to become judges of the High Court. At that time, the Legislature specifically provided in the Act, in section 8, that "in the case of an appointment to the office of ordinary judge of the Supreme Court or of ordinary judge of the High Court, has an appropriate knowledge of the decisions, and an appropriate knowledge and appropriate experience of the practice and procedure, of the Supreme Court and the High Court". That is still the law of the land and will stand to be repealed by this statute because the JAAB provisions will be swept away. That provision was designed to ensure that while someone could be a practising barrister or solicitor, it might be the case that they might never have darkened the door of either the High Court or Supreme Court at all. In 2002, the Legislature said that if a person wished to be appointed to either of those courts, that the JAAB would have to be of the opinion that the person being recommended had an appropriate knowledge of the decisions and an appropriate experience of the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court and High Court.
We have not reached the idea of an in-house solicitor or barrister, to which Senator Bacik referred. There is no doubt that it is complicated but it would be possible for someone to be the in-house solicitor of a building society and to have never seen the Four Courts in his or her life. Under the current JAAB legislation, the board was precluded from recommending people, be they barristers or solicitors, for appointment to the High Court or the Supreme Court, as then was – the Court of Criminal Appeal did not exist then – unless they had what was provided for in law. They had to have “an appropriate knowledge of the decisions," and, therefore, they had to be learned in the case law of those courts and, second, they had to have "an appropriate knowledge and appropriate experience of the practice and procedure, of the Supreme Court and the High Court". Senators Boyhan and Craughwell and I seek to maintain this requirement in section 35, so that it would not be possible to come into those courts as a neophyte who knows little or nothing about their practice, procedure or case law. This is very important.
Senator Norris, in making a different point, laid the ground for the point that I make now. He said that a professor of law teaches law students, ergo, he should be able to do what they do. I did not study law in university but I did study King's Inns subjects in UCD which was then possible. For my arts degree in UCD, I took economics, politics, Roman law and jurisprudence. I did so as the alternative was statistics, and my mind would go blank at the sight of a square root sign. I was never happy at the sight of square root signs, cubes, sigmas and all the rest that one had to master to become proficient in the science of statistics. I, therefore, decided to take the other option, which was what remained of legal and political science that later became group 9A in the arts faculty. I was lectured in Roman law and jurisprudence, happily by the late John Maurice Kelly, who was a wonderful lecturer. At the time, another person lectured in Roman law. As Senator Norris noted, someone might teach Roman law and qualify for appointment. It does not follow that teaching Roman law as a historical subject would be an eligibility criterion for being a member of the High Court or Supreme Court.
I understand that the Minister cannot be prescriptive and say that someone must lecture in the basic core subjects, but the mere fact that someone happens to be a professor or a lecturer in a law faculty, or a commerce faculty – in UCD this became the School of Business but I do not know its name now – and lecture in some aspect of law in a university does not mean that a person is likely to be a good candidate for a promotion to the Judiciary, and currently, the JAAB cannot recommend this, for the reasons outlined in section 8 of the 2002 Act.
This brings me to what Senator Bacik said about in-house lawyers. There are many in-house lawyers, in semi-State bodies and the like, for whom I have the greatest of time, who almost act as attorneys general for the semi-State bodies. I can see it of those people. However, I can imagine the case where someone is described as an in-house lawyer who might be a lawyer to a large supermarket chain. In the case of those types of people, one must ask oneself whether a person employed in private enterprise and having no day-to-day involvement in the practice of law in the courts sense, qualifies to be a judge in the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.
I am deeply worried about the Minister repealing the 1996 Act, insofar as it relates to the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, and the amendments made to it in 2002 which said that one could be an in-house barrister or solicitor but must demonstrate practical experience of the superior courts before being appointed to them. That will be swept away. The requirement for practical experience will be got rid of. That is why the requirement that one has practised as a barrister or solicitor before becoming a legal academic or in conjunction with being a legal academic is important. That used to often be the case, although Senator Bacik may correct me as to whether it is as fashionable now to do a bit of both; I know that some of our most eminent judges practised and lectured at the same time.
Comment on this
Senator Bacik herself is an example of that. I have no problem with that. I think that is great. I am quite happy with the idea that if somebody had practised for six years as a solicitor and then sought a post at Trinity College, that after accumulating the relevant years of experience as a legal academic there, that person would be eligible for appointment to the Judiciary. I have a problem with us sweeping away, as one of the criteria for recommendation to the Government, the requirement which now exists and has existed since 2002 that a person should have practical experience of the operation of the courts. In other words, somebody who has literally never seen the inside of a court could be eligible to be made a judge. That is a bad idea.
Comment on this
They may have a bit more common sense than most judges.
Comment on this
Senator Lawlor always comes in-----
Comment on this
-----with these little mots justes. I do not know what point he is making. Our Judiciary is excellent. It is not the case that somebody who has just seen the inside of a court is as good as a candidate from the Judiciary.
Comment on this
Service on a jury does not make one an eligible full-time judge.
Comment on this
They decide whether a person is guilty or innocent.
Comment on this
The Senator is addressing issues to the Minister and maybe the Minister is better qualified to respond rather than delaying proceedings with unnecessary cross-fire.
Comment on this
If Senator Lawlor puts his name down to speak, I will let him in. I have no problem with that but I do not want interruption of the person in possession.
Comment on this
I ask the Minister to indicate why the amendments made in the Act of 2002 to the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board provisions in the 1995 Act are to be done away with and the requirement for appropriate experience of the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court and the High Court to now be dispensed with as a criterion for eligibility. Why would we do that at this stage, with this having been part of our law for 16 years? This anticipates our amendment to section 35. Listening to the discussion here about legal academics and such, it is slightly worrying that insufficient emphasis has been put on the fact that one should know what one is doing, how courts function and that one should understand what makes a good judge and a bad judge. One of the best ways is to watch judges in practice. It is very hard for somebody who has never seen a judge adjudicate in any case to have a clear understanding of what makes a good judge or a bad judge. That applies to the lay majority aspect of the Bill.
Senator Bacik has a number of amendments. She is keeping her powder dry with them, which is an option she has and so be it. I am not satisfied that the Bill in its present form is sensible. I do not believe that two years of experience in the District Court should render one eligible to go to the High Court. It is not a good idea.
Comment on this
I attract Senator McDowell's attention to section 35(3) which seems to me to meet most of the grievances he has put forward relating to the change from the 1996 Act and the 2002 Act to the current Bill. The Senator will be aware, with the quotation from the Courts and Court Officers Act 2002, that the text has been evolving to cater for the fact that solicitors bring a different type or range of experience to the courts. I remind the Senator of the 1999 working group on qualifications which made specific reference to appropriate knowledge and experience. That, in many respects, forms the change of wording. In section 35(3), with regard to the appointment for office in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court, it is clear that the commission will be unable to recommend a name of a person unless, in the opinion of that commission, the person has appropriate knowledge of the practice and procedure, which is the point that Senator McDowell has made, with appropriate knowledge of the decisions and knowledge and experience of the practice and procedure of the court, whether the Court of Appeal, the High Court or the Supreme Court. I feel that meets the point, albeit in a different text. Nevertheless, it adequately covers the point that Senator McDowell has made.
I agree with Senator Bacik that the widening of eligibility for appointments should not be cumbersome. It is a point that I referred to in a reply earlier. It is something that I can work on and I can usefully draw from the points that Senator Bacik made. Lest my silence be misinterpreted, I agree fully with Senator Clifford-Lee on the points she makes regarding the importance of the District Court.
I am pleased that Senator McDowell added considerably to the points he made earlier in respect of that cohort. I regret what Senator Norris has said and I certainly do not agree with the point he raised.
If I did not make it clear early on to Senator Bacik, I want to acknowledge the importance of her point, which I believe is most correct, on the section 2 definition of "practising barrister" in the 2015 Act. That, of course, is detached from the Courts Acts insofar as the matter of eligibility is concerned. The point she makes regarding the in-house lawyer is reasonable and is one I will be happy to look at in the context of the earlier debate.
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 73:
In page 23, lines 32 and 33, to delete "Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Circuit Court, or the District Court" and substitute "Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court".
Comment on this
I move amendment No. 74:
In page 23, to delete line 37, and in page 24, to delete lines 1 to 11 and substitute the following:
“(3) Subsection (1) shall only apply to a legal academic who has qualified as a barrister or solicitor and subsequent subsections of this section, in so far as they relate to a person who is referred to in them as a ‘head of a faculty’ or ‘head of another faculty’, shall not be construed as enabling such a person to be the subject of such an appointment unless the person has qualified as a barrister or solicitor.”.
Comment on this
Amendment put
Do you agree with this result?
I move amendment No. 76:
In page 24, to delete lines 15 to 17 and substitute the following:
“(a) teaches one or more subjects in the field of law, and
(b) carries out research, or supervises the carrying out of post-graduate research, in one or more such subjects,”.
Comment on this
I want to talk about leave to withdraw. I would say to Senator Bacik that I know why she is withdrawing amendment No. 76 at this stage but-----
Comment on this
Can the Senator speak to a withdrawn amendment?
Comment on this
I know why she is proposing to do it-----
Comment on this
He cannot speak to an amendment that is withdrawn.
Comment on this
I can speak on the question of whether she should be given leave to withdraw it, which is what I am doing now.
Comment on this
When the Chair asked that, he did not look in my direction. In any event, the point I am making is that this is an important amendment. Even though, in one respect it is only the word "and" or "or", it has significance. In a second respect, the postgraduate research is also an important issue. Everybody carries out non-postgraduate research. As Senator Norris said, this idea that-----
Comment on this
I am most reluctant to intervene and run the risk of incurring the wrath of the Seanad-----
Comment on this
I am going to speak. The Senator should resume his seat. I want order. This is Senator Bacik's amendment. It has been discussed. It is her right to have it withdrawn and she indicated that is what she wanted to do. I understood that was agreed and I am reluctant to proceed along these lines, with respect, because it is her amendment and her entitlement, and she withdrew it.
Comment on this
Under what circumstances would leave be refused to withdraw an amendment?
Comment on this
I am asking the Chair a question.
Comment on this
We withdrew it on the basis that the Minister and I had an exchange on it and I am grateful to the Minister for indicating a willingness to consider the issue and an inclination to accept at least the spirit of it. I just want to check the wording of it. I fully intend resubmitting a similar amendment on Report Stage. I said all this earlier.
Comment on this
I need the agreement of the House for an amendment to be withdrawn and I understood I had it.
Comment on this
Under what circumstances would that agreement not be forthcoming?
Comment on this
I think it is a legitimate question.
Comment on this
The Minister should be aware that somebody cannot just put an amendment down and withdraw it and have the House assume that it is about to decide something of importance and then say it is not deciding it because I am withdrawing it. Once an amendment is tabled it cannot just be withdrawn unilaterally. The Member has to get the agreement of the House.